INFANTRY IN BATTLE

From Somalia to the Global War on Terror

I love the infantrymen because they are the underdogs.

They are the mud-rain-and-wind boys. They have no comforts,
and they learn to live without necessities. And in the end, they
are the guys that wars can’t be won without.
Ernie Pyle
New York World Telegram
5 May 1943

August 2005
 CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
INTRODUCTION ................................................. iii
EDITOR‘S NOTES .................................................v
1. LEADERSHIP .........................................................1
2. INITIATIVE ..........................................................23
3. ADAPTABILITY ..................................................35
4. USING TERRAIN .................................................65
5. RECONNAISSANCE..........................................109
6. COMBINED ARMS ............................................129
7. MUTUAL SUPPORT ..........................................163
8. MARKSMANSHIP .............................................183
9. SECURITY ..........................................................193
10. REPORTING .......................................................217
11. PATROLLING ....................................................227
12. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ..............................233
13. CASUALTIES .....................................................247
14. CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS ........................257
15. U.S. ARMY VALUES .........................................279
16. CONCLUSION ....................................................317
GLOSSARY ........................................................321
INDEX .................................................................325

i
 INTRODUCTION
In 1934, then-Colonel George C. Marshall commissioned
Infantry in Battle to ―check the ideas acquired from peacetime
instruction against the experience of battle.‖ In his
introduction, Marshall wrote: ―there is much evidence to show
that officers who have received the best peacetime training
available find themselves surprised and confused by the
difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and
those they encounter in campaign…In our schools, we
generally assume that the organizations are well-trained and at
full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply
arrangements function, that communications work, that orders
are carried out. In war, many or all of these conditions may be
absent.‖ Today, in 2005, we find that Marshall‘s observations,
recorded pre-WWII, are still true and relevant.
At the time that the original Infantry in Battle was written,
the face of war was in the midst of a transformation—from
WWI trench warfare to maneuver warfare, enabled by armor
and air support. The technology of the day added another
dimension to the battlefield; thus, leaders had to adjust their
thinking to incorporate these new technologies. Today, the
Army finds itself, again, transforming to incorporate new
technologies, certainly, but also to defeat a different type of
enemy—the asymmetric threat. Our enemy is less predictable
and less visible than in the past, and, thus, the lessons of those
who have faced this threat become critical to those who will.
Today‘s Army faces challenges that Marshall‘s Army did
not. The Army of 1934 studied tactics and trained in
preparation for the conventional war that would come in the
next decade, and this study and training held its leaders in good
stead. What the Army of 1934 did not have to consider was the
wide range of tasks and the relative reduction in time and space
iii
that our Soldiers face today. As we fight the Global War on
Terror, our leaders must be able to deploy anywhere in the
world on short notice to conduct operations, ranging from
Stability and Support to major combat operations and back
again. This requirement for agility and adaptability necessitates
that we turn to the experiences of those who have faced these
challenges—in Somalia, Kosovo and Macedonia, Afghanistan,
and Iraq—to guide us and assist in ensuring our success.
As in 1934, we have drawn information from the personal
experience monographs on file at the Infantry School;
however, we have also included first-hand accounts of actions
published in Infantry Magazine and other professional journals,
input from the field, and information from personal interviews.
Unlike the original, which limited its discussion to operations
during WWI, this edition covers a broad variety of conditions,
including operations in Kosovo, Macedonia, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, to account for the range of challenges
faced by today‘s Infantry leaders.
According to Marshall‘s introduction in the original book,
―(t)he aim of its authors has been to develop fully and
emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated
by concrete cases rather than to produce just another book of
abstract theory.‖ It educated leaders who triumphed against the
threats of the 20th Century. Our hope is that we can do the same
for our leaders facing the threats of the 21st Century.

Benjamin C. Freakley
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia
May 15, 2005

iv
 EDITOR’S NOTE
Twenty years ago, the Infantry School restarted the monograph
program that had languished after WWII. I was fortunate to be able
to assist the writers as they came to the Infantry Officer Advanced
Course, later known as the Infantry Captain‘s Career Course, and it
is from these monographs that most of the vignettes come.
Therefore, I would first like to thank those officers who captured
their operational experience so others could learn from them. Thanks
also to Judith Sasser who assisted in this effort in more ways than I
can count.
The discussions for each of the vignettes were composed by
some of the smartest men I know, the Infantry School‘s Tactics
Small Group Instructors, in particular LTC Nigel D. Smith, MAJ
Chad Q. Christman, MAJ Nicholas E. Davis, MAJ Geoffrey D.
Greene, MAJ Darren K. Jennings, MAJ Michael G. Knowlton, MAJ
Nelson G. Kraft, MAJ Campbell W. Paine, MAJ Paul J. Salmon,
MAJ Stephen P. Talbott, MAJ Samuel J. Welch, CPT Gregory A.
Cannata, CPT Dominick L. Edwards, CPT George C. Hackler, CPT
Eric M. Hiu, CPT Thomas J. McCarron, CPT James T. McGahey,
CPT Clifton B. Trout, CPT William D. Voorhies, CPT Stephen
Wargo, CPT Joshua D. Wright, and CPT Daniel R. Miller.
COL Edmund W. Woolfolk Jr., COL (ret.) Frank J. Stone, LTC
John D. Harding, LTC James G. Riley, CSM Kevin T. Dalley, and
1SG (ret.) Gary Connor were an integral part of this project,
providing oversight, feedback, and support.
Finally, thanks to MG Benjamin Freakley—who commissioned
this work.

Joanie Horton
Editor

v
 CHAPTER 1: Leadership
The moral equilibrium of the man is tremendously
affected by an outward calmness on the part of the
leader. The soldier‘s nerves, taut from anxiety of what
lies ahead, will be soothed and healed if the leader sets
an example of coolness. Bewildered by the noise and
confusion of battle, the man feels instinctively that the
situation cannot be so dangerous as it appears if he sees
that his leader remains unaffected, that his orders are
given clearly and deliberately, and that his tactics show
decision and judgment…But if the leader reveals
himself irresolute and confused, then, more even than if
he shows personal fear, the infection spreads instantly
to his men.
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

INTRODUCTION: When one considers the combat power the

Infantry brings to the fight, the fundamental element of that
combat power is Leadership. The other elements—Maneuver,
Protection, Firepower, and Information—are assets brought to
bear through effective leadership. While leadership may be
difficult to codify—why else would the sheer number of books
be devoted to the topic—the Army defines it as ―influencing
people, by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.‖ The
combat leader, from the individual Soldier to the commanding
general, brings his values and attributes; becomes a master at
his skills; and then acts to influence, operate, and improve his
unit. Leadership qualities are born from tough, realistic training
and honed by experience. The study of the profession of arms

1
Infantry in Battle
and of leaders of the past provides the foundation from which
great leaders can begin to develop.

On 5 April 2003, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

for TF 1-30, 3rd ID, received the order for the TF to attack
north toward Baghdad.

The following morning, we began our attack. The initial leg

of the drive took several hours and was uneventful, but before
we knew it, we were on the outskirts of Baghdad, crossing the
Euphrates River, and driving straight down the middle of a
six-lane western interstate-style hardball road, heading into
Baghdad. Artillery was landing nearby, destroyed civilian
vehicles were strewn across the landscape, and here we were
driving down the road as if we were going to the mall back
home in Columbus, Georgia. We were actually reading the
green road signs (which were in English) and using them to
help guide us onto the proper exits off the interstate.
The tank company was traveling at the front of our Task
Force formation, as was always the case. It was periodically
calling in spot reports during movements. Suddenly, a report
we had not received before came across the radio, ―enemy
tanks to our front.‖ The order was given to close with and
destroy them. This brought our Task Force convoy to a halt in
the middle of the six-lane interstate around Baghdad. As the
tank company continued to engage and destroy the enemy
tanks in the front, we pulled security as best as possible. We
herringboned our vehicles, dismounted, and assumed security
positions. I was the fourth vehicle back from the front of my
approximately 20-vehicle TOC convoy, and we were at the tail
end of the Task Force convoy. About five vehicles behind me
was a standard highway overpass, and some of the vehicles
from my section were under it, using it as overhead cover. To

2
 Chapter 1, Leadership
my front, there was another overpass under which sat the lead
vehicle of my TOC convoy. I noticed that to the right side of
the hardball where we sat, there was a concrete wall dividing
the two directions of traffic, approximately 6-10 feet high. On
the shoulder of the road to our left was a steep ditch about 4-6
feet in depth. On the far side of that ditch was a small two-lane
dirt road running in front of some houses. Unbelievably, there
were civilians sitting in the yards and on top of cars along the
streets, just watching us. About the time I received the Tank
Company Commander‘s report over my radio that the enemy
tanks to our front had been destroyed, my head suddenly felt
numb, and it seemed like everything around us had turned
instantly white. A split second later, I felt a blast of air get
sucked out of me with a deep rumbling crack. We were taking
indirect fire.
Immediately, I realized we were in a textbook kill zone for
an enemy ambush, canalized on all sides by existing obstacles.
There were potential enemy observers all around to call for and
adjust indirect fires. I radioed a report to my Task Force
Commander, who was trying to continue developing the
situation to our front with the Tank Company; the TF
Commander acknowledged but gave no guidance. I radioed the
commander of the vehicle at the front of my convoy, telling
him to move out immediately, but he did not. The vehicle was
tucked nicely under the overpass ahead, and he was not willing
to move out from his cover while under indirect fire. I then
radioed the commander of the vehicle directly to my front,
telling him to move out and go around the two vehicles to his
front. He did not. I told my driver (I was in an M577) if they
were not going to move, then we would. I turned to my rear,
gave the old Infantry ―follow me‖ hand and arm signal, and
started carefully weaving a path between the vehicles to our
front. As far as I knew, the battle drill for receiving indirect fire

3
Infantry in Battle
was still to move out smartly in a designated distance and
direction, and that was just what I was going to do.
I watched as the vehicles behind me were quickly loaded
up. Finally, the second vehicle from the front of our convoy
began to move. I radioed to the commander of that vehicle and
told him to cross the ditch on our left, get onto the dirt road on
the far side, and move north. To my amazement, I watched as
the vehicle turned at a ninety degree angle, headed straight
down into the ditch, and hit with a thud; it was stuck.
Meanwhile, indirect fires continued to rain down around us. I
watched as Soldiers poured from the stuck vehicle, like bees
leaving a hive; they were franticly looking for a vehicle to get
into, and people were not allowing them in. I couldn‘t believe
it! I ordered my driver to go get them; and he did just that,
loading all six into the back of my M577.
I radioed a spot report to the Task Force Commander, again
reporting the loss of the vehicle and the actions we were taking.
I ordered my driver to cross the ditch, and he found a fordable
spot and crossed at a proper angle. We immediately began
moving down the side street out of the kill zone. I turned and
watched to ensure all vehicles followed us, and they did; they
all crossed at the site where we had crossed. We maneuvered to
the location where the tanks had just recently been destroyed
by our tank company and established a secure perimeter to
regain accountability.
Fortunately, for us, we had sustained minimal damage to
our vehicles; the vehicle stuck in the ditch was recovered by
our maintenance team, as the team approached from our rear.
No serious injuries had been sustained. The convoy was secure
and prepared to resume the mission.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Martin

Jeremy Bowling, who served as an assistant S-3, TF 1-30, 3d

4
 Chapter 1, Leadership
Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This example exhibits both good leadership

and, conversely, a TOC that is focused on administrative
training, rather than battle focused training.
The most dynamic element of combat power is leadership.
The assistant S-3 in TF 1-30 exhibited the very essence of
leadership by understanding the situation and conducting a
react to indirect contact battle drill. He assessed the situation
by analyzing the terrain and then determining how the enemy
would use the terrain. Leaders must quickly develop the
situation, and then they must have an appropriate reaction. In
this example, the assistant S-3 went back to his battle drill—
react to indirect fire. He made a decision and directed his
Soldiers to follow him. He exhibited outstanding leadership in
the face of adversity and reacted with an appropriate response
to ensure his unit‘s protection and security.
The TOC had focused its preparation on its C2—command
and control—role and not on its Warrior battle drills. Many
times, TOCs prepare, plan, and execute outstanding battle
focused training for their subordinate units, but they forget to
incorporate the same for the TOC. The TOC must rehearse the
react to contact battle drill as a part of its assigned mission
essential task list (METL), under a variety of conditions.
Individuals manning TOCs must stay abreast of their own force
protection while continuing to do outstanding work for their
units.

On 7 April 2003, TF 3-15, 3d ID, departed to seize three

key intersections along Highway 8—a four-lane highway
with concrete dividers—to secure the MSR for 2d Brigade’s
operations in Baghdad. Team Alpha (Alpha Company)

5
Infantry in Battle
would seize “Moe,” in the north; Team Bravo would seize
“Larry,” in the middle; and Bravo Company would seize
“Curly,” in the south.

The morning of 07 April, after a sleepless night, the

Support Platoon conducted refuel operations, topping off all
the combat vehicles in the Task Force and then refilling our
own fuel trucks. To date, we had not conducted any resupply of
ammunition. Each vehicle in the Task Force was loaded with

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 Chapter 1, Leadership
almost twice the combat load of ammunition normally carried.
Even with the firefight the night prior, Team Alpha had only
expended a small fraction of its ammunition.
I had ten cargo HEMMTs, five fuelers, my Platoon
Sergeant, and me lined up on Highway 8, facing north
approximately 250 meters from the Brigade TOC. My
HMMWV was the lead vehicle, and my Platoon Sergeant‘s
HMMWV was the trail vehicle. Objectives Larry, Moe, and
Curly were approximately 15 kilometers north of our position.
The buildings were hampering our FM communications with
the three companies, so CPT Bailey (S-4) pushed the combat
trains approximately eight kilometers further north, so he could
communicate with the Task Force Executive Officer (XO),
MAJ Knapp, who was located on Objective Curly. The Task
Force Commander, LTC Stephan Twitty, was on Objective
Larry. From what little radio traffic I could pick up, I could tell
all three companies were in contact with enemy fighters on
each of their objectives. I also knew it would not be long
before the tanks would need fuel, and it sounded like the
Mortar Platoon on Objective Curly was expending a large
amount of high explosive (HE) rounds and would probably
need a resupply of ammunition. I traveled to each vehicle in
my platoon with a crew-served weapon and instructed the
Soldier manning that weapon system to mentally prepare
himself to engage the enemy.
Team Bravo on Objective Larry was reporting its tanks
were nearing ―black‖ fuel levels and requested an emergency
resupply. The Mortar Platoon on Objective Curly was reporting
―black‖ on HE rounds and also requested an emergency
resupply. LTC Twitty ordered the XO to bring up the
Re-Arm/Re-Fuel package and conduct an emergency resupply
of fuel and ammunition. MAJ Knapp, TF 3-15 XO, relayed this
order to CPT Bailey.

7
Infantry in Battle
As we began to move, our convoy consisted of two
sections. The first section consisted of three vehicles: a gun
truck in the lead; an M577 APC, carrying the S4 and S1; and
an M113 APC, carrying the battalion maintenance technician,
Chief Warrant Officer Angel Acevedo. The second section
consisted of the Support Platoon, with the Scout Platoon‘s
Platoon Sergeant‘s HMMWV in the lead approximately 100
meters behind Chief Acevedo‘s M113; then my HMMWV; and
the remainder of my platoon.

After traveling approximately three to five minutes, our

convoy came under intense RPG and small-arms fire from
enemy fighters positioned in buildings approximately 300
meters from the road along the east side of the highway. I saw
the first RPG streak towards the Scout Platoon Sergeant‘s
HMMWV directly in front of me and impact squarely in his
upper torso, blowing him out of his turret and onto the road.
Despite the fact he had been wearing body armor, the RPG had
almost completely severed his body in half. The impact dazed
the driver of his HMMWV, and he came almost to a complete
stop. As we veered around his vehicle, I hollered for him to
keep driving. Knowing that follow-on elements would retrieve
the Sergeant‘s body, I did not stop for fear the rest of the
convoy behind me would also stop, and the enemy would
destroy us in his kill zone. We were now the lead vehicle in the
platoon convoy. I began to return fire with the MK-19 in the
direction of the enemy positions and ordered my driver to

8
 Chapter 1, Leadership
increase our rate of speed and close the distance between our
vehicle and Chief Acevedo‘s M113. As we closed to within 25
meters of Chief Acevedo‘s vehicle, a second RPG impacted his
M113, instantly killing his gunner, SSG Robert Stever, who
had been firing his .50 cal at the enemy. The impact also dazed
his driver, and the M113 veered left, crashing violently into the
median in the center of the road. Again, I ordered my driver to
increase our rate of speed and bring us directly behind CPT
Bailey‘s M577. The enemy fired subsequent RPGs at my
vehicle and my fuel and ammo trucks, missing their marks by
mere inches.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Aaron

Polsgrove, who served as the Support Platoon Leader, TF
3-15, 3d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary, TF 3-15‘s mission was to

support the 2nd Brigade Combat Team‘s (BCT) mission—to
seize key infrastructures within the Iraqi capital—by seizing
key intersections along Highway 8 and securing the 2nd BCT‘s
main line of communication into Baghdad.
From his position in the rear, CPT Polsgrove could garner
only a few key pieces of the battle raging throughout the task
force and knew only a few of the key munitions that would
quickly be needed by other units in his task force. However, he
immediately began to prepare his support platoon for the call
that he knew he would eventually receive from the task force
commander. He briefed the platoon on the situation, ensuring
that his Soldiers were mentally and physically prepared to fight
their convoy into the task force objective areas to deliver much
needed fuel and ammunition.

9
Infantry in Battle
He led his convoy into the fight through withering
automatic weapons and RPG fire to resupply the Infantry
companies and mortar platoon in contact. His personal courage
to gain control of the chaos and keep his men focused on the
mission is evident in the summary. When his lead convoy
vehicle commander was killed in action by RPG fire, CPT
Polsgrove assumed the role of not only the convoy commander,
but also the lead vehicle, ensuring that the convoy did not stop
inside the kill zone. His outstanding leadership, and that of
many of his Soldiers, ensured the delivery of critically needed
fuel and ammunition, allowing the task force to continue its
mission.

From 03 March to 01 May 2003, the 3rd Ranger

Battalion conducted operations in Iraq. During the
campaign, two separate company-sized airborne assaults
were conducted in the western part of the country. A high
number of jump-related casualties immediately hindered
operations and forced Rangers to adapt.

In an effort to attack in the western part of Iraq while most

of the mechanized forces assaulted in and around Baghdad, 3rd
Ranger Battalion conducted two company-sized airborne
assaults in late March and early April. Charlie Company, with
attachments of snipers and mortars, as well as the Tactical
Operational Command II (TOC II), jumped into a Desert
Landing Strip (DLS) in late March. Alpha Company, with its
attachments and TOC I, jumped into the abandoned Iraqi
airbase of H1.
It was not known when Charlie Company would receive a
resupply of food, water, etc., so the guidance was to jump with
enough items to sustain the company for a week. The
individual loads were so heavy that Rangers could not walk to

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 Chapter 1, Leadership
the MC-130s without assistance. One Ranger even collapsed
fifty feet from the plane and was not able to make the jump; the
medics stated that he suffered an injury to his back. The planes
almost took off late due to the lengthy process of sitting each
Ranger down with his massive rucksack and weapons cases.
One of the MC-130s conducted a ramp jump instead of the
normal exit through the side door. As one of the Rangers was
walking to the ramp, his heavy rucksack disconnected from his
reserve parachute, and he immediately fell to the floor of the
aircraft as other jumpers behind him were also preparing to
exit. The air-land safety, SFC Morgan, immediately saw this,
grabbed his knife, and cut the Ranger‘s static line. The Ranger
did not know that his static line had been cut and tried to get up
to walk to the end of the ramp. SFC Morgan raced toward the
individual and laid on him so that he did not exit without an
active parachute. As a result, the remaining jumpers barely
made it out of the aircraft as they exited right before the red
light.
Almost twenty Rangers (of the nearly 200 jumpers) were
injured badly enough to be evacuated from the DLS. The
impact was severe, as key leaders were some of the wounded.
The Sniper Team Leader broke both legs on impact and was
later medically discharged from the Army; he jumped the
Barrett .50-cal weapon as well as a large amount of
ammunition. The commander‘s plan immediately changed as
Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) became the new priority.
Due to low visibility and the austere environment, it took
several hours to account for everyone; some of the injured
Rangers were still unconscious. Medical aircraft were called
upon earlier than the initial planning estimates to transport the
wounded Rangers to a hospital in Jordan. The loss of such
combat power was critical (as one-third of Charlie Company

11
Infantry in Battle
was involved two weeks later with the seizure of the Hadithah
Dam).
Just a week after Charlie Company jumped into the DLS,
Alpha Company and TOC I seized an abandoned airbase
named H1. Instead of the MC-130s, the jump was conducted
using the new C-17 Globemaster airplanes. It was not known
when a resupply would occur at H1, so these Rangers were also
instructed to bring enough equipment for at least one week.
The jump produced nearly the exact number of injuries as that
of Charlie Company. The Rangers of the Casualty Collection
Point (CCP), who searched throughout the battlefield for
injured jumpers, were initially without direction for the first
hour. 1SG Smith, the leader of the CCP, was flipped upside
down upon exiting the aircraft as his right ankle-brace became
tangled within his risers. He lay unconscious from the pain
from the dislocation of his knee and the tear of every ligament
and tendon. Other key leaders, to include two squad leaders,
were evacuated due to injuries. Like the jump with Charlie
Company, medical assets had to be diverted to H1 to treat such
a large number of injuries.

From the personal experiences of 1LT Chris DeMure, who

served as Support Platoon Leader, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th
Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: 1LT DeMure‘s account of two separate Ranger

airborne assaults in Iraq (C/3-75 IN and A/3-75 IN,
respectively) demonstrates the need by unit commanders to
better evaluate Soldiers‘ load capabilities. We include this
vignette in the chapter dealing with leadership because leaders
must manage the operational risk of their formations and are
ultimately responsible for the consequences of their risk

12
 Chapter 1, Leadership
acceptance decisions. Charlie and Alpha companies each
sustained approximately 20 casualties out of 200 jumpers on
their drop zones – a significantly higher jump related casualty
rate than in training. Most of these casualties were due to the
enormous loads (150 lbs average) jumped by the Rangers into
their objective areas. Ranger commanders approved these loads
for their Rangers and, given the opportunity to ‗Monday
morning quarterback‘ those decisions, may have failed to
adequately consider the potential effect.
―Army research indicates that a soldier can carry an amount
equal to 30 percent of his body weight and still retain a high
percentage of his agility, stamina, alertness, and mobility
…these loads are divided up into three major types: combat,
sustainment, and contingency loads…‖ (FM 3-06.11)
Rangers are, by definition, trained to move further, faster,
and fight harder than any other Soldier. However, the Rangers
in this vignette were clearly not trained to jump with these
loads. One hopes that an adequate assessment was completed
during the preparation time available to tailor their loads (both
companies were instructed to take a week‘s worth of supplies).
A failure to adequately plan a Soldier‘s load that was
commensurate with Ranger capabilities and realistic resupply
alternatives may have caused the large amount of casualties
sustained at both DLS and H1 drop zones.
In any event, this vignette offers another example of how, if
ignored, a Soldier‘s load can become the central issue
inhibiting mission accomplishment. Leaders are faced with
many tough decisions in combat, but decisions to exceed
established norms for Soldier combat load must only follow a
rigorous analysis of risk.

On 4 April 2004, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, (TF

Lancer) of the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility

13
Infantry in Battle
for the Sadr City area of Baghdad. The unit had just
completed two weeks of familiarization, conducting
combined operations with the unit it was replacing at
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Eagle. Because TF Lancer
lacked tanks, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 37th Armor, was
attached to it. Sadr City, a six- by eight-kilometer slum,
was home to 2.5 million people—ten percent of Iraq’s
population. The departing unit had been in Sadr City for a
year and had experienced low levels of violence and unrest.
The commander of TF Lancer had little reason to believe
that before that first day was over, his Soldiers would be
fighting for their lives against a fanatical enemy determined
to defeat the Americans and force them out of the city.

Late in the afternoon of TF Lancer‘s first day on its own in

Sadr City, the 1st Platoon of C Company escorted a sewage
removal truck to the southern part of the city and then moved
to observe the Sadr Bureau headquarters for one of the many
political factions in the city suspected of sponsoring subversive
activity. As the Platoon approached the Sadr Bureau complex,
three large groups of Iraqi men scattered to the north. Almost
immediately, there were bursts of automatic weapons fire from
east of the four-lane road that ran north and south directly to
the west of the Sadr Bureau. First Platoon halted and
dismounted its Infantry squads. As they moved towards the
sound, they began to take fire from every direction that rapidly
increased in intensity and accuracy. One of the platoon‘s
machine gunners identified the enemy positions and initiated
suppressive fire. Following his lead, the platoon‘s other
gunners engaged multiple enemy forces.
At approximately 1800 hours, the platoon leader reported
that the enemy was emplacing obstacles made of concrete
blocks, metal spike strips, and scrap metal along the major

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 Chapter 1, Leadership
roads to both his front and rear as he fought his way forward.
Aided by the fire from the platoon‘s heavy machine guns, the
HMMWVs pushed through obstacle after obstacle despite fire
from the front, the rear, and from elevated positions on both
sides of the road. Their luck ran out when the second vehicle in
the column hit an obstacle but didn‘t make it across. Seeing the
vehicle stopped, the enemy massed fires on it. The gunner was
mortally wounded in his exposed position, killed fighting to
protect his comrades as they dismounted and moved to safety.
Without hesitation, the driver of the third vehicle moved his
vehicle to push the stalled vehicle over the obstacle.
Unfortunately, heavy fire also disabled this vehicle before it
was able to move the one that was stuck. The Platoon Sergeant
in the trail vehicle moved to the disabled vehicles and
established a security perimeter. The platoon leader, in the lead
vehicle, turned around and linked up with his two disabled
vehicles.
After receiving the initial report, the Task Force
Commander, LTC Gary Volesky, alerted A Company, 2-5
Cavalry, and ordered it to move to and reinforce the isolated
platoon. Simultaneously, the Commander of C Company, 2-5
Cavalry, instructed the Platoon Leader to break contact, get his
unit off of the road, and consolidate and reorganize. LTC
Volesky then ordered the Task Force to assemble and move to
assist the platoon in contact. Within minutes of assuming
responsibility for Sadr City, Task Force Lancer was committed
to high intensity urban combat against an unknown number of
heavily armed insurgents in unfamiliar territory with night soon
approaching.
With 20 Soldiers and two of the original four vehicles
operational, 1st Platoon, C/2-5 Cavalry, took over a building
west of Route Delta. After moving the casualties and vital
equipment inside, they placed the two operational vehicles in

15
Infantry in Battle
blocking positions on both ends of the alley next to the
building. The Platoon Sergeant remained at his vehicle by
himself for the next three hours, under constant enemy fire,
providing the only communications link between his Platoon
and the rest of the Task Force. During this time, the Platoon
repulsed three attacks by Iraqi militiamen in civilian clothes
who attacked with RPGs, small arms, and hand grenades.
At the TOC, the Task Force Commander, Operations
Officer, and company commanders assembled to plan how to
rescue the isolated platoon. The TF Commander ordered a
powerful penetration of the city along a single route to limit the
risk of another platoon becoming separated along the way. The
distance from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Eagle to the
beleaguered platoon was nine kilometers. Alpha Company, 2-5
Cavalry, and C/2-5 Cavalry would depart the camp
immediately, with C/2-5 Cavalry leading. Charlie Company,
2-37 Armor, would move north from its original location
southwest of Sadr City and mass with the other companies to
reinforce the platoon in contact. Bravo Company, 1-12
Cavalry, and C Battery, 1-82 Field Artillery, were put in
reserve with extra recovery and medical assets and were told to
be prepared to reinforce the main effort, if required. The
companies assembled quickly, with Soldiers jumping into
whatever vehicles had open seats or floor-space. Incredibly,
less than fifteen minutes after receiving the first reports, Task
Force Lancer began the attack to rescue its isolated platoon.
As the rescue effort began, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
liaison at FOB Eagle reported that Mahdi Army elements
(fanatical followers of the firebrand Moqtada al Sadr) had
seized all of the police stations in Sadr City.
Charlie Company, 2-5 Cavalry, attacked south, bypassing
numerous obstacles to get onto the attack axis. It forged ahead
under withering RPG and small arms fire but soon encountered

16
 Chapter 1, Leadership
a complex obstacle that it could not breach. A bypass route was
blocked with debris and overturned carts from the local
markets. The company continued to fight its way north until
the lead vehicle was destroyed by heavy small arms and RPG
fire, blocking the road. By that point, C Company had taken
several casualties and had numerous vehicles damaged or
disabled. Enemy fire was coming from all directions. The Task
Force Commander, with C/2-5 Cavalry, ordered the company
to move back, collect its casualties, and evacuate them.
Meanwhile, A/2-5 Cavalry had started receiving small arms
fire, while breaching numerous obstacles in its attack. The
volume and intensity of fire increased as the company
continued to fight its way through the city. Soldiers reported
seeing countless muzzle flashes from rooftops, windows, and
alleyways. Concrete, metal scrap, and burning debris blocked
the road. The Company continued to fight north but was forced
to negotiate each obstacle individually, slowing movement
under the intense enemy fire. Although the Soldiers responded
with a high volume of well-aimed fire, destroying many enemy
fighters, the Company began to take significant casualties and
lost communications with the Task Force. With the lead
vehicle disabled, no communications with the Task Force, and
all vehicles in the convoy damaged by fire, the Commander
rallied his men and returned to the FOB to evacuate casualties
and reorganize for another assault into the city.
Charlie Company, 2-37 Armor, had begun its attack north
into the city along with the other units. In the vicinity of the
Sadr Bureau, however, a man in an Iraqi Police uniform shot
and killed one of the tank loaders. The company moved south
back to reorganize.
At the C/2-5 Cavalry casualty collection point, the Task
Force Commander and the Company Commander developed a
new course of action. They would make a northern approach

17
Infantry in Battle
and move south to relieve the isolated platoon of C/2-5
Cavalry. Within minutes, they launched the hasty attack.
Almost immediately, C/2-5 Cavalry came under direct fire
from the south side of the road. Soon, enemy forces were firing
from every direction. The farther west the element moved, the
more intense the fire became. With steadfast determination, the
company fought through the enemy‘s obstacles, firing steadily
with deadly 25-mm High Explosive rounds.
As C/2-5 Cavalry turned south, the small arms fire became
deafening. The enemy was heavily barricaded and delivered
continuous fire. The Iraqi Police assisted insurgent personnel,
joining them in fighting or opening doors from which the
enemy shot. Enemy weapons included small arms, pipe bombs
and grenades, RPGs, and IEDs constructed with propane and
gasoline. The streets were littered with weapons and enemy
bodies—most dressed in black.
At the same time C/2-5 Cavalry had begun its attack,
C/1-82 FA and B/1-12 Cavalry were moving into the fight.
C/1-82 FA was working with A/2-5 Cavalry to escort recovery
assets, retrieving disabled vehicles, while B/1-12 Cavalry
moved to assist C/2-5 Cavalry in casualty evacuation. As these
units moved south, however, the Operations Officer redirected
them to clear barriers that OH-58D helicopters, now in support,
had spotted on a parallel route. This would improve the
freedom of maneuver for the rest of Task Force Lancer.
Although both the units came under heavy fire from numerous
buildings, rooftops, and alleys, they continued moving and
engaging the enemy with precision fires as they cleared the
critical routes and secured key intersections in support of the
Task Force mission to rescue the isolated platoon.
Charlie Company, 2-5 Cavalry, continued to attack south,
firing 25mm HE, 40mm grenades, .50 caliber machineguns,
and all its small arms. The lead Bradley had taken multiple

18
 Chapter 1, Leadership
RPG strikes that knocked out its communications. As a result,
it unknowingly passed by the isolated platoon. Due to the
smoke, obstacles, and heavy fire, the rest of the element was
not able to stop the errant vehicle. As the convoy reached and
passed the isolated platoon, the platoons reported they had
numerous casualties and were low on both 25mm and machine
gun ammunition. Minutes later, the Task Force Commander
received a report that C/2-37 Armor had initiated a second
attack after evacuating its casualty. The route of attack took it
north. Fearing the potential for fratricide due to the converging
of C/2-37 Armor and C/2-5 Cavalry, the Task Force
Commander ordered C/2-5 Cavalry to establish a stationary
blocking position and continue CASEVAC operations. Charlie
Company, 2-5 Cavalry established its casualty collection point
and began to consolidate and reorganize.
At this point, the Task Force‘s wheeled vehicles were
almost all beginning to fail mechanically due to battle damage;
however, the tanks of C/2-37 Armor soon approached from the
south, passing by C/2-5 Cavalry‘s position. As it passed, the
tank company fired main gun rounds into enemy locations. The
tanks were able to fight through the enemy gauntlet and reach
the isolated platoon‘s position. They linked up with the platoon
and escorted it back to Camp Eagle. Task Force Lancer
consolidated, reorganized, and started preparations at FOB
Eagle to take back the Iraqi Police stations that the Mahdi
Army had occupied.
At the end of the first battle, Task Force Lancer had eight
soldiers killed in action, and 51 soldiers wounded in action. Of
the soldiers wounded in action, 15 returned to the fight after
treatment. Many more wounded warriors never left the fight,
not seeking medical treatment until long after the first battle
ended.

19
Infantry in Battle
In the aftermath, the estimated size of the enemy was 2000-
3000 fighters. The report from the Iraqi Ministry of Health
reported 500 killed in action. Notably, the Ministry of Health
confirmed that the majority of the casualties were wearing the
black Mahdi Army uniform.

From the Narrative for Presidential Unit Citation for

Extraordinary Heroism, Task Force Lancer, 1st Cavalry
Division, written by 1LT M. Jordan Inman, who served as
Battle Captain, 2-5 Cavalry, Donovan Research Library, Fort
Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: On 4 April 2004, Task Force Lancer—2nd

Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry
Division—effectively massed combat power in Sadr City to
rescue the isolated 1st Platoon, C/2-5 Cavalry. This success is
directly attributed to the outstanding leadership of this
battalion.
TF Lancer went into Sadr City with the expectation that the
area was relatively peaceful. The unit TF Lancer replaced had
spent the previous year conducting stability and support
operations and had spent the majority of its efforts on
providing basic services to the people of the area, as it had
been long-neglected by Sadaam Hussein‘s government.
Therefore, before arriving in country, TF Lancer had spent
considerable time training on tasks associated with providing
those basic services as well on its combat-related METL. This
superior training paid off when, on TF Lancer‘s first day on its
own in the area, the fanatical Mahdi Army attacked to push
U.S. forces from the area.
Immediately, TF Lancer Soldiers went from the mindset of
providing aid to the people in Sadr City to conducting intense
urban combat operations. Examining the vignette, it becomes

20
 Chapter 1, Leadership
apparent that the tough, realistic combat training the TF had
conducted allowed the isolated platoon to survive and the rest
of the TF to begin combat operations to defeat this new enemy.
The platoon immediately and effectively organized its defense,
and the TF leadership quickly leveraged all elements of combat
power to come to its rescue. Good training and leaders who
provide direction and motivation allowed TF Lancer to succeed
in this situation and throughout the next four months of combat
operations in Sadr City.

CONCLUSION: One of the strongest attributes of an effective

leader is his ability to assess the circumstances correctly and
then act appropriately, in any given situation. Memorizing
templates and reciting doctrine cannot take the place of the
individual‘s ability to think clearly, act decisively, and
influence the fight at the decisive point. This ability is critical
in accomplishing the mission, while taking care of our most
precious resource: the Soldier.

21
 CHAPTER 2: Initiative
I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of
campaign: but simply to lay down the work it is
desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it
in your own way.
General of the Army Ulysses S. Grant
Orders to General Sherman, 1864

INTRODUCTION: There are two primary components to

Initiative: individual and operational. Individual initiative is the
ability to act within the commander‘s intent in the absence of
clear orders or when the situation changes. Operational
initiative is determining the time, place, pace, and terms of
action, imposing the commander‘s will upon the enemy, rather
than reacting to the enemy. Initiative retains options for the
commander and enables freedom of action, while denying
options to the enemy. For military units to be successful, both
components must be present, particularly in today‘s
contemporary operating environment where we face a clever,
adaptive enemy who changes as soon as we believe we
understand him.

The original plan of the 75th Ranger Regiment, to

conduct an airborne assault into Baghdad International
Airport (BIAP), was cancelled and new objectives in the
western portion of Iraq emerged. As the 3rd Infantry
Division was advancing north, a need arose for Special
Operations Forces to secure the Hadithah Dam and prevent
the explosive-rigged facility from being blown and
disrupting the Coalition movement. Elements of 3rd Ranger
Battalion planned and led an attack to seize the Hadithah
Dam in western Iraq on 31 March 2003.
23
Infantry in Battle

Just before daylight, and as soon as the Rangers first saw

the towers of the dam facility, the Gun Mobility Vehicles
(GMVs) began their race toward the entrance at 60 miles per
hour. A guard-shack, constructed of cinder blocks and a metal
roof, was identified on the southern portion of the dam. Inside
were four enemy soldiers who were all promptly killed by a
two-man Ranger entry team. Attached Ranger snipers oriented
on the adjacent low ground and made several long distance
kills. One shot in particular was directed at a propane tank,
which had three enemy soldiers around it. When the sniper‘s
bullet from the Barrett .50 caliber entered the tank, it exploded,
killing all three soldiers.
Just as the Company Commander directed 2nd Platoon to
cross the surface of the dam to the eastern tower, a truck
approached the dam from the east; .50 caliber machine guns
engaged the truck and killed its occupants. During this
exchange of fire, an MK-19 40mm round ricocheted off a
metal light post and exploded over the heads of one of the
vehicle crews, injuring two Rangers. Minutes later, a flatbed
truck full of enemy soldiers moved quickly toward the dam.
Again, one of the fifty-caliber machine guns engaged the
vehicle, as six soldiers emptied into the street once the machine
gun began to impact. Four enemy soldiers were killed with
direct fire while two others fled, injured, to the southern low
ground. The 2nd Platoon Sergeant and CSM decided to retrieve
the enemy wounded, an act for which the two men were later
awarded the Silver Star.
As the fighting continued on top of the facility, a Ranger
element, with attached Special Operations Forces, began the
arduous task of systematically clearing the eleven floors and
hundreds of rooms throughout the facility. After nearly twelve
hours, the Rangers determined that the dam was not rigged

24
 Chapter 2, Initiative
with explosives. As the Rangers expanded their area of
operations, teams of GMVs established blocking positions
along the perimeter of the dam. By the mid-afternoon, it
seemed as if enemy personnel had either been captured or
killed.
Suddenly, during the first period of darkness, a barrage of
indirect fires began. Enemy mortar and towed artillery rounds
landed all around the Rangers‘ locations. Throughout all of the
incoming fire, Ranger forward observers and Air Force
Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETAC) continuously
directed overhead Close-Air Support airframes and counter-
mortar fire onto suspected enemy locations. S-60 anti-aircraft
guns impacted the metal crane atop the dam‘s surface to our
rear while the eastern tower sustained multiple direct hits. The
first night atop the dam was spent at 100% alert. All available
night vision devices and thermal viewers scanned the area to
make sure the enemy did not infiltrate. The intense enemy
indirect fires lasted for three straight days. On 8 April 2003,
Charlie Company arrived by rotary-wing and vehicle convoy
and relieved Bravo Company at the Hadithah Dam.

