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Iggle - The Ethics of Computer Games - A Character Approach

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Chapter 11

The Ethics of Computer Games:


A Character Approach

Adam Briggle

11.1 Introduction

Computer games are a rapidly evolving and growing aspect of contemporary


culture. In 2008, U.S. retail sales of computer games topped $21.3 billion, a new
industry record and well more than Hollywood’s box-office receipts.1 The upward
trend in sales is due in part to growth in online gaming and the portable game
market, indicating how pervasively games are becoming woven into the fabric of
daily life. Playing computer games is a major activity for youth. Yet many players
are adults, and the market includes once under-represented groups such as retirees.
Games are becoming more culturally acceptable—changing from “geek to chic”
(King and Borland 2003). This growth in gaming has sparked ethical reflection and
debate from concerns about violence (see Waddington 2006) to claims that com-
puter games can improve education (see Dostál 2009) or even aid in psychological
therapy (see Brezinka and Hovestadt 2007).
In computer games, as in other forms of media, an “alternate reality” is created in
which the gamer is immersed. It is comprised of actors, activities, and situations all
of which are morally charged. But the most salient ethical issues do not pertain to
the actors in the alternate reality. An avatar in Mortal Kombat is not really the sort
of thing that can suffer and die. Rather, the important ethical consideration is
whether and how participation in or exposure to such alternate realities influences
primary reality—the world populated with living human beings for whom the
stakes of life are real. This seems a particularly pressing consideration with

1
Worldwide sales are forecast to top $44 billion in 2011. I use “computer games” to designate
computer-based gaming systems. I intend this to include video games as well as online and offline
computer games. I conceptualize computer games according to the classic game model outlined by
Jesper Juul (2005).
A. Briggle (*)
Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, University of North Texas, USA
e-mail: Adam.Briggle@unt.edu

J.R. Sageng et al. (eds.), The Philosophy of Computer Games, 159


Philosophy of Engineering and Technology 7, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4249-9_11,
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
160 A. Briggle

computer games due to the gamers’ active involvement in the alternate reality and
its increasing verisimilitude.2
The relevant question, then, is how best to conceive of and evaluate this traffic
across worlds—how the real and the virtual interact and co-shape one another.
After setting this question in terms of the “magic circle,” I argue that this traffic is
often best understood as influences on the character of gamers. The benefits of this
approach are its intuitive appeal, wide coverage of issues, and ability to mitigate
problems of causality. After offering an account of the key terms “character” and
“valuation,” I suggest four ways in which they apply to computer games. My aim is
not to specify the details of how character and valuations are impacted by computer
games. Rather, my goal is to use these terms to better articulate moral intuitions
about computer games, thereby promoting improved ethical evaluations and
discussions concerning their design, use, and regulation.

11.2 Through the Magic Circle

Johan Huizinga (1950) described games as existing outside of normal life—closed


off by a “magic circle,” the borders of which defined a separate time and space
(see Salen and Zimmerman 2004). Game fiction projects another world and game
rules carve out an area where they apply. Huizinga described games as separate and
unproductive. A game is an activity that has “no material interest, and no profit can
be gained from it” (1950, p. 13). To account for gambling, Roger Callois (1961)
modified the basic thesis, but the disputes surrounding, for example, the sale of
EverQuest characters for real money signify that the magic circle has even more
porous borders than Callois realized.
Indeed, games pervade our personal lives, culture, and economy. There is a two-
way traffic across the borders of the magic circle as game contents and forms are
products of wider social dynamics, which in turn are influenced by the games
themselves. Henry Jenkins (2003) pictured video games as a storytelling that inhabits
a cultural ecology of beliefs, institutions, and signs. Eugene Provenzo (1991) similarly
cast computer games as cultural objects that configure societal values. More recently,
Miguel Sicart (2009) argued that computer games are ethical objects and computer
game players are ethical agents, which means that computer games are situated in a
complex network of moral responsibilities and duties.
Jesper Juul (2005) argues that “A game is characterized by the fact that it can
optionally be assigned real-life consequences” (p. 41). Betting is an example where
consequences are pre-negotiated. Such optionality does some work in distinguishing
games from real-world activities. We cannot make the consequences of politics
optional. We could model politics and use it as a basis for a game. But politics itself

