GUIDE NO.

AERB/RF-RS/SG-1
GUIDE NO. AERB/RF-RS/SG-1

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

AERB SAFETY GUIDE

SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

IN
RADIATION FACILITIES

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

 AERB SAFETY GUIDE NO. AERB/RF-RS/SG-1

SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

IN
RADIATION FACILITIES

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

Mumbai-400 094
India

March 2011
 Price

Order for this guide should be addressed to:

The Administrative Officer

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
Niyamak Bhavan
Anushaktinagar
Mumbai-400 094
India
 FOREWORD

Activities concerning establishment and utilisation of nuclear facilities and use of

radioactive sources are to be carried out in India in accordance with the provisions of
the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. In pursuance of ensuring safety of members of the
public and occupational workers as well as protection of environment, the atomic
energy regulatory board (AERB) has been entrusted with the responsibility of laying
down safety standards and enforcing rules for such activities. The Board has, therefore,
undertaken a programme of developing safety standards, safety codes, related guides
and manuals. While some of these documents cover aspects such as siting, design,
construction, operation, quality assurance and decommissioning of nuclear and radiation
facilities, other documents cover regulatory aspects of these facilities.
Safety codes and safety standards are formulated on the basis of internationally accepted
safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, systems,
structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety codes establish
the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance
for safety. Safety guides and guidelines elaborate various requirements and furnish
approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specific topics and
contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. These documents
are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewed by advisory
committees of the Board before they are published. The documents are revised when
necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well as new
developments in the field.
In India, radiation sources are being widely used for societal benefits in industry,
medical practices, research, training and agriculture. It has been reported from all
over the world that unsecured radioactive sources caused serious radiological accidents
involving radiation injuries and fatalities. Particular concern was expressed regarding
radioactive sources that have become orphaned (not under regulatory control) or
vulnerable (under weak regulatory control and about to be orphaned). There is a concern
about safety and security of radioactive sources and hence the need of stringent
regulatory control over the handling of the sources and their security. In view of this,
this guide is prepared which gives provisions necessary to safeguard radiation
installations against theft of radioactive sources and other malevolent acts that may
result in radiological consequences. It is, therefore, required that the radiation sources
are used safely and managed securely by only authorised personnel. This guide is
intended to be used by users of radiation sources in developing the necessary security
plan for sources.
Consistent with the accepted practice, ‘shall’ and ‘should’ are used in the guide to
distinguish between a firm requirement and desirable option respectively. Appendices
and bibliography are included to provide further information on the subject that might
be helpful to the user. Approaches for implementation, different to those set out in the

i
guide may be acceptable, if they provide comparable assurance against undue risk to
the health and safety of the occupational workers and the general public, and protection
of the environment.
Specialists in the field drawn from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, the Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology, the Department
of Atomic Energy and other consultants have prepared this guide. It has been reviewed
by experts and relevant AERB Advisory Committee on Codes and Guides.
AERB wishes to thank all individuals and organisations who have prepared and
reviewed the draft and helped to finalise it. The list of persons, who have participated
in this task, along with their affiliations, is included for information.

(S.S. Bajaj)
Chairman, AERB

ii
 DEFINITIONS

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)

A national authority designated by the Government of India having the legal authority
for issuing regulatory consent for various activities related to the nuclear and radiation
facility and to perform safety and regulatory functions, including their enforcement
for the protection of site personnel, the public and the environment against undue
radiation hazards.
Design Basis Threat (DBT)
The attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who
might attempt unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a
physical protection system is designed and evaluated.
Radiation Facility
Any installation/equipment or a practice involving use of radiation-generating units
or use of radioisotopes in the field of research, industry, medicine and agriculture.
Radiation Surveillance
Measures that may be specified by the competent authority to provide adequate
protection either generally or in any individual case.
Radioactive Material/Radioactive Substance
Any substance or material, which spontaneously emits radiation in excess of the levels
prescribed by notification by the Central Government.
Sealed Source
Radioactive source material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule, or (b) closely
bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of a sealed source shall be strong
enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and wear for which the
source was designed, as also under foreseeable mishaps.
Source
Anything that may cause radiation exposure, either by emitting ionising radiation or
releasing radioactive substances or materials.

iii
 CONTENTS

FOREWORD ...................................................................................... i

DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................... iii

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 1
1.1 General ......................................................................... 1
1.2 Objective ...................................................................... 2
1.3 Scope ............................................................................ 2

2. SECURITY PRINCIPLES ........................................................ 4

2.1 Basic Principles of Security ......................................... 4
2.2 Security Culture ........................................................... 5
2.3 Security Functions ........................................................ 5
2.4 Assessment of Threat and Vulnerability ...................... 6
2.5 Dynamic Nature of Security Threat Perceptions ......... 7

3. SECURITY LEVELS BASED ON CATEGORIZATION

OF SOURCES ........................................................................... 9
3.1 Purpose of Categorising Sources ................................. 9
3.2 Basis of Categorisation ................................................ 9
3.3 Graded Approach to Security ....................................... 9
3.4 Security Levels and Security Objectives ..................... 12

4. SECURITY MEASURES FOR RADIATION FACILITIES.... 13

4.1 Administrative Measures ............................................. 13
4.2 Technical Measures ...................................................... 14
4.3 Physical Protection Systems (PPS) .............................. 14
4.4 Security of Radioactive Sources during their
Transport ...................................................................... 15
4.5 Measures Common to Security Levels A and B .......... 15
4.6 Additional Measures Required for Security
Level A ......................................................................... 17
4.7 Additional Measures Required for Security
Level B ......................................................................... 20
4.8 Measures Required for Security Level C ..................... 23
4.9 Measures Required for Security Level D .................... 25
4.10 Security for Aggregation of Sources ............................ 25
4.11 Temporary Storage of Recovered Sources .................. 25
4.12 Preparation and Submission of Security Plan
to Competent Authority ................................................ 25
5. RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................ 28
5.1 General ......................................................................... 28
5.2 Radiation Facility ......................................................... 28
5.2.1 Employer ........................................................... 28
5.2.2 Licencee ............................................................ 29
5.2.3 Radiological Safety Officer (RSO) .................. 30
5.2.4 Workers and Other Personnel ........................... 30
5.2.5 Security Personnel ............................................ 30
5.3 Supplier of the Source .................................................. 31
5.4 Role of Law and Enforcement Agencies .................... 31

APPENDIX- I : DOSE CRITERIA USED IN THE DERIVATION

OF THE D VALUES ................................................. 32

APPENDIX- II : CATEGORIES OF COMMONLY USED

SOURCES ................................................................. 36

APPENDIX-III : SECURITY LEVELS AND SECURITY

OBJECTIVES ............................................................ 41

APPENDIX-IV : DESCRIPTION OF SECURITY MEASURES ........ 43

APPENDIX-V : PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS (PPS) ........ 47

APPENDIX-VI : SPECIMEN FORMAT FOR REGISTRATION

OF SECURITY PLAN FOR CATEGORY-1
SOURCES ................................................................. 50

APPENDIX-VII : KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN A

SECURITY PLAN .................................................... 51

APPENDIX-VIII :GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY

PLAN FOR GAMMA IRRADIATOR
FACILITY/TELETHERAPY FACILITY ................. 53

APPENDIX-IX : GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY

PLAN FOR INDUSTRIAL GAMMA
RADIOGRAPHY/HDR BRACHYTHERAPY
FACILITY .................................................................. 55

APPENDIX-X : GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY

PLAN FOR FACILITY HANDLING WELL
LOGGING SOURCES/FIXED NUCLEONIC
GAUGES ................................................................... 57
APPENDIX-XI : GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY
PLAN FOR FACILITY HANDLING
PORTABLE GAUGES/TECHNETIUM
GENERATORS ......................................................... 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... 60

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................... 61

COMMITTEE TO DEVELOPE GUIDELINES ON SECURITY

OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN RADIATION FACILITIES
(CDGSRS) ................................................................................... 61

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

(ACRS) ................................................................................... 62

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SECURITY (ACS) .............................. 63

PROVISIONAL LIST OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS

ON SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS .............................. 64
 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 General
Radioactive sources are widely used in various applications in medicine,
industry and research. These sources are supplied by authorised manufacturers
to authorised users and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the
authority empowered to issue such authorisations.
Unsecured sources can cause serious injuries and could even result in fatalities.
Further they could also result in damage to the environment and lead to
significant economic losses. In India, this issue of security of sources was
addressed as early as in 1980, when a notification titled ‘The Industrial
Radiography (Radiation Surveillance) Procedures [1]’ was issued under the
Radiation Protection Rules, 1971 [2], which identified the licencee as being
responsible for the security1 of the source. As per the Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 [3] issued under the Atomic Energy Act,
1962, a licence needs to be obtained from the Competent Authority for
handling such sources. The Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004
also emphasise the importance of the security of radioactive material, in
addition to radiological safety.2
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1996, published the
International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation
and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) [4], which specifically requires
that sources shall be kept secure so as to prevent theft or damage. The IAEA
code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources [5] addresses
the matter of security of sources extensively and recommends that appropriate
measures be taken to ensure that the radioactive sources are safely managed
and securely protected during and till their useful lives, and until their safe
disposal. It also recommends that safety culture3 and security culture4 should
be promoted.
Any breach in security during the handling of radioactive material, could
have safety consequences resulting in radiation exposure to workers and/or

1 Security means measures to prevent unauthorised access or damage to, and loss, theft or
unauthorised transfer of, radioactive sources.
2 Radiological safety means measures intended to minimise the likelihood of accidents with
radioactive sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its consequences.
3 Safety culture means the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and
individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues
receive the attention warranted by their significance.
4 Security culture means characteristics and attitudes in organisations and of individuals, which
establish that security issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.

1
 the public, in excess of the regulatory dose limits. Accordingly, the AERB
has taken up the task of developing the technical basis to establish security
levels for ensuring the safety of radioactive materials during all stages of
their handling. Recognizing the need to ensure appropriate use of the sources
for beneficial purposes it is intended that the level of security should be
commensurate with the potential hazard posed by the sources. Towards this,
measures have to be applied to prevent unauthorised access, loss, theft and
unauthorised transfer of radioactive sources at all stages of their life cycle.
Safety and security aspects of sources are intimately linked and many of the
measures designed to address safety would also address security. However,
in the current context, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that
these may not be sufficient to address the threat of deliberate attempts to
acquire control of a radioactive source for malevolent purposes. Based on
the potential hazard and vulnerability of a source or device, as well as the
potential consequences of any malevolent action, a graded concept of security
measures is outlined in this guide. Implementation of these measures is
expected to significantly lower the risk associated with such sources.
1.2 Objective
The security of radioactive sources includes measures required to protect the
sources from unintentional access by inappropriately qualified personnel or
attempts of theft for financial gain. The objective of this guide is to recommend
to the employer and the licencee security measures which are aimed at
prevention and countering of deliberate and malevolent acts that could result
in significant radiological consequences. The recommended measures include
a combination of deterrence, early detection and delay of attempts at
unauthorised acquisition, mitigation of consequences and response to a loss
of authorised control including recovery.
1.3 Scope
The guidance provided in this document address the radiological concerns /
hazards associated with the unauthorised removal, sabotage and other
intentional malicious acts during the handling of radioactive material which
are used in medical, industrial and research applications. This document
covers the processes to determine the level of security required for preventing
malevolent use of sources throughout their lifecycle, and the assignment of
security measures to sources based on graded performance requirements to
deter, detect, and, if necessary respond to theft of radioactive material. In
doing so, it is recognised that such measures will also minimise inadvertent
or negligent losses of sources.
While security considerations for all radioactive sources are outlined in this
document, the main focus is on radioactive sources that could be dangerous
if they are not under control (primarily Categories 1 to 3 in Ref. [6]). The

2
 security concerns addressed in this guide relate primarily to sealed sources.
However, consistent with the code of conduct, the scope of this document
includes unsealed sources also. This guidance applies to all medical, industrial
and research institutions, nuclear facilities and radioactive waste disposal
facilities. This guide is not applicable to nuclear material.5
This guidance has been drawn up for the following radioactive sources used
by the above radiation and nuclear facilities:
(i) Reference sources
(ii) Consumer products (e.g. smoke detectors, luminous painted dials,
tritium light sources)
(iii) Radiopharmaceuticals
(iv) Nucleonic gauge sources
(v) Calibration sources
(vi) Sources used in well logging
(vii) Industrial radiography sources
(viii) LDR Brachytherapy sources
(ix) HDR Brachytherapy sources
(x) Teletherapy sources
(xi) Gamma irradiator sources
(xii) Decayed sealed sources for disposal
The guidance specified in this report are applicable to the complete life cycle
of sources covering manufacture, supply, receipt, storage, use, transfer, import,
export, transport, operation, maintenance or disposal of radioactive sources.
Since the security of radioactive sources in the public domain merit separate
consideration, the guidance for the same are addressed in another AERB
publication [7].
This document does not discuss radiation safety requirements for specific
applications. These practice specific guidance outlined in other AERB
publications should also be followed in addition to the guidance given in this
document.