From the personal experience of 1LT Chris DeMure, who

served as Support Platoon Leader, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th
Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary of the Rangers‘ actions on

Hadithah Dam, we see the importance of initiative—a tenet of
Army operations.
The Rangers succeeded in their mission of seizing and
controlling the dam to prevent the enemy from destroying it
and flooding the avenues of approach Coalition forces needed
for their assault to Baghdad, despite the fact the Rangers

25
Infantry in Battle
sustained heavy indirect fire in the days following the dam‘s
seizure. However, we included this vignette, as it provides a
―falcon‘s view‖ on initiative.
Although having successfully conducted the mission of
seizing the dam, the Rangers found themselves in a defensive
position, and because of their small numbers, unable to exploit
the success of the initial assault on the objective. This vignette
highlights the difficulty in retaining and exploiting the
initiative when in static defensive positions, particularly so in
the non-contiguous and non-linear battlefield the Rangers faced
in Iraq.
According to doctrine, ―offensive action is key to achieving
decisive results,‖ and we must ―seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative.‖ (FM 3-0) It can be easily argued that the initial
success of this operation was due to the Rangers‘ application of
this guidance. However, it was in the transition from an
offensive to the defensive mission that we see the violation of
initiative at a higher level and, thus, the difficulties experienced
by the Rangers in exploiting the initial shock they created.
After the initial seizure of the dam, it appears that the
initiative hung in the balance, and, then, as night fell, it fell
heavily in the hands of the enemy. The Rangers, limited by
troop numbers to continue offensive operations, consolidated
their defense around the dam. Alternatively, the Iraqi forces,
given a period to reorganize and freedom to maneuver around
the isolated defense of the U.S. forces, seized the initiative by
directing artillery and mortar fire onto the defending Rangers.
From this point onward, it is debatable who actually had the
initiative.
Although U.S. forces were ultimately successful in
countering the enemy indirect fires using close air support, they
could not immediately regain the initiative because of their
limited numbers and inherent light organization. At the same

26
 Chapter 2, Initiative
time, it is hard to accept that Iraqi forces held the initiative
when relying largely on indirect fires. Given the information
available, we can reasonably conclude that this vignette
demonstrates a failure on the part of the Iraqi ground
commanders to reorganize for a coordinated ground offensive
against what we know was a largely unsupported light infantry
force that ultimately defeated the Iraqi intent of blowing the
dam.

On 6 April 2003, on the outskirts of Baghdad, OBJ

Saints, all key leaders from the 3-15 IN Battalion, 3rd ID,
along with all the attachments, sat, stood, or crouched
under a tarp draped over a bombed-out building. The
mission was for Task Force 3-15 to seize three key
intersections—Larry, Moe, and Curly—along HWY 8 to
keep the LOC open and facilitate the movement of CSS
assets to the tank battalions. The two tank battalions, 1-64
and 4-64, would lead the way and seize presidential palaces
and government buildings in central Baghdad. An armor
company, Charlie, would seize OBJ Larry, while one
Infantry company, Alpha, would seize OBJ Moe, and the
other Infantry company, Bravo, would secure the BDE
TOC. That would leave OBJ Curly to one Infantry platoon
from Bravo Company, a few scouts, a few engineers, the
main aid station, the TOC, and my mortar platoon. The C2
for these elements would be an S3 battle captain named
CPT Zan Hornbuckle.

Our mortar platoon was comprised of four M113s, each

with a 120mm mortar tube and a .50 cal.; two HMMWVs, one
equipped with a .50 cal., one with an MK-19 and each had an
M240B; and our M577, equipped with an M240B and a trailer
full of additional ammo. It was a very somber mood as we

27
Infantry in Battle
moved into the order of march at around 0530 hrs. I remember
seeing an interstate sign, saying, ―Baghdad Airport straight
ahead‖ and then the arches stretching across the four and
sometimes six lane highway. After driving on dirt and gravel
roads for the past few weeks, it was a shock to see what
resembled a major interstate, such as I-85. After we crossed an
extensive minefield that the engineers had cleared just hours
earlier, we started to receive sporadic gun fire. What puzzled
me was that there would be a goat herder or a group of kids
waving off the side of the road, and then no more than three
hundred meters down the road, enemy fighters would be firing
at us. Finally, through the thick smoky haze, I could make out
the overpass. It was approximately 0700 hrs.
As Team Zan reached the cloverleaf, we all came towards
the center of the intersection then cleared out about 200 meters,
conducting a recon by fire. The Infantry platoon quickly took
up defensive positions on the overpass and behind the
embankments bordering the on and off ramps. Before we could
even get set, A/3-15 IN and B/4-64 AR began calling for fire
missions to the north on both OBJs Moe and Larry. We had
already planned to use two tubes for Larry and two tubes for
Moe, so within about two minutes, we were executing fire
missions. What concerned me was the consistent enemy fire we
were receiving from the surrounding buildings and even from
down the road. For the first time, I heard the whiz of an RPG
right over my head as I tried to figure out where the enemy was
located to our south. My squad leaders were trying to control
their fire missions while simultaneously engaging enemy
personnel with their .50 cal. machine guns. The .50 caliber
machine gun is an excellent suppression weapon, but we could
not hit specific windows or get into enemy bunkers on the sides
of the road.

28
 Chapter 2, Initiative
The situation was gradually getting worse. One of my
gunners, PFC Taniguchi, was hit by a piece of shrapnel in the
chin, but he continued to fire his M4 between making
adjustments and giving fire commands to his assistant gunner. I
got a call from my PSG, asking me if we could direct lay, that
is, fire the mortar as a direct fire weapon, on the buildings and
enemy positions surrounding our tight perimeter. I knew the
mortar platoon was a Battalion asset, and we were shooting fire
missions as fast as we could compute them for both B/4-64 AR
and A/3-15 IN. On the other hand, what good were we if one
gun went down due to enemy fire? I had to make a call that
was best for not only us, but also the entire perimeter. It was
plain to see that even the TOC was coming under fire.
So, I decided my number three and four guns would be
used for the companies to the north, while number one and two
guns would be used in direct lay to destroy enemy positions
around our perimeter. It was a scary sight to see the elevation
on those big 120mm tubes cranked so high that they appeared
to be straight up and down. The first round was shot behind a
stone wall to the east into a mud hut which the enemy was
using to regroup. The ground trembled as the round landed
only 250 meters away. I received a call from the Infantry
platoon‘s PSG saying, ―Cease Fire, Cease Fire, Danger Close.‖
I had seen the dismounted Infantrymen only fifty meters to our
front, but it appeared they had good cover from the round. My
biggest fear of fratricide was quickly dispelled as the PSG
came back over the radio and said, ―Do that again! That was
right where we need it.‖ I quickly told number two gun to Fire
for Effect!
Meanwhile, we were still receiving fire from a very large
warehouse to the southwest. We quickly changed the fuse
setting on the mortar rounds to high explosive delay so that the
mortar round would explode one second after impact. The

29
Infantry in Battle
rounds punched through the roof and exploded inside,
shattering all the windows where we were receiving fire.
Needless to say, we didn‘t have any problems from that
warehouse any more. It wasn‘t long before CPT Hornbuckle
called me up and said he needed some fire support on the
northwest side of the objective. Evidently, the enemy was set
up in a courtyard beside a water tower. We quickly walked the
rounds in, as CPT Hornbuckle made adjustments for us,
chopping down buildings filled with enemy fighters.
At 1024 hrs., the BDE TOC was hit by a surface to surface
missile, but the situation at OBJ Curly was deemed to be more
desperate, so, soon thereafter LTC Twitty launched CPT
Johnson with the rest of Bravo Company to reinforce us at the
cloverleaf. Just then, I noticed that one of our mortars had
ceased firing. I was beginning to move in that direction to find
out what was going on, but then I saw them kicking the tube.
They were conducting misfire procedures. Normally, the crew
would exit the track and wait for a specified time at a specified
distance away before reentering the vehicle. No time for that
today, and I discouraged my platoon from dismounting and
exposing itself to enemy fire. However, once the dud round
was removed, two of my Soldiers had to discard the round
away from friendly troops. I had never seen misfire procedures
done so quickly before.
By 1130 hrs., my platoon was running desperately low on
mortar rounds. I sent the report up that I was amber on ammo
and quickly found out that I was not the only one. Both Larry
and Moe also were running low on ammo and fuel. As a result,
the CSS assets, consisting of fuel trucks, ammo trucks,
mechanics, and a few scouts, were launched from OBJ Saints
to resupply the task force.
As the fuel and ammo trucks moved between the on ramp
and overpass in a tight formation, I thought to myself, ―what an

30
 Chapter 2, Initiative
excellent target that would be for the enemy.‖ Once the ammo
trucks were set, our ammo bearers began to download rounds
from the trucks so we could continue to fire. Somehow, they
were able to carry three mortar rounds each, back to their guns
and back again several times. Keep in mind, each round weighs
thirty-eight pounds. To this day, I‘ll never know how they did
it. We were shooting fire missions faster than we could
resupply ourselves.
I then got the call on the radio that the situation had become
too dangerous for our unit, so we were to move north to a
secure area at the Ba‘ath Party Headquarters Building. By this
time, five ammo and fuel trucks were engulfed in flames,
having been hit by enemy mortar rounds, so Soldiers were
scrambling everywhere trying to find a ride. Tank and mortar
rounds were cooking off and exploding, making the situation
even worse.
As the remaining vehicles attempted to get on the road and
ready to move, I called my squad leaders and asked if we were
ready to move. ―No Sir,‖ was the reply. Apparently, when the
ammo and fuel trucks were hit, we had three ammo bearers
caught on the far side. The convoy was beginning to move, and
I became frantic that we would be left there if I didn‘t find my
Soldiers. I was attempting to find out if there were any
casualties or if they were picked up by another vehicle, when I
saw my number one gun, SPC Smith, whom we all called
Smitty, charging right through the exploding ammo to the far
side. He reappeared only minutes later with all of our missing
mortar men. They were trapped behind a pillar on the far side
of the overpass trying to gain cover from the monstrous
explosions. Another heroic act by one of my Soldiers had
saved the day. As we moved out at about 1400 hrs., heading
north down HWY 8 towards safety, I looked back at the
dreadful intersection and thought how truly fortunate we were.

31
Infantry in Battle

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Robert

Woodruff, who served as the Mortar Platoon Leader, TF 3-15,
3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: Professional military journals are filled with

articles stating that junior leaders are required to make more
significant decisions in the Global War on Terror than they had
to make in the past. This example from a significant fight
during Operation Iraqi Freedom does more to highlight this
concept than any article currently available. The actions of a
few junior leaders and Soldiers and the initiative they
demonstrated were critical to the task force‘s successful
mission accomplishment on that day. FM 3-0 states that
Soldiers ―must exercise mature judgment and initiative under
stressful conditions…to meet the demands of full-spectrum
operations.‖ The manual further defines individual initiative as
the ability ―to act when there are no clear instructions or when
the situation changes.‖
Initially, the mortar platoon leader made the difficult
decision to use his guns to protect his position. He knew his
fires were critical on the other objectives, but he also
understood that his assets, the mortar tubes, were critical to the
task force‘s success and to its ability to continue the fight at
this location. He exercised initiative in a changing situation and
made the decision to direct-lay the guns without specific
guidance. This action protected his guns and ensured that the
Soldiers on the other objectives continued to receive fire
support.
Throughout the fight, CPT Woodruff‘s Soldiers acted with
initiative and contributed to overall mission accomplishment.
In a firefight, a leader cannot issue clear instructions to every

32
 Chapter 2, Initiative
Soldier. The leader must depend on his Soldiers‘ ability to
recognize what needs to occur and then to exercise the
initiative to make it happen. Soldiers who continued to fight
while injured, conducted misfire procedures while in contact
and then continued to fight, and exercised great personal risk
during the ammunition resupply while in contact all
contributed to the successful mission and made the platoon
leader‘s job significantly easier. The Soldier who risked his life
to account for the three separated Soldiers acted at the right
time and allowed Team Zan to depart the area in time to meet
further mission requirements.
The initiative of the Soldiers in this fight is indicative of
what junior leaders and Soldiers are doing on a daily basis
while in contact. Many of their actions will not be recorded,
but they are just as critical.
Commanders must ensure they foster an environment
where bright leaders and Soldiers are able to exercise initiative.
This is best accomplished in peacetime by allowing them to
make decisions, both tactical and administrative, and then
discussing their decisions afterward. Such experiences allow
the commander to gain trust in his subordinates and then give
the subordinate experience operating within the commander‘s
intent. As Soldiers and junior leaders gain proficiency in small
things and demonstrate they can be trusted, commanders must
give them increasingly larger and more difficult tasks to
continue to hone initiative. This practice will help ensure junior
leaders make sound decisions—while in contact—that are
critical to mission success.

CONCLUSION: A study of military history reveals that the

force that seizes the initiative tends to be successful. Good
planning is critical in achieving operational initiative; good
training ensures individual initiative. As our Infantry forces

33
Infantry in Battle
continue to adapt to meet the challenges of the asymmetric
threat, we must continue to seek and retain the initiative. We
create a culture of initiative by conducting tough, realistic
training that rewards individual initiative and by ensuring our
leaders on the ground, with a clear understanding of their
commanders‘ intent, have the authority to take the fight to the
enemy.

34
 CHAPTER 3: Adaptability
In any problem where an opposing force exists, and
cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for
alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which
governs survival in war as in life—war being but a
concentrated form of human struggle against the
environment.
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Strategy, 1944

INTRODUCTION: When viewed 100 years from now, the

hallmark of today‘s Army will surely be its ability to adapt.
Not since the Viet Nam War has the Army faced an enemy that
was unpredictable and asymmetric rather than the symmetric
enemy of the Cold War years. This current enemy,
understanding it would not find success in a conventional
fashion, had to strike in an unexpected manner to achieve its
desired endstate. To stay ahead of this enemy, our forces must
be able to adapt to any given situation to rob the enemy of his
initiative. At the tactical level, every leader should be prepared
to act quickly to execute the ―next step‖ in an operation and to
take advantage of an immerging situation. He must train
himself to fight the enemy and not the plan—only then will he
be able to adapt to a changing environment.
In this chapter, we see Soldiers who, within the
commander‘s intent, accomplished their missions by
examining their list of options and choosing the most effective
one for that situation: the result of a trained and disciplined
force.

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 1993,

L Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was tasked with the
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Infantry in Battle
mission of conducting a food relief convoy to the village of
Dhex-Yaal to distribute grain and supplies. The writer was
a platoon commander in L Company.

Task organization included my platoon of 42 Marines, a

machine gun section, four HMMWVs mounted with .50 caliber
machine guns, eight CARE civilian relief workers, and a
translator. The mission would be conducted in two distinct
phases: the convoy movement to Dhex-Yaal, and the issue of
food and supplies to the Somalis. The CARE agency had
coordinated for the feeding center and informed the village
headmaster of our impending arrival.
The plan to establish the relief site was to use 5-ton trucks,
connected by engineer tape to form a perimeter, with one lane
into it where we could escort one person at a time to receive
supplies and grain. We would use the gun trucks to isolate the
village and overwatch the food relief center. Expecting a large
crowd, we brought twenty ten-foot plastic tent poles for
Marines to use on the perimeter to control and hold back the
crowd. To ensure that no one tried to go through the line twice,
the CARE workers had a list of every head of household, and
we brought black markers to mark the thumbnail of every
Somali who had received his ration of supplies.
At 0630, on 7 January, the convoy moved out from the
town of Baidoa. As we made the 30-40 minute movement
through the town, a growing crowd of Somalis, hoping to be
issued or to steal the supplies, followed us. Once we passed out
of Baidoa, I spread out the convoy interval so that the lead gun
truck was about 1000 meters ahead of us to provide early
warning as we moved.
At 0845, about 20 km outside of Baidoa, near a town called
Awlo, the lead HMMWV reported hearing shots fired. I
stopped the convoy, asked for a SITREP, and could then hear

36
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
the rattle of small arms fire. It was sporadic and sounded like
nothing heavier than AK-47 and light machine gun. The lead
vehicle reported that he was not being engaged, but there was a
firefight about 400 meters to his front involving about 50
lightly armed Somalis. I moved forward to assess the situation
and observed Somalis behind a four-foot wall exchanging fire
with other Somalis in adobe huts on the other side of the road. I
also observed that the terrain to the west was visibly lower than
the area of the firefight and that a bypass would be possible. I
disseminated instructions to the convoy, leaving the one
HMMWV to observe the firefight, and we prepared to move.
The concern was that if the armed Somalis saw the cargo, we
could become a high-priority target to them. We began our
movement off road. Two of the CARE vehicles, with their
heavy loads, got stuck, but, with the manpower available to us,
we were able to free them and continue the one-hour
movement around the firefight.
As the convoy pulled into an open field just past Dhex-
Yaal, I saw a large crowd of about 500 Somalis gathered and
awaiting our arrival. We pulled the trucks into position and
established the perimeter, while Marines held back the crowd.
The translator explained to the people what was happening to
keep them calm, and two of the CARE workers talked to the
headmaster while the others began unloading grain and
supplies. When the CARE workers began to call out names to
receive goods, problems erupted. Many Somali names are
combinations of Mohammed, Ali, Aideed, and Mahdi, in
different orders. Fights began to break out in the crowd over
who was who, and the only way we found to solve the problem
was to let the headmaster choose who got relief supplies and
who did not. At 1445, one of the HMMWVs overwatching the
area reported that large numbers of Somalis from nearby
villages were heading toward Dhex-Yaal. The crowd around

37
Infantry in Battle
our site swelled to around 2000 Somalis, and they became
more aggressive as the supply of grain dwindled. Some
Somalis began testing the perimeter by charging the Marines
who secured it, while the remainder became more frustrated
and vocal. The lead CARE worker and I began to work out a
plan to withdraw from Dhex-Yaal and avoid violence.
At 1505, we began to slowly shrink the perimeter, moving
one empty 5-ton at a time to linkup with the isolation force
HMMWVs one km away. When we had three 5-tons and ten
Marines left on the ground, we took three of the last five bags
of grain and threw them into the crowd. As the crowd focused
and began to fight over the grain, we rapidly loaded on the
trucks, did a head count, and started to drive away. The crowd
began to chase us, so we took the last two bags of grain and
dumped them out of the last truck. The closest Somalis began
to scoop up the grain, effectively blocking the pursuit of the
rest of the crowd. We linked up with the remaining vehicles
and returned to base. The return was uneventful, and the
convoy reached Baidoa by 2015.

From the personal experience monograph by CAPT Jay Rutter,

who served as a platoon leader in L Company, 3rd Battalion,
9th Marines, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary of combat operations, we see a

platoon commander tasked with establishing, securing, and
aiding in the distribution of humanitarian aid (HA) at a site in
Somalia. His actions illustrate the adaptability necessary of a
combat leader to perform support operations. The platoon
commander was tasked to work in conjunction with a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) to effectively distribute
the supplies. When tasked to perform a support operation, a

38
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
leader must understand how to: 1) display the capability to use
force in a non-threatening way; 2) act decisively to prevent
escalation; and 3) apply force discriminately and selectively.
Capt Rutter moved his platoon—42 Marines, a machine
gun section, and four gun trucks—and eight NGO workers, and
a translator to the relief site. Upon reaching the relief site, after
conducting a bypass of an internal Somali firefight, a crowd of
500 local nationals began gathering. By use of non-lethal
means, to include tent poles, he was able to ensure that none of
the local nationals could penetrate his perimeter. He
additionally placed his gun trucks in overwatch positions to
isolate the site. To ensure the rapid and correct amount of
humanitarian aid was distributed, Capt Rutter developed a
marking system for each local national. However, based upon
the fact that a majority of the Somali names sound the same,
fights began to break out in the crowd.
At this time, Capt Rutter received word that more local
nationals were en route from neighboring villages, and he
began to collapse the perimeter to prevent further escalation of
the violence, using the tent poles to hold back the crowd.
Additionally, he gave the order to throw the rest of the grain
into the crowd to focus the crowd away from his Marines. By
throwing the rest of the grain into the crowd, the Marines were
able to withdraw from the aid site. By applying force
selectively and discriminately, Capt Rutter‘s platoon was able
to ensure that the local nationals were unharmed and that his
Marines were able to leave the area without undue casualties.
By acting decisively to diffuse the situation, Capt Rutter
prevented uncontrollable escalation of the situation and was
able to complete his mission.

Early in 1993, the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th

Mountain Division, in Somalia was assigned responsibility

39
Infantry in Battle
for a humanitarian relief sector at Marka. For the next
four months, the battalion was involved in security and
counter-bandit operations along the entire length of the
Shabele Valley. These operations included convoy security,
show of force, patrolling, and cordon and search.

Cordon and search operations were normally conducted

when the battalion received intelligence of bandit operations in
a certain area. This intelligence, normally obtained through
interrogation or volunteered by locals, had to be accepted with
some skepticism, but we eventually developed a good idea of
where selected bandit groups were in the valley.
One of the areas of frequent bandit activity was the airfield
south of Afgoi, near the small village of Lantabur. This airfield
was the main site for delivery of Khat, the mildly narcotic
stimulant grown in Kenya and chewed by most Somalis. Its
traffic was very profitable, and many of the bandits in the
valley either participated in the Khat trade or preyed on the
traders. Unfortunately, they also preyed on normal commerce
in the valley. The airfield was a constant hub of activity, and
our intelligence about banditry in the vicinity was fairly
consistent. The battalion decided to conduct a cordon and
search of this area to catch the bandits in the act. We placed an
OP at the airfield that gave us a confirmed base of intelligence
on the periods of maximum activity there.
If the pattern of daily activity held true, on 16 January, the
battalion would conduct a cordon and search of the airfield.
Only one company-sized element was available for the
operation. The cordon would have three blocking positions,
one inserted by air and two by ground. Helicopters would
secure the western flank of the cordon, which consisted mostly
of open ground. The recon and surveillance plan called for the
anti-armor section of A Company to be inserted on 13 January

40
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
to observe the airfield for up to three days. Because of the
relative openness of the terrain, a single OP from the tree line
to the end of the airfield was adequate.

Unfortunately, during the early morning hours of 14

January, the HMMWV that was inserting the anti-armor
section to man the OP got stuck in a conspicuous place along
the trail. Although it was camouflaged as well as possible, it
was likely to attract attention, and we did not want to lose the
element of surprise. Company A immediately launched along
the beach to link up with the reaction platoon and get into
position east of the OP. A resupply convoy, which was headed
to the Baledogle airstrip under the battalion XO, was redirected
into providing the southern blocking position. Coordination
was made for aircraft, but the only ones available were two
UH-60s that made daily logistics flights, placed under our
control until 1200 hrs. When the anti-armor section reported a
tremendous amount of activity at the airfield, the commander
decided to execute the operation at 1100, the earliest time that
all ground and aviation elements could be in position.

41
Infantry in Battle
The scheme of maneuver was fundamentally unchanged.
Company A would provide the majority of forces, with the
Baledogle convoy occupying a blocking position along the
main road south of the airfield. The company would move
along the coast in HMMWVs and approach the airfield along
the dirt track until it was short of the OP. The Baledogle
convoy would hold in the vicinity of Mundun and then move
up the road until it reached the blocking position.
Simultaneously, the Company A‘s Air Assault platoon was to
land on the road south of Lantabur and north of the airfield.
Upon discharging the troops, the helicopters would move off to
positions west of the airfield to discourage escape attempts
over the open ground. Once the troops landed, Company A
would move in from the east and clear the airfield complex,
searching all vehicles and huts for weapons and detaining any
bandits who offered resistance.
The operation went off almost flawlessly, with the nearly
simultaneous establishment of all key blocking positions. The
two helicopters dropped the air assault platoon at the same time
the convoy arrived and set up the blocking position to the
south. As soon as the Somalis saw the helicopters fly in and
land troops, the airfield came alive with vehicles leaving as fast
as they could. Most of them traveled north and were stopped
and searched by the northern blocking position. A few tried to
go west, away from the troops. Company A moved in from the
east and began its search of the airfield and the few vehicles
that remained.
The helicopters worked well, pursuing vehicles that tried to
escape in their direction and forcing them back to the road and
to our checkpoints. The aircraft were assisted by elements of
the 3rd Battalion, 17th Cavalry, which was conducting
operations in the area. After hasty face-to-face coordination on
the ground, the 3-17th Commander had agreed to provide one

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 Chapter 3, Adaptability
gunship and two scouts to help our battalion maintain the
western end of the cordon. The five helicopters were
intimidating and succeeded in keeping the Somali vehicles on
the road. They were also a key factor in discovering the Somali
bandits who were inclined to fight. No vehicle that was inside
the cordon escaped the search.

The vast majority of vehicles carried nothing but Khat,

which we allowed the occupants to keep. We picked up about a
dozen discarded rifles on the road leading to the checkpoint,
but the biggest find was in two abandoned dump trucks at the
airport—box after box of small arms ammunition, hundreds of
rifle grenades and RPG rounds, three heavy machine guns, an
RPG-7 launcher, and a 75mm recoilless rifle. Apparently, we
had interrupted a major weapon shipment from an arms cache

43
Infantry in Battle
in our AO to the militia forces in Mogadishu. The search of all
vehicles concluded around 1400 hrs., and all elements returned
to the battalion base site at 1530.

From a November, 1994, article in Infantry Magazine by

Major Martin N. Stanton, who served as S-3 for 2nd Battalion,
87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, we see the practical application

of our intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.
The IPB process focuses our analysis and evaluation of our
forces, our threat or enemy forces, our terrain and weather. The
IPB process is a continuous process that begins upon mission
receipt and is not completed until the operation is determined
to be completed. We also see the application of pattern analysis
through a cordon and search operation.
The subordinate units of the 2-87th IN used active patrolling
and observation posts to gather intelligence on threat actions in
their area of responsibility. The unit continuously analyzed the
patterns of the threat and local populace to determine when and
where the threat was conducting operations. Through this
analysis, the unit was able to plan and prepare for a cordon and
search. It is evident through the unit‘s actions that the plan was
briefed and understood by all members of the battalion. The
plan and, more importantly, the commander‘s intent were
understood throughout the unit. This was evident when the
conditions changed during the execution of the operation. The
commander was able to adjust his plan during execution by
using combat power that was not originally planned for during
this operation. This adaptable formation was then able to
execute through an understanding of the commander‘s intent.
The unit understood that the blocking position in the south was
essential. The convoy, led by the battalion executive officer,

44
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
was able to adapt to the changing conditions through the
understanding of the mission and resulted in the successful
completion of the operation.

The 2-502nd Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division

deployed to Kosovo in May, 2001, as part of the NATO
peace enforcement operation in the war-torn Serbian
province. Its deployment coincided with the escalation of an
ethnic Albanian insurgency in the neighboring Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). To prevent
the Albanian guerillas from transporting weapons and
personnel from Kosovo into the FYROM, NATO
introduced Operation Relentless Denial.

Albanian smugglers had been moving drugs and illegal

goods through the area known as the chicken-leg for decades
(see maps), taking advantage of the geographical isolation and
austere terrain. When the Albanian National Liberation Army
looked to use the region to move weapons and supplies, it had
a cadre of experienced smugglers who were happy to lend their
expertise.

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Infantry in Battle

46
 Chapter 3, Adaptability

There were no drivable roads into the FYROM from the

―chicken-leg,‖ so, at some point near the border, Albanian
National Liberation Army smugglers would unload the
weapons and equipment and carry them across the border with
pack animals or by foot. These smugglers were tactically adept.
They would move at night, camouflage themselves with fresh

47
Infantry in Battle
vegetation, and avoid trails whenever possible. Often, they
would walk through streambeds to avoid leaving tracks.
What made the system most effective was the security and
reconnaissance screen that accompanied major shipments.
Rarely would weapons move without at least one forward
security element clearing the road ahead. These elements
would move anywhere between five hundred meters to five
kilometers ahead of the shipment and, using cell phones, would
report on checkpoints, KFOR patrols, and anything that might
pose a risk to the shipment.
Closer to the border, where the density of KFOR troops
increased, the Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers
used local citizens to create an even more elaborate
reconnaissance screen. People in the ―chicken-leg‖ would
observe KFOR movement and signal whether or not the area
was clear. They occasionally used cell phones, but usually they
would simply flash their house lights on and off to indicate our
presence. When patrolling in the southern chicken-leg, our
patrols routinely watched houses flash their lights as the patrols
approached.
Due to the surveillance and security employed by the
Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers, secrecy was
key to mission success. It was critical that their forward
security elements and local civilians not know that U.S. forces
were in the area. To accomplish this, I divided the platoon into
three reconnaissance and surveillance squads and a quick
reaction force squad. The basic plan was that the
reconnaissance and surveillance squads would covertly
overwatch possible smuggling routes. When they identified
Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers, they would
allow the forward security element to pass and find the main
shipment. They would then call the platoon quick reaction
force to conduct the actual capture. They would conduct the

48
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
actual interdiction themselves only if the quick reaction force
could not arrive in time. This would trick the captured
Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers into believing
that they had merely chanced into a KFOR patrol. They would
not understand the mechanism of our interdiction system, and,
if released, could not advise their counterparts on how to avoid
capture.
I normally put two reconnaissance and surveillance squads
on the border and one further inside Kosovo, all covering
potential avenues of approach. I assigned each of the
reconnaissance and surveillance squads a sector and let the
squad leaders determine where to position their observation
posts. The squad leaders would analyze their assigned terrain
and set up one or two surveillance sites.
By day, they sent out reconnaissance teams to look for
buried caches and signs of smuggling routes. In this manner,
the squads continuously developed their own intelligence and
were thus able to adapt to changing Albanian National
Liberation Army routes and tactics. They also occasionally
identified buried weapons caches. The Albanian National
Liberation Army employed these caches as temporary storage
sites when they had too many weapons with which to cross the
border at any one time.
An excellent example of our interdiction system at work
occurred one evening in June. Two Soldiers from First Squad
were overwatching the Lipkovsko Valley path when they
observed two men with backpacks stealthily attempting to
cross into Kosovo. The Soldiers called the quick reaction force
and explained the situation. Within five minutes, the quick
reaction force squad leader had his Soldiers (plus my radio
operator and me) briefed, loaded up, and on the road. He
established communications directly with the overwatching
Soldiers on his hand-held radio and asked for directions. While

49
Infantry in Battle
they vectored us in, we dismounted and moved quickly to
surround the two men.
Our appearance surprised the men in such a way that they
did not even attempt to run when confronted. In rudimentary
Albanian, one of the team leaders ordered the men to freeze
and drop their weapons. One was unarmed; the other pulled a
Russian 9mm pistol from his belt, cleared it, and offered it
handle-first to the searching Soldiers. While one team secured
the prisoners, the other team cleared the surrounding area and
searched for any hastily discarded weapons or documentation.
The entire operation took less than ten minutes.
The armed man carried documentation identifying him as
the Commander of 5th Battalion, 113th Albanian National
Liberation Army Brigade. The 5th Battalion was responsible for
re-supply and logistics within the eastern National Liberation
Army‘s area of operations. His capture represented an
intelligence windfall for KFOR and a major blow for NLA
operations in the Kumanovo region.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Andre

Rivier, who served as a platoon leader with 2nd Battalion, 502nd
Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary, we see how a platoon leader

developed tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs)to capture
smugglers with contraband crossing into Kosovo. He describes
how the locals developed a system to warn the smugglers that
the U.S. Army was operating in the area. The locals would
flash their house lights, and the smugglers, usually on foot or
with pack animals along trails, would have enough warning to
either change their path or vacate the area. CPT Rivier soon
realized that he needed to change the way in which his Soldiers

50
 Chapter 3, Adaptability
conducted their missions to be more effective at catching
smugglers. What he began to do was to put three squads in
overwatch while a fourth squad, his quick reaction force
(QRF), would be postured to interdict the smugglers. When
one of the squads in overwatch would identify smugglers, they
would call the QRF which would be able to rapidly move
towards the smugglers and capture them before they would
could run away. This TTP proved to be successful as CPT
Rivier and his platoon captured smugglers with weapons,
including the commander of the 5th Battalion, 113th Albanian
National Liberation Army Brigade.

In the months following the conclusion of major combat

operations in Iraq, U.S. forces assumed a variety of
missions, from hunting down terrorists to stability and
support operations to assisting the Iraqis in setting up
governments and standing the new Iraqi Army.

On May 17, 2003, at 0930 hrs., I was the XO in Chosen

Company, 2-503rd, 173rd Airborne Brigade, conducting
morning LOGPAC operations in Kirkuk, Iraq. By 1130, I was
a team leader, stacked against a wall, preparing to clear a
house. During those two hours, my company responded to
reports of rioting between the Arabs and Kurds throughout the
city as part of a Task Force effort to restore peace.
While conducting the morning LOGPAC, we received
reports of protests and gunfire. At 1000 hrs., I conducted
link-up with my Company Commander, CPT Arie Richards,
and together we resumed efforts in trying to control the volatile
situation. 1SG Nick Rolling reported that he was trying to
contain a firefight in D6, a hostile sector within the city. He
reported to the CO that he needed more Soldiers and that he
had fixed the location of the gunfire. With two HMMWVs, the

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Infantry in Battle
CO, four Soldiers from our company HQ, one squad from 1st
Platoon, and me, we moved to the 1SG‘s location and the
sounds of gunfire and women yelling.
The CO stopped the vehicles perpendicular to our 1SG‘s
position. This allowed our force to clear street-to-street while
the 1SG and his force could engage anyone we flushed. We
determined the 1SG‘s position and cautiously began to clear
the street leading to the area from where the gunfire was
coming. With four members of the headquarters element, I
moved forward down the street. Bullets, coming from a nearby
rooftop, ricocheted off a wall in front of us near a local man. I
stacked with two Soldiers against the corner of a building
adjacent to the building from where we were taking fire. From
there, we could see the top of the gunman‘s turban behind a
wall that was located on the roof. I shot a spotter round at the
wall where his head was to gain a quick zero and to check the
consistency of the wall. The two other HQ Soldiers moved
along a wall on the opposite side of the street from us to gain a
better angle. As they moved, I aimed three feet above the wall
where we saw the gunman‘s turban. At that moment, he stood
up and sprayed gunfire in the vicinity of my Soldiers across the
street. Although I shot, I did not see if I hit the gunman.
Immediately following the engagement, CPT Richards told
us to hold our position and await Bradley support. The gunfire
had stopped on our street, but 1SG Rolling reported gunfire
from his position near a school located in an open area. The
Bradley Fighting Vehicles were called forward to suppress the
school by fire and to breach the building.
Meanwhile, a family came towards us, screaming that there
was an unattended baby in a nearby house with an armed
gunman. SGT Neal, our company medic; one of our
translators; two Soldiers; and I stormed the house, sequentially
clearing the rooms. SPC Tusa and I cleared the second floor

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 Chapter 3, Adaptability
while SGT Neal and SPC Tanaka continued to clear the ground
floor. SGT Neal secured the baby, but the gunman had fled.
We moved back onto the street to join our company.
Just prior to the Bradleys‘ arrival, C Co, 1-508th, arrived to
assist in controlling the sector. When the Bradleys arrived, we
prepared to conduct the raid of the school. 1SG Rolling and
elements from 1st Platoon arrived just as CPT Richards
conducted hasty coordination and situation briefs with the
Bradley commanders. Because he had been near the school,
1SG Rolling aided in giving the Bradley commanders a more
in-depth perspective. Simultaneously, both company elements
began maneuvering to buildings near the school, posturing
themselves for the assault. The Bradley Platoon loaded our
company radio frequency and then proceeded across the open
area to the school. Thus far unopposed, one Bradley in the lead
breached an outer wall and crashed into the front entrance,
while a second maneuvered to support. Both of our companies
began maneuvering behind the Bradleys as they continued to
breach and isolate. The lead Bradley completed its task of
breaching the structure, and a mix of both companies of
Soldiers began clearing the school as an F-18 Hornet screamed
overhead, providing close air support to our maneuver forces.
As the Bradleys provided overwatch, our Soldiers searched for
the enemy, but the gunmen had fled during the Bradley
advance.

From the personal experience of 1LT Steve Brignoli, who

served as the Executive Officer, C Co., 2-503d IN (ABN), 173rd
Airborne Brigade, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Adaptive leadership can be defined as the

creative application of battle command; the leader is able to

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Infantry in Battle
visualize a situation in terms of enemy, terrain, and the higher
commander‘s intent; describe tasks and requirements in quick
mission-type orders to meet and accomplish commander‘s
intent; and direct action that creatively accomplishes the unit‘s
mission. 1LT Brignoli was able to quickly change his focus
based upon rapidly changing conditions. His ability to execute
LOGPAC operations for his company one instant, and then
transition to a quick reaction force in the next, demonstrates
adaptability.
Doctrinally, agility is a tenet of Army operations.
According to FM 3-0, Operations, ―agile commanders can
anticipate a full range of tasks and include capabilities to
accomplish them.‖ Further, ―commanders develop this state of
mind through rough, realistic training‖ and implement ―tactics
to mission requirements in dynamic environments.‖
Adaptability, although not clearly defined by doctrine, is really
the ability of the Soldier/leader to react to unanticipated
circumstances or unexpected challenges by making quick and
effective changes to his list of options. 1LT Brignoli
understood the complex nature of the terrain. He also realized
that the asymmetric enemy in contact with his 1SG posed the
greatest threat to his company‘s security and the Iraqi civilians‘
survival in his sector. Though his job requirements to the
company were traditionally understood to be combat service
support-oriented by design, he was adaptive enough to become
a combat Infantryman and lead an element to assist in
destroying the enemy when the situation required. Adaptive
leaders like 1LT Brignoli lead by example and are ―able to
adjust plans with minimal loss of combat power, making Army
forces more agile today than previously.‖ (FM 6-0).

