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Balbaguio - Demurrer2

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Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


6th Judicial Region
Branch 66
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Crim. Case No. 2012-5570

-versus- For: Murder

REY BALBAGUIO,
Accused.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
The Accused REY BALBAGUIO, through the undersigned counsel, most respectfully
submits its Demurrer to Evidence and avers:

BASIS FOR THE DEMURRER


In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral certainty.
When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction.
Specifically, where the state's evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond
reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails
and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.1

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce evidence sufficient to prove beyond


reasonable doubt (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused.2 The charges against an accused must be dismissed if there is no
competent or sufficient evidence adduced that would sustain the charges against him, should the
same be raised in a demurrer to the evidence. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

“Sec. 23 After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.

x x x”

1
PP Vs. SERGIO BATO and ABRAHAM BATO, GR No. 113804, January 16, 1998
2
Gutib vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 365

1
It is well-settled rule that conviction for a criminal offense should be based on clear and
positive evidence and not on mere assumption.3 The burden lies upon the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather that upon the accused to prove that he is
in fact innocent.4 Failing in this, the presumption of innocence will prevail.5

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION

THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED


WAS NOT ESTABLISHED

In this case, there were three witnesses presented by the prosecution during the course of
the trial. The Municipal Health Officer was first presented to prove the fact of death. Then, the
Arresting Officer who went over to the crime scene after the incident. Finally, the wife of the
deceased, who only knew of the death of his husband after the fact, that is, when she went to the
hospital after being informed of the incident.

Looking carefully at their testimonies and the pieces of evidence presented, the identity
of the accused was not sufficiently established. First, the Municipal Health Officer testified only
to the fact of death but in no way does it show moral certainty that the death was caused by the
accused.

Then, there is the testimony of the Arresting Officer. He admitted in his testimony in
open court and in his affidavit that he was detailed to provide security to the Mayor’s Office of
the Municipality of Ajuy and away from the place where the incident happened. He merely
responded to the scene when he saw people cramming down the stairs. He further alleged that he
saw a man holding a bloodied knife and arrested the said person. However, there was no mention
of the identity of the said man. Assuming however that the said man was in possession of the
said knife, there is no way to be certain that he was the one who killed the victim. More
importantly, the bloodied knife, supposedly in possession of the man referred to by the arresting
officer was never presented in Court.

Finally, there is the testimony of the supposed “eyewitness”, Mayla Didelis. On the
affidavit she first executed, she stated that she accompanied the victim to the public market to
buy hog feeds but she supposedly saw the accused pull the victim and stab him on the back. The
victim supposedly ran away but was chased by the accused and she was later on informed that
her husband, the victim, was brought to Sara District Hospital and when she reached the hospital,
the victim was already dead. On cross-examination, she even reiterated that she only knew the
fact of the death of her husband after the fact. When she was recalled to the stand, she executed a
judicial affidavit and testified that she was at home with her mother during the time of the

3
Gaerlan vs. CA 179 SCRA 20
4
People vs. Lati, 184 SCRA 336
5
Sec. 1 (a) Rule 115, Rules of Court

2
incident and was only informed later on that her husband was stabbed to death. There are glaring
inconsistencies between her two testimonies and the fact of the matter is, she did not witness the
incident and the eventual demise of her husband but only knew about it after the fact. Moreover,
the identity of the accused was only mentioned in her affidavit but it is in fact hearsay because
she never saw the accused stab her husband.

Also, the Arresting Officer did not truly identify the assailant and merely alleged that the
accused was holding a bloody knife which was not even presented in Court. Thus, the
prosecution only alleged but has not proved any link that would support the conclusion that the
accused killed the victim.