5 Nuclear material means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in
238
Pu; 233U; uranium enriched in isotope 235 or, uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing
one or more of the foregoing.

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 2. SECURITY PRINCIPLES

2.1 Basic Principles of Security

In attempting to address the threats from malevolent acts involving radioactive
sources, it is clear that sources of certain magnitudes and types are more
vulnerable to such acts than others. Therefore, the approach to security needs
to be graded accordingly. Following are components which would influence
the strategy to be adopted while drawing up a specific security plan:
(a) Management6 of sources only within an authorised, regulated, legal
framework.
(b) Appropriate design and manufacture of sources and design features
incorporated in the equipment housing the sources, to minimise the
feasibility of malicious actions and maximise security.
(c) Prevention of acquisition of radioactive sources by those with
malevolent intent. This includes measures to:
(i) deter unauthorized access to the source or source location, in
order to deter theft;
(ii) detect any such attempts at unauthorised access;
(iii) delay unauthorised access or theft;
(iv) provide rapid response to attempts at unauthorised access or
theft; and
(v) ensure the reliability of personnel involved in managing
sources.
(d) Detection of actual theft or loss in order to appropriately respond
and allow recovery efforts to start as soon as possible. This includes:
(i) the provision of radiation, or other alarms; and
(ii) accounting7 and inventory8.
(e) Efforts to recover any stolen or lost sources and bring them into
secure regulatory control.

6 Management means all activities, administrative and operational, that are involved in the
manufacture, supply, receipt, storage, use, transfer, import, export, transport, maintenance or
disposal of radioactive sources.
7 Accounting means physically checking that all sources are present in their expected location.
This may be satisfied by an appropriate radiation survey.
8 Inventory means a campaign to physically check all sources possessed, by specifically and
uniquely identifying each individual source using appropriate means such as serial numbers.

4
 (f) Prevention of unauthorised use of sources.
(g) Minimisation of the consequences of any malevolent use of a source.
2.2 Security Culture
It is necessary that the radiation facility develops and maintains a security
culture, which can be achieved by various means such as:
(i) identifying the personnel and their roles in ensuring the security of
radioactive sources in the facility;
(ii) documenting a security plan which will also assign security
responsibilities, and informing all the concerned employees and
contractors of their specific roles;
(iii) providing security instructions and ongoing security awareness
briefings to staff and contractor and training and evaluation of the
lessons learned;
(iv) ensuring threat awareness and training security managers, response
personnel and all personnel with secondary responsibilities for
security; and
(v) conducting regular performance testing and preventive maintenance.
The security culture should be inculcated amongst all employees. This should
be done by means of training and awareness programmes, security drills, etc.
It is not only the persons who are occupationally exposed to radiation in the
facility but also the general employees working in the facility should be
included in such programmes. The employer, the licencee, the radiological
safety officer (RSO) and the general security personnel have important roles
to play in developing the security culture amongst all employees in the facility.
2.3 Security Functions
The security functions cover the entire gamut of activities required to ensure
that radioactive sources are always under regulatory control. These functions
range from simple safe management and protection of the sources to the
establishment of systems that would prevent unauthorised access to the
sources. The security functions deter and delay unauthorised access to sources,
detect should such access occur and ensure that measures to mitigate the
radiological consequences and recover the sources are implemented without
delay. The basic security functions are deterrence, detection, delay, response
and security management.
2.3.1 Measures of Deterrence
The measures of deterrence are aimed at convincing that act of getting
unauthorised access to a source would be too difficult, that the success of the

5
 act would be uncertain and that the consequences would not justify the risk
of undertaking the act. Communicating the existence of such measures would
to a large extent serve the purpose of such deterrence. In this regard,
implementing specific measures for detection, delay, response and security
management would themselves function as a deterrent.
2.3.2 Measures of Detection
The measures of detection are aimed at discovering an actual or an attempted
intrusion, which could have the objective of theft or sabotage involving a
radioactive source. Means of detection include visual observation, electronic
surveillance (which include video surveillance like CCTVs, electric sensors,
IR sensors, etc), periodic source accounting, seals and other tamper-indicating
devices.
2.3.3 Measures of Delay
The measures of delay are aimed at impeding an adversary’s attempt to gain
unauthorized access or removal or sabotage of a radioactive source. This is
generally achieved through barriers or other physical means. The effectiveness
of delay is measured by the time required by the adversary to gain unauthorised
access to the source and commit the intended malicious act.
2.3.4 Measures of Response
The measures of response are aimed at preventing a malicious act and if it
occurs, mitigating the severity of the consequences of such an act. These
measures have to be implemented by security personnel or the law enforcing
personnel. The actions include interrupting and subduing an adversary while
the malicious act is being committed or preventing the adversary from using
a stolen radioactive source for committing a malicious act or mitigating the
severity of the consequences of such an act.
2.3.5 Measures of Security Management
The measures of security management are aimed at developing procedures,
policies, records and plans for the security of radioactive sources, proper
handling of sensitive information and protecting it against unauthorised
disclosure.
2.4 Assessment of Threat and Vulnerability
It is recommended that the best method to design security measures for specific
sources is the use of a ‘design basis threat (DBT) assessment’ methodology.
The DBT will vary quite widely from one location to another within the
country, one type of facility and another and from source to source. The
associated security measures should be commensurate with the threat and

6
 the level of risk acceptance. The assessment of threat could range from being
a generic one to a very detailed assessment.
Likewise, security measures could be based on generic assessments performed
at the government level or at an organisational level or could be very specific
in nature. At one extreme, security requirements might be based only on the
consequences of malevolent acts without an assessment of the likelihood of
the threat. A detailed threat assessment provides the means of adjusting
security provisions in accordance with the results of that analysis and more
specifically for addressing the potential consequences associated with loss
of control over each specific source. A detailed DBT assessment methodology
to define the appropriate level of security would consist of the following
activities:
(i) Characterise the source, its type, nature and application (identify the
target).
(ii) Perform an assessment of the potential threat within the country as a
whole, based on information from security and intelligence experts.
(iii) Evaluate the potential consequences of successful actions to acquire
the source. These could range from simple theft for monetary gains
to deliberate acquisition of a source and threatening to use it and
cause panic or even deploying it as a radiological dispersal device
(RDD).
(iv) Determine, based on the assessment of threat and potential
consequences, a DBT against which the security plan should be
designed and evaluated. For example, the threat assessment may
range from attempts to gain access by an un-armed and un-equipped
person to a major attempt by an armed and well-equipped group.
(v) Based on the above, perform a vulnerability analysis for the specific
source, or sources, against this DBT.
(vi) If there is a requirement to reduce the risk associated with
unauthorised access and acquisition, then first optimise existing
measures and then implement the additional measures. Many of these
additional measures may be in the form of just extensions or
enhancement of the existing safety measures.
2.5 Dynamic Nature of Security Threat Perceptions
It has to be recognised that security threats are dynamic in nature and would
vary with space and time. For example, at a given place, the security threat
could be different at different times. On the other hand, at a given time, the
security threat may be different in different places. It is therefore necessary
that the threat perception is under constant review. If the threat perception
indicates deterioration in the security situation, the licencee should

7
immediately prepare a revised security plan, upgrade the security level of the
facility as deemed desirable, implement necessary measures, submit the
revised security plan to the Competent Authority for review and implement
additional measures as may be recommended by the Competent Authority. In
the event that the deterioration in security situation was a short-term
phenomenon and the situation has reverted back to what originally existed,
the licencee could revert to the original security plan and formally inform the
Competent Authority.

8
 3. SECURITY LEVELS BASED ON CATEGORISATION OF
SOURCES

3.1 Purpose of Categorising Sources

Radioactive sources with a wide range of radiation intensity are used in a
variety of authorised applications in medical, industrial and research
institutions. Sources with high activity, if not managed safely and securely,
could cause severe deterministic effects to individuals in a short period of
time. The categorisation provides an internationally harmonised basis for
risk informed decision making. The categorisation is not relevant to radiation
generating devices such as X-ray machines and particle accelerators. There
are also certain situations where the categorisation is not applicable because
of factors such as specific activity, chemical properties and half-life. For
example, at a waste management facility for the disposal of disused sources,
the security requirements would be different from what was required when
the sources were originally in use. The categorisation described in this safety
guide essentially reflects the system of categorisation of sources devised by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [6].
3.2 Basis of Categorisation
When the activity of a source is high enough to deliver a radiation dose
which would result in severe deterministic effects in the exposed individual,
the source is considered as a ‘dangerous source’. The activity of a source,
which can deliver this dose, is termed its ‘D value’. Both external and internal
exposures are therefore considered in the derivation of D values. The criteria
for the derivation of D values are given in Appendix-I. Based on the D
values thus derived, sources are divided into five categories [6]. The
commonly used sources and their respective categories are listed in
Appendix-II.
3.3 Graded Approach to Security
Based on the vulnerability analysis for a specific source, an assessment can
be made of the level of risk involved. This risk level would determine the
security measures required to protect the source. The higher the risk, the
more capabile security systems are required. This ‘level’ of capability can be
expressed in terms of the ‘performance objectives’ of the security system.
While the range of possible specific security measures could be quite wide,
they can be described by their capability to deter, to detect and to delay
unauthorised access or acquisition. This graded approach will ensure that the
level of security measures in place is commensurate with the potential
consequence associated with the possible breach of security with respect to
that source.

