Another Law School Course Outline Brought To You by

Another law school course outline brought to you by:
The Internet Legal Research Group http://www.ilrg.com

ILRG Law School Course Outlines Archive http://outlines.ilrg.com
LawRunner: A Legal Research Tool http://www.lawrunner.com
OUTLINE DETAILS:
School: Georgetown University Law Center
Course: Copyright
Year: Fall, 2005
Professor: Julie Cohen
Text: Copyright in a Global Information Economy, 1st Ed.
Text Authors: Julie Cohen
NOTICE:
This outline is © copyright 2006 by Maximilian Ventures, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. This outline,
in whole or in part, may not be reproduced or redistributed without the written permission of the copyright holder.
A limited license for personal academic use is permitted, as described below. This outline may not be posted on
any other web site without permission. ILRG reserves the exclusive right to distribute this outline.
THIS OUTLINE IS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS LOCATED AT:

http://www.ilrg.com/terms.
USAGE NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER:

Although the Internet Legal Research Group has tried to assemble the best possible outlines, WE MAKE NO
WARRANTIES AS TO THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION THIS OUTLINE CONTAINS. THIS OUTLINE
IS PROVIDED TO YOU AS-IS. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND DO NOT RELY ON IT FOR LEGAL
ADVICE. IF YOU NEED LEGAL HELP, PLEASE CONTACT A QUALIFIED ATTORNEY IN YOUR
JURISDICTION. As this outline has been written by a law student, it may contain inaccurate information.
Furthermore, some law schools have policies that permit law students to take outlines into final exams so long
as the student actually wrote the outline. If your law school has such a policy, you are expressly prohibited from
representing any of the outlines contained in this archive as your own. If you are not sure of your law school's
policy, you should contact the appropriate staff at your school. Otherwise, the Internet Legal Research Group
genuinely hopes you derive benefit from this outline.
outlines.ilrg.com Page 1 of 44
COPYRIGHT
I. FOUNDATION OF COPYRIGHT
A. Constitutional
B. Statutory
II. ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. FIXATION— § 102(a) requires a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” to qualify for
copyright protection.
1. § 101: Work is “fixed” if
(a) it is fixed in tangible medium of expression
(b) sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived reproduced or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration
(c) must have been fixed by or under the authority of the author.
2. RATIONALE—focus on effect (of sufficient permanence or stability) produced by the work
rather than the particular means used to create or store it, thereby avoiding anomalous
decisions such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. (US 1908) which deemed piano
rolls beyond protection because it was not a “written record or intelligible notation” (i.e.
content could not be discerned by the public without the intervention of a mechanical device).
Definition tries to protect original basis of copyright in the publication of printed materials.
(a) Complication—emails and other ephemeral media—if they are not protected other
digital works may not be either, if they are then is fwding an email infringement?
3. APPLICATIONS
(a) Repetition of a transitory image qualifies as fixed. Common core of experience.
Williams Electronics v. Artic Int’l (3d 1982) [repetitive image in video game is “fixed”
despite player interaction causing the image to change]
i. This case corrects the Apollo doctrine in that the work itself requires both
technological and human interaction to be displayed, but is it still considered
“fixed” by the court.
(b) Live performances w/o recording are not protectable
i. Transmission rule—transmitted sounds or images are protectable if fixation (record)
made while being transmitted. § 101 (leg hist.).
ii. Bootleg problem—strict language of statute requires both transmission and
recording under permission of author to be copyrighted; live performances not
transmitted were not covered, permitting bootlegging by audience members.
 Congress enacted amend. to Copyright Act to implement TRIPs Agreement
§ 1101(a) protection for live music performances (no fixation w/o permission
of performer, no distributing copies).
 Court said this is not consistent with Const. copyright protection, but allowed
under Commerce Clause because not “fundamentally inconsistent” with
Copyright Clause. US v. Moghadam (11th 1999).
4. COPIES—fixation also an issue in determining when a copy has been made.
(a) Court found transferring files from disk onto RAM of computer is copying because the
programs become fixed (enough to be viewed/ utilized) even though the fixation is
temporary. MAI Systems v. Peak Computer (9th 1993) [later statutorily overruled by
§ 117 permitting 3rd party repair/ maintenance]
i. NOTE: § 101 requires that a copy be fixed in a way that permits perception but
does actually require that it is perceived.
5. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:
(a) Berne Convention leaves fixation decision to individual countries (most require only
form in which others can perceive it)
(b) Neither WIPO nor TRIPs Agreement mention fixation
(c) EU specifically exempts certain copies:
i. Transient / incidental aspect of process (e.g. viewing web page)
ii. Integral / essential to the technical process of viewing
iii. Lawful use or transmission by ISP
iv. No independent economic significance
1. even some uses with economic significance do not adversely impact author
(e.g., cyber café charges to surf the web)
B. ORIGINALITY—§ 102(a) extends copyright to “original works of authorship”

1. WHAT IS ORIGINAL?—1909 Act contained no originality requirement, it was added in
1976 Act. Originality is not a Const. requirement so courts have struggled to interpret what it
means. Progress of case law has been increasingly satisfying “originality” at a very minimal
threshold.
(a) A photograph that reflects creativity in the photographer’s selection of costume, pose,
lighting and composition is sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony (US 1884) [posed photograph of Oscar Wilde is
a proper subject of copyright]
(b) People are free to copy the life-subject of a work, but not to copy the copy. All that is
required is some personal input on the subject matter by the author. Use as
advertisement does not undermine originality (subjective standard of originality).
Bleistein v. Donaldson (US 1903) [chromolithographs of people on an advertisement
are copyrightable]
i. Announces non-discrimination standard where judges should not evaluate merit of
work or tastes of the public.
ii. NOTE: planning and original mental conception language from Burrow-Giles has
disappeared.
(c) Originality means that the particular work “owes its origin” to the author. No large
measure of novelty is required so long as input of author is “more than merely trivial.”
Alfred & Bell v. Catalda (2d 1951) [A lithograph etching of a painting in the public
domain is protectable.]
i. NOTE: Feist later rejects a “sweat of the brow” doctrine which rewards effort, but
the language in Catalda emphasizes the tie between labor and talent suggesting that
it is skilled labor (with its irreducibly mental element) that they are protecting.
(d) Originality is not satisfied where the work is simply “slavish copying”. Some
distinction beyond a change of medium or mere technical skill is necessary. The
Bridgemann Art Library v. Corel (SDNY 1999) [transparencies of paintings are not
protected]
(e) Cf. In patent law, a patent may not be awarded unless there is sufficient difference from
the original that the new version / development would not have been obvious to an
observer trained in that field upon seeing the original. Graham v. John Deere (US
1966)
i. But copyright can be granted in cases where the originality requirement of patent is
not met. Laureyssens v. Idea Group (SDNY 1991) [granting copyright in foam
puzzles where multiple expired patents existed in similar designs]
(f) NOTE: modern standard for originality is Feist “minimal creative spark” and no “sweat
of the brow”
2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:
(a) Japan & Germany require high level of originality including creativity and artistic merit
(qualitative approach)
(b) Italy & France require only personal expression
(c) UK requires that the work originate from the author and not be copied.
C. IDEA/EXPRESSION DISTINCTION—§ 102(b)— “In no case does copyright protection for an

original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”
1. RATIONALE: (1) Define line btw copyright and public domain; (2) define line between
copyright and patents
2. FORMS: Blank forms are not copyrightable, because they are designed to record information,
not convey information. But, the instructions on forms for filling them out are copyrightable.
Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. East). And, if a form in designed so as
to guide the user is filling itself out, e.g. some test answer sheets, it may be copyrightable.
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. 37 CFR 202.1
(a) In obtaining the copyright to an explanation of a method, one controls only the
expression of the explanation and not the method itself. A book is intended to
communicate knowledge and the purpose would be frustrated if that knowledge could
not be used without infringing the copyright of the book. Baker v. Selden (US 1879)
[method of bookkeeping and the blank ledgers necessary to that method are not the
proper subject of copyright; forms are the system (or whatever expression is in the
forms is overcome by the merger with the system)]
3. MERGER DOCTRINE: if a limited number of ways exist to express an idea, the idea and the
expression merge into an uncopyrightable whole (E.g., the rules of sweepstakes, Morrisey v.
Proctor & Gamble or “scenes a faire”, Hoeling)
(a) As the number of potential expressions expand, the courts can grant “thin” copyright
protecting only against virtually identical copies.
(b) This is sometimes a defense to infringement rather than a bar to copyright
4. FACTS: facts are not copyrightable because they are discovered and not created.
(a) News is not copyrightable. Int’l News Service v. Assoc. Press (US 1918)
i. But state unfair competition law may provide protection under a labor theory (news
as common good blends with labor of collection to create quasi-property) when
copyright does not.
(b) In historical fiction, facts, theories or interpretations of history are uncopyrightable
ideas. A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios (US 1980) [author of fictional work
which borrowed details / theory of historical work does not violate copyright]
i. Constitutional justification: copyright is supposed to advance arts/ sciences and not
protecting fact prevents waste of duplicative fact finding, thus encouraging
historical works.
5. While facts cannot be copyrighted, classification is a creative endeavor which can be
copyrighted. When there are a great number of variations of expression, the process of
selecting one is an original process. Work need not be aesthetically pleasing to be literary
(Feist). American Dental v. Delta Dental (7th 1997) [granting copyright in a taxonomy
(categories of dental work)]
(a) NOTE: Baker said that a copy cannot utilize the expression of the original, but that
copyright is not held in the process. Here the claim is not in the process (Delta may use
the ADA system and encourage others to do so) but in the expression (Delta may not
publish a derivative work based on the ADA code).
 Easterbrook’s Variations Approach—

Originality
Copyright
Protection
The more variations there are, the more original each
individual expression is.
Too few variations 
merger doctrine Copyright tracks the line between sufficient number of
variations (copyrightable) and too few variations (merger doctrine).
Number of possible variations
Cohen says: Whereas the originality requirement has gradually lowered the bar for protection, the idea /
expression distinction seems to work as a corrective to guard against unoriginal work being protected simply
because it slides above the minimal test applied by the courts. Also, it seems to be (however accurately) a more
objective and less discretionary test than originality. At the same time, it may be that the courts end up using
originality as a test of whether something like a bookkeeping method is an idea or expression
D. DERIVATIVE WORKS—A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".§
101.
1. BASIC LIMITATIONS: (1) does not cover any part of the work in which copyrighted
material has been used unlawfully; (2) Only covers new contributions and gives no exclusive
right to preexisting material (cannot limit original copyright holder’s rights)
CONSIDERATIONS:
 Which circuit are you in?
 Level of skill required to make derivative work (we reward skilled labor, not sweat)
 What is the underlying work? (differing standards for fine art v. functional items)
 Access (did the DW author have access to the original work?)
 Who holds copyright in underlying work?
o public domainlower standard
o permission needed for copyrighted works
2. A replica of a work in the public domain must have changes that are more than merely
functional/ trivial in order to qualify for copyright protection as a derivative work. L. Batlin
& Son v. Snyder (2d 1976) [plastic version of metal Uncle Sam coin bank was not
copyrightable]
(a) Introduces public benefit of access as a basis for granting copyright (constitutional but
not statutory basis)
(b) Unprotected middle ground between two protected categories.
i. Exact copy requiring great skill to make (Alva Studios protection of Hand of God
replica)
ii. Substantial originality.
(c) Dissent would permit thin copyright to protect exact replicas.
3. Two-part test from Durham (1980):
(a) the original aspects of the work must be more than trivial
i. Purely functional alterations are trivial. Entertainment Research Group v. Genesis
Creative (9th 1997) [inflatable costumes of copyrighted cartoon characters not
copyrightable]
ii. ERG v. Genesis distinguishes Doran v. Sunset House Dist. Corp. (SD Cal 1961)
[permitting copyright in 3D Santa Claus]—Doran gave protection to works that
“differed sufficiently” but that lower standard only applied because the existing
work was in the public domain.
(b) the original aspects must reflect degree of reliance on preexisting material and not affect
the scope of the copyright protection in the preexisting material
i. This element prevents harm to primary holder’s rights to re-license derivative works
ii. NOTE: Idea of reflecting degree of reliance suggests reciprocity – the derivative
work must involve as much originality as the aspects of the preexisting work that
are used – difference between copy and derivative work. Adds a concept of fairness
to the statutory minimum mentioned in requirement (a)
4. PHOTOGRAPHS:
(a) ETS-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits (9th 2000): photograph of a bottle was not a derivative work
because the bottle was not a pre-existing work (but is photograph of a protected work
derivative? Perhaps)  independently copyrightable
(b) SHL Imaging v. Artisan House (SDNY 2000): photograph of protected work is not
derivative because it does not alter or recast the original independently copyrightable
5. PERMISSION REQ: Otherwise copyrightable derivative works are not copyrightable without
the permission of the underlying copyright holder. Pickett v. Prince (7th 2000) [denying
copyright in guitar shaped like Prince symbol]
6. WHY DERIVATIVE WORKS??
(a) Posner approach: derivative protection is designed to protect works that would not
otherwise be protected in a category of their own, presumably because they are not
original enough to merit regular copyright protection. True derivative works do seem
meritorious of protection but their similarity to the preexisting work might otherwise
undermine that claim – non-protection by association. E.g. Rosencrantz & Guilderstern
are Dead, or Friday. Or a parody.
(b) Pickett approach: one can start with fair use and get nearer and nearer infringement
without actually violating until one gets to the safe harbor of derivative works which
grant protection under the umbrella of the original to something that without the
similarity (albeit fair use) to the original may be in danger of being considered useless.
And the safe harbor would allow what would otherwise be infringement. So it is the
(innocent) similarity to the original that grants derivative protection – protection by
association.
i. But non-discrimination says we don’t inquire into the work’s merit (i.e., is it
“useless” under Pickett principle). So under that standard a work which is not
original enough to qualify for independent protection should be infringing.
(c) Synthesis: The key seems to be that a derivative work is original in its own right, but
due to inspiration by the original veers too close for comfort ⇒ separate protection.
What is not protected are works that start out too close, like a costume of the character,
and then supposedly depart just far enough for the claim to be made of originality &
separate protection.
E. COMPILATIONS—A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting

materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective works. §
101.
1. Three requirements:
 Collection of facts or data
 Selection or arrangement of the facts
 Creation thereby of original work of authorship
(a) Note the “or”: the originality can be restricted to selection, or arrangement – all of these
elements do not have to be original.
2. Compilations protect original selection or arrangement of facts or data. Does not provide
protection based solely on the labor of arrangement, but requires originality of selection/
arrangement. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service (US 1991) [telephone directory
listings are not protected because the selection is based on geographic region and the
arrangement is alphabetical]
(a) O’Connor explicitly rejects the “sweat of the brow” doctrine
(b) Intent in Feist is to protect consumers by limiting protection of information. Ginsburg
suggests in No “Sweat”? that it may have had the opposite effect in two respects: (1)
elimination of “sweat” copyright means that compilers will restrict access to protect
their work, and (2) to gain protection compilers will introduce subjective elements of
originality that will add to the cost, and be passed onto consumers who will have to pay
for aspects they may not want or need.
3. Sufficiently novel arrangement of facts in the public domain will qualify the arrangement for
protection. Trebonik v. Grossman Music (ND OH 1969) [arrangement of guitar chords on a
wheel classified by root chords is a novel arrangement and can be copyrighted]
4. Creative selection of individually uncopyrightable text/ art can be protected as a compilation.
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co. (9th 1970) [although individual greeting cards were
not protectable, selection and combination of the cards in a set is original and copyrightable]
5. The discretion that goes into selecting, reconciling and presenting data creates an original
work which can be protected. Mason v. Montgomery Data (5th 1992) [real estate maps are
protected]
(a) Maps are arguably part of the “original intent” of the Copyright Clause—but difficult to
swallow in light of the changed nature of maps.
(b) Court rejects dist. court merger doctrine argument. If all maps are compilations,
perhaps we treat some details (i.e., roads and towns) like scenes a faire and protect more
discretionary aspects.
6. INTERNATIONAL APPROACH: neither Berne nor TRIPs require originality.
Three Tiers of Originality:

1. Derivative works held to a higher standard of originality (see Feist)
2. “Regular” works are held to the low constitutional floor test (see Catalda)
3. Compilations seem to be held to an even lower standard (see Roth)
III. AUTHORSHIP
A. SOLE AUTHORSHIP
1. Author is the source of “original individual conception” even if that individual did not exercise
control over all aspects of creation. Lindsay v. Titanic (SDNY 1999) [designer of concept and
storyboards is the author of film project despite not going underwater to film it]
(a) This abstract concept of “authorship” creates tension between protecting the creators of
a work and protecting economic interests in the work.
B. JOINT AUTHORSHIP—A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. § 101.
1. Aalmuhammed v. Lee (9th 1999) [π advised character development and accuracy in
“Malcolm X” and sued for joint authorship] ELEMENTS OF JOINT AUTHORSHIP:
(a) Final work is copyrightable—movie and movie script
(b) Two or more authors—there are many people involved in the creation of a movie but
some element of control (originating and completing the project) is lacking here
(c) Intent to create joint authorship—there was no contract signed, no public declaration, no
shared decision-making
(d) Each author’s contribution is independently copyrightable (see Trinity)
(e) Policy considerations—if de minimis contribution counts, no one will consult others on
their work.
2. Joint authorship requires that each author’s contribution represent original expression that
could stand on its own as the subject matter of copyright. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre Inc.
(7th 1994) [theatre members claim joint authorship with playwright because of contributions
to plays, but suggestions were not independently copyrightable so no joint authorship]
3. ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS: Joint authors hold undivided interests in a work regardless of
their contribution.
(a) Exclusive license—permission of all authors required
(b) Non-exclusive license—each co-author may independently grant with accounting to
others for profits
i. In some countries permission of all authors is required, but provisions resolve
unreasonable hold-outs.
C. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE—
Significance of “made for hire” classification—

 Employer has all rights to the work
 Not subject to termination provisions of the 1976 Act
 Copyright duration of 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (whichever is less)
 Nationality and status of employer can have significance
1. § 201(b)—in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or person for whom the work is
made is considered the author (unless written instrument)
2. § 101 defines “work made for hire” as:
(a) (1) Work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment
(b) (2) Work specially ordered for use in a collective work (nine enumerated examples)
under written instrument designating “work for hire”
i. No contract can create a “work for hire” in a category of work not listed in § 101(2)
3. RATIONALE—if an employee does the work, the employer bears the risks and costs and
should get the benefit.
4. “EMPLOYEES”
(a) Works created by independent contractors are under the authorship of the creator. Term
“employee” only refers to those defined in agency law. Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid (US 1989) [dispute over copyright in a bronze nativity-like scene
depicting homelessness for which CCNV supplied the plan and Reid executed; Reid was
independent contractor]
(b) FACTORS:
i. Hiring party’s right to control manner and means of production
ii. Skill required
iii. Source of materials and tools
iv. Location of production
v. Whether hiring party has right to assign other projects to worker
vi. Discretion of worker over hours worked
vii. Worker’s role in hiring assistants
viii. Whether work is part of hirer’s regular business
ix. Provision of employee benefits
x. Tax treatment of worker
(c) The most significant considerations of employee status are benefits and tax
contributions. Aymes v. Bonelli (2d 1992) [Δ hired π to create computer programs for
Δ’s business.]
5. “SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT”
(a) Avtec Systems v. Peiffer (4th 1994) [Δ created computer program for employer and
subsequently improved it; claimed new version was not in “scope of employment”]
TEST:
i. Was the work the kind of work Δ was employed to perform?
ii. Where was the work done?
iii. Was the work “appreciably motivated by desire to further corporate goals”?
(b) Cf. employer ownership of trade secrets—employer owns if worker is employed to do
experimental work; employee owned if employed in the general field of expertise
(c) Teacher exception: under 1909 Act teachers retained copyright in works regardless of
employee status; not mentioned in 1976 Act because it was considered obvious. Hays
v. Sony Corp (7th 1988). Increase in marketability of electronic class materials is
causing reassessment by universities.
6. “SPECIALLY ORDERED” WORKS—§ 101(2) enumerates nine categories of commissioned
works where the copyright initially vests in the commissioner instead of the author (even
though really independent contractor)
(a) Influenced by trade group negotiations, why?—if copyright initially vests in author and
is signed away, the author can terminate between years 35 and 40 (§ 203(a)); if the work
is included in § 101(2) the employer has automatic copyright not subject to termination.
(b) Writing requirement must be satisfied though courts are split as to before/ after and
exact wording necessary.
7. GOVERNMENT WORKS—§ 105 prevents copyright in any work where the US Government
is the “author” (or employer-author), however, US Govt can hold copyrights transferred by
assignment, bequest or otherwise.
(a) No public good argument for govt author because the work is created with tax dollars.
8. INTERNATIONAL VARIATIONS
(a) Ecuador, France, Germany, Ivory Coast, Jordan, and Morocco—the author of a work in
the natural person who created it and copyright vests in that person
(b) Ghana, India, Japan and UK follow work for hire standard.
IV. FORMALITIES (for duration calculations see DURATION CHARTS)
A. Copyright Act of 1790—Formal Requirements

1. Publication
2. Notice—publication of notice in domestic newspaper for 4 weeks within 2 months of record
3. Registration—deposit copy with clerk of dist. court; if printed or published after act deposit
must be made prior to publication
4. Deposit—one copy to Secretary of State with 6 mos. of publication
B. PUBLICATION—
1. HISTORY: Under 1909 Act, publication was the point at which copyright crossed from state
matter (copyright in perpetuity) to federal matter (constrained time limits by const. language).
Publication requirement is gone from 1976 Act, but works published before Jan 1, 1978 are
governed by 1909 Act formalities.
Significance of publication date for pre-1978 works:

o Work is published (divests common law) without notice (not investive of fed law)  public domain
o Work is published (divests common law) with notice (invests fed law)  initial protection of 28 years
plus renewal term of 47 years
o Work is not generally published (does not divest common law) and is legally “unpublished” as of Jan
1, 1978  protection for life of the author plus 70 years (under 1976 Act)
2. A general publication occurs when:

(a) tangible copies of the work are distributed to the public in a way that allows the public
to exercise control over the work;
(b) where the work is exhibited in a way that permits unrestricted copying by the general
public. (MLK v. CBS)
3. Limited Publication—The mere performance of a speech or the release of the speech to the
media for coverage of a newsworthy event is not a general publication. Estate of MLK v.
CBS (11th 1999) [estate of MLK suing makers of documentary featuring “I have a dream”
speech without permission from estate]
4. INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE:
(a) Uruguay Round Agreements Act—restored copyright in certain foreign works that
were injected into the public domain for noncompliance with US formalities.
(b) Berne Convention—works published in a member state or by a national of a member
state must be given the same protection in every other member state as works first
published in the member’s own territory.
C. DURATION (see Duration Charts)

