Climate Changes, Water Security and Possible Remedies For The Middle East

The United Climate Changes, Water
Nations
World Water Security and Possible
Assessment Remedies for the Middle East
Programme
by Jon Martin Trondalen for UNESCO-PCCP
SCIENTIFIC PAPER
Scientific Paper
Side publications series
World Water Assessment Programme
Climate Changes,
Table of Contents Water Security and
Possible Remedies
Executive Summary 1 for the Middle East
Acknowledgements 2 Jon Martin Trondalen
From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (UNESCO PCCP)

Introduction 3
1. Current research on climate change and

the water situation in the Middle East 5
2. Climate changes and possible water

resources related implications in the
Middle East 9
Executive summary
3. National water security challenges The public notion of the relationship between conflict
and water resources change and degradation is gaining
resulting from climate change 22
momentum. Statements in the aftermath of 2007 Nobel
Peace Laureates, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
4. Water security challenges for the Change (IPCC) and President Al Gore, are ample illustra-
international community resulting tion of public concern as well as of the desire to develop
from climate change 23 national and international remedies.
In the past, there seems to have been a common wisdom

5. Possible adaptation strategies for that environmental and water resources changes take
nations and the international place over such a long time span that they are more
community to jointly adopt 24 or less irrelevant in relation to the immediate need for
water and conflict-management interventions in the
so-called water hot-spots. However, recent studies1 as
6. A particular focus on co-operation well as phenomena in the physical environment are
in the Euphrates and Tigris basins 26 beginning to call into question such a notion: Are we in
fact witnessing climatic and subsequent environmental
Summing up 29 changes with such a magnitude that they may impact
the stability and management of coastal areas and of
vital national and international resources such as water
References 30 and productive land?2
The scope of the IPCC process is global, and is divided

into several regional studies that develop climatic
circulation models and scenarios. It does not, however,
link such estimations to the political, economic and
social stability of such regions.
This report looks more closely at the Middle East and

explores the relationship between climate change and
water vulnerability – it also indicates some remedies in
certain selected cases. The scope of the work rests on
five questions:
1. According to authoritative scientific knowledge,

what and where are the most likely climatic
and water resources changes to take place in the
Jon Martin Trondalen, Middle East?
From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential
UNESCO-PCCP
1 From such authoritative sources as the IPCC: www.ipcc.ch
2 As well as potential evolution of new diseases.

Climate Change, Water Security and Possible Remedies for the Middle East
2. What are the likely impacts on water vulner- the availability of water in terms of quantity and
ability, stability, and water security in the quality. In addition, it may happen that the flow of
Middle East? a number of major rivers will become increasingly
variable – rivers such as the Blue Nile, the White
3. Where are the risks of immediate and serious
Nile4, the Euphrates, the Tigris (Turkey, Syria and
water vulnerability,3 at the national and inter-
Iraq), the Jordan, and the Yarmuk River in Southern
national levels, caused by such environmental
Lebanon – affecting the recharging of aquifers such
changes?
as those in Gaza and on the West Bank.5
4. What are the national and international water
security challenges brought about by climate Possible environmental implications, such as a rise
change? in sea levels, would have immediate and devastating
impacts on the coastal areas, especially in Gaza and
5. Are there any remedial actions that could be Shat-al-Arab (Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait). Migration and
taken to cope with water vulnerability and changes in rainfall-dependant production systems
security? should also be taken into account.
Some experts argue that the implications for

national and international water vulnerability and
security in the Middle East could be severe. The
fragile water resources situation makes the whole
region extremely sensitive to changes in rainfall or
4 If the Nile River basin is to be included, it has to be expanded,
due to the complexity of the eastern African environment and the
3 Vulnerability implications mean, in this context, the extent to fact that there are nine riparians.
which water resources and the environmental effects of climatic
changes would impact economic and social development and 5 Involving Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and
political stability. the West Bank and Gaza.
Acknowledgements
A report like this, which requires different skills and areas of expertise, would not have been possible without
the input and contributions of others.
I am greatly indebted to Dr Yigal Salingar, who has been in charge of developing a synopsis of current
climate-change research programmes in the Middle East as well as running a simulation model of different
climate-change scenarios on Lake Tiberias basin. Many thanks also to Professor Pinhas Alpert’s research group
of climatologists, who reviewed the set synopsis.
My thanks too to the Director of UNESCO’s Water Science Division and Secretary of the International
Hydrological Program, András Szöllösi-Nagy; the co-ordinator of UNESCO PCCP (From Potential Conflict
to Co-operation Potential), Léna Salamé, and not least, to Marwa Daoudy, editor of the side-publications to
the United Nations World Water Development Report 3, for their constructive input and fruitful co-operation. I
am also very grateful to Adrienne Cullen for her meticulous and painstaking language-editing as well as to
Samantha Wauchope for her coordination.
A special thanks to everyone who has reviewed the document – who should be credited for giving input
and improving the report, although they do not have any responsibility for unintended statements, errors,
misinterpretations or misrepresentation. I’d like to especially thank Nazih Bandak (Amman), BertJan Heij
(Wageningen), Adnan Shuman (Damascus) and Simon Mason, (Zürich).
Finally, many thanks to Compass Foundation’s research associate, Tone Aasberg, for providing the initial
research overview for several of the topics covered.
Geneva, November 4th, 2008
2 THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME: SIDE PUBLICATIONS SERIES
Introduction
Introduction conflicts could be summarised as follows: sudden

‘hydrological shocks’ as well as slow onset changes
On the United Nations News Centre website on can increase the risk of conflict in unstable states
March 4th, 2008, the following message drew world- and regions because the governments lack the
wide attention: capacity to respond, adapt, and recover. Recent
research has shown that conflicts and instability in
UN warns of climate change effects on water populated areas could be linked to key-sectors in
shortages water quantity (i.e., the extension of drinking water
and its continuity) and quality (i.e., the extension
The UN Food and Agricultural Organization of waste-water collection and treatment); urban
has warned in a new report that climate hydrological problems (such as storm water); the
change is likely to reduce agricultural output impact of large cities on their water environment;
and make water shortages in the Middle East the financing of investment issues; tariff setting;
worse, threatening the poor of the region. The cost recovery, and the degree of freedom left to
report warns of an increased risk of conflict urban dwellers vis-à-vis the services provided (see
over scarce resources, and predicts that an UNESCO IHP, 2006).
extra 155–600 million people could experi-
ence additional water stress if temperatures There is a high probability that some hydrological
increase by a few degrees. systems would also be affected through increased
www.un.org/News runoff and early spring peak discharge in many
glacier- and snow-fed basins. There would also be
The spatial impacts of climate change on the stabil- effects on thermal structure and water quality with
ity of social, economic and hydrological regimes the warming of rivers and lakes (IPPC, Dec. 2007
and systems are indeed uncertain – but potentially and Romm, 2007). Earlier snow-melting in the
devastating (see Mintzer, 1992 and Romm, 2007). springtime might have enormous consequences for
A recent study by SIDA and International Alert downstream countries – countries such as India,
(Smith and Vivekananda, 2008), describes conflicts Bangladesh, Azerbaijan and Iraq.
and instability risks especially related to political
turmoil, economic weak- Local, national and inter-
ness, food insecurity, and national water agreements
In most of the countries in
large-scale migration: that have already been
46 countries – home to
the Middle East, population, agreed might have to be
2.7 billion people – are growth and land management reopened and renegotiated.
at high risk of conflict. may be far more significant and Such situations could trig-
Furthermore, another critical than climate change. ger new tension, instability
group of 56 countries (with Therefore, the impact of climate and even conflicts as cli-
1.2 billion people) have change on water security mate change puts additional
governments that face great should be seen in a broader social and economic stress,
difficulties in taking the water development and conflict especially in developing
strain of climate change on context. countries.
top of their already current
challenges. There are reasons to argue
that the following geo-
As there is broad international consensus that there graphical areas are likely to be the first to be at risk
will be climate change and that risk and uncertainty of instability and conflict:
are increasing, no one really knows the magnitude
and significance of the consequences in terms of Conflict prone areas: The Middle East, the Caucasus,
how they will affect instability and conflict. In any Central Asia, and certain parts of central and eastern
case, nations and the international community have Africa.
to manage changed water-resource conditions that in
some instances may fuel old water-related conflicts Emerging conflict/instability areas: western and
or even yield new ones, but could also – and prob- southern Africa, South East Asia, and South America.
ably in limited cases – contribute to stabilisation and
the prevention of such disputes (Klare, 2002). As risks, uncertainties and vulnerability to changes
of national and international water resources are
Relationships between potential and current increasing (as anticipated in the climate-change
water vulnerability, instability and climate scenarios), the demand for national governments
changes to develop adaptive policies and strategies becomes
Ongoing intranational as well as international insistent. Countries would, under any circum-
disputes and tension over water scarcity, water pol- stances, have to prevent and resolve local, regional,
lution, and water allocation may be escalated and and international vulnerability and disputes related
fuelled by climate change (Soffer, 2000; Trondalen, to the proper use, control, access and allocation
2008). Some of the relevant consequences of climate of water resources (see, for example, Bruns and
change that may foster water-related or induced Meinzen-Dick, 2000).
From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 3

Some concepts
— Aquifer is used to refer to various kinds of groundwater basin.
— Basin is used synonymously with watershed, catchment, or watercourse.
— Conflict Management comprises prevention, avoidance, settlement, and resolution
— International water resources/watercourses is preferred to shared international water resources
— Return-flow means the drainage water from irrigated land that could go to surface water and groundwater
(compared to run-off, which is natural drainage)
— Rule Curve is a function that defines the use of water – either for power production or for irrigation.
— Sustainable governance means, in this context, sustainable solutions for the management of international
watercourses
— Virtual or invisible water refers to the water that’s used to grow or produce a particular product. In water-
scarce countries, it is often preferred to conserve the precious national supply by importing crops and goods
that require a lot of water to produce.
— A river system comprises both the main course and all the tributaries that feed into it. The area that the
river system drains is known as its catchment or watercourse.
— A water management regime means a water arrangement that specifies the use of water flow according to
certain timescales and specifications of water-quality standards
— Lake Tiberias in the upper Jordan River basin has many other names – including the ‘Sea of Galilee’
(a Biblical expression) and ‘Lake Kinneret’.
— Auditing: a systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining evidence and evaluating it
against agreed, pre-set criteria.
— Monitoring: The systematic surveillance and measurement of defined parameters.
— Some names are spelled in different ways such as the Hasbani, Hasbanye or Hasbanya (a tributary of
the River Jordan, called the Snir in Israel). As far as possible, the most common names in English usage are
applied.
— The contemporary name for the geographic area of the West Bank is used instead of the Jewish terms,
Judea and Samaria, which include a larger area
— Various water monitoring and verification systems are proposed, and the following concepts are used:
— Verification: Confirmation, by examination and the provision of objective evidence, that results have been
achieved or that specific requirements have been fulfilled (or the status of requirements)
— CIF: the newly established World Bank led Climate Investment Fund.
Dispute is used synonymously with Conflict
JR: the Jordan River
LTB: Lake Tiberias basin
MENA countries: the region known as Middle East and North Africa.
UJRB: the upper Jordan River basin
(Source: derived from Trondalen, 2008)
1. Current research on climate change and the water situation in the Middle East
Climate change will have different impacts in When ice and snow cover diminish, it results in
different regions, and traditional patterns of reduced freshwater storage and supply. This supply
conflict will – with high probability – change in is especially important in regions where water
certain areas. In some cases, nations might achieve availability is already limited. It is predicted that the
successful co-operation due to less water stress – but greatest effects of global warming (climate change)
in many already politically charged areas, the will occur in high latitudes (Matthews et al., 2003).
disputes are likely to increase in intensity and
complexity – in a different form than in the past – The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes
and would require new and rapid adaptive conflict- (IPCC) is one of the most renowned publishers of
management strategies. internationally acclaimed research on global climate
change. Its recent Technical Paper on Climate Change
Climate changes could potentially significantly and Water (IPCC Working Group II, 2008)7 outlines
affect current water vulnerability and security some general statements that are relevant for the
situations in the management of national and Middle East region – such as:
international waters in areas that are already conflict
prone – such as the Middle East and Central Asia.6 • By the middle of the 21st century, annual average
river runoff and water availability are projected
Instead of discussing the ‘linkages’ in more aca- to increase as a result of climate change at high
demic terms, likely ‘linkage-situations’ from the latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, and
Middle East are elaborated – with a concretisation decrease over some dry regions at mid-latitudes
of some of the climate-change estimates and likely and in the dry tropics. Many semi-arid and arid
implications on the water resources situation in one areas (for example, the Mediterranean basin,
of the sensitive areas, the upper Jordan River basin western USA, southern Africa and north-eastern
(sections 1 and 2). Brazil) are particularly exposed to the impacts
of climate change and are projected to suffer a
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are also looked decrease of water resources due to climate change
at because of their strategic, political, economic, (high confidence). (Section 2.36)
energy, and agricultural significance for Turkey, • Changes in river flows, as well as lake and
Syria, and Iraq. wetland levels, due to climate change depend pri-
marily on changes in the volume and timing of
The following sections elaborate ways for these coun- precipitation and, crucially, on whether precipita-
tries to adapt to changes and outline how the internation falls as snow or rain. Changes in evaporation
tional community can assist them towards that end. also affect river flows. Flows in high-latitude
rivers increase, while those from major rivers in
the Middle East, Europe and Central America
1. Current research on climate change tend to decrease. (Section 3.2.3)
and the water situation in the Middle East
• In areas where rainfall and runoff are very low (for
1.1 A synopsis of current research on climate change example, desert areas), small changes in runoff can
and the water situation in the Middle East lead to large percentage changes. In some regions,
Climate is usually described in terms of mean tem- the sign of projected changes in runoff differs
perature, variability of temperature, precipitation, from recently observed trends (Section 2.1.6).
and wind over a period of time. Climatic factors, • In some areas with projected increases in runoff,
principally temperature and precipitation, are the different seasonal effects are expected, such as
major controls on the broad-scale distribution of increased wet-season runoff and decreased dry-
biomes (Matthews et al., 2003). season runoff. (Section 3.4.1)
There are many predicted and observed changes Finally, it voices some reservations in interpreting
attributed to global warming and climate change. the large-scale predictions:
Some of the changes are increased temperature,
altered patterns of precipitation, sea-level rise and … note the large areas where the direction
a diminishing ice and snow cover (Matthews et al., of change is uncertain. This global map of
2003). A change in temperature and rainfall modi- annual runoff illustrates large-scale changes
fies the distribution of vegetation and wetlands, and is not intended to be interpreted at small
and vegetation in semi-arid areas is strongly sensi- temporal (for example, seasonal) and spatial
tive to climate-induced variability (Zaitchik et al., scales (Section 2.3.5).
2007). Rising sea levels induce changes in coastal
ecosystems by saltwater intrusion and possibly by Concrete interpretations of these statements in terms
increased erosion. Changes in nutrient availability of water resources in the Middle East – at least at the
and ocean currents may alter marine ecosystems. country level – are hard to make, except that there is
high probability that some changes will take place.
Others will go further and state that: ‘With the
6 The notion of international water resources should be applied
rather than transboundary waters, as the latter is more vague and
limited in scope. 7 www.ipcc-wg2.org