9
3.3.1 Security Levels Applicable to Sources
Based on the security threat associated with radioactive sources, four security
levels - A, B, C and D have been defined. It must be emphasized that these
security levels do not themselves lay down the security guidelines or measures.
They essentially lay down a set of objectives to be achieved, with Level A
requiring the highest performance objectives. These levels provide a
systematic way of categorising the graded performance objectives required
to cover the range of security measures that might be needed, depending on
the assessed risk. The performance objectives for the four security levels of
a security system are detailed below:
(i) Security Level A : Prevent unauthorised removal of a source by
timely detection and response action. Measures should be established
to deter and detect unauthorised access, and acquisition of the source
in a timely manner. These measures should be such as to delay
acquisition until a response is possible.
(ii) Security Level B : Minimise the likelihood of unauthorised removal
of a source by immediate detection without having to interrupt the
act. Measures should be established to deter and detect unauthorised
access, and acquisition of the source in a timely manner.
(iii) Security Level C : Reduce the likelihood of unauthorised removal
of a source. Measures should be established to deter unauthorised
access and verify the presence of the source at set intervals.
(iv) Security Level D : Measures should be established to ensure safe
use of the source and adequately protect it as an asset, verifying its
presence at set intervals.
The quality and effectiveness of the security measures would be dictated by
the specific design basis threat (DBT). Protection against unauthorised access
for security reasons is primarily aimed at trying to prevent theft of the material.
Measures to achieve this objective may already be in place arising out of
safety consideration to protect against unintentional radiation exposure.
3.3.2 Assignment of Security Level to a Radioactive Source
The security level for a radioactive source is assigned on the basis of
consequences of the perceived threat. This allows flexibility and specificity
to account for the variability in threat levels and security environments. It
also permits different choices of security levels for sources in the different
stages of their life cycle. In the event that insufficient data are available to
perform a reasonable design basis threat assessment, or it is not considered
desirable or necessary to do so, then security measures could be based upon
the consequences of the malevolent acquisition and use of the source(s), and
an assumed threat to the source. As mentioned earlier, the sources have been

10
 divided into five categories, with category 1 being the most significant
radioactive source. Sources in categories 1 to 3 generally have the potential
of giving rise to exposure sufficient to cause severe deterministic effects if
they are uncontrolled. A severe deterministic effect is one that is fatal or life
threatening or results in permanent injury that decreases the quality of life.
The default/desired security levels and categories assigned for various sources/
practices are given in Table 3.1 which are based on implicit assumption of a
threat posed by a person or group with serious intent to acquire the source.
However, different circumstances or more detailed assessments may justify
assigning a higher security level than indicated in this table. For example,
one reason for doing this is that a specific threat assessment may reveal a
facility with several sources or mobile sources to be more vulnerable, even
though they may not be individually high activity sources, which may
otherwise warrant a lower security level.

TABLE 3.1 : SECURITY LEVELS BASED ON

CATEGORISATION OF SOURCES
Security Source Examples of practices
level category
A 1 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
Irradiators
Teletherapy
Fixed multibeam teletherapy (gamma knife)
B 2 Industrial radiography
High/medium dose rate brachytherapy
C 3 Fixed industrial gauges incorporate high activity sources
(e.g. level, dredger, conveyor)
Well logging gauges
D 4 Low dose rate brachytherapy (except those given against
Category 5)
Industrial gauges that do not incorporate high activity
sources [e.g. Thickness/fill-level gauges, portable gauges
(e.g. moisture/density)]
Bone densitometers
Static eliminators
Diagnostic isotope generators
5 Low dose rate brachytherapy eye plaques and permanent
implant sources
(Positron emission tomography (PET) check sources, X-
ray fluorescence (XRF) devices, Electron capture devices,
Mossbauer spectrometry sources)
Radiopharmaceuticals and other unsealed sources

11
 In respect of practices not included in this table, users should seek advice
from the Competent Authority on the applicable security levels. Unsealed
sources are assigned Security Level D in view of the activities handled and
the associated potential hazard. Decayed sources are generally assigned the
same security level as originally assigned to them.
3.4 Security Levels and Security Objectives
The objectives of the security functions, viz., detect, delay, response and
security management apply differently to the different security levels. The
detailed performance objectives against various security functions for each
security level are given in Appendix-III. Security Level D corresponds to
prudent security objectives that would be applicable to all facilities.
As emphasised earlier, it must be noted that the security level determines the
specific security measures that will meet the performance objectives for that
level. These security measures are described in section 4.

12
 4. SECURITY MEASURES FOR RADIATION FACILITIES

The performance objectives for different security levels can be met by a combination
of administrative and technical measures. These security measures should be seen as
an integrated concept of safety and security involving industrial safety arrangements,
radiation protection measures and appropriate design to achieve the necessary level of
protection against unauthorised acquisition of radioactive sources.
4.1 Administrative Measures
Administrative measures are the use of policies, procedures, and practices
which direct personnel to securely and safely manage sources. Administrative
measures are used to support or supplement technical measures. Among others,
administrative measures would include:
(i) access control procedures [e.g. personal identification number (PIN)
or biometric features to activate a door control reader or a badge
system which may also activate an electronic reader];
(ii) intrusion alarms at access points (e.g. with radiation detectors);
(iii) key control procedures;
(iv) video cameras or personal surveillance supported by adequate area
lighting systems (even if surveillance measures involve the use of
intrusion detectors instead of human observation, they are still
considered as administrative measures since they do not provide a
physical barrier.);
(v) records related to management of sources;
(vi) inventories;
(vii) reliability and trustworthiness of personnel;
(viii) preparation of emergency plans to respond to the loss of control of
higher risk radioactive sources and carrying out exercises (the
envisaged scenarios including a suspected or threatened malicious
act, or a public demonstration which has the potential to threaten the
security of sources or an intrusion into the security area by
unauthorised persons with violent and malicious intent);
(ix) information security (protecting the confidentiality of information,
the unauthorised disclosure of which could compromise the security
measures, e.g. information relating to the specific location and
inventory of sources, the relevant security plan and detailed security
arrangements, security systems like intruder alarms, weaknesses in
the security arrangements, means of response to a breach of security,

13
 planned dates, routes and mode of transport/ shipment or transfer of
sources);
(x) quality assurance measures; and
(xi) establishment and maintenance of a safety culture and a security
culture.
The extent to which the above measures would need to be implemented would
depend upon the security level applicable to the practice.
4.2 Technical Measures
Technical measures pose a physical barrier to the radioactive source, device
or facility in order to prevent inadvertent or unauthorised access, to deter, or
to prevent removal of a radioactive source. The design of technical measures
and the level of quality assurance should be appropriate to the threat and the
potential consequences of the defined malevolent act.
Technical measures generally comprise hardware or security devices and
would include among others:
(a) fences,
(b) walls, rooms/vaults,
(c) cages,
(d) transport packaging,
(e) locks and interlocks for doors with alarm systems, and
(f) intrusion-resistant source-holding devices.
The extent to which these measures would need to be implemented would
depend upon the security level applicable to the practice.
The description of security measures are given in Appendix-IV
4.3 Physical Protection Systems (PPS)
This term applies to the entire range of systems and equipment, which
physically protect the radioactive source or the facility using a radioactive
source. The design of these systems is governed by physical protection
principles and physical protection can be effectively implemented through
human actions supported by equipment. An effective physical protection
system makes a judicious combination of human surveillance and physical
protection equipment. Its design and evaluation involve concepts of DBT
and vulnerability assessment (VA). Appendix-V gives details on PPS, which
covers these aspects and could be used as a guide to develop an effective
security plan.

14
4.4 Security of Radioactive Sources during their Transport
A radioactive source could be in storage at the facility or in use there. It
could also be in transport either from the supplier of the source to the facility,
or from one location to another for operational reasons, or the source is being
sent to a disposal facility. As mentioned earlier, transport of a radioactive
source needs special consideration from the view of safety and security. The
guidance for this purpose are available separately in the AERB safety guide
No. AERB/NRF-TS/SG-10 [7] and these should be used by the licencee
whenever the source is in transport.
4.5 Measures Common to Security Levels A and B
There are several measures, which are common to achieve the performance
objectives of Security Levels A and B. These are outlined in the following
paragraphs:
4.5.1 Availability of Formal Security Plans
Formal security plan should be prepared for facilities possessing Category-1
sources, got duly registered with District Law and Enforcement Authority
and submitted to Competent Authority for review. The specimen format for
registration of security plan is given is Appendix-VI. For facility possessing
sources of category 2 to 5, the security plan should be submitted to competent
authority for review. This plan should describe how the security provisions
in this document are met for the source(s) under consideration. It should be
reviewed at least annually to ensure that it is still current and applicable.
Appendix-VII outlines some of the issues that should be considered in a
security plan. Security systems are effective only if they are fully implemented
and are periodically tested and evaluated. System evaluations should be
performed and documented as part of a quality assurance system. Whenever
any component of the security system has been compromised, steps should
be taken to suitably rectify the system. Towards this, there should mechanisms
to detect any attempt to tamper the security system.
4.5.2 Ensuring Security of Critical Information
Ensuring information security is a critical factor for any security plan.
Particular attention should be paid to this aspect. The ‘need to know’ principle
should be adopted in the dissemination of such information and the distribution
of relevant documents has to be controlled. Information, in this regard, applies
to those pertaining to source locations, specific security measures or
weaknesses in the licencee’s system of management of sources, etc. Typically,
this would include:
(a) specific locations of sources;

15
 (b) the facility’s security plan and security system associated with the
sources;
(c) temporary or permanent weaknesses in the security system;
(d) source utilization plans and records;
(e) proposed date and time of source(s) shipment or transfer; and
(f) emergency response plans and systems.
4.5.3 Background Checks on Key Personnel
The licencee should ensure that persons engaged in the management of the
source have a high degree of trustworthiness. This has to be established by
checking the antecedents of such personnel by District Authority prior to
obtaining the licence from the Competent Authority. Other personnel with
access to these sources do not necessarily need such background checks as
long as they are appropriately escorted or kept under visual surveillance by
persons who have undergone background checks.
4.5.4 Response to an Increased Threat Perception
The planning for response to an increased threat involving the possible
malevolent use of the radioactive source should include the role of concerned
public authorities/functionaries. For example, the licencee should establish
pre-arranged procedures with law and enforcement authorities regarding
intelligence information and use of secure communications as well as the
reactions to an increased threat.
If the licencee becomes aware, or suspects that there is a specific threat
targeting a source or source storage location, the security should be increased
in accordance with the threat. The increased security measures should be
continued until such time as it is determined that the specific threat is no
longer present. Under such circumstances, the following measures should be
considered:
(a) if the source is in use, return the source to its secure storage location;
(b) preferably to have armed guards in round the clock shift as a good
deterrence for Category-1 sources after evaluation of the threat levels;
(c) use video observation, or an intrusion alarm;
(d) ensure that the law and enforcement and regulatory authorities are
made aware of the suspected threat;
(e) review the security procedures, facility layout, and radiation safety
practices with the law enforcement and emergency response
personnel; and

16
 (f) make sure that emergency response procedures are in place. In
addition, identify the nearest medical facilities where personnel
trained and equipped to handle radiological emergencies are
available.
4.5.5 Availability of Emergency Response Plans
Depending upon the magnitude and number of sources at a facility, specific
emergency response procedures should be developed by the licencee. As a
minimum, these would normally include informing the local police and the
Competent Authority in the event of a loss of the source and the initial
measures that would be made to recover lost or stolen sources. These
emergency response procedures should be periodically exercised and
evaluated.
4.6 Additional Measures Required for Security Level A
The performance objectives of security measures for Security Level A are to
prevent unauthorised access and detect unauthorised access and acquisition
of the source in a timely manner. These measures should be such as to delay
acquisition until response is possible. Ideally, the access control to the source
should incorporate at least two technical measures. However, it is recognised
that during normal use it may not be practicable to have all these measures in
place all the time. In any given situation, the quality of these security measures
should be consistent with the DBT. Any unauthorised access to the source
should be detected in a timely manner. The source should be accounted for
on a daily basis.
Depending on whether the radioactive source is in storage or in use, following
are the security measures that should be in place for Security Level A.
4.6.1 Source in Storage
To achieve the defined performance objective, the following security
provisions could be implemented:
(a) A locked and fixed container or a device holding the source
(b) A locked storage room, separating the container from unauthorised
personnel
(c) Access control to the storage room
(d) Detection of unauthorised access or removal of the source
(e) Ability to respond in a timely manner to such detection.
For a mobile device containing a high activity source, the requirements could
be:

17
 (a) Storage in a locked and shielded container
(b) Container being kept in an enclosed, secured vehicle
(c) The vehicle itself being parked inside a locked compound or locked
garage
(d) The vehicle being subjected to continuous surveillance to detect
intrusion attempts along with the capability to respond to any such
attempt.
These measures should provide the desired degree of delay against the defined
threat. Depending on the specifics of a particular threat assessment, additional
responses might be required.
4.6.2 Source in Use
To achieve the defined performance objective, the following security
provisions should be implemented :
(a) A locked device in a controlled area, separating the container from
unauthorised personnel
(b) Access control to the area
(c) The room, where the source is being used, being subjected to
continuous surveillance (either by personnel surveillance or
electronic equipment) to detect any intrusion attempt
(d) The building housing the facility having security guards who are
able to provide a timely response.
These measures should provide the desired delay against the defined threat.
Depending on the assessment of the threat, additional response might be
required. The above measures would be applicable by default, for example
to the use of a teletherapy source in a hospital.
For a mobile source being used in the field, it might not always be possible to
achieve the specified requirements. Therefore, compensatory measures, such
as rigorous personnel surveillance, must be implemented. In addition, the
required security measures should be re-established as soon as possible.
4.6.3 Summary of Security Measures for Security Level A
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of the security measures required to
meet the security objectives of Security Level A :

18
 TABLE 4.1 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES
FOR SECURITY LEVEL A

Security Security objectives Security measures

functions
Detect Provide immediate detection of Electronic intrusion detection
unauthorised access to the system and/or continuous
secured area / source location surveillance by operating
personnel
Provide immediate detection of Electronic tamper detection
any attempted unauthorised equipment and/or continuous
removal of the source surveillance by operating
personnel and radiation zone
monitors at the exit points.
Provide immediate assessment of Remote monitoring of CCTV or
detection assessment by operator / response
personnel
Provide immediate communi- Rapid, dependable diverse means
cation to response personnel of communication such as
phones, cell phones, pagers, radio
links, etc.
Provide a means to detect loss Daily checking through physical
through verification checks, CCTV, tamper indicating
devices, etc.
Delay Provide delay after detection System of at least two layers of
sufficient for response personnel barriers (e.g. walls, cages) which
to interrupt the unauthorised together provide delay sufficient
removal to enable response personnel to
interdict
Response Respond to assessed alarm in Capability for timely response
time and with sufficient resources with size, equipment and training
to interrupt and prevent the to interdict
unauthorised removal
Security Provide access controls to source Identification and verification,
management location that permits access to e.g. lock controlled by swipe card
authorised persons only reader and personal identification
number, or key and key control

19
 TABLE 4.1 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES
FOR SECURITY LEVEL A (Contd.)

Security Security objectives Security measures

functions
Security Ensure trustworthiness for Background checks for all
management individuals involved in the personnel authorised for
(Contd.) management of sources unescorted access to the source
location and access to sensitive
information
Identify and protect sensitive Procedures to identify sensitive
information information and protect it from
unauthorised disclosure
Provide a security plan. A security plan which conforms
to regulatory requirements and
provides for response to
increased threat levels
Ensure a capability to manage Procedures for responding to
security events covered by security-related scenarios
security contingency plans

Establish security related event Procedures for timely reporting

report system of security related events

4.7 Additional Measures Required for Security Level B

The performance objectives of security measures for Security Level B are to
detect and deter any unauthorised access and acquisition of the source, in a
timely manner. Ideally, there should be at least two security measures to deter
any unauthorised access, with at least one of the measures being a technical
one. It is recognised that it may not be practicable to have these measures in
place all the time. Access controls should also be established. Any
unauthorised access to the source should be detected in a timely manner and
the source itself should be accounted for on a weekly basis.
Depending on whether the radioactive source is in storage or in use, following
are the security measures that should be in place for Security Level B:
4.7.1 Source in Storage
To achieve the defined performance objective, the following security
provisions could be implemented:

20
 (a) A locked and fixed container or a device holding the source
(b) A locked storage room to separate the container from unauthorised
access
(c) Access control to the room
(d) Ability to detect unauthorised access to, or removal of the source
(e) Provision of tracking mechanism on devices containing sources.
4.7.2 Source in Use
To achieve the defined performance objective, the following security
provisions could be implemented :
(a) Use of the source in a locked room or controlled area
(b) Continuous surveillance of the source
(c) Access control to the room or controlled area.
For a mobile source, it might not always be practicable to have all the measures
in place all the time. Therefore, administrative measures such as personnel
surveillance need to be rigorously maintained. Compensatory measures should
also be considered to provide other levels of protection. These could include,
for example, establishing a communication link to allow response to incidents,
or potential threats. In addition, necessary measures should be re-established
as soon as possible after use.
4.7.3 Summary of Security Measures for Security Level B
Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the security measures required for
Security Level B.

TABLE 4.2 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES

FOR SECURITY LEVEL B

Security Security objectives Security measures

functions
Detect Provide immediate detection of Electronic intrusion detection
unauthorised access to the system and/or continuous
secured area/source location surveillance by operating
personnel
Provide immediate detection of Tamper detection equipment and/
any attempted unauthorised or continuous surveillance by
removal of the source operating personnel and radiation
zone monitors at the exit points

21
 TABLE 4.2 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES
FOR SECURITY LEVEL B (Contd.)

Security Security objectives Security measures

functions
Detect Provide immediate assessment of Remote monitoring of CCTV or
(Contd.) detection assessment by operator/response
personnel
Provide immediate commu- Rapid, dependable means of
nication to response personnel communication such as phones,
cell phones, pagers, radio links
etc.
Provide a means to detect loss Weekly checking through physi-
through verification cal checks, tamper indicating
devices, etc.
Delay Provide delay after detection System of at least two layers of
sufficient for response personnel barriers (e.g. walls, cages)
to interrupt the unauthorised
removal
Response Provide immediate initiation of Equipment and procedures to
response immediately initiate response
Security Provide access controls to source One identification measure
management location that permits access to
authorised persons only
Ensure trustworthiness for indivi- Background checks for all
duals involved in the manage- personnel authorised for un-
ment of sources escorted access to the source
location and access to sensitive
information
Identify and protect sensitive Procedures to identify sensitive
information information and protect it from
unauthorised disclosure
Provide a security plan A security plan which conforms
to regulatory requirements and
provides for response to
increased threat levels
Ensure a capability to manage Procedures for responding to
security events covered by security-related scenarios
security contingency plans
Establish security related event Procedures for timely reporting
report system of security related events

22
4.8 Measures Required for Security Level C
The performance objectives of security measures for Security Level C are to
deter unauthorised access and to verify the presence of the sources at set
intervals. The licencee should ensure that persons engaged in the
management of the source are authorised. Ideally, there should be at least
one technical measure to deter any unauthorised access.
Access control to the area where the source is located should be provided
and the source should be accounted for every month. Generic emergency
plans are considered sufficient to respond to any incidents with these sources.
Depending on whether the radioactive source is in storage or in use, following
are the security measures that should be in place for Security Level C:
4.8.1 Source in Storage
To achieve the defined objective, Security Level C requires that the source is
stored in a locked, fixed container and in a room to which the access is
controlled.
4.8.2 Source in Use
The appropriate control on a radioactive sources which requires Security
Level C, would be measures to make sure that only an authorised person uses
the source and that too only in an area to which the access is controlled or to
make sure that the source is in a secure containment in an area where there
are personnel able to detect any interference with the source.
4.8.3 Summary of Security Measures for Security Level C
Table 4.3 below provides a summary of the security measures required for
Security Level C.

23
 TABLE 4.3 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES
FOR SECURITY LEVEL C

Security Security objectives Security measures

functions
Detect Provide immediate detection of Tamper detection equipment and/
any attempted unauthorised or continuous surveillance by
removal of the source operating personnel
Provide immediate assessment of Assessment by operator/response
detection personnel
Provide a means to detect loss Monthly checking through
through verification physical checks, tamper
indicating devices, etc.
Delay Impede the unauthorised removal One barrier (e.g. cage, source
housing) or under observation by
operating personnel
Response Implement appropriate action in Procedures for identifying
the event of unauthorised removal necessary action in accordance
of source with contingency plans
Security Provide access controls to source One identification measure
management location that permits access to
authorised persons only
Ensure trustworthiness for Background checks for all perso-
individuals involved in the nnel authorised for unescorted
management of sources access to the source location and
access to sensitive information
Identify and protect sensitive Procedures to identify sensitive
information information and protect it from
unauthorised disclosure
Provide a security plan A security plan which conforms
to regulatory requirements and
provides for response to
increased threat levels
Ensure a capability to manage Procedures for responding to
security events covered by security-related scenarios
security contingency plans
Establish security related event Procedures for timely reporting
report system of security related events

24
4.9 Measures Required for Security Level D
The performance objectives of security measures for Security Level D are to
ensure safe use of the source, to adequately protect it as an asset and verify
its presence at periodic intervals of once in three months. The personnel in
charge of managing sources requiring Security Level D should be formally
approved as authorised personnel by the management. The source should be
protected by application of the relevant safety standards as well as appropriate
industrial standards. The natural interest of the owner to protect the asset and
to ensure safe use and storage is considered as an appropriate basis for this
security level.
4.10 Security for Aggregation of Sources
In general, the security measures given in this section are intended for
implementation with regard to security of individual sources. The
categorisation of radioactive sources described in section 3 incorporates a
method for appropriately categorising aggregations of sources at a given
location. Hence, it would be sufficient if Table 3.1 is used as the basis of
determining the applicable level of security. However, when there is an
aggregation of sources, the security level should be appropriately upgraded
depending upon the types of sources, their number and their activity.
Accumulation of decayed/disused sources at a facility, pending disposal, is
an instance of aggregation of sources.
4.11 Temporary Storage of Recovered Sources
A source is considered to be in temporary storage when the licencee or any
other responsible authority is actively seeking a permanent storage for the
source or its transfer to another authorised agency. A source in temporary
storage should be transferred to a designated facility as soon as practicable.
For the duration of the temporary storage of such sources, the security level
applicable to the radiation facility should be determined and the appropriate
security measures implemented. Examples of such situations when the need
for temporary storage could arise are those following an emergency or
following the discovery of an orphan source or after the recovery of a stolen
source.
4.12 Preparation and Submission of Security Plan to Competent Authority
Based on the guidance give in this section, the licencee should prepare a
security plan for the facility using the radioactive source. The
comprehensiveness of this plan would obviously depend on the security level
assigned to the application or use of the radioactive source as identified in
Table 3.1. In this regard, a summary of the security measures required to
meet the performance objectives under Security Levels A to D is given in
Table 4.4 below:

25
 TABLE 4.4 : SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES
TO BE CONSIDERED

Security Level A Security Level B Security Level C Security Level D

General admini- General admini- General admini- General admini-
strative measures strative measures strative measures strative measures
Daily accounting Weekly accounting Monthly accounting Quarterly
accounting
Access control to Access control to Access control to No specific
source location source location source location provisions.
allowing timely allowing timely Routine measures
detection of un- detection of un- to ensure safe use
authorised access authorised access and protect as an
asset
Deterrence pro- Deterrence pro- Deterrence
vided by : Two vided by : Two provided by : One
technical measures measures (one technical measure
separating the technical) separating the
source from un- separating the source from
authorised source from unauthorised
personnel unauthorised personnel
personnel
Specific emergency Specific emergency Generic emergency
response plan response plan response plan
Background checks
Security plan
Information
security
Upgrade security
for increased threat
Timely detection Timely detection
provided by : provided by : Local
Remotely moni- alarm
tored intruder alarm
Timely response to
an alarm

26
To facilitate the licencee in preparing the appropriate security plan, security guidelines
for typical applications, are given in Appendices-VIII to XI. These guidelines are by
no means comprehensive. The licencee should draw up the security plan specific to
the radiation facility on the basis of their threat assessments and the security needs.
The security plan prepared using the guidelines detailed above, should be formally
submitted by the Licencee to the Competent Authority for review.