1. POLICY—Const. permits Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors for “limited times”
hence the concern about extension of copyright durations
2. TERMS: § 302(a)-(e)
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft (US 2003)—SBCTEA is constitutional under copyright clause “limited
times”; serial extension of the copyright term, even if it looks unlimited, does not in fact run
afoul of the Copyright Clause.
4. Berne Convention—required minimum of life plus 50 years for entry
D. RENEWAL—
1. REQUIREMENTS: If work is published
(a) Before Jan 1, 1964  file for renewal in 28th year of copyright term
(b) From Jan 1, 1964 until Dec 31, 1977  renewal is automatic
(c) After Jan 1, 1978  no renewal, just single terms of life + 70 years
2. DERIVATIVE WORKS: 1976 Act § 101(c)(6)(A) gives copyright holder of derivative work
the right to continue to utilize the work under the terms of the grant even after the grant
expires.
(a) Old Rule: The owner of copyright in a derivative work infringes the copyright of pre-
existing work when the term of underlying grant expires and is not renewed and
reassigned. Stewart v. Abend (US 1990) [author assigned copyright to movie maker
and died before renewal and reassignment; estate trust assigned renewal rights to π but
movie continued to be displayed; Court held infringement]
(b) Court discusses underlying purpose for renewal as giving copyright holder opportunity
to renegotiate terms of a grant after “testing” the work.
E. TRANSFER— Copyright protection consists of a bundle of rights – any of which may be transferred to
others. The recipient of a transfer receives full protection of whatever right that were granted. (See § 201
below)
1. Definition. A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license,
or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license. § 101
2. Express and Implied Transfers. “A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer,
is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized
agent.” §204(a)
(a) Transfer of copyright ownership requires a written instrument. However, certain actions
of the parties (such as conveyance) will create an implied nonexclusive license which is
exempted from the writing requirement. Effects Assoc. v. Cohen (9th 1990) [movie
scenes made by π and given to Δ but Δ only paid half and still used them; held that π
gave Δ an implied nonexclusive license to use the scenes]
3. Technological Developments—how does the court deal with language of old transfers as
applied to new techonologies and medium
(a) Videotapes
i. The burden falls on the grantor to specify exclusion of new formats and markets.
Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. v. Walt Disney (2d 1998) [licensing agreement
granted right to use Stravinksy’s “Rite of Spring” in Disney movie “Fantasia”; π
objected to release of video format of movie claiming beyond license]
1. Test in interpreting language is any new technology the nature of which
would reasonably fall within the scope of the medium for which the license
was originally granted.
2. Rejects “core use” approach which includes only those uses within the core
unambiguous meaning of the term and excludes uses in the ambiguous
penumbra.
ii. If the words are broad enough to encompass the new use, it is fairer to burden the
grantor with renegotiating the exception. Burden is met where permissible
mediums are specified and license excludes uses not known to the parties at the
time of execution. Herbert Cohen v. Paramount Pictures (9th 1988) [license
granted in 1969 did not include video release of movie where language specified
distribution in theatres and “by means of television” and excluded unknown uses]
(b) Internet
i. Publishers of periodicals may not relicense individual articles to databases as
“collective works” absent a transfer of copyright from authors of individual articles.
Dividing the articles in a collective work is not protected as a “revision” under §
201(c). New York Times v. Tasini (US 2001) [NYT licenses previously published
articles to electronic databases which permits them to be search individually and not
in the context of their original publication]
1. Important that this only applies to freelance articles because of “work for
hire” doctrine.
2. Dissent—§ 201(c) does apply so long as each article refers to the collective
work and the remainder of the collective work is accessible to the reader at
the same time (like re-ordering the articles) [bad analogy for LEXIS where
you buy one article and don’t have same access to the edition]
3. NOTE: this case hasn’t had any real significance in future works because
NYT can demand and always get electronic rights from freelancers.
ii. Lemley: Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet—argues that
distribution on the internet is neither performance nor reproduction strictly so it’s
hard to say what license it falls under; we need a new right in the bundle for
“distribution over a computer network”
(c) Ebooks.
i. Fundamental alterations in the form of a work will exceed the grant. Random
House v. Rosetta Books (SDNY 2001) [publisher given license to publish “in book
form” sued for publishing in electronic book form]
4. Termination of Transfers
(a) Effect of termination:
i. All rights covered by the grant revert to author or person owning termination
interests
ii. Further grants or agreements only valid if made after the date of termination, except
if made to current assignee (grant can be made after notice of termination is served)
iii. Derivative works prepared prior to termination may continue to use assigned work
subject to same terms of original grant.
(b) Transfers made before January 1, 1978—§ 304(c) & (d)
i. Policy—to ensure that after extensions of copyright period under 1976 and 1998
Acts, the benefits of the extension would go to the author and successors rather than
existing copyright holders.
ii. When: five year window beginning—
1. at the end of 56 years from when protection was secured (publication &
notice). § 304(c)
o OR, only if the original © would have expired prior to Oct 27, 1998
(effective date of Bono Act) [© started pre- Oct 27, 1940]
2. at the end of 75 years from when protection was secured. § 304(d)
 NOTE: § 304(d) only applies to © between Jan 1, 1923 and Oct 26, 1942
(pre-1923 has passed in to public domain)
iii. Notice:
1. notice of termination to grantee or grantee’s successor
2. must state effective date of termination
3. must be served not less than 2 and not more than 10 years prior to effective
date
4. notice must be recorded with the Copyright Office before effective date
iv. Scope:
1. can only terminate transfers that convey an interest in a renewal term, not
transfers of initial term
2. does not apply to works for hire
3. does not apply to transfers by will (but does include those by widow, child,
successor or executor)
v. Parties:
1. If grant by author  terminated by author or, if deceased, any owner of at
least half of the termination interest.
2. If grant not by author  can only be terminated by the person who made the
grant. (e.g., author dies, widow sells rights, but dies before timely notice of
termination can be sent, no one can terminate)
(c) Transfers made after January 1, 1978—§ 203
i. Policy: paternalistic protection of authors to compensate for uneven bargaining
positions at point of transfer
ii. When: five year window beginning—
1. If transfer includes right to publish  35 years from publication date or 40
years from execution of grant (whichever earlier)
2. If transfer does not include right to publish  35 years from execution.
iii. Notice:
1. notice of termination to grantee or grantee’s successor
2. must state effective date of termination
3. must be served not less than 2 and not more than 10 years prior to effective
date
4. notice must be recorded with the Copyright Office before effective date
iv. Scope:
1. does not apply to works for hire
2. does not apply to transfers by will
3. only applies to transfers by author, not successor transfers
4. covers outright transfers, exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.
v. Parties:
1. If grant by author  terminated by author or, if deceased, any owner of at
least half of the termination interest.
2. If grant not by author  cannot terminate
V. BOUNDARY PROBLEMS
A. USEFUL ARTICLES— Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
§ 101.
1. Policy—if purpose of copyright protection is to provide economic incentive for creation then
we should err on the side of protection of creative arts without over-reliance on narrow or rigid
conceptions of art. Mazer v. Stein (US 1954) [court gave protection to sculptures intended as
lamp bases]
2. Conceptual Separability—§ 101 requires that artistic elements are conceptually separable from
utilitarian elements.
(a) Ornamentation is an artistic element which can be conceptually distinct from the its
function. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl (2d 1980) [extending protection to
an ornamental belt buckle]
i. Court takes “intent” approach—if you start with trying to make something artistic
and turn it in to something useful then it is protected; if you start with something
useful and try to make it artistic there is no protection (e.g., Barnhart). Here
“ornamentation” is artistic rather than useful.
(b) Where all aesthetic elements of a work are derived from the manner in which they serve
their function, the artistic and utilitarian elements are not separable and no protection is
available. Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover (2d 1985) [no protection for torso forms
used to display clothing]
i. Dissent: The test should be how people perceive the functional and artistic nature;
if artistic nature could display the function in a viewer’s mind, then it should be
protected. (e.g., one might buy an artistic chair without any intention of sitting in it).
ii. NOTE: if we took the dissent position (individual reflection on artistic value)
combined with the non-discrimination principle (court should not say what is
artistic)  we end up protecting everything.
(c) Separability requires aesthetic judgments exercised independently of functional
considerations. Something that starts as artistic purpose and is modified to reflect
practical requirements is not eligible for protection. Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber (2d 1987) [designer denied copyright for curved metal bike rack that he claim
is a “minimalist sculpture”]
i. NOTE: this analysis requires the judge to make aesthetic determination of merit;
court in Brandir embraces this inevitability and encourages transparency in process
of evaluation.
3. TRIPS and Industrial Designs. TRIPS requires protection of industrial design, which the U.S.
claims to do in two ways over and above copyright protection.
(a) Design patents. New, original, or ornamental design for item of manufacture can be
patented for 14 years. Understood expansively to cover anything that people could care
what looks like, because apparent purpose is to eliminate ugliness of many functional
items.
(b) Trade Dress Protection. Trade dress can be protected under Lanham unfair
competition act prohibiting false origin claims. Was expanded in 1992 from country of
origin to cover implication that company was affiliated with other company, even with
no showing of customer association (“secondary meaning”). However Court has
retreated to allow protection beyond product packaging (shape of bottle etc.) to actual
design or product itself only when can show secondary meaning.
(c) INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:
i. EU sui generis protection for industrial design. The EU specifically protects
industrial design if it has a new and individual character – i.e. if the overall effect in
informed viewer is different from existing products. Does not cover features solely
dictated by function or required for compatibility with other products (e.g. design of
generic spare parts).
ii. U.S. sui generis protection for industrial design. There is no specific protection
yet, but individualized legislation for semiconductors and boat hull designs suggests
potential for general protection of industrial design.
(d) Industrial design protection raises two concerns:
i. Depletion: if the denial of protection for designs dictated solely by function is
interpreted to allow protection whenever there are alternative designs possible, the
number of efficient designs will be depleted, leaving only less useful designs that
still do the job
ii. Overlap: having more than one kind of protection for the same design (e.g,
_________)
B. COMPUTER SOFTWARE—Boundary problem is that while the code itself is written, and analogous
to a literary work, the program itself is functional. Protection is based on findings by CONTU that
programs could be considered writings under the 1976 act.
Three waves of judicial software analysis

1. Establishing protection for software (Apple v. Franklin, Williams v. Artic)
2. Working out the scope of protection (Comp Assoc. v. Altai)
3. Protecting otherwise infringing uses for policy reasons (Lotus v. Borland)
1. Text vs. Machine?