WHEN INADEQUATE, CIRCUMSTANTIAL


EVIDENCE CANNOT SUSTAIN A CONVICTION

It should be noted that these three witnesses were not eyewitnesses but their accounts are
only circumstantial evidence. There is also no corroboration between the testimonies of the
Arresting Officer and Mayla Didelis as to the identity of the accused and the facts surrounding
the victim’s death. It was only Mayla Didelis who in her affidavit identified the accused but she
later testified that she was in fact at home and did not see the accused kill her husband. More
importantly, both witnesses could not have ascertained the circumstances surrounding the death
of the victim. Only mere speculations and assumptions provide for the link between the accused
and the supposed crime he committed. In comparison to the case of PP vs Sergio and Abraham
Bato6, we see close similarity between the case at bar to wit:

“In sum, therefore, the witness established only the following: (1) That the Bato
brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) That after two hours of drinking,
said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away; and (3) That
the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab wounds,
was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about five kilometers away from where he was last
seen by the witness.
After a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we believe
that the appellant’s authorship of the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
xxx.
Notwithstanding the presence of other persons who ever nearby when the
appellants tied the hands of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other
witnesses to corroborate Ernesto Jr.’s testimony. As it was, his testimony was grossly
insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established much less corroborated, cannot by
itself be the basis of conviction.”

It was also held in that case that in the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused
may be established by circumstantial evidence. 7 Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may

6
supra
7
supra

3
tend by inference to establish a fact in issue." 8 Such evidence, however, must still pass the test
of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot
sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state's evidence does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption
of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.9(Empasis ours)

A rule of ancient respectability now molded into tradition is that circumstantial evidence
suffices to convict only if the following requisites concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. 10

The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is


well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday:11 

"No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in
any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."12
It has been said, and we believe correctly, that the circumstances proved should constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 13 From all the circumstances, there
should be a combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves
no room for reasonable doubt as to his guilt.  14 Stated in another way, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to convict the accused. 15

IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE PROSECUTION


TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce evidence sufficient to prove beyond


reasonable doubt (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation

8
Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, 1964 ed., p. 786, citing Tracy, 313.
9
supra
10
Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court; formerly Section 98, Rule 123, 1964 Rules of Court.
11
61 Phil. 216, 221-22, quoting 12 Cyc. 488.
12
See also: Pareja vs. Gomez, L-18733, July 31, 1962.
13
U.S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil. 510, 512; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692-693; Salonga, op. cit., p. 791; 6 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 162; 4 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 601.
14
U.S. vs. Villos, supra; U.S. vs. Lim Sip, 10 Phil. 627, 629; People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463, 467. See cases
cited in 6 Moran, p. 163, at footnote 129.
15
People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, 57, citing U. S. vs. Maaño, 2 Phil. 817; People vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1, 4-5. See
Salonga, op. cit., p. 792; 6 Moran, p. 163.

4
therein by the accused.16 The charges against an accused must be dismissed if there is no
competent or sufficient evidence adduced that would sustain the charges against him, should the
same be raised in a demurrer to the evidence. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

“Sec. 23 After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.

x x x”

It is well-settled rule that conviction for a criminal offense should be based on clear and
positive evidence and not on mere assumption.17 The burden lies upon the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather that upon the accused to prove that he is
in fact innocent.18 Failing in this, the presumption of innocence will prevail.19

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court


that this Demurrer to Evidence be granted and that the criminal charge of Murder against the
accused REY BALBAGUIO be DISMISSED.

Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for.

Iloilo City, Philippines for Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, May 12, 2014

J.C. PADIOS & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE


Counsels for the Accused
Unit 2, 3rd Floor, Rosary Bldg., Iznart St., Iloilo City

By:

LEONIL ANTHONY S. BACAY


Roll no. 60245
IBP No. 941601 – 1/2/14 – Iloilo City
PTR No. 4401579 – 1/6/14 – Iloilo City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0012207

16
supra
17
supra
18
supra
19
supra

5
NOTICE OF HEARING
 
Greetings:

Please take notice that undersigned counsel shall submit the forgoing Demurrer to
Evidence for the approval and consideration of the Honorable Court on May 22, 2014 at 8:30 in
the morning with no further arguments and without appearance of counsel.

LEONIL ANTHONY S. BACAY

Copy Furnished:

Provincial Prosecutor
Ramon C. Q. Avancena Hall of Justice
Iloilo City

Registry Receipt No. ______________ dated __________________

EXPLANATION

A Copy of this Motion was furnished to the Provincial Prosecutor at his office address by
Registered Mail with return card because of lack of personnel to effect service.

LEONIL ANTHONY S. BACAY

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