2
See Funk et al. (2004) for evidence that violent computer games may have greater impacts on
empathy than other forms of violent media.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 161

is not a game, because it has non-negotiable consequences. The stakes, in other


words, are real.
Yet, not all consequences of games are optional or consciously pre-negotiated.
One obvious example is “after effects,” or the way in which the elation of winning
or the depression of losing continues after the game is done. Friendships have ended
over arguments about a game. We can identify with virtual characters and situations
with greater strength than we may consciously admit to or desire. Sports athletes are
often heralded as heroes, but not just for their performance in the game world.
In fact, for two reasons it has at least as much to do with their character as human
beings. First, athletes are often judged by how well they “handle themselves.” They
are esteemed for demonstrating grace after a loss and for showing humility after a
win. Similar traits are often esteemed in computer gaming communities.
Second, cheating is detested for reasons that transcend the game itself. We judge
excellence in sports not just by the outcome of games, but also by how the outcome
was reached. We care about the character of the athlete, for example, his or her
discipline to avoid the temptation of doping and to train everyday. And we care not
just because we think it is important to maintain the game rules, but because games
are opportunities to cultivate and demonstrate excellence as a whole human being.
Achievement in the arena is necessarily connected to one’s entire character. This is
why many parents encourage their children, perhaps to an extreme, to play sports.
They “learn life lessons,” as the sport is a cauldron in which to mold a better person.
Juul (2005) claims that computer games retain a stronger border between
gamespace and real world than physical games in which the ball can literally fly
“out of play.” Yet due to the allure of computers and their pervasiveness, this
argument does not hold. The computer screen is not a separate reality, but one in
which we pour our creative energies, receive signals from our culture, and shape
our identities. Computers are entering “the inmost recesses of human existence,
transforming the way we know and think and will” (Heim 1993, p. 61). They serve
as “digital habitats” in which we live, structuring the way we are (Stefik 1999).3

11.3 Ethical Approaches to Computer Games

How can we best conceive of and evaluate the traffic across the magic circle? It is
here that we need recourse to ethical theory. These theories provide both the
evaluative language with which to highlight relevant values and the normative
standards by which to judge actions. They sharpen moral vocabulary by indicating
reasons why we found ourselves caring in a given situation. They develop a more
critical understanding of an issue that aids in navigating dilemmas and clarifying
ambiguity. Different theories may highlight different aspects of complex issues,

3
For other, more recent elaborations of this point see (Bakardjieva 2005; Baym 2002).
162 A. Briggle

and when confronting something as novel as computer games it is prudent to adopt


a pluralist attitude and explore several theoretical options. Thankfully, this is
happening with the ethics of computer games as ethicists have put forward analyses
grounded in virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarianism, and Humean ethics (see
Coleman 2001; McCormick 2001; Wonderly 2008).
In the following section, I argue that one good way to theorize the traffic across
the magic circle is in terms of influence on character. This expands upon the work of
Matt McCormick (2001), who argued that virtue ethics offers the best theory for
understanding what is objectionable about engaging in simulated immoral acts in
computer games. McCormick makes several valuable critiques of deontology and
utilitarianism. But this also forces him to draw too sharp of a distinction between
these theories. After all, the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill (with its qualitative
ranking of pleasures) is replete with references to the importance of character and
virtue, as when he notes, for example, that it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied” (Util. II). Similarly, Immanuel Kant notes that nothing can be
called good without qualification except a good will, and that we may be blessed by
nature with many talents “but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad
and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore,
constitutes what is called character, is not good” (Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysics of Morals, first section, emphasis in original).
Furthermore, Hume’s moral sentimentalism readily admits of a virtue-based
interpretation where the moral life is one of feeling rightly for the given situation
and of training certain character traits such as empathy (see Wonderly (2008)
for a reading sympathetic to this interpretation). To make the point symmetrical,
although the virtue ethics of Aristotle highlights the individual moral agent, it is far
from silent on matters of consequences, motivations, and principled actions toward
others that are central to utilitarianism and deontology. For example, Aristotle
begins with the premise that humans are political animals, and thus the develop-
ment of virtues simply cannot be understood as the task of an atomistic self remote
from the polis. Further, according to Aristotle a virtuous person does not just act
virtuously, but does so for the right reasons.
The point of this discussion is this: we must not treat ethical theories as static and
wholly distinct warring camps and declare our allegiance to one or the other. It may
be more fruitful to follow a thread that runs throughout many theories and use this
as the locus for ethical analysis and interpretation. In what follows, I suggest that
“character” is one such thread that has much to offer by way of improved insight.
In one sense or another and to varying degrees, all of these theories concern
themselves with the development of human capacities.4 These capacities are intrin-
sically valuable—parents wish for their children to grow into dignified, right-
minded, and happy adults. And they are important for navigating social ethical
situations in which rules are absent, unclear, or clash.

