Iggle - The Ethics of Computer Games - A Character Approach
Iggle - The Ethics of Computer Games - A Character Approach
Iggle - The Ethics of Computer Games - A Character Approach
Adam Briggle
11.1 Introduction
1
Worldwide sales are forecast to top $44 billion in 2011. I use “computer games” to designate
computer-based gaming systems. I intend this to include video games as well as online and offline
computer games. I conceptualize computer games according to the classic game model outlined by
Jesper Juul (2005).
A. Briggle (*)
Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, University of North Texas, USA
e-mail: Adam.Briggle@unt.edu
computer games due to the gamers’ active involvement in the alternate reality and
its increasing verisimilitude.2
The relevant question, then, is how best to conceive of and evaluate this traffic
across worlds—how the real and the virtual interact and co-shape one another.
After setting this question in terms of the “magic circle,” I argue that this traffic is
often best understood as influences on the character of gamers. The benefits of this
approach are its intuitive appeal, wide coverage of issues, and ability to mitigate
problems of causality. After offering an account of the key terms “character” and
“valuation,” I suggest four ways in which they apply to computer games. My aim is
not to specify the details of how character and valuations are impacted by computer
games. Rather, my goal is to use these terms to better articulate moral intuitions
about computer games, thereby promoting improved ethical evaluations and
discussions concerning their design, use, and regulation.
2
See Funk et al. (2004) for evidence that violent computer games may have greater impacts on
empathy than other forms of violent media.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 161
How can we best conceive of and evaluate the traffic across the magic circle? It is
here that we need recourse to ethical theory. These theories provide both the
evaluative language with which to highlight relevant values and the normative
standards by which to judge actions. They sharpen moral vocabulary by indicating
reasons why we found ourselves caring in a given situation. They develop a more
critical understanding of an issue that aids in navigating dilemmas and clarifying
ambiguity. Different theories may highlight different aspects of complex issues,
3
For other, more recent elaborations of this point see (Bakardjieva 2005; Baym 2002).
162 A. Briggle
4
The hedonic utilitarianism of Bentham is probably an exception to this as it takes as its object
simply the maximization of pleasure without any concern for the quality of those pleasures.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 163
Let us begin with the obvious kind of interaction between gameworlds and the
realworld, namely, the opportunity cost involved. Even if the magic circle were
airtight and permitted no cultural influences to leak back and forth between worlds,
there would still be the opportunity cost of time spent within this supposedly
consequence-free world that could have been spent otherwise. These opportunity
costs are ethically significant, because they raise questions about the relative
quality of activities. Is it better to spend one’s time reading, playing a computer
game, watching television, playing with friends outdoors, etc.? Is it better to
play certain computer games—perhaps those that are social or require physical
activity—rather than others?
Note that this question about the relative quality of activities is important in a
derivative sense, because we care not about the activities themselves, but about how
they affect those who engage in them. What mixture of activities is most conducive
to living rightly and well? The ethics of opportunity cost, then, is really a question
about how gaming fits into culture and how that shapes the character of contempo-
rary life. Thus, we can see that “character” has two facets. It pertains both to the
character of a culture—its activities and artifacts, which embody a range of values
and beliefs—as well as the character of individuals who are stamped with the
impress of their culture.
Indeed, it has long been folk-wisdom (now bolstered by science) that “character,”
understood loosely as one’s personality or make-up, comes partly from nature and
partly from nurture. Our environments deeply influence who we are. So too do our
practices. It would be foolish, for example, to suppose that a Buddhist monk is the
same person before and after all those years of training and discipline. It is common
to speak of life transforming experiences. In short, there is no impervious, pre-social
self. Our environment is partly constitutive of who we are. In the early twenty-first
century in developed nations, a major part of that environment is computer games.
Especially in cases where one plays games on a regular basis, it would be inconsis-
tent to exempt computer games from this general insight about environments,
practices, and experiences shaping who we are. Children are particularly prone
to absorb and mimic their surroundings. As is often noted, children are very
impressionable.
This basic intuition ties directly to the philosophic tradition. “Character” derives
from a Greek word denoting a tool to engrave and derivatively the mark impressed
on coins or seals. The term was used as early as the fifth century B.C.E. metaphori-
cally to denote the mark impressed on persons. Aristotle argued that, more than any
other type of entity, humans have a nature that is open to and even requires further
determinations through behaviors that actualize inherent potencies. At the social
level, these additional determinations are called political regimes and cultures; at
the individual level they are called character. Character is an integration of human
nature and cultural form. Human nature is “oriented toward, in need of, in potency
to, character” (Mitcham 2000, p. 131). Aristotle noted that the seed will only sprout
164 A. Briggle
well in well-prepared soil (Nic. X, 9; 1179b23-25). Mill also remarked that our
higher capacities whither and die if we find ourselves in a society or fulfilling an
occupation that is not favorable to their realization (Util. II).