Middle East being the world’s most water-stressed • Significant negative trends have been found in
region, climate change – which is projected to cause the number of days when daily temperature is
sea-level rise, more extreme weather events such as below the 10th percentile of its average tempera-
droughts and floods, and less precipitation – will ture range.
contribute to even greater water stress in the region’
• Trends in precipitation indices, including the
(Freimuth et al., 2007)
number of days with precipitation, average pre-
cipitation intensity, and maximum daily precipi-
Although there seems to be international con-
tation events, were weak in general and did not
sensus that if climate change takes place as these
show spatial coherence.
and other authors predict, a further question is to
go beyond the report of IPCC’s Working Group II
and assess available regional research on regional Hansen et al. (2005) used a global climate model to
climate change. compare the effectiveness of many climate forcing
agents in producing climate change:
The following analysis of current research in
the Middle East is based on published material. • Increasing greenhouse gases in their model
Although there are also a number of prominent caused increasing rainfall in the Intertropical
unpublished national studies in the Middle East, Convergence Zone, the eastern United States, and
most of them are not made available publicly, as East Asia, while intensifying dry conditions in
some states consider this to be sensitive national the subtropics including the south-west United
information.8 States, the Mediterranean region, the Middle East,
and an expanding Sahel.
The Compass Foundation has therefore commis-
sioned a group of scientists9 from the Middle East to Shindell (2007) investigated the potential for sudden
assess existing and current internationally recog- climate change during the current century. This
nized research and to answer the following question: investigation takes into account evidence from the
Earth’s history, from climate models and from our
According to authoritative scientific understanding of the physical processes governing
knowledge what are the most likely climate shifts:
climatic and water resources changes to
take place in the Middle East and were • Sudden alterations to climate forcing and ocean
will they occur? circulation seemed to be improbable, with
sudden changes instead most likely to arise from
Their findings are as follow: climate feedbacks.
• More probable sudden changes are large increases
Climatological aspects in the frequency of summer heat waves and
A climate-change workshop for the Middle East changes resulting from feedbacks involving
brought together scientists and data for the region hydrology, such as ice sheet decay.
to produce the first area-wide analysis of climate
extremes for the region Zhang et al. (2005) and to • Reductions in subtropical precipitation are likely
report trends in extreme precipitation and tem- to be the most severe hydrologic effects this
perature indices. The trends were examined for the century, with rapid changes due to the feedbacks
period 1950–2003 at 52 stations covering 15 coun- of large-scale circulation patterns.
tries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, • Water stress may become particularly acute in
Cyprus, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, the south-west of the United States, Mexico, the
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey: Mediterranean and the Middle East, where rain-
fall decreases of 25% (regionally) and up to 40%
• Results indicate that there have been statistically
(locally) were projected.
significant, spatially coherent trends in tem-
perature indices that are related to temperature Alpert et al (2002) investigated the paradoxical
increases in the region. increase of Mediterranean extreme daily rainfall
• Significant, increasing trends have been found despite decreases in total values:
in the annual maximum of daily maximum and
• They showed that the torrential rainfall in Italy
minimum temperatures, the annual minimum
exceeding 128 mm/d has increased percentage-
of daily maximum and minimum temperatures,
wise by a factor of four during the period 1951
the number of summer nights, and the number
t01995 with strong peaks in El-Nino years.
of days where daily temperature has exceeded its
90th percentile. • In Spain, extreme categories at both tails of the
distribution (light: 0–4 mm/d and heavy/torren-
tial: 64 mm/d and up), increased significantly.
8 See for example the following information from AUB, Beirut:

• No significant trends were found in Israel and
www.aub.edu.lb/~webifi/ Cyprus.
9 Under the leadership of Dr. Yigal Salingar.
1. Current research on climate change and the water situation in the Middle East
• The consequent redistribution of daily rainfall Alpert et al. (2008) analyzed the results of regional
categories – torrential/heavy against the mod- climate modelling of the Eastern Mediterranean
erate/light intensities – is of utmost interest, region:
particularly in the semi-arid, sub-tropical regions
in relation to water management, soil erosion and • It was found that the average temperature over
flash-flood impacts. the Mediterranean area has increased by 1.5–4 ºC
in the last 100 years.
Morin et al. (2007) analyzed extreme flood-causing • Temperatures in 2071–2100 are predicted to
rainstorms over Israel: increase by about 4–6 ºC over northern Israel
in comparison with the control period of
• Extreme rain intensities with recurrence intervals
1961–1990.
of more than 100 years were found for rains of
durations of one hour and more, as well as for • Precipitation over most of the Mediterranean
daily rain depth values. shows a dominant negative trend in the last
50 years.
• Specific peak discharges were as high as
10–30 m3/s/km2 for catchments of 1–10 km2 – • A large negative trend in one scenario (A2) is
values larger than any recorded floods in similar found over northern Israel, while another sce-
climatic regions in Israel. nario (B2) shows no significant trend.
Alpert et al. (2004) carried out a classification of • There is a tendency toward extreme events. It was
daily synoptic systems by analysing climate data found that the extreme precipitation over north-
over the eastern Mediterranean for the period ern Israel shows significant increasing trends
1948–2000: for the A2 and B2 scenarios with respect to the
present climate.
• By analysis of trends in the annual frequencies of
• Also, the standard deviation of the average
the synoptic systems, they show that the frequen-
annual precipitation is higher in the A2 and B2
cies of the mostly dry Red Sea trough systems
scenarios, showing a trend towards drier as well
have nearly doubled since the 1960s, from 50 to
as wetter years in the future.
about 100 days per year.
• This explains a dominant decreasing trend of Zangvil et al. (2003) investigated connections
rainfall in most of the eastern Mediterranean, between the eastern Mediterranean seasonal mean
along with a rainfall increase in the southern sea height (500 hPa) and sea-level pressure patterns,
part of the eastern Mediterranean region, where and the recently observed changes in winter rainfall
the Red Sea trough is deep enough to bring tropi- distribution over Israel:
cal moisture over this area.
• They constructed a conceptual model of the
• The increasing tendency towards heavier daily mechanism responsible for the relative increases
rainfall, in spite of the general decrease in total in seasonal (winter) rainfall over the southern
rainfall, may be explained by the increase in part of the country and the decrease over the
the active and stormy types of Red Sea trough north.
situation.
• The researchers demonstrated that the direct
• The annual frequency of the Cyprus lows was atmospheric agent responsible for this change in
noticed to drop slightly between 1983 and 1998 the spatial rainfall distribution is an increased
to 26, compared with about 30 during the period frequency of occurrence of 500 hPa troughs
1967 to 1982. The high positive correlation oriented from north-east to south-west, accom-
between the recent increase in the North Atlantic panied by prominent positive sea-level pressure
oscillation index and the pressure over most of anomalies centred over Turkey.
the eastern Mediterranean countries is linked to
• Their analysis further shows that these atmos-
these tendencies in the synoptic systems.
pheric systems are consistent with the persist-
Krichak and Alpert (2005) analysed decadal trends ence of a positive phase of the North Atlantic
between 1950 and 2000 in the east-Atlantic- Oscillation and with the latest IPCC predic-
west-Russia pattern, as well as Mediterranean tions of precipitation patterns over the eastern
precipitation: Mediterranean basin.
• Their findings provide an explanation of the Ziv et al. (2005) points out that:
observed precipitation decline over the eastern
Mediterranean region during the last decades • There are indications of an aggravation of summer
of the past century, in terms of the positive heat conditions over the Mediterranean basin.
trend of the east Atlantic – west Russia pattern;
• Summer temperature variations over the
atmospheric flow transports the air masses from
Mediterranean basin were studied through the
the Atlantic to the eastern Mediterranean, or
850 hPa level for the months of June to August
advection of the air masses from central Europe
during the period 1948–2003.
to the eastern Mediterranean.

• The most prominent feature found is warming, value of local groundwater has remained similar to
which is greater than the global average, over present-day values:
the majority of the study region, with maximum
warming over Sicily. • This suggests that changing atmospheric circula-
tion has played a role in climate change in the
• At the same time, cooling was noted over Algeria Middle East over the past two millennia.
and the Balkans.
• Their analyses also implied that heat waves lead Weiß et al. (2007) examined the change in current
general long-term trends, and suggested that the 100-year hydrological drought frequencies in the
Mediterranean basin manifests an increase in the Mediterranean in comparison to the 2070s, as simu-
greenhouse effect in the summer season. lated by the global model, WaterGAP. The analysis
considers socio-economic and climate changes as
Bar-Matthews et al. (2003) investigated sea–land indicated by the IPCC scenarios A2 and B2 and the
oxygen isotopic relationships from planktonic global general circulation model ECHAM4:
foraminifera and speleothems in the eastern
Mediterranean region. The oxygen and carbon-stable • Under these conditions, today’s 100-year drought
isotope compositions of cave speleothems provide is estimated to occur 10 times more frequently
a powerful method for understanding continental in the future over a large part of the northern
climate change: Mediterranean, while in north Africa, today’s
100-year drought will occur less frequently.
• These records for the last 7,000 years show a
• Water abstractions are shown to play a minor role
trend toward increasing aridity, which concurs
in comparison to the impact of climate change,
with similar climatic and archaeological data
but can intensify the situation.
from northern Africa and the Middle East.
• The detailed lake-level history of the closed Lake The synopsis outlines a set of possible and probable
Lisan (paleo-Dead Sea) in the Middle East has changes that would – if they do take place – have
been reconstructed from shoreline indications and serious impacts on the water resources situation in
high-resolution U-Th and C-14 chronologies, thus the Middle East, especially the international surface
providing data on the response of the lake’s catch- and sub-surface basins.
ment area to climate
changes during the Therefore, and in order to
a decreasing trend in improve the quality assurance
corresponding period.
rainfall in most of the eastern of the synopsis, Professor
Bartov et al. (2003) present Mediterranean and increased Pinhas Alpert’s research
a correlation between the rainfall over the southern part of group conducted the fol-
newly developed Lake the East Mediterranean lowing assessment of these
Lisan level curve for the findings.10
past 55,000 years and the
North Atlantic Heinrich events: 1.2 A brief assessment of the findings of the
synopsis of research on climate change in the
• The correlation indicates a closely connected Middle East
climate response between these North Atlantic Professor Pinhas Alpert’s research group conducted
events and hydrologic conditions that prevailed the following assessment of the findings outlined
in the eastern Mediterranean. above:
• Their findings show that, although the gener- Climate change has impacts on many levels
ally cooler conditions that prevailed during the
last glaciation favoured high levels in the lake, On the synoptic level, it has been found that the
catastrophic events in the North Atlantic, which mostly dry Red Sea trough systems have nearly
are associated with maximum cooling, have doubled since the 1960s, from 50 to 100 days in
been responsible for droughts in the eastern a year. The east Atlantic-west Russia pattern also
Mediterranean. shows a positive trend, as well as the occurrence of
500 hPa troughs. These all explain the dominant
Bartov et al. inferred that cold-water input to the decreasing trend in rainfall in most of the eastern
Mediterranean, originating in the collapse of the Mediterranean, and increased rainfall over the
North Atlantic Deep Water circulation, caused a southern part of the east Mediterranean. The
reduction of evaporation and less precipitation in Lake-level history of Lake Lisan (Paleo-Dead Sea)
the eastern Mediterranean. also shows a climate connection between North
Atlantic events and the hydrologic conditions that
Using the C-13/C-12 and O-18/O-16 ratios of stem have prevailed in the eastern Mediterranean over
cellulose of Tamarix jordanis (a tree common in wadis the past 7,000 years.
in arid regions) and relative humidity data, Lipp et
al. (1996) showed that, since the Roman period,
10 Professor Pinhas Alpert is a leading international expert in
relative humidity at the ancient fortress of Masada climate change in the Middle East, with a research group at Tel Aviv
has decreased by about 17%, while the delta (18)O University, Geophysics and Planetary Science
2. Climate changes and possible water resources related implications in the Middle East
Temperature trends for the region show a signifi- 2.1 Water resources related implications11
cant increase in maximum and minimum daily Recent research on the water resource implications
temperatures. The average temperature over the of climate change has been conducted by several
Mediterranean area has increased by 1.54 ºC in scholars, some of which will be outlined in the
the last 100 years, and temperatures in the years following
2071–2100 are predicted to increase by 4 ºC to 6 ºC Kitoh et al. (2008) present the first full projections
over northern Israel. of rainfall and stream-flow in the ‘Fertile Crescent’
of the Middle East. Until the time this research was
There are indications of an aggravation in summer carried out (early 2008), such projections had not
heat conditions over the Mediterranean basin, with been possible, due to a lack of observed data and
an increase in heat waves, which heads the general atmospheric models of sufficient resolution. Kitoh
long-term trend. Models predict annual mean et al. employed an innovative super-high-resolution
increases of up to 4.5 ºC; with some variations – for (20-km) global climate model, which accurately
example, increases of only 1.5 ºC are predicted in reproduces the precipitation and the stream-flow of
the coastal areas of the eastern Mediterranean. the present-day Fertile Crescent:
Precipitation above most of the Mediterranean shows • It was projected that, by the end of this century,
a dominant negative trend in the last 50 years. In the Fertile Crescent would lose its current shape
Israel, precipitation shows no trend. and could disappear altogether.
• The annual discharge of the Euphrates River will
Extreme precipitation shows significant increasing decrease significantly (29%–73%), as will the
trends. In southern Europe (Italy and Spain) torren- stream-flow in the Jordan River. Thus counter-
tial rainfall increased by up to a factor of four during measures for water shortages will become much
the period 1951 to 1995. more difficult.
There are indications that extreme flood-causing Another research group, Jorgensen and al-Tikiriti
rainstorms have also increased in Israel. (2003), established aridity (desertification) trends
for archaeological sites in the United Arab Emirates,
There is a trend toward both drier as well as wetter for the past 4,500 years, and correlated them with
years in the future, accompanied by generally the trends of increased well depths and declining
increasing aridity, as shown by cave speleothems groundwater levels. Trends of declining groundwater
records for the last 7,000 years and the relative levels were related to trends of increasing aridity
humidity of Masada, which has decreased by about (climate change). The increasing aridity had a
17% since Roman times. pronounced effect on
development in the
It seems obvious that climate trends show a significant research area. For exam-
change in one way or another increase in maximum and ple, non-irrigation farming
will take place, with sig- minimum daily temperatures could not be successfully
nificant impact on the water sustained at the end of the
resources situation. To go one Bronze Age. This thwarted
step further in assessing a few economic development
scenarios, the next section points to possible water until a water conveyance structure was introduced in
resources changes in the region, and specifically in the Iron Age:
the upper Jordan River basin.
• The aridity trends in the research area corre-
spond to contemporaneous aridity trends noted
2. Climate changes and possible water in Mesopotamia and the Dead Sea area, as well
as in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and
resources related implications in the
northern Africa, in general.
Middle East
• Other global climatic changes that are contempo-
The previous section aimed to establish the factual raneous with climate change in the research area
basis of climate-change scenarios. This section builds have been noted. The increased aridity trends
on these findings and examines further possible in the research area are contemporaneous with
water-related impacts of these climatic trends. reported increased atmospheric CO2 trends.
It begins with an assessment of recent research on Ragab and Prudhomme (2000) calculated a high
the water resources implications of climate change, water exploitation index, estimated as a percentage
both environmental and socioeconomic. Because of renewable annual water resources. For example,
of the availability of accurate data and because of this was 83% for Tunisia, 92% for Egypt, 140%
the international significance of the area, the upper for Israel, 169% for Gaza and 644% for Libya.
Jordan River basin is then examined in detail. Some The authors ran the UK Hadlley Centre’s Global
scenarios for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are then Climate Model on a monthly basis for the southern
outlined briefly, and a number of water security
issues are discussed. 11 The overview in this section was prepared by Dr. Yigal Salingar.