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th

Ranger Regiment, received a FRAGO for a company air

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 Chapter 3, Adaptability
assault in northern Iraq and raid of a suspected terrorist
camp in northern Iraq. Intelligence sources had observed
the terrorist group infiltrating the Iraqi border from Syria
and establishing a base camp in a wadi system just north of
a small town. The intelligence community believed this
group was within 24-48 hours of conducting a suicide
bombing on Coalition forces in the Ramadi/Fallujah region
of Iraq.

First and Second platoons, with the Company

Headquarters, would air assault into four different Helicopter
Landing Zones (HLZs) on the eastern side of the wadi system
and assault two different objectives simultaneously, while
Third Platoon, with the mortar section and the Company
Executive Officer, would infiltrate via ground mobility assets
and establish an engagement area to the western side of the
wadi should anyone flee from the objective or try to reinforce
from the west. In addition to establishing the engagement area,
Third Platoon would secure the entire objective after the rest of
the company exfilled and conduct a battle hand-over with the
101st the following morning. Our platoon had been tasked to
clear OBJ Auburn and establish a blocking position to the north
of OBJ Auburn.

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Infantry in Battle

As the platoons were boarding the Black Hawk, I heard

over the headset that one of the birds was a ―Lame Duck‖ on
start. ―Oh crap,‖ I said to myself, ―I am going to have to bump
my 1st Squad.‖ Unfortunately, due to the bump plan, if one of
1st Platoon‘s helicopters broke, I would have to bump my 1st
Squad off because it was in the bump bird. Within minutes, the
bump plan was executed, and we were airborne.
Although I was angry that 1st Squad had been left behind,
there was nothing that I could do about it now. I had to worry
about the mission at hand. Luckily, this was one of the
contingencies that we had rehearsed and were prepared to
execute if necessary. Over the headset, I told the pilot to make
sure that my Platoon Sergeant, who was on the other bird, got
the word that 1st Squad would not make it. Then I told the 2nd
Squad Leader, with whom I was riding, what was going on and

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 Chapter 3, Adaptability
what he needed to accomplish. The plan now called for 2nd
Squad to assume 1st Squad‘s mission to clear the northern
portion of OBJ Auburn and establish the blocking position to
the north of the objective. Third Squad would now become the
main effort and clear the portion of OBJ Auburn where the
templated buildings were. Obviously, there were some gaps to
be filled in between the two squads, which I would have to
adjust once we got on the ground.
As soon as the birds touched down, we were off the helos
and began to receive sporadic fire from the objective. I was
amazed at how many people were still alive on the objective
after six 2000lb JDAMs were dropped on the objective, AC
130s had been on station for 15 minutes, and the Little Birds
had been conducting gun runs for over five minutes. The
Second Squad Leader began to maneuver his squad forward
and suppress known, likely, and suspected enemy positions.
Off to my left flank, I could see the Chinooks coming into their
HLZ‘s as tracer fire flew through the air from random spots on
the objective. We quickly moved up to the edge of the wadi
that looked down onto OBJ Auburn and began to throw
grenades into the wadi. During our platoon rehearsals, we had
decided to treat the wadi just like a trench line, which it
essentially was. When clearing a trench line, the battle drill
calls for soldiers to throw grenades into the trench, then follow
the explosion into the trench, or wadi in this case. We would
later discover that we killed at least two enemy personnel by
doing this.
Once 2nd Squad reached the edge of the wadi, I had it hold
up and overwatch for 3rd Squad. I also instructed my Weapons
Squad Leader to bring himself and one gun team over to link
up with me on the north side of OBJ Auburn. At this point, my
plan was for SSG Williams to use his machine guns to
establish the blocking position to the north and suppress

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Infantry in Battle
anyone who attempted to reinforce OBJ Auburn from the
north. SFC Albert called me over the radio and informed me
that he had linked up with elements of 1st Platoon and that we
were clear to move into the wadi now.
By this time, 3rd Squad was moving in the wadi and then
clearing the building complex on OBJ Auburn. From my
position, I could see 3rd Squad as it assaulted through the
objective, and I also could see my PSG, SFC Albert, moving
behind 3rd Squad.
Realizing that we may have bypassed some individuals
who now may be trying to flank us, I had 2nd Squad re-clear
back to the HLZ and then to the north. SSG Casey called over
the platoon assault net and informed me that the buildings on
OBJ Auburn were clear and that he had killed two more enemy
personnel. I then had him cross the wadi and begin to clear on
the eastern side to the north to ensure that no one was trying to
maneuver on us from the east. I also called 1LT Wertz, the 3rd
Platoon Leader, to inform him that I had a squad moving in the
vicinity of Engagement Area Hammer, and it was marked with
a directional strobe for identification. SSG Nolan came back to
my position and reported that his squad had not found any
more enemy personnel back to the east; I then had 2nd Squad
link up with 3rd Squad and clear the north on his side of the
wadi. Both squads moved up about 500 meters on each side of
the wadi and then came back. I called 06 and informed him that
the buildings on OBJ Auburn were clear,

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Scott B.

Cheney who served as the 2nd Platoon Leader, Bravo
Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

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 Chapter 3, Adaptability
DISCUSSION: This vignette is a great example of units
fighting the fight, not fighting the plan. Adaptive thinking,
coupled with strong unit rehearsals for bump-plan
contingencies, enabled CPT Cheney and his platoon to
effectively accomplish their assigned mission.
Each squad leader had a clear visualization of success. CPT
Cheney‘s OPORD and subsequent rehearsals allowed for
seamless transition from one squad, a planned supporting
effort, now assuming 1st Squad‘s mission when it was bumped.
At this point, the Ranger leadership was able to choose from a
menu of capabilities, options, and choices based on these
unanticipated changes in the situation to accomplish the
mission endstate. Leaders and units become adaptive based
upon their understanding of commander‘s intent, their training,
and their abilities to make quick, sound decisions in the face of
adversity.

From 6 April to 20 May 2004, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger

Regiment, executed combat operations in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Many of
these operations consisted of zone and area clearance
missions in which Rangers would saturate a specific area in
an attempt to garner intelligence and hunt enemy
combatants.

Over the course of the deployment, the 2nd Ranger

Battalion operated in an area in proximity to the Pakistan
border that was suspected of having high amounts of
Taliban/Al Qaeda activity. Although it was thought that
terrorists and criminals found sanctuary in this region, it was
extremely difficult to pinpoint where the enemy operated from
because locals claimed to have no knowledge of enemy activity
in the area. These difficult circumstances required that Rangers

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Infantry in Battle
be extra vigilant in attaining actionable intelligence and
pursuing anti-coalition forces. First Platoon, Alpha Company,
2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, deployed to this region in
early May, expecting to find the perpetrators of an ambush that
killed one Ranger just days prior. For this operation, our
mission was to clear a series of villages to disrupt enemy
operations and kill or capture enemy personnel in our area of
responsibility.
The operation commenced with a ground assault convoy
(GAC) a few hours after nightfall from our forward operating
base to the first objective in sector. Due to ongoing operations
that required the Company Commander‘s presence, I was sent
to be the ground force commander and was responsible for
providing overall command and control for the operation. Our
company had traveled this same route previously, thus
allowing us to move with speed and get established on the first
objective quickly. After a few hours of sleep in the assembly
area, we rose at sunrise to begin the clearing operations that
would last the better part of the day. Our efforts in the area did
not yield much in terms of information, and it was not until late
in the afternoon that the first significant action occurred.
Throughout the day, one squad from 1st Platoon was
conducting Traffic Control Point (TCP) operations along the
main road in the area. Stopping and searching vehicles passing
through the area, the squad found nothing of interest until one
car, carrying an older man we had come across a few nights
earlier, passed through the TCP. The man was a doctor in a
local village and claimed to know the whereabouts of a
younger man who might have ties to the ambush that
previously occurred. Although uncomfortable and somewhat
afraid, the doctor eventually agreed to lead us to the suspect‘s
house in a nearby village, and, in return, we assured him that
his identity would not be compromised. We compared the

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name he gave us to the names listed on a black list of potential
participants in the ambush that our Tactical HUMINT Team
(THT) was carrying. The names matched, so we began
preparing for a late night raid on the suspect‘s house.
Through satellite imagery and maps, we ascertained the
general location of the house. Once we moved into the vicinity,
the plan was to have the doctor use a set of night vision
goggles to pinpoint the exact house and relay the location
through the interpreter to the Platoon Sergeant who was riding
with him. We moved approximately three kilometers by
vehicle to the target, and, once we got there, the doctor
identified the house to the interpreter, at which time the
Platoon Sergeant radioed the house location over the net and
identified it by ―painting‖ the house with a laser. This method
of identifying a particular house from others of common size
and structure was both effective and simple. By focusing the
light from his hand-held laser on the target house, the Platoon
Sergeant showed the Rangers exactly what house they needed
to move to. In addition to searching the suspect‘s house, we
cleared the surrounding houses as well in an attempt to gain
more useful information regarding this individual. After the
raid was complete and the doctor identified all of the
individuals detained during the search, we knew that our
primary suspect had fled the area prior to our arrival. However,
the doctor confirmed that we had detained the suspect‘s father,
and, while the father had no knowledge of his son‘s current
location, we detained him for further questioning.
We took the suspect‘s father with us and moved to an
assembly area for the remainder of the night. The following
day, 1st Platoon continued to clear more villages in the area
while the THT interrogated the father. It appeared as though
the interrogation and the searches would provide no additional
information to act upon, but, late in the day, the THT informed

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Infantry in Battle
me that the suspect‘s father claimed to know the location of a
very powerful Taliban official who potentially had a
connection to the ambush. The father pointed out the general
location of the house and assured us that he could identify the
house once we got there. At this time, I informed Battalion
headquarters of the situation. After a condensed period of
planning of approximately two hours, I received approval to
execute the search, and we began preparing to move.
In an identical fashion to the previous night‘s mission, the
father wore night vision goggles and would identify the house
to the interpreter, who would then relay that information to the
Platoon Sergeant. After an approximately five-kilometer
movement by vehicle, the father pinpointed the house, and a
squad of Rangers moved to search it. Again, the suspect was
not in the house, but a neighbor stepped forward and told us
that he knew the suspect‘s current location and was willing to
take us there. We mounted our vehicles again and moved
forward through the extremely arduous terrain to the suspect‘s
location. The route leading up to the target area was typical for
that region: a dirt trail not much wider than our vehicles.
However, as we moved closer, the incline dramatically
increased, the rocks became more abundant, and eventually the
trail ended at the foot of a very steep hill. We left the vehicles
there and began a dismounted assault of the suspect‘s hideout.
With the neighbor by his side, the Platoon Leader led three
of his squads up into a mountainous hideaway to search the
scattered houses. After conducting an exhaustive search of the
area, the Platoon Leader moved with a squad into one of the
last houses left and found the Taliban suspect. He was
immediately identified by the neighbor traveling with the
platoon; the father, our original source, who was waiting by the
vehicles at the bottom of the mountain, also confirmed the
identity of the suspect. In addition to the primary suspect, the

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neighbor identified five additional Al Qaeda operatives who
were living in the hideaway, all of whom were detained. After
reporting our actions to the battalion headquarters, 1st Platoon
conducted a late night GAC back to the FOB where we turned
all six suspects over to interrogation professionals. A few days
later, I received word that the Taliban official was indeed who
we thought he was, and his days of fueling terrorism and
criminal acts were over.

From the personal experience of 1LT Kirby R. Dennis, who

served as Executive Officer of Alpha Company, 2nd Ranger
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This vignette highlights two very important

enduring lessons from operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
First, it highlights the differences of and challenges of
attacking a network instead of a more traditional enemy or
terrain oriented objective. CPT Dennis‘ and the Rangers‘
operation more closely resembles police work than warfare. In
fact, OGA efforts with counter-drug, organized crime, and
gang warfare illustrate the complexities and patience needed to
incrementally win such a fight. Their persistence, patience, and
agility enabled them to penetrate the network faster than the
enemy‘s controls could reform or inform its cells. Units
fighting in such a conflict must plan for multiple sequels to
counter the perishable nature of intelligence on a network.
What is laudable about this operation is that CPT Dennis
and his Rangers were able to actively find and use human
intelligence sources without revealing their identities and
putting them in danger. Usually indicative of U.S. Special
Forces missions, these activities are not trained and practiced
by Infantrymen. The Rangers‘ use of civilians to gather

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actionable intelligence, while preserving the safety of those
civilians, was an adaptive measure used by CPT Dennis to
effectively find and capture high payoff targets. His unit‘s
ability to identify the value of using civilians in the local area
to augment his patrol activities is something that reflects his
ability to react to the unanticipated circumstance quickly and
effectively.
The second enduring lesson is the synergy created between
the Rangers and the tactical HUMINT teams (THT). Each of
these units has their inherent strengths and weaknesses. This
vignette shows how to properly complement and compensate
for those, respectively. In this case, the team was far enough
forward, yet detached enough from the unit, to perform its
appropriate role.
These two enduring lessons were key to the Rangers‘
success. Agility led to the adaptability required for our leaders
to think and act faster than our enemy. This vignette shows us
what persistence and the exploitation of properly acquired
intelligence can do.

CONCLUSION: Given an effective mission-essential task list

(METL); clearly communicated rules of engagement; and
tough, realistic training as a foundation for action, our
Infantrymen have the assets to adapt to any situation they face.
That, combined with a strong IPB, will allow our leaders to
read the situation and then be able to develop and apply the
TTPs that will allow for success. The Army‘s transformation
into modular organizations—which are adaptable to any
situation Soldiers may face—will ensure Soldiers and leaders
have all of the tools necessary to succeed.

64
 CHAPTER 4: Using Terrain
The contour of the land is an aid to the army; sizing up
opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and
distances…those who do battle without knowing these
will lose.
Sun Tzu
The Art of War, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: While joint operations occur in three

dimensions, Infantry commanders must focus on the ground.
Once a commander receives an operation and analyzes his task
and purpose, he immediately begins analysis of the terrain
upon which operations will take place. This analysis includes
all terrain features, how the terrain can be used to friendly
advantage, how the terrain can be used against the enemy, and
how the enemy may use the terrain against friendly forces.
Although small Infantry units cannot often choose the terrain
over which they will attack or upon which they will defend,
they can make the best of it.
Army operations in the past 15 years have occurred in areas
that we have traditionally avoided, for good reason; there can
be no more challenging environment than the mountains of
Afghanistan, as the Soviets discovered in the 1980‘s, or the
complex urban areas of the Middle East. Our Infantrymen in
Somalia, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq who have taken the
challenge of fighting the enemy in these inhospitable regions
have succeeded, in large part, because of their ability to
analyze the terrain and use it to their advantage.

On 2 March 2002, troops from the 2-187th Infantry,

101st Airborne, conducted an unopposed night air assault

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Infantry in Battle
into the northern tip of the Shah-I-Kot Valley in support of
Operation Anaconda.

Two hours after sunrise, on 3 March, CPT Kevin Butler

and his Soldiers were just starting to wonder whether they were
missing all the action when, with a whistle and an almighty
boom, the first Al Qaeda mortar round hit barely 50 feet from
their position. A second round exploded moments later, as
Alpha Company's Soldiers scrambled to find cover and to
locate the enemy who had them in his crosshairs.
It took only moments for the Alpha Company troops to spot
one of the three positions that had them in its range. ―They're
on the snow-covered mountain,‖ shouted the observers posted
on the low hills around the command post, pointing towards
the peak in question. Soon the Soldiers realized they were

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being attacked from three different positions simultaneously.
One Al Qaeda mortar was firing rounds at them from a position
to the south, while another was shelling them from a peak to
the west. In between the mortar volleys, the enemy was raining
fire from a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 12.7mm heavy machine
gun, RPGs, and Kalashnikov rifles on Alpha Company from a
third position that no one could pinpoint immediately.
As his Soldiers scrambled for cover, Butler faced a crucial
moment in any young officer's career: his first time under fire,
with about 100 Soldiers – almost all of whom were equally
new to combat – looking to him for leadership. What they may
not have realized at the time was that Butler had already made
two decisions that would likely save some of their lives. One of
those was his decision, made in the bitter cold in the early
hours of that morning, to locate his command post, and the
bulk of his force, in a deep wadi. The dried-up stream bed was
wide enough to allow Soldiers to walk through it and sleep in it
but so narrow that it would take an extraordinarily lucky—or
skillful—mortarman to land a shell inside its steep, rocky
walls. The other decision that would prove crucial over the
next few hours was Butler's determination that bringing his
company's own two 60mm mortars would be worth the hassle
of lugging the bulky weapons through the thin mountain air.
Butler quickly brought his two-mortar section into the
fight, and from a protected position in the wadi, it started
returning fire on the two enemy positions within its range. Its
first shots brought a wry comment from Butler. ―It's all fun and
games until the other guy has a mortar too,‖ said Butler, whose
radio call sign was ―Black Hawk 6.‖ But, even Butler's skilled
mortar section needed help. The mortar position to the south
was beyond its range. Only air power could destroy it. SGT
Corey Daniel, the company's fire support NCO, called in F-16
and F-15E attack jets. At 1021 hrs., a series of loud explosions

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from the direction of the southern Al Qaeda positions
announced the arrival of the close air support and was met with
cheers from the Alpha Company troops. A combination of air
strikes and Alpha Company's mortars put an end to the other,
closer position where the recoilless rifle lay, but there still
remained the mortar on the western ridge. It was inside of the
Alpha mortars' range, but the four Al Qaeda troops knew their
business. As soon as they heard the drone of incoming aircraft
or the distinctive bang of the Alpha Company mortars firing,
they would run from the ridge to take cover, reappearing after
the U.S. ordnance had landed to wave defiantly and send
another shell Alpha Company's way. Knowing that if any of
the Al Qaeda rounds found their target, he could lose several
Soldiers, Butler thought quickly. ―I was trying to come up with
a way of sneaking the round in quietly,‖ he said. He settled on
a novel approach.
CPT Butler ordered SGT Daniel to call in another air strike
and had his mortarmen calculate how long their rounds spent in
the air on their way to the ridgeline. The answer was 32
seconds—long enough for the enemy mortar crew to run for
cover, wait for an explosion, and reappear. Butler directed his
mortar crews to fire several rounds at the moment they heard
the explosion from the close air support. ―I thought maybe we
could mask the sound of the 60 mm mortars firing with the
sound of the close air support,‖ he said. As the booms from the
Air Force bombing echoed across the valley, Butler's crews
went to work. ―The boys were just hanging rounds like
nobody's business,‖ he said. Seven rounds flew out of the tubes
toward the ridgeline. Watching through his binoculars, SGT
Daniel saw the four Al-Qaeda troops reappear on the ridge. As
they taunted the American troops, all seven rounds came down
on them, blowing them off the ridgeline and killing them.
―We've got the best mortarmen in the battalion,‖ one Soldier

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 Chapter 4, Using Terrain
could be overheard telling a buddy after the fight. ―And the
best company commander,‖ the other Soldier replied.

From a March, 2002, article by Army Times staff writer Sean

D. Naylor

DISCUSSION: This vignette illustrates the importance of

cover and the use of mortars in mountain warfare.
The use of cover is seen in the selection of the location of
the command post. CPT Butler took advantage of the wadi‘s
narrow and steep rocky walls that provided cover to all but the
luckiest of indirect shots. The cover provided by the wadi
allowed U.S. forces to organize and rest as the battle
progressed.
The wadi also provided cover for Alpha Company‘s mortar
positions. The mortars, although bulky and heavy to carry in
the thin mountain air, provided the commander with responsive
and accurate fires to counter the enemy‘s use of mortars firing
from more exposed firing positions. Moreover, his ingenious
use of CAS to capitalize on the enemy‘s predictability can‘t be
overstated. In the end, the U.S. commander was able to
effectively read the terrain and use combined arms to defeat the
enemy.

At 0630, 2 March 2002, the TOC for TF 1-87, 10th

Mountain Division, air assaulted into the Shah-I-Kot Valley
as part of Operation Anaconda.

As the CH-47 landed with a thud, all I could think about

was getting off of that huge target. As the Chinook flew away,
the seven of us formed our own perimeter as we prepared our
SKEDCO (field litter) with extra water, MREs, long-range
antenna, and batteries. After 30 seconds on the ground, the

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Infantry in Battle
CSM and I located a small rise in the flat valley only thirty or
forty meters away. The ―Bowl,‖ as it is fondly known now, was
basically centered between BP Ginger and BP Heather, and it
would provide good cover and concealment as there were no
trees on the LZ or in the desert valley.
Maybe 45-60 seconds after landing, red tracers began
kicking dirt up just a few meters from my front, and then came
the report of the rifle fire and loud snaps as the rounds traveled
next to my head. We dropped the SKEDCO and ran to the
ridgeline for protection. As I was getting ready to go over the
top of the rock ridge, I saw the Operations Sergeant, SFC
Robert Healy, who was leading the remainder of the TAC,
including the S-3, MAJ James Hall, to link-up at my location.
As he closed to within ten feet of me, close enough for us to
hear each other, we confirmed accountability, and,
simultaneously, an RPG landed between us, no more than five
feet away. It did not explode but lay there, sparking; I cannot
remember ever running so fast with my ruck on in my life.
As the remainder of the TAC moved over the mound, we
set up communications and a hasty command post in the dried
out creek bed cut out in the center of the bowl; this was our
home for the next 18+ hours. The dried creek bed was nearly
200 meters long, surrounded by high ground on the east, west,
and north. To the south, the little bowl was open, looking out to
the dried up Sorbaghi River. The aircraft I was on in HLZ 13
and the one at HLZ 13A carried the Soldiers who were
supposed to establish blocking positions Ginger and Heather.
The bowl was at the edge of BP Heather so that was
established; however, C Company never made it all the way to
BP Ginger.
As the situation developed, we realized that the enemy was
executing the most dangerous course of action we had
discussed in mission analysis: he was not occupying the

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 Chapter 4, Using Terrain
villages but defending fearlessly from the hills. Initial estimates
ranged from 200-400 enemy fighters; later reports concluded
that up to 800 hard-line Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were
killed in and around the valley and mountains.
With 82 personnel on the ground, fixed by heavy small
arms and RPG fire from the ridge line to the east, the Takur
Ghar Mountain, now known as Ginger Mountain, we were
unable to maneuver. The battalion mortar section set up the
sole 120mm mortar and was firing it as fast as it could, but
enemy direct fire was landing within feet of the tube. The
enemy mortar-men began to adjust 82mm mortar rounds in on
the 120mm mortar position. On one occasion, five rucksacks
were destroyed and subsequently detonated a Claymore mine
concealed within one of the rucksacks. The enemy was also
attempting to place indirect fire on our position with 122mm
towed howitzer fire from within the valley. We later found
three artillery pieces and a large cache of artillery rounds three
to four kilometers away, so we confirmed the enemy had
artillery in the area.
The first CAS asset to come on station for us was the
AH-64s, flying low over-head. However, the Apaches could
not elevate from behind a terrain feature to establish traditional
support by fire positions because they could not hover at that
altitude. LZ 13 and 13A were at approximately 8500 feet, and
the enemy fighters were anywhere from 8500 to 10000+ feet
on the mountain. A total of six Apaches were used that
morning; five of the six were damaged from ground fire
vicinity LZ 13. The Apaches tried to fire the 30mm cannon and
2.75‖ rockets at the dug-in enemy, but the amount of ground
fire and elevation was too much for the Apaches.
After the first couple of Apache runs, we received priority
of fast moving CAS. All types of aircraft were flying, from
B-52s to F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18s. The first bomb dropped

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Infantry in Battle
for us in the Shah-I-Kot was a 2000 lb. JDAM (Joint Direct
Attack Munitions), the Global Positioning System (GPS)
guided bomb that was dropped from a B-52 flying at 50,000
feet, which landed only 300 meters to our east. Several others
followed, but none were any closer.
The enemy had discovered from other engagements that
when the jets are flying over-head, the bombs will follow, so
they would retreat into their caves. Once the bomb landed, they
would run out again and engage us again. The enemy firing
mortars at us had the base plates cemented into the ground near
caches of ammo. They would remove the tube, hide in the
cave, and then run out set up and aim, using Kentucky
windage, or hip-shooting, with the firm base plate. We
determined that the enemy had likely registered his mortars in
the valley floor where we were, near trails and passes through
the lower Shah-I-Kot. To distract the enemy mortars, we would
try to fix them with small arms or machine gun fire or
Apaches, if on station, then bring in a jet to drop bombs while
the enemy was busy fighting the Infantry.
The battalion‘s first casualties came as enemy mortar
rounds landed on our 120mm mortar position. I recall looking
down to the mortar firing position, then an explosion and black
cloud of smoke then screams. The CSM said what everyone
else was already thinking, ―We have just taken our first Killed
in Action.‖ Although no one was killed, we had 6-8 wounded
from the shrapnel alone. Throughout the day, most casualties
were due to mortar shrapnel, but several Soldiers had bullet
wounds to the extremities. One Soldier actually had two
7.62mm round strike him in his new Interceptor Body Armor;
he yelled he had been hit, but the bullets had been stopped by
the ceramic plate.
Throughout the day, both direct and indirect fire remained
heavy until around 1300 hrs., when it seemed, if only for 30 to

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45 minutes, that there was a lull in the fighting, with only
sporadic small arms fire from the hills. After the lull, enemy
fire rained down on our position, as if he was committing all of
his assets to the fight.
That was about the time one of the enemy mortars seemed
to be bracketing rounds in on the bowl; eventually, an enemy
mortar round found its way into the center of the BN TAC. The
round landed strangely in small creek bed, in the center of our
perimeter. The splash and shrapnel came to the eastern side of
the small creek where the S3; FSO; CSM; Ops SGT; our senior
Radio Telephone Operator (RTO), SGT Black; and I were
sitting. Each took shrapnel in the extremities, particularly SGT
Black who received a severe gash in his lower right leg. Once
the initial shock of the round and the injuries wore off, we
quickly assessed each other and moved about fifteen feet up the
eastern side of the ditch. At least two or three subsequent
rounds landed to the left and right of the position we had
previously occupied; had we not moved even fifteen feet, we
may have taken several more casualties.
At approximately 2000, under cover of darkness two
UH-60 Air ambulances flew in to extract the eight most critical
Soldiers. As the two aircraft flew in over the top of the bowl,
enemy 12.7mm DSHk fire and airburst RPGs almost shot down
one of the aircraft. The UH-60s were able to land on the west
side of the bowl, covered from enemy fire by a small ridge line,
to load and exfil the casualties back to Bagram airbase. The
remainder of C Company and TAC would have to wait for
another four hours to be exfiltrated on CH-47‘s, as several
other lifts on 101st Soldiers were flying in to the north of OBJ
GINGER.

From the personal experience monograph of CPT Timothy

Gittins, who served as the Assistant S-3, TF 1-87, 10th

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Infantry in Battle
Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: CPT Gittins‘ vignette demonstrates what

Infantryman can do to maximize the benefit terrain offers when
the enemy situation is not as they originally envisioned. The
enemy situation is never a ―known‖ entity and oftentimes
changes when the first contact occurs. What does not change,
however, is the terrain that defines the battlespace.
The enemy was not intermixed with the civilians in the
villages on the Shah-I-Kot valley floor, as most planners
assumed prior to Operation Anaconda. The enemy was actually
located in the surrounding ridgelines and cliffs that
overwatched the Americans‘ landing zones. Taking severe fire
upon landing, Gittins and LTC LaCamera‘s TAC made a quick
assessment of the terrain at hand and maximized the only cover
and concealment afforded by a small depression in the valley
floor a few hundred meters away. Later known as ‗Hell‘s
Halfpipe,‘ this ground lent itself to protection from enemy
fires, as well as an adequate mortar firing point for a section of
the battalion‘s 120mm mortars.
As our doctrine on the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) indicates, ―step two of the IPB is evaluating
the battlefield effects with which both sides must
contend…Infantrymen consider the possible actions of the
enemy they are about to contend with and how the terrain will
affect both themselves and their adversary.‖ (FM 34-130) The
IPB is a continuous process. The Infantrymen who air assaulted
into the HLZ 13 and 13A fought the enemy and not the plan;
they did a quick assessment and used the existing terrain to
their advantage against an enemy that occupied dominating
positions on key terrain.

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 Chapter 4, Using Terrain
From 17 March until 1 April, 2003, C Company, 2-7
Infantry, 3rd ID, as part of TF 3-69 Armor, had fought its
way from the Kuwaiti border to the Euphrates River. On
1 April, TF 3-69, traveling ahead of the main body, was
tasked to secure a large bridge, known as Objective Peach.
The writer served as XO, C Company, 2-7 Infantry.

Company A (Tank) led the battalion, and C Company was

second in the order of march. When an A Company tank crew
reported it could see the Euphrates Bridge, C was to take the
lead and suppress the far side of the objective, while the
engineers came forward, along with Bravo Company, 3-7
Infantry, to check for demolitions on the bridge. This required
them to check under the bridge using boats. The battalion had
an engineer boat team attached to it specifically for this
mission.
Captain Kelly, C Company Commander, directed 1st
Platoon move to right side of the bridge and provide
suppressing fire from that side while 2nd Platoon moved to the
left of the bridge to provide a support by fire. The 3rd Platoon,
the assault element, would cross the bridge and secure a
foothold for the Battalion to pass through and continue its
attack. Battalion fired a smoke mission to obscure movement,
but the smoke landed directly on top of the 1st Platoon element.
Meanwhile, as 2nd Platoon was moving into position, the
Platoon Leader encountered a marshy area, and his tank
became mired. When his Platoon Sergeant attempted to pull
him out with his tank, his tank became mired as well. The
Platoon Leader radioed me that his two vehicles were stuck and
that he would not be able to observe the far side of the bridge. I
called up my mechanics and had them move their M88 to the
mired tanks. Because they were a few kilometers away from

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us, I informed the Commander that it would be a while until we
got the two tanks unstuck.
He then told me to take my Bradley, along with the Smoke
Platoon, to provide overwatch and destroy any enemy that we
could engage on the far side of the bridge. During this time, the
other companies lined up behind our company position while
the engineers were moving the boats towards the bridge. I
looked at my map and had to figure a way to take the Smoke
Platoon. I found a trail on the map and told the Smoke Platoon
Leader to follow me, as we headed towards the trail.
The trail was very narrow, with about a ten-foot drop on
either side of it. It looked like about six inches of my track was
hanging off the trail, and I was praying that the trail would not
start to collapse. Along the winding trail, there were places
where I had to go between two trees, and the Bradley would
rub half the bark off because the trail was so narrow. After
about ten minutes of weaving my way through, I found an
opening where I could see the other side of the bridge. I was
directly beside a house, and there were some other houses
around my area as well. As I called the Commander that I was
in position, an old man, who looked like a farmer, came out of
a hole which resembled a bunker and began to walk towards
me. I thought this might be a trap, and I pointed my weapon at
him and told him to move in the opposite direction of me. After
many hand gestures, he got the idea and began to move the
opposite way.
Soon, mortar rounds began to land in our area, and I
buttoned up but realized I couldn't really see anything, so I
opened my hatch and hoped that a mortar round wouldn't land
on top of me. My gunner spotted three motorcycles with mortar
tubes, and we destroyed them with HE rounds. As soon as we
were done destroying the motorcycles, a troop transport truck
began to move towards the bridge, and we destroyed that as

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well. I called to the Commander and let him know what I was
seeing; it seemed that I was the only person who could see to
the other side of the bridge. Battalion radioed and told us to go
ahead and start employing the smoke. The Smoke Platoon
Leader did so, and soon the whole battlefield was covered with
smoke. As I spotted more enemy vehicles trying to reach the
bridge, my gunner destroyed them. The Iraqis were trying to
get to the bridge to detonate explosives to destroy it and,
although they were successful in detonating one part of it, they
only caused minimal damage to the bridge.
During this time, the engineers had managed to get the
boats in the river, disarmed the remaining explosives under the
bridge, and said it was clear to cross. I was relieved because I
felt like a huge target on the battlefield and was tired of
sporadic mortar fire that was landing around me.
Captain Kelly ordered 3rd Platoon to cross the bridge and
establish a foothold on the far side of the bridge. As 3rd Platoon
crossed, it destroyed the remaining enemy vehicles in its area.
By this time, a Bradley section from 2nd Platoon relieved
me, and I brought the smoke vehicles back to the rear of the
company. The remaining two companies then moved across the
bridge and began to destroy targets as they moved into the area.
The battalion was all across, and other battalions then began to
move through our position on the bridge. There was a great
sense of pride knowing that we had been the first unit to secure
the Euphrates Bridge.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Michael M.

Pecina, who served as Executive Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th
Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

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DISCUSSION: CPT Pecina‘s actions along the near side bank
of the river clearly reinforce a Soldier‘s absolute requirement
to continuously evaluate terrain in his battlespace as part of his
analysis of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
CPT Pecina called for additional smoke to obscure his
element‘s maneuver onto OBJ Peach. He accurately analyzed
the ground and understood that the weather effects would allow
for effective smoke obscuration due to the proximity of the
Euphrates River. The temperature and humidity of the area
would prolong the effects of the smoke, thus allowing for
effective maneuver. In contact with the enemy, which was on
the far side of the bridge, CPT Pecina used battlefield effects to
further his advantage and decided to maneuver cross-country
along a cross mobility corridor he identified on his map. His
ability to visualize and understand the terrain enabled him to
maneuver to a key vantage point along the river and
contributed significantly to the overall success of his unit. With
the Al Mussayib Euphrates Bridge crossing site secured, other
units of the 3rd Infantry Division maneuvered on toward
Baghdad.

On 2 April 2003, the 3rd Infantry Division approached

Karbala, located approximately sixty miles south of
Baghdad. Because it had a bridge that allowed for
mechanized movement across a large wadi in the middle of
the desert, known as the Karbala Gap, it became decisive
terrain for the 3rd ID’s movement to Baghdad. The nearby
city of Karbala afforded the enemy the opportunity to
cover this bridge by fire and had been occupied by the
Iraqi Army for the conduct of an area defense. The 3 rd
Infantry Division saw no reason to enter and clear the city
during its push to reach Baghdad, so it isolated and
bypassed the city. The 3rd ID did leave behind a small

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element to secure the bridge crossing the Karbala Gap,
thus providing mobility to all follow-on Coalition forces.
The 101st Airborne Division was assigned the mission to
relieve the 3ID security force and clear the city of Karbala
on April 4th, 2003.

By the time my Battalion, the 3-502nd, reached Karbala on

April 5th, we had taken part in numerous small unit level
engagements—approximately 4-6 man security positions—
some random mortar fire, the occasional sniper -- but in all
cases, they were one-sided fights. The enemy, which consisted
of not only the Iraqi Army, but Fedayeen soldiers as well,
would fire a few perfunctory rounds and then withdraw so as to
not become decisively engaged.
I went to the Battalion Operations Order at 0600 hrs. on
April 5th. The general concept of the operation was for
B/3-502nd, the Bulldogs, to Air Assault to the southwest of the
city to seize a water treatment plant for the Battalion to use as a
CTCP (Combat Trains Command Post), and then move
northeast through the city, stopping to set up Company battle
positions at night and continuing in the morning, until the
entire sector was cleared. We would then be met by Black
Hawk helicopters on the northeast side of the city for extraction
and movement to the next city north.
The Black Hawk helicopters arrived, and we conducted our
air assault into Karbala. I had four aircraft for my PLT, which
put a squad plus—about 10-12—fully loaded Infantrymen per
aircraft. I rode in the first aircraft of my lift with my 1st Squad
and headquarters section. Just prior to getting on the aircraft, I
had been discussing with my 1st Squad Leader, SSG Luke Carr,
that the likely LZ was only 500-1000 meters from the city
itself, with the worst case scenario being our landing upon
Highway 1, no more than 4km away.