Character involves a behavioral aspect (e.g., actions) and a psychological aspect
(e.g., knowledge, attitudes, and desires). In the modern world, emphasis is often
placed on identity, or the assemblage of traits or qualities that distinguish one from
another, thus giving rise to the more common term “personality.”5 For the ancients,
however, excellence of character, eˆthikai aretai, is usually translated as “moral
virtues,” signifying an emphasis not just on individuality but on the qualities or
traits that make a person ethically admirable. This addition of a scale of excellence
is necessary for evaluating computer games from a character approach. Computer
games, like other aspects of new media culture, contribute to the character of
culture, the “soil” in which we find ourselves, thereby influencing what we do
and how we think, or in short, who we are. These influences, then, can be evaluated
in terms of their goodness and badness.
One’s character is comprised of an assemblage of moral virtues such as integrity,
honesty, compassion, and courage, which are well-entrenched and thus form one’s
identity. Aristotle explains that moral virtue is formed by habit, which shows that
“none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature, for nothing which exists by
nature can be changed by habit” rather “we are by nature equipped with the ability
to receive them, and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment” (Nic. II,
1; 1103a15-25). We are provided with the capacity first, and if we are molded
appropriately and train correctly, we later display the virtuous activities.6
Individual character is a disposition that provides orientation—on how to live
and what to value. A central expression of someone’s character, then, is his or her
values, or the valuations that he or she makes. Character conditions valuations,
which in turn inform character through the production and dissemination of cul-
ture.7 Valuation pertains to what someone finds noble or beautiful as well as wrong
or base. An important aspect of valuation is devaluation. Those who successfully
fake virtue, for example, can get all the rewards of being deemed a virtuous person
without actually being virtuous (cf. Republic). The difficulty is one of telling the
difference between real and simulated virtue. If we cannot tell the difference, then
the very notion of virtue becomes devalued. Similarly, if we could not tell the
difference between gold and dirt, then gold would be devalued—it would be as
worthless as dirt.
5
Throughout the twentieth century, discussion of character mostly took place in the social science
literature. In The Psychology of Character (1928), for example, A.A. Roback defined it as “an
enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive tendencies in accordance with regulative
principles” (p. 450).
6
See Hursthouse (1999) for an excellent contemporary exegesis and defense of Aristotelian virtue
ethics.
7
This circularity is often seen as a weakness (e.g., Pellegrino 1995). It is, however, more true to
life than abstract, universal “systems.” Others argue it is totalitarian, relying as it does on the
authority of teachers to shape character, rather than rational first principles to guide conduct. I can
only here point to the valuable insights developed by Susan K. Allard-Nelson in this regard (2004).
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 165
interactions with others? Any direct causal claim about specific actions could never
be made. I argue, however, that the character approach does warrant this extension
to social interactions in a more general way.
Key to the character approach is an understanding of the self as pliable and
constantly changing with new experiences. Character is automatically being shaped
within the activity of gaming itself, just as in any other experience. The question is
how to account for some experience at time T1 influencing a later interaction at time
T2. If, the self is pictured as an impervious essence now at T1 and then at T2 all the
while unchanged, then the temporal relation really is a mystery. But if we see changes
in character as mediating between these experiences, the mystery is reduced. Later
consequences are mediated through or affected by prior influences on one’s character.
Experiences influence character, especially when they are engaged in repeatedly
over long periods of time, and character is simply not separable from one’s social
interactions.
Some qualifications to the character approach are now in order. First, the claim is
not that the causality problem is completely elided, but rather that for most practical
purposes there is no need for studies to demonstrate specific causal mechanisms or
direct links to specific behaviors. Governments and parents have long set general
guidelines regarding access by children to potentially corrupting media without the
benefit of any such studies. The implicit guiding principle is most often concerns for
the character of culture and the character of the children shaped by it, including how
that will be expressed in social behavior. There are widely shared values and
intuitions here that simply do not require studies in order to be realized in the
form of social policies.
Second, some empirical psychologists have launched an attack, “situationism,” on
the notion of character as composed of stable, robust, or global traits (e.g., Doris 2002).
They claim instead that human behavior is best described as local traits that vary with
context. Though this may be an accurate description of much of human behavior, it
does not undermine the ideal of moral character as a disposition to act rightly no matter
what the circumstance. This research does mean, however, that character may be
descriptively understood as a mixture of “local” traits that vary with context and global
traits that do not. The implication for the ethics of computer games is that they may
impact the character of gamers in a diversity of ways—some effects dissipating when
the gaming context is exited and others ramifying throughout life.
