What constitutes practice of law?

Case #1
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113; 201 SCRA 210; 3 September 1991

Doctrine: Experiences as Lawyer-economist, a Lawyer-manager, a Lawyer-entrepreneur of

industry, a Lawyer-legislator was deemed practice of law. The practice of law is any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. It is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

FACT:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the said nomination.
Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the Constitutional qualification requirement.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:

(1)There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

(2)The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the
bar, worked in his father’s law office. After then, he worked as operations officer in the World
Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with
the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently rendered services to various
companies either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUE:
Whether Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.

RULING:
YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-

entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Practice Under Detention

Case #2
PEOPLE v. MACEDA
G.R. No. 89591-96; 24 January 2004

Doctrine:All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

FACTS:
This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of its
August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason
was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s
order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be
held as detention prisoner in said residence. It was however found that the order was not strictly
complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went
about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Javellana, a convict, is allowed to practice law.

HELD:
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him.
By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold
and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the
regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the
personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is
not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial court’s order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to
roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not
only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private
respondent would appear in court to defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

He was ordered to be detained in Provincial Jail of Antique.

Private Practice of Law

Case #3
OCA vs Atty. Ladaga
AM No. P99-1287; 26 January 2001

Doctrine: The "private practice" of the law profession that is prohibited by law does not pertain to
an isolated court appearance. It contemplates succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. In this case, the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin does not constitute the "private practice"
of the law profession contemplated by law.

FACTS:
Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal
case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as required by
the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing
law without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified
his appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he was on an
approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel. Moreover, the presiding
judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his appearances as such counsel.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice
of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of
law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD:
No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be customarily or habitually
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. It does not
pertain to isolated court appearances as in this case.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva, the meaning of the term "private practice" is explained:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."

Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as
required by law, respondent was reprimanded.

Admission to Bar

Case #4
In Re: Almacen
G.R. Nos. L-27654; February 18, 1970

Doctrine: It merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges and that these criticisms are subject to a condition – bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety.

FACTS:
Atty. Almacen, Legal Counsel of the Defendant in a legal Case entitled Antonio H. Calero, Vs.
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, filed a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," in protest
against what he asserted as "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." In the said case, Atty. Almacen filed an appeal at the Court of Appeals (CA) after the
lower court rendered judgment against his client. The CA denied repeatedly Atty. Almacen’s
motions and dismissed the case. He later filed a Petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court (SC)
which refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. His further appeals
for reconsideration were also denied. At this, Atty. Almacen got disappointed and filed the
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," (with reservation that at any time in the future
and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession). He also caused the publication in the Manila Times an article
assailing the SC as “composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.”

Through the Petition and the publication, Atty. Almacen expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will
become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself
of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions”.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.
HELD:
Atty. Almacen deserves to be disciplined. As such, the court suspended him.

“A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through
constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. “

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
“professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of
law until further orders.

Case #5
In Re: Lanuevo
A.C. No. 1162; August 29, 1975

Doctrine: Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He only act as a
sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual
members of the committee, on the other.

FACTS:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released this year and that there are grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects that underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to release of
results.

The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954, Ramon Galang,
underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted
having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that
the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing.

The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in
the 1971 bar examinations. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five
examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant,
stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in
his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the
1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5
subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
ISSUES:
Whether Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang”s exam
notebooks.

HELD:
Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-
examine the grades of Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the Court. All
respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the
notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that
they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any.

The records clearly that indeed the examiners made the re-evaluation in good faith and without
any consideration whatsoever. But the favorable re-evaluations made by the examiners were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent
Lanuevo.

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the
Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority
from the Court. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after
their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the
appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot
presume to know better than the examiner.

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration. There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after
the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

Initial Requirements for Admission to Bar

CASE #6
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION
TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR OF VICENTE CHING
Bar Matter No. 914; October 1, 1999

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint
Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs
to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.

Apparently, Chingʼs father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents
were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose
one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.

Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese
and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998
or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has
not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the
construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyerʼs oath.

HELD:
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age
of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the
period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it canʼt be extended any
further). Chingʼs special circumstances canʼt be considered. It is not enough that he considered
all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this
country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnʼt give any explanation why he
belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess itʼs simply because he never thought heʼs
Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is
to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Chingʼs unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.

The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

Philippine Shari’a Bar

CASE #7
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF
BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING
IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

FACTS:
Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.

ISSUES:
Whether or not he can use the appellation “Atty.”

RULING:
His use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of
the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine
Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in
Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of
a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that: persons who pass
the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it
seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot
and academic.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known
to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.

Penalty: the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court.

Who may be called “Attorney”?

CASE NO. 8
SOPHIA ALAWI V. ASHARY M. ALAUYA
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P; February 24, 1997

Doctrine: The title Attorney is reserved only to those who had been admitted to the BAR and
successful passed the examinations thereof. It cannot be used by those who only took and
passed the Shari’a Bar.

FACTS:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing
unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter
Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio.
Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.
Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a
local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title
of an attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

HELD:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed the bar
examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing.

Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only
practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law does
not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.

CASE #9
IN RE: GALANG
66 SCRA 245; A.M. No. 1164; August 29, 1975

Doctrine: That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of
the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as ground for revocation of his
license to practice law, is well settled.

FACTS:
An investigation conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang, was charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same university. Confronted
with this information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. It must also be noted that
immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Lanuevo gained
possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared
in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo”s statement of assets and liabilities were
not taken up during the investigation but were examined as parts of the records of the court.

ISSUES:
Whether Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his pending
case

HELD:
Yes. Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his
oath. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of
his license to practice law is well-settled. Furthermore, respondent’s persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of
the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and
his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor.
He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

CASE #10
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA
403 SCRA 342; B. M. No. 1036; June 10, 2003

Doctrine: It is upon signing the roll of Attorneys that one becomes a full-fledged lawyer, prior to
which one has no authority to practice law.

FACTS:
The respondent Edwin Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Exams. A day before
the mass oath taking, the complainant Donna Aguirre filed against him a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar, charging him with unauthorized practice of the law, grave misconduct,
violation of the law, and grave misrepresentation. Because of these, Rana was disallowed from
signing his name in the Roll of Attorneys until the said charges are resolved.

These charges stemmed from the fact that during the mayoralty elections in May 2001, Rana,
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for candidates before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate. Further, he even signed pleadings as “counsel for George
Bunan”, “Undersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan”,
and even entered his “appearance as counsel for mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao”. All
these were executed prior to his taking the lawyer”s oath. In denial of the charges, he claims to
have assisted the candidates not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He also claims
that the charges against him were only brought as political vendetta by the daughter of the losing
mayoralty candidate.

ISSUE:
Whether Rana was guilty of unauthorized practice of the law.

HELD:
YES. The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation. The OBC found that Rana did in fact appear as counsel for Bunan in the
mayoralty elections even before he took the lawyer”s oath on May 22, 2001, thus recommending
that he be denied admission to the Philippine Bar. The SC agreed with the findings and
conclusions of the OBC and denied him admission to the Bar. The Court ruled that although he
passed the examinations and took the oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that makes
one a full-fledged lawyer. Prior to this, he had no authority to practice the law.
 May a Non-Lawyer appear in court and administrative tribunals?

CASE #11
FIVE J TAXI vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 111474; August 22, 1994

Held: Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter. Granted that they acted as
legal representatives, they are still not entitled to receive professional fees. The statutory rule that
an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation or
remuneration for the services they have rendered presupposes the existence of an attorney-client
relationship. Such a relationship cannot, however, exist when the client’s representative is a non-
lawyer.

May a party represent himself?

CASE #12
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. SANTOCILDES, JR.
G.R. 109149; December 21, 1999

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine years old. The court
rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However, during the proceeding,
accused-appellant was not represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a Notice of
Appeal and praying that the judgment against him be set aside on the ground that he was denied
of his right to be represented by a counsel which results to the denial of due process. The Office
of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during the
trial was not a member of the Bar, he was afforded due process since he was given opportunity to
be heard and records reveal that said person handled the case in a professional and skillful
manner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine Bar may represent an accused in a
criminal proceeding.

HELD:
NO. The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly. Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside, and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Even the most intelligent or educated man may be convicted without a counsel, not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. A
person has the right to due process, he must be heard before being condemned - a part of
person's basic rights.
 Limitation on appearance of non-lawyers before the courts

CASE #13
PAFLU vs. BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY
G.R. No. L-23959; November 29, 1971

FACTS:
Petitioners PAFLU, Enrique Entila, and Victorino Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72-
ULP-Iloilo in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The complainants were represented by
Cipriano Cid and Associates thru Atty. Anastacio Pacis and later, Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the complainants; a portion of that order
granted respondent Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney’s fees for professional service. Thus, a
petition was filed seeking review of the order made by the CIR in the said case.

ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?

RULING:
No. Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court imports the existence of attorney-client relationship as a
condition for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such relationship cannot exist unless the
representative is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-
client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees

Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party litigants should be entrusted only
to those possessing tested qualifications for the protection of the courts, clients and the public.
The permission of a non-lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself entitle the
representation to compensation. For Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 24.
Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services…" imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees.
Order under review is set aside.

Public Officials and the Practice of Law

CASE #14
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 151809-12; April 12, 2005

The “matter” contemplated are those that are adverse-interest conflicts (substantial relatedness
and adversity between the government matter and the new client’s matter in interest) and
congruent-interest representation conflicts. “Intervention” should be significant and substantial
which can or have affected the interest of others

FACTS:
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on,
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank,
'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

HELD:
No, it does not apply. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved
in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation
and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI. The Court should resolved his act as
then Solicitor General,of advising on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Public officials restricted from engaging in the Practice of Law

CASE #15
CATU V. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738; February 19, 2008

Doctrine: Public confidence in the law may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the Bar.