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As we approached Karbala at 500 feet, we could see tanks
and Bradley fighting vehicles from 1-41 IN interspersed with
their Infantrymen on the outside of the city, exchanging fire
with what must be the enemy within. I watched a section of
Kiowa Warrior helicopters conduct an attack on something that
was unseen to me; then I heard the ―cherry‖ call come over my
headset from the pilot, meaning the pilot had determined the
LZ to be hot. We were coming into Karbala under fire.
Our aircraft were checked off of the original LZ and flew
out to the west of the city. I was desperately trying to orient
myself from the air to our Company‘s sector of the city, which
was falling further by the second into the eastern sky, when
SSG Carr pounded on my chest and leaned in close to be heard
over the rotor wash of the helicopter; he pointed down out the
window and yelled, ―Is that Highway 1?‖ I looked down out
the other side of the aircraft at a paved highway running
generally north-south, surrounded by miles and miles of barren,
open desert, broken only by the city of Karbala to the east and
yelled back, ―You see any other road out there?‖ I could not
hear SSG Carr‘s response, but I think I read the blasphemy on
his lips—we were going for a long walk in the hot desert sand.
My platoon dismounted the aircraft and formed a battle line
on a berm 4km to the west of Karbala, while we waited for the
remainder of the inbound Company. We were to be the last
platoon in the Company order of march, so we were the first on
the ground to provide security. As the Company‘s elements
landed, they immediately formed and began movement, with
1LT Joe Thomas and his 2nd Platoon leading off. We were in a
Company column, platoons in column, squads in wedge
formation which stretched out over the desert about 1000
meters from head to tail and at least 200 meters wide. As we
maneuvered toward the city in a very long company column,
the Commander tasked the attached mechanized platoon to race

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north and south to our front to create a cloud of dust and sand
to provide obscuration for our very exposed formation.
Enemy artillery and mortar fire was our greatest threat at
this point. The ground we walked upon was like that of a
beach: loose and deep. With every step forward, we felt as
though we were falling half a step back. Every Soldier was
loaded down with combat gear, assault packs, and body
armor—weights ranging from 80 lbs, for the average rifleman,
to 120 lbs for a machine gunner or RTO. We took only the
essentials: if it was not bullets, body armor, batteries, or water,
we left it behind. It was about 1000 hrs. when we left Highway
1, and the temperature was already into the mid-nineties; most
Soldiers in the Company were already down to their final
canteen.
My Platoon began to pass Bradley fighting vehicles and
tanks in battle positions about 2000 meters from the outer walls
of the city, which meant that Joe Thomas and 2nd Platoon were
only about 1000 meters from entering the city proper. If one
was not tracking the Company progress by GPS, it was hard to
tell how far from the city we were—it was like an old Bugs
Bunny cartoon I remembered seeing as a kid where the mirage
just remains out of reach, no matter how long Bugs walked
towards it. It was impossible to judge distances in the open
desert. My 2nd Squad Leader called me on the icom radio and
asked, ―How much further to the city?‖ I looked around at my
Soldiers, panting and trudging through the sand and beating
sun; checked my GPS; and called back, ―Just another klick.‖ A
klick later, I would answer the same question with the same
answer. SSG Ryan Alfaro (2nd SL) came back immediately,
―Hey, you said ‗a klick‘ a klick ago.‖ I replied, ―Ohh, you
wanted to know how far until we hit the city, I thought you
meant until the Company enters the city.‖ There was a moment
of silence on the radio while I listened to a few chuckles from

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the men around me, then SSG Alfaro said, ―OK, how much
farther until we—3rd Platoon—enter the city?‖ I replied,
―About a klick.‖ I only caught half of SSG Alfaro‘s reply,
which had something to do with my mother, because he
stopped transmitting it over the net. My RTO, SPC Schake,
began singing the Alice in Chains‘ song, ―Man in the Box,‖ a
tradition we had started to kill the boredom of long road
marches while training at Fort Campbell. It seemed very
appropriate, and more than a few of the boys joined in.
Halfway through the song, 2nd Platoon entered the city and
immediately came under direct fire.
I maneuvered my platoon to the left flank of Gary Bartels
and his 1st Platoon and established an overwatch position on a
line of berms about 400 meters from the outer walls of the city,
while 1st and 2nd platoons ran to the cover provided by the
buildings. Once both platoons were inside the street system,
my Platoon picked up and followed. The sounds of small arms
fire was constant but always just ahead of my platoon, as we
rushed to catch up with the rest of the Company. A few blocks
in, we finally found 1st Platoon halted in the street, while 2nd
PLT was clearing and securing the water treatment plant. I
moved forward to link up with Gary Bartels to find out what
was going on. The cross street separating the tail of his platoon
from the head of mine became its own little war for a few
minutes while we all exchanged M4 for AK-47 fire and M203
HE for RPG rounds with some enemy soldiers a few blocks to
the northeast. My RTO and I crossed at a momentary lull, and I
ran into Gary. He pointed out the water treatment plant and our
Company‘s breach point and said it should not be more than a
few minutes until Joe was finished clearing and we could move
in.
We were going to have to cross a large open area, about
300 meters long, to get inside the water treatment plant, and

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none of us wanted to leave the cover of the city street walls.
Gary and I wished each other good luck, and I watched as
bullets kicked up dust on the berm surrounding the water
treatment plant as 1st Platoon made its run for it.
Then it was our turn. We crossed just as we had trained to
cross open areas in the urban environment, just a little faster.
Bullets provide great motivation. Once inside, our Company
Commander, CPT James McGahey, set 2nd Platoon into its
SBF position oriented to the east and had me place one squad
on an outer berm to overwatch the southern approach to the
water plant. The remainder of the Company hunkered down
inside two buildings on the compound awaiting the drop of a
JDAM (500lbs bomb) seven blocks away in the monument
sector. It seems a large formation of enemy soldiers had been
observed there.
It was 1200 hrs. The Company was almost completely out
of water. My Platoon was down to its last two or three canteens
for the entire platoon. My medic, SPC Jarod ―Doc‖ Herniak,
had begun to consolidate the remaining canteens for use only
upon our expected casualties. The Battalion Trains decided
they could not make it to the water treatment plant; the area
was just too hot.
I was called into the CP to receive my orders from CPT
McGahey. He was in his usual orders position, kneeling on the
ground over his map, using his knife as a pointer. He said we
were leaving, we were going to take the fight to the enemy, and
3rd Platoon was on point. He ordered my Platoon and 1st
Platoon to search and attack the ―monument sector.‖
It took a little more personal will than I would have liked to
exercise to bring myself and my Platoon outside the seeming
safety of the water plant and the protection its walls provided. I
could feel the fear and uncertainty of my Soldiers as I told
them to exit the entry breach of our safe haven and hoped I was

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not showing my own. SFC Stone and I moved forward in the
formation and led the Platoon out of the fence surrounding the
water plant; once the men saw that we were all right, it was as
if their heads cleared, and they returned to the aggressive
mentality they had always had. The 105mm artillery prep fires
started just as we entered the streets. I could feel the
concussion and hear the enemy AKs and Kiowa choppers
playing tag with each other, not 500 meters away. The CO
halted my Platoon in the street while we waited out the prep
fires. SGT Jason Sypherd, 1st Squad‘s lead Team Leader,
yelled back from the road intersection he was holding at, ―I feel
pieces of shrapnel flying over my head.‖ I yelled back, ―Well,
keep your head behind that wall.‖ It was a very long five
minutes listening to the war.
My mouth was so dry, whether from fear or lack of water
(we left the CTCP ―black‖) I don‘t know, probably both. The
order to continue movement was both a blessing and a curse: I
was happy to be moving again, for it took my mind off my own
welfare, but we were pushing into the area that had previously
been reported to contain an enemy regimental headquarters—
enough enemy soldiers to warrant my chain of command
attempting to drop a JDAM five blocks from where I was
standing. We turned the corner into the city proper and
immediately came under sniper fire. We could not see them,
just their bullets ricocheting off walls and kicking up dust at
our boots. We kept moving, straining to see any threat before it
saw us.
Two blocks in, we received very effective volleys of
AK-47 fire in the street. We knew the street was the kill
zone—we had to get out of it. I ordered everyone to enter the
buildings. Our tactic of having one squad on the left side of the
street, and one squad on the right with a MG attached to each,
paid dividends. Both squads ended up in secured positions with

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heavy weapons capabilities. I personally breached the house
SSG Carr was to go to and began to clear with my RTO (SPC
Schake) and my FO (SGT Slaton), until the line squad entered.
It was obvious that this house had felt the effects of the
105-artillery fire, a portion of the roof had caved in; there were
two men inside, one of them with pretty severe wounds on his
face. Doc Herniak began to treat the wounded man, while SSG
Carr‘s squad moved to the roof. While we moved from the
street to the rooftop in under two minutes, the firing had
stopped. We never did see the guys who shot at us.
After about 15 minutes, we left the house and continued
our movement north. We pushed up another two blocks and
saw what we believed to be the rooftop from which we had
been receiving the vast majority of fire. We entered and cleared
two houses on the opposite side of the street. We found nothing
but empty shell casings and two very frightened people, a man
and his wife, the woman screaming and crying uncontrollably.
As I knelt in front of what used to be their living room window,
looking at my men maneuver on the two houses across the
street, listening to all of the automatic gunfire going on around
me, I briefly considered how it would feel to have my own
home in the middle of a war zone when a foreign army kicks in
the door, knocks out the glass windows, and starts shooting at
my neighbor‘s house.
At this point, Gary Bartels and 1st Platoon had come under
extremely intensive fire and were fighting a few blocks to the
east. We moved another block north and turned east to relieve
some of the pressure upon 1st Platoon and eventually link up.
CPT McGahey and I identified a three-story building at the end
of the block and decided that, as the highest building in the
area, it was a good point of domination, with excellent
observation. Plus, we needed a break; we had been out of water
for a few hours, and it was 104 degrees. I called SFC Stone on

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the platoon radio and told him I wanted that building. In true
Platoon Sergeant-fashion, SFC Stone had been moving to seize
that building before I could even order it. Just as my 1st Squad
began to enter the building, we came under a surge of effective
fire from the west. CPT McGahey recalled, ―I literally watched
tracer rounds go between the arms of SPC Brady, who was
returning fire to the west from the rear of 3rd Platoon. Brady
and I looked into each other‘s eyes, and we both knew we had
to get out of that street, now.‖
The Platoon ran into the building, the CO and I last,
covering each other. Once inside, the Platoon got on the second
story and then the rooftop. We could see for miles and soon
discovered all of the enemy positions to our north and east. It
was a shooting gallery. We decimated them. The locals kept
coming out to watch; we yelled at them at first but soon
discovered only warning shots fired generally towards them
dispersed the crowds. It was like entertainment for these people
to watch a battle going on. We began to realize that most of the
enemy, who, at one time wore OD green uniforms, now wore
civilian clothes. Crowd control took on a whole new meaning,
as we attempted to distinguish combatant from spectator and
spectator from spotter for enemy mortar fire. There were
numerous repeat customers hidden amongst the civilian
spectators, who we finally identified as spotters. We shot them.
Events like this went on for hours. We fired over 100 rounds of
105 artillery and uncountable rifle rounds.
We had not had a drink of water since morning. I almost
passed out from dehydration, since I had given all my water for
the past 30-hours to my Soldiers. One of my NCOs, SSG
Alfaro, ordered me to sit down and drink from his quarter
filled, final canteen. It was an order I followed. CPT Johnson
was diligently fighting to get water pushed up to us and later
stated, ―…the issue was that the Battalion Commander had

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deemed the area too hot and would not let any vehicles, except
for our anti-armor company, to drive into the city. We had
water at the CTCP by this point but were forced to continue
pulling security on it and get it to the company first thing in the
morning.‖
The 1st Platoon and 2nd Platoon began arriving at the three-
story at about 1600 hours. My Platoon had already been
fighting there for about three hours. As the other platoons
began to relieve my men, my men moved to the cooler internal
rooms of the building and got a much-needed break. My PSG,
SFC Stone, took a small quartering party and went to find a
local water source for us all to use our iodine tablets on. The
locals brought us a few pitchers, and there was a slow pouring
spigot we were raiding on the next block. It was not much, but
it kept us moving.
CPT McGahey started prepping the military HQ based in
the school from where we had identified most of the resistance
was coming. I was exhausted, starving, and dehydrated; my
boys were much worse. By 1700 hrs., the Battalion Scouts took
over the ―shooting gallery,‖ as the three-story building had
become known, while we prepared to seize and clear the school
suspected to be housing the military HQ.
Joe Thomas with 2nd Platoon and Gary Bartels with 1st
Platoon would assault this one, while my Platoon remained in
SBF position on the three-story. SFC Stone and his water party
were still out scouring the neighborhood, when CPT McGahey
called to give me the ―all is clear‖ call over the Company net.
We found tons of weapons within the HQ objective, both
heavy and light, and an entire room filled with a to-scale terrain
model depicting the planned defense of Karbala. It seemed the
Iraqis took with them all the dead bodies they could; there was
nothing but pieces of bodies left in the HQ building.

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Company B stayed in the military HQ building for one
night. The next morning, we continued our clearance operation
to the north but did not make contact with any further enemy
personnel. We ended up spending four days total in the city of
Karbala, the last two primarily spent resting and prepping for
the eventual air assault into Baghdad.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jason

Davis, who served as a platoon leader in B Company, 3-502nd,
101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Key terrain is defined as ―any locality, or area,

the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to
either combatant.‖ (FM 1-02) This discussion on the events in
Karbala illustrates key terrain on all three levels of warfighting:
strategic, operational and tactical. Strategically, Karbala is the
center of the Shiite Muslim religion, as it is the pilgrimage site
for the Shiites. Operationally, the Karbala Gap was key
because it had the best maneuver corridor to Baghdad. The city
overwatched the bridge and the area around the bridge to build
combat power. Additionally, this was truly the last Shiite-
dominated city as coalition forces progressed north, so this was
the convergence of a melting pot of ethnic, political, and
military groups. Tactically, key terrain within the city was the
governmental area in the center of town. Military complexes
and other municipal buildings outside the center were also key
terrain to subordinate units.
Key terrain in this situation was initially the water plant for
the military use of the compound. Although the security of this
complex was important for future stability operations, in the
current fight, it lost its key terrain status. Key terrain quickly
became the rooftops, as they could cover both the ground and

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the sky, and we need to own the third dimension. From the
ground, the ability to see the different levels was difficult;
however, once the company identified the three-story building,
its value became painfully obvious. As the Company fought to
the dominant building, it was prepared for a massive fight. The
continued and massive use of artillery and mortars with
proximity or timed fuses continued to prevent the use of the
rooftops outside of the risk estimated distance. The fight within
the buildings really never materialized. The enemy used the
rooftops as a large avenue of approach and never became
pinned into the buildings. As the company seized the building,
it provided more than just observation and fields of fire over
the other rooftops in the area—it covered four major roads and
was a premier support-by-fire position for the seizure of the
military compound 500 meters away.
Just like the decisive point, key terrain can change
throughout the operation or will change in order of precedence.
Terrain within the IPB process must be continuously analyzed,
thus changing the unit‘s plans and operations. Continuously
analyzing METT-TC brought out positive changes to the
operational plan, and this, combined with solid execution,
equaled mission success.

At 0500 on 3 April 2003, 2-7 IN (M), 3rd ID, having

seized Objective Lions on the eastern portion of Baghdad
International Airport, now pushed out, forming a
perimeter to the east and south of the airport. The 1st
Platoon, A Co, was assigned a blocking position to the
southeast of “Four Corners”—the main intersection of
roads leading into the airport from Baghdad. With two
Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) and a squad of
dismounted Infantrymen, the platoon leader cautiously
moved the platoon to establish its position.

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As I approached the planned location, two U.S. Soldiers

were desperately running up the road towards us yelling, ―two
tanks, two tanks,‖ as they went past us in a panic. I recognized
the two Soldiers as the Battalion Mortar Platoon Leader, CPT
Matthew Paul, and one of his squad leaders, Sergeant Jose
Adorno. They had gone outside of our planned perimeter to set
up the mortar firing position, and the two enemy tanks had
actually driven right past them. I radioed the contact to my
Company Commander, CPT Robert Smith, and was ordered to
engage and destroy. One of the tank commanders attached to
my company overheard the report on the company net. He
happened to be passing by our current position, towing another
disabled M1, and immediately volunteered to join my section
and assist.
The road we were on made a sweeping turn to the left and
was lined with trees. The enemy tanks were approximately
400m further south along the road and outside of our line of
sight due to the trees. I dismounted my Infantry to get eyes on
ground level, and my Soldiers immediately spotted the enemy.
No sooner had my squad leader, SSG Robinson, pointed in the
direction of the tanks, when one of them fired a main gun
round, and I watched in horror as the round impacted a BFV
from an adjacent unit that was passing over a bridge 800m
back to our north. There were other vehicles on the bridge, and
I knew we had to take action quickly to prevent further
damage.
SSG Robinson took up a position in a ditch along the road
and ordered his squad to engage the tanks in an attempt to kill
or at least distract the tank commanders. I maneuvered the
attached tank out into a field to my right, left my wingman on
the road, and positioned myself in between them in the field.
As we began to advance, I knew the M1 would be able to spot

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the enemy tanks first, one at a time, and with the advantage of
knowing their general location, would be able to acquire the
target and fire before the enemy had a chance to react.
Before our vehicles were even in a position to advance,
SSG Robinson reported that he had killed the tank commander
of the lead tank and that the tank was now stationary, directly
behind a red building. He completed his report in haste, and I
observed his squad fleeing out of the ditch, while the second
tank was traversing its turret and taking aim on my dismounted
Soldiers. The enemy tank round impacted less than five meters
away from the nearest Soldier with no effects (the Iraqi tank
commander must have fired an armor piercing round rather
than a high-explosive round by mistake).
I relayed the information that SSG Robinson had reported
to the attached tank commander and ordered the tank to
advance. The tank commander reported: ―I see the
building…I‘ve got him.‖ The M1 fired, and the destruction of
the enemy tank was obvious. ―One down. Where‘s the next
one?‖ asked the tank commander. A second report from SSG
Robinson placed the second tank only 20m behind the first one,
both directly on the road. I again relayed the information to the
M1, and we advanced. With the accurate report from SSG
Robinson, the second tank was destroyed just as easily as the
first.
The marksmanship and accurate reporting of SSG
Robinson saved lives that day. The T-72s were 400m down the
road from our position. With the way the road bent, I estimated
the straight-line distance to the tanks at just over 300m. SSG
Robinson was always a standout at the rifle range, and, before
deploying to Iraq, I named him as the platoon sniper. He
purchased a small civilian scope, mounted it to his M4, and
was anxious to put his skills to work. His successful
engagement of the lead enemy tank commander all but

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prevented the enemy from firing on the friendly vehicles that
were left on the bridge to the north. The crew of the lead tank
was undoubtedly occupied with the treatment of its commander
and was thus eliminated from the fight. The second tank was
directly behind the first and had no field of fire in the direction
of the bridge.

From the personal experience of 1LTJames A. Horn who

served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion,
7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: This engagement in the Baghdad area is a good

example of using terrain to develop situational awareness and
standard operating procedures (SOPs) between BFV platoon
leaders, tank platoon leaders, and dismounted squad leaders.
By placing the dismounted squad leader on the ground to
observe below the tree line, the platoon was able to maneuver
along the direction of the attacks to destroy the enemy tanks.
Leaders must always consider the importance of their
dismounted infantry in restricted terrain. Infantry provides
critical combat power on the battlefield that enhances
situational awareness for everyone.
By properly analyzing how the enemy used the terrain, the
platoon leader was able to develop his course of action to
destroy the threat and provide situational awareness for the
tank platoon leader. The Bradley platoon leader ensured that
the tank platoon leader understood the situation by providing
accurate and timely information about the disposition,
composition, and strength of the enemy threat. Because there
was a clear understanding of the SOPs established by the task
force in theater, the platoon leaders were successful in
synchronizing their efforts.

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At 1400, 5 April 2003, 2-7 IN (M), 3rd ID, having now

occupied Baghdad International Airport for more than two
days, established several ambush sites along main avenues
of approach to the south and east of the airport. The 1st
Platoon of A Co was ordered to establish an antiarmor
ambush approximately one kilometer south of “Four
Corners,” the main intersection of roads leading into the
airport from Baghdad.

I was given a verbal order to destroy as many enemy

armored vehicles as possible with the end-state of no enemy
armor permitted north of my position.
This was the first time since before the war had begun that I
was able to go through the proper steps of mission analysis and
course of action development. My platoon was currently
occupying a hasty defensive battle position oriented south with
a sector of fire of almost 180-degrees. From previous
engagements in that battle position, I knew that, if at all
possible, our next position should have a reduced sector.
Though the engagement area (EA) was not too large, covering
such a wide sector made it difficult to quickly identify enemy
presence and required several pairs of eyes. Having fought
constantly for the past five days, rest was a crucial factor for
maintaining combat power, and the constant surveillance of
such a wide area was taxing.
I selected an ambush site that allowed one kilometer of
standoff and up to four enemy armored vehicles to be
destroyed with a flank shot at one time in the EA. From where
my platoon would be located, we could observe the entire EA
with only having to scan a 30-degree sector. By establishing a
good alert plan, I was able to allow the majority of my Soldiers
to rest in their fighting positions with only two pairs of Soldiers

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effectively monitoring the EA and the avenues of approach
leading to it. Adding two more Soldiers for rear security and an
NCO for C2, I was left with two-thirds of my platoon on rest.
To facilitate my Commander‘s specified end-state of no
enemy armor permitted north of my position, I wanted to create
an obstacle along the high-speed avenue of approach that ran
through our EA. The main road leading into the EA was lined
with ten-foot high, concrete walls. Destroying a vehicle while
between the walls would block the avenue. Engagement
priority went to the lead vehicle and then either the trail vehicle
or fourth vehicle, whichever came first. The former was to be
destroyed while still between the concrete walls. Before I
moved the entire platoon into position, my Platoon Sergeant,
SFC Irwin, and I conducted reconnaissance of the area,
confirming the fields of fire and planning the positions of the
two Bradley Fighting Vehicles and two Infantry squads that
would be positioned there. In the back of my track, I also
brought two Infantry squad leaders and a Javelin team.
Shortly after arriving at the site, with everyone still
mounted on the vehicles, my Platoon Sergeant made a quick
report of a vehicle in the EA ―right now,‖ and I watched as a
TOW2-B impacted a T-72 at the edge of a line of brush.
Having already seen numerous destroyed tanks, I knew the one
in front of us was still intact because of the small impact the
missile had made. SFC Irwin fired a second TOW2-B with the
same effects, and I immediately ordered my gunner to fire a
missile as well. The two TOW2-Bs fired from SFC Irwin‘s
track had properly detonated above the tank and shot straight
down into it, but there was no explosion or fire. The TOW2-B
fired from my track had malfunctioned, and, even with my
gunner‘s hand still squeezing the hand station, it flew off high
into the air and was gone. At the first report of enemy armor, I
had dismounted the Javelin Team and squad leaders. After

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having fired three TOW2-Bs with no obvious effect on the
T-72, the Javelin team was now ready, and it engaged the tank.
Having never before been close behind a Javelin when it
was fired, I was surprised to see the steep flight path of the
missile. My first inclination was that it too had malfunctioned,
but I quickly saw the rocket come screaming down on top of
the T-72, and, with grave destruction, the tank was eliminated.
The T-72 driver never moved or even traversed his turret. I
believe that the vehicle was either abandoned or disabled upon
impact of the first TOW2-B. My platoon-minus occupied the
ambush position as planned and remained there for two days
with no further contact with armored vehicles.

From the personal experience monograph of 1LT James A.

Horn who served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd
Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd InfantryDivision, Donovan Research
Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Besides illustrating the lethality of the Javelin,

1LT Horn‘s vignette demonstrates the importance of seeing
ourselves, the enemy, and the terrain.
Understanding that all the elements of METT-TC influence
or impact each other during mission analysis is crucial to COA
development. Ultimately, these factors determined the terrain
1LT Horn selected to defend. A few of the considerations 1LT
Horn factored in about the troops available were the fatigue
level of his Soldiers, his mission requirements, and the
capabilities of his weapon systems.
During prolonged periods of continuous operations, leaders
must understand the impact of fatigue on the Soldiers‘ ability
to perform even simple tasks. 1LT Horn identified the lowered
readiness level of his troops and factored that into the planning
process, resulting in a reduced sector but allowing him to

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implement a rest plan. Through this effective use of terrain, he
was able to ease the strain on his Soldiers while still
maintaining the ability to complete his assigned mission.
His terrain analysis determined the enemy avenues of
approach. He then identified the site along the avenue that
provided both stand-off and a restrictive enemy mobility
corridor. While building his engagement area (EA), he
identified the need for an obstacle effect to slow enemy forces
in the EA. Often times, austere engineer support may not allow
for dedicated obstacles effort. In this instance, 1LT Horn
identified the effect he needed and determined the best way to
achieve that effect with resources on hand: the hulk of the first
enemy vehicle at a specific location. LT Horn did an excellent
job of seeing himself, the enemy, and especially the terrain.

On 21 July 2003, an informant had gone to American

forces, claiming to be housing Saddam’s two sons in an
affluent section of northeast Mosul. The informant, a
cousin of Saddam Hussein’s, claimed that both sons had
been living on the second floor of his house, located in a
neighborhood in the city of Mosul, with seven bodyguards
while they waited on passports so they could flee to Syria.
Several hours later, members of the elite Special
Operations unit, Task Force 20 (TF20), arrived at the 3rd
Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment’s tactical operation
center (TOC) in northeastern Mosul. The commander of
the TF20 element began discussing a potential mission
involving forty operators from TF20 and forces from 3rd
Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, Task Force Battle
Force. The two commanders, along with the staff of Battle
Force, began to plan a raid on high-value targets number
two and three on the V Corps “Black List.”

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At 0900 hrs. on 22 July 2003, the two TF commanders

decided to execute the planned raid. Throughout the night,
subordinate leaders had been summoned to the TF Battle Force
TOC to receive course of action briefings for their portion of
the raid. Charlie Company, 3rd of the 327th Infantry Regiment,
was tasked to provide a platoon of Soldiers to man the northern
side of the objective and prevent anyone from leaving or
entering the objective. Delta Company, 3rd of the 327th Infantry
Regiment, was tasked to provide gun-trucks at each of the six
battle positions that surrounded the objective and formed the
inner cordon. A squad from Bravo Company, 3rd of the 327th
Infantry Regiment, was tasked to provide drivers for TF20 as it
rode into its initial positions outside of the target house. A
Military Police platoon was tasked to provide crowd control
and establish the outer cordon.
Since the intelligence gathered on the two sons stated that
seven bodyguards were with them at all times, the U.S. forces

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suspected that they would have observation posts established to
monitor any coalition traffic approaching the house with the
two sons in it. This would require a nearly simultaneous
occupation of all six inner cordon battle positions as TF20
moved into its initial position outside the target house. Multiple
routes were planned for the different elements based on a
synchronized occupation of battle positions from all sides.
Based on time-distance analysis, each moving element had a
different trigger for initiating its movement to its position. Each
element established its positions immediately after the TF20
element moved into its initial position. TF20 moved to the
objective in several different vehicles, and once the operators
were at the objective, they began moving by foot to different
portions of the building in 3-5 man teams. TF20 snipers
occupied three firing positions south of the house, but no one
initiated fire. I was with the Battalion Commander at the battle
position 150m south of the target house, with one of the TF20
snipers.
The TF Battle Force Commander received the occupation
of battle position brevity codes from each position and notified
the TF20 Commander. The well-orchestrated movements of
many moving pieces then froze in place. The TF20 interpreter,
using a bull-horn, told the persons inside the house to surrender
because they were surrounded. The owner of the house, the
informant, and his family, made it outside and into the custody
of the U.S. forces. The men inside the house responded with
shots aimed at the various battle positions around them. The
hopes of a non-violent surrender were shattered with each
round that pierced the cinder blocks providing protection for
the U.S. Soldiers around the house.
TF20 went into the execution of the breach and assault on
the house. From the inner cordon, TF20 requested that the TF
Battle Force suppress, with small arms fire, the second floor of

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the house. Once inside of the house, the operators realized that
a central stairway was the only way to the second floor, where
the four men easily maintained a wall of lead. With only one
access point to the second floor, it was very easy for the four
men upstairs to repel each assault by TF20. After the first
assault was repelled and two members of TF20 were wounded,
the TF20 Commander requested that the inner cordon use small
arms and .50 caliber weapons mounted on the gun trucks from
the southern battle position. The TF Battle Force Soldiers at the
southern battle position had also received rounds from within
the house and were more than happy to be cleared to fire at any
moving object on the second floor.
Now that the inner cordon was providing suppression, the
TF20 assault element again attempted to gain access to the
second floor and again ran into the same withering wall of lead
as before. Several more TF20 Soldiers were wounded in the
second attempt to take the upstairs floor. The TF20 assault
team pulled back again, and several teams began to move along
the street outside the house to a neighbor‘s house. The teams
quickly moved onto the roof by climbing up from the outside
of the house. The TF20 Soldiers‘ level of fitness to accomplish
this feat was nothing short of amazing. Once on the roof of the
neighbor‘s house, they began climbing and jumping from
rooftop to rooftop until they made their way onto the target
house‘s rooftop. The rooftop teams tried in vain to find a way
into the second floor from the roof. However, through their
internal communications, a TF20 Soldier would lean over the
edge of the roof and designate for the inner cordon Soldiers of
TF Battle Force rooms at which to shoot. With a controlled and
escalated response, the inner cordon, at the request of the TF20
Commander, began increasing the caliber and volume of
suppressing fire into the second floor. Gun-trucks from TF
Battle Force, along with Soldiers at the Battle Positions, began

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firing MK-19, .50 caliber, and machine gun fire into the second
floor.
TF20 had sustained several casualties from the initial two
assaults and requested a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of
their wounded Soldiers from TF Battle Force. When the call
came over the radio, the TF Battle Force medics were too far
away from the fight to provide a rapid response, so the TF
Battle Force Commander asked for someone to volunteer for
the CASEVAC. An officer, an NCO, an enlisted man from
Delta Company, and I volunteered for the mission. We moved
from the southern Battle Position through the open street to the
gate of the house and picked up two wounded TF20 Soldiers,
placed them into a HMMWV, and drove them north to a house
that was secured by Soldiers from Charlie Company. The TF20
Soldiers hydrated and provided expert self-aid to their injuries
and were soon trying to influence the fight again in spite of
their wounds.
Immediately after the CASEVAC team got the TF20
Soldiers to a secure location, the TF Battle Force Commander
initiated fire onto the second floor with the first of eighteen
TOW missiles. Due to the high volume of fire and the large
caliber of the weapons, the rounds began to penetrate through
the target house and into two more houses immediately to the
north of the target house. In such a dense urban area, the
impact of the rounds from the southern battle positions was
now affecting several of the battle positions to the north of the
target house. I was in the street, near the two injured TF20
Soldiers, when I started to hear rounds crack over my head. I
could not figure out where they were coming from to return
fire; then I saw that it was .50 caliber rounds from my original
battle position coming through the target house and through the
house I was near, north of the target house. To avoid fratricide,
the Charlie Company Commander repositioned his platoon

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inside the courtyard and in the ground floor of a house that was
under construction north of the target house. The impact of the
TOW could be felt two houses north of the target house as the
TOW rounds penetrated through the house and continued into
the homes directly north of the target house.
After eighteen TOW rounds and thousands of rounds of
5.56mm, 7.62mm, and .50 caliber, the fourth and final assault
achieved its goal of entering the second floor. On the final
assault, a fourteen year-old boy upstairs, grandson of Saddam,
was still firing a weapon from under a mattress. Members of
the assault team shot and killed the boy as they assaulted
through the second floor.
All four men upstairs had been killed, and their bodies were
carried downstairs to a waiting vehicle and then on to
helicopter back to Baghdad for autopsy reports and forensic
dental and blood work to match DNA to those of Uday and
Qusay Hussein. Security forces were brought in to secure the
site of the raid to ensure that no riots or violence were started
by the indigenous population over the death of the two sons of
Saddam Hussein. The relative of Saddam who turned in the
two sons to the U.S. forces was taken back to TF Battle Force‘s
TOC to await his link-up with CIA handlers. The informant did
not seem to mind that his home had been completely
demolished from the fighting that day; he was all smiles as he
planned how to spend his thirty million dollar reward. Later
that evening, General Sanchez officially announced the news
that the two bodies were, in fact, the two sons of Saddam
Hussein.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT C. Quay

Barnett, who served as a scout platoon leader and Battalion
S-1 in 3-327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

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DISCUSSION: This vignette demonstrates important aspects

of several doctrinal concepts: encirclement techniques, the task
to support by fire, direct fire suppression, and weapons effects.
The fugitive Hussein brothers and their small security
element certainly typified the elusive leader cells of a fledgling
insurgency as they attempted to avoid capture, while spreading
subversion and enlisting support for future guerilla tactics.
Moving from one temporary site to another, they were avoiding
direct contact and defensive actions of any kind. The
counterinsurgency tactic of encirclement, executed in text book
fashion by TF20, is designed to cut off all ground routes for
escape and reinforcement of an encircled insurgent force. It
offers the best possibility for fixing insurgent forces in position
and for achieving decisive results. The outer and inner cordons
in the TF20 plan certainly achieved this purpose.
More problematic during execution of the operation was
the reduction of the encirclement in the face of desperate acts
by the isolated fugitives. Doctrine further tells us that the
capture or destruction of the trapped insurgent force is
methodical and thorough. Fire and maneuver are used together
in a controlled contraction of the encirclement. The assault
force alone had difficulty achieving adequate suppression
within the building to allow the force to clear the objective.
The TF20 commander properly adjusted his plan and used part
of his inner cordon force to provide suppressive fires to support
the continued efforts of the assault force. The assault force was
able to methodically control the location, caliber, and volume
of the suppressive fires of the support-by-fire element to
eventually seize and clear the entire objective.
Although the assault on the building occupied by Uday and
Qusay was an obvious tactical success, the conduct of the
operation also risked possible fratricide and led to significant

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collateral damage. The commanders on the ground eventually
employed overwhelming firepower to destroy the enemy in the
building but, in doing so, also failed to adequately account for
the dense urban battlespace that good terrain analysis affords.
The increased penetration of the thousands of .50 caliber
rounds and 18 TOW missiles against a heavy-clad framed
building proved more than sufficient and was actually tactically
risky. The kinetic effects of these rounds completely penetrated
the structure, impacting other friendly units nearby (C/3-327
IN) and causing increased collateral damage to the surrounding
urban area.
As our doctrine on urban terrain indicates, ―the risks of
friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered
during the planning phase of operations, and control measures
must be adjusted to lower the risks…the enclosed nature of
combat means that weapons‘ effects, including muzzle blast
and back-blast, must be considered as well as the round‘s
impact on the target.‖ (FM 3-06.11) As the plan adjusted out of
situational necessity, better direct fire control measures and a
better understanding of the munitions effects on the terrain
were needed by all units and commanders involved.

In November, 2003, the 3d Stryker Brigade Combat

Team (SBCT) deployed to Iraq in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. After a month of downloading and
prepping equipment in Kuwait, 3d SBCT moved to FOB
Pacesetter in central Iraq. At FOB Pacesetter, 3d SBCT
prepped for combat operations in the city of Samarra. The
3d SBCT and a brigade from 4th Infantry Division split the
city of Samarra, with 3d SBCT’s sector further split
between two of its battalions: 5-20 Infantry and 1-23
Infantry. These operations were supposed to last only a few
days. U.S. forces were to conduct several raids to capture

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or kill noncompliant forces and Saddam loyalists. Other
U.S. forces had met stiff resistance in Samarra; thus, 1-23
IN planned for the worst as it got ready for operations in a
city that had been dubbed the “wild west.”

The 1-23 IN had a series of targets. It assigned B and C Co

the highest priority targets within the series for the first night of
operations. Battalion kept A Co in reserve should B or C Co
uncover intelligence on its objectives that needed to be targeted
by a company-sized element. C Co‘s target was Aziz Abas,
code-named Abigail, a high ranking Ba‘ath party official and
leader of a terrorist cell.
The day prior to the Battalion departing FOB Pacesetter
and moving to Samarra, the Reconnaissance Platoon
reconnoitered the routes and objectives. After several days‘
postponement, possibly due to Saddam‘s capture, the battalion
departed FOB Pacesetter in the afternoon of 16 December. A
recon section guided the two lead companies to their assault
positions outside of Samarra, and then the companies waited
until dark.
For this raid, C Co task organized its platoons as such: 1st
Platoon was the isolation platoon; 2nd Platoon was the reserve;
3rd Platoon was the assault platoon; and the MGS Platoon, with
the company sniper team, was the overwatch platoon. The 2nd
Platoon‘s priorities for planning were first to reinforce the
assault platoon and then to assault Objective Copper, a house a
few blocks away that possibly contained non-compliant forces.
The MGS platoon was overwatching the large open area just to
the west of the objective while the sniper team overwatched the
rooftops around the objective.
At 0200 hrs. on 17 December, C Co departed its assault
position and moved into Samarra. The company initiated the
raid on Objective Cobalt, Abigail‘s house, by plowing through

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the gate with the Company‘s Engineer Stryker Vehicle (ESV).
By the time the ESV had backed out of the gate, the assault
platoon‘s Infantry squads had dismounted and moved through
the broken gate. Simultaneously, the isolation platoon
dismounted and moved to its blocking positions and isolated
the block. Also, the company snipers and MGS platoon
assumed overwatch positions in the vicinity of an abandoned
school. The snipers took up a position on top of the school to
overwatch the roofs near the target house, and the MGS
platoon oriented south to overwatch a large open area.
The majority of the company‘s Strykers picked up the
racetrack after dismounting the Infantry squads. The racetrack
was a series of blocks that the vehicles could drive around.
Thus, the vehicles would not be easy targets because they
would not be stationary or massed together. For contingencies,
the company had a ―911‖ package that could recover vehicles,
casualties, or EPWs. The package consisted of the XO‘s
Stryker, the medical Stryker, and the two mortar carriers.
Mortars could not fire into the town, so the mortarmen were the
vehicle recovery team and the EPW handlers. Additionally, one
of the MGS platoon‘s vehicles would join the ―911‖ package to
provide additional security. The reserve platoon stayed
mounted while the Strykers drove the racetrack. Thus, should
the company‘s Strykers come into contact, a rifle platoon could
target that contact.
Once inside the gate, the assault platoon breached the front
door with a shotgun and then began to clear the house and look
for Abigail. They found him still in bed; thus, detaining him
was very easy. With the target detained and the house cleared,
the assault platoon began to search the house with the help of
the engineer squad. Their search found nothing out of the
ordinary. Upon completion of the search, the company
exfiltrated in the following order: the 911 package, the assault

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platoon, the overwatch platoon, the reserve, and then the
isolation platoon. The C/1-23 IN‘s raid on 17 December 2004
was successful. The man it detained was Aziz Abas.

From the personal experience of 1LT Vince Kaster, who served

as Executive Officer, C/1-23 IN, 3rd SBCT, Donovan Research
Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: C/1-23 IN‘s actions in the raid at Samarra

highlight excellent urban terrain analysis and the application of
those deductions about terrain to the friendly plan. The vignette
begs the question: why not use these awesome Stryker vehicles
to provide their support (firepower and mobility) to the
objective area? The answer is that the urban terrain analysis
conducted by the commander indicated that the streets were too
narrow, the fields of fire too restrictive, and the objective too
small for more that just the two dismounted Infantry platoons
(isolation and assault).
Having conducted a thorough urban analysis and a good
COA development, the commander knew his understanding of
the terrain and his task organization was appropriate. The
question then became what to do with the vehicle sections and
the reserve. The commander‘s answer, for the security of those
forces and immediate response to the objective as required, was
the racetrack.
By keeping those forces doing ―laps‖ around specified city
blocks, he prevented them becoming a stationary target for
enemy forces, kept them near the objective area to provide the
support required to the main effort (nesting), and maintained
command and control over his separated forces. In the troop
leading procedures process, identifying and planning all of this
would have occurred during COA analysis.

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This vignette highlights how a commander takes a
significant deduction from terrain analysis, applies it
throughout the TLP, and turns a possible disadvantage into a
successful piece of his course of action.

CONCLUSION: Units are successful when they use the terrain

to their advantage, and that can only occur with a thorough
analysis of the battlespace in which they will fight. Only
through this analysis can the leader plan his fires, place his
forces, and determine their movement. Furthermore, although
friendly forces can never know the disposition of the enemy
they face, an effective analysis of the terrain and how it affects
the enemy will give the leader a picture of the enemy upon
which to base his plan.

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 CHAPTER 5: Reconnaissance
Agitate the enemy and ascertain the pattern of his
movement. Determine his dispositions and so ascertain
the field of battle. Probe him and learn where his
strength is abundant and where deficient.
Sun Tzu
The Art of War, vi, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: ―The side possessing better information

and using that information more effectively to gain
understanding has a major advantage over its opponent.‖
(FM3-0) Although the U.S. forces, by merit of their
technological superiority, may enjoy the advantage in
surveillance assets, those assets must be complemented with
aggressive and continuous reconnaissance to ensure timely and
accurate intelligence.
Every commander has unique information and intelligence
requirements specific to his operation. Commanders can gain
information on the enemy through a variety of means, but we
continue to see that the information gathered by reconnaissance
units—the commander‘s ―eyes on the ground‖—provide the
most specific and relevant information. Reconnaissance units
begin their operations as early as possible to collect
information not only on the enemy, but also the terrain, and
they continue to provide timely and accurate information
throughout the tactical operation. This information enables
situational understanding, further enabling appropriate and
decisive tactics.