4
The hedonic utilitarianism of Bentham is probably an exception to this as it takes as its object
simply the maximization of pleasure without any concern for the quality of those pleasures.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 163

11.4 Character and Valuation

Let us begin with the obvious kind of interaction between gameworlds and the
realworld, namely, the opportunity cost involved. Even if the magic circle were
airtight and permitted no cultural influences to leak back and forth between worlds,
there would still be the opportunity cost of time spent within this supposedly
consequence-free world that could have been spent otherwise. These opportunity
costs are ethically significant, because they raise questions about the relative
quality of activities. Is it better to spend one’s time reading, playing a computer
game, watching television, playing with friends outdoors, etc.? Is it better to
play certain computer games—perhaps those that are social or require physical
activity—rather than others?
Note that this question about the relative quality of activities is important in a
derivative sense, because we care not about the activities themselves, but about how
they affect those who engage in them. What mixture of activities is most conducive
to living rightly and well? The ethics of opportunity cost, then, is really a question
about how gaming fits into culture and how that shapes the character of contempo-
rary life. Thus, we can see that “character” has two facets. It pertains both to the
character of a culture—its activities and artifacts, which embody a range of values
and beliefs—as well as the character of individuals who are stamped with the
impress of their culture.
Indeed, it has long been folk-wisdom (now bolstered by science) that “character,”
understood loosely as one’s personality or make-up, comes partly from nature and
partly from nurture. Our environments deeply influence who we are. So too do our
practices. It would be foolish, for example, to suppose that a Buddhist monk is the
same person before and after all those years of training and discipline. It is common
to speak of life transforming experiences. In short, there is no impervious, pre-social
self. Our environment is partly constitutive of who we are. In the early twenty-first
century in developed nations, a major part of that environment is computer games.
Especially in cases where one plays games on a regular basis, it would be inconsis-
tent to exempt computer games from this general insight about environments,
practices, and experiences shaping who we are. Children are particularly prone
to absorb and mimic their surroundings. As is often noted, children are very
impressionable.
This basic intuition ties directly to the philosophic tradition. “Character” derives
from a Greek word denoting a tool to engrave and derivatively the mark impressed
on coins or seals. The term was used as early as the fifth century B.C.E. metaphori-
cally to denote the mark impressed on persons. Aristotle argued that, more than any
other type of entity, humans have a nature that is open to and even requires further
determinations through behaviors that actualize inherent potencies. At the social
level, these additional determinations are called political regimes and cultures; at
the individual level they are called character. Character is an integration of human
nature and cultural form. Human nature is “oriented toward, in need of, in potency
to, character” (Mitcham 2000, p. 131). Aristotle noted that the seed will only sprout
164 A. Briggle

well in well-prepared soil (Nic. X, 9; 1179b23-25). Mill also remarked that our
higher capacities whither and die if we find ourselves in a society or fulfilling an
occupation that is not favorable to their realization (Util. II).
Character involves a behavioral aspect (e.g., actions) and a psychological aspect
(e.g., knowledge, attitudes, and desires). In the modern world, emphasis is often
placed on identity, or the assemblage of traits or qualities that distinguish one from
another, thus giving rise to the more common term “personality.”5 For the ancients,
however, excellence of character, eˆthikai aretai, is usually translated as “moral
virtues,” signifying an emphasis not just on individuality but on the qualities or
traits that make a person ethically admirable. This addition of a scale of excellence
is necessary for evaluating computer games from a character approach. Computer
games, like other aspects of new media culture, contribute to the character of
culture, the “soil” in which we find ourselves, thereby influencing what we do
and how we think, or in short, who we are. These influences, then, can be evaluated
in terms of their goodness and badness.
One’s character is comprised of an assemblage of moral virtues such as integrity,
honesty, compassion, and courage, which are well-entrenched and thus form one’s
identity. Aristotle explains that moral virtue is formed by habit, which shows that
“none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature, for nothing which exists by
nature can be changed by habit” rather “we are by nature equipped with the ability
to receive them, and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment” (Nic. II,
1; 1103a15-25). We are provided with the capacity first, and if we are molded
appropriately and train correctly, we later display the virtuous activities.6
Individual character is a disposition that provides orientation—on how to live
and what to value. A central expression of someone’s character, then, is his or her
values, or the valuations that he or she makes. Character conditions valuations,
which in turn inform character through the production and dissemination of cul-
ture.7 Valuation pertains to what someone finds noble or beautiful as well as wrong
or base. An important aspect of valuation is devaluation. Those who successfully
fake virtue, for example, can get all the rewards of being deemed a virtuous person
without actually being virtuous (cf. Republic). The difficulty is one of telling the
difference between real and simulated virtue. If we cannot tell the difference, then
the very notion of virtue becomes devalued. Similarly, if we could not tell the
difference between gold and dirt, then gold would be devalued—it would be as
worthless as dirt.