Mediterranean and Middle East countries to predict • Most adaptation measures attempt to develop
the percent change in rainfall with respect to mean non-conventional sources of water that can be
monthly values: exploited in the future, including the use of
surplus winter runoff, wastewater reclamation,
• The results show that in the dry season (April to seawater and brackish water desalination, rain-
September), by the year 2050, northern Africa fall enhancement by seeding clouds with silver
and some parts of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, iodide crystals, and the exploitation of sub-
Syria, Jordan and Israel are expected to have marine springs.
reduced rainfall amounts of up to 20% to 25%
less than the present mean values.12 • In addition, the authors claim that conservation
measures, as well as institutional reforms and
• This decrease in rainfall is accompanied by capacity building, are also needed. The indirect
temperature rises in those areas of between 2 °C impact of climate change on hydraulic structures
and 2.75 °C. may affect potential increases in precipita-
• For the same period, the temperature in the coastal tion intensities and modifications in river flow
areas of the southern Mediterranean and Middle patterns.
East countries will rise by about 1.5 °C. In winter, • Similar hydrologic impacts might have differ-
rainfall will decrease by about 10%–15%. Winter ent socioeconomic consequences depending on
temperatures in the coastal areas will also increase, region-specific characteristics. In the context of
but by only 1.5 °C on average, while inside the the Middle East, different configurations of water
region it will increase by 1.75 °C to 2.5 °C. resources systems might affect the magnitude
of potential adverse effects, such as a reduction
Ragab and Prudhomme (2000) claim that, given the in gross domestic product, future population
above-mentioned predictions, in order to meet the redistribution, workforce shifts to alternative
water demands in the next century, more dams and economic sectors, and so forth.
water infrastructure will have to be built in southern
Mediterranean and Middle East countries and, by Alcamo and Henrichs (2002) present a top-down
rethinking water use with the aim of making it more approach for identifying regions whose water
productive, a new paradigm will have to be adopted. resources have higher sensitivity to global change
They argue that two approaches will be needed: than in other regions. The aim of this approach is
to provide an overview of regions that may justify
• Increasing the efficiency with which current special attention from the research and develop-
needs are met and increasing the efficiency with ment assistance community under particular global
which water is allocated among different uses. change scenarios. Under the scenario showing the
• In addition, non-conventional sources of water largest increase in water stresses, the estimated area
supply, such as reclaimed or recycled water of critical regions in 2032 ranges from 7.4% to 13.0%
and desalinated brackish water or seawater, are of the total land area, depending on the criteria for
expected to play an important role. identifying critical regions:
Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002) characterize water • Some regions always appear as critical regions
resources in several Middle Eastern countries and regardless of the scenario. These include parts of
evaluate regional climate predictions for various central Mexico, the Middle East, large parts of the
scenarios using general circulation models. Lebanon Indian sub-continent, and stretches of the north
is selected as a case study for an in-depth investiga- African coast.
tion, with potential impacts on the water budget and
soil moisture as indicators: Alcamo et al. (2005) estimated that the global
demand for ecosystem services will substantially
• Climate change is expected to further exacerbate increase up to 2050:
existing water shortages in the country.
• Cereal consumption will increase by a factor of 1.5–
• Although precipitation was not predicted to
1.7; fish consumption (up to the 2020s) by a factor
decrease, temperature increases of 0.6 °C to
of 1.3–1.4; water withdrawals by a factor of 1.3–2.0,
2.1 °C would have an impact on the water bal-
and biofuel production by a factor of 5.1–11.3.
ance and reduce available resources.
• They point out that the risk of lower water avail-
• A maximums 15% decrease in available water and
ability, especially in the Middle East, could slow
6% increase in agricultural demand were pro-
down an increase in food production.
jected by the year 2020.
• Their scenarios also show that certain hot-spot
• Adaptation measures were assessed, with a focus
regions may experience especially rapid changes
on no-regret actions in the context of local socio-
in ecosystem services: these include the central
economic and environmental frameworks.
part of Africa, southern Asia, and the Middle East.
12 Note that in the dry period (April to September) it is almost

An assessment of the relative effect of climate
totally dry in Jordan, with only a few mm of precipitation. This is
also true in Saudi Arabia, southern Syria and many parts of Israel. change and population growth on future global
and regional water resources stresses, using socio- 2004). The beginning, end and length of the rainy
economic scenarios and climate projections, was season were analysed based on rainfall data for 30
performed by Arnell (2004). The research estimates: years, presented for daily rainfall and for accumu-
lated rainfall within a rain spell, and associated with
• Water resources stresses in some parts of the different geomorphic processes.
world where runoff decreases, including around
the Mediterranean. Climate variability affects wave-heights in the
Mediterranean. A study by Lionello and Sanna
Kunstmann et al. (2007) investigated the impact of (2005) examined the variability of the monthly
climate change on water availability in the Middle average significant wave height field in the
East and the upper Jordan catchment by dynamic Mediterranean Sea in the period 1958–2001, and
downscaling of ECHAM4 time slices and subsequent linked it with North Atlantic oscillation and the
hydrological modelling. Two time slices (1961–1990 Indian monsoons. The inter-annual variability of
and 2070–2099) of the global climate scenario B2 the mean significant wave height is associated with
of ECHAM4 were dynamically downscaled with the sea level pressure patterns, which present their most
meteorological model MM5 in two nesting steps of intense features above or close to the Mediterranean
54 km and 18 km resolution. The results of the joint region, where they are most effective for wave
regional climate-hydrology simulations indicate: generation.
• Mean annual temperature increases of up to Spatial pattern formation of shrub populations may
4.5 °C, and 25% decreases in mean annual pre- be affected by climate change in the Middle East.
cipitation in the mountainous part of the upper Malkinson and Jeltsch (2007) concluded that as
Jordan catchment. stress conditions (droughts) increase, the importance
• Total runoff at the outlet of the catchment is pre- of intraspecific neighbourhood interactions decrease,
dicted to decrease by 23%, and is accompanied whereas the importance of environmental factors
by a significant decrease of groundwater recharge. in dictating intraspecific spatial pattern formation
increases. Consequently, in mesic environments,
Shadeed et al. (2007) analysed rainfall-runoff process intraspecific competition among adult shrubs deter-
in semi-arid sub-catchments of the lower Jordan mines the emerging patterns, while intraspecific
catchments. Their results generally support the facilitation is a negligible process.
above-mentioned projections.
Tielbörger and Valleriani (2005) investigated the
Environmental aspects germination strategies of density-regulated desert
Developing sustainable land use practices under annuals, and found that seeds produced in a copious
climate change requires a detailed knowledge of the year had lower germination rates than seeds pro-
system dynamics. This applies particularly for the duced in drought years. Their findings are suggestive
management of domestic livestock in semi-arid and of an intriguingly simple and effective mechanism
arid grazing systems, where the risk of degradation that may allow annual plants to partly predict their
is high and likely climate change may have a strong future success. Change in rainfall amounts has an
impact. A suitable way to assess potential future impact on the selective forces of annual plants in
trends of these complex systems is through the the Middle East.
application of simulation models.
Petr ů et al. (2006) studied phenotypic variation in
Tietjen and Jeltsch (2007) reviewed 41 models pub- a winter annual crucifer, Biscutella didyma, persist-
lished between 1995 and 2005 simulating semi-arid ing along a steep gradient of increasing rainfall in
and arid livestock grazing systems. The models were Israel. Their overall findings indicate two strongly
categorized according to the model aim and type, opposing selective forces at the two extremes of
their temporal and spatial scale, and several indica- the aridity gradient, which result in contrasting
tors of model complexity. Additionally, the authors strategies within the studied annual plant species.
developed a list of model requirements for adequately In another study, Petr ů and Tielbörger (2008)
simulating the effects of climate change. Based on separated local and regional environmental effects
these requirements, they evaluated the potential of on the germination strategies of annual plants under
current models to simulate the impacts of climate changing climatic conditions and found that local
change and determine important shortcomings. environmental conditions may override the effects
Their analysis of current models shows that few of climate, and so should be carefully addressed in
existing models are able to assess the impacts of the future studies testing for the potential of species to
predicted climate change. Therefore, they call for the adapt or plastically respond to climate change.
development of new dynamic grazing models that
provide land managers with the necessary tools to Though not yet studied in depth in the Middle East,
face the threat of future climate changes. soil respiration is affected by water availability, tem-
perature and site properties – for example, site pro-
In Mediterranean semi-arid and arid regions, ductivity as reflected by leaf area index (Reichstein et
geomorphic processes are controlled by the charac- al., 2003). Furthermore, the effect of precipitation on
teristics of rainstorms and dry spells (Aviad et al., soil respiration stretches beyond its direct effect via