In 1992, President Bush ordered the U.S. Marines to

Mogadishu, Somalia, to facilitate the distribution of relief
supplies. The 10th Mountain replaced the Marines, and in
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April, 1993, the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, 10th
Mountain Division arrived in Somalia. With the murder of
22 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June by pro-Aideed forces,
the focus of 10th Mountain changed from humanitarian
relief to combat operations. One such operation was to seize
and destroy all ordnance and any radio retrans equipment
within a radio relay compound to prevent Aideed from
transmitting negative propaganda within the city and.
using that propaganda to incite violent riots within
Mogadishu. The writer served as a squad leader for 1st
Squad, Scout Platoon.

The plan was for my squad to insert to an LZ about 2000

meters from the objective by Blackhawk at approximately 0100
hrs. on 12 June with 3rd Squad and the PL. My squad would
infiltrate south 2500 meters, drop the Platoon Leader at a
central CP along the way, and then continue to move into our
southern surveillance position. The mission for my squad was
three-fold: first, to recon for and establish the landing zone for
First Platoon, Alpha Company, the assault element; second, to
recon and find the route for Alpha Company from the LZ to an
entry point into the compound; third, to ensure the route was
free of mines (intelligence stated that mines were present).
During our mission planning and rehearsal phase, I had the
opportunity to do an actual aerial reconnaissance of the
compound and infiltration route. It was then that I realized that
the portion of the objective I was to observe and into which I
was to guide 1st Platoon, A Co, did not have a hole for the
assault element to enter. The actual terrain model depicted a
hole in the eight-foot compound wall that the assault element
would assault through to gain a foothold. I disproved this
during the aerial recon, so I talked to the Platoon Leader and

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told him that there was no hole in the wall. He insisted there
was and disregarded my information.
Having to go over the wall, instead of through it, could
expose the assault element to a waiting and eager enemy and
would slow the tempo of the raid. However, the other options
were to blow a hole with demo or AT-4s and lose the element
of surprise or to enter through the front gate, likely meeting a
waiting enemy. Going over the wall was the least risky way to
maintain surprise.
After landing at our LZ, the squad moved out on the route
to the objective. During movement, we stopped at a major road
that we had to cross en-route to the objective. When we
stopped short in some coarse thorn bushes and prepared to
cross the linear danger area, we heard voices speaking in
Somali coming down the road. I gave the hand and arm signal
for freeze as the voices got closer, thinking that some
combatant Somalis were coming toward the LZ where they
heard the landing Blackhawk. I then saw the glow of a cigarette
in my NODs and smelled the odor. Neither of the two men had
weapons, and they kept walking down the road in the opposite
direction of the objective. We came close but did not get
compromised, and we still had to move 2200 meters through a
shantytown-desert scrub gauntlet to our surveillance overwatch
position.
On our route, we came across a cluster of about three small
shanty- type buildings with a donkey and stray dogs outside the
structures. I stopped and looked for ways to bypass this danger
area. The problem was that various rows of impenetrable thorn
hedges as tall as a man surrounded this shanty area. I decided
to bypass to the left where the way appeared to be easier, and
we moved quickly in a five-man file, avoiding the thorn
hedges. We did not see any more activity on our movement
into position. The next task I had was to find a good LZ on

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which to land the assault element. We then needed to clear the
route from the LZ and find the best place for the assault to go
up and over the wall, checking for mines. Finding the LZ was
easy because the whole area was relatively flat and sandy
except for some sporadic clumps of scrub like the one I
selected to halt behind for concealment. I then sent SGT
Davidson to look for an entry point along the wall.
SGT Davidson went up to the wall and then reported seeing
no mines, but he had found a place where there was a mound of
dirt piled up against the wall, making it only about five feet
from the top of the wall and easy to scale. SGT Davidson
looked over the wall to see if there was anything that would
hinder the assault force from establishing a foothold on the far
side. He called back and said it was about the best place to go
over the wall. With the route cleared, the point of entry
confirmed, and the LZ selected, I called Battalion with the
eight-digit grid to the LZ. I reiterated the fact that the assault
element would have to go over the wall and that we had found
a good place to scale it. Once First Platoon landed, I physically
linked up with SFC McDowell and linked him up with SGT
Davidson who guided them up to the wall for entry into the
compound. The time from landing until the entire assault
element was over the wall was about five minutes.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Rick Storm,

who served as a Recon squad leader in 1st Battalion, 22nd
Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary of the actions of 1-22 Infantry,

we see the importance of reconnaissance during the
‗preparation phase‘ of offensive operations. At the company
level, this phase includes the planning and issuing of orders,

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the preparation of personnel and equipment, and the conduct of
rehearsals. Another task, usually generated through the
commander‘s warning order, is the conduct of reconnaissance.
This reconnaissance is focused on obtaining information about
the enemy or the terrain and, specifically, on information
critical to the attack.
The reconnaissance squad‘s mission required three tasks to
be achieved that would facilitate the assault forces‘ landing and
movement to and seizure of the compound. Using these forces,
the commander was able to maximize the Principle of War—
Surprise—while also maintaining Security (another Principle)
for his forces. Likewise, Security remained an important factor
for the reconnaissance forces themselves, as remaining
undetected to achieve their tasks enabled the resulting
operation to be successful.
Another lesson we can take is the importance of ground
reconnaissance. Doctrine states that ‗a ground reconnaissance
effort is essential if the mission is to conduct detailed
reconnaissance of the route and the terrain around the route.‘
(FM 3-90, Tactics) In this example, had the assault leaders‘
original information—that there was a hole in the compound
fence—not been confirmed or denied by the reconnaissance,
the operation may well have lacked the surprise and security
that were important to its success.

On 22 March 2003, the 3d BCT, 3ID, attacked to seize

Objective Rams, an area south of Najaf, to secure it for use
as a logistics support area. To support the attack, V Corps
inserted LRS teams to conduct reconnaissance.

Despite all of the planning, not all insertions go as planned.

SSG Peter D. Armstrong‘s surveillance team, Team 1-2,
E/165th MI BN, was one of three teams inserted for the

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campaign. Bedoin dogs compromised the team soon after its
insertion into central Iraq. After the dogs followed the team to
its secondary site, the team quickly moved to its tertiary site
and went to ground.
As an example of how disciplined the Soldiers are and how
effective their hide techniques are, SSG Armstrong‘s team
spent over 48 hours in an 18-inch hole with a sheet covering
six Soldiers. Iraqis were actively searching for them, coming as
close as ten feet away. SSG Armstrong lay flat on his back,
peering through a small hole in the camouflaged sheet with his
weapon tracking the Iraqi leader who was looking for them.
Once the Iraqis moved off, the team exfiltrated to an alternate
extraction site and were picked up safely.

From a 1 June 03 interview with LTC Robert P. Walters Jr.,

Commander, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion, included in
the OIF Study Group publication On Point, Ch 4, pg 163.

DISCUSSION: SSG Peter D. Armstrong‘s surveillance team

was successful in avoiding detection by the enemy in
preparation for the 3rd ID attack of Najaf because it thoroughly
applied the fundamentals of reconnaissance in accordance with
FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad. It is
clear that the LRS commander effectively briefed his teams on
the engagement criteria and risk acceptance for this mission.
The illustration shows the engagement decision process applied
by SSG Armstrong‘s team. The first engagement decision
required by the team involved the dogs. Did the team need to
destroy the dogs in self-defense? Certainly, the team could
have shot the dogs and moved to an alternative position, but
SSG Armstrong was aware that this engagement could have
compromised his team and alerted Iraqi forces in the area. SSG
Armstrong chose not to engage but instead to move to his

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alternative and tertiary site. It was in this tertiary site that SSG
Armstrong again had to apply the engagement decision process
to determine if he should engage the Iraqi force searching for
his team. SSG Armstrong organized and prepared his forces
and then positioned to defend if necessary. This action allowed
him to defend his force but did not compromise his mission to
support the 3rd ID.

In the months following the conclusion of major combat

operations, U.S. forces assumed a variety of missions, from
hunting down terrorists to stability and support operations

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to assisting the Iraqis in setting up governments and
standing the new Iraqi Army.

On 26 February 2004, my company commander assigned

me the mission of conducting a detailed reconnaissance of a
bomb maker‘s house in Mosul, Iraq. I was the Company
Executive Officer, and I planned and executed all sniper
missions with my sniper section. My sniper section leader was
SGT Joseph Brown. His shooter was SPC Carlos Garcia, and
his spotter was SPC Bill Hansen. SGT Brown and SPC Hansen
were Sniper School qualified, and the entire team was very
good at target interdiction and reconnaissance missions. The
mission would require them to infiltrate, undercover, during
hours of limited visibility to the house of a known bomb maker
and conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the target house,
which would include taking detailed footage of the house with
a night vision camera. This was an extremely difficult and
dangerous task because the house was in the middle of Mosul,
a very large city.
I went through a quick but detailed mission analysis and
determined that I would need a Stryker Infantry platoon to
support this mission as a quick reaction force. The difficulty
would be to infiltrate the sniper team close enough to the
objective to minimize the distance from the support unit but
also far enough away to prevent compromise. I finally decided
that I would use 3rd Platoon as the infiltration and quick
reaction force for my snipers. The primary reason for using 3rd
Platoon was that it was going to be the one to assault the
objective the day after we conducted the reconnaissance. This
would allow its platoon leader, LT Paul Blanton, an early look
at the target house.
The plan was to depart from the Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Marez at 260100FEB03 and drop the snipers off in an

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abandoned lot that was obscured from the target area. This lot
was one km northwest of the target house. I then set up a small
tactical assembly area in this abandoned lot with 3rd Platoon.
The snipers moved to the target house along a small side street
that did not have any activity on it. They moved in buddy
teams, always maintaining good overwatch of each other. They
moved silently and used the dark areas of the streets to hide
their movement.
Once they had identified the target house, SPC Hansen and
SPC Garcia set up an overwatch position of the target house.
SPC Garcia used the night vision optics on his M24 sniper rifle
to provide security for the reconnaissance element. They
observed the house for 15 minutes to ensure that there was no
activity in the house. Everyone was asleep in the house, so they
determined it was safe to proceed with the reconnaissance.
They called me back at the tactical assembly area, and I gave
them the go ahead for the reconnaissance. SGT Brown and LT
Blanton moved in to take detailed video footage of the target
house. LT Blanton went along to get a detailed look at the
house, but SGT Brown was in charge of the actual
reconnaissance. SGT Brown used the digital video camera with
night vision capability to film the front gate, the inside of the
courtyard, all the outside doors, and the accesses to the roof.
The actual reconnaissance only took 15 minutes.
When the reconnaissance was complete, SGT Brown called
me and said he was moving back to the tactical assembly area.
The entire force then moved back to the FOB and delivered the
video tape to my Company Commander, CPT Robert
Robinson. I conducted a detailed debriefing with the sniper
team and provided this information to my Company
Commander and 3rd Platoon. The next night, we conducted a
raid, and 3rd Platoon captured the bomb maker. The video
footage of the target house provided the detail the platoon

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needed to conduct a successful raid. The 3rd Platoon was able
to assault the house from the top floor and the bottom floor
simultaneously. The Soldiers used a water impulse charge to
breach the outer gate and the outside door on the roof. This
technique enabled them to dominate the house quickly and
prevent the bomb maker from putting up any resistance. The
bomb maker was captured without a shot being fired.

From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D. Tiffner, who

served as Executive Officer, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion,
23rd Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: 1LT Tiffner‘s sniper section reconnaissance in

Mosul is an example of using a sniper asset to perform a
sniper‘s secondary mission: reconnaissance. In this case, the
sniper section executed an area reconnaissance of a suspected
bomb maker‘s house in Mosul. The snipers performed well,
and the subsequent raid, executed by B/1-23 IN (SBCT),
resulted in the capture of the bomb maker.
Snipers, primarily used to deliver long-range precision fire,
can adequately and accurately perform zone, area, and route
recons if properly trained to do so. This mission‘s success
supports the argument for unit commanders to become
knowledgeable about sniper employment and to trust their
sniper team‘s capabilities. Well-employed sniper teams are
combat multipliers to the company and battalion commanders
who know how to plan and use them.

In April and May of 2004, Coalition Forces (CF) fought

and won several costly victories in Fallujah, taking heavy
casualties in the process. Since then, Coalition Forces had
essentially contained enemy forces in this key enemy strong

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point, with only limited forays into the actual city. In
November, 2004, 1st Marine Division (1 MAR DIV)
assigned 1st Regimental Combat Team (RCT 1) to be the
main effort for the attack to destroy the terrorist forces in
western Fallujah. A mechanized Infantry task force,
formed around the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment (TF
2-7 CAV), of the 1st Cavalry Division, was tasked to support
RCT 1 as the main effort in the attack to regain control of
Fallujah.

Reconnaissance and surveillance showed that the terrorists

had developed a three-layered defense in the city of Fallujah
and planned to execute a mobile defense, much as they had in
April, 2004. The Jolan District on the western side of the city,
along the banks of the Euphrates River, appeared to be the
enemy‘s primary defenses. The RCT 1 intelligence officers
determined that the Jolan Park was the enemy‘s key assembly
area and command and control node to which they planned to
withdraw and deploy defenders throughout the city. Based on
the decisive value of this terrain to the enemy, RCT 1 tasked
TF 2-7 CAV to seize this terrain to prevent the enemy from
using it.
Upon receipt of the mission, the Task Force Staff began
analyzing the mission and providing the commander with
various courses of action. Ultimately, the commander chose to
execute a frontal attack on the Jolan Park, supported, if
necessary, by an armored company penetration to attack from
the east. The risk of the frontal attack was seen as acceptable
due to the limited enemy presence anticipated on the objective
during the initial stages of the battle. Furthermore, as the RCT
main effort, TF 2-7 CAV had priority of fires, ensuring that
preparatory fires would be available to shape the battlefield.

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All of these mitigating factors combined to reduce the risk of a
frontal attack to an acceptable level.
On the evening of 8 November, Team A/2-7 CAV
(consisting of 1st and 2nd Platoons of A/2-7 CAV, augmented
by tanks from 3rd Platoon of C/3-8 CAV) staged in its attack
position in Assembly Area Otter. Earlier that afternoon,
Apache 6, CPT Ed Twaddell, the Commander of A/2-7 CAV,
conducted a short leader‘s reconnaissance of the breach site
with the Task Force Commander and 2LT Mike Duran, the
Team‘s lead platoon leader (2/A/2-7 CAV). This
reconnaissance proved to be invaluable, as later, in the
darkness, the winding approach lane to the breach would be
exceptionally challenging to navigate. The reconnaissance also
served as a route rehearsal for the approach to the breach. Upon
returning to the assembly area from the reconnaissance,
Apache Company established positions along the perimeter to
provide the battalion with 360-degree security. Once it was set,
the company conducted final preparations for combat.

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Throughout the day and into the evening, the Marines
conducted preparatory fires into the city. These fires began in
earnest around 1830 and included fixed wing aviation (AC130
gunships), attack helicopters, and heavy artillery. Forces
arrayed north of the city watched as F-15s soared overhead,
turned, and flew out of sight, followed by the distant rumble of
their exploding bombs. The 155mm howitzers from Camp
Fallujah fired numerous missions, using variable timed fuses
(VT) for airbursts to clear the rooftops along primary attack
routes. TF 2-7 CAV‘s Mortar Platoon began firing missions
prior to midnight, launching 120mm high explosive projectiles
into the city, two and three at a time.
TF 2-7 CAV attacked into Fallujah early on the morning of
9 November 2004. Team C/3-8 CAV led the Task Force
through the breach cut through the railroad tracks north of
Fallujah and onto Phase Line APRIL (PL APRIL), the city‘s
outer ring road. Team A passed through the breach at
approximately 0100 hrs. The Task Force Commander ensured
that Team A did not begin movement towards the breach until
Team C/3-8 CAV had cleared the breach lane with its last
vehicle and had turned east onto PL APRIL, towards its assault
position. Once that occurred, CPT Twaddell gave 2LT Duran
the order to begin movement. The order of march was simple:
2/A/2-7 followed by 3/C/3-8 (led by 2LT Matt Wojcik),
followed in trail by 1/A/2-7 (led by 2LT Dan Kilgore), with the
company headquarters element (the Commander, CPT
Twaddell; the Company Executive Officer, 1LT Hank Wiley;
the Company Fire Support Officer, 1LT Demetrius Parrott; and
the company‘s M113 ambulance, carrying 1SG Steven Vigil)
moving between 3/C/3-8 and 1/A/2-7. The company passed
through the breach without incident and turned east onto PL
APRIL.

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As the Task Force began its attack, shaping fires were
employed within the constraints of the current Rules of
Engagement (ROE). During this battle, the ROE required
positive identification of enemy forces within a structure before
indirect or aerial delivered fires could engage the building. The
Task Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) oriented the
Battalion‘s Raven Unmanned-Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to identify
enemy locations within the Jolan Park. Once these positions
were identified, preparatory fires from AC-130 gunships and
155mm howitzers (again using VT fuzes to clear exposed
rooftop positions and minimize collateral damage) were
brought in on these positions. These fires shaped the battlefield
for Team A‘s subsequent attack.
Once Team A was arrayed along PL APRIL, the platoons
moved to their assault positions and prepared to advance
through the city from north to south, towards the Jolan Park,
designated Objective (OBJ) PENNSYLVANIA. En route to
OBJ PENNSYLVANIA, the Task Force had designated a
series of march objectives, each named after a State, allowing
the Task Force Commander to focus his companies on
templated enemy positions to ensure the destruction of enemy
forces north of the Battalions‘ primary objective. The
Commander arrayed his company with tanks in the middle, 1st
Platoon on the west, and 3rd Platoon on the east, linked in with
Team C/3-8 CAV on its eastern flank. The 1st Platoon was
oriented down RTE JACOB, but in reality that route served as
a western limit to its axis of advance.
CPT Twaddell had tasked 2LT Kilgore‘s platoon with
suppressing enemy forces on OBJ VERMONT to prevent the
enemy from enveloping the western flank of the tank platoon.
The 3/C/3-8 was oriented on RTE ISAAC as the Team‘s Main
Effort, and CPT Twaddell instructed 2LT Wojcik to destroy
enemy forces on OBJs VERMONT and NEW HAMPSHIRE to

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rd st
enable the attack of 3 Battalion, 1 Marines (3/1 MAR). The
2nd Platoon attacked south as well, utilizing RTE HENRY as its
left handrail, preventing 2d Platoon from moving into Team
C/3-8 CAV‘s fields of fire. Apache 6 also ordered 2nd Platoon
to suppress any enemy forces on OBJ NEW HAMPSHIRE to
prevent the envelopment of 3/C/3-8 from the east. The Team‘s
mission was two-fold: to destroy enemy forces enroute to the
OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to allow 3/1 MAR to pass follow
unhindered and then to seize OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to enable
the attack of 3/1 MAR into the heart of the Jolan District.
On order from the Task Force Commander, the Apaches
began their advance to the south. They moved slowly. The 1st
Platoon was slowed by the very narrow and winding streets
that emerged from the ―Old City‖ to its west that snaked
through this area, forcing the Platoon to move in column,
separating into sections to allow overwatch of the lead element.
CPT Twaddell had deliberately placed 3/C/3-8 on the fastest,
widest, and most direct route to OBJ PENNSYLVANIA (RTE
ISAAC) to allow it to move south quickly and, thus, if
necessary, bring the tanks‘ firepower to bear very quickly on
the decisive point. The 2nd Platoon also had a fairly high-speed
and direct avenue of approach to OBJ PENNSYLVANIA
although the small alleys and narrow roads in the zone of
attack also canalized it to some extent. As the Team moved
south into the city, it made light contact. As a result, it was
ordered to hold in place and conduct survivability moves as it
approached PL CATHY, immediately north of OBJ
PENNSYLVANIA. The 3/1 MAR‘s movement was slower
than expected, and the Battalion Commander did not want to
leave space between the two battalions that might allow the
enemy the opportunity to isolate the force and attack it
piecemeal or to lie in wait for the Marine infantry. The
Apaches held their positions for approximately three hours, and

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during that time, both First and Second platoons engaged
several RPG teams with coaxial machine guns, killing
approximately eight insurgents who had come out in the
darkness to test their abilities.
As dawn broke on 9 November, Team A received orders to
begin its assault of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. While planning
the attack, CPT Twaddell had divided OBJ PENNSYLVANIA
in half, designating the two sub-objectives as
PENNSYLVANIA WEST and PENNSYLVANIA EAST. He
tasked 1st Platoon to conduct a deliberate clearance of the
buildings on PENNSYLVANIA WEST to seize the park as a
whole. Apache 6 viewed the early seizure of OBJ
PENNSYLVANIA WEST as decisive since this would
facilitate the rapid passage of 3/1 MAR into the heart of the
―Old City‖ of the Jolan District. He instructed 2nd Platoon to
seize PENNSYLVANIA EAST to prevent the enemy from
massing on 1st Platoon. The tanks were to establish the western
portion of what would become the company‘s perimeter. CPT
Twaddell instructed 2LT Wojcik to orient his fires to the west
toward the ―Old City‖ to prevent the enemy from repositioning
against the attack on OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. He had drawn a
close-up sketch of the objective area, labeling buildings with
numbers; distributed them down to the squad leader level; and
provided the Battalion TOC with a copy. This would allow all
leaders to track where individual units were moving as they
cleared the objective and allowed a common frame of reference
when reporting to the Task Force so that it could easily track
the unit‘s progress. At the battalion-level, the Task Force
Commander ensured that Team C/3-8 CAV was arrayed 300
meters to the east of Team A, allowing C/3-8 to execute an
attack to the west in the event that the company met stiffer than
anticipated enemy resistance. As often happens in combat, the
plan changed to some extent as they began their assault.

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Upon further evaluation of the terrain, CPT Twaddell
ordered 3/C/3-8 to stay on the north side of the objective and
1st and 2nd platoons to move on line with their rifle squads
down the west and east sides of the objective, blocking
possible enemy egress routes as they went. The 3/C/3-8
established the support by fire position on the north side of
OBJ PENNSYLVANIA and breached four walls by driving
into them with the tanks to allow the rifle squads easier access
to the courtyards within the objective area. The platoon leaders
dismounted with their rifle squads and began to clear the
buildings on the objective one at a time. Meanwhile, their
platoon sergeants maneuvered each platoon‘s Bradleys to
establish defensive positions to the west and east of the
objective, while the tanks secured the northern portion. The 2nd
Platoon discovered a major enemy arms cache, containing
approximately 50kg of PE-4 plastic explosives and a vehicle,
the body and trunk of which had been filled with another
100kg of PE-4 and artillery shells, converting it into a Vehicle
Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Team A
secured this vehicle and continued its assault. In another
building, 2nd Platoon discovered several hundred mortar rounds
of various calibers, as well as several surface-to-surface
missiles, parts for a heavy machine gun, and several hundred
rounds of ammunition. During the assault, 2LT Duran‘s
platoon killed one insurgent who, for some reason, had not fled
the area already.
Meanwhile, 2LT Kilgore‘s 1st Platoon continued to clear
the western portion of the objective, making no contact with
the enemy. SFC Calvin Smalley, the Platoon Sergeant for 1st
Platoon, secured the western side of the objective, orienting his
Bradleys to the west. He began to report that multiple RPG
teams were running out into the middle of the street to the
west, attempting to engage his Bradley from the middle of the

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street. Over the next several hours, SFC Smalley and his crew
would engage and kill multiple RPG gunners who attempted
this tactic.
As soon as Team A had initially secured the northern
portion of OBJECTIVE PENNSYLVANIA, it consolidated its
rifle squads and began to prepare to pass 3/1 MAR. While
Team A fought to secure the northern portion of OBJ
PENNSYLVANIA, 3/1 MAR had continued to move forward
and was closing on Team A‘s position. As the lead Marine rifle
company began to pass through Team A‘s positions, the team
was still in contact with enemy forces south of PL DONNA in
the actual park. Prior to the attack, the operations officers of
both battalions had developed a plan to control the passage, but
this operation had not been rehearsed. Also, leaders had not
anticipated this passage occurring while Team A was still in
relatively heavy contact on the southern portion of OBJ
PENNSYLVANIA. This continued heavy contact on OBJ
PENNSYLVANIA forced the Task Force Commander to
commit his Tactical Command Post (TAC) to the north side of
OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to assist with further coordination for
the passage. The Company Commander eventually handed
control of the passage of lines off to his company executive
officer, 1LT Wiley, while he continued to fight the company.
Over the course of the afternoon, 1LT Wiley successfully
passed three companies through Team A‘s forward trace and to
the west to continue the fight in the ―Old City.‖
The Team‘s rapid attack and ability to seize the northern
portion of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA enabled several key events
to occur. Most importantly, the seizure of this terrain prevented
the enemy from using it as an assembly area to mass forces and
executing their mobile defense. Secondly, this attack quickly
isolated the Jolan District from the remainder of the enemy
defenses in Fallujah. Finally, the rapid passage of 3/1 MAR

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allowed RCT 1 to attack the Jolan District from two directions
(north and east), facilitating the destruction of the enemy‘s key
defenses. All of these events were critical in preventing the
enemy from executing his planned mobile defense, denying
him the tactic that had worked so well in April, 2004.
Thus, TF 2-7 CAV‘s rapid and destructive attack during the
first 12 hours of the Battle of Fallujah proved decisive and was
the first victory in a string of victories that would last through
the next 12 days. The decisive impact of the attack on the Jolan
Park cannot be overestimated. Throughout the next 24 hours,
the enemy made repeated attacks, attempting to force A/2-7
from this position, to no avail. This attack illustrates the value
of determining the decisive point and its relationship to the
enemy, then attacking violently with overwhelming force to
seize that point.

From the personal experience monograph by Major Tim

Karcher, Operations Officer, TF 2-7, 1st Cavalry Division,
Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort
Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In addition to the writer‘s lessons on the

importance of speed in taking away the enemy‘s mobility, this
vignette serves as an excellent example of reconnaissance. It
highlights not only reconnaissance for planning and execution,
but also the incorporation of higher‘s reconnaissance;
physical/personal reconnaissance; and, presumably, map
reconnaissance and other means.
The intelligence provided by RCT 1 to 2-7 CAV outlined
the enemy‘s defenses and his type of defensive operation, all of
which proved to be accurate and timely. This is reconnaissance
for planning, which helps confirm or deny initial commander
and staff assessments and, if provided early enough in mission

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analysis, helps shape COA development by focusing effort on
specific COAs or eliminating infeasible ones.
After receiving the 2-7 CAV Battalion OPORD, CPT Ed
Twaddell conducted a personal, physical reconnaissance of the
breach site. His reconnaissance helped ensure his unit‘s success
during the stress and obscuration inevitable at a combat, night,
breach site.
Although this vignette does not highlight all the
reconnaissance assets employed at the regimental, battalion,
and company levels, the unit‘s success in identifying, targeting,
and decisively engaging the enemy‘s center of gravity in the
Jolan District is proof of the successful use of reconnaissance
during the planning process and good execution by warfighters
on the ground.

CONCLUSION: In war after war, conflict after conflict, our

Army has demonstrated we have the finest finishing force in
the world; if we can find the enemy, we will kill him. Today,
we must fight for the same information and intelligence that we
fought to attain in the past.
On today‘s battlefield, we have an asset that is better than
the finest computer ever imagined—the Soldier—but he must
be prepared to receive and send the information the
commander requires—the priority intelligence requirements—
to meet with and defeat the enemy. This chapter demonstrated
why we must remain focused on training our reconnaissance
Soldiers to standard. In future battles, it will be the
reconnaissance Soldiers who will provide our warfighting
leaders with the actionable intelligence that will be required to
kill the enemy. Our finishing forces will not let us down, but
we must ensure that we find the enemy first.

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There is still a tendency in each separate unit…to be a
one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman
wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to
fire…That is not the way to win battles. If the band
played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass
horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet,
there would be a hell of a noise but no music. To get
harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other.
Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait
for the band leader to signal you…You must each of
your own volition see to it that you come into the
concert at the proper time…
GEN George S. Patton, 8 July 1941
Address to the men of the
2nd Armored DIV
The Patton Papers, Vol. II, 1974

INTRODUCTION: General Patton‘s comments above foretold

the advent of combined arms warfare—the synchronized
application of several arms to achieve an effect on the enemy
that is greater than if each arm is used independently or in
sequence. For the task force to create the effects that the
commander desires, each battlefield operating system must be
synchronized with all of the others. Today‘s application of
combined arms at the lowest level would have made General
Patton proud.
There are two principles that guide leaders in fighting
combined arms—complementary effects and reinforcing
effects. Leaders create complementary effects when they
arrange elements with different characteristics together to
protect friendly vulnerabilities and enhance effects on the
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enemy. Reinforcing effects occur when leaders arrange similar
combined arms elements together, either simultaneously or
sequentially, to either augment the effect of one element with
another or to sustain the effect longer than if just one element
was used. Commanders create effects based on, first, an
understanding of the enemy‘s capability and tendencies as well
as their own and, second, the ability to visualize the enemy and
themselves throughout the battle in time and space, from initial
contact until culmination. The commander organizes, arranges,
and applies his force to maximize each arm and the battle
operating system at each decision point, attaining synergistic
effects.
In every doctrine manual that speaks to combined arms
warfare, and even in the first edition of this book, published in
1939, the point is made that the arms must not just work in
concert, they must form cohesive teams focused on common
goals. The examples in this chapter illustrate both the
synergistic effects of combined arms and the teamwork
necessary to achieve this synergy.

Early in the afternoon of 3 October 1993, elements of

TF Ranger were stranded during a daylight raid to capture
key members of General Aideed’s Somali National
Alliance. Following the first unsuccessful rescue attempt by
C Company, 2-14th, 10th Mountain Division, a second rescue
attempt was conducted, with Company A in the lead,
followed by Company C, attacking to secure the second
crash site and retrieve the dead and wounded.

The movement to National Street, the main east-west

running road through Mogadishu, was uneventful. As the
column approached the turn onto National Street, all hell broke

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loose. I heard small arms fire and RPG explosions and felt
shrapnel hitting the vehicle.

The vehicle began to pick up speed. We started going over

curbs and obstacles in the road which threw us around.
Unknown to me, the first vehicle, carrying the 1st Squad
Leader, and my vehicle began pulling away from the rest of the
column. The third vehicle, the commander‘s HMMWV, kept
the rest of the Malaysian Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)
from following my two runaway lead vehicles. This effectively
separated my two squads from the rest of the company, and we
would remain separated until the following morning.
The two APCs continued west on National Street, then
turned south toward crash site 2 and continued past it. The
vehicles were about one kilometer south of crash site 2 when
they entered a Somali ambush. RPG fire struck the lead vehicle
head-on, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver. My vehicle
was struck a moment later, in the right-front side, in the engine

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compartment. The 1st Squad Leader called from the lead
vehicle requesting guidance, and I told him to dismount and
establish security. I was doing the same. When I got out, I
realized we were on our own. Green tracers and RPG rounds
were hitting all around us. We moved to a building east of the
vehicle and occupied some low ground on the south side. I
made contact with the squad leader and told him to stay in his
secure position and that we were going to move north up the
hill and try to reestablish contact with the company. Low
ground and buildings were blocking all radio transmissions.

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I led my element north past two buildings, attempting to
gain sight of the company. Small arms fire began to intensify
from the direction of travel farther up the hill. The M60 gunner
engaged targets from the corner of what appeared to be some
sort of garage. All he was actually doing, however, was
drawing fire; every time he engaged a target, the RPG fires into
our vicinity intensified. I told the gunner to engage only
identified targets to limit RPG fires at us. He said that he was
only engaging identifiable targets and that there were a lot of
people up the road. With the increasingly heavy enemy fire,
and the fear of the enemy moving between my divided
elements, I decided to return to the original location. Before
moving out, I heard the clearing of a weapon on the other side
of a wall. I pulled out a grenade, pulled the pin, flipped off the
thumb clip, and threw it over the wall. There was no explosion.
I pulled out another grenade, repeated the arming process,
released the spoon, and the spoon did not fly off. The tape we
used to silence the pull rings had left small strands that kept the
grenade from arming; I then pulled the spoon off and threw the
grenade. A huge explosion followed, and the weapon noise
stopped.
Throughout the entire movement back, the RTO tried to
establish radio contact with the company with no success.
About 15 minutes from the time of the ambush, we reached our
original position and reestablished a secure perimeter. I then
sent an M60 assistant gunner back to the APC to retrieve gear
and additional ammunition; he returned with the Malaysians in
the vehicle who had decided to join our perimeter. At this
point, we were still under heavy fire, and I decided we had to
get inside a building to survive. I asked the engineer squad
leader if he could make a hole in the wall, and he assured me
that he could. I contacted the squad leader and told him that we
were going to blow a hole in the compound so that he could

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ensure his men were out of the danger area. After receiving
confirmation that all of his personnel were out of the direct
blast radius, I had the charge set.

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Everything on the battlefield seemed to go quiet after the
blast, as if it had surprised the Somalis. The blast was so large
that it not only made the hole we wanted, but also knocked
down the wall and a small building on the other side. The
squad leader reported that part of the wall on his side had come
down on his Soldiers as well. (Next time, I will specify how
large of a hole I want.) In the quiet after the blast, someone had
to make the initial entry, and all my Soldiers were pulling
security. I jumped up, sprinted across the street, and entered the
compound, firing at the house I was entering. No fire was
returned, and I called the squad into the perimeter to establish a
more defensible perimeter. We formed two mutually
supporting positions with the Infantry squad oriented south,
and the engineer team with the M60 oriented north. The RTO
and Malaysians also entered the compound. The RTO put up
the long whip antenna and tried to establish communications
on different nets. I placed the Malaysians in a hallway in the
rear of the building, and the squad‘s combat lifesaver began
working on the injured while I checked security. Two adults
and several children who were in the house moved to the back
room, and we left them alone.
At this time, screams of pain were reported coming from
the lead APC, apparently from a wounded Malaysian who had
been left behind. I told a team leader to go out there and get the
man. Without concern for his own safety, he ran back into the
kill zone, retrieved the mortally wounded man, and attended to
his wounds. (This act earned him a Bronze Star with Valor
device)
Finding that the RTO still had not been able to contact
anyone on any net, I pulled the radio out of the rucksack, took
off all of the secure devices, and transmitted in the clear. The
Battalion Commander‘s voice was the first I heard and was the
most calming influence I had that night. He said ―keep doing

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what you‘re doing. You‘re alive, and I will work on getting
you out.‖ I then contacted the C Company Commander, and we
each fired a star cluster signal, determining that we were about
one kilometer apart. He said that he would get the company
down to our location once the search of the crash site was
completed. An AH-1 Cobra flew east over us and started
engaging targets a block or two away. This prompted me to
place my M203 gunners on the roof of the building, and they
engaged targets to the east. Throughout the night, the Somalis
continued sporadic attacks, usually standing off to fire RPGs at
the compound; I counted no less than ten impacts in a one-
minute period.
Around 0300 hrs., the C Company Commander told me
that they were having trouble moving south and wanted us to
try and move north and link up with his lead platoon. I called
my leaders together to formulate a plan. The engineers would
lead, followed by the machine gun teams with me, the
Malaysians, and 1st Squad trailing. The intent was to use the
engineer team as a base of fire, and be able to maneuver the 1st
Squad if needed. I had the Malaysians carry the stretcher with
their wounded comrade.
The engineers moved up past the garage where we had
been earlier that night. I positioned myself on the corner of the
garage looking north. The Malaysians were streaming by,
moving toward the engineers, when a Somali gunman stepped
out in front of the engineers and engaged them with small arms
fire. Three men were injured; one took a round in the chest and
later died in Germany when surgeons tried to remove the
bullet. I moved forward to a door stoop and began suppressing
the gunman‘s position. An engineer helped pull the wounded
men back behind the door stoop. From that stoop, all I could do
was to suppress the gunman; I needed a better shot if I was
going to kill him.

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st
I yelled back to the 1 Squad Leader to take a team across
the street, move up the wall, and kill the gunman. He came
back with, ―This street? The one with bullets flying down it?‖ I
said ―Roger.‖ Reluctantly, he and the combat lifesaver moved
across the street and worked their way forward. The medic
came to my location to help with the wounded and see if I
needed help suppressing the gunman. I had him treat the
wounded, as there was only room for one man to fire from the
small stoop. Just as I ran out of ammunition and was changing
magazines, the gunman moved around the corner and began
shooting at my location. His actions gave the squad leader
enough time to draw a bead on him and kill him. I was so eager
to ensure he was dead that I grabbed grenades from the medic
and hurled them into the building. We had no more shots from
that gunman, but another one began engaging us from across
an open lot to our north.
The new gunman‘s fire was accurate enough to keep the
squad leader and the combat lifesaver pinned against a
building. At this point, I had two casualties who were litter
urgent and eight who were walking wounded. We needed help.
I had the RTO contact C Company to request transport out. He
informed me that the Malaysians were on the way and that we
had ―Little Bird‖ on station. Yelling over to the squad leader, I
asked him if he could mark the building with an M203 flare,
and he said he could. I told the RTO to relay to the pilots. The
flare was fired, but it hit the wrong building, which the Little
Bird destroyed. I then told the RTO to relay that I was marking
the building with tracers. Standing up from behind the stoop, I
emptied an entire magazine of tracers into the building. The
Little Bird came in perpendicular to our location and fired his
7.62mm gun followed by rockets, and the building
disappeared. Shortly thereafter, we were extracted.

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From a January, 1998, article in Infantry Magazine by Captain
Mark A.B. Hollis, who was a platoon leader in 2nd Battalion,
14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.