5
Throughout the twentieth century, discussion of character mostly took place in the social science
literature. In The Psychology of Character (1928), for example, A.A. Roback defined it as “an
enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive tendencies in accordance with regulative
principles” (p. 450).
6
See Hursthouse (1999) for an excellent contemporary exegesis and defense of Aristotelian virtue
ethics.
7
This circularity is often seen as a weakness (e.g., Pellegrino 1995). It is, however, more true to
life than abstract, universal “systems.” Others argue it is totalitarian, relying as it does on the
authority of teachers to shape character, rather than rational first principles to guide conduct. I can
only here point to the valuable insights developed by Susan K. Allard-Nelson in this regard (2004).
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 165

In the case of computer games, devaluation relates to the connection between


the ontological status of simulated objects or actions and their intrinsic value.
David Waddington (2006) applies devaluation to the case of simulated acts of
immorality. The danger is that as computer games increase in verisimilitude, it
will become increasingly difficult to differentiate between real transgressions
and simulated transgressions. The very idea of wrongness, then, would become
devalued. Importantly, he notes this devaluation would happen slowly and imper-
ceptibly, as most changes to character tend to happen. Devaluation means losing
sight of qualities that differentiate one thing from another. It is closely related to
desensitization, or the notion that repeated exposure to simulations of X inures one
to actual instances of X (see Wonderly 2008).
Devaluation is also related to re-valuation. For example, some worry about
the tendency for game worlds to portray female characters in stereotypical ways.
One concern is that repeated exposure to such simulated female forms may lead to a
re-valuation of the natural, given female form. People may begin to prefer the
artificial figures to the natural. This could be part of a larger cultural devaluation of
the given bodily form as enhancements and cosmetic surgeries are increasingly
used, suggesting a de-differentiation: all bodies are seen like virtual bodies,
instantly malleable to suite our preferences. Another related issue is glamorization
or glorification. For example, the glamorization of warfare depicted by many
videogames may contribute to a devaluation of actual war, possibly contributing
to the devaluation of life. Indeed, the conduct of war already resembles computer
games as actions are often reduced to pushing buttons in a remote location while
watching the consequences unfold on a screen.
Yet positive as well as negative appraisals of the impact of media on character
are possible. Martha Nussbaum (2001), for example, argues that literature aids in
the development of empathy, or an ability to imaginatively reconstruct the
experience of one who is suffering. Literature can also train a cosmopolitan
character, or one capable of grasping the common humanity of others. U.S.
Federal Justice Richard Posner argued that exposure to imaginary violence—
whether in The Odyssey or Grand Theft Auto—plays a positive role in forming the
moral character of children by expanding empathy. The strength of such ethical
arguments depends on the features of the media in question and even the specific
book, play, or game. In reference to Posner’s argument, for example, Barbara
Kingsolver (1995) notes a relevant distinguishing feature between most works of
literature and most computer games. Literature provides an encompassing narra-
tive that sets violence within the context of the lives affected. For computer games
in which such a narrative is absent, violence simply brings rewards to the player
and is set loose from the human stories that could make its devastating impacts
come to life, thereby cultivating empathy.
Character is not only intrinsically important, but it also helps ensure right
behavior toward others. Insofar as computer games influence character, then, it
seems natural to suppose that they entail consequences for social behavior.
McCormick, however, argues that this presents the same causality problem that
plagues consequentialist accounts. How can we obtain the evidence to support
claims that the activity of playing computer games is causally related to specific
166 A. Briggle