soil moisture. Jones et al. (2005) reported enhanced Models all show intensifying dry conditions, with
release of CO2 to the atmosphere from soil organic rainfall decreases of up to 25% (regionally) and 40%
carbon as a result of increased temperatures. (locally), and projected increases in the frequency of
summer heat waves.
Steinitz et al. (2007) studied
the effect of projected Global demand for ecosys-
climate change on the a trend towards drier as tem services is projected to
mammals of Israel at both well as wetter years in the future substantially increase by
the species and assemblage 2050, with water withdraw-
level. They asessed two als increasing by a factor of
potential future scenarios: 1.3 to 2.0.
‘business-usual’ and ‘global adherence to Kyoto
protocol’, and concluded that the implementation Modest climate changes, as anticipated till 2020, are
of a greenhouse gasses policy will reduce the effect beneficial to agriculture (such as early season supply
on mammals at the assembly level. Shtirberg et al. to markets), while drastic climate change in the long
(2007) found significant differences in the biodiver- run, as anticipated till 2100, will be detrimental.
sity of several taxonomic groups along a climatic A reduction of about 20% in state-wide annual
gradient in Israel. agricultural net-revenues by 2100 is projected in
comparison with 2002.
A brief assessment of the findings of water resource
and environmental The effect on natural
implications13 ecosystems is very hard
Today’s 100-year drought is All models show to quantify. Studies show
forecast to occur 10 times intensifying dry conditions, with that local environmental
more frequently in the rainfall decreases of up to 25% conditions may override the
future over a large part of (regionally) and 40% (locally), effects of climate changes.
the northern Mediterranean, and projected increases in
while in north Africa, the frequency of summer There are, however,
today’s 100-year drought heat waves. significant differences in
will occur less frequently. the biodiversity of several
taxonomic groups along a
One study predicted that at the end of this century, climatic gradient in Israel – which might translate
the Fertile Crescent may disappear altogether. The into biodiversity changes as climatic conditions
annual discharge of the Euphrates River will decrease change. Species that cannot move with the changing
by 29%–73% as will the stream-flow in the Jordan climate, for example, northward to lower tempera-
River. By the year 2050 north Africa and some parts tures, may become extinct.
of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Israel,
are expected to have reduced rainfall amounts of up 2.2 Some excerpts from current research on
to 20%–25% less than the present mean values. the socioeconomic aspects of climate change
in the Middle East
The GLOWA project predicts 25% decreases in mean The interrelationships between climate change on
annual precipitation in the mountainous part of the one hand and water resources; environmental
the upper Jordan catchment. It also predicts a total impacts, agricultural production; food security, and
runoff decrease of 23% at the outlet of the catch- other related socioeconomic issues on the other
ment, accompanied by a significant decrease of hand are complex and will not be dealt with in
groundwater recharge. depth here. Several publications have substantially
dealt with theses issues – such as two recent World
In the United Arab Emirates, trends of declining Bank publications (World Bank, 2007 and Shetty,
groundwater levels were related to trends of increas- 2006). These both highlight the fact that agriculture
ing aridity. and the rural economy are important elements in
the Middle East region, and also point out that
Across the region, even if precipitation does not the relative contribution of agriculture to overall
decrease, temperature increases of 0.6 °C to 2.1 °C GDP in most MENA countries is low and has been
would have an impact on the water balance and declining. They further acknowledge that water,
would reduce available resources. not land, is now the limiting factor for improving
agricultural production in the region – an issue
Estimates of the decrease in available water range up that will be exacerbated by the predicted trends of
to 15%, whereas the increase in agricultural demand climate change.
for water by the year 2020 is estimated at 6%.
The World Bank (Shetty, 2006) takes a broader
development standpoint, and notes that agriculture
claims the largest share of the workforce in the
13 Professor Pinhas Alpert’s research group conducted the follow-
region, with a high proportion of the poor depend-
ing assessment of the findings outlined above. ing on the sector for their livelihoods. Region-wide,
88% of the economically active population works these rangelands provide for livestock growers. The
in agriculture. However, in some countries – such as researchers implemented a Time-for-Space approach
Syria – the economically active population engaged with which they were able to measure changes in
in agriculture has fallen from 31.6% in 1970 to biomass production and rainfall at four experimen-
19.6% in 2006 (Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, tal sites along an aridity gradient.
2007). Thus, despite its small contribution to GDP,
agriculture is still important to development in Syria Fleischer et al. (2007) tested the relationship
and in the region. between annual net revenues and climate across
Israeli farms. Their model predicts that only modest
The greatest consumer of water, by far, in the Middle climate changes, as anticipated till 2020, are ben-
East is irrigation/agriculture. The World Bank eficial, while drastic climate change, as anticipated
highlights that the issue is not just the absolute use till 2100, will be harmful. Although Israel has a
but the relative use of water. As water will continue relatively warm climate, a slight increase in tem-
to be the main input in agriculture, it is more perature is beneficial because it enables producers to
important (and realistic) to focus on how technology supply international markets with Public Disclosure
and research may be able to help improve efficiencies Authorized farm products early in the season. Their
and reduce overall usage. While agriculture and the findings lead to the conclusion that securing water
rural economy are important elements in the MENA rights and international trade agreements for the
countries, the relative contribution of agriculture to farmers can be important policy measures that help
overall GDP in most countries is low and has been farmers adapt to climate change.
declining. Recent research shows that agriculture,
even in Syria, which has the highest share of Kan et al. (2007) developed a regional scale eco-
contribution to GDP in the region, contributes only nomic model for analysing climate-change impacts
24 %, whereas agriculture in Jordan contributes only on agriculture. The model was applied to the case of
2 % of GDP. Israel and the results indicate a reduction of about
20% in state-wide annual
As MENA countries experi- the socio-economic agricultural net-revenues by
ence the effects of climate implications of climate change the year 2100 in comparison
change and increased water with 2002. Land allocated
for some of the countries in the
scarcity, there is increasing to field crops is increased
region could be severe at the expense of forages
pressure to allocate water
away from agricultural to and vegetables. The shares
industrial and municipal of field crops and forages
uses, as well as to increase water efficiency within in the agricultural irrigation-water allotment are
the agricultural sector (Shetty, 2006). Some countries, increased, while those of vegetables declines.
such as Israel, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, have
begun addressing the issue of water reallocation
whereas others, notably the Gulf countries, have not In the following discussion, two disconnected hydrologi-
(Adams et al., 1999). cal basins are outlined as possible implications of climate
change. These have primarily been selected because of
From a macro-economic perspective, one could the availability of data, as well as for their strategic
argue, based on the information from the World significance to the countries involved. They are the upper
Bank, that the effects of climate change may not Jordan River basin and the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.
have direct and severe economic consequences
(because agricultural production’s relative contribu- 2.3 Possible water resources implications of
tion to GDP is low). However, the socioeconomic climate change in the upper Jordan River basin
implications could be severe – as in the case of Syria, Climate change in the Middle East, together with
where about 20% of all active workers are employed upper Jordan River basin vulnerability, makes this
in the agricultural sector. area a highly relevant and illustrative case study
for the potential impact of climate change on water
More recently, some other studies have looked at the resources. Certain factors, including a rise in tem-
potential economic impact of climate change: peratures, a decrease in rainfall, population growth
and general increased consumption, are expected
Fleischer and Sternberg (2006) analysed the to decrease water availability in the sensitive upper
economic impact of global climate change on Jordan River basin, and more specifically in the Lake
Mediterranean rangeland ecosystems. They looked Tiberias basin.
specifically at Israel (because of the relative good
quality of data), and show that the urban population Precipitation and snow cover: Mount Hermon and
in Israel values the green landscape of the range- the Golan Heights
lands in the mesic Mediterranean climate region Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee/ Lake Kinneret) is
and is willing to pay to preserve it in light of the located in northern Israel. The lake is an important
expected increasing aridity conditions in this region. freshwater resource, supplying more than 30% of
The value people put on the landscape is higher Israel’s total water and 50% of its drinking water.
than the value they put on the grazing services (Avissar and Pan, 2000). The Jordan River is the

main tributary to Lake Tiberias and rainfall, along Temperatures will rise by 4 oC to 6 oC (Alpert et al.,
with the snowmelt from Mt. Hermon, recharge the 2008), rainfall will decrease by up to 15 % (Ragab
main tributaries of the upper basin of the Jordan and Prudhomme, 2000), and the Jordan River flow
River. Knowledge of the geo-hydrology of the Mt. predictions show a decrease of between 23% and
Hermon area is limited. Only a few hydrological 73% (Kitoh, 2008).
quantitative studies have been conducted, and
estimations of snow and rainfall on Mt. Hermon • Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002) predict a 15%
have previously been based on stations located at decrease in available water, and a 6% increase in
lower elevations (Rimmer and Salingar, 2006). agricultural water demand.
Rainfall in the area is generally restricted to the wet Although only a few examples of climate-change
season, from October to April. The four heaviest predictions are given here, as stated earlier, there is a
rainfall months are from November to February. general consensus that water scarcity is expected to
The Hermon high regions (over 1,000 m above sea increase in the Middle East.
level) has over 1,300 mm of
rainfall per year- (Simpson Water crisis frequencies
this report presents the
and Carmi, 1983; Rimmer in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,
results of the modelling of
and Salingar, 2006). Snow Israel and areas under the
usually falls and accumu- possible scenarios of climate Palestinian Authority (PA)
lates on the highlands from change for the upper Jordan have increased in the last
December to March and two decades. In the summer
may persist at elevations of of 2008, Jordan, Israel and
1,400 to 1,900 m until early summer (Simpson and the Palestinian Authority confronted their third
Carmi, 1983; Rimmer and Salingar, 2006). water crisis since 1990.
In the Golan Heights, annual precipitation varies For Israel (which is where the data in this simulation
from more than 1,200 mm in the northeast to less are derived from14), the country’s three main water
than 500 mm in the south. Recharge is estimated in resources: the mountain aquifer on the West Bank,
different studies to vary from between 10% and 30% the coastal aquifer and Lake Tiberias, are approach-
of the total precipitation in different parts of the ing their ‘red lines’.
Golan Heights (Dafny et. al, 2006).
The geopolitical sensitivity of the Lake Tiberias
The vulnerability of water resources in the Jordan basin (Map 1) is well known (see Daoudy, 2004 and
River basin caused by global climate change is 2008; and Trondalen, 2008) and is interconnected
addressed by an interdisciplinary project ‘GLOWA with water quantity and quality issues, as the area’s
Jordan River’ (www.glowa.org). An integrated economy depends on agriculture and tourism. More
approach provides scientific support for sustainable importantly, however, the basin is the only remain-
and co-operative management practices. The project ing example in the region of a large, freshwater
addresses conventional as well as non-conventional ecosystem. The lake supplies about 30% of Israel’s
methods of water management and their ecological total water consumption and almost 50% of its
and socioeconomic implications. Research institu- drinking water. The basin’s total area is 2,713 km2,
tions from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, of which 676 km2 are in Lebanon. In the northeast,
and Germany have contributed scientific knowledge Mt. Hermon is the major water resource of the
from a range of sources and a modelling framework Jordan River’s three main tributaries. Only 7% of
has been developed to integrate data and methods its area is in Israel. The Hasbani basin is mostly in
from various disciplines. Lebanon, as are the two other major tributaries,
the Dan and the Baniyas. The east part of the Lake
In the Middle East, water crises have impacts far Tiberias River basin is on the Golan Heights, but
beyond food and water shortages. some of the basalt aquifer recharge area is in Syria
(Dafny et al., 2003).
Climate change scenarios
As outlined above, climate change is likely to influ- The rest of the Lake Tiberias sub-basins, west of the
ence both water availability and water consumption: lake, are in Israel. Their contribution to the replen-
ishment of the lake is the least important.
• Data show that in the Middle East, the aver-
age temperature rose by 1.5 oC to 4 oC during
The fact that the upper Jordan River basin covers
the course of the twentieth century (Alpert et
three countries gives rise to geo-political complica-
al., 2008) and that there was an aggravation in
tions (for more information on hydro-political
summer heat levels (Ziv et al., 2005).
issues, see Trondalen, 2008). The question of water
• Future climate predictions in the Middle East resources is already a major issue in the relationship
for the next 100 years foresee droughts that are between the three countries.
10 times more frequent (Weib et al., 2007).
14 The geographical selection of the simulation was solely on the
basis of access to reliable data.
The lower Jordan River, which involves Jordan, Israel are agriculture in the Hula Valley (90 Mm3/year-)
and the Palestinian Authority is beyond the scope of and the Golan Heights, and urban consumption in
this simulation. Eastern Galilee.
Lake Tiberias Water Balance Water Management

The Lake Tiberias annual operational volume is The Lake Tiberias basin and the lake itself yield
about 680 Mm3 – between the upper (-208.80 m) and about 750 Mm3 of water annually, of which
the lower (-213 m) ‘Red Lines’. The Jordan River’s 400 Mm3 is transferred by the NWC southwards to
average annual flow into Lake Tiberias is 410 Mm3. the populous centres, and some to areas under the
The east and west direct watersheds contribute about Palestinian Authority.
90 Mm3, and the rest is mainly winter rain (66 Mm3)
and runoff (83 Mm3). The Dan River is the upper Water resources include, beside the lake and streams,
Jordan River’s biggest water contributor, with an reservoirs, springs, groundwater and effluent. Most
average annual flow of approximately 245 Mm3. The of the natural water resources in the basin are
Baniyas and Hasbani rivers contribute 125 Mm3 and exploited. To maintain water quality and a sustain-
115 Mm3 annually. able ecosystem, there is a great need for accurate
Map 1 Lake Tiberias basin (Yellow line) upper Jordan River basin (Green line) and the ceasefire
lines between Lebanon and Israel (Magenta line)
Mt. Hermon
Syria
Upper Jordan River

Hula Valley
Lebanon Golan Heights
Israel
Lake Tiberias
Hashemite
Kingdom of
Jordan
Lower Jordan River
Source: Trondalen, 2008.