DISCUSSION: This vignette illustrates that the combined arms

concept does not just apply to higher level units. In this
particular case, we see a textbook application of combined
arms at the platoon level, using assets normally seen at much
higher levels of command.
The platoon leader with A Company, 2-14 IN, was tasked
with securing the second crash site in Mogadishu, Somalia. In
the first phase of the operation, enemy resistance was initially
not present. However, as soon as the convoy, which consisted
of an Infantry platoon, an Engineer squad, and a section of
Malaysian armored personnel carriers, turned into the street
that led to the crash site, the enemy engaged with a
combination of RPGs and small-arms fire. By successfully
integrating and fighting as a combined arms team, the platoon
leader was able to destroy the enemy, keep his men alive, and
eventually be extracted.
During the course of the battle, the platoon leader realized
that his machine guns were drawing an inordinate amount of
enemy fire when they engaged indiscriminate targets. Quickly
analyzing the situation, the platoon leader ordered his gunners
to engage only identifiable targets to limit the enemy‘s ability
to place effective fire on the machine gun team. The platoon
leader also synchronized his small-arms assets, which were
organic to the platoon, to maximize their effectiveness. For
example, his decision to place his M203 gunners on rooftops to
engage the enemy contributed greatly to the success of the
platoon.
The platoon leader‘s ability to synchronize and integrate
combined arms at the lowest level was outstanding. One

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example that exemplified using combined arms was marking
buildings with tracers to facilitate the destruction of the
structure by rotary wing CAS. Another example was using the
attached engineer squad to blow a hole in a wall to get the
platoon behind some cover. His use of the MH-6 ―Little Birds‖
and engineers enabled his platoon to maximize the enemy‘s
casualties while diminishing friendly wounded.
In conclusion, the application of combined arms at the
lowest level resulted in a well-synchronized and successful
fight in very difficult terrain. By integrating all of his organic
assets and successfully using available external assets, the
platoon leader was able to destroy the enemy and, most
importantly, ensure the safety of his Soldiers.

TF 2-327 conducts a search and attack 1200Z 31 MAR

03 to destroy enemy forces and equipment IOT hasten the
surrender of enemy forces within An Najaf” (2-327th IN
Valorous Unit Award Recommendation for Operation
Iraqi Freedom). The TF commander’s guidance for the
operation was five-fold: first, the enemy would be unable to
influence 1-327th IN, the brigade main effort, from 2-327th’s
sector; second, the tanks and antitank TOW vehicles would
secure the intersections; third, the Infantry would protect
the tanks and TOW vehicles; fourth, the task force would
influence the local populace to turn on the Fedayeen within
the city; and finally, the attack in the city would be
methodical. The commander’s end state for this phase was
to isolate Fedayeen in the vicinity of the mosque, develop a
positive relationship with the local population, and finally,
to posture the task force to isolate the mosque and continue
offensive operations.

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On the morning of March 31, Task Force 2-327 (TF No
Slack), comprised of 2-327 Infantry, 1/A/2-70 Armor, 2/A/2-44
Air Defense Artillery, 2/A/326 Engineers, A/311 Military
Intelligence, and members of the 431st Civil Affairs, conducted
an armor/armed reconnaissance. At 1100 hrs., an armed
reconnaissance element of OH-58Ds and AH-64s, the attached
tank platoon, and Delta Company commenced the first phase of
the attack, focusing on the escarpment that dominated the
approaches from the south leading up to the city. The purpose
of this phase was to identify the enemy‘s defensive scheme
and, armed with that intelligence, use both direct and indirect
fires to destroy the enemy‘s main defensive positions before
committing any rifle companies to the attack.
Armed with the improved anti-armor sight (TOW ITAS),
with target acquisition capabilities exceeding ten kilometers,
Delta Company established a support-by-fire position to
observe the escarpment as the tank platoon maneuvered
forward to gain contact with the enemy in the oasis that lay at
the foot of the massive earthwork, OBJ FOX. Preceded by
echeloned close air support (CAS) attacks, 105mm artillery
fires, and 81mm mortar fires, the tank platoon maneuvered
forward along the avenue leading up to the city, operationally
designated ROUTE TAHOE, with the intent of forcing the
enemy to reveal his positions amid the thickly vegetated terrain
of palm trees. As the tank platoon approached the objective, it
received small arms fire and heavy mortar fire from the enemy
defensive positions. Now able to identify the hidden enemy
positions firing upon the tank platoon, Delta Company began
engaging from the support-by-fire position with MK-19 and
.50 caliber fires at maximum standoff distance. Due to the
angle of the sun reflecting off of a small lake in their line of
sight at the time of the attack, the enemy could not pinpoint
friendly positions. Unhindered by enemy fires, Delta Company

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maneuvered forward to more effectively support the tanks and
remain out of enemy small arms‘ range. To cover the tank
platoon‘s run up the escarpment, Delta Company conducted a
recon by fire to the platoon‘s front. Immediately, Delta
Company began receiving small arms fire from two buildings
on the escarpment to its front, though out of range of the
enemy weapons.
During the course of this recon by fire, a sniper team
attached to Delta Company identified bunker positions and
muzzle flashes emanating from below the two target buildings.
The location of the two target buildings was in the line of fire
of the most sensitive religious site in An Najaf— if not the
entire Shi‘ite Muslim world—the Golden Mosque of Ali. To
prevent any damage to the Mosque, the Task Force
Commander ordered the Delta gunners to fire the more
accurate TOW missiles at the buildings. The gunners continued
to use Mark-19 and .50 caliber fires to suppress the bunker
positions below the target buildings. To maximize the
destruction of the enemy battle positions, the Task Force
Commander integrated close air support and close combat air
attack missions. With the battalion‘s combat observation lasing
team (COLT), equipped with designators to direct laser-guided
munitions, the Commander was able to call for close air
support from F-16 fighters to complete the destruction of the
enemy within the target buildings. The OH-58D‘s played an
invaluable role in destroying enemy positions within the oasis
with their rocket and .50 caliber fires, while continuing to
attack and support the tank platoon in the face of heavy small
arms fire.
Upon reaching a mine/wire obstacle blocking the avenue
leading up the escarpment to the city, the tank platoon
attempted to clear a lane by shooting the poorly emplaced
mines with their coaxial machine gun. While proofing the lane

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with the plow, the lead tank struck a mine, damaging the lifter
and causing the tank to become immobile without immediate
repairs. Delta Company maintained its suppression of the
remaining enemy on the escarpment, thereby enabling the tank
crew to secure the plow and withdraw from enemy fires.
At approximately 1400 hrs., while continuing suppression
of enemy on the escarpment, a battalion sniper identified a
towed artillery piece being moved into a firing point. Shortly
thereafter, a TOW gunner identified three more artillery pieces
already in firing position 500 meters south of the target
buildings. During this time, enemy fighters in a third building
began engaging friendly forces with small arms and RPG fires.
The Task Force Commander called for immediate indirect
suppression on the artillery pieces until close air support assets
could arrive on station. Delta TOW gunners also engaged the
artillery pieces with missile fires, scoring a direct hit on one
tube, resulting in large secondary explosions. Indirect fires,
close air support, and TOW missile fires completed the
destruction of the remaining pieces, which was confirmed by
the OH-58D pilots.
Around the middle of the afternoon, enemy fire from the
escarpment decreased significantly. The battalion received
intelligence reports that the Fedayeen fighters were
withdrawing to the north in the vicinity of the Mosque of Ali
and the adjacent cemetery, as well as other protected sites such
as hospitals and schools. Shortly thereafter, the battalion
reconnaissance elements withdrew back to the battalion attack
position, thereby completing the first phase of the operation in
preparation for the attack on March 31. Of significant note
during the attack is that because of the precision of the direct
and indirect fire in the vicinity of the holy Mosque, the Mosque
sustained no damage.

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From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jonathan
Bradford, who served as XO, B Company, 2-327th, 101st Air
Assault, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection,
Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The first phase of TF 2-327 search and attack

on 31 March 2003 is an excellent example of just how effective
a well-coordinated combined arms battle can be. This vignette
clearly demonstrates the importance commanders at all levels
should place upon effectively understanding and employing
key weapon systems to ensure weapon capabilities are used to
appropriate effect. In the example above, this meant
minimizing potential damage to a sensitive religious site—as
was the case with the use of the TOW missiles or the use of
coordinated heavy suppression on enemy artillery pieces using
artillery, close air support, OH-58Ds, and TOWs.
With the initial and subsequent synchronization of
echeloned close air support, 105mm artillery fires, and 81mm
mortar fires, combined with the combat maneuver elements of
the OH-58Ds, the attached tank platoon and Delta Company
undoubtedly overwhelmed the enemy. TF 2-327 applied
combined arms warfare at its greatest potential: delivering
timely and effective combat power, which disrupted the
enemy‘s cohesion and will to fight and resulted in the enemy‘s
withdrawal. The fact the TF 2-37 sustained no damage is great
testimony to the courage and skill displayed by all.

On 07 February 2004, B Co., 1st BN, 23rd IN (SBCT),

and Special Operations Forces conducted a raid to capture
a former major general in the Iraqi Army who had a direct
link to former Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein.

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We received the mission from our Battalion Commander,
LTC Buck James, who had received it from a Special
Operations Force (SOF) working in Mosul, Iraq. The SOF unit
wanted us to isolate the objective using our superior firepower
and maneuver capabilities to accomplish the mission: to
capture an Iraqi major general to gather intelligence on High
Value Target (HVT) #6, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri, so he could be
captured. I was the Company Executive Officer and was in
charge of establishing the outer cordon and sniper position to
isolate the target building. My Company Commander, Captain
Robert Robinson, and First Sergeant Robert Swift had planned
the mission in detail. The plan was simple, and we had
approximately two days to plan and rehearse the mission.
We met with the key players—our BN S3 and the SOF
assault team leader—the day prior to the mission to finalize the
plan. During this meeting, the SOF assault team leader
reviewed the plan and made some key suggestions that we
incorporated into our plan. The SOF assault team leader
recommended adding an additional sniper team to overwatch
the target building and stated that his men would conduct the
explosive breach for us. These changes proved to be the key to
success on the raid.
The final plan for the mission had one Infantry platoon, one
MGS platoon, and two sniper teams as an outer cordon around
the city block of the target building. Their task was to isolate
the target to prevent anyone from coming on or off the
objective. The assault force was one Infantry platoon with four
SOF members, who would capture the major general.
At midnight on 7 February 2004, B Co., 1st BN, 23rd IN
(SBCT), moved from Forward Operating Base Pacesetter and
conducted a linkup with the SOF unit at the attack position.
This position was on the far side of an inter-visibility line that
prevented anyone from identifying our approach to the

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objective. The linkup took place around 0030 hrs., and we
made final coordination with the SOF unit to ensure the
success of the mission. We conducted our final radio checks
and confirmed our signals with the SOF unit. I took the
isolation force into the target area and set up the outer cordon. I
set up three mounted blocking positions and then dismounted
with my sniper team, infiltrated, and set up in the building
across the street from the target building. My sniper position
provided CPT Robinson with direct fire overwatch of the entire
target building and detailed intelligence of the target building
and the occupants. We accomplished the infiltration of the
isolation force without being compromised by the enemy. The
Stryker vehicles are very quiet and were able to block all the
key intersections around the target building.
Once the outer cordon was set, the assault force moved to
two separate assault positions and dismounted 1st PLT and the
SOF unit. One assault position was in the west, and one was in
the north. The only activity that we identified from the sniper
position was a single person walking around on the second
floor of the target building. This person had no idea that 40
Infantrymen were moving to his house to capture him.
The house had two gates on the outer wall, one in the north
and one in the west. The two assault elements moved to the
outer gates of the target building, and the SOF Soldiers placed
two charges on the outer gates. They used a rubber strip charge
on the outer gates of the house to gain access to the courtyard.
At this point, the enemy still was not aware of our presence.
Soldiers emplaced the charges on the gates. On a
simultaneous countdown, they command-detonated the rubber
strip charges and breached the outer gates. Then two SOF
Soldiers entered the courtyard and set two more rubber strip
charges on the outer doors of the house and detonated both of
these simultaneously. The assault squad followed the SOF

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Soldiers into the courtyard, entered the house, and cleared the
kitchen, which allowed us to establish a foothold. It took eight
seconds to get the assault squad from the street into the house.
Once the assault platoon leader secured the foothold, he
passed a second squad into the house and cleared the first floor
within two minutes after the first charge was detonated. Then
the assault platoon leader passed a third squad through the
second breach point and cleared the second floor and roof. On
the second floor, one of the rooms was locked, so the SOF
Soldiers breached it with their final charge. The major general
was captured on the second floor in his bedroom. The entire
building was cleared and secured three minutes after the initial
charge was detonated. The enemy was taken by surprise and
could not recover in time to put up any resistance. The mission
was a complete success without a shot being fired.

From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D. Tiffner, who

served as Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd In
(SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The success of the raid described by 1LT

Tiffner can be attributed primarily to the synchronization of the
combined arms team, in particular, Infantry and Special
Operations forces. B Company‘s close integration with SOF
forces, along with its wise use of snipers in support of the raid
did, in fact, result in the successful capture of the General and
ultimately the capture of Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri in Mosul,
Iraq.
1LT Tiffner‘s outfit successfully combined garnered SOF
intelligence, Infantry snipers, an Infantry cordon, and an
Infantry/SOF assault force that seamlessly captured a known

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Iraqi general. This vignette also demonstrates a great example
of SOF integration at the lowest tactical level.

CONCLUSION: Combined-arms warfare is a team sport and

must be planned, rehearsed, practiced, and executed with the
whole team. The successful use of combined arms does not
occur merely because it appears in doctrinal manuals; it occurs
as a direct result of education and training. Commanders and
their staffs must have a solid concept of the application of
combined arms, which starts with a well-grounded expertise in
weapons and systems‘ capabilities and experience in tactical
situations. It is also a result of the study of past battles.
However, commanders must also seek every opportunity to
train their units in combined arms tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Finally, the whole team must train together as
often as possible. All battlefield operating systems must be
integrated, and the different arms must speak the same
language and know each other‘s capabilities and limitations
and the power of their synchronized effects. This allows the
commander to develop trust and confidence in all team
members.

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149
112th Infantry in Kosovo

110th Infantry in Kosovo

150
151
Daychopun Province, Afghanistan

82nd Airborne in Afghanistan

152
 Tirin River, Afghanistan

Shkin firebase, Afghanistan

153
10th Mountain destroying cache, Afghanistan

Orgun-E, Afghanistan

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155
Infantry assault

Karbala, Iraq

156
B/3-502 IN officers

Infantry

157
Objective Moe, 8 April, ground level north

3rd ID, Iraq

158
 1st ID, Samarra

82nd Soldier with Iraqi soldiers

159
Haifa Street, Baghdad

Dealing with civilians

160
Baghdad, Iraq

161
4 May 2003

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 CHAPTER 7: Mutual Support
The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some
position or battery, under fire without the privilege of
returning it; or to guard some train left in the rear,
within hearing but out of danger; or to provide for the
wounded or dead of some corps which is too busy
ahead to care for its own.
GEN William T. Sherman
The Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman,
1875

INTRODUCTION: It is no mistake that this chapter on mutual

support follows the chapter on combined arms as, in many
cases, it is through the use of combined arms that mutual
support is achieved. However, the presence of other branches
of service is not a requirement to achieve mutual support—two
Soldiers can achieve mutual support. Mutual support is support
that units render each other against an enemy because of those
units‘ assigned tasks, their positions relative to each other and
to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. Maneuver units
attain mutual support when their fires capabilities and CSS are
within supporting distance and supporting range of an enemy
attempting to engage the other unit.
With the decentralized nature of the Global War on Terror
and the anticipated future fight, mutual support must be
foremost in each Soldier‘s mind; this only comes about through
realistic training. Likewise, planning for mutual support—
between squads, platoons, companies, and above—must be
foremost in the leader‘s mind; again, the result of good training
and strong military education.

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By 4 April 2003, V Corps and I MEF had almost
completely surrounded Baghdad and had begun planning
for operations within the city. In an effort to pierce the
heart of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 3ID conducted
“thunder runs,” probes, into the city to “see what would
happen.” The first raid, conducted on 5 April by TF 1-64
Armor, resulted in fierce Iraqi resistance. The second run,
conducted by 2d Brigade, 3ID, on 7 April was significant:
2d Brigade would remain in the city. To ensure supplies
would reach 2d Brigade, controlling Highway 8, south of
Baghdad, was critical. Task Force 3-15 would seize three
cloverleaf intersections along Highway 8, from south to
north, objectives Curly, Larry, and Moe, and retain them
to allow movement of supplies into the city.

LTC Stephen Twitty, the Commander of TF 3-15, arrived

at OBJ Daly, south of Baghdad, following offensive operations
south of the Brigade at OBJ Grady. Because of the operation at
OBJ Grady, he had not received the brigade operations order,
but he had sent his S-3 to the OPORD. LTC Twitty, arriving at
OBJ Daly with his three maneuver companies and a small
portion of his Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service
Support (CSS) assets, found his staff, which had arrived there
hours earlier, in the midst of the Military Decision-making
Process. The Battalion S-3 briefed LTC Twitty on the current
situation and the upcoming offensive into Baghdad. The
warning order that he had gotten three hours earlier had
directed that he detach B/3-15 IN, with its Commander, XO,
and two mechanized Infantry platoons, to secure the Lines of
Communication (LOCs) around Brigade OBJ Saints. LTC
Twitty had under his command a tank company team, B/4-64
AR, and one mechanized Infantry company team, A/3-15 IN,
along with the normal attachments. As his companies refueled

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and rearmed, he and his staff huddled in a bombed-out building
to complete the order for the attack the next morning.
At 0100 hrs., LTC Twitty called his commanders to the
building—its missing roof replaced with a tarp and the
windows blacked out with ponchos—and issued his order for
the attack. His Infantry combat team, A/3-15 IN, led by CPT
Josh Wright, would attack to seize the northern objective, OBJ
Moe; his Armor company team, B/4-64 AR, led by CPT Dan
Hubbard, would attack to seize the center objective (Larry);
and TM Zan would seize objective Curly in the south. Team
Zan consisted of a single mechanized Infantry platoon, an
engineer squad, the mortar platoon, a scout section, and the TF
Command Sergeant Major with an M88 and a HMMWV. It
was commanded by one of the battalion's battle captains, CPT
Zan Hornbuckle. The company team commanders had six
hours from the time they received the mission to the time they
would cross the Line of Departure.
The enemy at Moe, Larry, and Curly was a combination of
fanatical Syrian Jihadists, Special Republican Guards,
Republican Guards, Saddam Fedayeen, and members of the
Regime‘s Al Kuds brigades, all determined to fight and die.
They attacked incessantly for 12-18 hours, firing small arms
and RPGs from buildings, trenches, bunkers, and rubble
alongside the cloverleaf intersections. They ―charged‖ the U.S.
positions in taxis, cars, trucks with heavy machine guns
mounted, and even on motorcycles with recoilless rifles tied to
the sidecars. They drove cars loaded with explosives at high
speeds towards the U.S. positions, hoping to destroy the
Americans when they exploded. The Mortar Platoon occupied
the southern part of OBJ Curly, with two tubes aimed north and
two aimed south. It fired simultaneous indirect fire missions in
both directions, while the gunners on the .50 caliber machine
guns engaged the enemy in the defense of their positions.

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The mortar men continued to fire missions even while
under ground assault and indirect fire, firing over 20 direct lay
missions against buildings housing enemy forces and against
―Technical Vehicles‖ assaulting their position. They also
supported the forces on the two other objectives with nine
DANGER CLOSE missions: seven in support of OBJ Moe and
two in support of OBJ Larry.
The Combat Engineers earned that title. They were
magnificent both as Infantrymen and as Engineers. They
exposed themselves to incredible fire to emplace demolitions,
dropping light poles to make abatis to stop the suicide taxis.
The drivers of the Armored Combat Earthmovers went outside
the perimeter, alone, to build berms and remove guardrails to
allow movement between positions. They formed ad hoc
teams, along with radio operators and drivers, and cleared
trenches and bunkers against fanatical defenders, at least one of
whom was a woman, armed and fighting to the death in the
trench line.
Everyone fought! There was no choice; it is not overly
dramatic to state that it was a case of ―fight or die.‖ TF
objectives had to be held. If the Task Force could not keep the
main supply route open, the two armor task forces further north
would be cut off and isolated deep within the city. Already the
Brigade Combat Team Commander had ordered the tankers to
shut off their engines to save the little remaining fuel.
Everyone was critically short ammunition, but the company
team fighting on Objective Moe was ―AMBER‖ on main gun,
machine gun, and small arms ammo. If Curly fell, so would
Moe, and TF 3-15 would face defeat in detail.
As the battle entered its fourth hour, the Task Force
Commander called and asked the key question of CPT
Hornbuckle: ―Can TM Zan hold CURLY and let the
ammunition and fuel trucks roll north to the other forces?‖ CPT

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Hornbuckle said that he thought he could hold, but the Task
Force Commander heard the stress and worry in his voice. He
knew that CPT Hornbuckle was a fighter, but he worried that
TM Zan was facing a crisis, and he needed to know for certain.
He called the CSM and asked him, straight up, did the team
need help. CSM Robert Gallagher, who had been wounded
fighting with the 75th Rangers at Mogadishu, didn't hesitate.
He told LTC Twitty that he needed to do something to help
relieve TM Zan, and he had to do it fast! At that time, CSM
Gallagher was already wounded again, and he was standing on
one leg beside his M88, engaging the enemy with his M4
carbine.
The medics had armed themselves, and all the drivers and
RTOs who could be spared were defending the company‘s
tactical operations center against suicide attackers working
their way through the rubble and along the off-ramps of the
cloverleaf.
LTC Twitty had no other forces, but he did have the
uncommitted elements of his last mechanized Infantry
company, B/3-15 IN (-), back at the OBJ Saints. Although it
had been fighting a series of engagements itself, it was ready to
move. LTC Twitty called the Commander, CPT Ronnie
Johnson, and told him get ready to send a platoon to Curly.
CPT Johnson made a counter-recommendation. He wanted to
take his entire company: the two mechanized platoons, the
BFIST, and the maintenance and 1SGS's M113s—all the
armored fighting vehicles he could lay his hands on. This was
probably the crucial decision of the battle. LTC Twitty agreed
and asked the BCT Commander to release the company, which
he did. B Co, 3-15 Infantry, attacked north, every weapon in
the convoy engaging the enemy, as B Company assaulted to
Objective Curly. It arrived literally in the nick of time,
although it lost a scout HMMWV and one NCO killed in action

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by a rocket propelled grenade. With the additional forces, CPT
Johnson, who took over command at Curly, reinforced the
defenders and expanded the perimeter further out, far enough
that the vital re-supply convoy that was right behind him had a
chance to make it through.
Even then, the situation was not secure. The sight of 20
heavy trucks loaded with ammunition and fuel reinvigorated
the Syrian Jihadists attacking Curly. They assaulted with
renewed fury. In a moment, several trucks were burning, and
the fire was spreading. A sergeant ran out into a hail of fire to
try to start one of the trucks to move it away, but it was already
too damaged to drive. At this time, LTC Scott Rutter arrived
with the lead elements of TF 2-7 Infantry. He had been sent,
with only an hour's notice, on a long, circuitous route from his
position near the airport to reinforce the 2nd BCT. He fought his
way through to the objective and assumed control at Curly.
CPT Johnson moved the remaining re-supply trucks to Moe
and Larry with his forces and then escorted them further north
for the armored task forces, thus ensuring that they could stay
in the city for the night and the next day. LTC Rutter had a
hard fight at Curly the next day, but the heart had been cut out
of the enemy forces, and the 3rd Infantry Division was in
Baghdad to stay.

From interviews with Soldiers of 3-15 Infantry, conducted by

Art Durante, included in the OIF Study Group publication On
Point, Ch 6, pgs 362-367

DISCUSSION: This vignette captures lessons from a

significant engagement during the offensive operations of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of which is mutual support. In
this vignette, we can see the application of our doctrinal
definition of mutual support: support which units render each

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other against an enemy because of those units‘ assigned tasks,
their positions relative to each other and to the enemy, and their
inherent capabilities.
TF 3-15 had the mission to seize key terrain along Highway
8, a key line of communication (LOC) for the adjacent task
forces in the brigade combat team (BCT). The arrangement of
Highway 8 made this task force fight a linear fight in terms of
disposition of friendly forces. Objectives Moe, Larry, and
Curly were arranged in the area of operations in a linear
fashion, from north to south, respectively, each within
supporting range of the next. The placement of the objectives
themselves illustrates the planning for mutual support
necessary to ensure that the LOC remained open. Placing the
companies, the mortars, and the CSS in this manner ensured
each could react to influence changing events, particularly in a
fluid environment such as this..
The task force commander had determined that OBJ Moe
was his main effort, as it possessed the decisive terrain for the
task force, and arguably for the BCT as well. The success at
OBJ Moe was predicated on the support from, and, thus, the
success at objectives Larry and Curly; without the mutual
support from the southern objectives, actions at Moe would
have been for naught. This can be seen through the placement
of the mortars on OBJ Curly which ensured the mortars could
support operations on the other objectives while, at the same
time, being supported by the Soldiers on those positions.
Finally, we can see how another unit‘s actions, B/3-15 IN,
reacting to changing battlefield conditions, greatly contributed
to the successful accomplishment of the mission at OBJ Curly.
It was positioned so as to be able to influence the fight as
needed, and did so. This example can be extended as we see TF
2-7‘s ability to relieve B/3-15 IN at OBJ Curly to enable the

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B/3-15 IN‘s continued support to the logistics operations and to
resupply units still in contact at OBJs Moe and Larry.

On April 6th, 2003, elements of 3-187th IN, 101st ABN

(AASLT), relieved elements of the 1st Brigade, 3rd ID
(MECH), on the V Corps’ front line along the perimeter of
the recently-seized Saddam International Airport.

My battalion was posturing for a sequential attack on key

sites of Iraqi infrastructure and probable enemy locations.
These locations included the Iraqi Secretariat, Spiral Hill, and a
Special Republican Guard (SRG) compound, all in plain view
of my assigned engagement area. As a platoon leader for
A/3-187th IN, I was a little hesitant when my commander told
me that the mechanized team had maintained steady contact for
the last 72 hours on or around the engagement area. While I
was more than happy to give our brethren from 3rd ID an
opportunity to refit at the airport, the prospect of replacing
mechanized and armored forces with my rifle platoon did not
thrill me.
I knew we would have to remain vigilant as the enemy
would know the heavier forces were leaving and probably
probe our positions. When I made coordination with the
platoon leader of the outgoing mechanized platoon, he showed
me the most likely enemy avenues of approach which helped
me develop where I should place my key weapons systems.
The battlefield was dirty, filled with remnants of recent fights.
Behind what became my platoon command post were two
destroyed T-72 tanks. Around the destroyed tanks and forward
of this particular position were several dead Iraqi soldiers and
another destroyed T-72 tank. I realized there was the possibility
of an armored threat in my engagement area.

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Our company was arrayed in mutually supporting platoon
battle positions, and I arrayed my platoon in mutually
supporting squad positions. I received an anti-tank section and
incorporated this asset into my defense, dismounting the
MK-19 and placing it in a location where it could best cover
dead space. In addition to this asset, we had many other modes
of indirect fire in support of our battle position: 60/81mm
mortars, 155mm, and close air support from A-10s. I placed
my two Javelins down the most likely avenues of approach for
the enemy: one was focused on the armored threat, while I
wanted to focus the other Javelin‘s thermal-viewing command
launch unit (CLU) to better observe my dismounted threat.
Before the mechanized team withdrew, I emplaced my key
weapons systems and briefed my squad leaders on my concept.
I walked each of the squad leaders over the entire platoon area
of operations, so he could see how each position was mutually
supporting the other. After this recon, 3ID pulled back, and my
platoon began to dig its fighting positions. We finished suitable
positions for our defense just as the sun was going down. This
proved to be very important because nightfall brought our first
contact.
Throughout the night, we came in contact with enemy
patrols, the largest being at squad level. I suspected the enemy
was not positive that any American forces were left in our
positions after the mechanized team left, and these attacks were
just probes, perhaps to find a route out of the SRG compound
to our 12 o‘clock. I could hear our adjacent companies
experiencing similar contacts about the same time as we did.
As these attacks occurred, my squad leaders had difficulty
identifying the enemy with their night vision capabilities. The
terrain was sparsely wooded, but illumination was poor.
Instead, we had to rely on our thermal capabilities and lasers to
point out suspected enemy locations. The PEQ-2A and the

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PAC-4C were crucial in identifying enemy positions to
subordinates. I also relied on the use of our new 60mm infrared
illumination round to identify these enemy locations. Rather
than allow the threat to close the distance on our locations, we
began to call for and adjust 60/81mm mortar fires. The most
effective combination proved to be a mixture of high explosive
rounds and white phosphorous. Due to the lack of illumination
and my decision that they would not compromise our positions,
I used 40mm illumination rounds to identify enemy positions.
This was imperative because of the frequency of thermal ‗hot
spots‘ on the battlefield and what I decided was a need to
accurately bring our indirect fires to bear. I directed the use of
the 40mm illumination in a unique way. If my right flank was
in contact, I would direct my left flank to place the
illumination. Because of the earlier leader‘s recon, my
subordinate leaders were able to accomplish this task. The end
result of this technique was a success. I did not deplete the
mortar ammo, and my M203 gunners could mark targets with
HEDP rather than focusing on illuminating the battlefield. In
the morning, we realized that we had not destroyed the
remnants of a platoon but the remnants of an Infantry battalion.
As the war transitioned to support and stability operations
in May, 2003, and our company moved north to Rabea‘a, a
border town near Syria, a local Sheik recalled the events that
occurred on April 6th and how he narrowly escaped death.
Apparently, this former Iraqi battalion commander, in this
interesting, new post-war dynamic, was now a major social
power with whom we had to deal with for credibility within
our new area of operations.

From the personal experience of 1LT Jaron Wharton, who

served as a platoon leader in A/3-187 IN, 101st Airborne

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Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection,
Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: It is our ability to integrate and synchronize the

combined arms fight that distinguishes our Army from others
in the world. The foundation of a combined arms engagement
is the principle of mutual support. Mutual support is a method
to create a relative combat power advantage in a fight. It is
maintaining a positional relationship to another element while
providing support with reinforcing or complementary effects.
1LT Wharton clearly demonstrated initiative in the defense.
His analysis of the situation using METT-TC focused the
platoon‘s efforts during the preparation and execution of the
defense. The lesson in the vignette is not the techniques
employed with the various weapons systems but the manner in
which the platoon leader arrayed the squads. The effectiveness
of techniques varies relative to the situation METT-TC. What
worked in Saddam International Airport may not be effective
in another area of operation. Techniques for achieving mutual
support might differ from situation to situation, but the concept
of mutual support remains constant throughout full-spectrum
operations. This platoon was able to maximize its relative
combat power in the engagement area by providing reinforcing
and complementary effects on the enemy force. One side of the
battle position provided illumination so the other side could
focus its direct and indirect fires on the enemy in the
engagement area.
Leaders should always apply the mutual support test to
their plans. As a platoon leader, ask yourself, ―Have I created
conditions for a platoon fight or a squad fight?‖ If METT-TC
allows, the right answer is always a platoon fight. Mutual
support gives an attacker or a defender a positional advantage,
even though elements may not be in visual contact. The idea of

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mutual support is embedded in our TTPs. However, some
leaders will still choose a course of action that sends elements
piecemeal to separate objectives over a course of action that
maximizes combat power with maneuver from LD through
endstate.

In November, 2003, 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team

(SBCT) deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. By January, 2004, 3d SBCT was in and around
Mosul, Iraq. Two of its Infantry battalions had sectors of
the city, with 1-23rd having most of the city on the western
side of the Tigris River.

The city had been fairly quiet, compared to other parts of

the country, since 3d SBCT arrived. The majority of operations
were to capture weapons and to capture or kill weapons dealers
and terrorists. Information on these targets came from a variety
of sources: some came from BDE intelligence sources, and
some target information was developed at the company and
battalion level. This bottom-up driven intelligence came from
squads talking with local neighborhood leaders and other
reputable sources or from Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)
Soldiers who volunteered to go undercover.
The 1-23rd divided its portion of Mosul up among its
companies. Each company was responsible for getting to know
its part of the city by frequent patrolling as well as by
interfacing with neighborhood leaders, police chiefs, heads of
banks, heads of schools, and any other prominent people. The
companies operated out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).
The A Co and B Co were together at the very large FOB,
Marez, near the Mosul Airfield, and C Co was at FOB
Blickenstaff, near the heart of Mosul. The level and type of
development in each company‘s sector dictated the type of

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patrolling it could conduct. The A Co and B Co had primarily
urban and industrial sectors with wide streets; therefore, they
conducted a combination of mounted and dismounted patrols.
C Co‘s sector was smaller but much more densely populated.
C Co had the city center and ―old town‖ Mosul. This portion of
the city was built in ancient times and has very few streets
where a Stryker can negotiate, so C Co conducted mostly
dismounted patrols.
The patrols executed by 1st BN served a variety of
purposes, but each patrol had to have a specific purpose. For
example, some patrols were to find and meet local leaders,
others were to encourage Iraqi policemen to get out of their
stations and do their jobs, and others were to recon routes or
objectives for up-coming missions.
In mid-February, 2004, various sources began to indicate
that weapons dealers were operating out of a prominent
marketplace in C Co‘s area of operations. Once enough sources
validated the presence of weapons dealers, the Company
planned a cordon and search of the marketplace.
Late in the morning on 20 February 2004, C Co cordoned
and searched the marketplace. The primary purpose was the
capture of weapons and ammunition, but a major plus would
have been the capture of the dealers. Since we had no photos or
names for the dealers, the only way to capture them would
have been to catch them with the weapons in hand. Thus, the
cordon and search took place during daylight hours since the
Iraqis were averse to doing much business at night.
Doing a daylight cordon and search presented many issues
that we had not had to face up to this point. We had to be
careful not to alert the dealers that the search would occur, and
we had to be prepared to search a large market filled with
bystanders and, possibly, fight in a very busy marketplace. So
as not to tip off the dealers, we knew that nothing could appear

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out of the ordinary. Since most daily patrols were squad-sized,
we knew that anything significantly larger would make the
enemy suspicious. We also knew that the cordon had to be
established quickly. If we established one side and then the
other, the dealers could potentially escape out the un-cordoned
side with their weapons. To mitigate both of these risks, we
had two cordon elements, each about the size of a squad plus,
move dismounted from opposite directions. Since both
elements needed to arrive simultaneously, we made extensive
use of phase lines to control and coordinate their movements.
To deter any weapons dealer from trying to fight his way
out of the market, we rapidly massed the rest of the company
with Strykers around the market. Once the dismounted cordon
element was in place, the company‘s Strykers would arrive
with the other two platoons who executed the search. The
cordon platoon‘s Strykers would then join the cordon to
provide additional firepower, protection, and maneuverability
should they need it. The other two platoons‘ Strykers moved
back and staged out of a safe area a few kilometers away, as
too many Strykers around the market would have hindered
movement. In our estimation, the rapid establishment of the
cordon, followed immediately by the arrival of forces with
armored vehicles, deterred any weapons dealer from trying to
fight his way out.
With the cordon established and all elements on site, we
began the search. One platoon searched the targeted shops and
warehouses within the market while the other platoon searched
people and vehicles. The Soldiers in the platoon searching the
target shops and warehouses made extensive use of metal
detectors which is how they found several bags of 7.62mm
ammo, several pistols, a grease gun, and one RPG sight buried
in sacks of grain.

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From the personal experience of 1LT Vince Kaster, who served
as Executive Officer, C Co,1-23 IN, SBCT, 2nd Infantry
Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection,
Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION : This vignette provides an example of how to

use the Stryker unit‘s capabilities to achieve mutual support in
one of the most commonly performed operations in Iraq, the
cordon and search. Additionally, one can extract basic
characteristics of both offensive and defensive operations,
namely surprise and flexibility, and the criticality of both while
conducting operations.
While planning this particular operation, the commander
determined that any patrol consisting of an element larger than
a dismounted squad might raise enemy suspicions and enable
the enemy to safely exfiltrate from the target area prior to the
establishment of the cordon. Thus, to achieve surprise,
dismounted squads converged on the market street along
multiple avenues of approach and established the cordon,
fixing the enemy in his position, while the Stryker vehicles
maneuvered through the streets to reinforce the cordon.
From the cordon‘s blocking positions, the Stryker vehicles,
with their mounted weapon systems, were able to cover the
dismounted Infantry as they cleared the shops in the market.
The rapid mobility of the Stryker vehicles also provided the
ability to maneuver inside the cordon to maintain constant
overwatch of the searching element, or if casualties were taken,
the Stryker could have easily provided CASEVAC. This type
of mutual support is critical to maintaining security while
conducting operations, especially when working in a heavily
populated area.
In addition to using the Stryker vehicles for support within
the cordon, the troop-carrying capabilities and mounted

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weapon systems provided flexibility to counter a threat outside
of the cordon or to make the fluid transition to a follow-on
operation. As is the case many times, a cordon and search will
lead to time-sensitive intelligence that requires immediate
action, but the new target might be outside of the initial
targeted area. The Stryker unit could have quickly determined
the new target, remounted its vehicles, and moved to the new
target.
What is essential in conducting a cordon and search is the
establishment of direct fire control measures. The units in the
cordon must be able to track the movement of the searching
units; likewise, the searching element must know where the
cordon is capable of engaging. When there is more than one
searching unit, each must be fully aware of the movement of
the other search teams and what its response can be if contact is
made.
While this example deals with a Stryker unit, the basic
concept can be applied with HMMWV gun trucks and Bradley
fighting vehicles working with dismounted Infantry.
Depending on assets available, a simple cordon and search can
also involve the use of a fully integrated combined arms team.
Aviations assets can assist with cordon establishment and
possibly close air support. The commander might have an
armor unit as part of his cordon, and artillery and mortars can
provide indirect fire support. While the forces available to
conduct these missions might change, the basic concept of
mutual support will remain constant throughout.
The ability to provide mutual support, both internal and
external to the unit, will be a cornerstone to future operations in
the War on Terror. The potential to use mechanized, light,
SBCT, and Special Operations units in mutual supporting roles
is unlimited and is well-suited to address the flexible response
required when operating in an urban environment.

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On 14 February 2004, the Special Operation Force

(SOF) unit in Mosul, Iraq, brought to 1-23rd Infantry
detailed intelligence on a bomb maker who was providing
many of the terrorist cells in the city with improvised
explosive devices.