interactions with others? Any direct causal claim about specific actions could never
be made. I argue, however, that the character approach does warrant this extension
to social interactions in a more general way.
Key to the character approach is an understanding of the self as pliable and
constantly changing with new experiences. Character is automatically being shaped
within the activity of gaming itself, just as in any other experience. The question is
how to account for some experience at time T1 influencing a later interaction at time
T2. If, the self is pictured as an impervious essence now at T1 and then at T2 all the
while unchanged, then the temporal relation really is a mystery. But if we see changes
in character as mediating between these experiences, the mystery is reduced. Later
consequences are mediated through or affected by prior influences on one’s character.
Experiences influence character, especially when they are engaged in repeatedly
over long periods of time, and character is simply not separable from one’s social
interactions.
Some qualifications to the character approach are now in order. First, the claim is
not that the causality problem is completely elided, but rather that for most practical
purposes there is no need for studies to demonstrate specific causal mechanisms or
direct links to specific behaviors. Governments and parents have long set general
guidelines regarding access by children to potentially corrupting media without the
benefit of any such studies. The implicit guiding principle is most often concerns for
the character of culture and the character of the children shaped by it, including how
that will be expressed in social behavior. There are widely shared values and
intuitions here that simply do not require studies in order to be realized in the
form of social policies.
Second, some empirical psychologists have launched an attack, “situationism,” on
the notion of character as composed of stable, robust, or global traits (e.g., Doris 2002).
They claim instead that human behavior is best described as local traits that vary with
context. Though this may be an accurate description of much of human behavior, it
does not undermine the ideal of moral character as a disposition to act rightly no matter
what the circumstance. This research does mean, however, that character may be
descriptively understood as a mixture of “local” traits that vary with context and global
traits that do not. The implication for the ethics of computer games is that they may
impact the character of gamers in a diversity of ways—some effects dissipating when
the gaming context is exited and others ramifying throughout life.
Third, as I have stressed with the two senses of the term—individual character
and cultural character—a fully formed character approach must recognize the wider
cultural ecology in which games are situated. Even avid gamers are influenced by
other media and activities. For the most part, the influence of gaming on any given
gamer’s character will be subtle and formed in complex relations with other
influences.
Finally, a character approach is not best suited to all ethical issues raised by
computer games. For example, intellectual property right disputes and privacy
concerns are most likely not best treated in terms of character. Though it does not
apply universally, I suggest in the following section that a character approach can
be useful for thinking through the ethics of a wide range of issues generated by
computer games.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 167

11.5 A Character Approach in Action

In what follows I suggest four ways in which computer games—as simultaneously


technologies and cultures—relate to character and valuation. The goal is not to
provide a definitive analysis of any issue, but rather to demonstrate how a character
approach to computer game ethics can usefully be employed to refine ethical
evaluations of a range of issues. What is ethical about these dimensions of a
character approach to gameplay is best understood in terms of quality: the quality
of our character, of the lives we lead, and the attitudes we adopt toward the world.
This is another way to understand the character approach to the ethics of computer
games: it draws attention to how gaming influences the quality (type, kind, or
character) of our lives.

11.5.1 Cognitive Skills

In the information society, one of the main ways character is discussed is through
the rhetoric of cognitive skills. There is widespread valuation of the kind of
education that develops the mental skills necessary to compete successfully for
jobs in the globalizing high-tech economy (e.g., Friedmann 2005). Unlike the craft
economy, in which “skills” refers to the mastery of a particular manual labor, the
skills demanded by a dynamic economy are more nebulous. Workers must be
equipped with a general ability to creatively adapt, process, and apply new knowl-
edge. For training or cognitive exercise, content matters less than form.
Computer games are commonly held to distract from the serious business of
acquiring such skills. They are part of the “entertainment industry,” thus sapping
the intellectual resources of gamers who are “supine before the false pleasures” of
consumption (Strinati 1995, p. 12). But several authors refute this common wisdom,
arguing that it inappropriately transfers cognitive models from the consumption of
passive old media to the interactive, nonlinear cognition involved with new media.
For example, Juul (2005) notes that “Playing a game is an activity of improving
skills in order to overcome. . .challenges, and playing a game is therefore funda-
mentally a learning experience” (p. 5). David Shaffer, in How Computer Games
Help Children Learn (2006), draws from psychological and pedagogical research to
argue that computer games may hold the key to transforming educational systems to
meet the demands of a high-tech economy. Shaffer focuses on the character traits of
creativity, design, and innovation.8
Steven Johnson (2005) makes similar claims in his defense of mass culture.
Arguing in terms of form (not content), he claims that video games can enhance