Note: at present, the pre-1976 line along the JR and the LB has not been shown due to technical challenges.
Many streams flow into the upper Jordan River, monitoring of water use (for agriculture, domestic
providing 70 Mm3 annually in addition to the water use, or industry).
resources on the Golan Heights and about 100
active springs. The water balance in the lake is systematically
monitored, and the pumping restrictions do not
The biggest consumer in the basin is the Israeli permit water withdrawal when the lake level drops
National Water Carrier (NWC) which pumps below the lower red line (-213 m); in fact, the current
400 Mm3 per year from the lake. Evaporation loss operational lower red line is -215m. The ‘upper red
of the lake is 250 Mm3 and the rest of the water is line’ is set at -208.80m, to prevent coastal flooding,
stored in the lake or flows downstream to the Dead with the regulation line at Dgania Dam in the south-
Sea, when the upper ‘Red Line’ reaches -208.8 m.15 western part of the lake.
The other main consumption uses in the basin
In other parts of the basin, data are collected on
stream-flow, spring discharges and consumption
15 Please, note that 50 Mm3 is pumped to Jordan annually from (Ingerman and Zonenstein, 1994; Minitzker, 1993;
the Lake Tiberias basin – and that amount is included in the bal-
ance as part of the storage: Cf. Annex IV of the Jordanian-Israeli
Tahal 1993, 1994 and 1997). Recently, a calibration
Peace Agreement of 1994. scheme that includes all water-balance components

for the basin was published (Sivan et al., 2007). This as in the first scenario, but with the NWC allocated
scheme will assist in planning water allocation in second priority. The results are viewed by examin-
the event of future climate change, and could assist ing the unmet water demand in the upper Jordan
in the basin’s water management under different sce- River basin and in the NWC, as they are the major
narios of economic development, land-use changes consumers in the Lake Tiberias basin. The results are
and potential geo-political developments. also examined by fluctuations in the water-level of
the lake under the different scenarios.
A WEAP Model of the Tiberias Basin
A Water Evaluation and Planning Tool (WEAP) oper-
ates on the basic principal of water balance (Yates et Two Scenarios were performed:
al., 2005). Closing a water balance on a monthly and
yearly basis is essential to understanding the water
system in the basin. The WEAP is an integrative
Scenario*
tool designed to show an overall picture of a water
system both in its current state and in predicted
future scenarios. The main goal of a WEAP model is
to serve as a decision-support tool. (2) Upper
(1) NWC 1st
Jordan River
priority and
An elaborated database that includes all water basin 1st
Upper Jordan
priority and
resources, consumptions, hydrology and physical River basin 2nd
NWC 2nd
data of the basin is crucial for an accurate water- priority
priority
balance simulation.
Please note: The data are of very high reliability Decrease in the
and are derived from open sources made available Jordan River -20% -20%
by Israeli official institutions – the Hydrological monthly inflow
Yearbook of Israel, annual reports of the
Hydrological Service, the Mekorot Water Company’s
periodicals on Lake Kinneret Watershed Basin and * The reference scenario is the actual water balance through
the Upper Jordan Catchment, and the Kinneret the 15 year period, 1989–2003
Drainage Authority’s annual reports.
Simulations and Scenarios

WEAP simulations are used to evaluate water alloca- Results and Discussion
tion in the Lake Tiberias basin according to different Unmet demand for water supply in the upper Jordan
scenarios. River basin is presented in Figure 1. In the refer-
ence scenario, water shortage was seen only in the
According to the background given above, it is summer of 2001, after four consecutive dry years.
assumed that a decrease in total available water in
the basin is due to causes such as climate change.16 NWC gets first priority, Scenario 1:
Even though forecasts are uncertain, a 20% decrease • A reduction of 20% in the Jordan River flow
in the flow of the Jordan River is a conservative causes water shortage in dry summers.
estimate (Kitoh, 2008). In the following simulations,
• Those shortages are emphasized in summer simu-
the monthly flow of the Jordan tributaries (Dan,
lations of the years 1998, 2000, and 2001.
Hasbani, and Baniyas) was reduced by 20 percent,
in comparison with a Reference Scenario, which • In those years, the shortages are about one-third
is the actual water balance through the 15 years of average consumption.
1989–2003.
• The recurrence of such large shortages three
times in four years makes the managements of
Some assumptions in the simulation:
such crises harder.
First Priority to NWC for water allocation means that
water is first given to the NWC, and only after that
is water allocated to the upper Jordan River basin. UJRB gets first priority, Scenario 2:
• No unmet water demands will be experienced
Second Priority to NWC for water allocation means in the upper Jordan River basin, even during
that water is first allocated to the upper Jordan River consecutive dry years.
basin and then to the NWC.
In Figure 2, the unmet water demand of the NWC
Simulation number 1 (Scenario 1) represents a 20% under both simulations is almost a mirror image of
decrease in the Jordan’s monthly inflow. Simulation the upper Jordan River basin unmet water demand
number 2 (Scenario 2) represents the Jordan’s inflow (Figure 1).
No unmet water demand was calculated in the

16 A reduction of such a magnitude could also be caused by other
factors – such as hydro-political ones. reference scenario.
Figure 1 Unmet water demand in the upper Jordan River basin under reduction of 20% in the
Jordan River flow (Scenario 1 with 1st priority to NWC–and with 2nd priority to the NWC in
Scenario 2)
18
16
Scenario 1
Reference 14
Scenario 2
12
10
Mm3
8
Jun-03
Feb-03
Oct-02
Jun-02
Feb-02
Oct-01
Jun-01
Feb-01
Oct-00
Jun-00
Feb-00
Oct-99
Jun-99
Feb-99
Oct-98
Jun-98
Feb-98
Oct-97
Note: all the scenarios are with respect to the water balance in the ‘reference years’ of 1989–2003.
When the NWC is set to first priority and the river this is in comparison with the reference scenario,
flow is reduced by 20% (Scenario 1), there are only a where the Tiberias water level crossed the red line
few months in the summers of 1998, 2000 and 2001 in only 16 months.
where not all water demands in the upper Jordan
River basin were supplied – and the unsupplied Water level influences the lake’s water quality and
volume was smaller than 5 Mm3 /month. ecosystem stability (Zohari, 2004), as well as tourist
and recreation activities.
On the other hand, if the NWC is in second priority
(Scenario 2), there is unmet water demand through Another possible implication is related to the
all the dry years. The shortage reaches a maximum restoration of the lower Jordan River, from the
of almost 140 Mm3 in the simulation of summer lake southwards to the Dead Sea. This river section
2000, when all the summer months are summed up. receives 20 Mm3 of low-quality water, which is only
3% of the historical flow. As the NWC is by far the
Of course, the impact on the water supply to the biggest consumer in the Lake Tiberias basin, in the
NWC would be significant. long run it is the only water consumer that holds
significant amounts of water that could be allocated
The unmet water demand scenarios clearly show for the lower Jordan River restoration.
that securing the future water supply in the upper
Jordan River basin can only be done if it is given Guaranteeing the economy of the current Lake
higher priority than the NWC. Tiberias region, together with its water ecosystem,
and endeavouring to allocate water to the lower
Evaluation of the influence of a 20% reduction Jordan River for restoration purposes would
in the river flow on Lake Tiberias’s water level apparently be feasible only if the NWC priority
fluctuation (Figure 3) suggests that the priority were to be changed. However, any realistic option
setting has no influence. Closer examination may be through additional and alternative water-
reveals that 20% reduction scenarios lower the supply sources, such as desalination and water
water level below the red line through 66 months; transportation.

Figure 2 Unmet water demand of the NWC under reduction of 20% in the Jordan River flow
(Scenario 1) and reduction of 20% in Jordan River flow together with changed priority in
the NWC (Scenario 2)
45
40
Scenario 2
35
Scenario 1
Reference 30
25
3
Mm
20
15
10
Jun-03
Feb-03
Oct-02
Jun-02
Feb-02
Oct-01
Jun-01
Feb-01
Oct-00
Jun-00
Feb-00
Oct-99
Jun-99
Feb-99
Oct-98
Jun-98
Feb-98
Oct-97
In addition, and of course necessary for all countries if any, reliable research publicly available, and this
in the region, are improved water-demand manage- section is to a large degree based on two sets of
ment and water efficiency. information: first, the limited, although reported,
research findings, and second, Trondalen’s (2008)
Summary book Water and Peace for the People, which is based on
The Lake Tiberias basin’s vulnerability and geo- 40 years of base-line data and modelling17, and on
political significance make it a relevant case for possible implications for future water management.
studying the potential impacts of climate change on
water resources. First, just a brief description of the area and then
an overview of some selected publications that
Rising temperatures, decreasing rainfall and increased highlight the significance of climate changes on the
demand for water as the economy and population two basins:
grow – as well as possible geo-political changes –
would decrease the water availability in the basin. The Shatt al-Arab River has its headwater in Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq and is formed by the Euphrates River,
Maintaining current basin economy and sustainable the Tigris River and the Karun River. According
lake management, together with the future restora- to Cullen and deMenocal (2000), a conserva-
tion of the lower Jordan River, may be achieved by tive estimate states that 88% of the water in the
re-allocating water at the expense of the NWC. This Euphrates River is derived from precipitation falling
would imply a setting of alternative water priorities in Turkey, thus, making it highly sensitive to Turkish
and further development of new and additional precipitation, while the Tigris receives almost 60% of
water sources. its water below Baghdad, making it less sensitive but
still linked to variations in Turkish precipitation.
2.4 Possible scenarios for the Euphrates and
Tigris river basins
The influences of climate change on the Euphrates
and Tigris river basins are currently under investiga-
17 Based on authorised data provided by the three countries
tion by the countries concerned. There is very little, – cf. Trondalen, 2008.
Figure 3 Lake Tiberias’ water level fluctuation under a reduction of 20% in the Jordan River flow
(Scenario 1) and under a reduction of 20% in Jordan River flow together with changed
-207.00
-208.00 Red line Reference Scenario 1 Scenario 2
-209.00
Elevation (m)
-210.00
-211.00
-212.00
-213.00
-214.00
-215.00
Oct-87
Oct-88
Oct-89
Oct-90
Oct-91
Oct-92
Oct-93
Oct-94
Oct-95
Oct-96
Oct-97
Oct-98
Oct-99
Oct-00
Oct-01
Oct-02
The Euphrates River basin has a north-to-south The Shatt al-Arab River is the main source of fresh-
precipitation gradient with humid highlands in water into the Arabian Gulf. Variability in salinity
the north and the arid plain of Mesopotamia in is determined by the return-flow from irrigations,
the south. In the highlands, precipitation is over as well as rainfall and snowmelt upstream, and is
1,200 mm/year- and in the south the annual average probably the dominating component in the region’s
rainfall is about 100mm (Zaitchik et. al, 2005). In production of economically important shrimp and
portions of the Euphrates basin that are marginal finfish fisheries (Al-Yamani et al., 2007).
for dryland production, the difference of one or
two rain events can mean the difference between As outlined in Section 1, the climate-change
crop success and crop failure (Zaitchik et. al, 20054, scenarios are not yet clear, but they are potentially
Zaitchik et. al, 2007). staggering for the basins – such as: ‘The severity
and magnitude of water resource stress in Turkey is
The Euphrates and Tigris have two primary flood- most likely to be exacerbated by the continuance of
ing periods. The first, from November to March, is the present unsustainable trends of environmental
mostly due to rainfall. The second, occurring during degradation and global climate change whose great-
April and May, results form snowmelt and generates est adverse impact on water resources is expected in
50% of the annual runoff (Cullen and deMenocal, the countries located around the Mediterranean and
2000). According to Aqrawi (2001), the highest the Middle East’ (Odemis and Evrendilek, 2007).
river discharge is restricted to the spring season,
particularly April. Many parts of the lacustrine- Furthermore; ‘There are considerable uncertainties as
marsh regions in the Euphrates have been subjected to the impacts of global climate change on changes
to drainage modifications during the 1970s and in the demand and supply of water and water qual-
1980s (Aqrawi, 2001). Discharges reaching southern ity. Possible reductions in run-off may be attributed
Mesopotamia are often contaminated with high to increased evapotranspiration, decreased precipi-
concentrations of salt-ions, reflecting the return-flow tation, or a combination of both, which will be
from intensive irrigational systems and natural river- influenced by global climate change. The sensitivity
bed leakages on the Tigris River and especially on the of river discharge to climate change is of significance
Euphrates River (Trondalen, 2008 and Aqrawi, 2001). to the Middle East region.’