(a) Text—
i. CONTU Report (1980) specifically rejects the idea that a program is part of the
computer (Congress adopts definition in § 101 as “set of statements or
instructions….)
ii. Clapes, Silicon Epics and Binary Bards, likens a program to a symphony score in
that it tells the musician & conductor what to do but involves creativity to do so.
(b) Machine—
i. Commissioner John Hersey wrote strong dissent to CONTU Report—saw a crucial
difference in that computer programs are instructions addressed to machines and
thus “eventually become an essential part of the machinery that produces the
results”
ii. Samuelson saw two differences btw program and text
1. program is valued solely for functional characteristics
2. two different and protectable programs can have identical appearance and
function (the protected “form” is independent of the function which is
valued).
(c) An operating system, like an application program, is copyrightable as a computer
program. An OS is not a method of functioning, but rather operates as instructions.
Apple Comp. v. Franklin Comp. (3d 1983) [Franklin copied parts of Apple’s operating
system to ensure its computers could run Apple compatible programs; Franklin claims
OS is not copyrightable]
i. Merger doctrine?—if a different program could be written that performs the same
function then OS should be copyrightable (isn’t this deflating Easterbrook’s
conception?); the fact that Franklin wants absolute compatibility is a business
matter not copyright.
2. Idea/ Expression Distinction in Software.
(a) Merger Doctrine— two basic problems in applying the merger doctrine to software:
i. in many cases it is possible for different code to produce the same function – is this
a copy or not?
ii. to the extent that programs strive for efficiency (albeit with some trade-offs that
might count as creative choices), it can be argued that there is basically only one
acceptable way to perform a function which is the most effective way, so the
merger doctrine always applies.
(b) Three part test for evaluating similarity of non-literal components of a computer
program. Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai (2d 1992) [part of a scheduling program
was copied but only at the functional and not the code level.]
i. Abstraction—divide program at levels of abstraction
1. broadest—i.e., word processor
2. structure—the modules the program performs (print, save)
3. code—source code and object code
ii. Filtration—remove from consideration all elements of the original program that are
unprotected
1. Efficiency elements
2. Elements dictated by external factors (like scenes a faire)
3. Public domain elements
iii. Comparison—protection is only appropriate if after removing all these elements
there is a core element of expression that was copied; also evaluate how important
that expression is to the program.
(c) Even though there may only be limited ways to write code for a function, that does not
permit copying. Softel v. Dragon Medical and Scientific Comm. (2d 1997) [Δ used
leftover software on computer to design new programs using different language to run
on different hardware  infringing]
(d) A system’s menu structure is not copyrightable because it is a process of using/
controlling the program (like buttons on a VCR) utilizing “external factor” filtering
from Altai test. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l (1st 1995) [Δ used Lotus
command functions in a rival program to allow users to switch easily from Lotus to its
system]
(e) NOTE: Both Altai and Lotus courts look at the demands of users of software – Lotus in
the sense of asking what is useful system and what is the underlying product; Altai in
the sense that external efficiency considerations are filtered out.
3. Software compatibility considerations. A complicating factor of the software industry is
that it features a “network market” whereby value depends on the number of people who use it
(like telephones), with an exponential effect that the more people who buy it, the more other
programs will be developed around it, making it even more valuable. For this reason, software
writers must often use the same features to ensure compatibility with, e.g., Windows. Courts
are increasingly refusing to protect these features (this protects against Hersey’s CONTU
concerns that protecting software will encourage a sort of “tying” to hardware leading to
monopolies).
4. Patent protection for software. U.S. courts, unlike most other countries, seem willing to
patent software that performs useful functions, such as accounting – this is now considered a
tangible useful result even though it is not tangible in the literal sense.
5. Trade secret protection for software. Some allowance is made for software, such as special
deposit requirements, but it only covers improper discovery, not reverse engineering or
independent creation. Software companies increasingly use licensing to prevent reverse
engineering. The EU does protect software, but forbids certain kinds of licensing restrictions.
C. CHARACTERS—are characters of protected works ideas or expressions?
1. “Story Being Told” Test—applied to characters in literary works; protection of the character
when the character is the story being told. Sam Spade case.
2. Character Delineation Test—slightly less stringent test for graphic characters considers
whether the character is sufficiently distinctive to merit protection.
(a) Metro-Goldwyn Mayer v. American Honda Motor (CD Cal 1995) [James Bond
character both is the “story being told” and a sufficiently delineated character to merit
protection]
(b) Π must demonstrate that character is distinctly delineated in π’s work and that particular
delineation was copied by Δ. Physical identity may merge with character. Titan Sports
v. Turner Broadcasting (D. Conn. 1997) [WWF had sufficiently delineated wrestling
characters that may have been infringed when WCW hired the wrestlers]
(c) Context-based characters. Some characters lose their distinctiveness outside a certain
context (e.g. would Bond-type character in a cooking show still be a Bond-type
character), but others, especially graphic characters do not (e.g. Mickey Mouse in
space).
3. Fan Fiction. Unauthorized sequels are infringements, but fan fiction (especially where there
is no money being made, and a copyright disclaimer is present) are a grey-area. Possibly there
could be a harm of dilution in some cases, but otherwise not seem to adversely affect progress,
which is the point of copyrights. (Jake says If the fan fiction adopts the perspective of the
author in creating new works, that seems more like infringement)
4. Trademark and unfair competition law applied to characters. These laws protect
characters designed specifically as product representations – e.g. Energizer Bunny, Michelin
Man, etc. But a fictional character is harder to place in this category because it seems silly to
imagine James Bond endorsing a product.
5. Rights to publicity. When an actor’s likeness becomes part of a character there are
conflicting interests in use of that character. Wendt v. Host International, Inc. (9th 1997)
denied summary judgment on π’s claim that animatronic figures of Cliff and Norm from
Cheers used in Cheers-like setting resembled actors enough to infringe their right of publicity,
even though used by owner of Cheers copyright, thereby making this an issue at trial.
Kozinski objected on the grounds that allowing possibility of infringement whenever a
character is closely enough associated in the public imagination with an actor that any new
version will call to mind the first, and prevent a generic actor-neutral model from being made,
would over extend protection to actors.
(a) Preemption. Right of publicity claims are state law ⇒ must be understood as distinct
from copyright claims or would be preempted by federal copyright law.
D. DATABASES
1. The problem of Feist. The problem for copyrighting databases is that TRIPS and Berne
require only that databases receive the same protection as compilations, and they are therefore
subject to the Feist holding that sweat of the brow does not warrant protection ⇒ the
arrangement of the facts must be sufficiently original if copyright is to be allowed.
2. Arrangement.
(a) Only the selection and arrangement of a compilation is protected by copyright, not the
facts which make up the compilation. Bellsouth Advertising v. Donnelley Information
Pub. (11th 1993) [facts of business listings in yellow pages are not copyrightable
elements of a compilation]
(b) Elements of a compilation determined by necessity (or machine) do not evidence the
creativity of arrangement necessary to merit copyright protection. Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publishing (2d 1998) [pagination in public domain cases is not
copyrightable and CD-Rom permitting users to view pagination is not infringing]
3. Selection.
(a) Selections requiring judgment and expertise satisfies the originality requirement. CDN
v. Kapes (9th 1999) [price list for collectible coins which is compiled from many
sources is protectable]
(b) Predictions that require opinion or analysis may be protectable even if based on facts.
Selection can be satisfied by the process of selecting sources of relevant information to
include. CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports (2d 1995)
[extending protection to predicted used car values against infringement in composite
guide]
i. Rejects argument that the predictions are ideas or that they are barred from
protection by merger with ideas merger applies more clearly to ideas that are
purportedly factual, such as the symptoms of a disease, or how to perform a certain
process, than ideas that are infused with the author’s taste or opinion, like the car
prices in this case. citing Kregos v. AP (1991).
4. NOTE: both Bellsouth and West Publishing decline to extend protection to underlying
elements of compilation protected by virtue of arrangement; CCC Information Services
provides protection to underlying elements of compilation based on selection impact of
Feist is that compilations won’t be protected when works are in public domain.
5. Possible Solutions: we need to provide database creators with some sort of protection as an
incentive to do the work.
(a) Sui generis protection.
i. EU Database Directive. EU protects databases precisely as substantial investments
in either obtaining, verifying or presenting the information (sweat of the brow)
(although excludes computer programs used to make or use the database – just the
collection of facts is protected – and has exceptions for private individual use and
educational use etc.).
ii. US. No proposals to create sui generis protection has succeeded, but likely that one
will.
6. Policy considerations.
(a) Ginsburg: No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information
After Feist v. Rural Telephone.
i. In order to avoid conflict with Constitutional copyright provisions, sui generis
protection would have to differ in duration (probably shorter) and scope (utilize
compulsory licenses)
ii. Although Feist was designed to protect consumers by limiting protection of
information, it may have had the opposite effect in two respects:
1. Elimination of “sweat” copyright means that compilers will restrict access to
protect their work, and
2. To gain protection compilers will introduce subjective elements of
originality that will add to the cost, and be passed onto consumers who will
have to pay for aspects they may not want or need.
(b) Reichman and Samuelson: Intellectual Property Rights in Data?—Any intellectual
property right in data itself would conflict with Constitution ⇒ need protection based on
trade secret law that balances needs of creators and public by allowing limited lead-time
and allocation of development costs among users.
VI. STATUTORY RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) To prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) To distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) In the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
A. REPRODUCTION RIGHT.
1. Exact Copy.
(a) Three types:
i. Piracy: selling unlicensed copies
ii. Grey area copies: exact copy is made but some question exists as to whether it
was privileged under exemptions like fair use or library/ archive privilege.
iii. Technology: Copies that are automatically made during the process of viewing or
using the work (e.g., software on RAM)
(b) Innocent Infringer Defense: no liability incurred if authorized copy had no copyright
notice until after notice has been given—§ 405(b)
i. Innocent infringer defense may only be raised when the infringer relied on an
authorized copy that omitted the copyright notice. Marobie-FL v. Nat’l Assoc. of
this Equip. Dist. (ND Ill. 1997) [NAFED made copies of π’s clip art available for
downloading on their website; the copies were obtained by sending disks to an
unknown source; NAFED claims innocent infringer]
(c) Ephemeral copies: § 112 permits the creation of a backup copy made during the
transmittal of a broadcast, which had to be destroyed within 6 months unless used
purely for archives. The exception does not apply to motion pictures or audio-visual
works. § 118(d) expands this to allow public broadcasters to make non-ephemeral
copies of broadcasts given the budgetary need to repeat broadcasts, and allows for
compulsory licensing to permit rebroadcasts.
2. Substantially Similar Copy.—in determining whether a copy has been made, courts assess
substantial similarity to the original
(a) Abstractions test (Learned Hand): Works can be abstracted on several levels
(concept, plot, characters, dialogue) and between the levels of abstraction lay the
boundaries between ideas and expression.
i. Copyright protection is not limited to the literal text, however protection also does
not extend to the “ideas” of the work. The generalized level of abstraction at which
these works are similar is not protectable. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. (2d
1930) [two plays both depicted conflict resulting from a relationship between an
Irish Catholic and a Jew]
(b) Ordinary observer test: Whether the ordinary observer would find the aesthetic
appeal of the works to be substantially similar.
i. A visual image that would be recognized by the average person as having been
appropriated from a copyrighted work infringes on that copyright. Steinberg v.
Columbia Pictures (SDNY 1987) [cover of movie “Moscow on the Hudson” was
intended to “capture the feel” of a cover illustration from The New Yorker done by
Steinberg]
ii. Once there is evidence of access and similarity, it is up to the trier of fact to
determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. Π may call
witnesses and experts, but it is ultimately a questions of fact for the jury. Arnstein
v. Porter (2d 1946) [π alleges Δ infringed on compositions and demonstrated access
through wide publication and performance]
iii. Problem: Explains the perspective from which a fact-finder should evaluate
similarity, but does not adequately account for parts of original works that may not
be protected (but would seem copied to ordinary observer). Similar to the total
concept and feel test
(c) Extrinsic / Intrinsic test. Looks initially for similarity of ideas – only then does it
inquire into whether there is similarity of expression.
i. The First Amendment offers protection to ideas which may not be protected by
copyright. However, what McDonald’s copied was both the idea (fantasy land) and
the expression (particular images). Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prod. v. McDonald’s
Corp. (9th 1977) [McDonald’s commercial utilized characters very similar to the
cartoon images from “H.R. Pfunstuf”; McD’s claimed First Amend protection of
ideas]
ii. Krofft court seems to combine the ordinary observer test with the total concept and
feel test, suggesting that they may be essentially the same test
(d) Total concept and feel test: Like the ordinary observer test but permits observer to
filter out the unprotected components of the work.
i. Boisson v. Banian (2d 2001) [alphabet quilts were infringing]
ii. Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai (2d 1992) [
iii. Cavalier v. Random House
iv. Swirsky v. Carey
3. Standard for appellate review. Because substantial similarity is a matter of fact, standard is
clear error – reasons for reversal are either no substantial similarity or similarity only in
unprotected elements.
4. Standard for summary judgment. Summary judgment traditionally discouraged given the
role played by findings of fact, but more popular recently. Court must conclude, however, that
there is no possibility of reasonable jury finding.
5. Role of experts in assessing similarity. Traditionally experts were permitted to describe fact
of copying but not wrongfulness of the copying (substantial similarity). Increasingly,
especially because of software cases, experts are permitted on both issues. Appellate courts
tend to leave it to discretion of trial courts.
B. DISTRIBUTION RIGHT—§ 106—allows suit against distributors of unauthorized copies