Third, as I have stressed with the two senses of the term—individual character
and cultural character—a fully formed character approach must recognize the wider
cultural ecology in which games are situated. Even avid gamers are influenced by
other media and activities. For the most part, the influence of gaming on any given
gamer’s character will be subtle and formed in complex relations with other
influences.
Finally, a character approach is not best suited to all ethical issues raised by
computer games. For example, intellectual property right disputes and privacy
concerns are most likely not best treated in terms of character. Though it does not
apply universally, I suggest in the following section that a character approach can
be useful for thinking through the ethics of a wide range of issues generated by
computer games.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 167
In the information society, one of the main ways character is discussed is through
the rhetoric of cognitive skills. There is widespread valuation of the kind of
education that develops the mental skills necessary to compete successfully for
jobs in the globalizing high-tech economy (e.g., Friedmann 2005). Unlike the craft
economy, in which “skills” refers to the mastery of a particular manual labor, the
skills demanded by a dynamic economy are more nebulous. Workers must be
equipped with a general ability to creatively adapt, process, and apply new knowl-
edge. For training or cognitive exercise, content matters less than form.
Computer games are commonly held to distract from the serious business of
acquiring such skills. They are part of the “entertainment industry,” thus sapping
the intellectual resources of gamers who are “supine before the false pleasures” of
consumption (Strinati 1995, p. 12). But several authors refute this common wisdom,
arguing that it inappropriately transfers cognitive models from the consumption of
passive old media to the interactive, nonlinear cognition involved with new media.
For example, Juul (2005) notes that “Playing a game is an activity of improving
skills in order to overcome. . .challenges, and playing a game is therefore funda-
mentally a learning experience” (p. 5). David Shaffer, in How Computer Games
Help Children Learn (2006), draws from psychological and pedagogical research to
argue that computer games may hold the key to transforming educational systems to
meet the demands of a high-tech economy. Shaffer focuses on the character traits of
creativity, design, and innovation.8
Steven Johnson (2005) makes similar claims in his defense of mass culture.
Arguing in terms of form (not content), he claims that video games can enhance
8
Sandra Calvert (2005) further notes that videogames provide cognitive skills, especially “visual
iconic and spatial representation skills” that are “needed to excel in many technical careers” (p. 130).
168 A. Briggle
In other words, character pertains to far more than job skills. It also pertains to how
we interact with one another. There has been a recent resurgence in the importance
of social character. Robert Putman (2000) traced the worrisome trend of individuals
becoming disconnected from family, friends, community, and democratic forms of
participation. Michael Sandel (2005) made a case that strong civic order relies on
strong individual character. Indeed, the globalizing techo-economy increasingly
demands civic virtue and substantive public dialogue as it brings cultures into
conflict and challenges traditions.
Again, common wisdom has computer games fairing poorly on such wider notions
of character. If the widespread negative image above was of the feebleminded
dropout, the image here is of the apathetic, infantilized, socially inept nerd. He may
save damsels in distress in virtual worlds but be unable to approach an actual woman.
She may rescue a cyber-world but she could not tell you how her government works or
what is in the news. We can adopt here Neil Postman’s critiques of television (1985)
and argue that computer games, as a medium, inherently shape dialogue and the way
we think. Jonathan Rauch (2006) noted the meager, pre-programmed dialogue of most
games, arguing, “State-of-the-art games render action and environment with eerie
realism and genuine aesthetic distinction. But their characters are dolls, not people”
(p. 80). Many games offer a “stunted environment in which blasting someone’s head
off is easy but talking to him is impossible” (p. 78).
However, this paints computer games with too broad of a brush. Many online
games, for example, foster communities that must co-operate to achieve common
goals. Some games even feature chatting as a central element. Many gamers
take on leadership roles in EverQuest, often to the point of becoming overly-
socialized, as they manage people with divergent desires and conflicting ideas
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 169
see a master warrior deftly vanquishing other players through his superior talents.
In the next scene, we see that the person controlling this avatar is, in the actual
world, not such an admirable character. He is morbidly overweight and “has no
life,” that is, he plays the game every waking minute. This is a powerful contrast
of achieving excellence in the game at the expense of wasting one’s life in the
actual world. The player was not really a warrior. He did not possess any physical
skills outside of some digital dexterity to manipulate his keyboard. He did not
engage in any physical or mental discipline. His was an artificial areˆte. The same
can be said of the popular sports computer games. Gamers win the super bowl
every day without every putting on the pads or making a play. Though virtual
experiences, such as flight simulation, may help in training, they are not the “real
thing.” As one article noted about the rise of professional video game leagues:
“There’s a difference between watching Peyton Manning threading a touchdown
pass and watching a gamer control a character doing something onscreen” (Caplan
and Coates 2007, p. 61).