8
Sandra Calvert (2005) further notes that videogames provide cognitive skills, especially “visual
iconic and spatial representation skills” that are “needed to excel in many technical careers” (p. 130).
168 A. Briggle

cognitive faculties. Thus, he argues against the widespread assumption that


media can only be good if their content is morally redeeming. Johnson claims
that nonliterary media like computer games provide the same cognitive benefits as
literary media while honing different mental skills as well.
Skeptics can counter by questioning the overall value of cognitive skills.
Perhaps computer games will help us perform better in the global economy, but
is human character here not portrayed too narrowly as an information processor?
Computer games may help “impress” us into the mould of techno-global capital-
ism, but how valuable is that goal to begin with? Skeptics may claim that there
is an implicit devaluation behind the cognitive skills arguments. In assuming
the goal of economic competition, we may lose sight of the difference between
this narrow aspect of life and the full flourishing of a human person. Advocates
for the redeeming values of computer games, then, would have to broaden their
perspective on the meaning of a quality of life and how computer games enhance
well-being in a wider sense.

11.5.2 Interpersonal Skills and Civic Engagement

In other words, character pertains to far more than job skills. It also pertains to how
we interact with one another. There has been a recent resurgence in the importance
of social character. Robert Putman (2000) traced the worrisome trend of individuals
becoming disconnected from family, friends, community, and democratic forms of
participation. Michael Sandel (2005) made a case that strong civic order relies on
strong individual character. Indeed, the globalizing techo-economy increasingly
demands civic virtue and substantive public dialogue as it brings cultures into
conflict and challenges traditions.
Again, common wisdom has computer games fairing poorly on such wider notions
of character. If the widespread negative image above was of the feebleminded
dropout, the image here is of the apathetic, infantilized, socially inept nerd. He may
save damsels in distress in virtual worlds but be unable to approach an actual woman.
She may rescue a cyber-world but she could not tell you how her government works or
what is in the news. We can adopt here Neil Postman’s critiques of television (1985)
and argue that computer games, as a medium, inherently shape dialogue and the way
we think. Jonathan Rauch (2006) noted the meager, pre-programmed dialogue of most
games, arguing, “State-of-the-art games render action and environment with eerie
realism and genuine aesthetic distinction. But their characters are dolls, not people”
(p. 80). Many games offer a “stunted environment in which blasting someone’s head
off is easy but talking to him is impossible” (p. 78).
However, this paints computer games with too broad of a brush. Many online
games, for example, foster communities that must co-operate to achieve common
goals. Some games even feature chatting as a central element. Many gamers
take on leadership roles in EverQuest, often to the point of becoming overly-
socialized, as they manage people with divergent desires and conflicting ideas
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 169

(Taylor 2006). Players’ development of moral character occurs through interac-


tion with gaming communities, which often confront morally ambiguous actions
and situations together. Some psychological research suggests that mediated
relationships like those between players in games can become “hyper-personal,”
as the increased anonymity provides a safe environment to divulge secrets and
form closer emotional bonds (e.g., Walther 1996). Game-worlds can be fruitful
places to try out alternative identities, thus potentially increasing one’s empa-
thetic capacities (Turkle 1995).
Players can also hone their ideal identity, which could transfer to improved
character in the actual world. This is increasingly happening through a genre of
video games that examines social and policy issues. For example, Food Force,
created by the United Nations World Food Programme is designed to educate
children about world hunger. Players are humanitarian workers stationed on a
fictional famine-stricken island. The popularity of this game (it had four million
players worldwide 1 year after its launch) has been fueled in part by the non-
governmental organization Games for Change.
Yet skeptics may still contend that another type of devaluation is going on here,
one in which the differences between simulated friendships or community and
actual relationships are eroded. For example, online communities, especially the
issue-specific variety formed in game-worlds, may not foster the same level of
commitment and meaning as offline versions. Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews
(2000) further argue that mediated friendships, due to the greater level of control
involved, cannot form the kind of relational identities essential to strong
friendships. In short, even those computer games that foster interaction may be
offering substitutes of inferior quality.

11.5.3 Artificial Areˆte

Another way in which character is valued is in terms of excellent achievements.