1. What is distribution? Distribution rights can be violated by making a work available for
distribution with no necessary showing of actual distribution.
(a) Posting on the internet is distribution. Marobie-FL v. Nat’l Assoc. of Fire Equip. Dist.
(ND Ill. 1997) [NAFED made copies of π’s clip art available for downloading on their
website]
(b) A library can be held to have distributed a work just by making it available to the public
as part of the library collection. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints (4th 1997) [library acquired a single legal copy of genealogical research and
made multiple copies to send to other branches of the library; illegal copy later found on
library shelves]
2. First Sale Doctrine: once a buyer has purchased an authorized copy of a work, he may
dispose of or sell it on his own terms, subject only to limitations of moral rights (below)—§
109(a)
(a) REQUIREMENTS:
i. Copy was lawfully made with the authorization of the copyright owner;
ii. The copy was transferred under the © owner’s authority.
iii. The defendant is a lawful owner of the copy in question;
iv. The defendant’s use implicates the distribution right only, not the reproduction
right.
(b) Author is granted the right of first sale, but not restrain future sales of the same
authorized copy of the work. Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus (US 1908) [author sought to
prevent the resale of his book for less than $1]
(c) Doctrinal Exceptions: § 109(a) does not apply to electronically transmitted copies
because when a file is transmitted a new copy is made on the destination computer,
leaving the original copy in the source computer  there is no transfer of a single copy.
(d) Pragmatic Exceptions:
i. Due to ease of copying, § 109(b) introduced in 1994 to forbid lending for profit of
musical recordings (later expanded to include software). These exceptions do not
affect nonprofit library lending or leasing of equipment containing the works (like
computers).
ii. § 108 prevent libraries from making digital copies of works available to patrons
(e) European Rental Rights. Countries have a choice to either restrict lending to libraries
or to institute royalty scheme for commercial lenders to remunerate authors.
3. “Grey Market” Copies: Division of copyrights for different countries / regions may lead to
different prices, and incentive to import unauthorized copies into expensive regions –
obviously without permission of copyright owner.
(a) § 602(a) provides that importation into the US of copies or phonorecords of works
acquired outside the country without the authorization of the copyright holder is an
infringement of the distribution right of § 106.
(b) § 602(a) does not apply to resales by lawful owners under § 109. § 602(a) creates an
action under § 106, and § 109 is an exception to an action under § 106. Works that
originate in the US are subject to first sale doctrine, even if that first sale is to a foreign
company that subsequently resells it to the US. Quality King Dist. v. L’anza Research
Int’l (US 1998) [US copyright holder sold products to international distributors at lower
rates than domestic distributors and some int’l distributors sold back to US retailers; no
infringement of distribution right]
C. RIGHT TO PREPARE DERIVATIVE WORKS—when is a new work a derivative work and when is
it an infringing reproduction?
1. Derivative Works: A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a "derivative work". § 101.
(a) Derivative rights include protection both the expected return on investment and the
direction of the investment (Goldstein)
2. Applying the Substantial Similarity Tests (above): Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol
Publishing (2d 1998) [trivia book about television series Seinfeld] INFRINGEMENT
(a) Quantitative and Qualitative Similarity Test
i. Quantitative looks for more than de minimus material
ii. Qualitative similarity  what was borrowed is the protected expression (quotes,
characters) and not just ideas
(b) Ordinary observer test
i. The ordinary person may or may not regard the aesthetic appeal similarly—a book
and a tv show are different but the book cover links itself to the same “pleasures” as
the show
(c) Total concept and feel test
i. Difference in genre or medium does not change total concept
3. Modes of Transformation: what degree of transformation of a work makes it a derivative
work?
(a) Originality requirement?
i. Issue. Mirage and Lee differ on whether a use of the original work must satisfy the
originality requirement for copyrightable derivative works in order to count as an
infringing derivative work. The tension here is because there does not seem to be a
direct link between originality and the amount of reproduction there is.
ii. Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque ART Co. (9th 1988) [Δ transferred copyrighted
reprints of lithographs from a book onto ceramic tiles] INFRINGEMENT
1. Derivative work if “recast, transformed or adapted”; binding to tile is
transformative so it is derivative which means no first sale doctrine =
infringement.
iii. Lee v. ART Co. (7th 1997) [Δ transferred copyrighted art cards onto ceramic
tiles] NO INFRINGEMENT
1. The print was essentially “framed” on the tile; it is not a derivative work and
is protected by first sale (price capture argument)
2. Derivative works are independently copyrightable and this would not be so it
is not derivative work.
iv. Framing: one website placing the contents of another website in a window within
its own page poses similar concerns. (pg 387)
(b) Required Form? Derivative work does not need to be fixed, but it must incorporate a
protected work in some concrete or permanent form.
i. Lewis Galoob v. Nintendo (9th 1992) [Game genie device, which allows users of
Nintendo to add more lives, strength etc] The device does not incorporate protected
work or duplicate any part of the Nintendo game itself. NOT DERIVATIVE
ii. Micro Star v. FormGen (9th 1999) [user-created “levels” for a video game were
downloaded and placed on a CD for sale] In order to run the programs, the “levels”
must incorporate substantial amount s of protected material from the preexisting
work.
D. MORAL RIGHTS—the right to claim authorship and object to any distortion or modification of a work
1. Int’l Moral Rights: The Berne convention requires that moral rights be granted for at least as
long as the authors economic rights. U.S. claims that existing protections grant sufficient
protection to comply.
2. Visual Artists Rights Act (1990). § 106A, § 113(d). Grants Berne-style moral rights to
visual artists, and, in case of visual art works of “recognized stature” the right to prevent
destruction.
(a) To be of “recognized stature”: work must have
i. stature in sense of being viewed as meritorious, and
ii. be recognized as such by experts, other artists, or some cross-section of society.
Martin v. City of Indianapolis (7th 1995) [denies damage award after city destroys
sculpture originally commissioned by the city]
iii. NOTE: isn’t “being viewed as meritorious” a small way around the Bleistein non-
discrimination principle? But this is statutory.
(b) Carter v. Helmsley-Spear (2d 1995) Reverses injunction preventing removal of
sculpture and permanent “installations” in hotel lobby because work for hire, but finds
that would otherwise be protected.
3. Prior to VARA, courts found rights similar to Berne-style moral rights to follow from U.S.
statutory protection. Gilliam v. Amer Broadcasting Comp. (2d 1976) [Reverses denial of
injunction to stop ABC broadcasting heavily edited episode of Monty Python.]
(a) Although U.S. law does not recognize moral rights, as such, because it focuses on the
economic, not personal, rights of authors, the economic incentive of copyright is
incompatible with an inability to protect works against mutilation or misrepresentation
to the public on which authors are financially dependent.
(b) In this case, the contract allows for the creation of a derivative work of one kind (show
made from script) but because the cut show does not resemble the script in the way
specified by the contract, it is a new derivative work that is not authorized.
4. Right of Attribution
(a) § 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not create a cause of action for misrepresentation of
authorship in noncopyrighted works. Dastar Corp v. Twentieth Century Fox (US
2003) [Dastar copied Fox videos that were in the public domain, made minor alterations
and repackaged them as their own series; π alleges § 43 Lanham Act violation for “false
designation of origin”; court finds no violation]
i. Court notes that holding otherwise would be “finding that § 43(a) created a species
of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do”
E. PUBLIC PERFORMANCE/DISPLAY RIGHTS—Originally applied only to live performance of

dramatic works and musical compositions. 1976 act expanded to “literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works.” § 106(4). Sound
recordings are treated separately.
Definitions.
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process
or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible. § 101.
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.
§ 101.
To perform or display a work "publicly" means--

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. § 101.
1. Public display. Supreme Court held that a restaurant owner playing radio to customers is not
pub. perf., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (1975). 1976 Act reversed this: not only is
a radio station engaged in public performance, turning on a TV or playing the radio is a
performance that may be public depending on audience.
(a) Court finds “public” display where space is available to public even if audience is self-
selecting. Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne (3d 1984) [Δ rented viewing rooms in
which a group of people could “rent” and view a movie]
(b) NOTE: Legislative history indicates intent to cover hotels broadcasting into their rooms
which Court analogizes to what is occurring in this case.
(c) NOTE: What about first sale doctrine? If the people rented the video, went to the
room, and played it themselves it would be ok.
2. Limitations on the Public performance and display rights. Even if an activity meets the
definition of a public performance or display, always consider the limitations imposed by:
(a) § 106: Fair use
(b) § 109: First sale doctrine
(c) § 110: Specific exceptions
3. Distance Education Issues: § 110(1) exempts educational use of copyrighted materials (with
some limitations), but limits it to face to face performance ⇒ TEACH act adds § 110(2) which
includes distance learning, with some limitations and requirements
4. Cable and satellite retransmission rights—§ 111. While cable was in its infancy, Supreme
Court held that it did not constitute public performance, because merely enhanced viewer’s
ability to receive transmissions. By time of the 1976 act, however, cable was more pervasive
so Congress solved the problem with permissible use but compulsory licenses. There is no fee
for retransmitting local signals and network programming, because these are out there anyway,
and advertisers take cable viewers into account, but cable companies must carry these signals.
Satellite is dealt with in § 119 (1998) and the SHVIA (1999) which involves compulsory
licenses unless viewers are unable to receive local broadcasts, and a carry one, carry all
requirement (unless company negotiates with individual companies independently of right to
carry with compulsory license).--> check expiration
(a) Note. § 110.5(b) changed the exemptions for restaurants and bars (who could do so
provided used home equipment and no charge or rebroadcast) to revolve only around
the square feet of the location, not any equipment requirements etc. The WTO has
found that this violates TRIPS
5. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002. (supp pg 397)
6. International treatment of public displays and performances. In many countries the right
to communicate a work to the public is divided in to as many as three subcategories (1)
performance in presence of audience, either live or via recording; (2) wireless transmission;
(3) cable or wire transmission. There is debate as to whether U.S. law meets standards
required by Berne
F. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