27
 5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 General
It is now a well recognised concept that just like safety and quality, security
is a matter of common interest to the entire organisation and cannot be the
responsibility of any one agency. Because of the safety implications of a
security breach, it is essential that all the employees at a radiation facility
have to be sensitised of their respective roles in ensuring security of the
radioactive sources used at that facility. Persons working in a radiation facility
such as employer, licencee, RSO and all others involved in handling the
radioactive material, should implement the security measures dentified as
part of their responsibilities in the security plan. The present security scenario
also necessitates that government agencies dealing with law and order have a
major role in preventing breach of security of radioactive sources as such
breach may undermine or even jeopardize public safety. The Competent
Authority may impose penalties for non-compliance with the security
requirements by the licencee.
Contingency plans to respond to malicious acts involving radioactive sources
including the recovery of lost or stolen material and for mitigation of
consequences, should be established in advance by the licencee, concerned
emergency response organisations and by the law enforcing authority.
5.2 Radiation Facility
The security related responsibilities of the employer, the licencee, the
radiological safety officer (RSO), the workers occupationally exposed to
radiation, other personnel working in a radiation facility and the security
personnel are broadly described in the following paragraphs.
5.2.1 Employer
As the owner of the facility using a radioactive source, the employer has the
primary responsibility for ensuring and maintaining the safety and the security
of the sources. This guide outlines guidance for preparing the appropriate
security plan for the facility, which has to be submitted to the Competent
Authority for review. In this regard, the employer is primarily responsible
for ensuring that the security plan at the facility is implemented in letter and
spirit. In particular, the employer is responsible for:
(i) ensuring that all personnel and their contract workers who use or
have access to the sources are reliable;
(ii) reporting to the Competent Authority of a source in the facility,
provide the origin and/or identity of which cannot be established;

28
 (iii) promoting a security culture and establishing a management system
commensurate with the security needs to ensure that problems
affecting security are promptly identified and corrected, clear lines
of authority are defined for security related decision making and
sensitive information is identified and protected on a ‘need to know’
basis; and
(iv) promptly responding to any request from the local law enforcing
authorities in the recovery of any lost or stolen source.
5.2.2 Licencee
As the individual who is responsible for preparing a security plan and
submitting to the Competent Authority and obtaining the licence in his/her
name, the Licencee has a major responsibility in ensuring the security of the
radioactive sources at the facility. The Licencee’s responsibility commences
from the moment the authorised radioactive material is received in the
radiation facility. In particular, the Licencee should ensure that the following
actions are carried out:
(i) Assess the security threats, evaluate the security requirements, design
the security provisions and prepare a security plan for the facility in
consultation with the security personnel.
(ii) Implement the security plan along with its administrative and
technical measures to ensure the safety and security of the radioactive
sources at the facility.
(iii) Bring to the notice of the Employer any additional actions specified
by the Competent Authority, for implementation.
(iv) Establish a specific security clearance procedure for those persons
in the radiation facility who would be involved in the use of the
source, as also those personnel who would be deputed to collect the
source from the supplier or carrier on behalf of the facility.
(v) Procure radioactive material only from an authorised supplier.
(vi) Maintain a complete inventory of all sources in the facility.
(vii) Ensure that the storage of a source not in use, its transfer to any
other person/agency is done in accordance with procedures and
requirements prescribed by the Competent Authority.
(viii) Promptly respond to any request from the local law enforcing
authorities in the recovery of any lost or stolen source.
(ix) Submission of reports to the Competent Authority at prescribed
intervals in the prescribed format, on the status relating to the safety
and security of sources handled in the facility. This should include

29
 any unusual events that have a bearing on the security of the sources
and would include among others, loss of control, unauthorised access,
unauthorised use, malicious acts threatening the authorised activities,
failures of equipment containing sources which may have security
implications and discovery of any unaccounted source.
(x) Any attempt to or actual breach of security including attempted thefts
and actual thefts, and even misplacement or loss of radioactive
material or loss/theft of sensitive information is reported to the law
enforcing authorities and the Competent Authority within 24 hours
of the event.
5.2.3 Radiological Safety Officer (RSO)
While the RSO’s primary responsibility is to implement radiological safety
requirements at the facility, he / she should be fully aware of the fact that any
breach of security has safety implications. Consequently, with regard to
ensuring security of radioactive sources, the RSO should:
(i) ensure that persons entering the area/zone where a radioactive source
is used/or in use, have been permitted by the Concerned Authority;
(ii) implement when required, the procedure for mitigating the
consequences of a breach of security;
(iii) inform and train all the personnel working with radiation in the facility
and other personnel as well about the safety and security of sources;
(iv) secure the records appropriately and update the routine source
inventory. This should also include source use history;
(v) bring to the notice of the licencee, the employer and the security
personnel of the facility, any situation which could be a potential
threat to the security of source(s) in the facility.
5.2.4 Workers and Other Personnel
Persons occupationally exposed to radiation in a facility and the other workers
should implement the procedure relating to the security of sources in the
facility. If they detect any threat to the safety and security of the sources
handled in the facility they should immediately report the matter to the RSO,
the licencee, the employer and the security personnel of the facility.
5.2.5 Security Personnel
The security personnel of the facility should obtain the relevant information
about the sources handled in the facility and provide the necessary advice,
guidance and co-operation in devising and implementing the security plan of
the radiation facility.

30
5.3 Supplier of the Source
The source supplier should possess a licence from the Competent Authority
(Chairman, AERB) to supply radioactive material as required in the Atomic
Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 and should further ensure that the
radioactive material is being supplied only to the person authorised to receive
and handle the source. Further, appropriate security measures should be
implemented in the supplier’s facility on the basis of an approved security
plan. The responsibilities of the employer, licencee, RSO, workers and other
personnel including the security personnel should be identified in the security
plan.
5.4 Role of Law and Enforcement Agencies
The government agencies dealing with law and enforcement constantly review
the prevailing security scenario and communicate the necessary warnings/
alerts/advisories about perceived security threats, sufficiently in advance to
the concerned agencies. The licencee is required to work out a coordination
mechanism with the concerned law and enforcement agencies as mentioned
in this document to ensure that the facility using the radioactive source gets
these warnings/alerts/advisories in time so that appropriate security measures
could be implemented. The threat assessment process adopted by the law
and enforcement authority would generally be based on their knowledge of
the characteristics of the potential offender(s), who may be an internal or an
external adversary. The law and enforcement authority is also expected to
extend the necessary support in the event of a theft of a source. Where
necessary, police protection should be available to personnel investigating
cases of theft of a source.

31
 APPENDIX-I

DOSE CRITERIA USED IN THE

DERIVATION OF THE D VALUES

Categorisation of the sources is based on the D value of the source as stated in

section 3. The D values are determined on the basis of certain dose criteria, which are
given below:
(i) A dose of 1 Gy to the bone marrow or 6 Gy to the lung from low linear
energy transfer (LET) radiation, received by the organ in 2 d.
(ii) A dose of 25 Gy to the lung from inhalation exposure to high LET radiation
in 1 year. This is the dose level at which fatalities are likely to be induced
within 1.5 years.
(iii) A dose of 5 Gy to the thyroid received by the organ in 2 d. This is the dose
level at which intervention is justified to prevent hypothyroidism.
(iv) For a source in contact with tissue, a dose of more than 25 Gy at a depth of
(i) 2 cm for most parts of the body (e.g. from a source in a pocket) or
(ii) 1 cm for the hand for a period of 10 h. This is the threshold dose for
necrosis.
(v) For a source that is considered too big to be carried, a dose of 1 Gy to the
bone marrow in 100 h from a source at a distance of 1 m.
In summary, the reference doses for D values are given in the table below:
TABLE I-1 : REFERENCE DOSES FOR D VALUES

Tissue Dose criteria

Bone marrow 1 Gy in 2 d for a source that can be carried by an individual
1 Gy in 100 h for a source that is too big to be carried
Lung 6 Gy in 2 d from low LET radiation
25 Gy in 1 year from high LET radiation
Thyroid 5 Gy in 2 d
Skin/tissue 25 Gy at a depth of 2 cm for most parts of the body (e.g.
(contact) from a source in a pocket) or 1 cm for the hand, for a period
of 10 h

The D values derived for some of the commonly used sources are given in Table I-2.

32
 TABLE I-2 : ACTIVITY CORRESPONDING TO A
DANGEROUS SOURCE (D VALUE)a FOR
SELECTED RADIONUCLIDES

S. No. Radionuclide D value S.No. Radionuclide D value

(TBq) (TBq)
1. Am-241 6.E-02 18. Mo-99 3.E-01
2. Am-241/Be 6.E-02 19. Ni-63 6.E+01
3. Au-198 2.E-01 20. P-32 1.E+01
4. Cd-109 2.E+01 21. Pd-103 9.E+01
5. Cf-252 2.E-02 22. Pm-147 4.E+01
6. Cm-244 5.E-02 23. Po-210 6.E-02
7. Co-57 7.E-01 24. Pu-238 6.E-02
b
8. Co-60 3.E-02 25. Pu-239 /Be 6.E-02
9. Cs-137 1.E-01 26. Ra-226 4.E-02
10. Fe-55 8.E+02 27. Ru-106 3.E-01
(Rh-106)
11. Gd-153 1.E+00 28. Se-75 2.E-01
12. Ge-68 7.E-01 29. Sr-90 (Y-90) 1.E+00
13. H-3 2.E+03 30. Sr-90 1.E+00
14. I-125 2.E-01 31. Tl-204 2.E+01
15. I-131 2.E-01 32. Tm-170 2.E+01
16. Ir-192 8.E-02 33. Tc-99m 7.E-01
17. Kr-85 3.E+01 34. Yb-169 3.E-01

a Since this Table does not show which dose criteria were used, these D values should not be
used in reverse to derive possible doses due to sources of known activity.
b Criticality and safeguards issues will need to be considered for large multiples of D.