Games have long served as artificial worlds in which fair rules create ideal
conditions for displays of greatness. The Greek term for excellence, areˆte, is the
noun corresponding to the adjectives agathos (good) and aristos (best) and origi-
nally denoted the excellence of a brave or noble warrior. It later came to mean civic
virtues and moral virtues that define the excellent citizen. Finally, it came to denote
the functional excellence of any person, animal, or thing. In this sense, aretai or
virtues are those qualities which make a person function well in relation to others
and to play his or her part in society well. For all of its democratic tendencies, the
modern world still esteems the nobility of soul and physical determination that
excellent achievements require. We admire athletes who endure hardships under
intense pressure to perform. Similarly, we admire great artists tortured by the
exacting demands of the muses.
In what sense is successful play of computer games a demonstration of excel-
lence? A South Park television episode took up this question. In the show, we first
170 A. Briggle

see a master warrior deftly vanquishing other players through his superior talents.
In the next scene, we see that the person controlling this avatar is, in the actual
world, not such an admirable character. He is morbidly overweight and “has no
life,” that is, he plays the game every waking minute. This is a powerful contrast
of achieving excellence in the game at the expense of wasting one’s life in the
actual world. The player was not really a warrior. He did not possess any physical
skills outside of some digital dexterity to manipulate his keyboard. He did not
engage in any physical or mental discipline. His was an artificial areˆte. The same
can be said of the popular sports computer games. Gamers win the super bowl
every day without every putting on the pads or making a play. Though virtual
experiences, such as flight simulation, may help in training, they are not the “real
thing.” As one article noted about the rise of professional video game leagues:
“There’s a difference between watching Peyton Manning threading a touchdown
pass and watching a gamer control a character doing something onscreen” (Caplan
and Coates 2007, p. 61).
What is artificial about the excellence achieved in computer games? Norman
Mooradian (2006) argues that virtual objects and activities can “fail to have the
properties that ground the value attributions made to them” (p. 674). He takes
the example of virtual karate. Because the art of karate is rooted in movements of
the body that take years to perfect, it can be said to have an essence.9 This is in
contrast, say, to sex, which Mooradian argues has no such essence, because there is
no equivalent training involved to master any specific movements, as its value lies
in pleasurable brain states. The notion of essence is the basis of the distinction
between appearance and reality, which bears on the intrinsic value of an experience.
The virtual body movements bear no relation to the physical bodily movements
required for superior performances. Yet, as there are certain “objective” actions
that must be carried out in order to achieve excellence in karate, the value it has
is necessarily grounded in the body and its physical action. Those partaking in
simulated karate games may be disappointed to learn that they are very far from
practicing the real thing. If this is the case, then ontological facts about the
simulated experience undermine its value. They may nonetheless still enjoy
the activity, but this enjoyment would be a “kind of spectator activity. . .with
interactivity and immersion thrown in” (p. 683).
Defenders of computer games, however, can point out at least two problems with
this argument. First, Mooradian develops a rather narrow definition of areˆte.
Gamers do undertake mental exercise in mastering the increasingly difficult
challenges crafted by game designers. People who are able to solve spatial game
puzzles such as Rubik’s Cube are often highly esteemed by those of us who are
baffled and quit in frustration. Clearly this is a display of a kind of mental
excellence. Second, computer games of the future may incorporate greater ranges
of embodied action and force-feedback sensors to monitor precise movements.

9
Poker, however, can be simulated without losing value, at least in this radical sense, because it is
not rooted in the execution of certain physical movements.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 171

In this case, the simulations may approximate the real acts to such an extent that
there is no longer anything “artificial” about the areˆte that results from training and
competition. Rudimentary versions of such technologies are already on the market
and may be further driven by the use of interactive video games in physical
education courses and retirement homes.
Mooradian argues that sex is different from karate in part because the criterion of
success in the former is based entirely in feeling, or perceptual experience, whereas
in the latter there are more objective standards of excellence. In other words, we
cannot understand artificial areˆte if we only have recourse to a hedonist account of
value as equivalent to perceptions, sensations, or feelings. Areˆte signifies that value
stems from the physical and mental capabilities of practitioners of an art: “devel-
opment to a standard of excellence is the basis of value and the source of satisfac-
tion and enjoyment” (Mooradian 2006, p. 688). Devaluation in this instance would
entail losing sight of the difference between the standards set by feeling and those
set by perfection. Computer games may democratize excellence—with a few hours
of practice anyone can hone a wicked serve in a tennis computer game—but in
so doing they may also cheapen its very meaning. Areˆte entails continentia,
self-control, and ascesis, exercise or self-discipline. Its devaluation would stem
from incontinence, weakness of the will, in the face of the temptation of easy but
ultimately shallow achievements.
Yet, it is not clear that computer games will lead to such a devaluation of
excellence, in part because the achievements in many games are not in any obvious
sense “shallow” or “easy.” Indeed, some computer games arguably can provide the
objective standards of excellence Mooradian sees as essential to genuine areˆte,
especially when it comes to the development of superior mental capabilities.
Finally, there is a sense in which excellence is a derivative value based on a prior
normative judgment about an activity being worthy of pursuit. We do not, for
example, celebrate those who are extremely good at performing an immoral
activity. In what sense, then, are computer games worthy sorts of activities in the
first place? Should the best gamers be admired as much as the best athletes,
musicians, or public servants?