1. § 115—creates a compulsory license for “covers” of song and statutory royalties
2. § 114—Sound-alikes of a recording (even deliberately imitative) are not violations, but any
direct appropriation (e.g., sampling) is.
(a) § 114(b) gives the owner of copyright in a sound recording the exclusive right to
prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds are remixed or altered. This
creates a bright line rule  get a license or don’t sample. Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films (6th 2005) [Δ sampled π’s music and claimed de minimis use
therefore not infringement]
(b) Π is not required to show that the two works are so similar that a listener would confuse
one for the other. Jarvis v. A&M Records (DNJ 1993) [Δ sampled portions of πs work]
3. Audio Home Recording Act—response to emerging DAT technology; contained three
provisions
(a) Prevention of second-generation copying. Allowed only one copy to be made by
consumer.
(b) Royalty pool. Manufacturers pay a royalty on every machine and tape sold into a pool
to be divided.
(c) Exemption from liability for non-commercial copying.
4. Streaming webcasts over the internet of radio broadcast are not exempt from the rights of
sound recording copyright holders in § 106(6). Bonneville Int’l v. Peters (ED Pa 2001)
5. § 110 limitations. In 1998 Congress passed FIMLA which clarified § 110(5)’s exemption for
public performance using home equipment of publicly available broadcast by, e.g. a bar.
Established bright line rules: below a certain size, any equipment OK provided no charge and
no rebroadcast to public at large; above that size, restrictions on number of speakers etc.
(a) TRIPS. In 2000 WTO ruled that FIMLA violated TRIPS, because conflicted with
“normal exploitation of copyrighted works” and did not in fact carve out exception for a
few special cases only. U.S. has not changed law – probably will be sanctions.
VII. INFRINGEMENT
A. ELEMENTS OF INFRINGMENT.
1. Prima Facie Case of Infringement.—burden on π
(a) π must allege and prove ownership of valid copyright
i. timely registration is prima facie evidence of copyright
(b) π must prove Δ violated an exclusive right under § 106
i. this is most often an issue of determining whether something is a “copy in fact” or
independently created
2. Copying in Fact—may be proven or presumed
(a) Similarity—The degree of similarity between the works
i. if sufficiently similar then access can be assumed.
ii. Similarity does not per se establish access, it is evidence of access that must be
weighed in light of nature of work and other evidence of access. Selle v. Gibb (7th
1984) [π composed a song which was played a few times in Chicago and demo
tapes sent to record studios; later believed Bee Gees infringed his song (but not
lyrics); held, similarity in the absence of other evidence of access is not sufficient]
iii. But see Ty v. GMA below.
(b) Access—Evidence suggesting Δ had access to π’s work (circumstantial evidence)
i. chain of events established between work and access (such as a publisher or record
company)
ii. π’s work is widely disseminated (not “top 100”, see Three Boys)
3. Standard of Review—Given standard of “reasonable access” is very factual, appellate courts
are reluctant to reverse jury verdicts in music cases. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael
Bolton (9th 2001) [song was relatively obscure and the songs are not so similar that access
can be presumed  dubious case of infringement but not so implausible as to overturn jury
verdict]
4. Establishing Independent Creation—short of documentation or temporal impossibility
(Grubb v. KMS Patriots), Δ have to rely on establishing manifest unlikelihood of access (e.g.,
Repp v. Webber—social and geographical differences are enough, or “clean room process” in
software design). Without these “defenses” substantial similarity is enough
(a) Reallocating the burden to the Δ: Ty v. GMA Accessories (7th 1997) access and
copying may be inferred from substantial similarity (and lack of similarity to anything
in public domain), but this inference can be rebutted by Δ disproving access or showing
independent creation. [virtually identical bean bag toys that do not resemble actual
animals creates rebuttable presumption of access]
B. TYPES OF INFRINGEMENT.
1. Direct Infringment strict liability
(a) Although copyright is strict liability, there still must be some element of causation
present. ISPs are more like copy machines than actual makers of copies. Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-line (ND Cal 1995) [Δs were operator of bulletin
board and ISP providing access to board on which a third party placed infringing copies
of Church of Scientology materials]
(b) NOTE: Authorizing illegal copying is not direct infringement. Although §§ 501 and
106 suggest that because copyright owner has exclusive right to copy and authorize
copying, anyone who authorizes a copy is a direct infringer, the leg hist indicates
otherwise. “Authorize” is only there to confirm that contributory infringement is
prohibited.
i. Nimmer—an employee cannot be directly liable for work-required infringing acts
unless employee is permitted to exercise judgment about conduct of activities
(respondeat superior of copyright)
2. Vicarious and Contributory Infringement.
(a) Contributory infringement is designed to target intentional contributions to
infringement. Requires (1) knowledge of the infringement; (2) continued substantial
and material provision of means.
(b) Vicarious infringement is designed to target negligent provision of means. Requires
(1) ability and right to control the infringing conduct; (2) receipt of financial benefit
from the conduct.
i. Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction (9th 1996) [finding contributory and vicarious liability
for promoter of a swap meet where vendors openly sold infringing copies of CDs]
ii. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line (1995) [finding potential
contributory but not vicarious liability for ISP that refused to deny access to user
posting infringing material on an internet bulletin board]
(c) NOTES:
i. Knowledge—knowledge is assumed in Fonovisa and based on actual information
(letter from π) in Netcom.
ii. Materiality/ Substantiality—court uses a “but for” approach to establish material
& substantial contribution. Fonovisa court makes a lot of the idea, cf. Napster, that
the swap meet creates the market for pirated CDs. Netcom court addresses the
relative ease of steps to stop infringement as part of materiality.
iii. Right and Ability to Control—swap meet is not in same position as landlord (i.e.,
ability but no right to control).
iv. Financial Benefit—two approaches
1. direct fee derived
2. enhanced value of service
 court in Fonovisa found financial benefit in daily rental
fee & draw to the auction (value); Netcom did not find
financial benefit in flat monthly fee and no increase in
value of service (though “regulation free” advertising may
now be sufficient). Distinction in court’s interpretation of
“direct” benefit (i.e., whether the payment is contingent on
the permissiveness of infringing). Could swap meet show
that they could fill their spaces with noninfringing users?
(d) NOTE: Device Manufacturers. Sony (U.S. 1984) limits third-party liability by holding
that one cannot be liable simply for providing the means by which infringement takes
place – the reason is to prevent copyright holders from being able to control the market
for any products that may be used to infringe but whose purpose may not be
substantially related to infringement. Device “need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” – even if not actually used for them.
3. On-line Service Providers—Congress reacted to potential for vicarious liability of ISPs in
Netcom by enacting statutory immunity in § 512 of the DMCA (1998)
(a) § 512—Service providers are protected for any transmissions initiated by someone else,
not modified by the ISP, and sent to someone not chosen (except automatically) by the
ISP.
i. extends to “hosting” provided ISP has agent to receive notice of infringement and
takes down any material “known” to be infringing – unless poster protests under
penalty of perjury, and goes to court, “known” means alerted by copyright holder
(good faith reason to believe infringes).
ii. Compliance is voluntary – can just take chances in courts
(b) Congress only intended § 512(a) safe harbor to apply to activities in which the ISP acts
as a conduit. § 512(a) also requires a policy for receiving notice of violations and
terminating violating users. A&M Records v. Napster (ND Cal 2000) [rejecting motion
for summary judgment on § 512 immunity grounds because Napster is not a transmitter
but rather it conveys information permitting connection without itself facilitating or
completing the connection]
(c) Grokster v. MGM (US 2005)
4. Criminal Infringement—after 1976 (1982 for software) Congress enacted criminal penalties
for willful copying of a certain volume or value of works
(a) Term “willfully” requires a showing of “voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty” (no strict liability in criminal context). United States v. Moran (D Neb
1991) [no evidence of “willful” violation when Δ made copies of videotapes he was
lending in order to insure their return]
(b) The criminal penalties for copyright infringement are limited to those outlined by
Congress. The Wire Fraud Act cannot be used to supplement copyright prosecution.
United States v. LaMacchia (D Mass 1994) [student prosecuted under Wire Fraud Act
for running bulletin board permitting users to download copyrighted software]
(c) No Electronic Theft (NET) Act (1997): passed after LaMacchia to extend the
financial gain requirement for criminal copyright violations to encompass any financial
motive, including obtaining other software in return. (but did not include Wire Fraud
Act)
Civil Infringement Remedies
1. Registration.
US authors must register before suing (and foreign authors get benefits from doing so).
2. Owner v. author.
§ 501 defines who is an owner and ⇒ has right to sue. Author may not sue if sold the rights. But a beneficial owner –
sold rights but entitled to ongoing royalties – can sue.
3. Injunctions.
Two-part test for preliminary injunction –(1) irreparable harm if no injunction and (2) likelihood of success on merits,
although it tends to collapse in to single inquiry into likely success on merits, after which irreparable harm will be
presumed.
Some people argue against the ease with which preliminary injunctions can be obtained in copyright cases
compared to other types of case, given that copyright injunctions restrain speech and ⇒ implicate the 1st
amendment.
4. Damages.
§ 504 deals with damages – must prove that people who, e.g., bought from others would otherwise have bought from
you. Can look at infringer’s profits to calculate damages – this leads to battles about extent to which infringer can
deduct overheads from profits and whether owner can recoup other indirect profits made by infringer that it claims
arose from business generated by the infringement.
Statutory damages (§ 504(c)) are a good remedy if it is hard to calculate profits or if there are no profits to speak of –
e.g. a website simply gives away the pirated item.
Attorney’s fees. Fogerty recognized value of defending against copyright suit, so emphasized that attorney’s fees can
be awarded to defendants also, although they are not to be routinely given.
VIII. FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A. STATUTORY ELEMENTS.
1. General limitations on copyright protection found in § § 107- 122 in three categories:
(a) Bright line exceptions (e.g., first sale doctrine—§ 109)
(b) Individual applications (e.g., small business use of TV—§ 110(5)(B))
(c) Fair use (broad principle of exceptions applied by courts—§ 107)
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include--
1. The purpose and character of the use: commercial or non-commercial
2. The nature of the copyrighted work [fiction / creative or fact?]
3. Amount and substantiality of portion used in relation to copyrighted work as a whole
4. The effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above factors.
2. NOTE: leg hist suggests that purpose of § 107 is to codify, not replace, case law
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
1. Courts primarily find fair use when
(a) Productive new use adds something to the market or is to the benefit of he original use
(b) Implied consent (i.e., publication)
2. Burden. When use is non-commercial, burden of proving effect on market falls on π; when
use is commercial, burden to prove no effect falls on Δ. (Sony v. Universal)
3. Theory. Wendy Gordon Fair use should be granted when:
(a) Transfer of use to D is socially desirable
(b) Award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to incentives of copyright owner
(c) Market failure, such as:
i. Market barriers. Transactions costs outweigh the value of the use (e.g. home
copying for personal use)
ii. Externalities. External benefits to public outweigh monetary values generated by
use (and ⇒ price that could be paid for it) (e.g. value of public debate sparked by
controversial biography that uses letters and writings etc. of subject).
iii. Anti-dissemination motives. Case law has generally favored fair use when
copyright owner is seeking to use property right to restrict flow of information
rather than for economic gain.
C. CULTURAL INTERCHANGE—To what extent does a work’s “cultural currency” affect its fair use?
To what extent may a new work capitalize on interest in the original?
1. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises (US 1985) [Nation excerpted portions of Ford’s
memoirs prior to publication by Harper, causing Time to cancel its contract with Harper for
exclusive preview] NOT FAIR USE
(a) Purpose and Character of Use
i. Broadly the purpose was news coverage but the value of the news coverage was in
supplanting right of first publication
ii. Character includes “propriety of user’s conduct”—here the manuscript was stolen
(b) Nature of Copyrighted Work
i. Some of the manuscript is factual, other parts are expression merged with fact
ii. Unpublished work goes against fair use (later amended)
(c) Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used
i. Question is not how much of the infringing work is borrowed but rather how much
of the underlying work is used.
ii. Quantitatively small amount is still significant when it is the “heart” of the work
(d) Effect on Potential Market
i. Caused cancellation of Time contract (precluded market for prepublication
exclusives)
(e) Dissent: this gives too much control to authors, undermining “the robust public debate
essential to an enlightened citizenry”
(f) NOTE: In 1992 Congress enacted legislation clarifying that the unpublished nature of
material does not bar a finding of fair use.
2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (US 1994) [2 Live Crew parodied Roy Orbison’s song “Pretty
Woman” and contended that it was fair use; court of appeals said commercial use is
presumptively unfair, Sup Court granted cert] FAIR USE
i. Question is whether the new work supersedes the original (not fair use) or whether
it is parody/ critique (fair use)
ii. Bliestein non-discrimination says court cannot make merit assessments so how do
we determine parody/ criticism?
1. does this add to the world of ideas?
2. extent to which it transforms previous work
3. First Amendment concerns
i. By nature parodies utilize well known creative works
i. Parody requires “conjuring the essence” of its target
ii. Question should be whether more was taken than necessary for the fair purpose of
the new work.
i. With parody/ criticism you cannot look to market for original work because nobody
licenses criticism and it is supposed to harm the original
ii. Question is whether there may be harm to a derivative work market.
3. New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing (2d 1990) [Δ published a critical biography of L.
Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, including 121 passages quoted from 48
of Hubbard’s work; exclusive licensee in Hubbard’s works sued for infringement and got
permanent injunction against publication from dist ct]  FAIR USE
i. Critical scholarship—listed in § 107
i. Most of the quoted works are factual or informational which tends to support a
finding of fair use
i. Not substantial percentages of work quoted nor use of the “heart” of the work
i. Will not affect market for favorable biography, probably will only increase general
interest in Hubbard
4. Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing (2d 1998) [Δ published trivia book based on
episodes of Seinfeld; π holds copyright in Seinfeld series and sued for infringement; Δ claims
fair use] NOT FAIR USE
i. Commercial use—but real question is whether it supersedes or adds something new
ii. Rejects “critical comment on banality” justification
iii. Minimal changes to dialogue show lack of transformative purpose
i. Fiction which goes against fair use when use is commercial
i. Exact quoting from shows—too much for alleged purpose of critique
i. Undermines market in derivative games, whether or not π intends to enter this
market
(e) NOTE: Court really focuses on the impact of commercial use on the other categories of
consideration (creates semi-presumption against commercial)
5. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News (1st 2000) [Nunez holds copyright in photographs of Miss
Universe Puerto Rico including some nearly nude; local news organization published copies of
the photos in connection with stories about the controversy caused by the photos] FAIR
USE
i. Both commercial and informative
ii. Using photos in a news story with editorial commentary is transformative, not
superseding
i. Photography is creative but model portfolios are informative
ii. Already published so no first publication right problem
i. Copied all but copying all was necessary to the use
i. No evidence of a market in this type of photograph
D. TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE.—works that trade on technical attributes of original
Two Rules of Interoperability:

1. Disassembly of copyrighted code is a fair use of the material if it is the only means of access
to uncopyrighted elements of the code and there is a legitimate reason for seeking such
access.
2. Intermediate infringement of copyrighted materials where the final product does not contain
infringing material is likely to be viewed as fair use.
1. Sega Enterprises v. Accolade (9th 1992) [Δ copied π’s video game source code in order to
reverse engineer it and create compatible games]  FAIR USE
i. Commercial, but not direct capitalization on Sega’s creativity, only using to make
secondary product compatible
i. Although Δ copied both creative and functional aspects of code, the nature of the
code makes it necessary to do so, so less protection is given
i. Copied the whole work but that is necessary for this use
i. This practice would not decrease the market for Sony games (i.e., people would buy
both Sega NFL and a rival game)
ii. Court seems to be suggesting that you can’t use copyright to protect against fair
competition
2. Sony Comp. Entertainment v. Connectix Corp. (9th 2000) [Δ reverse engineered Sony OS to
make Sony games run on PCs]  FAIR USE
i. Commercial but indirect (Sega)
ii. Transformative in expanding use of games and creates new product
i. Necessary to copy to get to unprotected aspects (Sega)
ii. Repeated copying is not relevant—Sega gave protection to a method of
disassembling
i. Copied the whole thing, but the final product contained no infringing code.
i. This is legitimate competition.
(e) Note: EU policy on interoperability. When decompiling is necessary to get at
information necessary for interoperability (functional exchange and interaction) it is
protected.
E. MARKET FAILURE.—alternative theory of fair use— fair use is warranted when there is market
failure that prevents bargaining for the rights held by copyright holders.
1. Rationale. One basis for copyrights is that progress etc. will be stimulated by letting authors
control and sell the rights ⇒ if sale is prevented by market failure, fair use becomes a way
around this problem to prevent undermining copyright.
2. Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios (US 1984) [Sony manufactures Betamax VCRs for use in
home recording; Universal alleges contributory infringement for infringing uses by owners of
VCRs]  FAIR USE
i. Time-shifting use is both non-commercial and a fair use of protected works
(b) Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used
i. Whole work, but this merely changes the time at which the whole work is enjoyed.
(c) Effect on Potential Market
i. Need only show that if the challenged use became widespread, it would affect the
potential market for the work not here because market for official taped programs
still requires VCR and will likely expand audience of programs.
(d) Rule: Manufacturers of copying equipment are not contributorily liable if the product is
capable of being used for substantial non-infringing purposes.
(e) Dissent. Time shifting is not the issue, “library building” is. No public gain in the form
of use of the tapes by person who made it outweighs right of copyright owner to limit
access to work. (weighing rights)
3. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco (2d 1995) [Texaco permits/ encourages scientists to
make copies of articles from journals so they don’t have to buy more subscriptions] NOT
FAIR USE
i. Dominant use is “future retrieval and reference” which supersedes the originals
ii. Although the articles were used for scientific research, Texaco is a commercial
enterprise and ultimately was just trying to save money
iii. Not transformative
iv. Customary practice not relevant given licensing scheme
i. Basically factual  favors fair use
i. Copied entire articles
i. Widespread practice would reduce market for licensed copies.
(e) Dissent. Licensing argument is circular—the licensing market has not developed and
will not do so until the court holds that this is not fair use.
4. Princeton UP v. Michigan Doc. Services (6th 1996) [course packets sold at university
without copyright permissions]  NOT FAIR USE
i. Educational, but the challenged use is commercial copying
ii. No transformation in combining pages with others.
i. Creative weighs against fair use
i. Exceeds 1000 words in “Classroom Guidelines”
ii. Real issue is that professor’s selected the excerpt as the “heart” of the work.
i. Because of commercial use there is a presumption of market loss (Sony)
5. A&M Records v. Napster (9th 2001) [use of peer to peer server to share music files]  NOT
FAIR USE
i. Not transformative simply because of medium
ii. Direct economic benefit is not necessary to establish commercial use—saving
money is an economic benefit
i. Creative works
i. Whole work
i. Even if increased CD sales through sampling, there is still damage to entry into
digital market.
IX. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS
A. DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

1. Universal Studios v. Reimerdes
B. COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT PROTECTION
1. Kelly v. Ariba Soft
X. STATE LAW THEORIES OF PROTECTION
A. Federal Intellectual Property Preemption: An Overview. As the courts have interpreted Art. VI, cl. 2
of the Constitution, federal law can preempt state law in three ways:
1. Expressly. § 301(a) of the copyright act states that it prohibits state law claims concerning
subject matter within the general scope of copyright that “are equivalent to copyright
infringement claims.” This can also be the case with constitutional provisions, but the
Intellectual Property Clause does not expressly preempt state law.
2. Occupation of the field. If a scheme of federal legislation is so pervasive that it effectively
leaves no room for state law to supplement it, or if it falls in an area of dominant federal
interest, state law can be preempted.
3. Conflict preemption. If state law conflicts with the purpose of a federal statutory scheme it
might be preempted.
(a) Note. Express preemption in one aspect of an area of law does not mean federal law
cannot preempt by, e.g. occupation, in other aspects. Whether the Intellectual Property
Clause impliedly preempts state law is an unresolved question.
B. Supreme Court cases on preemption.
1. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO V. STIFFEL CO. (U.S. 1964) Federal patent law preempts state
unfair competition law protecting design of lamp refused a patent from exact copy.
(a) In the same way that a state could not (1) extend the life of a patent or (2) award
protection to an item undeserving of federal patent protection, cannot give protection
that clashes with objectives of federal patent law.
(b) Only valid, non-preempted state concern is consumer confusion, but that could be
solved with labeling requirement.
2. COMPCO CORP. V. DAY-BRITE LIGHTING, INC. (U.S. 1964) Extends Sears to
copyrights. When an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law may not
forbid others to copy that article. Even if particular aspect of a design has acquired
“secondary meaning,” only permissible state action is labeling requirement.
3. GOLDSTEIN V. CA (U.S. 1972) CA law prohibiting copying of sound recordings
unprotected by federal law (because recorded before federal protection kicked in) is not
preempted.
(a) Copyright Clause Objective of the Copyright Clause was to enable national
intellectual property rights but cl. 8 grant of power to Congress was not exclusive..
Because not all works will be of national interest ⇒ interprets copyright clause to enable
national standards where possible but allowing states to add protection to works of
purely local interest. If Congress leaves a category of “writing” entirely alone, not
granting protection but not specifying freedom from restriction, the states are free to act.
In particular, [pre-1976], unpublished works are not one of the specified writings, and
Court is unwilling to say that Constitution requires they are public domain at expense of
power of states to legislate.
(b) Note. Examples of writings left alone would be harder nowadays, when almost all
works fall under the scope of copyright act. Now the only “unattended” works are
unfixed.
(c) Supremacy Clause The evidence suggests that Congressional lack of protection for
sound recordings was not because Congress deemed them unworthy of protection, but
rather never really dawned on them to treat them as a category separate from the
machine that played them.
(d) Sears does not apply, because with patents, Congress engaged in a balancing act
between encouraging innovation with the incentive of protection and encouraging
competition ⇒ set a standard that must be met for protection. Here, the standard is not
at issue: it is the category of “writings” only at stake: Congress left this alone.
(e) Cohen. What is stake in this case is whether there are only two classes of work: (1)
protected by copyright, and (2) public domain; or whether there is a third class (3)
neither protected by Congress nor mandated by Congress as free for use and therefore
subject to state legislation.
(f) Note. Pre-1976 there was no recognition in the copyright act of explicit exclusions from
copyright (ideas, processes etc., from § 102(b)) – the court here had to rely somewhat on
case law to discern the extent of copyrights, and sound recordings had never been
excluded from protection in case law.
4. KEWANEE OIL CO. V. BICRON CORP. (U.S. 1974) State trade secret law is not
preempted by federal patent law.
(a) Copyright Clause Under Goldstein, non-exclusivity when there is no “occupation of
the field” applies to discoveries just as much as writings.
(b) Supremacy Clause The supremacy clause test is whether state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress.”
(c) Trade secret law protects items not suitable for patent protection: the question is
whether this conflicts with the purposes / balancing act of patent law. No conflict with
incentive to invent: just a different kind of protection. No conflict either with disclosure
and enabling competition.
(d) Dissent. This conflicts with holding of Sears that every item not protected by a patent is
in the public domain ⇒ states may not forbid others to copy it.
(e) Cohen. The significance of this case is that it appears to create yet a fourth category,
which allows the states to protect works that would otherwise be in the public domain
(and not in the unattended category) because they could obtain a patent but have not, but
(a) the boundary of the category and the public domain is permeable – the protections
are limited to works protected in a certain way by the firms (i.e. kept secret) – which
mitigates the intrusion of trade secrets into the public domain and vice versa, and (b) the
protections must be in line with the purposes of federal law, which in this case is
satisfied by the Court’s belief that no one would ever rely on trade secret law when a
patent could be obtained.
Copyright / patent
Sears /
Compco
Public domain
Kewanee
Trade secret / labeling laws
Goldstein
Unattended: “unfixed”
BONITO BOATS, INC. V. THUNDER CRAFT BOATS, INC. (U.S. 1989)

 FL law forbidding direct molding copy of boat hull design is preempted by federal patent law
according to Sears and Compco, because it is patent-like protection forbidden for items unprotected
by federal law - prohibits reverse engineering of product in public domain.
 Unless the subject matter is unattended (which there is very little of post-1976), a state may
prohibit particular unethical or unfair practices (labeling, trade secrets etc.) but it may not prohibit
copying per se. [There does not seem to be anything particularly unethical about direct molding as a
method of copying.]
 The law cannot be justified as targeting unfair competition because that protects consumers
not manufacturers.
2. Express preemption under the 1976 act: in force from 1/1/78.
a. Extends federal law to cover unpublished works. States may extend copyright protection only to
unfixed works such as performances. The policy reasons for this are:
i. National uniformity (as mentioned by Madison)
ii. Prior limit of federal scope to published works increasingly meaningless
iii. Stricter enforcement of limited times: allows access to unpublished works after time
iv. Aids international compliance
b. Preempts any state law that is “copyright like.” Preempts protection for works that would be
copyrightable but for a lack of originality or has fallen into the public domain.
i. Two Prong Test. Preemption if:
1. General scope requirement. State law claim seeks to vindicate legal or equitable rights
equivalent to one of the bundle of rights protected under § 106.
2. Subject-matter requirement. The work to which state law claim is applied falls within type of
works protected under §§ 102 & 103.
NBA v. Motorola
Note: Legislative History on permissible state legislation. The original legislative history listing
permissible state regulation was removed, but not repudiated, after Justice department objections,
especially to misappropriation laws ⇒ not helpful. Originally it allowed states to protect works only if:
i. Subject matter does not come within subject matter of copyright
ii. The state cause of action arose before 1/1/78
iii. Violations of rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights of copyright
E.g. Purely contractual claim, even though the contract dealt with copyrights. But it does
prohibit enforcement of contracts that are themselves merely the equivalent of copyright
protection.
E.g. Misappropriation is permitted as a state law claim if it deals with, e.g. stealing information
as in INS v. AP, but not if it means copyright violation.
3. Commerce clause power. Congress has extended sui generis protection to items, such as boat hulls, that are
not protected by the Copyright clause. This cannot be justified by that clause, obviously, suggesting that it is
commerce clause power. Likewise, protection of trademarks, that the Supreme Court found unprotectable
under the Copyright clause, must be warranted by the commerce clause.
a. Interaction of clauses and their limits. Many scholars suggest, however, that the various clauses limit
each other, so if the copyright clause limits Congressional power to protecting certain kinds of works, the
commerce clause may not be invoked to protect other works. The only indication by the courts of sympathy
for this “implied limits” argument, was an allowance in U.S. v. Moghadam that had the issue been raised, it
may have been found that the limited times provision of the copyright clause rendered unconstitutional a
permanent ban on bootlegging concerts enacted under commerce clause powers.
B. Straightforward preemption cases.
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. V. NATION ENTERPRISES (2d Cir. 1983)
Facts as above
 State conversion claim by P preempted because no conversion in simply unauthorized borrowing,

and returning, manuscript.
 As such, conversion claim is alleging taking the information ⇒ equivalent to state copyright claim.
DIELSI V. FALK (CD Cal 1996)

 P alleges that D based TV show on his submitted script.
 Conversion and negligence claims preempted because allege same elements as copyright
infringement: taking the information without permission.
 But fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims not preempted because P adds to taking
information claim the allegation that D fraudulently promised not to violate P’s authorship rights.
C. Misappropriation. One of the more controversial elements of the House Report on permissible state regulation.
INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOC. PRESS (U.S. 1918)

 The value of news is its freshness, and there must be some financial incentive to collect it.
 ⇒ Rival companies may have rights against each other, independently of any rights they may have
against the public.
 Dissent: Brandeis. The fact that the news costs money, time etc. is not enough to make it property,
especially in light of the traditional rule that knowledge and facts are common property.
Note. This rule of this case could be generalized to suggest in right of publicity cases that, e.g. the
right of fair use, parody etc. might be limited in case of direct competition, so Saturday Night Live
could parody a star in a sitcom on CBS who is a “cultural icon” (in Kosinski’s terms), but an NBC
sitcom might not be able to have a character based on the rival character even if it claims it to be
parody / fair use because of the iconic status.
NBA V. MOTOROLA, INC. (2d Cir. 1997)