What is artificial about the excellence achieved in computer games? Norman
Mooradian (2006) argues that virtual objects and activities can “fail to have the
properties that ground the value attributions made to them” (p. 674). He takes
the example of virtual karate. Because the art of karate is rooted in movements of
the body that take years to perfect, it can be said to have an essence.9 This is in
contrast, say, to sex, which Mooradian argues has no such essence, because there is
no equivalent training involved to master any specific movements, as its value lies
in pleasurable brain states. The notion of essence is the basis of the distinction
between appearance and reality, which bears on the intrinsic value of an experience.
The virtual body movements bear no relation to the physical bodily movements
required for superior performances. Yet, as there are certain “objective” actions
that must be carried out in order to achieve excellence in karate, the value it has
is necessarily grounded in the body and its physical action. Those partaking in
simulated karate games may be disappointed to learn that they are very far from
practicing the real thing. If this is the case, then ontological facts about the
simulated experience undermine its value. They may nonetheless still enjoy
the activity, but this enjoyment would be a “kind of spectator activity. . .with
interactivity and immersion thrown in” (p. 683).
Defenders of computer games, however, can point out at least two problems with
this argument. First, Mooradian develops a rather narrow definition of areˆte.
Gamers do undertake mental exercise in mastering the increasingly difficult
challenges crafted by game designers. People who are able to solve spatial game
puzzles such as Rubik’s Cube are often highly esteemed by those of us who are
baffled and quit in frustration. Clearly this is a display of a kind of mental
excellence. Second, computer games of the future may incorporate greater ranges
of embodied action and force-feedback sensors to monitor precise movements.
9
Poker, however, can be simulated without losing value, at least in this radical sense, because it is
not rooted in the execution of certain physical movements.
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 171
In this case, the simulations may approximate the real acts to such an extent that
there is no longer anything “artificial” about the areˆte that results from training and
competition. Rudimentary versions of such technologies are already on the market
and may be further driven by the use of interactive video games in physical
education courses and retirement homes.
Mooradian argues that sex is different from karate in part because the criterion of
success in the former is based entirely in feeling, or perceptual experience, whereas
in the latter there are more objective standards of excellence. In other words, we
cannot understand artificial areˆte if we only have recourse to a hedonist account of
value as equivalent to perceptions, sensations, or feelings. Areˆte signifies that value
stems from the physical and mental capabilities of practitioners of an art: “devel-
opment to a standard of excellence is the basis of value and the source of satisfac-
tion and enjoyment” (Mooradian 2006, p. 688). Devaluation in this instance would
entail losing sight of the difference between the standards set by feeling and those
set by perfection. Computer games may democratize excellence—with a few hours
of practice anyone can hone a wicked serve in a tennis computer game—but in
so doing they may also cheapen its very meaning. Areˆte entails continentia,
self-control, and ascesis, exercise or self-discipline. Its devaluation would stem
from incontinence, weakness of the will, in the face of the temptation of easy but
ultimately shallow achievements.
Yet, it is not clear that computer games will lead to such a devaluation of
excellence, in part because the achievements in many games are not in any obvious
sense “shallow” or “easy.” Indeed, some computer games arguably can provide the
objective standards of excellence Mooradian sees as essential to genuine areˆte,
especially when it comes to the development of superior mental capabilities.
Finally, there is a sense in which excellence is a derivative value based on a prior
normative judgment about an activity being worthy of pursuit. We do not, for
example, celebrate those who are extremely good at performing an immoral
activity. In what sense, then, are computer games worthy sorts of activities in the
first place? Should the best gamers be admired as much as the best athletes,
musicians, or public servants?
Many computer games have the potential to enhance imagination and fantasy. Some
have suggested they also engender new art forms and artistic expressions. Ian Bogost
(2006) explores the ways in which computer games shift from entertainment
(passing the time) to art (transforming our times). Similarly, Heim (1993) sees in
computer game players the emerging talent to become new artists, ready to birth the
world-transforming potential of virtual reality.
Yet the centrality of creativity in computer games may also have downsides.
Importantly, an emphasis on creation and manipulation of artificial (and real)
worlds can clash with another important aspect of character: respect for others.
172 A. Briggle
10
For another interesting take on this idea see Borgmann (1993).
11 The Ethics of Computer Games: A Character Approach 173
11.6 Conclusion
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