11.5.4 The Given and the Created

Many computer games have the potential to enhance imagination and fantasy. Some
have suggested they also engender new art forms and artistic expressions. Ian Bogost
(2006) explores the ways in which computer games shift from entertainment
(passing the time) to art (transforming our times). Similarly, Heim (1993) sees in
computer game players the emerging talent to become new artists, ready to birth the
world-transforming potential of virtual reality.
Yet the centrality of creativity in computer games may also have downsides.
Importantly, an emphasis on creation and manipulation of artificial (and real)
worlds can clash with another important aspect of character: respect for others.
172 A. Briggle

The ethical imperative of respecting others is rooted in the concept of otherness as


that which one does not create or appropriate (Levinas 1969). Rather, it is received
as given—a limit on one’s willfulness. A well-rounded character entails respecting
the claims of this given otherness, which not only fosters humility and patience, but
is also a source of meaning. Computer games may be problematic, then, in fostering
an overly manipulative character, especially toward the givens of our own bodies
and the natural world.10
Jeremy Rifkin (1983) made this argument in regard to biotechnology, suggesting
that children will grow up in a world populated with their own artificial creations,
which will distort or even erase their relationship to nature. Computer games
are directly linked to such concerns about respect for nature insofar as children
increasingly spend time playing computer games rather than being exposed to the
ennobling qualities of nature (Louv 2005). One such quality is patience, as we wait
by the side of a pond for the frogs to emerge or for the snail to chew his way round
the mushroom. More indirectly, environmental problems, instruct us in the wisdom
of respecting nature. Yet, in SimCity, a power-plant can be constructed in minutes.
In Age of Empires II, villagers can be created with the click of a button. Computer
games often provide experiences in which we are everywhere surrounded by
ourselves—our own creations that are controllable, instantly disposable, and
re-creatable.
But to leave it at this would be an unwarranted generalization. The details of
each game matter, as some emphasize control and creativity more than others.
Computer games are essentially about following rules—they are not free-form play.
Gamers may hone respect for otherness as they repeatedly confront the limits
established in the gameworld. Juul further notes that “if we actually play SimCity,
the experience is one of not being able to control a city” (2005, p. 191). Indeed,
some games model emergent complexity that can foster humility in the face of
forces beyond one’s control. An important part of SimCity, for example, is learning
that actions have long-term consequences. The hastily constructed power plant can
cause pollution and other unforeseen effects.
Nonetheless, it is worth considering further the ways in which computer games
might be contributing to the devaluation of nature. This particular devaluation
would result from the loss of the distinction between artificiality (human created)
and reality (natural or given). Its apotheosis would entail the “precession of
simulacra” in which the copy replaces the original (Baudrillard 1976). The world
itself peels away, leaving only the unbearable lightness of simulacra. As we
continue to immerse ourselves in computer games, we risk losing our anchorage
in this world. If we cannot find enduring meaning in those virtual worlds, we will
need to find moral language to explain the importance of nature’s unbidden alterity.

10
For another interesting take on this idea see Borgmann (1993).
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 173

11.6 Conclusion

I developed a character-based approach to the ethics of computer games in light of


the question concerning traffic across the borders of the magic circle. This approach
fleshes out intuitions regarding the threats and promises of computer games as
media that work imperceptibly and slowly to influence the attitudes, skills, actions,
and valuations of gamers in tandem with the character of the cultures they inhabit.
The brief sketches in the last section show that computer games present a mixed
normative picture. This is to be expected given their diversity. Positive evaluations
focus on the potential of games to not only provide intrinsically enjoyable
experiences, but also their instrumental value in developing cognitive and interper-
sonal skills as well as imagination and creativity. Negative evaluations focus on the
potential of computer games to distract us from more worthy pursuits or to devalue
moral behavior, personal relationships, excellence, and nature.

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