I was the Bravo Company Executive Officer and was in

charge of establishing the outer cordon and sniper position to
isolate the target building. LTC Buck James, our Battalion
Commander, and the SOF Team Leader decided that we would
conduct the raid, and the SOF operators would conduct
Sensitive Sight Exploitation.
The bomb maker‘s house was in a very poor section of
Mosul. This area of the city consistently gave us problems.
This was the part of the city from where the terrorist
organizations would hire their shooters and bombers. The
young men of this area were easily manipulated because they
were poor and out of work. These factors caused us to have a
lot of direct fire contact in this part of town. We decided to use
three platoons to carry out this raid.
My Company Commander, CPT Robert Robinson, decided
to divide the company into an isolation force and an assault
force. I was in charge of the isolation force, and I had 3rd PLT,
4th PLT, the Company Sniper Team, and a Battalion Sniper
Team. My plan was simple; I task-organized my force into four
separate elements that included one Infantry Stryker, one
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Stryker, and one Infantry
squad. Each one of these elements would set up a blocking
position on the four corners of the city block, preventing
anyone from moving into or out of the target area.
Simultaneously, I would establish SGT Joe Brown and his
company sniper team into a three-story house overwatching the

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entire city block. I kept the Battalion Sniper Team with me to
move onto the upper floor of the target house to establish
overwatch to the south, once we had secured the bomb maker.
This plan gave me the flexibility to deal with any threat with
precision fires from my Company Sniper Team and maneuver
with my Infantry and Strykers in the four blocking positions.
CPT Robinson planned to use 1st Platoon as the assault
force. It would move to a dismount point 100 meters to the
north of the bomb maker‘s house. The 1st Platoon would then
move to the target house dismounted, establish an inner
cordon, breach the outer gate and the inner door with a
battering ram, and secure the target house with two assault
squads. We decided to use mechanical breaching on the gate
and door because the door was very weak, and we did not want
to cause any secondary explosions because we knew the bomb
maker stored explosives in his house. The isolation and assault
forces would move into position simultaneously to prevent the
bomb maker from escaping. The plan was simple, but it
required speed, stealth, and violence of action to be a success.
At 141230February04, the company left Forward Operating
Base (FOB) Marez in three separate elements to conduct the
raid. I controlled two of the elements that made up the isolation
force, and CPT Robinson controlled the assault force. I had one
element approach from the south and establish the two
southern blocking positions, and I traveled with the isolation
element in the north.
We established the four blocking positions, and I
dismounted with the Company Sniper Team and helped it clear
the three-story building where it was establishing overwatch of
the target area. Simultaneously, 1st Platoon dismounted from its
Strykers and moved to the target house. LT Moreno, the 1st
Platoon Leader, used the weapons squad to establish an inner
cordon. He then breached the outer gate and inner door with his

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breach squad. As soon as the inner door flew off its hinges,
SGT Perdue, a Team Leader in the breach squad, noticed the
bomb maker running out of his room and heading for the
stairway to the roof. SGT Perdue immediately threw a flash
bang down the hallway, and it exploded right beside the head
of the bomb maker. He collapsed to the ground, and the assault
squad captured him as it entered the target house.
The house was secured two minutes after the outer gate was
knocked down with the battering ram. The SOF operators
moved into the house and conducted the interrogation of the
bomb maker. We searched the house and uncovered plastic
explosives, mortar rounds, rocket propelled grenades, mortar
tubes, AK47s, TNT, and two booby traps. The SOF operators
took the bomb maker back to the detention facility. During his
interrogation, he revealed ten other terrorist leaders in Mosul.
All ten of these terrorist leaders were captured on 3 March
2004 when my brigade conducted ten simultaneous raids across
Mosul, Iraq.

From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D Tiffner, who

served as the Bravo Company Executive Officer, 1st Battalion,
23rd Infantry Regiment (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, we see how conventional

forces supported Special Operations Forces (SOF) to
accomplish their mission of capturing and interrogating a bomb
maker in Mosul, Iraq. This vignette demonstrates the concept
of mutual support, not only between conventional forces and
SOF, but also between elements within the conventional force.
The SOF supported the conventional forces by providing them
detailed information about the objective area. Based on this
information, the battalion commander decided to conduct a

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cordon and search of the objective area and supported the
Bravo Company commander by providing him with a battalion
sniper team and an ATGM Stryker. The Bravo Company
commander decided to task organize his company into an
isolation force and assault force (FM 7-10, Appendix A calls
these elements the security element and the search element) to
provide the maximum mutual support needed to accomplish the
mission. 1LT Tiffner further task organized his isolation force
so he could establish the outer cordon of the objective area,
while 1LT Moreno used elements of his platoon to establish the
inner cordon. Both the inner and outer cordons mutually
supported each other to prevent the enemy from influencing the
assault force.
1LT Tiffner also achieved mutual support by placing the
battalion snipers in locations that could overwatch the objective
area once it was seized. After the objective area was isolated,
the assault force was able to quickly capture the bomb maker
which allowed the SOF to interrogate him under the security of
Bravo Company. The success of this operation is a direct
reflection of the mutual support units give each other because
of their assigned tasks, position on the battlefield, or inherent
capabilities.

CONCLUSION: Units achieve mutual support not only to

defeat the enemy, but also to ensure the Soldier, or unit, in
proximity is protected. As it is one of the basics of warfighting,
Soldiers at all levels must be trained to achieve it, and leaders
must consider it at all time. Only then will a unit be successful
in accomplishing its mission.

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 CHAPTER 8: Marksmanship
…we have three goals: to shoot accurately, to shoot
powerfully, to shoot rapidly.
Anonymous Byzantine General
On Strategy (Peri Strategias)
in Dennis, 1985

INTRODUCTION: Firepower—an element of combat

power—at its most fundamental level is achieved through the
individual Soldier‘s mastery of his weapon. Every
Infantryman, from private to the general officer, is first a
rifleman. As such, he is a master of his basic skills: move,
shoot, communicate, fight, and sustain. The Infantryman‘s
primary weapon is the rifle; placing well-aimed effective fire
on the enemy is his primary capability. Once the Soldier
masters his primary weapon, his training can, and many times
will, extend to the other weapons in the unit‘s inventory, but
the emphasis must remain at the mastery level for each weapon
system.
One of the primary objectives of initial entry training is to
provide the training for each Soldier to become proficient in
marksmanship. This competence must be reinforced frequently
once the Soldier leaves initial entry training and arrives in his
unit, as the muscle memory necessary for mastery is
perishable. Every commander must ensure that Soldiers fire
their weapons frequently and under a variety of conditions to
ensure the unit can maximize firepower effects on the
battlefield.

On 3 October 1993, Company A, 2-14, 10th Mountain

Division, part of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for
missions within Mogadishu, was alerted that it would
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conduct operations in support of TF Ranger. Company C,
2-14, had already attempted a link-up with TF Ranger but
had sustained heavy casualties and was forced to return to
its base. At 2145 hrs., 3 October, Company A was en route
to downtown Mogadishu. After traveling several blocks, it
began to receive enemy fire from both sides of the street;
thus began several hours of combat as it moved to link up
with the Rangers.

The Commander was pinned down with 1st Platoon by

crossfire coming from the hotel and several other buildings. He
told me to get a MK19 equipped HMMWV forward for
suppression. I talked to the squad leader of the nearest one and
moved him forward, around the APCs, to the front of the
column. We learned that a large amount of fire was coming
from the large hotel on the left side of the street, about 50
meters to the front of the lead platoon. So the gunner could
occupy a support by fire position, I guided the MK-19 up onto
a steep sidewalk and told him to watch my M16 tracer rounds
and to suppress the building from top to bottom. I fired several
tracers into the hotel; the gunner fired a spotting round into one
of the top-story windows and then fired the grenade launcher
on automatic, hitting every single window in the building. The
effects were devastating; concrete fragments flew everywhere,
and one or two Somalis fell out of the building. When the
gunner ceased firing, I asked the lead element where else the
heavy fire was coming from. The response was – the right side
of the road, so I further directed the MK-19 fire into a building
about 40 meters to our front. I then directed the lead platoon to
begin maneuvering forward again, and eventually, we linked
up with TF Ranger.
Later, as the company began to move out of the city with
TF Ranger, heavy small arms and RPG fire erupted on all

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sides. Squads and platoons bounded by fire and movement,
engaged with heavy suppressive fire while elements sprinted
across alleys. Several Somali gunmen were shot and killed at
almost point-blank range by the lead element. The Somalis
seemed to know that we were disengaging and were giving us
all they could. The company was now spread across a distance
of four to five city blocks, maneuvering at a fast pace. The
Commander directed gunship strikes along both sides of the
road to cover our movement and to suppress heavy fire from
the Olympic Hotel until we were clear of the city.
During this operation, everyone carried a double basic load
of ammunition. Because of disciplined fires, most Soldiers had
some ammunition remaining after nine hours of sustained
battle.

From a September-October 1994 article in Infantry Magazine

by Captain Charles P. Ferry, who served as a company
executive officer in 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry,10th Mountain
Division.

DISCUSSION: In this summary, we see the executive officer

of A Company, 2-14, effectively employing his forces through
manuever combined with firepower to link up and relieve TF
Ranger in downtown Mogadishu, Somalia. The company was
provided with Malaysian armored personnel carriers to
augment its protection and firepower.
The enemy effectively engaged the QRF from positions of
advantage (for example, upper floors of buildings and
alleyways). Therefore, CPT Ferry directed his forces to
concentrate their fires on the upper floors of the buildings and
the alleyways, orienting his forces on the greatest enemy threat
first. CPT Ferry used his own weapon system to orient the
crew-served MK-19 to effectively engage the enemy; this is a

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leader task. This vignette demonstrates the necessity for quality
crew drills, application of the principles of direct fire control,
and the application of advanced marksmanship skills. CPT
Ferry accomplished this by using his organic crew-served and
individual weapons, the main weapons systems of the
Malaysian APCs, and disciplined firing which prevented the
unit from running out of ammunition. By concentrating his
available combat power, CPT Ferry was able to maintain his
momentum and dominance over the enemy which led to the
successful link-up with TF Ranger. Consequently, CPT Ferry
was able to evacuate numerous TF Ranger casualties to the
battalion aid station for treatment..

In March, 2003, shortly after entering the CENTCOM

AOR, a Special Operations Task Force called on 2nd
Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, to execute the
first air assault raid into hostile enemy territory in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 2nd Platoon, Alpha
Company, 2-75th Ranger Regiment, was chosen to be the
Ranger element to execute this spearhead mission. Its task
for this operation was to block enemy forces from
influencing actions on the objective to facilitate the
exploitation of sensitive material.

The operation commenced shortly after nightfall with a

helicopter infiltration from a forward operating base to the
town of Al Qaddisiyah, located in the Sunni heartland of
west-central Iraq. My platoon was cross-loaded over four
Blackhawk helicopters and would be the first assault element
in this operation. Minutes behind our aircraft were two CH-47
Chinook helicopters, which carried the Task Force‘s primary
assault element. The four Blackhawks approached the outskirts
of the town traveling in formation, and each would soon break

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away and move toward its respective helicopter landing zone
(HLZ). Just seconds away from landing, we were engaged by
enemy small arms fire from the ground and immediately
responded with M4 and helicopter machine gun fire. We later
learned that, during this first exchange of gunfire, at least one
helicopter sustained serious mechanical damage and that one of
our Rangers was seriously wounded. Despite this, all four
Blackhawks continued movement to the objective and landed
with pinpoint accuracy on all four HLZs.
Upon landing, my platoon immediately occupied four
geographically-separated battle positions outside of the
objective compound, which was located on the edge of town.
Within a matter of seconds, we isolated the target, blocked all
avenues of approach, denied egress routes out of the objective,
and established the link-up point where we would establish
contact with the assault force. All of this happened while AH-6
―Little Bird‖ aircraft were circling the objective overhead and
suppressing enemy forces moving in the town. My platoon
could not observe these hostile forces but did encounter
noncombatants seeking cover and fleeing the area.
At this point in time, the CH-47 aircraft were approaching
the objective and receiving enemy fire along the same route
that we had taken earlier. Their infiltration mirrored my
platoon‘s in terms of friendly damage, as one CH-47 suffered
serious mechanical setbacks and one helicopter door gunner
sustained serious gunshot wounds. Just prior to them landing at
the HLZ, I received reports from all of my battle position
leaders that they were established and prepared for the assault
force to attack the objective. Using infrared (IR) chemical
lights, my closest battle position conducted a link-up with the
assault force and guided it to the target building.
My platoon received enemy small arms fire from a moving
vehicle within minutes of the assault force entering the

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objective area. The vehicle approached our positions along a
main road leading up to the objective. Upon seeing U.S. forces
on the ground, the automobile accelerated through an emplaced
obstacle and began engaging my Rangers with small arms fire.
Immediately after identifying the threat, accurate crew-served
weapon fire engaged the enemy vehicle, and, shortly thereafter,
the vehicle was immobilized due to overwhelming, accurate
firepower from numerous weapon systems. Once the two
enemy personnel dismounted the vehicle, they were designated
by IR lasers from every weapon on the ground and were
subsequently engaged and killed in a very one-sided firefight.
Following this contact, the town quieted down, and the
assault force conducted a thorough search of the target,
obtaining numerous pieces of intelligence for further analysis.
Shortly thereafter, the assault force moved to its HLZ and
withdrew from the objective. Minutes later, our four
Blackhawks arrived in the HLZ and moved us back to our
forward operating base.

From the personal experience of 1LT Kirby R. Dennis who

served as 2nd Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Ranger
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Many factors can influence mission success,

but poor marksmanship can guarantee mission failure. The
United States Infantryman is outfitted with the best
marksmanship equipment in the world, but this alone does not
ensure success. As we see in this vignette, he is most effective
on the battlefield when he can employ well-aimed, accurate
fires to destroy enemy combatants.
Units must follow the example set by the 2nd Ranger
Battalion during operations in Al Qaddisiyah and in training.

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All too often, units are not trained on the proper use of
assigned weapons, optics, and laser aiming devices. Individual
weapons qualification must be the first step in the unit‘s
marksmanship training program, not the last step. Unit
commanders and leaders need to ensure that all Infantrymen
fully understand the ballistic characteristics of their assigned
weapon, the four fundamentals of rifle marksmanship, and the
characteristics and use of assigned optics and laser aiming
devices. The goals of unit marksmanship training programs
should include engaging single and multiple targets, both
moving and stationary, at distances varying from 0 meters to
the maximum effective range of the weapon. Additionally,
leaders must know how to distribute these lethal fires.
There is nothing more deadly on the battlefield than an
Infantryman with his individual weapon, as is evidenced by the
Rangers‘ ability to mass accurate direct fire, but only if he can
accurately engage enemy combatants at all ranges.
Marksmanship training is the foundation that leaders can build
lethal units upon.

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th

Ranger Regiment, received a FRAGO for a company air
assault and raid of a suspected terrorist camp in northern
Iraq. Intelligence sources had observed the terrorist group
infiltrating the Iraqi border from Syria and establishing a
base camp in a wadi system just north of a small town.
Intelligence assessments indicated that this group was
within 24-48 hours of conducting a suicide bombing on
Coalition forces in the Ramadi/Fallujah region of Iraq.

The 3rd Squad was moving in the wadi to clear the building
complex on OBJ Auburn. From my position, I could see 3rd
Squad as it assaulted through the objective, and I also could see

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my PSG, SFC Albert, moving behind 3rd Squad. Concurrently,
SSG Williams linked up with me, and I was instructing him
where he needed to move his machine guns to establish the
blocking position. Just then, a tracer zipped by my head, and I
heard the burst from a M240B machine gun. I spun around and
saw CPL Matthews, one of my machine gunners, engage and
kill an insurgent just 20 meters behind my position. CPL
Matthews had been moving to link up with SSG Williams
when the enemy popped up from behind a rock outcropping
and attempted to engage my position. CPL Matthews engaged
and killed him with a couple bursts from his machine gun. Of
note, he fired both of his bursts from the hip.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Scott B.

Cheney, who served as the Platoon Leader of 2nd Platoon,
Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,
Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort
Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This vignette clearly demonstrates the

importance professional Soldiers must place on realistic
marksmanship training, specifically the requirement to train to
fire from alternate firing positions until it becomes instinctive.
These skills are an emerging requirement, and units train these
as advanced marksmanship skills. Confidence in handling
personal weapon systems to the high level demonstrated in this
vignette is the direct result of the high levels of realistic
live-fire training and weapon familiarization.

―In no other professions are the penalties for employing

untrained personnel so appalling or irrevocable as in the
military.‖
General Douglas MacArthur, 1933

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CONCLUSION: As we have seen from these vignettes, our

forces cannot be successful in defeating our enemies without
frequent training under various conditions. Regardless of which
weapon the Soldier is assigned, mastery of the weapon and the
ability to use lethal fires must be maintained.

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 CHAPTER 9: Security
Even in friendly territory, a fortified camp should be set
up; a general should never have to say, ―I did not expect
it.‖
The Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon
c. AD 600

INTRODUCTION: The Principles of War are the enduring

bedrock of Army doctrine. The U.S. Army published its
original Principles after WWI and, in the following years,
adjusted them, but they have stood the tests of analysis,
experimentation, practice, and time. The Principles of War do
not constitute a checklist; rather they summarize the
characteristics of successful military operations. They provide
a powerful tool for analysis in the study of war.
Security, one of the Principles, protects and preserves
combat power. It does not involve excessive caution;
calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security operations are
conducted by the commander to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being
protected with time and maneuver space within which to react
to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the
commander to use the protected force effectively. The threat of
asymmetric action requires emphasis on security, even in low
threat environments.

On 23 December 2001, Company A, 1-187th Infantry,

101st Airborne Division, deployed to Jacobabad, Pakistan,
to provide airfield security.

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When we arrived in Pakistan, we joined with our sister
companies in improving the existing security perimeter
established around the outside of the Jacobabad airfield. The
perimeter consisted of an outer ring of Pakistani Army and Air
Force defense forces and an inner ring of U.S. forces. The
original U.S. forces‘ perimeter had been constructed by
Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. It consisted
of open foxholes spaced along the airfield with little existing
support for each other and no overhead cover. The first Army
forces, the leading edge of my battalion, had assumed the
positions in the perimeter and improved them with overhead
cover—although they still did not support each other with
fields of fire.
While my company worked to integrate into and improve
the existing defense, we quickly realized that the true threat to
our mission in Pakistan was not to the airfield or existing
equipment operating there, but to the American personnel who
were staged there. The Al Qaeda terrorist and Islamic
Fundamentalist threat that we were primarily concerned with
were focused on inflicting casualties to turn American public
opinion against the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and
the deployment of military forces in support of the War on
Terror. This analysis was to serve us well in preparing us to
operate in Afghanistan and to be properly oriented against
enemy forces.
We recognized that the primary technique that the enemy
would employ would be to attempt to infiltrate a bomb or a
small team into the airfield to attack exposed personnel within
the security perimeter. This would be the most effective way of
inflicting casualties on coalition forces in country. The
secondary technique that we determined the enemy would
employ would be to use snipers, mortars, or remote detonating
munitions to minimize his exposure to our defenses while still

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allowing him to inflict casualties. The best way to counter
these techniques was to emphasize observation and detection
over battle positions and heavy fortifications.
After conducting this analysis and reaching our
conclusions, we began to improve the defense. First, we
adjusted the existing positions and created new positions so
that each position complemented the other, emphasizing the
maximum field of fire and observation possible. Initially, we
built each of the positions down into the ground as a regular
fighting position with overhead cover to provide the most
protection to the Soldiers inside. The major avenues of
approach were covered with checkpoints and crew served
weapons.
Once this initial series of positions was completed, we
continued to improve the defense. Although the perimeter was
complete with interlocking fires, we next looked to increase the
observable distance for each position. To do this, we increased
the height of each position, in effect transitioning from fighting
positions to observation posts. Based on a design that the
platoon leaders and company executive officer devised, we
built wooden platforms on stilts to raise each ground-level
position about eight to twelve feet into the air. Each raised
position was then sand-bagged to provide cover for the
Soldiers within. Although the positions did not offer as much
cover as the built down fighting positions had, they offered
increased observation while still offering some protection from
direct and indirect fire to the Soldiers within. The positions at
or near the base of buildings were moved to the tops of the
buildings, allowing for similar trade-offs in protection and
observation.
The final step in improving the defense was to expand the
current fields of fire and observation. To accomplish this, we
used Pakistani bulldozers to knock down trees and then burned

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Infantry in Battle
off all existing ground vegetation. We then augmented the wire
perimeter with additional wire and trip flares. Once these
improvements had been accomplished, we were satisfied that
we had successfully prepared for the risks posed by the
potential enemy forces.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Timothy B.

McColloh, who served as a rifle platoon leader in 1-187th
Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, the company commander

ensured that the plan provided early and accurate warning. He
accomplished this by expanding the field of fire and
observation from the built-up guard towers. He also used
bulldozers to remove restrictive vegetation and then further
augmented the area with concertina wire and trip flares to
provide the force with a way to detect movement outside of the
perimeter.
The plan also provided for increased reaction time and
maneuver space. When the company arrived at the airfield, the
commander decided to construct observations posts that
extended 12 feet into the air. This, coupled with the efforts to
remove restrictive vegetation, allowed the Soldiers manning
the observation posts to greatly increase their fields of fire,
providing increased reaction time for the company. The
commander also ensured that all of the observation posts
mutually supported each other to provide the maximum amount
of security for the airfield.
By conducting a detailed intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), the commander successfully oriented his
force on the facility that he was tasked to secure. He deduced
that car bombs and small-unit raids were the modus operandi of

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the enemy. Therefore, he focused much of his combat power
on the avenues of approach into the airfield, while greatly
reducing the capabilities of a small-unit raid by improving
reaction time and maneuver space through active and passive
security measures.
Through a thorough understanding of the doctrine
associated with security operations, the company commander
was confident that his force was prepared for the risks posed by
a potential enemy force.

On 24 March 2003, 2-7 Infantry Battalion (M) of the 1st

Brigade, 3rd ID, was established in Assembly Area Raider
just south of Karbala, Iraq.

As the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, A Co, 2-7 Infantry, I

was assigned a section of the perimeter along the northern wall
of the assembly area. The 3rd ID had now maneuvered over one
hundred miles of desert terrain since attacking into Iraq, and its
supply lines were stretched far behind the Division. Screen
lines and blocking positions were established along high-speed
avenues of infiltration in an effort to prevent Iraqi forces from
conducting harassment raids on combat support elements.
The major highway running north/south leading into
Karbala, Hwy 9, had been identified as a potential enemy
avenue of approach, and 2-7 Infantry was given the task of
blocking the highway to prevent the disruption of supply lines.
The tasking was rotated between A Co and B Co, each
company dedicating six to eight combat vehicles and three
Infantry squads to accomplish the task. The blocking position
was established with four perimeter security positions,
triple-strand concertina wire across the southbound lanes of the
road, and the combat vehicles spaced evenly around the
perimeter. A four-man search team was used at the wire to stop

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Infantry in Battle
and search each vehicle that approached from the north.
Civilian vehicles traveling on the highway were allowed to
travel north, but all traffic moving south was stopped, searched,
and turned around.
The 1st Platoon, A Co, assumed the tasking from 3rd
Platoon, A Co, on the morning of 25 March. As the Platoon
Leader for 1st Platoon, I was very concerned about being
stationary in a position that was exposed to enemy forces, with
very little cover or concealment. When I met with the 3rd
Platoon Leader, 1LT Brian Johnson, he informed me that his
platoon had been engaged by small arms fire on each of the
past four days from as many as twenty enemy combatants at a
time. He also reported being engaged by a few inaccurate RPG
rounds but had sustained no casualties and stated that his
platoon had destroyed two civilian vehicles trying to drive
through the wire.
My platoon assumed the blocking position at 1000 hrs. and
immediately began improving the Infantry fighting positions.
With no Class IV or engineer support, it was a long, arduous,
and dangerous process to dig the fighting positions with only
our e-tools. Once the sun had set on the first day, we were able
to work under the concealment of the darkness and in the
relatively cool temperatures of a desert night. With the good
fortune of no enemy contact the first day or night, we were able
to complete our positions to standard before being told there
was a water shortage, and we now had to ration our water to
three canteens a day per Soldier.
Several of the vehicles that we searched at the blocking
position were carrying all male passengers and had bags in the
trunk containing military uniforms. All personnel traveling
with uniforms or military items were detained and turned over
to the Battalion detention center to be interrogated and passed
on for further questioning. Many of the detained Iraqis claimed

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to be fleeing from their military units because they did not
want to fight the Americans. Several of them were freely
offering up any information they had; some cried in fear; and a
few just stared at us with indignation and hatred.
On the third day, several of the Iraqis we had detained that
day reported that our current blocking position was being
targeted for a mortar attack that night. I immediately reported
this information to the Company HQ and was told to stay in
place and prepare for an indirect fire attack. I dug the fighting
positions down deeper, ensured that all Bradley Fighting
Vehicles were ―buttoned up,‖ and limited movement outside of
fighting positions. That evening, when the detainees were
transported back to the Battalion, two things were apparent:
they were visibly happy to be leaving the area, and many
believed some sort of attack was imminent.
The night of 27 March was long but uneventful. No attack
came, no mortars, nothing; it was a very quiet night. The 3rd
Platoon, A Co, was scheduled to relieve my platoon at 1000
hrs. on 28 March. When it arrived, I again met with 1LT Brian
Johnson and passed on to him all relevant information. We
decided to change out the perimeter security positions first, and
then the blocking position itself would be relieved. 1LT
Johnson and I stood near the wire at the blocking position and
watched two cars crest the hill just north of our position
heading towards us. With the security positions having already
been passed to his platoon, we decided that my search team
would clear the first car, and his team would then search the
second car, and that would be the battle handover.
I moved my Bradley closer to the blocking position to
allow 1LT Johnson‘s Bradley to take my place on the perimeter
and so I could load the last of my Soldiers on the vehicle. I was
standing on the rear ramp, accounting for the Soldiers and their
sensitive items, when an enormous explosion blew me to the

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ground. (To this day I still feel the intense heat from the blast
on my right side.) In the split second after the explosion, my
initial reaction was to run towards the blast in complete rage. I
took about four or five steps before I came to my senses (my
brain was a little disoriented) and began ordering my Soldiers
to take cover from the apparent mortar attack. With no further
rounds suppressing our position, I moved forward to assess the
situation.
As it turned out, the second car that approached our
blocking position had been rigged with explosives. The car
containing the explosives was almost completely disintegrated;
the car that was previously beside it had been blown to the
other side of the highway with only the frame remaining. The
four Soldiers who had moved forward to search the car were
mortally wounded; two of the bodies were incomplete, and two
of them were scarred and badly burned. One of the four
Soldiers sustained life for almost two minutes after the blast;
his fellow squad members rushed to his aid and futilely
attempted to apply buddy aid. An M113 ambulance with three
medics was collocated at our position only 50 meters from the
site of the blast. The medics, paralyzed with fear, did not
attempt to move forward and treat the wounded until several
minutes after the blast occurred.
When I realized it had been a car bombing, I moved my
platoon out around the blocking position, creating a larger
perimeter to tend to the wounded. The platoon sergeant of the
Soldiers who had died, SFC Henson, approached one of my
squad leaders and, in a tearful request, asked that the squad
leader help him pick up and identify ―his boys.‖ Once the
bodies had been collected, 3rd Platoon took control of the
position, and my platoon returned to the assembly area.
We later learned that opening the car trunk had been the
trigger to detonate the explosives therein. A single Iraqi man in

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civilian clothes with no distinguishable characteristics occupied
the car and was also killed by the explosion. The attack was the
first car bombing to occur during the war.

From the personal experience monograph of 1LT James A.

Horn, who served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd
Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan
Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, security in the defense was

discussed several times. Security includes all active and
active/passive measures taken to avoid detection by the enemy,
deceive the enemy, and deny enemy intelligence elements
information on the friendly battle position.
The Soldiers in the vignette recognized the relatively open
terrain and the lack of existing cover and concealment. To
minimize the vehicles‘ signature, the unit dug in the vehicles
using the entrenching tools, which were the only means
available. This was the first step in improving the battle
position and continuing with the sequence of the defense.
When the unit established the vehicle control point, the use of
wire and a basic obstacle plan was included to provide a
marked area to conduct the search of vehicles and occupants.
These obstacles should be established in such a manner as to
make the cars slow and, thus, decrease their ability to breach or
bypass the control point.
Conducting vehicle control points creates the necessity to
come into close contact with both the vehicle and its occupants.
While conducting traffic control points, it is beneficial to be
accompanied by local security, if available, who can convey
guidance to the occupants of the vehicle and give basic
commands to open all doors and hatches and lay any contents
of the vehicle out in clear sight prior to the occupant stepping

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to the side to be searched for any possible triggers that might
detonate a hidden bomb. Furthermore, vehicles must be
stopped outside of the blast radius to protect Soldiers at the
check points. These measures will minimize the risk to friendly
forces but will not eliminate the threat if the driver of the
vehicle is willing to die to injure or kill friendly forces.

On 30 March 2003, the 1-325th, 82nd Airborne Division,

arrived at As Samawah. Its mission was to seize the town of
As Samawah, a Fedayeen stronghold, and secure the
bridges across the Euphrates to protect 3d ID’s line of
communication (LOC). Therefore, the 1-325th was also
tasked with destroying the Fedayeen resistance since it was
largely responsible for the attacks on the 3rd ID’s supply
lines.

I was on the southernmost security and, thus, was to

position my platoon before the rest of the Task Force did. Once
I was set, the other Delta platoons would move into place, and
the rifle companies would begin to maneuver through the
trench network and clear it. Our intelligence was that this
trench network, on the southeast side of the city, was supposed
to hold a reinforced squad. My first task was to identify the
trench and any enemy locations. During our hasty map
reconnaissance, CPT Boone, my Company Commander, and I
found some high ground where I would be able to use my
Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) thermals to
provide overwatch and early warning to the rest of the Task
Force.
Unfortunately, things did not go exactly according to plan.
It was not lack of trying by any means, simply inaccurate
intelligence. When I moved up to the trench network, I noted
that this no was ordinary trench network but, instead, was a

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landfill. As I maneuvered my vehicles through the trash, I
began to realize that the trench network was no more than cuts
in the trash which, on satellites, looked like trenches. They
could be used as trenches but were certainly not part of some
master plan except by some trash man or perhaps vagrants who
needed a way through the landfill. We scanned through and
around trash heaps but did not find any reinforced squad.
Meanwhile, the other Delta platoons were maneuvering into
position, and the Task Force, on Light Medium Tactical
Vehicles (LMTVs), was filling into the far eastern side of the
bowl. Companies moved into their assembly areas, and men
instinctively sought cover and established local security. Alpha
Company sent LT Dave Powell, my good friend and drinking
buddy back in Fayetteville, first through the ―trench network.‖
I watched anxiously, oriented my weapons on target reference
points, and kept myself updated on the continuous scanning,
overwatching his maneuver. I reported to Alpha 6, CPT
Shannon Nielson, whenever I could, but otherwise I was
restricted to overwatching the maneuver elements.
As I sat waiting while the rest of the forces moved into
place, my gunner noticed a man walking with a donkey in the
middle of the landfill. I notified the Tactical Operations Center
(TOC) and continued to observe. We watched the donkey man
with some interest, wondering what he must have been
thinking watching us maneuver forces into the lip of the trash
dump.
Soon after the man and his donkey returned to the buildings
on the west side of the dump, Fadayeen fighters, who had taken
up positions in the cement factory, houses, and other buildings
overlooking the landfill, began to engage our forces. Alpha
Company continued to move its other platoons through, and LT
Powell maneuvered his machine guns forward. Bravo
Company, led by CPT Gabe Barton, was north of Alpha

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Company, moving likewise from east to west through the
trenches. When LT Powell began receiving mortar fire, we
realized what the donkey was for – the strange man taking his
donkey out for a walk was actually pacing off the distance for
the Iraqi mortars hidden in the housing complex. They moved
spotters up onto the roofs to adjust the mortars. Our naiveté had
been taken advantage of, and it would not happen again.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jeff Wilbur,

who served as a platoon leader, Delta Company, 1-325th, 82d
Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The situation that CPT Wilbur encountered is a

common occurrence on the modern battlefield. Soldiers and
leaders are continually confronted with civilians on the
battlefield and must make rapid decisions that will affect the
unit‘s security. The individual with the donkey was not armed
and did not display a hostile intent towards friendly units but
was conducting reconnaissance. When confronted with a
situation like this, leaders and Soldiers must decide to use
lethal force to stop the individual, risk American Soldiers by
moving forward to detain the individual, or to observe the
individual‘s movements and actions. To rapidly react to these
situations, Soldiers and leaders must be fully informed about
current operations and thoroughly trained in the rules of
engagement.

On 3 April 2003, the 3d BDE of the 3d ID had entered

the outskirts of Baghdad, Iraq.

Although we were literally in Baghdad, we were not in a

traditional urban environment; instead, we were in a

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well-vegetated farming area approximately 15 kilometers
outside of the city center. There were approximately 40
single-story homes interspersed among large open fields. Our
area of operations measured approximately three square
kilometers. I was leading a Bradley Fighting Vehicle platoon
that had been task organized to the tank company in our
battalion for the entire war.
In this area, we encountered what appeared to have been an
abandoned tank regiment and estimated that the Republican
Guard had abandoned these tanks within hours of our arrival.
Two BMPs still had some crew remaining who attempted to
engage us with direct fire, but we immediately destroyed them.
We assumed that meant remnants of the enemy were still
nearby.
Sure enough, we began to receive sporadic suppressive fire
from small arms, machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades.
It was impossible to ascertain the exact location from where it
came, so our commander ordered our Infantry platoon to clear
buildings in the farming village. Our platoon destroyed a van
carrying seven armed insurgents as it sped through our
checkpoint, while proceeding to systematically clear the homes
and buildings in the farming community. We found signs of
insurgents everywhere, from abandoned uniforms of the Iraqi
Army to small weapons caches inside the homes.
At approximately 1900 hrs., as I was speaking with a local
farmer, my platoon sergeant yelled to me from the Bradleys:
―Sir, the Commander is in trouble!‖ We quickly remounted our
vehicles, and my PSG explained the situation to me as we
moved about two kilometers through irrigated farmland and
houses to the CO‘s location. The CO and XO were conducting
a leaders‘ reconnaissance of the local area that we would
occupy that night. They entered a very wet area, and the
ground gave way, sending the 60-ton M1A2 Abrams tank on

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its side into a ravine, rendering the main gun and mounted .50
cal inoperable. Local insurgents immediately attempted to
capitalize on the situation. The Commander calmly engaged
them but was at a decided disadvantage. We maneuvered our
four Bradleys and quickly established a defensive perimeter.
As daylight waned, the mechanics brought in two M88s to
retrieve the tank. With 22 Soldiers on the ground, we
established sectors of fire, identified target reference points,
determined mortar targets, and established priorities of work.
Throughout the night, while the mechanics worked with the
two M88s to retrieve the tank, we received sporadic gunfire,
but it never posed a serious threat. My Platoon Sergeant, SFC
Ohlemann, had most of the enemy actions in his sector. He
expertly employed his section to destroy the enemy in their
hide positions and as they attempted to maneuver on our
positions by low crawling through a field. Meanwhile, I took
Infantrymen to set into hasty battle positions and provide
additional observation, using our NVGs and our Javelin CLUs.
At this point, we had been awake for over 32 hours, since the
previous morning. At approximately 0800 hrs. the tank was
fully recovered, and we maneuvered to link up with the
company and prepare on our next mission.

From the personal experience monograph of 1LT Sean

Morrow, who served as a platoon leader, B TM, 1st Battalion,
30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division,
Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort
Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: When conducting troop-leading procedures,

company and team commanders need to plan for the security of
battle damaged or stuck vehicles, recovery of injured Soldiers,
and recovery of the combat vehicles. This is a combined arms

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operation that requires leaders to plan and synchronize
numerous battlefield operating systems, with the focus centered
on security. A secure perimeter must be established using
maneuver and fire support assets. The area secured must be
large enough to allow medical evacuation and vehicle recovery
assets to operate with little or no influence from enemy
combatants. After the perimeter is established, the unit will
then conduct the evacuation of injured Soldiers and the combat
vehicle. The requirement for the unit in contact to secure the
recovery assets is not complete until the recovery assets have
returned to a secure area or have been passed to another unit
responsible for providing security. This causes the unit in
contact to employ even more combat power for a short period.
Due to outstanding Soldier discipline, training, and
leadership, the Soldiers of 3d Platoon quickly reacted and
prevented the loss of life or combat power. This action shows
that the importance of tactical logistics cannot be stressed
enough when conducting offensive operations against an
asymmetric threat. The failure to recover a combat vehicle
would have degraded the combat power of the company/team
and provided the enemy with additional weapons, ammunition,
communication equipment, and a tool for international
propaganda.
Combat recovery operations are resource intensive and
time consuming but are critical to mission success. Units can
ensure their success by planning for and training for combat
vehicle recovery operations, with a focus on security
operations, prior to combat operations.

The 1st BN, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, was given
responsibility for Fallujah, Iraq, on 11 September 2003. Its
task was to secure Fallujah to allow support and stability
operations to be conducted in the area.

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I was appointed the Battalion‘s Liaison Officer for Civil

Military Operations and rebuilding the government of the city.
Being the Liaison Officer involved going into the city every
day to check on the mayor and how he was running the city, as
well as to hear about the problems of the city‘s people.
On 2 October 2003, my liaison team and I were to conduct
a routine council meeting with the mayor and some sheiks at
the Fallujah Government Compound. The team consisted of
CPT Cirino, the HHC Commander who handled security; SPC
Dudin, an Arab-American, who was a medic but acted as a
translator; two rifle platoons; an Anti-Tank platoon; an Army
Reserve Civil Affairs team; an Army Reserve vertical
engineering team; and me. We had Infantry patrols, moving
two to three blocks out from the meeting location, and
protective positions overwatching the two major buildings in
the government compound.
One of the Infantry patrols, just across the street to the
south of the government compound, surprised an Iraqi rebel
moving into position with an RPK machine gun. The rebel
yelled, ―Allah Akbar‖ (Allah or God be praised) and fired at
our patrol. The rounds hit the lead Soldier in his ammo pouch
and knocked him down; the team leader then fired two rounds
in the Iraqi insurgent‘s chest, wounding him.
I was just about to start the meeting when this happened.
Hearing the shots, I went to the front hall of the building just as
other Iraqis who were trying to attack us engaged. The rest of
the enemy force was using the apartment complex across the
street as its attack by fire position. The building provided an
elevated advantage against us and was a good attack by fire
position. However, they were not expecting that the U.S. patrol
would surprise their other gunner as he was moving to the
building next door.

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Our patrol maneuvered to a protected position, while I went
out the side door and repositioned at the front wall of the
compound across from the enemy. Our Soldiers, while still
under enemy fire, carried the wounded enemy Iraqi to the
government office. The U.S. positions on the rooftop and those
of us who were on the ground level covered their movement
and suppressed the enemy on top of the apartment. We
suppressed the enemy and perhaps killed the insurgents there;
however, we also had some direct fire engage the complex
where there were noncombatants. Our Soldiers then lifted fire,
the platoon that was across the street cleared the building from
where the enemy was firing, and we seized control of the area.
However, a female civilian on the third floor was wounded
in the neck, and the public outcry was immediate. It appeared
that we had won the fight but not the battle. We got permission
from her brother-in-law to treat her, so we didn‘t break cultural
law. Then we called in the battalion surgeon, and he helped the
woman. The next day, we brought food and supplies to the
complex. Over the course of the next few months, we
strengthened our relationship with the residents by bringing
them clothes, food, and toys.