Map 2 Image of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers
Source: Trondalen, 2008
Al-Yamani et al (2007) notes that: ‘Unfortunately, If even the conservative estimates are taken, it will
discharge records for the Shatt Al-Arab River have have a profound impact on the water resources for
not been made available for the scientific commu- the two largest basins in the Middle East.
nity for the past three decades.’
Based on years of leading studies and modelling
Taking into account these statements, there are of the two rivers and co-operation with the three
reasons to argue that several renowned scientists countries, Trondalen (2008) outlines a set of conclu-
highlight the susceptibility of the two rivers to sions and recommendations for the nations and the
climate change. A brief summary of some of the international community to adopt (see section 6).
scientific bases of possible trends (cf. Section 1) are
outlined in the following: Water security, possible co-operation, and
climate change
• A decreasing trend in rainfall in most of the
Traditionally, water and security have been treated
Eastern Mediterranean and increased rain-
as separate entities; when they were combined it was
fall over the southern part of the eastern
often as ‘water security’ such as in relation to safely
Mediterranean.
procedures or security concerns for water infrastruc-
• Trends show a significant increase in maximum tures and transportation. Security studies have a
and minimum daily temperatures. long tradition of interpretation in military, strategic,
and political contexts, while water has been regarded
• A trend toward drier as well as wetter years in the
from a geo-science perspective or strictly as a water
future.
management issue.
• One study predicts that at the end of this century,
the Fertile Crescent may disappear altogether. In the late-eighties however, the epistemic com-
munity began to analyse the nexus in a broader
• The annual discharge of the Euphrates River will
sense, and scholars like Westing (1986) stated
decrease by between 29% and 73%.
that comprehensive security has two intertwined
• By 2050, there is an expectation that rainfall components: political security, with its military,
amounts will be reduced by up to 20–25% below economic and humanitarian subcomponents, and
present mean values. environmental security, including the protection and
use of resources and the environment. Much of
• All models show intensifying dry conditions, the research on environment and security was in
with rainfall decreases of up to 25% (regionally) fact more about strategic resources like water and
and 40% (locally), and projected increases in the security aspects than about environmental issues in
frequency of summer heat waves. a broad sense (see also Trondalen 1993 and 1997).
It is worth noting that the acceptance of the link • Water resource inequities as the roots of
between security and water is not universal. One of conflict and insecurity – Growing disparities
the difficulties in assessing the nexus is due to the between water-resources-rich and water-resources-
ambiguity surrounding the term ‘security’. Researchers poor communities and countries, in terms of
working in the area of water and security come from a access and control of the resources, has created a
variety of backgrounds and disciplines, and each inter- constant tension in some areas and open rebel-
prets the term ‘security’ in a different way, ranging lion in others, especially in areas that are heavily
from a strict definition of safety from armed conflict dependant on either rainfall or irrigation for
to a more general interpretation of ‘human security’, their food security.
or ‘human livelihood security’, which includes social, • Water resources changes as the roots of
cultural, economic, environmental, and other broader vulnerability to conflict – As water resources
aspects (Lonergan and Brooks, 1994). are altered either through human intervention
or simply due to natural variations, and not least
The notion of water security in this context is in relation to possible climate changes, scarcity
linked to different actors’ need to attain control and in terms of quality and quantity are aggravating
access to water resources in order to secure their conflict vulnerabilities. Communities and states
vital interest on various scales and geographical could then be exposed to a perceived risk to their
levels, seen from a strategic, political, economical, security, which in some instances has severe
cultural, environmental and social perspective. The implications.
fact that different actors have incompatible, compet-
ing, or conflicting strategic interests often create Under each category, water, security and various sec-
conflicts with varying intensity (Trondalen, 2008). tors including energy, agricultural production/‘food-
As conflicts escalate, stakeholders will be exposed security,’ and social and economic factors as well as
to conflict vulnerability, which in turn could be political ones are intertwined. An alternative way
a threat to security or simply creating a sense of of crafting out water security categories would be
insecurity.18 to investigate such sectoral causalities. However, to
raise the awareness and significance of the water
As national security has often been understood in security nexus in the Middle East, this report will
terms of assuring strategic interest (and even risking just highlight some of the water security concerns
the lives of citizens to attain security concerns), it is (before turning to a discussion of remedies in the
increasingly recognized that communities also often next section).
view access and control of basic goods and services
such as food and water as fulfilment of their need The Centre for Strategic and International Studies
for security. and the Centre for a New American Security recently
published a comprehensive report that aims to shed
In light of the sensitive water resources in the light on climate change, security and, among other
Middle East, the following broad categories related to issues, water: The Age of Consequence: The Foreign
water and security have been developed:19 Policy and National Security Implications of Global
Climate Change (CSIS and CNAS, 2007). Although
• Water resources as strategic20 goals — their study took a United States perspective, its
Obviously, in areas such as the Middle East, findings are quite relevant internationally – and
access and control of precious water resources is staggering. Such an approach could well be carried
vital from a security and strategic perspective. out for the Middle East, and probably, most of the
• Water resources as strategic targets — countries have unilaterally done that (but not made
Modification of water resources for military their findings publicly available).
purposes is a long-standing issue (such as in
about 2400 BC, when the Sumerians dug a canal Another and complementary perspective is a report
to divert water from the Tigris to the Euphrates to published by Friends of the Earth and EcoPeace.21
gain independence from Umma – cf. Roots, 1992). ‘Climate Change: A New Threat to Middle East
Security’ (Freimuth et al, 2007), outlines several
• Water resources as strategic tools — Water water security concerns related to water and climate
resources are, under certain conditions, powerful change. Some of their findings are (p. 4):
strategic tools – an example is an upstreamer’s
ability to restrict the flow of a vital river in order • Climate change is likely to act as a ‘threat
to fulfil other vital interests. multiplier’ – exacerbating water scarcity and
tensions over water within and between nations
linked by hydrological resources, geography, and
18 Stakeholders could range from parties that have stakes in the shared political boundaries. Poor and vulnerable
water in one way or another – such as an ‘impoverished commu- populations, which exist in significant numbers
nity’ in a mega city, a ‘farming community’ in a predominately
agriculturally based society, or even ‘states’. throughout the region, will likely face the
greatest risk.
19 The text in the first four categories is derived from Lonergan
and Brooks (1994)
20 A strategic resource, like water, is one that is indispensable for a

society in the short term. 21 Two environmental NGOS represented in the Middle East.

• Water shortages and rising sea levels could to determine the extent and magnitude of the
lead to mass migration in the region. Scenarios possible water security challenges.
conducted by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and other organizations • The least resourceful countries seem to have
indicate that a 50-centimetre (0.5 metre) rise in limited ability to adapt to climate change – even
sea level, for example, could displace between the modest and early manifestations.
2–4 million Egyptians by 2050. The drinking • Climate change effects will aggravate existing
water of 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza would international crises and problems.
be further contaminated by rising sea levels
leading to sea-water intrusion of their only • Reliable and relevant data and modelling are
freshwater source, the Coastal Aquifer. needed to determine with any sense of certainty
the direct impact of climate change.
• Economic unrest across the region, due to a
decline in agricultural production from climate Nevertheless, based on even these broad but poten-
impacts on water resources, also could lead to tially serious conclusions, the next section will
greater political unrest, which could threaten explore ways of handling the potential impacts of
current regimes, thereby affecting internal climate change on the nexus of water security.
and cross-border relations. These factors place
greater pressure on the entire region and on
already-strained cross-border relations, and 3. National water security challenges
potentially foster more widespread heightened resulting from climate change
tensions or conflicts.
As water resources will be diminished in the Middle
The report goes on to outline some of the factors East as a result of population growth, land manage-
that would determine the likelihood of conflict ment and climate change, countries have of course
or co-operation in the region as climate impacts to reduce their consumption and improve the
become more significant (Freimuth et al, 2007, p. 4): efficiency of existing resources.
• The existence of water agreements, and their Structural changes such as the reduction of water for
degree of sustainability, including the ability of irrigation may be one option, but as these changes
parties to deal with extreme circumstances, such take place, national governments will face increased
as longer periods of drought. competition internally and internationally. In some
• The influence of destabilizing economic and instances instability, disputes and security threats
political factors – for example, unemployment may evolve.
and mass migration due to agricultural decline
and the large-scale flooding of agricultural areas. These issues will be dealt with in the following. A
critical question is whether current policies, insti-
• The extent of national economic and political tutional setups, and programmes are appropriate
development, including the degree to which local to handle increased risks and uncertainties. What
institutional structures and infrastructure exist. has yet to be determined is how quickly, where,
• A given political entity’s ability to mitigate or and with which magnitude and significance water
adapt to climate change. resources systems are likely
to change.
There are other reports that as climate changes evolve,
use a different methodo- national governments would As climate changes evolve,
logical approach, such as have to operate under higher national governments
the application of security would have to operate
risks and uncertainties
impact assessments (SIA) for under higher risks and
analysing the redistribution uncertainties, although,
of actual and perceived governments are always
security as a result of water development interven- making decisions in an area of relative risk and
tions and projects among the key stakeholder groups uncertainty. Awareness and understanding of
(Warner and Meissner, 2008)22. climate change on national and international water
resources is increasing, but no one really knows the
The outcome of such a SIA for the Middle East magnitude and significance of the risks and uncer-
would probably have given other findings. However, tainties, especially where regional and basin-wide
most of the available literature seems to support the changes are taking place (see, for example, WWF
following conclusions: International, 2006).
• The scale of the potential consequences of cli- Historically, risks and uncertainties related to
mate change in the Middle East makes it difficult natural resources may stimulate unilateralism and
less co-operation (see, for example, Klare, 2002),
22 They employ SIA to examine water security trade-offs in the while the current and future challenge is to counter
Okavango Basin, highlighting the positive role of information and
knowledge exchange as a means for alleviating actual as well as
that trend and craft out ways that stimulate co-
perceived insecurity. operative actions (see, for example, Dinar et al.,
4. Water security challenges for the international community resulting from climate change
2007). Some countries that are exposed to high risks 4. Water security challenges for the
and uncertainties are required to take precaution- international community resulting from
ary measures. However, what’s still unclear is the climate change
degree of influence that climate change has on a
country’s vulnerability to water disputes and instabil- The international community is faced with current
ity. Nevertheless, there are a set of national policy and new challenges in assisting countries, or groups
instruments that may prevent and resolve such of countries, that are already entrenched in domestic
disputes in a sustainable manner. or regional conflicts (either water-related or not).
The adaptation of coherent national planning, International organizations have different roles in
programmes and interventions would prevent such resolving water security issues as well as preventing
disputes at a national level – and reduce the chances and resolving water-related disputes – such as the
of spill-over effects internationally. In addition, United Nations, multilateral organizations, develop-
policies related to water legislature revisions and ment banks and regional organizations. Since the
national capacity building in conflict management nature of many of the causes behind instability,
should be given priority, especially in light of the security challenges and disputes is the same, the key
following factors: challenge is not necessarily to create new interven-
tions and institutions, but rather to improve and
• Implications of climatic variability and climate target the instability/conflicts in a different way
change on flood control and on reductions of the than in the past. Many attempts have been made
quantities of surface water and groundwater. to analyse how such improvements could be done,
• Adherence to co-operative arrangements and and there are unfortunately no quick-fix solutions
implications on water legislation and regulation. (CESAR, 1999). Recent comprehensive studies of
how, for example, a pivotal organization could
• Consequences in relation to protection from pol- improve its performance in preventing instability
lution and deteriorating water quality. and disputes (see, for example, Mason et al., 2008),
• Allocation of water to consuming sectors such do not offer any substantial new insight into how
as agriculture – timing, spatial distribution and multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations,
amount. can effectively act – except for already important
and known measures such as:
• Increased pollution from local and transbound-
ary sources. • improve inter-agency co-ordination,
• Improving the analytical capacity of relevant • enhance technical assistance to national gov-
water resources data as international co-operation ernments to prevent and manage conflicts and
on these issues increases. post-conflict situations,
• Fostering multiple stakeholders’ dialogues. As • develop financial arrangement that would create
water management often affects diverse stake- win-win situations and benefit sharing arrange-
holders, involving them would increases legiti- ments (as the World Bank has done in the
macy and the sustainability of decisions. Pakistani-Indian Indus basin or in the Nile River
basin between Ethiopia and Egypt),
Some countries are already entrenched in conflicts. • provide capacity-building assistance in relevant
The current and the new conflict dimensions will sectors (such as water, agriculture, energy and
create additional challenges. health),
Issues to be addressed by the various governments • assisting nations in setting up alternative dispute-
would include: resolution programs, especially at the community
level
• Reformulations of hydro-political positions and
• develop independent assessments and descrip-
interests.
tions of the water resources situation – such
• Changed conditions for the conflict in terms as water monitoring systems and institutional
of intranational and international dimensions support – as a basis for national and international
(foreign influence creates both constraints and management,
opportunities).
• adjustm national versus international/regional
• Ability to adopt international assistance (both water legislative frameworks,
technical assistance and so-called process tools
• improve third-party assistance programmes –
[like negotiation assistance]).
such as ‘good offices’ (involving both environ-
mental and mediation expertise),
• strengthen international legislation – and,
equally important, the enforcement of existing
international legal frameworks (laws, conven-
tions, protocols, and declarations).