On the basis of the above discussion, sources used in the various applications are
categorised as given in Table I-3 below:

33
 TABLE I-3 : CATEGORISATION OF SOURCES USED
IN DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS

Category Sourcea and practice Activity ratiob

1 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) A/D > 1000
Irradiators
Teletherapy sources
Fixed multibeam teletherapy (gamma knife)
2 Industrial gamma radiography 1000 > A/D > 10
High/medium dose rate brachytherapy
3 Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high 10 > A/D > 1
activity sources (e.g. level, dredger, conveyor
gauges)
Well logging gauges
Sources used in the blast furnace lining
Calibration sources
Research reactor startup sources
Sources used in pacemakers (238 Pu)
4 Low dose rate brachytherapy (except eye plaques 1 > A/D > 0.01
and permanent implant sources)
Industrial gauges that do not incorporate high
activity sources [e.g. Thickness/fill-level gauges,
portable gauges (e.g. moisture/density gauges)]
Low activity calibration sources (e.g. 90 Sr :74 GBq)
Bone densitometers
Static eliminators
Diagnostic isotope generators
5 Low dose rate brachytherapy eye plaques and 0.01 > A/D and
permanent implant sources A > Exemptc / D
Positron emission tomography (PET) check sources
X ray fluorescence (XRF) devices
Electron capture devices
Mossbauer spectrometry sources
Radiopharmaceuticals and other unsealed sources

Foot notes:

a In addition to the A/D ratio other factors like, the nature of the work with the source, the
mobility of the source experience from reported accidents and typical and unique activities
within an application have been taken into consideration.
b This column can be used to determine the category of a source, based purely on A/D. This
may be appropriate if, for example, the practice is not known or is not listed; sources have a
short half-life and/or are unsealed; or sources are aggregated.

34
 i.e. Aggregate A/D = ∑ n ( ∑ i A i, n /Dn )
where, A i, n = activity of each individual source ‘i’ of radionuclide ‘n’ in the aggregation of
sources; and Dn = D value for radionuclide ‘n’.
This principle will apply to situations in which radioactive sources are in close proximity to
each other in the same room or building, such as in a source manufacturer’s facility or in a
storage facility.
c Exempt quantities as notified under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004.

The above source categorisation is an important consideration in the evaluation of the

security requirements and the design of security provisions which should be carried
out by the licencee.

35
 APPENDIX-II

CATEGORIES OF COMMONLY USED SOURCES

A list of sources used in some common practices, the quantities in which they are
generally handled and also their D values and the respective categories of the sources
are listed in the table below:

CATEGORIES FOR SOURCES USED IN SOME COMMON PRACTICES

(There may be certain cases where the activity of the sources handled could exceed
the values indicated)

Source Activity D value Ratio of

handled (A) (TBq) A/D
(TBq)
Category 1
RTGs
Sr-90 2.5E+04 1.0E+00 2.5E+04
Pu-238 1.0E+01 6.E-02 1.7E+02
Irradiators used in sterilisation and food preservation
Co-60 5.6E+05 3.E-02 1.9E+07
Cs-137 1.9E+05 1.E-01 1.9E+06
Self-shielded irradiators
Cs-137 1.6E+03 1.E-01 1.6E+04
Co-60 1.9E+03 3.E-02 6.2E+04
Blood/tissue irradiators
Cs-137 4.4E+02 1.E-01 4.4E+03
Co-60 1.1E+02 3.E-02 3.7E+03
Multi-beam teletherapy (gamma knife) sources
Co-60 3.7E+02 3.E-02 1.2E+04
Teletherapy sources
Co-60 5.6E+02 3.E-02 1.9E+04
Cs-137 5.6E+01 1.E-01 5.6E+02

36
 Source Activity D value Ratio of
handled (A) (TBq) A/D
(TBq)
Category 2
Industrial radiography sources
Co-60 7.4E+00 3.E-02 2.5E+02
Ir-192 7.4E+00 8.E-02 9.3E+01
Tm-170 7.4E+00 2.E+01 3.7E-01
Yb-169 3.7E-01 3.E-01 1.2E+00
Se-75 3.0E+00 2.E-01 1.5E+01
Brachytherapy sources - high/medium dose rate
Co-60 7.4E-01 3.E-02 2.5E+01
Cs-137 3.0E-01 1.E-01 3.0E+00
Ir-192 4.4E-01 8.E-02 5.6E+00
Calibration sources
Co-60 1.2E+00 3.E-02 4.1E+01
Cs-137 1.1E+02 1.E-01 1.1E+03
Category 3
Level gauges
Cs-137 1.9E-01 1.E-01 1.9E+00
Co-60 3.7E-01 3.E-02 1.2E+01
Conveyor gauges
Cs-137 1.5E+00 1.E-01 1.5E+01
Cf-252 1.4E-03 2.E-02 6.8E-02
Blast furnace gauges
Co-60 7.4E-02 3.E-02 2.5E+00
Dredger gauges
Co-60 9.6E-02 3.E-02 3.2E+00
Cs-137 3.7E-01 1.E-01 3.7E+00
Research reactor startup sources
Am-241/Be 1.9E-01 6.E-02 3.1E+00
Well logging sources
Am-241/Be 8.5E-01 6.E-02 1.4E+01
Cs-137 7.4E-02 1.E-01 7.4E-01
Cf-252 4.1E-03 2.E-02 2.0E-01

37
 Source Activity D value Ratio of
handled (A) (TBq) A/D
(TBq)
Category 3 (Contd.)
Pacemakers
Pu-238 3.0E-01 6.E-02 4.9E+00
Calibration sources
Pu-239/Be 3.7E-01 6.E-02 6.2E+00
Am-241 7.4E-01 6.E-02 1.2E+01
Category 4
Brachytherapy sources - low dose rate
Cs-137 2.6E-02 1.E-01 2.6E-01
Ra-226 1.9E-03 4.E-02 4.6E-02
I-125 1.5E-03 2.E-01 7.4E-03
Ir-192 2.8E-02 8.E-02 3.5E-01
Au-198 3.0E-03 2.E-01 1.5E-02
Cf-252 3.1E-03 2.E-02 1.5E-01
Thickness gauges
Kr-85 3.7E-02 3.E+01 1.2E-03
Sr-90 7.4E-03 1.E+00 7.4E-03
Am-241 2.2E-02 6.E-02 3.7E-01
Pm-147 1.9E-03 4.E+01 4.6E-05
Cm-244 3.7E-02 5.E-02 7.4E-01
Fill level gauges
Am-241 4.4E-03 6.E-02 7.4E-02
Cs-137 2.4E-03 1.E-01 2.4E-02
Co-60 1.9E-02 3.E-02 6.2E-01
Calibration sources
Sr-90 7.4E-02 1.E+00 7.4E-02
Moisture detectors
Am-241/Be 3.7E-03 6.E-02 6.2E-02
Density gauges
Cs-137 3.7E-04 1.E-01 3.7E-03

38
 Source Activity D value Ratio of
handled (A) (TBq) A/D
(TBq)
Category 4 (Contd.)
Moisture/density gauges
Am-241/Be 3.7E-03 6.E-02 6.2E-02
Cs-137 4.1E-04 1.E-01 4.1E-03
Ra-226 1.5E-04 4.E-02 3.7E-03
Cf-252 2.6E-06 2.E-02 1.3E-04
Bone densitometry sources
Cd-109 7.4E-04 2.E+01 3.7E-05
Gd-153 5.6E-02 1.E+00 5.6E-02
I-125 3.0E-02 2.E-01 1.5E-01
Am-241 1.0E-02 6.E-02 1.7E-01
Static eliminators
Am-241 4.1E-03 6.E-02 6.8E-02
Po-210 4.1E-03 6.E-02 6.8E-02
Diagnostic isotope generators
Mo-99 3.7E-01 3.E-01 1.2E+00
Medical unsealed sources
I-131 7.4E-03 2.E-01 3.7E-02
Category 5
XRF analyser sources
Fe-55 5.0E-03 8.E+02 6.2E-06
Cd-109 5.6E-03 2.E+01 2.8E-04
Co-57 1.5E-03 7.E-01 2.1E-03
Electron capture detector sources
Ni-63 7.4E-04 6.E+01 1.2E-05
H-3 1.1E-02 2.E+03 5.6E-06
Lightning preventers
Am-241 4.8E-04 6.E-02 8.0E-03
Ra-226 3.0E-06 4.E-02 7.4E-05
H-3 7.4E-03 2.E+03 3.7E-06

39
 Source Activity D value Ratio of
handled (A) (TBq) A/D
(TBq)
Category 5 (Contd.)
Brachytherapy sources: low dose rate eye plaques and permanent implants
Sr-90 1.5E-03 1.E+00 1.5E-03
Ru/Rh-106 2.2E-05 3.E-01 7.4E-05
Pd-103 1.1E-03 9.E+01 1.2E-05
PET check sources
Ge-68 3.7E-04 7.E-01 5.3E-04
Mossbauer spectrometry sources
Co-57 3.7E-03 7.E-01 5.3E-03
Tritium targets
H-3 1.1E+00 2.E+03 5.6E-04
Medical unsealed sources
P-32 2.2E-02 1.E+01 2.2E-03

Notes:
1. Calibration sources are found in all categories except Category 1.
2. Pu- 238 sources are no longer manufactured for use in pacemakers.
3. Unsealed medical sources typically fall into Categories 4 and 5. The unsealed nature of these
sources and their short half-lives require case by case categorisation.

40
 APPENDIX-III

SECURITY LEVELS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Security Security objectives

Functions Security Level A Security Level B Security Level C
(To prevent (To minimise (To reduce
unauthorised likelihood of likelihood of
removal) unauthorised unauthorised
removal) removal)
Detect Provide immediate detection of unauthorised ------
access to the secured area/source location
Provide immediate detection of any attempted Provide detection of
unauthorised removal of the source unauthorised removal
of the source
Provide immediate assessment of detection
Provide immediate communication to
response personnel
Provide a means to detect loss through
verification
Delay Provide delay after Provide delay to Impede the unautho-
detection sufficient for minimise the rised removal
response personnel to likelihood of un-
interrupt the unautho- authorised removal
rised removal
Response Respond to assess Provide immediate Implement appro-
alarm in time and with initiation of response priate action in the
sufficient resources to event of unauthorised
interrupt and prevent removal of a source
the unauthorised
removal
Security Provide access controls to source location that permits access to
management authorised persons only
Ensure trustworthiness for individuals involved in the management
of sources
Identify and protect sensitive information
Provide a security plan
Ensure a capability to manage security events covered by security
contingency plans
Establish security event reporting system

41
Notes:
1. It may be noted that as regards the ‘deterrence’ security function, implementing specific
measures for detection, delay, response and security management would in themselves serve
as a deterrent.
2. As regards Security Level D, the objectives would be achieved through adoption of standard
prudent security measures, which would be adopted by any organisation to periodically verify
the presence of its assets and take measures to protect the same.