FACTS:
Rellosa was an attorney and originally stood as punong baranggay between petitioner and
another party during conciliation proceedings for a dispute over the possession of a unit in a
building in Malate, Manila. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner initiated an
ejectment proceeding against the adverse party.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for respondent party. This prompted Catu to
file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.032 and RA
67133. The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1 month.

ISSUE:
Whether Rellosa violated his oath as a lawyer by appearing as counsel for private defendants in
the ejectment proceedings.

HELD:
YES. As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71604, which actually allows him
to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil
Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head
who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do.

Under RA 7160, members of the sangguniang pambarangay are not covered by the express
prohibition against the practice of profession, unlike mayors, vice-mayors and governors.
Respondent as punong baranggay was not prohibited from practicing law as his profession,
however, by appearing as counsel for the private defendants, he violated Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules which provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
professionor be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the
board of directors.

Respondent should have asked for permission first from the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government before appearing for private defendants” cause at court.

Importance of Lawyer’s Oath

CASE #16
FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
A.C. No. 5365; April 27, 2005

Doctrine: By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes the guardian of truth and the rule of law
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Good moral
character includes, at least, common honesty. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not
merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw.

FACTS:
Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Office,
Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier and Lourdes a mail sorter. Through respondent,
Lourdes renewed her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000.
As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five PNB blank checks which
served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the
future. Thereafter, Lourdes paid respondent the amount corresponding to the loan plus
surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt.

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up the blank checks entrusted to
him by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and deposited the
same checks which were dishonored upon presentment because the account is already closed.
Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants for estafa and for violation of B.P. 22.
Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral
character. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed
by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for
truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader.”

By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. His propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of
one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law
effective immediately.

CASE #17
RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE OF ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCENA
A.C. No. 2841; July 3, 2002

FACTS:
Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late Ogan, his residuary estate was divided
among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as
executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her
lawyer. The settlement of the estate have been pending for thirteen (13) years when it was
transferred under the sala of Judge Ruiz who found out that the principal cause of delay wasthe
failure of Atty. Occeña to obey lawful court orders such as the submission of the latest inventory
of all securities of the estate, take possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements
belonging to the estate and as well as its inventory, and by willfully prolonging the litigation
through his various maneuvers, such as instituting actions for Atty. Occeña’s claim for attorney’s
fee and filing other cases before the court thus prolonging the settlement of the case.

ISSUE:
Did Occeña’s acts constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer?

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Occeña’s acts of disobeying lawful court orders and willfully prolonging the litigation
through his maneuvers constitute a gross violation of his lawyer’s oath that he will not willingly
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit or delay no man for money of malice.
 CASE #18
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH
B.M. No. 712; March 19, 1997

Doctrine: The lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone concerned.

FACTS:
Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993 but the Court deferred his oath-taking due to
his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. The criminal case which
resulted in petitioner”s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation
rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and 7 other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. Later, the 8 accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Petitioner filed before
this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer”s oath based on the order of his discharge
from probation. The Court noted however, that his probationary status was only for the length of
10 months.

ISSUE:
Whether Argosino may be allowed to take the lawyer”s oath.

RULING:
YES. The Court issued a resolution requiring Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. Petitioner submitted no less than 15 certifications/letters
executed by among others 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter”s family and the 8
accused in the criminal case.

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer”s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. They are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

CASE #19
EMILIO GRANDE VS. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA
A.C. No. 4838; July 29, 2003

Doctrine: A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such
conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's
professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.

FACTS:
Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath
relative to the criminal case for estafa, which he filed against the latter's client. According to the
complainant he withdrew his complaint against the respondent's client in exchange for
respondent's personal check which he later found to have been drawn on a closed account.
Complainant claimed that he refused to accept the said check as settlement of the civil liability of
respondent's client, but the respondent assured him that the check will have sufficient funds when
presented for payment. He alleged that the respondent ignored his repeated demands for
payment. When directed to comment on the administrative complaint against her, the respondent
refused to receive the notices served on her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath.

RULING:
The SC found the respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath for which she was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. According
to the Court, the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted
to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath for which she should be accordingly penalized.
Such an act constitutes gross misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a
debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the
bar, for a lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach
and above suspicion. Moreover, respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders
directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct, which merits
no compassion. The SC cannot tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of
an honorable profession.

CANON 1 - Gross Immorality

CASE #21
COBB-PEREZ V. JUDGE LANTIN
G.R. No. L-22320; 24 SCRA 291
July 29, 1968

Doctrine: A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

FACTS:
The court ordered an execution sale of the properties in question of Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez
and her spouse. They and their counsel assailed the execution in a piecemeal fashion unduly
delaying the projected execution sale many times. The court assessed treble costs against the
petitioners to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for
the petitioners, seek reconsideration of the decision contending that if there was delay it was
because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas used tactics to delay the execution of the
judgment.

HELD/ RATIO:
YES. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. When he finds his client’s cause to be defenseless, then it is
his duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. In the case at hand, despite their knowledge that their prayer would only be denied,
counsel for petitioners still pursue their claim before the court who has no jurisdiction over the
case; a clear tactic to unduly delay the execution of judgment.