 Copyright law preempts state misappropriation claim over “SportsTrax” pager.
Subject-matter requirement
 Rejects NBA claim of “partial preemption”: i.e. even though the broadcasts from which facts
gleaned are copyrightable, the underlying facts are not ⇒ no merely because the underlying facts are
basis of the claim. Distinction between facts and expression does not matter for preemption purposes:
Motorola gets information from copyrightable broadcasts: the facts are fixed in this medium.
Note. The other circuits seem largely to be accepting this rejection of partial preemption.
Scope requirement
 Courts agree that some variety of “hot news” claims are not preempted after INS, but this is a narrow
exception.
 Contra Metropolitan Opera, hot news misappropriation is not exempted if based merely on social
ethics of taking information: it applies only when there is:
(1) information gathered at time and expense,
(2) the value is time sensitive, and
(3) free-riding
(4) which would seriously undermine incentive to gather.
Cohen. Note that these elements seem to overlap to some extent with those in a copyright
claim.
(1) “time and expense requirement seems to mirror the “fixation” / “creation” requirement
that separates expressions from mere ideas
(3) free-riding requirement seems to mirror copying
Even threat to incentives seems to overlap somewhat with the purposes of copyright law.
Cf. Blue book / red book case seems to have all these elements except time sensitivity.
Probably preempted.
 Here only competition is with the pager service, not the playing or broadcasting, and Motorola fairly
competes with NBA’s own pager service: it would be different if Motorola did not gather facts from
broadcasts but somehow reproduced from NBA pager service.
Note. Federal database protection. Non-time sensitive databases would seem to be left without
non-preempted misappropriation protection under the Motorola rule. Proposed legislation protects
information in database from substantial unauthorized distribution (or extraction for that purpose)
with several exceptions including: non-profit, science, education; insubstantial parts or amounts of
information; independent gathering of same information; news reporting; or selling lawfully made
copy.
Cohen on incentive claims. Should it be enough for a copyright owner to simply ask rhetorically “If people
can use the information I collect, why would I bother?” or should there be some showing that would actually go
out of business? [Or maybe even some showing that no one would perform the same service?]
D. Contract. Again, complicated because of deletion of House Report.
1. Individualized contracts. These are straightforward: breach of contract is not preempted when the breach
refers not only to an act protected by the copyright act, but a breach of an agreement not to do so – e.g. licensing
agreement. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. (8th Cir. 1993). The
point is that if the breach of copyright law happens to be the behavior prohibited under the contract, then there
is no preemption.
2. Standard form contracts.

Cf. here, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus from above: court ruled that early version of “shrink-wrap” agreement to
not resell book for less than $1 interfered with first purchase rights.
ASK—whether the contract restriction is doing something that is normally restricted to copyright.
VAULT CORP. V. QUAID SOFTWARE LTD. (5th Cir. 1988)

 Affirms denial of injunction because no likely success on copyright claim, and state contract
claim is preempted.
 P claims breach of shrink-wrap licensing agreement when D made copies of software in
order to reverse engineer it [which is protected under copyright law]. Because “contract of
adhesion,” (standard contract not really agreed to on individual basis) only valid if state statute is
valid.
 State law permitting software maker to include license in box prohibiting any copying or
alteration of the software (including disassembly, reverse engineering etc.) is preempted because
conflicts with Copyright act on several grounds:
o Permanent bar to copying, while copyright act is limited
o § 117 permits copies for archival purposes
PROCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG (7th Cir. 1996)—Easterbrook

 Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable.
 Disagrees with both rationales of district court for denying enforceability:
o District Court: No contract because license is inside the box, not printed on outside.
But nowadays software is not always distributed in box: when downloaded, for example, the
district court’s reasoning would not permit any license at all.
o District Court: Even if there is a contract, state law permitting this is preempted
because software is fixed ⇒ subject for copyright.
But No preemption just because contract deals with copyrighted material: in that case video
store contract to return tape in two days would be unenforceable because dealt with video, as
would student’s agreement with LEXIS not to use for work purposes.
Also copyright is right against the world: these contracts only affect purchasers: someone
who found the CD on the street would not be bound by license.
Note. Would this be true if the person finding it had to click “I agree” before using
software?
Note: state action doctrine. To argue that state enforcement of private shrink-wrap
agreements is impliedly preempted, would have to rely on expansive, Shelley v. Kramer,
understanding of state action.
a. Form contracts and trade secrets. Individual non-disclosure contracts are not preempted simply
because they deal with secrets about copyrighted material; the difficulties arise when form contracts are
used to shield information from the general public.
The problem is that trade secrets by definition must be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy and not be readily ascertainable through proper means, such as reverse engineering. With software
this is a problem because companies try to keep the source code secret by only distributing the object code,
but this can be reverse engineered to get at the source code: is this reasonable secrecy and not ascertainable
by proper means?
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson, Co. (4th Cir. 1993).

 Reasonable secrecy when distributed object code only to two parties both of whom agreed
not copy code or use for any other purpose than particular project ⇒ some secrecy ensured for
the source and object code.
 But notes that in case of general distribution of object code, cannot claim secrecy for it.
Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman (SDNY 1985).

 Secrecy when wider distribution but disks copy protected to could not be copied in such a
way as to get at the source code.
Courts have not tested a case involving mass marketed software, such as Windows, but CONTU
suggested that mass marketed software would not be open to trade secret protection.
The main question is whether contracts can get around patent law under the Bonito Boats preemption
standard, which can protect software, or fair use under copyrights given permissibility of decompiling
(See Sega v. Accolade; Sony v. Connectix).
b. Note: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). Designed to be a UCC type
model code for transactions in computer information, but only adopted by a few states: tries to codify
“manifesting assent” to contract, but does not really deal with preemption issue.
c. Note: Fair use, preemption, and cyberspace. Some, especially those whose fair use as a solution for
market failure, see the development of low cost individual and specific licensing on the internet as the end
of fair use except perhaps in case of some users who are deemed as allowed access for free.
Cohen. This argument is based on false assumption that there is a direct and linear connection
between market value and incentives, which sees monetary value as the sole measure of copyright’s ability
to induce progress. It is also circular because it assumes that the author has a right to all possible and
potential revenues. In fact, the creative transformations that are supposed to spring from fair use may well
require lengthy access and reuse of the same work, and may come from the poor as well as the rich.
Question. Should there be any limitations on contract-based access to information etc.? if so, where
exactly do we draw the line?
F. Copyright Misuse. Courts can refuse to enforce copyrights when it is found that the owner has engaged in
certain kinds of misconduct, particularly in restrictive licensing. The copyright is unenforceable until the owner has
purged itself of misuse.
ALCATEL USA, INC. V. DGI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (5th Cir. 1999)

 Court refused to find violation when D copied software (prohibited by license) in order to reverse
engineer and produce product compatible with software.
 Misconduct because license was too restrictive: copyrights used to gain indirectly gain
commercial control over products P does not have copyrighted – the equipment that it was used with
and which D wanted to produce rival for.
1. Licenses that exceed the time period of copyright protection.
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds (4th Cir. 1990)

 Established misuse defense when D had agreed to, but violated, license requiring 99-year
agreement to refrain from developing competitive software.
 Violation because P used license to achieve purpose adverse to that of copyright law.
Brulotte v. Thys Co. (U.S. 1964)

 “A patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the
patent is unlawful per se.”
But see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co (U.S. 1979)
 Contract to pay royalties to manufacture a soon-to-be patented keyholder with lower
payments if patent refused was valid after patent was in fact refused, because there was no
prevention of copying in general: the royalty agreement provided compensation in return for the
right to preempt the general market.
Note. Presumably the exception for this case is based on fact that longer royalty agreement is not
strictly speaking royalties for the use of keyholder design, but payment for right to beat the
market.
Note: misuse and ProCD. Hard to establish misuse because no monopoly on facts contained in
database.
Note. The relationship between misuse of copyright and antitrust law. Antitrust law may still be
needed for powerful IP companies, because misuse does not cover all anti-competitive behavior. For
example, it is not misuse to refuse to license a patent in the first place. An unresolved question,
although impacted by Microsoft, is whether the doctrine of “essential facilities” which has been used to
allow telephone companies access to competitors’ phone lines etc., can be applied to copyrights –
particularly software. The problem with this application is the ready substitutability of most software
products – even Windows has rivals; their lack of success has to do with Microsoft’s popularity rather
than any structural obstacles to entering the market (assuming no unfair practices).
Conclusion on preemption. The law is in flux. Can see from ProCD that courts are sympathetic to some private
contractual protection that is not preempted, which is probably a good thing, but at the same time, question is
whether anything can be contracted to, especially with self-enforcing viral-contracts which forbid something like
reverse engineering which is protected by copyright law.
Note. What to watch out for with preemption.
 Is there a claim over and above intellectual property infringement?
 Is the property in question physical (no preemption) or intangible IP (preemption)?
 Do the elements of the claim make reference to the fact that it is IP in particular?
State claim Preempted? Why?

Unjust enrichment: retaining Yes Claim is that D is exercising rights owned by P
master recordings under copyright act
belonging to P and
exploiting them for
own benefit
Unjust enrichment: improper No Claim is that D is keeping money not entitled to
management of IP, (fact that money is royalties is not an
failing to account for element of the claim)
royalties
Conversion: retaining master No Claim is conversion of physical property, not
recordings belonging to intangible property
P
Unfair competition: false No Claim is false representation (what it is about is not
representation to P’s an element of the claim)
customers that D’s
software will perform
same function as P’s
Unfair competition: true Yes The claim here is that D copied the software:
representation to P’s otherwise not really unfair competition to
customers that D’s offer a competing product
software will perform
same function as P’s
Misappropriation of trade No Claim is that D had a state law duty not to obtain
secrets: D hired P’s known trade secrets from former employees
employees and
acquired trade secrets
P sues D for breach of No Claim here is breach of fiduciary duty in selling
fiduciary duty by company stock too cheaply: although the
selling under counter copyright issue may arise to decide whether
joint company’s it was company owned or not, the fact that it
software. D claims is IP is not an element in the claim
sole author ⇒ P’s claim
preempted by
copyright act defining
joint authorship

Another Law School Course Outline Brought To You by

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Another Law School Course Outline Brought To You by

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Another Law School Course Outline Brought To You by

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What are the main elements of copyrightable subject matter?

What are the main elements of copyrightable subject matter?

What are some examples of works that are considered 'fixed' for copyright purposes?

What are some examples of works that are considered 'fixed' for copyright purposes?

Another law school course outline brought to you by:

The Internet Legal Research Group http://www.ilrg.com

THIS OUTLINE IS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS LOCATED AT:

USAGE NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER:

II. ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

B. ORIGINALITY—§ 102(a) extends copyright to “original works of authorship”

C. IDEA/EXPRESSION DISTINCTION—§ 102(b)— “In no case does copyright protection for an

 Easterbrook’s Variations Approach—

E. COMPILATIONS—A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting

Three Tiers of Originality:

C. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE—

Significance of “made for hire” classification—

IV. FORMALITIES (for duration calculations see DURATION CHARTS)

A. Copyright Act of 1790—Formal Requirements

Significance of publication date for pre-1978 works:

2. A general publication occurs when:

C. DURATION (see Duration Charts)

Three waves of judicial software analysis

1. Text vs. Machine?

C. CHARACTERS—are characters of protected works ideas or expressions?

VI. STATUTORY RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS

§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works

B. DISTRIBUTION RIGHT—§ 106—allows suit against distributors of unauthorized copies

E. PUBLIC PERFORMANCE/DISPLAY RIGHTS—Originally applied only to live performance of

To perform or display a work "publicly" means--

F. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

Civil Infringement Remedies

VIII. FAIR USE DOCTRINE

§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use

D. TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE.—works that trade on technical attributes of original

Two Rules of Interoperability:

IX. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS

A. DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

X. STATE LAW THEORIES OF PROTECTION

BONITO BOATS, INC. V. THUNDER CRAFT BOATS, INC. (U.S. 1989)

i. Two Prong Test. Preemption if:

B. Straightforward preemption cases.

 State conversion claim by P preempted because no conversion in simply unauthorized borrowing,

DIELSI V. FALK (CD Cal 1996)

INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOC. PRESS (U.S. 1918)

NBA V. MOTOROLA, INC. (2d Cir. 1997)

D. Contract. Again, complicated because of deletion of House Report.

2. Standard form contracts.

VAULT CORP. V. QUAID SOFTWARE LTD. (5th Cir. 1988)

PROCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG (7th Cir. 1996)—Easterbrook

Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson, Co. (4th Cir. 1993).

Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman (SDNY 1985).

ALCATEL USA, INC. V. DGI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (5th Cir. 1999)

1. Licenses that exceed the time period of copyright protection.

Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds (4th Cir. 1990)

Brulotte v. Thys Co. (U.S. 1964)

But see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co (U.S. 1979)

State claim Preempted? Why?

You might also like