42
 APPENDIX-IV

DESCRIPTION OF SECURITY MEASURES

Recommended security measures some of which are referenced in Section 4 are

described below:
IV.1 Access Control
Access control can be exercised through entry checkpoints controlled by
response personnel, the use of electronic readers or key control measures.
Technology, in the form of automatic access control systems (AACS), is
available in various forms, from simple pushbutton mechanical devices to
more sophisticated readers that respond to proximity tokens or individual
biometric characteristics. In most cases, the use of a card should be verified
by a PIN keyed into the reader and in high security situations an AACS entry
point should be supervised by a guard positioned within view. The essential
factor for prospective operators is to specify a viable AACS that is appropriate
to the requirement and can be supported locally by a manufacturer or an
installer. It is also important to limit access to the AACS management
computers and software to prevent unauthorised interference with the system
database. Where conventional lock and key are used as a means of control,
locks should be of good quality and key management procedures should be
designed to prevent unauthorised access or compromise.
IV.2 Cages
Metal cages or containers may also be used to segregate and secure sources
by adding another level of protection, e.g. temporary retention within a receipt
and dispatch area. Elsewhere, cages could be part of the storage arrangements
within an established area that is enclosed, under control and supervision.
IV.3 CCTV Surveillance
CCTV is a useful aid which allows security staff to monitor outer approaches
and areas where radioactive sources are stored. Cameras can be combined
with an intrusion detection system (IDS) to provide event activated camera
views. However, to be fully effective, the performance of CCTV cameras
and monitors should be regularly assessed to ensure that they continue to
display imagery of good quality. Systems should also be supported by a
response so that alarm events and indications activated by technology can be
investigated.
IV.4 Communication
Security personnel at all levels should be provided with effective and reliable
forms of communication. This includes communication between patrols, fixed

43
 posts and the local reporting or control centre and the communication to
external agencies responsible for providing rapid response to security events.
IV.5 Fences and Gates
The type fence used on a perimeter should be appropriate to the threat, the
nature of the sources being protected and the category of the site overall.
There are various types of fence ranging from those that are little more than
a demarcation to those that are more robust and can be combined with a
fence mounted perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system or
electrified panels. Fence lines need to be checked regularly to ensure that the
fabric is in good order and free from interference or damage. Gates within a
fence should be constructed to a comparable standard to the fence and secured
with good quality locks.
IV.6 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
These systems are a useful means of monitoring the security of an unoccupied
area. Where appropriate, the technology can be extended to the outer area of
an establishment by use of a perimeter intrusion detection and assessment
system. All intrusion detection systems should be supported by a response to
investigate alarm events or conditions. Alarms can sound remotely at a security
control point or locally through a high volume sounder. CCTV can be a useful
aid in providing initial verification of events within an alarmed zone or area
but should normally be backed up by a patrol making a visual check or
investigation.
IV.7 Key Control Procedures
Keys which allow access to radioactive sources should be controlled and
secured. These keys may be to cages, doors, storage containers or shielded
units within which sources are used. Similar levels of control should be applied
to duplicate and spare keys.
IV.8 Locks, Hinges and Interlocks for Doors
Locks used for the protection of radioactive sources should be of good quality,
incorporating features that will offer some resistance to forcible attack. The
same applies to hinges on doors. Keys should be safeguarded in a manner
outlined above under the procedural measures. Within premises, interlock
doors that meet safety requirements can serve the interests of security by
controlling the movement of personnel and allowing staff to monitor access
to the facility.
IV.9 Locked, Shielded Containers
Shielding and fixed units containing radioactive sources can provide
protection, and can delay any attempt to interfere with the source. However,

44
 when staff members are not present, the area should be covered by an intruder
detection alarm system to alert the response personnel or security response
of the need to investigate the circumstances of any intrusion.
IV.10 Maintenance and Testing of Security Technology
Considerable reliance should be placed upon security technology to provide
early warning of the entry of an adversary to the site or the secured area.
Intruder detection systems used for the protection of the radioactive sources
should therefore not only be properly specified but also tested for performance
upon installation, maintained at regular intervals by competent persons, and
tested at intervals specified by the regulatory body.
IV.11 Pass Systems
A pass system is an efficient and cost effective means of providing a first
level indication of individual authority to be within a premises or a secured
area. Nevertheless, passes should be checked on entry to the facility and
worn visibly by holders to confirm authority and aid identification. Embedded
technology can also allow passes to be combined with use in access control
systems.
IV.12 Quality Assurance
Security arrangements and procedures should be prepared, documented and
maintained in line with recommended quality assurance standard such as:
recording of formal approval, version control, periodic and planned review,
testing of arrangements and procedures, and incorporation of lessons learned
into procedures.
IV.13 Security and Area Lighting
Effective illumination of areas can make an important contribution to physical
protection. In high security situations special lighting configurations may be
necessary. However, area and street lighting that may be in place for other
purposes can often provide illumination to deter intruders and assist patrolling
response personnel.
IV.14 Special Security Doors and Door Sets
Within certain facilities containing radioactive sources, it may be appropriate
to fit storage areas with special security doors and door surrounds that offer
resistance to forcible attack. This would be relevant in areas that are regularly
left unattended.
IV.15 Standby Power
Security control rooms and security systems should be able to cope with
power dips or outright loss of a main electric supply. This can be ensured

45
 through an uninterruptible power supply and a standby generator which
automatically starts when a fluctuation in power levels is detected. Battery
backup has only limited duration and should, therefore, be viewed as a short
term source of standby power.
IV.16 Walls
Unless they are already in place, walls are expensive way to form a perimeter
boundary. Walls also have the disadvantage of preventing response personnel
from looking out beyond the protected area.

46
 APPENDIX-V

PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS (PPS)

V.1 Physical Protection Principles

The design of the physical protection system (PPS) for a given source or
combination of sources is mainly governed by three steps viz. assessment of
security risk, establishment of performance objectives for the PPS
commensurate with the security risk, and identification of a combination of
security measures that meet the performance objectives. The security risk is
associated with all the security levels and can be estimated by carrying out
threat assessment and vulnerability analysis.
V.2 Physical Protection Equipment
Physical protection can be effectively implemented through human actions
supported by equipment. Physical protection equipment include turnstile gates
which will regulate the entry and exit of individuals enabling direct
surveillance, entrance doors operated by electronic recognition of security
cards, provision of intrusion alarms, video cameras, etc. Physical protection
equipment are many and varied. An effective physical protection system
makes a judicious combination of human surveillance and physical protection
equipment.
V.3 Design and Evaluation of PPS
The design and evaluation of physical protection system (PPS) need to take
into account the current national threat assessment and may include the
development and applications of design basis threat (DBT). PPS should be
such that it is effective in countering assessed threat and its security status is
heightened during times of increased threat. Such an assessment is normally
conducted by the Governmental Agencies such as Ministry of Home,
Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of External Affairs, Law Enforcement Agencies,
Customs and Coast Guard, Regulatory Authorities and other agencies with
security related responsibilities. A DBT describes the attributes and helps in
establishing performance requirements for the design of physical protection
system for specific types of radiation facilities. The threat assessment should
consider an insider threat, which could be from one or more persons and
should be given particular recognition when designing the physical protection
system. A DBT is a tool used to establish performance requirements for the
design of physical protection systems for specific types of radiation facilities.
A DBT is used to help the employer and the licencee to assess the effective-
ness of the systems to counter adversaries by evaluating the systems

47
performance against adversary capabilities described in the DBT, through a
vulnerability assessment (VA). VA is also known as security survey or security
assessment and is a method for evaluating the effectiveness of the physical
protection system. The VA can be specific or general in nature, and need to
be conducted by the licencee. The Competent Authority may verify the VA.
The following are the essential elements of VA:
(i) Establishing a radioactive source inventory, including both used and
disused sources, and associated information
(ii) Considering national threat assessment and also any local
considerations
(iii) Identifying existing security measures and assessing the expected
effectiveness of the PPS in protecting against attacks by postulated
threat
(iv) Determining if any, additional security measures are required to
ensure an acceptable and proportionate level of protection.
There can be three alternative approaches that user can apply to ensure the
achievement of security objective. These are prescriptive approaches,
performance based approaches and combined approaches. A prescriptive
approach is based on the specific security measures, which have been
established for particular category of sources (refer section 3 of this
document). It establishes the level of performance of PPS that must be
achieved. It considers the understanding of radiation facility in the context of
security (i.e. physical attributes of devices housing sources, whether the source
is in use /storage, nature of operations in which source is handled, accessibility
of source during working and non working hours and mobility or portability
of source), categories of sources used in it, performance objectives and
designing security system to include security measures. A performance-based
approach is based on the national threat (NT) assessment/DBT and allows
the user to establish security measures based on vulnerability analysis. It is
used to assess how a PPS performs against the DBT. It uses the principle of
‘timely detection’ to determine its effectiveness and then evaluate and upgrade
the PPS. A combined approach includes measures drawn from both
prescriptive and performance based approaches. For example, a performance
based approach can be applied for the sources with the highest potential
consequences of malicious use and a prescriptive approach for lower potential
consequences sources.
The following security principles should be considered in designing the
security system:
(i) The impact of deterrence can be quantified only by the frequency of
attempted malicious acts. So the design of a security system cannot
be based entirely on deterrence.

48
(ii) Detection should precede delay. Hence the detection systems should
be installed so that the attempts to commit a malicious act such as
stealing a source are detected at early stages of the attempt. Detection
would be effective only with human interfacing.
(iii) The delay factor of the security system can be effective only if the
delay time is greater than the time taken by the detection system
plus the time required for the response actions to be activated. The
combined effect of detection, delay and response is termed ‘timely
detection’.

49
 (Note: To be printed on Radiation Facility letter head)

APPENDIX-VI

SPECIMEN FORMAT FOR REGISTRATION OF SECURITY PLAN

FOR CATEGORY-1 SOURCES

Sub: Proposal for registration of security plan with District Law and Enforcement
Authority
As per the requirements specified in section 4.5.1 of the AERB Safety Guide on
‘Security of Radioactive Sources in Radiation Facilities’, (AERB/RF-RS/SG-1),
published by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which is the Competent
Authority for radiation protection in the country, the security plan need to be registered
with the District Law and Enforcement Authority. Herewith please find the details of
our radiation facility along with the proposed security plan for registration.
1. Name and address of the Radiation Facility:
2. Name and Designation of Head of the Radiation Facility:
3. Contact details including Tele./Fax. and E-mail:
4. Description of the sources and their use :
5. Physical security arrangement to the Radiation Facility :
(Copy of the security plan attached)
The District Law and Enforcement Authority is requested to kindly register our facility
with your office and endorse the enclosed security plan for further submission to the
Competent Authority (Atomic Energy Regulatory Board).

Signature
Name & Designation of the
Head of the Radiation Facility
Official Use by District Law and Enforcement Authority
The above radiation facility has been registered with our office and the copy of the
security plan is reviewed by us and same is endorsed for further action by the Competent
Authority (AERB).

Authorised Signatory
District Law and Enforcement Authority
(Seal with date)

50
 APPENDIX-VII

KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN A SECURITY PLAN

A security plan should include all relevant information required to evaluate and to
understand the security concept being used for the source. The following topics would
typically need to be included.
(a) A description of the sources and their use and security level(s).
(b) A description of the environment, building and/or facility where the source
is used or stored, and if appropriate a diagram of the facility layout and security
system.
(c) The location of the building or facility relative to areas accessible to the
public.
(d) The perceived security threats and the basis of such perception.
(e) The objectives of the security plan for the specific application, including:
(i) the specific concern to be addressed: theft, destruction, or malevolent
use;
(ii) the kind of control needed to prevent undesired consequences
including the auxiliary equipment that might be needed; and
(ii) the equipment or premises that will be secured.
(f) The technical measures to be used, including:
(i) the measures to secure, provide surveillance, provide access control,
detect, delay, respond and communicate; and
(ii) the design features to evaluate the quality of the measures against
the assumed threat.
(g) The administrative measures to be used, including:
(i) the security roles and responsibilities of management, staff and others;
(ii) routine and non-routine operations, including accounting for the
sources(s);
(iii) maintenance and testing of equipment;
(iv) determination of the trustworthiness of personnel;
(v) the application of information security;
(vi) methods for access authorization;

51
 (vii) security related aspects of the emergency plans, including event
reporting;
(viii) training; and
(ix) key control procedures
(h) References to existing regulations or standards
(i) Periodic updating of the security plan to ensure its continued effectiveness
(j) Procedure for reporting security related events
(k) Periodic evaluation of security systems for their functional performance
(l) Methods to ensure continued functionality of the security systems

52
 APPENDIX-VIII

GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY PLAN FOR

GAMMA IRRADIATOR FACILITY/TELETHERAPY FACILITY
(SOURCE CATEGORY 1 AND SECURITY LEVEL A)

The security plan should be prepared addressing the issues in Appendix-VII. As regards
the four security functions, the security plan should indicate the specific measure(s),
which would be implemented to meet the security objectives. Given below are the
security objectives against each of which, some security measures have been suggested.
Specific details of these measures should be furnished in the security plan. It may be
noted that these guidelines by no means are comprehensive.
Detection
1. Security objective: Provide immediate detection of unauthorised access
to the secured area/source location.
Security measures: Electronic intrusion detection system and/or
continuous surveillance by operating personnel.
2. Security objective: Provide immediate detection of any attempted
unauthorised removal of the source.
Security measures: Electronic tamper detection equipment and/or
continuous surveillance by operating personnel.
During source replacement, special care should be
taken.
3. Security objective: Provide immediate assessment of detection.
Security measures: Remote monitoring of CCTV or assessment by
operator/response personnel. Any significant change
in the ambient radiation level should be treated as an
alert signal.
4. Security objective: Provide immediate communication to response
personnel.
Security measures: Rapid, dependable diverse means of communication
such as phones, cell phones, pagers, radio links.
5. Security objective: Provide a means to detect loss through verification.
Security measures: Daily checking through physical checks, CCTV,
tamper indicating devices, etc.