CASE #22
OBUSAN vs. OBUSAN JR.
A.C. No. 1392; 128 SCRA 485; April 2, 1984

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman.)

FACTS:
Respondent Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, and became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo presented to be a widow, in which
they had a child named John. Later, it was known Natividad’s marriage was still subsisting.

Four days after the birth of John, Generoso married Preciosa (petitioner) and lived for more than
a year. Respondent took a vacation in Camarines Norte but he has never returned. Preciosa
looked for him and discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in Quezon
City.The housemaid, neighbors and several other persons known to Natividad and Obusan
testified and confirmed their relationship.

He answered that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa and
he only goes to Quezon City to provide financial support to Jun-Jun. He also denied the
testimonies of the maid, the plumber and several other persons and contended that he does not
live together with Natividad. He also contended that he only left the conjugal home for he cannot
contain the nagging of his wife and her interference with his professional obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Obusan should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.

RULING:
Yes. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community"

Thus, lawyer shall be disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child.
 CASE #23
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO
A.C. No. 389; February 28, 1967

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Lawyer who had a carnal knowledge on a promise of marriage
which he did not fulfill.)

FACTS:
Complainant Flora Quingwa filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint charging
respondent Atty. Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct.
Complainant and respondent were engaged to be married. One time, the respondent invited the
complainant to watch a movie, but later they went to a hotel (Silver Moon) to perform the sexual
act with a promise and assurance of marriage. After their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958
and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent
to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply. On February 20, 1959,
complainant gave birth to a child (Armando Puno Jr).

Respondents defense: that yes they were sweethearts but ended their relationship on 1955; that
he left for Zamboanga City on July 1958 to practice law.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is guilty of gross immorality, a case for disbarment.

HELD:
YES. Respondent’s name was ordered to be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest degree of
morality and integrity. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

A “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). Complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent
insisted, telling her: ‘anyway I have promised to marry you’. Complainant submitted to
respondent’s plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent’s promise of marriage and not
because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.

January 31, 1972: Reinstated as a member of the Bar with the following conditions: a) formally
acknowledge his child; b) provide minimum amount of P125.00 per month for the support of said
child.

CASE #24
JOSEFINA MORTEL vs. ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS
G. R. No. L-9152; A.M. No. 145;
December 28, 1956
Doctrine: Lawyer may be disbarred even if transgression is not one enumerated by law. Any
misconduct on the part of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity which shows him to be
wanting in moral character may justify his suspension or removal from office even though the law
does not specify the act as a ground for disciplinary action.

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Lawyer arranging the marriage of his son to a woman with whom
he had illicit relations. After the marriage he continued his adulterous relations with her)

FACTS:
In 1952, Atty. Anacleto Aspiras introduced himself as a single man to Mortel. The latter believed it
and he let Anacleto court her. Anacleto, with flowery words, promised to marry Mortel. With this
promise, Mortel agreed to have carnal knowledge with him. Later, Anacleto persuaded Mortel to
go to Manila so that they could marry there. Mortel complied. However, Anacleto did not secure
the marriage license with Mortel, instead he let Cesar Aspiras, whom he introduced to Mortel as
his nephew, secure it with Mortel. Further, in the marriage ceremony, Anacleto made Mortel
believe that Cesar will be his proxy in the wedding. So it happened that Mortel married Cesar –
who turned out to be Anacleto’s son, worse, Cesar was a minor. Worst still, after Cesar’s and
Mortel’s marriage, Anacleto continued to cohabit and have carnal knowledge with Mortel until the
latter got pregnant, and until the latter found out that Anacleto is married and he has a son,
Cesar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Anacleto should be disbarred.

HELD:
Yes. Though it may be said that Anacleto’s moral transgression did not amount to crime nor is it
one of those enumerated by statute still his moral delinquency as proved by the facts as
aggravated by his mockery of marriage which is an inviolable social institution and his corruption
of his minor son to marry Mortel just so he could redeem his promise of marriage to Mortel – all
these concur to Anacleto being unfit to continue being a member of the legal profession. The
Supreme Court ordered his disbarment.

It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault — in pari delicto, because
this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of unworthy members,
to protect the public and courts.

CASE #25
Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349; July 3, 1992

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Bigamy perpetrated by a Lawyer by inveigling a woman into

believing that they have been married civilly to satisfy his carnal desires.)

FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, respondent, Jordan Terre, was charged with “gross immoral conduct” for
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman while his marriage with
complainant, Dorothy Terre, remained subsisting.

Complainant alleged that while she was married to Merlito A. Bercenilla, Jordan deceived her to
marrying him by explaining to her that her marriage with Bercenilla was void ab initio since she
and her husband, Bercenilla, were first cousins. She then agreed to marry him. Complainant
through their marriage supported respondent during his study in law school. However, respondent
suddenly disappeared abandoning complainant penniless and without means to pay for the
medical and hospitals bills when she gave birth to their child Jason Terre. Later, she found out
that respondent married Vilma Malicdem, hence, he filed three cases against respondent: case
for abandonment of minor; case for bigamy; and an administrative case.

Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court’s Resolutions and
of the complaint by moving from one place to another, hence, on April 24, 1985, the court
resolved to suspend him from the practice of law. Respondent then finally filed an Answer with a
Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order on September 28, 1985. He contends that he
contracted marriage with Dorothy Terre upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to Bercenilla; that when he confronted Dorothy
about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had
private meetings with Bercenilla; that Jason Terre was the son of Bercenilla; and that believing in
good faith that his marriage to Dorothy was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with
Helina Malicdem.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent constituted grossly immoral conduct that would constitute disbarment.

HELD:
Yes. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that his defense that
he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and
void and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary was a spurious defense.
Such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

The moral character of respondent was deeply flawed. He convinced complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through
law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent’s
parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without wherewithal for delivering
his own child safely in the hospital. As held in Pomperada v. Jochico and Bolivar v. Simbol, said
acts of respondent constituted “grossly immoral conduct” under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent.

Wherefore, it was resolved to disbar respondent Jordan Terre and to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.

CASE #26
DELOS REYES vs. AZNAR
Adm. Case No. 1334; November 28, 1989

Doctrines: It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this
Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar.

(Instance of Gross Immorality: A Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the
College of Medicine and asked a lady student to go with him in manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under threat that if she refused, she would flunk in all her subjects.)
FACTS:
Atty. Aznar was the Chairman of the College of Medicine of Southwestern University in Cebu
while Delos Reyes was a second year medical student. When she failed her pathology subject,
she went to Atty. Aznar who assured her that she would not fail. The Solicitor-General found out
that Aznar told Delos Reyes to go with him to Manila so that she wouldn”t fail. From 12-14
February 1973, they stayed at the Ambassador Hotel where Aznar repeatedly had sex with Delos
Reyes. The latter said she consented because she was willing to forego her personal dignity in
order to pass, and that she feared that Aznar would push through with his threats to fail her if she
didn’t go with him. A few months after, Delos Reyes got pregnant and Aznar allegedly forced her
to abort it by making her go to a doctor and sedating her. When she woke up, the abortion had
already allegedly been done. Delos Reyes then filed a complaint for disbarment due to gross
immorality.

Delos Reyes presented detailed evidence while Aznar only presented two witnesses who said
that Aznar only went to Manila on December 1972 and that he stayed with them and with his
family. Aznar himself never appeared during the hearing to refute Delos Reyes’s allegations. He
merely said that the complaint was out of vengeance because he recommended that Delos
Reyes be not admitted for enrollment because she failed most of her subjects, that he never had
any carnal knowledge of her, and that she was a woman of loose morals.

While the Sol-Gen found the abortion allegations uncorroborated, it found that there was sufficient
evidence against Aznar’s gross immoral conduct. The Sol-Gen recommended that Aznar be
suspended from the practice of law for three years since what happened was partially Delos
Reyes”s fault because she willingly went with Aznar even if she knew that he was married and
had a family. Aznar, on the other hand, petitions that the Court declare that he already served the
three-year suspension because more than 10 years has lapsed before the case was filed.

ISSUES:
Whether Aznar should be disbarred

HELD/RATIO:
YES, the Court didn’t agree with the Sol-Gen that Aznar should only be suspended. First, he
wasn’t actively practicing as a lawyer so to merely suspend him would serve no redeeming
purpose. Second, he failed to adduce any evidence on his behalf to engender any doubt as to
Delos Reyes’s allegations. He only presented two self-serving witnesses, and did not even speak
up to present evidence that would contradict Delos Reyes”s material points. His mere silence is
not enough. When a lawyer”s integrity is challenged by evidence, it”s not enough that he denies
the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence, and show proof
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which is expected of him at all
times.
Since he did not make a reasonable effort to help himself, he cannot expect the Court to give him
the same full and wide consideration to those who do. Third, the Court reasons that it was highly
immoral of Aznar to have taken advantage of his position in order to have carnal knowledge of
Delos Reyes, more so because he is a family man.

CASE #27
ROYONG vs. OBLENA
A.C. No. 376; 7 SCRA 859; April 30, 1963

Doctrine: The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non- professional activities. The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be
broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer by seducing a woman who is
the niece of a married woman with whom the Lawyer had adulterous relations)

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and
bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out
that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be
consensual sex.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit
the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made
another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application
for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with
Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong.
Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the
permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD/RATIO:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character
is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify
that as ground for disbarment.

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in
this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the
Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to
show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the
time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the
fact that
people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of
good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he
is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
 CASE #28
LAGUITAN vs. TINIO
A.M. No. 3049; December 4, 1989

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Concubinage coupled with failure to support illegitimate children.

HELD:
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but
not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him
but also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a
course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for
the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar,  Concubinage imports
moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

CASE #29
SALVACION CORDOVA vs. ATTY. LAURENCE CORDOVA
179 SCRA 680; November 29, 1989

(Instance of Gross Immorality: Maintaining adulterous relationship with a married woman.)

Doctrine: An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon
admission to membership in the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

FACTS:
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two children,
left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and Cordova
had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently, Cordova still
continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman and
worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the child away from Salvacion.

