Barsabal, Rizel C. - Lauritzen vs. Larsen
Barsabal, Rizel C. - Lauritzen vs. Larsen
Barsabal, Rizel C. - Lauritzen vs. Larsen
Lauritzen v. Larsen
Facts: While temporarily in New York, Larsen (plaintiff), a Danish seaman, signed documents to
join the crew of the Randa, a Danish ship. The Randa was owned by Lauritzen (defendant), a
Danish citizen. The documents that Larsen signed provided that any injury sustained aboard
would be governed by Danish law as well as Lauritzen’s contract with the Danish Seamen’s
Union, of which Larsen was a member. While the Randa was in Cuban waters, Larsen was
injured aboard. Larsen filed suit in federal district court in New York under the Jones Act, a
United States law that protected seamen who suffer personal injury during a voyage. Lauritzen
argued that Larsen had already received all compensation available under Danish law. Larsen
argued that Lauritzen’s business with the United States served as a legitimate basis for the
court’s jurisdiction over the dispute. The district court agreed and issued a judgment against
Lauritzen. Lauritzen appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review.
Issue: Whether the Danish Law or the US Law shall apply in claiming damages?
Law of the Flag- Each state under international law may determine for itself the conditions on
which it will grant its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and
acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship’s papers and its flag.
Law of the flag supersedes the territorial principle (even for criminal jurisdiction of personnel of
a merchant ship), because it is deemed to be a part of the territory of that sovereignty (whose flag
it flies), and not to lose that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits of
another sovereignty. All matters of discipline and all things done on board which affected only
the vessel or those belonging to it, and do not involve the peace or dignity of the country or the
port’s tranquility, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the
nation to which the vessel belongs as the laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce
requires.
Also, allowance of an additional remedy under the Jones Act would conflict sharply with the
policy and letter of Danish law. By usage as old as the Nation, shipping laws of the United States
written in all-inclusive general terms have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions
in which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international
law. The locality test affords no support for the application of American law in this case, since
the injury occurred on a Danish ship in Cuban waters. The seaman's presence in New York was
transitory, and created no such national interest in, or duty toward, him as to justify application
of the Jones Act. The utmost liberality in disregarding the formality of a ship's registration in a
country other than that of the allegiance of its owner does not support application of American
law in this case. That the contract of employment was made in New York does not require a
different result, since the place of contract is not a substantial influence in the choice between
competing laws to govern a maritime tort, and the contract itself validly provided for application
of Danish law. Justice does not require adjudication of this case under American law to save this
seaman expense and loss of time in returning to a foreign forum. That an American forum has
perfected its jurisdiction over the parties and that the defendant does frequent and regular
business in the forum state does not justify application of the law of the forum in this case.