53
Delay
1. Security objective: Provide delay after detection sufficient for response
personnel to interrupt the unauthorised removal.
Security measures: System of at least two layers of barriers (e.g. walls,
cages) which together provide delay sufficient to
enable response personnel to interdict.
Response
1. Security objective: Respond to assessed alarm in time and with sufficient
resources to interrupt and prevent the unauthorised
removal.
Security measures: Capability for timely response with size, equipment
and training to interdict.
Security Management
1. Security objective: Provide access controls to source location that permits
access to authorised persons only.
Security measures: Identification and verification, e.g. lock controlled by
swipe card reader and personal identification number
(PIN), or key and key control.
2. Security objective: Ensure trustworthiness for individuals involved in the
management of sources.
Security measures: Background checks for all personnel authorised for
unescorted access to the source location and for access
to sensitive information.
3. Security objective: Identify and protect sensitive information.
Security measures: Procedures to identify sensitive information and
protect it from unauthorised disclosure.
4. Security objective: Provide a security plan.
Security measures: A security plan which conforms to regulatory
requirements and provides for response to increased
threat levels.
5. Security objective: Ensure a capability to manage security events covered
by security contingency plans.
Security measures: Procedures for responding to security-related
scenarios.
6. Security objective: Establish security event reporting system.
Security measures: Procedures for timely reporting of security events.

54
 APPENDIX-IX

GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY PLAN FOR

INDUSTRIAL GAMMA RADIOGRAPHY/HDR
BRACHYTHERAPY FACILITY
(SOURCE CATEGORY 2 AND SECURITY LEVEL-B)

The security plan should be prepared addressing the issues in Appendix VII. As regards
the four security functions, the security plan should indicate the specific measure(s),
which would be implemented to meet the security objectives. Given below are the
security objectives against each of which, some security measures have been suggested.
Specific details of these measures should be furnished in the security plan. It may be
noted that these guidelines by no means are comprehensive.
Detection
1. Security objective: Provide immediate detection of unauthorised access
to the secured area/source location.
Security measures: Electronic intrusion detection system and/or
continuous surveillance by operating personnel.
2. Security objective: Provide immediate detection of any attempted
unauthorised removal of the source.
Security measures: Tamper detection equipment and/or continuous
surveillance by operating personnel.
3. Security objective: Provide immediate assessment of detection.
Security measures: Remote monitoring of CCTV or assessment by
operator/response personnel. Movement of the
radiography device/source outside the controlled area
should be constantly monitored by trained persons.
4. Security objective: Provide immediate communication to response
personnel.
Security measures: Rapid, dependable means of communication such as
phones, cell phones, pagers, radio links.
5. Security objective: Provide a means to detect loss through verification.
Security measures: Weekly checking through physical checks, tamper
indicating devices, etc.

55
Delay
1. Security objective: Provide delay after detection sufficient for response
personnel to interrupt the unauthorised removal.
Security measures: System of two layers of barriers (e.g. walls, cages).
The gate pass for taking a source out of the radiation
facility should require multiple authorisations from
different agencies.
Response
1. Security objective: Provide immediate initiation of response.
Security measures: Capability for timely response with size, equipment
and training.
Security Management
1. Security objective: Provide access controls to source location that permits
access to authorised persons only.
Security measures: One identification measure, e.g., lock controlled by
swipe card reader or personal identification number,
or key and key control.
2. Security objective: Ensure trustworthiness for individuals involved in the
management of sources.
Security measures: Background checks for all personnel authorised for
unescorted access to the source location and for access
to sensitive information.
3. Security objective: Identify and protect sensitive information.
Security measures: Procedures to identify sensitive information and
protect it from unauthorised disclosure.
4. Security objective: Provide a security plan.
Security measures: A security plan which conforms to regulatory
requirements and provides for response to increased
threat levels.
5. Security objective: Ensure a capability to manage security events covered
by security contingency plans.
Security measures: Procedures for responding to security-related
scenarios.
6. Security objective: Establish security event reporting system.
Security measures: Procedures for timely reporting of security events.

56
 APPENDIX-X

GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY PLAN FOR

FACILITY HANDLING WELL LOGGING
SOURCES/FIXED NUCLEONIC GAUGES
(SOURCE CATEGORY 3 AND SECURITY LEVEL-C)

The security plan should be prepared addressing the issues in Appendix-VII. As regards
the four security functions, the security plan should indicate the specific measure(s),
which would be implemented to meet the security objectives. Given below are the
security objectives against each of which, some security measures have been suggested.
Specific details of these measures should be furnished in the security plan. It may be
noted that these guidelines by no means are comprehensive.
Detect
1. Security objective: Provide immediate detection of any attempted
unauthorised removal of the source
Security measures: Tamper detection equipment and/or continuous
surveillance by operating personnel
2. Security objective: Provide immediate assessment of detection
Security measures: Assessment by operator / response personnel
3. Security objective: Provide a means to detect loss through verification
Security measures: Monthly checking through physical checks, tamper
indicating devices, etc.
Delay
1. Security objective: Impede the unauthorised removal
Security measures: One barrier (e.g. cage, source housing) or observation
by operating personnel
Response
1. Security objective: Implement appropriate action in the event of
unauthorised removal of source
Security measures: Procedures for identifying necessary action in
accordance with contingency plans
Security Management
1. Security objective: Provide access controls to source location that permits
access to authorised persons only

57
 Security measures: One identification measure
2. Security objective: Ensure trustworthiness for individuals involved in the
management of sources
Security measures: Background checks for all personnel authorised for
unescorted access to the source location and access to
sensitive information
3. Security objective: Identify and protect sensitive information
Security measures: Procedures to identify sensitive information and
protect it from unauthorised disclosure
4. Security objective: Provide a security plan.
Security measures: A security plan which conforms to regulatory
requirements and provides for response to increased
threat levels
5. Security objective: Ensure capability to manage security events covered
by security contingency plans
Security measures: Procedures for responding to security-related scenarios
6. Security objective: Establish security event reporting system
Security measures: Procedures for timely reporting of security events

58
 APPENDIX-XI

GUIDELINES TO PREPARE SECURITY PLAN FOR

FACILITY HANDLING PORTABLE GAUGES/
TECHNETIUM GENERATORS
(SOURCE CATEGORY 4 AND SECURITY LEVEL-D)

The security plan should be prepared addressing the issues in Appendix-VII. The
security plan should also indicate the prudent measure(s) in place to ensure security of
assets and their periodic verification. Given below are the security objectives against
each of which, some security measures have been suggested.
The natural interest of the owner to protect the asset and to ensure safe use and storage
is the appropriate basis for the security provided.
Security Management:
1. Security objective: Ensure safe use of the source and adequately protect
it as an asset
Security measures: Apply the relevant safety standards as well as
appropriate industrial standards. Verify the presence
of the source at set intervals
2. Security objective: Ensure reliability of personnel
Security measures: The personnel in-charge of managing sources of Level
D should be approved as legitimate authorised
personnel

59
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Industrial Radiography (Radiation Surveillance) Procedures, 1980.

2. Radiation Protection Rules, 1971.
3. Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004.
4. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY OF THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANISATION,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, International Basic Safety Standards
for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation
Sources, Safety Series No. 115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
5. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
6. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorisation of
Radioactive Sources, Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.9, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
7. ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, Security of Radioactive
Material during Transport, Safety Guide No. AERB/NRF-TS/SG-10, Mumbai,
India (2008).
8. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Security of Radioactive
Sources, Nuclear Security Series No. 11, IAEA,Vienna (2009).

60
 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

COMMITTEE TO DEVELOP GUIDE ON SECURITY OF

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN RADIATION FACILITIES
(CDGSRS)

Dates of meeting : January 19, 2007

February 14, 2007
March 22, 2007
April 17, 2007
May 1, 2007
June 14, 2007

Members and Invitees of CDGSRS:

Dr. A.N. Nandakumar : AERB (Former)

(Convenor)

Shri S.P. Agarwal : AERB (Former)

Shri T.K. Jayakumar : BRIT (Former)

Dr. Pradeep Kumar : BARC

Shri R. Kannan : AERB (Former)

Dr. P.K. Dash Sharma : AERB

Dr. A.U. Sonawane : AERB

(Member Secretary)

Shri K. Muralidhar (Invitee) : DAE (Former)

Shri Pravin J. Patil (Invitee) : AERB

61
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL SAETY
(ACRS)

Dates of meeting : October 11, 2007

Members and Invitees of ACRS:

Dr. U.C. Mishra (Chairman) : BARC (Former)

Dr. A.R. Reddy (Vice-Chairman) : DRDO, New Delhi (Former)

Dr. Gurusharan Singh : BARC

Dr. B.C. Bhatt : BARC (Former)

Dr. S.K. Shrivastava : Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai

Dr. (Smt.) Meera Venkatesh : BARC

Shri S.P. Agarwal : AERB (Former)

(Member Secretary)

62
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SECURITY (ACS)

Date of meeting : September 7, 2007

October 11, 2007
November 2, 2007
June 9, 2010
August 11, 2010

Members and Invitees of ACS:

Shri G.P. Srivastava (Chairman) : BARC

Shri T.P. Das : DAE

Dr. A.K. Kohli : BRIT

Shri G. Nageswara Rao : NPCIL

Shri W.S. Aruldossa Kanthiah : HWB

Dr. P. Swaminathan : IGCAR

Shri R.I. Gujarathi : AERB

Shri R. Venkataraman : AERB ( Former)

Shri S.N. Rao : AERB

Shri S.P. Agarwal : AERB (Former)

Shri S.A. Hussain : AERB

Shri R. Bhattacharya : AERB

Shri Fredric Lall : AERB

(Member Secretary)

Shri S. Bhattacharya : BARC

(Co-opted Member)

Shri L.B. Mahale : AERB

(Permanent Invitee)

Shri S.K. Pradhan : AERB

(Parmanent Invitee)

63
PROVISIONAL LIST OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS ON
SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS/SOURCES

Safety Series No. Titles

AERB/RF-RS/SG-1 Security of Radioactive Sources in Radiation Facilities

AERB/NRF-TS/SG-10 Security of Radioactive Material During Transport

64
AERB SAFETY GUIDE NO. AERB/RF-RS/SG-1

Published by : Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

Niyamak Bhavan, Anushaktinagar
Mumbai - 400 094
INDIA. BCS