In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually, multiple
hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989,
Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she
and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her evidence
ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded. (Moral Delinquency)

HELD:
No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been morally
reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a person can be
admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On
the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage” such was the case in the case at bar.

CASE #30
PRISCILLA Z. ORBE vs. ATTY. HENRY ADAZA
A.C. No. 5252; May 20, 2004

FACTS:
Atty. Henry Adaza seeked a loan to Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe. Adaza issued two (2) bank checks
which tuned out that one of the check has insufficient funds, while the other one is a stale check.

Several demand letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainant’s
lawyer, but these letters also failed to elicit any response. A criminal complaint for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued by the court, but respondent
somehow succeeded in evading apprehension. One time, respondent went to the house of
complainant and promised to pay the checks within a months’ time. Complainant agreed to have
the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but, again, respondent failed to make good his
promise.

In a cross-examination, the complainant appeared for but Atty. Adaza did not appear despite due
notice. Respondent again failed to appear on the date set to give him another opportunity to rebut
the evidence of complainant.

ISSUE:
Can a member of the bar be removed for evading payment of debt

RULING:
Yes. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any
deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office. The word "conduct" used in the rules is not limited to
conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer's professional duties but it
also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his professional duties, that would
show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not
limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law, in serious doubt. Atty.Adaza's issuance of worthless checks and
his contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation for nearly eight years is appalling and
hardly deserves compassion from the Court.

CASE #31
MECARAL vs. VELASQUEZ
A.C. No. 8392; June 29, 2010

FACTS:
Complainant was hired as a secretary by the atty. Velasquez who later became his common-law
wife. Mecaral was later brought to Upper San Agustin in Caibiran,Biliran where he left her with a
religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines. Later, Mecaral returned
home and upon knowing,Velasquez brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction,
his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. Her mother, Delia Mecaral,having
received information that she was weak,pale and walking barefoot along the i the mountainous
area of Caibiran caused the rescue operation of Mecaral. Thus, Mecaral filed a disbarment
complaint against respondent and charged the latter with bigamy for contracting a second
marriage to Leny H.Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first
wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct

HELD:
Investigating Commissioner of the CBD found that [respondents] acts of converting his secretary
into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no
civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct which only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent
had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required bylaw for the conferment of such privilege. When a lawyers
moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction
of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of
Attorneys. Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before
the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him, suggesting that they are true. Despite his letter
dated March 28, 2008manifesting that he would come up with his defense in a verified
pleading,he never did

Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Distinction between Morality and Gross Immoral Conduct

CASE #32
LESLIE UI VS. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO
A.C. No. 3319; June 08, 2000

FACTS:
Complainant Leslie Ui found out that her husband was carrying an illicit relationship with the
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio whom he begot a daughter and they had been living together.
Complainant confronted the respondent but the latter said that everything was over between her
and Carlos Ui. However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
and the respondent continued and that respondent and her husband had a second child.
Complainant pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui. But to
no avail, the illicit relationship persisted.

A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant against Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Commission) on the
ground of immorality, particularly of carrying on an illicit relationship with he husband, Carlos Ui.

It is the respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui was not illicit because he
represented himself to the respondent as a bachelor and when he knew the civil status of Carlos
Ui, she cut off all her ties with him.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immorality for holding illicit relationship and whether
she is guilt of contempt of the Comission.
HELD:
No, her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what Atty. Iris believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of the community. Moreover for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be “grossly immoral”, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Atty. Iris’ act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos upon discovering his true civil status belies that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession.
Definition and Example of Moral Turpitude

CASE #33
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356
November 21, 1979

Doctrine: Moral turpitude implies something immoral regardless of the fact that it is punishable
by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.
The doing of the act itself, and not the its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

FACTS:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the
dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City
Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant
amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior
officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the City Judges. It was also found that the responded was previously
convicted of libel which he denied in his sworn affidavit.

ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service.

HELD:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.

Libel does not automatically justify disciplinary action or removal of a public officer. However, the
fact of conviction of libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote to the City
Judges which contains defamatory and uncalled for language, shows his propensity to speak ill or
malign people.

The respondent’s act of interfering in the case pending before the city court, evidenced by his
handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending a City Court of Quezon
City, presided by the complainant Judge, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence
in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. This alone warrants severe disciplinary
measures.

Rule on Advertisement of Lawyers

 CASE #34
ULEP vs LEGAL CLINIC
223 SCRA 398, June 17, 1993

Doctrines: A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession.

FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret
marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free
books on Guam Divorce. Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent contends
that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUES:
Whether its activities can properly be the subject of advertisements

HELD:
NO, the advertisements are not allowed. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an
ordinary,simple professional card.

The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements
of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack. The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Hence, it should be enjoined.

CASE #35
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN vs. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
A.C. No. 5299; August 19, 2003

Doctrine: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining of a livelihood should be come second.

FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the
number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided
the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published.