In reality, most of the remedial actions have been a capacity-building strategy must exist where aware-
taken as a joint effort between the national gov- ness is the first step.
ernments and the international community. The
following section explores joint challenges and At present and quite often, such a basis is lacking,
adaptive strategies. but some international organizations are assisting
nations to deal with these facts (for example, the
World Bank, UNDP, UNESCO, and ESWCA in the
5. Possible adaptation strategies Middle East).
for nations and the international
community to jointly adopt Several concrete and well proven joint measures
could be taken by nations or groups of nations
Over the years, instability and water vulnerability together with the international community (often
and security problems have occurred under different by international organizations):
conditions, and some nations and international
organizations have well-developed functional a. Conflict resolution capacity in most countries
policies and programmes that can jointly be adopted is weak, and sometimes almost non-existent. A
(in contrast to the preceding sections that dealt with common notion is that conflicts are handled
national and international measures separately). ad hoc, and that senior officials or even politi-
cal leaders are assigned the task of ‘solving’ or
Such situations are quite ‘fixing’ the problems when
relevant in the Middle they occur. It is increas-
East where some countries a national acceptance of the ingly recognised that a
need outside assistance fact that hydrological changes national capacity to actively
in handling internal and are taking place is a necessity resolve or settle conflicts
international water-security is something that must be
for action. A national willingness
problems and disputes. In given priority to in complex
to address the matter through a and inter-sectoral issues,
such cases, a majority of
capacity-building strategy must like water disputes. Climate
them will probably not be
exist where awareness is the change accentuates this
able to sustain national
water allocation or quality first step. need. United Nations organ-
needs without external izations (such as UNESCO’s
intervention, such as: PCCP and UN ESCWA) and
other organizations (such as
1. Generally, in large multi-country river/ground- COMPASS and the CESAR Foundation and CMG/
water basins where management policies and Harvard University) offer such assistance.
actions have already been agreed on – and which
have to be re-negotiated. b. Specific financial and economic instruments
that are tailored to meet local, national and
2. Where there is a demand for water management international needs. The popular notion of
investment that goes beyond the capacity of the benefit-sharing has a high academic value, but
countries involved, or because ‘third-party funds’ is limited in real-life situations, in the sense
would be more appropriate than neighbouring or that operationalization of the concept has been
bilateral funds. quite limited (Phillips et al, 2006 and Jägerskog
and Lundquist, 2006). That does not exclude
3. In a politically grid-locked situation, either the fact that one of the very few ways for
nationally or internationally. nations to prevent instability and water-related
disputes is to develop solutions that take each
nation’s concerns into account. Financial and
One of the most important tasks that national
economic instruments and arrangements such
governments and international organizations could
as swap-mechanisms – like ‘the up-streamer that
jointly take on is to assess and develop water vulner-
gets water while the down-streamer gets energy
ability/security/conflict-management strategies. With
or trading concessions’ offers opportunities
respect to possible climate changes, such strategies
that might prove to be sustainable. Another
ought to be developed on the following basis.
advantage is that as climate change influences
hydrological systems at a national or regional
The government must know the status and changes
level, some of the disputes and tensions can be
of the water resources. In this context, mapping and
defused by swapping water resource costs and
describing the changes of the water resources situa-
benefits in monetary terms – such as trading,
tion (such as rainfall pattern, resilience of hydrologi-
energy, water or other tradable resources, infra-
cal systems, water availability, and sustainable yields)
structure, and commodities. In mid-2008, the
is critical. Although it’s probably regarded as being
World Bank set up a Climate Investment Fund
obvious, a national acceptance of the fact that these
(CIF), which has pledged US$1.6 billion. The CIF
changes are taking place is a necessity for action. A
is an important new source of interim funding,
national willingness to address the matter through
through which the Multilateral Development
5. Possible adaptation strategies for nations and the international community to jointly adopt
Banks (MDBs) will provide additional grants and • Outlining the specific roles, rights, obliga-
concessional financing to developing countries tions, and responsibilities of the countries
to allow them to address urgent climate-change in all aspects related to the management of
challenges.23 In addition, an Adaptive Fund is water. Quite often, nations face major chal-
being established under the combined auspices lenges in defining and carrying out such
of the World Bank and the Global Environmen- functions, and even more so when interna-
tal Facility. tional agreements are developed. One point
of departure is to specify the institutional
c. The establishment of compensation mecha- functions and enhance countries’ capacity to
nisms: The recognition that countries involved carry them out.
in water disputes and climate-related conflicts
have mutually incompatible goals has prompted • Outlining the basic elements in procedures
the incipient design of compensation mecha- and protocols (in relation to, for example,
nisms – either in terms of monetary, energy, or visits and the systematic exchange of infor-
even commodity compensation. Such mecha- mation). In general, institutional and legal
nisms are quite complex, especially since they capacity building is broad in its scope, but in
demand a long-term perspective, which is often this context, it is recommended that countries
in conflict with short-term political decisions. As tailor their work towards concrete actions
climate change may force the reformulation of aimed at implementing water agreements.
current water agreements, compensation mecha- g. Joint commission: when countries decide to
nisms will probably be an instrument which has start co-operative management of international
huge potential in such contexts, as well as in waters or to implement a negotiated agreement, a
already grid-locked ones (see further reading in joint commission or group is usually established.
Trondalen, 2008). Some countries have been reluctant to do this,
while others can trace back a century-old struc-
d. The development of mechanisms for leasing
tured and fruitful record of co-operation – for
waters between nations (as proposed in
example, the 1909 International Joint Commis-
Trondalen, 2008, regarding the Wazzani water
sion regarding the Great Lakes between Canada
dispute between Lebanon and Israel). Such
and the US (Grover and Khan, 2007) – which
mechanisms require international assistance,
could serve as a model for others. Joint Com-
especially in acting as an interlocutor in the
missions, or River Basin Organizations (RBOs)
monitoring of agreements.
normally provide assistance to countries in
e. International assistance and investment in achieving the aims and principles set out in
water infrastructure is in many instances one a co-operative framework, especially on water
of the few ways in which countries are able to policy issues.
cope with water disputes. The recent planned
• RBOs also provide assistance to riparian countries
Egyptian and Ethiopian joint dam development
to develop legislative, regulatory instruments
on the Blue Nile is an example of how a preven-
and other measures in order to implement the
tive initiative is supported by the international
provisions of the framework agreement (such as
community (with the assistance of, in this case,
identifying and facilitating the filling of gaps).
among others, the Nile Basin Initiative and the
World Bank). • When a riparian country cannot implement the
provisions of the agreement or the RBO’s deci-
f. Institutional and legal capacity building would sions, certain policy advice and assistance from the
form the core of joint national and international RBO will be provided to the countries concerned.
efforts, and should include following aspects (see
also Sherk, 2000 and Scholz and Stiftel, 2005): • RBOs have also proven be have problem-solving
capacity at different stages in international lack
• Legal and institutional instruments and of co-operation (Tänzler et al, 2007):
arrangements offered for consideration in
relation to fulfilling the provisions of inter-
h. Streamlining and developing water policy
national agreements: As some nations strive
in an international context. In a national
to prevent instability and conflicts, agree-
context, it is an obvious necessity to establish
ments will be designed, but quite often, the
water policies on such critical issues as water
hard part is to implement the agreement –
rights and ownership, privatization, liabilities,
Strengthening implementation through insti-
pricing and tariffing, and pollution abatements.
tutional capacity building is pivotal.
Any international water context is likely to make
national water policies more complex, because
such national policies are, by nature, crafted out
on the basis of principles of national sovereignty.
23 The CIF aims to enable a dynamic partnership between the Therefore, national water policies are normally
MDBs and developing countries in order to undertake investments not adjusted to the fact that the water resource
that achieve a country’s development goals through a transition to
a climate-resilient economy and a low carbon development path is shared with a neighbour. Nations adhering to
(see http://web.worldbank.org

international agreements very often have ambi- receive such assistance, but there would be at least
guities and gaps in their national policy and leg- some issues that most nations would consider to be
islation. Some international organizations, such ‘acceptable’ international assistance or intervention –
as the International Network of Basin Organiza- see some examples in the following textbox:
tions (www.inbo-news.org), share knowledge and
provide technical assistance in such contexts.
Since climate change is expected to alter national Box 1
and international water systems, nations must
expect new challenges that should be reflected Examples of concrete assistance that international
in their legislation and policies. Countries that organizations might provide to countries that are exposed
do not have the capacity to adapt and develop in to problems related to water security and disputes:
this way will be even more exposed to instability
and conflicts. • Water monitoring and mapping technology (such as
Geographical information Systems):
i. Enhancing the mapping and analytical • Development of institutional setup and systems to react
capacity of water resources. Some countries to the (above-mentioned) results – such as technical
have, even today, limited knowledge and assistance in water monitoring and assessment, institu-
understanding of existing water resources, espe- tional capacity building, and legislative reform programs
cially in the areas of groundwater and water • Financial and economic packages (for example, relating
quality changes and trends. As climate changes to compensation) that would target ‘given water
alter the hydrological systems, countries with situations’ (such as the development of water allocation
limited assessment capacities will potentially be schemes between users and sectors and economic
exposed to ‘sudden hydrological surprises’ (such instruments) – cf. new instruments such as the CIF.
as acute water contamination of drinking water
• Development of conflict-management capacities –
sources). Many international organizations, such as enhancing the negotiation skills of national
including UNESCO’s International Hydrologi- delegates; developing negotiation strategies;
cal Programme (IHP), have for years provided enhancing the capacity to draw upon available legal,
assistance to national governments. Contempo- technical, negotiation and economic expertise.
rary technologies such as Geographical Infor-
mation Systems (GIS) provide streamlined tools
for governments to develop national overviews
6. A particular focus on co-operation in
and analytical capacities that will enable them
to systematically map and assess changes in the Euphrates and Tigris basins
their hydrological systems. UNEP has taken a
It should be quite obvious – based on the available
lead in such initiatives (see text box below).
studies, uncertainties related to climate-change
projects, and lack of understanding of water-related
j. Establishment of water-resources early warning implications at river basin level – that one should be
systems. As climate changes evolve, hydrological quite careful in prescribing remedies and ways out
changes will happen – some will occur slowly, for countries affected by the anticipated changes to
while others will take place quickly (such as the their climates.
saturation of water quality attributes like odour),
nations must develop an early warning capacity as The modelling of the upper Jordan River basin
well as developing water-quantity and water-quality and its potential implications revealed quite severe
monitoring systems (including the standardisation impacts. Due to the political complexity and sen-
of parameters): sitivity of the area24, this report will not, however,
elaborate various ways of mitigating the effects (as
• International organizations and partnerships expressed in the modelling), except for pointing to
between government and the private sector will the more general measures as outlined in the preced-
enable countries to establish national and interna- ing sections. More importantly, however, is the
tional water-quantity and water-quality meas- UNESCO publication, Water and Peace for the People:
uring programmes, especially as ‘hydrological Possible Solutions to Water Disputes in the Middle East
surprises’ could be detected at an incipient stage. (Trondalen, 2008), which deals with these matters
• Establishment of an early warning system for more extensively.
water quality as well as for hazards such as
floods and droughts. This is probably one of the Nevertheless, even the most conservative estimates
most cost-effective preventive measures that of climate change, such as those expressed in
can be taken to prevent sudden instability and Sections 1 and 2, support the argument that coun-
disorder due to unexpected pollution or water tries have to plan and take measures to minimize
unavailability. the potential staggering effects on the water security
situation. The situation may be described as follows:
In some cases, the international community is
unwilling or unable to provide assistance in the
circumstances mentioned above. Likewise, some
24 This demands a more elaborate explanation and assessment
countries may be either unwilling or unable to than the format of this report permits.
6. A particular focus on co-operation in the Euphrates and Tigris basins
• The scale of the potential consequences of cli- • The consequences of doing nothing to address
mate change in the Middle East makes it difficult the above-mentioned points would cause severe
to determine the extent and magnitude of the humanitarian suffering.
possible water security challenges.
• A precautionary principle should be applied to the
• The least resourceful countries seem to have lim- planned irrigation schemes in the three water-
ited capacity to adapt to climate change – even in course countries in order to maintain sustainable
modest and early manifestations. development of the river basins.
• Climate change effects will aggravate existing • A water quantity and quality monitoring programme
international crises and problems. should be implemented at the borders and a set
of limiting value-ranges for these parameters
Because there is a lack of reliable and relevant ought to be established.
data and modelling to determine with certainty
• There should be an intensification of the appli-
the direct impact of climate change, the data
cation of sound environmental waste-water
and information that follow is taken from one
technology and joint research regarding the
of the few international studies and models of
development of low-water-demand crops, as well
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that are publicly
as effective irrigation practices.
available: Water and Peace for the People: Possible
Solutions to Water Disputes in the Middle East • From a sustainable water-management perspec-
(Trondalen, 2008). tive, it is not necessarily important whether
there are two associated agreements for the rivers
The set modelling and studies did not – at the time or one unified one, as long as an agreement is
they were carried out – include data on climate reached on how to manage the rivers for the
change. Therefore, a conservative approach would optimal benefit of all three countries. From a
be to use the recommendations for the absolute negotiation-process point of view, however, it
minimum measures that the three countries (Turkey, seems conducive to develop one single agree-
Syria and Iraq) should take. As climate change will ment, or at least two linked river agreements.
aggravate the water situation, the argument is simply
• All three countries have, in principle, acknowl-
that the stated measures have to be taken earlier
edged their responsibility to protect and use
rather than later.
the watercourses in an equitable and reasonable
manner.
The recommendations could be grouped as follows:
(1) what the three countries could do, and (2) what • All irrigation projects in the watercourses should
the international community could do to support be made subject to extensive Environmental
them: Impact Assessment with respect to return flow,
and the effects on soil and groundwater.
1) Recommendations for Turkey, Syria and Iraq:
It seems obvious that all three countries have to The above-mentioned conclusions and recom-
improve their water efficiency by using a combina- mendations are considered to be an imperative.
tion of policy instruments, investment and institu- And of course, if climate change scenarios – even
tional capacity building. the conservative ones – were to be fully adopted,
more far-reaching measures would have to be taken.
However, taking the sociocultural and political con- Under any circumstances, co-operative frameworks
text into consideration, it is urgent that a trilateral between the three countries have to be in place
water agreement is reached sooner rather than later.
as soon as possible.
A conservative approach The ‘zero-hypothesis’ (where
If no remedial actions are would therefore be to follow no sustainable agreements
taken, irreversible damage, the recommendations for the exist between them) will
especially to the Euphrates three countries to take as an under any circumstances
watercourse in the lower absolute minimum. As climate have severe consequences
part of Syria and in Iraq, changes will aggravate the water from a water resources and
may occur as irrigation situation, the argument is water security perspective.
volumes increase. simply that the stated measures
A relevant question is to
• To prevent the Euphrates have to be taken earlier
what extent it is realistic
River from being pol- rather than later. that the three countries take
luted – especially in dry these steps alone – without
periods – the application any assistance from the
of rule-curves for extraction of water for irriga- international community. The fact that there have
tion is recommended. Discharge values at the not been any serious trilateral discussions about
Turkish/Syrian and Syrian/Iraqi borders might these matters in 20 years illustrates the situation.
therefore vary, and even more so in the case of The next section outlines ways in which the interna-
increases in climatic change. tional community may assist the three countries.