An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but
argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition
against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the
prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:
Yes. The practice of law is not a business, it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service
and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary
interest.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as an “annulment of
marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. He in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession and must
not be misleading. The law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only
for that purpose. A lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine, etc., nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar.

CANON 5

CASE #36

JUAN DULALIA, JR. vs. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ

A.C. No. 6854 (formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380); April 27, 2007

Doctrine: The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast
with legal developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic
legal principles.

FACTS:
Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal Government to
build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released due to the opposition of Atty.
Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the
airspace of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.
Juan also claimed that Cruz’s illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to have had the
impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for while
Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a
qualification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:
Cruz’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as
he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines
together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as “ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.”
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes “conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.” Gross
immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.

The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon
5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

CANON 6 - Foremost duty of a Lawyer

CASE #37
VALENCIA vs. CABANTING
A.M. No. 1302; 1391; 1543; April 26, 1991

Doctrine: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, but not at the expense of
truth. The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end,
his client’s success is wholly subordinate.

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.
1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of
the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the
purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

"The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
(5) xxx this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession."

Held:
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended
to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the
sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute
malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p.78) and is a ground for suspension (Beltran
vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a
lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can
marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an
attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775). In
the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty.
Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.

The Court found respondent Atty. Cabanting guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents
and was suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Membership is Compulsory

CASE #38
GARCIA vs. DE VERA
[IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA,
ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP
GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS]
A.C. No. 6052; December 11, 2003

Doctrine: A lawyer does not automatically become a member of the IBP chapter where he
resides or works after becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar. He has the discretion to
choose the IBP Chapter he wants to join.

FACTS:
Petitioner lawyers Garcia et. al. filed a petition seeking the disqualification of respondent lawyer
De Vera from being elected IBP Governor of Eastern Mindanao. Petitioners contend that
Respondent’s transfer from IBP Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas, and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter
to Agusan Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule,
a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied
that there is no lawyer from the region qualified to serve the IBP. They also submitted that De
Vera also lacks the moral aptitude for the petition. According to them, respondent De Vera was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices
during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have
been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered
his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for
the positionof Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-
24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao
Region.

RULING:
Yes. De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region. Section 19
Article II of the IBP By-laws states that a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus, unless he
otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter. It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic
that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the
Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering
one’s preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same
time. The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. The only condition required under
the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In the case at bar,
respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August
2001. The Court noted that De Vera’s transfer was made effective sometime between August 1,
2001 and September 3, 2001 while the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers was held on
February 27, 2003. Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than three months
ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003. On the issue of morality as a ground of
disqualification, the court also ruled in favor of the respondent. As long as an aspiring member
meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic
qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a
member in good standing of the IBP; 2) he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of
the Chapter to which he belongs; (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional
governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle; and
(4) he is not in the government service.

Effect of Non-payment

CASE #39
IN RE: EDILLON
84 SCRA 554; A.C. No. 1928; August 03, 1978

Doctrine: Requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the
State over an important profession.
FACTS:
Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the
Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues" notwithstanding due notice pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of
the By-Laws of the IBP.

In his pleadings, conceded to the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, but questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and
the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the
Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required
membership fee in IBP.

HELD:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged
to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar xxx.

The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are,
to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which
they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such
compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important
profession.

CASE #40
SANTOS JR vs. LAMAS
A.C No. 4749; January 20, 2000

Doctrines: Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay his annual dues. Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of Rule 139-A, default in the payment of annual dues for 6 months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for 1 year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

Atty. Llamas, for a number of years, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data
in his pleadings. He only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3
years already. Atty. Llamas averred that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of law
and under R.A. 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and
included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues.

IBP passed a resolution finding him guilty and ordering his suspension for three months.

ISSUES:
Whether he is exempt from paying his dues.

HELD:
Yes. Llamas is guilty of misrepresentation in his pleadings and of failure to pay his IBP dues.
Llamas can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is “limited.” Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Moreover, the exemption invoked by Atty. Llamas does not include exemption from payment of
membership or association dues. The exemption granted by R.A. 7432 to senior citizens from
paying individual income tax does not exempt lawyers who are likewise senior citizens from
paying IBP dues and privilege tax.

CASE #41
IN RE: AREVALO JR.
(LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES)
B.M. No. 1370; May 9, 2005

FACTS:
Atty. Arevalo sought exemption from payment of IBP dues for the alleged unpaid accountability
for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service then migrated to, andworked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues
for that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one’s profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the
years when he was working in the USA.

IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on the actual
practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP, and one
of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of such dues has been
upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the Integrated Bar Program
and no one is exempted from paying the dues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination
and reinstatement later on of membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldn’t be
assessed.

Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBP’s policy of Non-Exemption in
payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive for one who has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. Also, it is a
deprivation of property right without due process.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was
inactive in the practice of law.
HELD/RATIO:
No. The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is

exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allow exemption from payment
of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have
been discontinued.

Instances of disrespectful language

CASE #42
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al.
31 SCRA 1; G.R. No. L-27072, January 09, 1970
[PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION &
DISMISSAL OF JUDGE EMILIO B. LEGASPI
A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC; July 10, 2003]

Doctrine: Lawyer’s language should be dignified. Unnecessary display of passion, provocative or

challenging gestures, shouting at the judges, witnesses or opposing Counsel, slapping, boxing or
challenging anyone in Court to fistfight or duel are not only contemptuous but also reprehensive
and extremely degrading to the legal profession.

(Instances of disrespectful language: Categorizes the SC decision as false, erroneous and illegal)

FACTS:
Counsel asked CJ Concepcion and J Castro to inhibit themselves from judging the case since the
brother of Castro was the VP of favored party and CJ’s son was the Secretary of the Board of
Investments. He even threatened that if he didn’t get a favorable decision, he’d bring the case to
the World Court and invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid to the
Philippines.

HELD:
“In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al., we held that the use of
language tending to degrade the administration of justice constitutes indirect contempt.”

The court held that a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice and he has
the duty to preserve faith in the courts. He has the sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.

A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his client from doing those things
which he himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to the conduct toward the court,
judicial officer, witness and suitor and if the client persists in such wrong doing, the lawyer should
terminate their relation.

CASE #43
ZALDIVAR vs GONZALES
G.R. Nos. 79690-707; February 01, 1989

(Instances of disrespectful language: Attributing to the SC acts of dismissing judges “without

rhyme and reason” and disbarring lawyers “without due process”)

FACTS:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal information against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one
on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court‟s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation that the
“rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, while it is difficult for
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;
that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask
him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that
the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice
in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.

There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as
the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.The Supreme Court
suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

CASE #44
JOSE M. CASTILLO vs ATTY. SABINO. PADILLA, JR.
A.C. No. 2339; February 24, 1984

(Instances of disrespectful language: Calling an adverse counsel as “bobo” or using the word “ay
que bobo” in reference to the manner of offering evidence.

Doctrine: Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the
latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited a lack of respect not only to a fellow
lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure
up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession.

FACTS:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo (Complainant) was the counsel for the defendants in a cause for forcible
entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan while Atty. Sabino Padilla Jr. (Respondent)
was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case, while complainant was formally offering
his evidence, he heard respondent say “bobo”. When complainant turned toward the respondent,
he saw the latter looking at him menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of
many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. In his defense, while
respondent admitted the utterance, he denied that it was directed at the complainant, claiming
that what he was “Ay, que bobo”, referring to “the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly
irrelevant and highly offensive matter into the record” while in the process of making an offer of
evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent may be held administratively liable for his utterance.

RULING:
Among the duties of an attorney are to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged. Whether the remark was directed at the complainant or his manner of offering
evidence, the remark “bobo” or “Ay, que bobo” was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had
no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the
court. In so doing, he exhibited a lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court.
By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession.

CANON 10

CASE #45

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO vs ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO

A.C. No. 5624; January 20, 2004

Doctrine: Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary
would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that
will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in
the defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.

FACTS:
Atty. Florido demanded that the custody of their children be surrendered to him by showing his
spouse Hueysuwan-Florido a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the CA which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. His spouse refused to surrender the
custody. Hence, Atty. Florido filed a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged CA’s resolution.
Hueysuwan obtained a certification from the CA stating that no such resolution had been issued.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt
to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

RULING:
Yes. Although he claimed that he acted in good faith, this is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious Resolution several times. Atty. Florido’s actions erode the public
perception of the legal profession. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted
by counsel. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in
the defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined.

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is
prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The SC held that he is presumed to have participated in the fabrication of the Resolution. Atty.
James Florido violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He was suspended for 2 years.

Fidelity to the cause of the client vs. Duty to administer justice

CASE #46

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA vs ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO

Adm. Case No. 3923; March 30, 1993

Doctrine: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.

FACTS:
Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and
Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25
years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to
vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for
another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco,
commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property
and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the
said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription
against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such
remedies as were authorized by law.

ISSUE/S:
Wether respondent violated the Lawyer‘s Oath to not delay any man for money or malice.

HELD/ RATIO:
YES. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this
fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that
was consistently denied, as he should have expected.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had
been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court
For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be
sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers
who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR
from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to
membership of the Philippine bar.

CASE #47
MALIGAYA vs DORONILLA
A.C. No. 6198; Sept. 15, 2006

Doctrine: There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the
court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.

FACTS:
Dr. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Air Force filed an action for damages against
several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as a counsel. During the hearing of the
case, Atty. Doronilla says that he and Dr. Maligaya had an agreement that if the opposing party
withdraws the case against him, Dr. Maligaya will also withdraw all the cases. However, Dr.
Maligaya swore that he never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronillo
admitted that there was, in fact, no such agreement. He pointed out that his main concern was to
settle the case amicably. Dr. Maligaya filed a case against Atty. Doronilla charging him of
unethical conduct for having uttered falsehood in court.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of canon 10 of the code
of professional responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Doronilla violated Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the CPR. The common caricature that
lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not
become a common reality.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court,” of which Canon 10
and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer’s duty to “never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”