2) Recommendation for the international situation that may be described as a crisis, there
community to support the three riparian states: is a need for concerted measures to be taken to
The three nations have of course the option of reduce the expected adverse impacts of intensi-
moving along the path of no substantive co- fied and expanded irrigation.
operation. Or they could open up for international • In order to adequately address these impacts
support in their endeavours towards some sort by maintaining a certain water-quality level
of sustainable co-operative water management according to agreed standards, a Third-Party
framework. Compensation Mechanism is proposed, at
the first stage, i.e. at the border of Syria and
Based on Trondalen (2008), the international com- Iraq. Later, similar plants would be located in
munity could assist by establishing a new: the border areas of Turkey and Syria. Such a
Compensation Mechanism demands funds that,
International Initiative for the Euphrates and realistically speaking, can only be raised by the
Tigris river basins international community.
Irrespective of the political changes and even climate-
change scenarios, it seems obvious that a new, • There are two reasons for this: 1) The amount of
overarching international initiative must be taken: funds necessary to mitigate the pollution is so
large that only a multi-donor effort can meet the
• The Euphrates and Tigris Basins Initiative (ETI) financial requirements, and 2) stakeholders out-
could be a partnership initiated and led by side the region might consider this Compensation
the riparian states of the two rivers through a Mechanism to be effective in preventing unstable
Council of Ministers with the full support of the conditions that might stem from such a crisis.
international community through international
• A Compensation Mechanism would aim to
organizations such as Arab development banks
achieve internationally accepted water-quality
and institutions, together with for example, the
standards and thereby minimize the negative
World Bank (in association with GEF and the
effects of poor water quality on sustainable-devel-
United Nations).
opment projects in the watercourse countries.
• Following the example of the Nile Basin Initiative
• First priority should be given to the Euphrates
(NBI), which encompasses nine riparian African
River. This would take into account and reconcile
states, an ETI could start with a participatory
four key and potentially conflicting objectives:
process of dialogue among the riparians that
should result in agreement on a shared vision. 1. Turkey’s planned agricultural use in the South
For example, agreement could be reached on the Anatolia region (GAP).
principle of ‘achieving sustainable socioeconomic
development through the equitable utilisation 2. Syria’s demand for expansion of irrigation.
of, and shared benefit from, the common water
resources of the Euphrates and Tigris basins (cf. 3. Iraq’s long-term claim of access to usable
the similarity with the NBI). This vision could water.
then be translated into a similar (to the NBI) 4. Sustaining the ecological balance of the rivers.
Strategic Action Program with concrete activities
and projects. • The most effective way of mitigating pollution
of the Euphrates, and especially its salinity, is
In light of these conclusions (which are based on
to propose that the Compensation Mechanism
estimates that did not include climate change), there
would compensate Syria for upstream measures
will obviously be far-reaching implications for the
to reduce the pollution of the water flowing into
water resources of the two rivers for all three coun-
Iraq. In addition, and as a next step, the same
tries – even if only the most conservative climate
mechanism could be put in place on the Turkish
change forecasts come about.
side at the Turkish/Syrian border in order to
achieve acceptable water quality (especially along
One of the concrete proposals within an ETI is
the drainage areas at the border zone).
to mitigate cross-border pollution through the
establishment of a ‘Third-Party Compensation • An implementation, monitoring and verifica-
Mechanism’ (Trondalen, 2008): tion system should be an integral part of such a
Compensation Mechanism – see more specifica-
• The results of the modelling of the two rivers tions in Trondalen (ibid).
makes it quite clear that the water-quality aspects
– especially for the Euphrates River today and in Establishment of a Desalination Plant
the near future – have to be given special atten- Furthermore, Trondalen (2008) suggests that:
tion in any basin-management strategy, particu-
larly in terms of the impact of return-flow from • Economic compensation could be used to reduce
irrigation. the negative downstream effects, which could –
in the first instance – include a Desalination
• In order to avert the negative environmental (and
Plant at the Euphrates River on the Syrian side of
subsequently, humanitarian) consequences of a
the Syrian-Iraqi border.
Summing up
• Economic compensation would also be given to providing additional compensation to upstream

Turkey in the GAP-region to undertake measures countries that are adopting mitigation measures.
that aim to reduce the negative pollution effects Otherwise, the overall cost for the concerned
downstream through the efficient application national governments, as well as for the inter-
and transport of irrigation water, and the man- national community, is likely to be many times
agement of drainage water. higher in terms of unintended humanitarian, eco-
nomic, social and environmental consequences,
• Internationally, there are parallels to such a
as well as potential instability in the region.
mechanism, such as the United States/Mexico
agreement on the Colorado River, where a
Desalination Plant is installed on the United Summing up
States side that treats water in order to maintain
agreed water-quality standards. Even without climate change, there is a univocal
conclusion from Trondalen (2008) that co-operative
Trondalen also asks why the international commu- management of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers
nity should fund such a Compensation Mechanism – must be improved in the future. If not, these water
and outlines a reply to the question: resources will not only be insufficient for the
countries to provide ‘water for the people’ (either
• One may argue that national water usage for in terms of quality or quantity), but, and equally
sustainable development should be governed importantly, the resources themselves may be
through the respective countries’ water-manage- irreversibly damaged.
ment legislation. In most cases, however, as in
the Euphrates and Tigris basins, national legisla- However, reluctance on the part of the three coun-
tions are currently not harmonized to each other, tries and the international community to deal with
nor do they reflect international water-quality these challenges will eventually create multiple
standards. problems, necessitating critical remedial actions –
• It is well understood that unrestricted water use even before climate change starts to have an effect.
upstream would impose environmental, and
thereby economic, burdens on downstream Without action, the problems will continue to grow,
states. At present, improving downstream water with tragic consequences for the people of these
quality and quantity to minimize adverse countries and possibly for others outside the three
impacts will place additional costs on the countries.
upstream users.
It is therefore the international community’s obliga-
• Over the past decade, this has been internation- tion to urge Turkey, Syria and Iraq to take action
ally recognized, as shown by the establishment now. In addition to ‘sitting around the negotiation
of the joint World Bank/UNEP/UNDP Global table’, Turkey, Syria and Iraq should probably take
Environmental Facility (GEF). One of its four two immediate concrete steps:
prime objectives is to cover such additional costs
related to international watercourses. First, they should conduct a comprehensive
• Is seems obvious that the challenges to sound exchange of information, and second, they should
management of the two rivers falls within the initiate a comprehensive twin-basin hydrological
mandate of GEF, which is a recognition of the modeling of their region25 in order to improve the
responsibility of the international community in factual basis for further actions.
if action is not taken, the

problems will continue to grow
with tragic consequences for the
people of these countries and
possibly for ‘others’ outside the
three countries.
25 Such a comprehensive twin-basin modeling should be

compared with the separate-basin model studied up to now (see
Trondalen, 2008).

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World Water Assessment Programme side publications,
March 2009
During the consultation process for the third edition of the World Water Development Report, a general
consensus emerged as to the need to make the forthcoming report more concise, while highlighting
major future challenges associated with water availability in terms of quantity and quality.
This series of side publications has been developed to ensure that all issues and debates that might
not benefit from sufficient coverage within the report would find space for publication.
The 17 side publications released on the occasion of the World Water Forum in Istanbul in March, 2009,
in conjunction with World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World, represent the first
of what will become an ongoing series of scientific papers, insight reports and dialogue papers that
will continue to provide more in-depth or focused information on water–related topics and issues.
Insights
IWRM Implementation in Basins, Sub-Basins and Aquifers: State of the Art Review
by Keith Kennedy, Slobodan Simonovic, Alberto Tejada-Guibert, Miguel de França Doria and José Luis Martin for UNESCO-IHP
Institutional Capacity Development in Transboundary Water Management
by Ruth Vollmer, Reza Ardakanian, Matt Hare, Jan Leentvaar, Charlotte van der Schaaf and Lars Wirkus for UNW-DPC
Global Trends in Water-Related Disasters: An Insight for Policymakers
by Yoganath Adikari and Junichi Yoshitani at the Public Works Research Institute, Tsukuba, Japan, for the International Center for
Water Hazard and Risk Management (ICHARM), under the auspices of UNESCO.
Inland Waterborne Transport: Connecting Countries
by Sobhanlal Bonnerjee, Anne Cann,Harald Koethe, David Lammie, Geerinck Lieven, Jasna Muskatirovic, Benjamin Ndala, Gernot
Pauli and Ian White for PIANC/ICIWaRM
Building a 2nd Generation of New World Water Scenarios
by Joseph Alcamo and Gilberto Gallopin
Seeing Traditional Technologies in a New Light: Using Traditional Approaches for Water Management in Drylands
by Harriet Bigas, Zafar Adeel and Brigitte Schuster (eds), for the United Nations University International Network on Water, Environ-
ment and Health (UNU-INWEH)
Dialogue Series
Water Adaptation in National Adaptation Programmes for Action Freshwater in Climate Adaptation Planning and Climate
Adaptation in Freshwater Planning
by Gunilla Björklund, Håkan Tropp, Joakim Harlin, Alastair Morrison and Andrew Hudson for UNDP
Integrated Water Resources Management in Action
by Jan Hassing, Niels Ipsen, Torkil-Jønch Clausen, Henrik Larsen and Palle Lindgaard-Jørgensen for DHI Water Policy and the UNEP-
DHI Centre for Water and Environment
Confronting the Challenges of Climate Variability and Change through an Integrated Strategy for the Sustainable Manage-
ment of the La Plata River Basin
by Enrique Bello, Jorge Rucks and Cletus Springer for the Department of Sustainable Development, Organization of American States
Water and Climate Change: Citizen Mobilization, a Source of Solutions
by Marie-Joëlle Fluet, International Secretariat for Water; Luc Vescovi, Ouranos, and Amadou Idrissa Bokoye, Environment Canada
Updating the International Water Events Database
by Lucia De Stefano, Lynette de Silva, Paris Edwards and Aaron T. Wolf, Program for Water Conflict Management and Transforma-
tion, Oregon State University, for UNESCO PCCP
Water Security and Ecosystems: The Critical Connection
by Thomas Chiramba and Tim Kasten for UNEP
Scientific Papers
Climate Changes, Water Security and Possible Remedies for the Middle East
by Jon Martin Trondalen for UNESCO PCCP
A Multi-Model Experiment to Assess and Cope with Climate Change Impacts on the Châteauguay Watershed in Southern
Quebec
by Luc Vescovi, Ouranos; Ralf Ludwig, Department of Geography, University of Munich; Jean-François Cyr, Richard Turcotte and Louis-
Guillaume Fortin, Centre d’Expertise Hydrique du Québec; Diane Chaumont, Ouranos; Marco Braun and Wolfram Mauser, Department
of Geography, University of Munich
Water and Climate Change in Quebec
by Luc Vescovi, Ouranos; Pierre Baril, Ministry of Transport, Québec; Claude Desjarlais ; André Musy; and René Roy, Hydro-Québec.
All authors are members of the Ouranos Consortium
Investing in Information, Knowledge and Monitoring
by Jim Winpenny for the WWAP Secretariat
Water Footprint Analysis (Hydrologic and Economic) of the Guadania River Basin
by Maite Martinez Aldaya, Twente Water Centre, University of Twente and Manuel Ramon Llamas, Department of Geodynamics,
Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
From Potential Conflict to Cooperation Potential’ (PCCP)
facilitates multi-level and interdisciplinary dialogues in
order to foster peace, co-operation and development
related to the management of shared water resources.
Housed within IHP, and a contribution to WWAP, PCCP

uses research and capacity building activities to bring
players engaged in transboundary water management
together and help them increase the opportunities for
actual co-operation and development.
Contact details:
UNESCO - Division of Water Sciences
Léna Salamé
Project Coordinator
1, rue Miollis
75015 Paris, France
Tel: (+ 33) 1 45 68 41 80
Fax: (+ 33) 1 45 68 58 11
E-mail: l.salame@unesco.org
Website: www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp
www.unesco.org/publishing
United Nations

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The United Climate Changes, Water

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (UNESCO PCCP)

1. Current research on climate change and

2. Climate changes and possible water

In the past, there seems to have been a common wisdom

The scope of the IPCC process is global, and is divided

This report looks more closely at the Middle East and

1. According to authoritative scientific knowledge,

2 As well as potential evolution of new diseases.

Some experts argue that the implications for

Geneva, November 4th, 2008

Introduction conflicts could be summarised as follows: sudden

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 3

— Basin is used synonymously with watershed, catchment, or watercourse.

— Conflict Management comprises prevention, avoidance, settlement, and resolution

— International water resources/watercourses is preferred to shared international water resources

— Monitoring: The systematic surveillance and measurement of defined parameters.

Dispute is used synonymously with Conflict

JR: the Jordan River

LTB: Lake Tiberias basin

UJRB: the upper Jordan River basin

(Source: derived from Trondalen, 2008)

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 5

8 See for example the following information from AUB, Beirut:

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 7

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 9

12 Note that in the dry period (April to September) it is almost

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 11

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 13

Lake Tiberias Water Balance Water Management

Upper Jordan River

Lebanon Golan Heights

Lower Jordan River

Source: Trondalen, 2008.

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 15

Simulations and Scenarios

No unmet water demand was calculated in the

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 17

-208.00 Red line Reference Scenario 1 Scenario 2

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 19

Map 2 Image of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers

Source: Trondalen, 2008

20 A strategic resource, like water, is one that is indispensable for a

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 21

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 23

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 25

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 27

• Economic compensation would also be given to providing additional compensation to upstream

if action is not taken, the

25 Such a comprehensive twin-basin modeling should be

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 29

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 31

Housed within IHP, and a contribution to WWAP, PCCP

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From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 3

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From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 7

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 9

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 11

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 13

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 15

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 17

From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 19

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From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) 23

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