From the personal experience monograph of 1LT Ryan Edward

Huston, Sr. who served as Liaison Officer for 1st Battalion,
505th PIR, 82nd ABN DIV, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: Security, a Principle of War, is fundamental to

all operations. In this example, the leader chooses to secure a
site by having both overwatching security and Infantry security
patrols maneuver throughout the area of operations.
The patrol secured the meeting and its attendees, both
American and Iraqi. The aggressive and alert Infantrymen on

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patrol located an insurgent moving to a position of advantage
and disrupted a planned enemy ambush on the meeting
attendees. Their actions prevented the enemy from establishing
an interlocking base of fire on the friendly forces. Of primary
importance, the patrol‘s actions stole the initiative from the
enemy on that day and tipped the balance in favor of the U.S.
forces. By losing the initiative, the insurgents were unable to
act on their timeline and lost the tactical advantage over the
Americans. Finally, the patrol‘s unexpected presence forced
the enemy to fight in two directions. The added threat of
Infantrymen maneuvering from an unanticipated direction
during the engagement certainly helped to both shorten the
fight and prevent not only U.S. casualties, but also further
civilian casualties.
The value of a security patrol in an urban environment
cannot be overstated since the terrain is complex and
observation is very limited. Although necessary in a complete
security plan, even observation posts on top of a building have
a limited effect in many places. In this instance, local static
security elements alone would not have detected the first
insurgent, and the outcome of this fight could have been much
different. As forces fight in urban environments and against an
asymmetric threat, security patrols must become part of the
overall security plan for all elements from the squad-sized
observation post to the brigade combat team forward operating
base.
The excellent security plan led to the enemy‘s failure on
that day in Fallujah. All leaders must develop robust,
aggressive security measures to ensure mission success and
force protection in all operations.

October 27, 2003, marked the end of R&R— a four-day

rotation to Qatar— for 95 soldiers in the 173rd Airborne

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Brigade. Soldiers going on R&R would ride buses down to
Balad then fly from Balad to Qatar. The buses that
dropped those Soldiers off would take other Soldiers
coming from R&R north to Kirkuk.

After a C-130 flight into Balad from Qatar, we boarded

buses for the four-hour trip back to Kirkuk in northern Iraq.
The route we were taking, Highway 4 through Tikrit, was
considered by all to be very dangerous. Before departing, SFC
Juan Pena and I gave a mission brief to alert the Soldiers of the
possibility of being engaged and actions to take on contact.
Each Soldier had his own weapon, plus a weapon from the
Soldiers going on R&R. There was also one set of additional
body armor per man from the incoming Soldiers. We stuffed
that armor between the seats and the side of the bus, to include
its windows, for added protection. At the conclusion of the
brief and bus preparation, I informed 1LT Diggs, the Convoy
Commander, that we had accountability. We started movement
toward the main gate. Before exiting, we kept in the back of
our minds that the Balad Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD)
had a recent history of mortar attacks within its perimeter,
affirming to us that some of the local population was opposed
to the U.S. presence.
Our convoy included three locally contracted buses, two
cargo HMMWVs, two 5-tons with logistical packages, and one
HMMWV gun truck. The gun truck took the lead, followed by
a bus, a cargo HMMWV, the bus with SFC Pena and me, the
other cargo HMMWV, the last bus, and then the 5-ton trucks.
Five kilometers north of Balad APOD, on Highway 4, we
heard a loud explosion. The gun truck in the lead and the bus in
front of us disappeared into a large cloud of black smoke. I
directed the driver to stop the bus while SFC Pena directed the
30 Soldiers to dismount from the bus. As we quickly exited the

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bus, I took half of the Soldiers on the bus with me to clear the
left side of the road, while SFC Pena took the other half to
clear the right. As we moved forward, I noticed there were very
few Iraqi residents who were present at the site, and most of
those were women and children. None were armed or running;
none were celebrating what had happened. Everyone in the
direct vicinity of the explosion was carrying out his daily
routine as if nothing had happened. Nobody, at the time, was
suspicious or showed probable cause for detainment.
As we continued forward, the smoke began to clear, and I
could see the gun truck pulling off to the left side of the road.
The gunner, who had been positioned behind the .50 cal., was
not present behind the weapon. The bus behind the gun truck
was attempting to maneuver off to the right side of the road. As
SFC Pena‘s element and my element moved forward toward
the explosion site, we could see a U.S. Soldier limping toward
the gun truck. It was the gunner, a SPC from our Forward
Support Company (FSC). His Platoon Leader, 1LT Diggs,
reached him first and evaluated his condition. As I approached
them, the SPC stated that he had been thrown from his truck by
the blast but was OK. I left them to go examine the blast site.
There was blown wire that led to the side of the road but no
sign of a detonation device. The explosion left no cratering
effects to the pavement, which meant that it was simply laid
there and had not been dug in. Size or type of the explosive
was unknown.
While we finished securing the area, Soldiers on the first
bus detained two Iraqi men for being in the direct vicinity of
the blast. They would be making the ride with us back to
Kirkuk for questioning. Elements from the 4th Infantry Division
that were moving south along Highway 4 stopped to give
assistance. While they helped us with security, the bus driver
from Bus 1 was telling 1LT Diggs that his bus had broke down

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and that he could not make the trip. This was seemingly an
excuse, so we forced him to show us the problem. Somehow,
the clutch on the bus did not work; therefore, the bus would
only be drivable at 20-30km an hour. We had seen this tactic in
the past as a way to slow movement for anti-coalition forces to
easily ambush a convoy. Since we had no expertise on fixing
the bus or figuring out the problem, we took all 31 Soldiers
who were on Bus 1 and the two detainees and cross loaded
them onto the vehicles that were still functional.
The pending crisis we now faced was time. We had
departed from Balad at 1430 hrs. which would have gotten us
to Kirkuk before dark. However, forty-five additional minutes
were lost to securing the site and cross loading soldiers which
meant that our route through the ridgeline past Tikrit would be
in darkness. The ridgeline was known as a perfect ambush site
for the enemy due to its mountainous terrain. As we departed
for Kirkuk, 1LT Diggs reported the incident to the 173rd
Brigade TOC, and our convoy continued on through Tikrit.
As we entered the ridgeline, the sun crept behind the
mountains. All of the Soldiers in the convoy stood poised for
the worst, but we entered Kirkuk Airbase at 1930 hrs. without
being engaged. I reported to our Battalion Headquarters,
briefed the XO about the incident, and stated that there needed
to be an alternate mode of transportation for Soldiers going on
R&R. Buses carrying Soldiers to Balad along a dangerous
route, with little security and at the same time every week,
would eventually be costly. We began discussing the air assets,
which were limited, but our conversation was cut short to react
to a 107mm rocket hitting 150 meters from our TOC.
A week later, as the acting Company Commander, I
received a report that two of our Soldiers, PV2 Jacob Fletcher
and SGT Joseph Minucci, were being evacuated for injuries
sustained from an IED while riding back on the bus from R&R.

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The only information we received was that they were litter
urgent. At 0630 the following morning, LTC Caraccilo, our
Battalion Commander; CSM Rice, the Battalion Sergeant
Major; and Chaplain Wheatley arrived at our safehouse to
inform 1SG Nick Rolling and me that Minucci and Fletcher
had died from their wounds.

From the personal experience monograph by 1LT Steve

Brignoli, who served as XO of Chosen Company, 2-503rd
Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this example, the unit is faced with a

common problem on the asymmetric battlefield: how to ensure
security for routine convoys when there are limited routes
available. Every Soldier learns that patrols have to vary their
routes and times to prevent the enemy from patterning our
behavior and targeting us; however, in many situations, it is
neither possible nor practical to adhere to this fundamental
principle.
The most obvious challenges in varying convoy times and
routes are that there may not be additional trafficable routes or
there may be operational reasons for not using different routes.
In those instances, units must stagger departure times and
induce uncertainty into the enemy‘s plan. However, in the end,
varying routes or staggering times are passive measures and
will not adequately increase security if used alone.
Additionally, as our forces tend to operate from forward
operating bases, the routes into and out of these bases are
known and are almost certainly being observed, and our
movement on them likely serves as triggers for enemy actions.
Another technique is to permanently secure the route. This
requires a significant commitment in terms of manpower and

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time. If the commander determines the route is critical to the
unit after conducting mission analysis, he can fully commit a
unit to secure the route. Through a series of observation posts
(OPs), sniper positions, and well-planned patrols, the
commander can make the route reasonably safe for large
convoys. An enemy facing this threat is unable to establish
complex ambushes, and he cannot emplace effective
improvised explosive devices on the route. The OPs serve an
additional function of providing quick reaction forces that are
already deployed in the AO and can quickly respond to any
incident on the route or in the immediate vicinity.
If the commander determines that he does not want to
secure the route permanently, he must take actions to induce
uncertainty in the enemy‘s decision cycle. The first step in this
is to identify likely ambush and overwatch locations and the
routes into them. Next the commander has to commit combat
power directed against these likely areas, which can be done by
increasing patrols on a route, establishing both overt and covert
OPs, and using snipers at key locations. After the enemy is
ambushed where he previously acted with impunity, he will
often move to another area or he will expose himself to our fire
and be destroyed.
Despite a commander‘s active measures, he must still
ensure that his Soldiers are properly protected and that passive
measures are being used as much as possible. Every Soldier
must wear all available protective equipment, and vehicles
must be armored to the greatest extent available.
This vignette illustrates the challenge that our forces face
every day in Iraq in that large convoys, moving both personnel
and materiel, are important to all forward deployed units.
Ensuring these convoys arrive safely at their destination
requires deliberate planning with a tactical focus on security.
Commanders have many methods to choose from, but, in the

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end, they must analyze the enemy‘s tactics and design a
security plan that best protects their Soldiers.

CONCLUSION: To summarize, our forces cannot permit the

enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. The ultimate goal
of security operations is to protect the force against surprise
and reduce the unknowns in any situation.

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…you will find that quite different descriptions of the
same stretch of country will be given by an exonomist,
a carter, a huntsman, or a soldier.
Frederick the Great
Des Marches d‘Armee, 1777

INTRODUCTION: Soldiers communicate to provide accurate

and timely information to those who need it. Information is key
in helping commanders to successfully execute combat
operations. It enables leaders to achieve situational
understanding, make decisions, and give orders. As you will
read in this chapter, poor communication will adversely affect
mission accomplishment and can possibly cost lives.
Good communication does not necessarily come naturally;
like everything else we do, it must be trained. Leaders must
demand accurate reports, develop and use effective procedures
for transmitting information, and ensure they communicate
effectively to their superiors, peers, and subordinates.

In the spring of 2002, the 2-14th Infantry, 10th Mountain

Division, deployed to Kosovo, and its reconnaissance
platoon was often placed under the operational control of
the rifle companies to search the perimeters of buildings
and towns for illegal items—weapons or drugs—while the
rifle companies conducted searches of the houses and
buildings. Usually, these perimeter searches would occur
from the immediate vicinity of the buildings to
approximately 300 to 500 meters away from them, terrain
dependent.

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It was in the capacity of a perimeter search team that we
were being used on a Saturday morning in April, 2002. We
were placed under the operational control of C Company, 1-30
Infantry, a mechanized Infantry company that was attached to
Task Force 2-14 Infantry throughout the deployment. The three
platoons in C/1-30 would search the interior of houses
throughout one sector of Petrovce. My reconnaissance platoon
had the responsibility of searching the western side of
Petrovce, from its southern boundary to the main east-west
road located approximately halfway through town, a road that
did not extend into the hills to the west where we were to
search. This meant our northern boundary would be a
subjective, imaginary line east of town.
This imaginary line was significant because the 13th
Russian Tactical Group (TG), the unit responsible for the entire
area we were searching, was responsible for the search north of
the boundary.
Following the completion of this uneventful mission,
we headed for the battalion TOC because that is where CPT
Taylor, Commander of C/1-30, had ended up at this point of
the operation. Driving north along the town‘s main street,
across a short and narrow bridge, we passed a squad of Russian
Soldiers sitting on a BTR—a Russian wheeled armored
vehicle—in the middle of the town square. There was no room
to turn around, so I informed my Platoon Sergeant and squad
leaders to stay put while I dismounted to find the command
group. I located the Assistant S3 within a few minutes, and, as
soon as he saw me, I recognized that he was somewhat frantic,
hurriedly asking me why I wasn‘t still up on the hill. One of the
Kiowa helicopters had spotted a man walking west out of the
town with a rifle. No other information was forthcoming, just a
directive to get back up on the hill to apprehend and disarm this
man. As I was turning to head back to the platoon, the

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Assistant S3 mentioned that the Russians, along with an
unknown number of Special Forces soldiers, were already
looking for the suspect.
I assembled my subordinate leaders once I was within
eyesight and unfurled my map on the hood of a HMMWV to
brief the platoon. One squad would maneuver from a draw
heading west that we had previously identified as our northern
boundary. The squad was to move west up the draw and try to
turn the suspect north into the other squad. The other squad
was to maneuver directly uphill in a northwest direction,
placing it in a position to have the suspect moved into it and
simultaneously preventing him from heading back east into
town. I would move up the middle, back from the squads but
within visual contact of them and thus better able to control
movement.
Within 500 meters, SSG Tuttle had run into the Russians.
They were now moving north and into the avenues I had
designated for my squads. Instead of letting this become an
issue, SSG Tuttle began turning his squad to the north, earlier
than I had anticipated, but fine under the circumstances. Within
another 400 meters, we would be up onto flatter ground, and, if
the Russians had already cleared west up the hill and were
turning, then the suspect had to be to the north and closer to my
platoon. If SSG Tuttle and the Russians were on line heading
north, then SSG Wilkes would be in position, waiting for the
suspect when he came out onto the open ground.
As for SSG Wilkes, he had moved up the steep slope to the
northwest and, by heading more immediately uphill, had
already reached the plateau atop the hill. Unbeknownst to me,
upon cresting the hill, one of the helicopter pilots had spotted
him and landed to tell him which way the suspect had headed.
The pilot told Wilkes that the suspect was approximately 600
meters northwest of Wilkes‘ current position. SSG Wilkes,

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extremely spent from going straight up 800-1000 meters in
Interceptor body armor, Kevlar, and load bearing equipment,
didn't ask the pilot what the suspect was wearing, what type of
weapon he had, or what he looked like. The pilot took off
without having offered the information.
I called the TOC and requested a description of the suspect.
―Orange shirt, black pants‖ was the response. As I approached
the plateau, I simultaneously called SSG Wilkes to relay the
suspect‘s description. ―Orange shirt, black pants,‖ I said. ―We
got him!‖ was his response. I tried to calmly tell him over the
radio to proceed with caution and take no chances with this
man. Then he told me that he didn't quite have him yet, that he
only had visual contact with him. A moment before, I believed
the ordeal was over. Now, being told that he was not in our
custody yet, I pictured SSG Tuttle heading north in hot pursuit,
probably unable to monitor my transmissions with SSG
Wilkes. Immediately to his west would be a gaggle of Russian
Soldiers and, on top of all of it, an unknown number of Special
Forces Soldiers. Just as I was about to tell SSG Wilkes to hold
tight while I tried to contact SSG Tuttle, Wilkes came over the
radio to tell me that he had indeed physically apprehended the
suspect.
The prisoner made it to the TOC and was interrogated. My
platoon searched the area where the suspect had been
apprehended as well as multiple routes leading up the hill. No
rifle or any other type of contraband was ever found, and the
suspect ended up being a mentally challenged individual,
probably incapable of committing an act of violence. The
helicopter pilots claimed that they never reported any weapons,
and no one in the TOC knew from where that report came. Our
adrenaline-charged pursuit of an armed and potentially
dangerous suspect quickly became an embarrassing case of

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misidentification and miscommunication, based on incomplete
intelligence.

From the personal experience monograph by Captain Matthew

R. James, who served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in
2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Reporting of accurate information is critical to

shaping a unit‘s situational understanding. Units can ensure
proper reports by being observant, using proper formats, and
updating information as soon as possible. In this vignette, the
reconnaissance platoon received incomplete information,
which originated in the TOC, and then the information was not
properly communicated to the reconnaissance platoon and the
helicopter pilots.
Battle captains must develop an organized and effective
way of collecting spot reports and producing significant
activities and then employ an easily understood format to
communicate the information so it is understood by all.
Communicating the information using the SALUTE format—
size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment—would
have ensured the reconnaissance platoon received all of the
information it needed. In addition, units should consider having
helicopter pilots on the same frequency, so the pilots do not
have to leave their highly efficient reconnaissance and
surveillance platforms to land and coordinate with units on the
ground, thus, increasing the pilots‘ risk. Reporting of
information is critical to shaping a unit‘s situational
understanding and enabling the commander‘s decisions.

On 26 March 2003, the 3d BDE of the 3d ID was

performing line of communication security near As

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Samwah, while other elements of the division advanced
north towards Karbala. The writer’s platoon was part of an
Armor combat team, and his platoon was at full strength,
with 38 Soldiers and 4 vehicles.

We woke that morning and received plans to attack a

known Fedayeen camp. The camp was approximately ten
kilometers away--through urban terrain. As we began to move,
the dust that was swirling did not seem like the typical Middle
East sandstorm. The storm built into what historians later said
was the worst sandstorm in 900 years. An eerie red dust
covered everything, and our observation was only about ten
meters at best. We approached within about two kilometers of
the camp and set into an assault position near a rail yard. Our
Infantrymen got out of the Bradleys, and, although they were
only yards away, I could not see them. The company
commander decided we would wait for the storm to lift. The
storm held, and, after about four hours, the mission was
aborted.
We made our way back to the assembly area by way of
Highway 8, right through the heart of As Samwah. The order
from the previous day was to not decisively engage small
pockets of enemy resistance on the sides of the roads but rather
to pass the target from one vehicle to the next as we moved in
convoy. This order made more sense on this day because, if
anyone conducted a battle drill, we would have immediately
broken visual contact with the rest of the company due to
limited visibility.
Due to the treacherous weather conditions, a scout section
from another unit had become separated from its element. Our
commander made contact with the section leader and told him
to fall into our movement formation, and we could return the
section to their battalion. Suddenly, a call came over the net

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that two truckloads of Fedayeen were coming our way on
HWY 8. As the trucks appeared out of the red dust clouds, their
AK-47s and RPGs became visible.
Immediately our platoon engaged the enemy, and I gave the
order for each BFV to stay close with the vehicle to its front. I
was outside of the turret and gave the command to fire as soon
as the enemy was acquired. As the enemy fired their machine
gun, I dropped into the turret and looked through the sight.
After telling my gunner to continue engaging, I got back out of
the turret to look at my other section, which was behind me, to
assess the situation. I saw SFC Ohleman, my PSG, directly
behind me, engaging an enemy machine gun position. He
calmly rode high in the turret and destroyed both
truck-mounted Fedayeen and a pre-existing ambush position.
As we destroyed the two trucks and the 10-14 personnel,
the scout section pulled out from the column and began to
close on the enemy. This put the scouts directly in our field of
fire. Near fratricide was averted only by the quick net call of a
driver who saw the 25mm round fly over and narrowly miss
our scouts. Fortunately, the rounds found their target, and no
American Soldiers were hurt. We ensured the enemy was
destroyed and continued back to our base.

From the personal experience of 1LT Sean Morrow, who

served as a platoon leader, B TM, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry
Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan
Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This vignette vividly describes the challenges

of command and control during limited visibility. It was only
the alertness and training of the Bradley driver that averted a
tragic fratricide of a sister unit.

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Due to the severe dust storm that occurred in late March,
2003, American forces were forced to execute a temporary halt
in combat operations. Several decentralized units, such as the
battalion‘s scout platoon, had to join their parent battalion‘s
convoy along Highway 8 for better protection and support due
to the lack of visibility. The scout section was attached to a
company team for this purpose.
When this occurred, it would have been prudent for the
company team commander to have outlined his command and
control relationship with the scout section sergeant, informing
him of unit-specific SOPs indicative to that company and
giving him instructions on what his expectations were if they,
in fact, made contact with the enemy. Based upon changing
conditions of battlefield effects and troops assigned, ―signals
must be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all
assigned, attached, or OPCON‖ units. (FM 3-90.1) Had the
company commander done this, the scout section may have
chosen a different course of action, rather than to violate the
surface danger zones of the adjacent infantry platoon executing
a react-to-contact battle drill.
Further, 1LT Morrow‘s platoon needed to execute better
situation reports to his commander, as well as adjacent units, to
inform them of his intentions to initiate direct fire contact with
the approaching Fedayeen troops. ―A platoon leader who
encounters an enemy force immediately sends a contact report
to the company commander and then updates him with a
SITREP once contact has been executed.‖ These reports serve
to ―keep higher headquarters and adjacent units informed of
changes in the situation‖ (FM 3-90.1). Had 1LT Morrow done
this IAW the company SOP, the scout section may have been
alerted to the Infantry platoon‘s actions and not have risked
masking friendly fire.

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Good command and control SOPs, guidelines, and
reporting procedures serve to bolster force protection and
enhance situational awareness, especially when the combat
situation is further obscured by the elements and an
asymmetric enemy.

CONCLUSION: Leaders must ensure that their intent is

understood by their subordinates. In fluid situations, as we
have seen here, the leader must make an extra effort to ensure
his intent is understood and that he has the information to make
timely and accurate decisions. The more complex the
situation—due to likely enemy contact, terrain challenges, or
adverse weather—the more important it is for the commander
to specify his intent and issue clear and concise orders to
subordinates.

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 CHAPTER 11: Patrolling
When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when
well fed, starve him; when at rest, to make him move.
Appear at places at which he must hasten; move swiftly
where he does not expect you.
Sun Tzu
The Art of War, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: A patrol is, by definition, a detachment of

forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or
carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security
mission. A patrol is an operation that performs small unit
actions. Throughout this book, the reader sees various
examples of patrolling; in fact, an entire book could be written
on what we have learned about patrolling from our current
operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
The principles of patrolling are planning, reconnaissance,
control, security, and common sense. Like any other operation,
the leader must plan the patrol from beginning to end, to
include any contingencies that may arise during the conduct of
the patrol. Route reconnaissance must be conducted to
minimize those contingencies that may disrupt the mission.
Control measures, to include communications and security,
must also be developed and clearly communicated. Finally,
common sense must play a role; there must be a clear task and
purpose for the patrol, with a clearly defined end-state.

In June, 2001, the 2-502d Infantry, 101st Airborne

Division, was tasked to prevent the movement of weapons
across the Kosovo-Macedonia border.

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The task of halting the movement of arms into Macedonia
fell to our battalion. Given that our battalion also had to police
a large area of southern Kosovo, we could not move our entire
battalion to the border. The terrain at the border made the
situation much more difficult. The mountains by themselves
were large and steep, with any number of tree-covered ridges
jutting out toward the Kosovo plain beneath. The best maps
available showed dozens of trails crossing through the
mountains, but behind every ridge lay more unmapped trails
waiting to be discovered. In many cases, due to the thick
vegetation, our forces only discovered these trails when they
moved onto them through the wood line. At the bottom of each
ridge, the vegetation was thick enough to seriously impede
even foot movement, but there were almost always trails, many
of them large enough to allow passage of sport utility vehicles
crossing through these thick woods.
We could not confine our efforts to any specific type of
trail or area along the border. Weapons smuggling was the one
activity in Kosovo that crossed ethnic lines, and we were
unable to develop any information on weapons movement from
inside Kosovo. In early June, our initial deployment along the
border centered on populated areas and along the main crossing
sites into Macedonia. We maintained platoon-sized formations
along the main ridgelines throughout the sector, and the
Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) from 3rd ID patrolled the
rugged terrain to the west. At night, the platoons reorganized
into squads to block along the trails. Additional squads from
the peacekeeping base camps maneuvered up to the border at
night to further block the border. This initial array of forces
was not successful. Signals and human intelligence from our
Headquarters indicated that the weapons smugglers were
continuing to operate unimpeded within our sector.

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C Company, the company that controlled the center of the
battalion‘s sector, was the company that was most tied to the
populated areas, allowing the smugglers to bypass those areas
by following trails in the surrounding low ground. C Company
initially maintained two platoon-sized base camps on the
border, one at Mijack and one at Debelde. The base at Debelde
blocked the main road between Macedonia and Kosovo in the
region. Within sight of Debelde was the platoon at Mijack. The
platoon at Mijack blocked nothing more than a few trails that
led directly into the ―teeth‖ of the Macedonian border force.
The platoon on Mijack was not allowed to deploy outside its
defensive positions at night, which effectively prevented it
from blocking any of the arms flow into Macedonia.
With the bulk of our forces confined to base camps along
the border, the majority of our movement took place during
daylight when no smugglers were moving. The Brigade
Reconnaissance Team patrols to the west of Mijack did not
find any significant signs of activity. However, the patrols
between A Company‘s position at Letnica and the
C Company‘s position on Debelde frequently found fresh
tracks on the trails, and the occasional night-time fire fights in
the area on the Macedonian side of the border seemed to
indicate that this was the main area of weapons smuggling into
Macedonia. We would need to shift our forces if we were
going to successfully block the movement of arms across the
border. The platoon on Mijack, established opposite a
Macedonian platoon, was doing little more than reassuring the
Macedonian Army of U.S. intentions. As the position was only
accessible by helicopter, it was also a significant logistical
burden. The decision was made to abandon the position on
Mijack and shift our forces further east. With this decision, we
suddenly found sufficient forces to seriously begin the task of
blocking the border. The squads on the border began

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conducting daylight mounted and Infantry patrols through the
mountains to identify the crossing points into Macedonia. At
night, our squads would establish ambush positions along the
trails identified during the day. As our intelligence about the
activities near the border increased, our patrols began to have
their first successes.
Toward the end of June, 2001, the Battalion Scouts,
operating along the border, intercepted a convoy of seven sport
utility vehicles moving along an unmarked trail. The scout
teams identified likely crossing sites during the day and then
concealed themselves in the woods using standard ambush
techniques. As the vehicles approached, the scout teams moved
from the wood line and secured the front and rear vehicles in
the convoy. The sudden appearance of armed Soldiers moving
out of the woods along the border took the smugglers
completely by surprise. With no way of maneuvering their
vehicles, the convoy and all of the smugglers were caught. The
convoy contained everything from machine guns and rockets to
uniforms and boots. It was the largest weapons seizure during
the operation.
The battalion averaged one large weapons seizure a week
until mid-August, when all activity in the area stopped. With
the success of the border closure, all guerilla activity around
Kumanovo ground to a halt. The guerillas were able to
continue their operations around Tetovo, using supply routes
through Albania and portions of Kosovo not controlled by U.S.
forces.

From the personal experience monograph of CPT Eric Greek,

who served with 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, 101st Airborne
Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection,
Fort Benning, GA.

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DISCUSSION: In this summary of the 2-502 Infantry‘s
operations along the Kosovo-Macedonia border, we see the
practical application of our intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) process. The IPB process focuses our analysis
and evaluation of our forces, our threat or enemy forces, and
our terrain and weather. The IPB process is a continuous
process that begins upon mission receipt and is not completed
until the operation is determined to be completed.
The subordinate units of the 2-502 Infantry used both static
positions and patrols to confirm smuggling routes. They not
only used existing maps to plan patrol routes, but also took
advantage of debriefs that further developed the analysis and
understanding of the terrain and, more specifically, the aspects
of terrain—avenues of approach. It was this continuous
analysis of the terrain, signals intelligence, and human
intelligence that led the unit to understand when and where the
smugglers would attempt to traffic arms and equipment. This
understanding of the IPB process enabled the unit to adjust and
refocus combat power to prevent the smuggling of this
contraband, which ultimately led to stabilization in the unit‘s
area of operation.

CONCLUSION: One of the chief results of any patrol‘s

operation is the information that it gathers. The leader must
train his Soldiers in what to look for and accurate reporting
techniques. Above all, analysis, planning, and effective
execution are paramount in conducting successful patrols.

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The Soldier always knows that everything he
does…will be scrutinized by two classes of critics—by
the government that employs him and by the enemies of
the government.
Field Marshall Viscount Slim
Unofficial History, 1959

INTRODUCTION: Operational requirements, policy, and law

define rules of engagement (ROE). Effective ROE are
enforceable, understandable, tactically sound, and legally
sufficient. They are also responsive to the mission and permit
subordinate commanders and Soldiers to exercise initiative
when confronted by opportunity or unforeseen circumstances.
In all situations, the rules of engagement recognize the right to
self-defense; the commander‘s right and obligation to protect
assigned personnel; and the national right to defend U.S.
forces, allies, and coalition partners against armed attack. In all
situations, Soldiers and commanders use the degree of force
that is militarily necessary, proportional to the threat, and
prudent for future operations.

From 25 August until 3 October, 1993, Task Force

Ranger conducted seven combat missions in Mogadishu,
Somalia. The seventh and final mission, on 3-4 October,
known as “The Battle of the Black Sea,” was the catalyst
for a change in the United States’ policy in Somalia. What
began as capture of some of Mahamed Farah Aideed’s
lieutenants escalated when Somali RPG fire destroyed two
Blackhawk helicopters, and TF Ranger went to their
rescue, while defeating attacks by thousands of armed
Somalis. During the battle, which would be the most intense
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fighting seen by American forces since the Vietnam War,
18 American Soldiers were killed, and 83 were wounded.
The International Red Cross estimated that Somali
casualty figures exceeded 1,000.

Every Ranger studied the Rules of Engagement (ROE), yet

there was still confusion as to who would be regarded as a
noncombatant. Some Somalis were allowed to carry weapons,
as the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies hired locals
to provide security against looting gangs and militia.
During the fight, while securing the area around the first
destroyed Blackhawk, Freedom Road and the adjoining alley
had become a killing zone. AK-47 bullets flew overhead with a
loud pop, punctuated by the shriek of Rocket Propelled
Grenades (RPGs). As the Rangers fought to keep the crowds
back, target identification was becoming a problem. There
were combatants mixed in the crowds of non-combatants.
Women and children were screaming and running at us from
all directions. Some of them had weapons, ranging from
machine guns to small knives and machetes, and some did not.
Some men would stand near the corners of buildings. They
looked like they were non-combatants observing the action.
Other men, unknown to us, hid around the corner, loaded a
weapon, and handed it to the man who was in sight. The man
in sight would then fire the weapon as fast as he could, hand it
back to the loader, and just smile and wave his hands at us.
Women would walk in front of the men, acting as human
shields. The men would fire weapons from behind and under
the armpits of the women as they both walked toward us.
The Soldiers did not know what to do at first. Some
Soldiers yelled across the streets at me, asking what to do.
Small children had weapons and sometimes were more of a
threat because they had no fear.

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From the personal experience monograph by CPT Thomas Di

Tomasso, who served as a platoon leader in Bravo Company,
3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research
Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

Meanwhile, at my position, small crowds of Somalis had

begun to form. The crowd was mostly men and women,
curious to find out who had just landed in their neighborhood.
We cleared them out of the way by gesturing and throwing
flash bang grenades. Gradually, the direct fire around the area
began to increase. Shortly after scattering the curiosity seekers,
my blocking position began to receive sporadic fire from the
south and west. I diverted my attention from the radio and
concentrated on the fight at hand. No one in my chalk could
identify exactly where the fire was coming from, but I could
see that the AH-6 Little Bird helicopters were engaging enemy
targets to the south with their 7.62 caliber mini-guns.
The situation became even more intense when a woman
stepped out into the street south of our location and began
walking toward us with her arms outstretched. Behind the
woman was a man with an AK-47, apparently using her as a
human shield. PFC Heard cried out, ―I can see him. Right
behind her. He‘s got an AK.‖ PFC Heard fired a long burst
from his M60 machine gun, killing the two Somalis.
A couple of minutes later, several children walked out and
began pointing out our locations. Not wanting to take any
chances, I placed several well-aimed shots at the feet of the
children and sent them running for cover. Bullets began
cracking over our heads from the east, and my other M60
gunner, SPC Hawley, fired in the general direction of the
enemy fire. Another burst of fire impacted mere feet from

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SPC Hawley, but he still continued to engage enemy targets
down the street.
By this time, almost everyone in my chalk began to engage
armed Somalis as they ran out into the streets. Somalis were
firing RPGs at us and the helicopters overhead from every
direction. Out of the corner of my eye, I spotted a woman
carrying an RPG across the street about 150 meters away. I
aimed my CAR-15 and fired three rounds. The first shot was
behind her, but the next two found their mark, and the woman
fell down in a heap.

From personal experience monograph by CPT Larry D.

Perino, who served as a platoon leader in Bravo Company, 3rd
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: In 1993, to an Army finally recovered from

Vietnam, with many of its Soldiers and leaders being
post-Vietnam recruits, lessons concerning ROE had to be
relearned. The importance of these lessons are magnified
because of the close scrutiny the contemporary media places on
our Soldiers in combat zones, which has lent itself to the new
phrase, ―don‘t make a mistake at the tactical level that has
strategic repercussions.‖
Rangers Di Tomasso and Perino both provide excellent
personal examples of why Law of Land Warfare training has
become so important in recent years. In fact, their experiences,
if not their names, are known throughout the force because, in
ROE training, the lawyer conducting it will cite these
examples, or the Soldiers hearing the brief will question the
lawyer about the ―what ifs‖ included here.
This vignette enables the reader to visualize the absolute
chaos that is encountered on the battlefield. The application of

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the ROE mitigates the chaos—the ―fog of war‖—that Soldiers
routinely encounter on the battlefield. It is imperative that the
leadership identifies combatants from noncombatants and
translates this information without confusing the Soldier on the
ground. By strictly adhering to and training on ROE, this is
successfully accomplished.
Enemy forces who conduct themselves like this are not
planning on the American Soldiers mistakenly firing, but on
their hesitancy and, thus, tactical mistake in not firing. They
know a child or a woman carries an emotional, cultural, and
psychological reflex in most people and certainly Americans.
The enemy knows that, regardless of the level of training,
experience, or maturity of the individual involved in the
situation, except with the most callous person, there will be a
hesitancy. Every ROE incorporates the right of self-defense,
from the smallest battalion deployment to the overarching
Geneva Conventions for all signatory nations, but under fire,
potentially for the first time, it is easy to forget, to doubt, to
question.
Thus, again, firing at an individual who has plainly
demonstrated his hostile intent, regardless of age or gender, is
always lawful if appropriate force is employed and has been
escalated accordingly. Tactically, the mistake could only occur
if appropriate force is not used (for example, criminal
negligence). Operationally, strategically, or politically, a
mistake in the public affairs and media relations arena could be
made if we fail to protect our Soldiers by reinforcing their
actions and countering the certain use of the media by the
enemy.
For our Soldiers‘ benefit, the easiest way of explaining it is
this: the ROE always protects their right to self-defense but
never justifies illegal actions. When Soldiers make the right
call within these parameters, the Army will address the public

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affairs. The Army does not pretend that it is an easy decision,
but we train Soldiers, prepare Soldiers, and trust Soldiers to
make the right call.

On April 4, 2003, A Company, 1st Battalion, 30th

Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID, which had been cross-
attached to 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 3rd ID,
entered the outskirts of Saddam International Airport.

The airport complex was huge. The basic design was

divided between a military side and a civilian side. The
military side housed concrete reinforced hangers, military
buildings, and the Iraqi Missile Defense School. Special
Republican Guards were stationed throughout the airport
complex, as were more air defense artillery guns than I ever
imagined existed in one place. At dawn, we were to begin
seizure of our objective on the airport, the VIP Terminal
complex. To do so, we attacked straight up the middle of the
center runway, which had been cratered and rubbled, oriented
north on the control tower. To our right flank, Team 3-69
Armor was continuing its clearance of the airport. To our left
flank, C/3-7 IN (M) would clear the initial portion of the
military portion of the airport complex.
As I monitored progress and reported to Battalion on our
status, my gunner, Staff Sergeant Diggs, interrupted me, saying
that he had thermal signatures to our immediate front at about
400 meters or so. By this time, the fog limited visibility to
around 250 meters or less. I dropped down, looked into the
commander‘s sight, and clearly saw three thermal images of
men in the night site. They appeared to be standing in the tree
line. I could not positively identify any weapons, so I told him
to continue observing the target area.

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As I said this, one began moving forward alone. As he
approached out of the fog, we could see he was wearing dark
colored clothing but could not see much else. He appeared
unarmed but did not have his hands raised in surrender. I told
my gunner again to hold fire until we could ID a weapon of
some sort in accordance with our Rules of Engagement. As the
man drew closer, we could see he was wearing an Iraqi military
uniform but still could not see any weapon. At about 200
meters, his long trench coat moved just enough to show the
barrel of an AK-47 pointing out and magazines strapped to his
chest. As soon as I saw the weapon, SSG Diggs yelled, ―He‘s
got an AK Sir!‖ I simultaneously shouted ―Engage, Coax!‖
One round fired, and then the 7.62mm Coaxial Machine gun
jammed. I attempted to clear the weapon twice, but it continued
to jam, no longer firing at all. Quickly, I popped up, grabbing
my M4 from the turret where I had it secured, and told my
gunner to engage with 25mm High Explosive (HE).
My gunner engaged with several rounds HE, which
impacted directly on top of the enemy soldier. Miraculously, he
somehow survived and threw his rifle one way and dove into
the bushes, stripping off his clothes at the same time. I do not
know how this man lived. My only conclusion is that the HE
was either bad or it didn‘t arm since the impact was far too
small for high explosive rounds. As the first enemy soldier
dove out of sight, we traversed onto the other two, still at 400
meters‘ range, and observed what appeared to be an RPG
launcher or some other cylindrical type weapon. I ordered my
gunner to engage with HE again. The fog was too thick to
assess weapon effects among the trees and underbrush. I
requested to move forward 200 meters, but Captain Whyte told
me to hold in place and sent an Infantry squad from an adjacent
platoon to my position.

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Infantry in Battle
From the personal experience monograph by CPT Nathanael
Tagg, who served as XO in A Company, 1st Battalion, 30th
Infantry Regiment, 3d ID, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Before engaging targets in limited visibility or

unfavorable conditions, positive identification of the target is
not only necessary, it is required. Once the target is positively
identified, the leader can then assess the threat accurately and
respond to the danger with appropriate force.
CPT Tagg and SSG Diggs followed the rules of
engagement, while maintaining operational security and
individual self-defense, by maintaining visual contact with the
three enemy soldiers until CPT Tagg or SSG Diggs could
identify weapons or hostile intent. SSG Diggs identified the
three enemy soldiers and informed the Bradley commander
prior to engaging. When CPT Tagg could not identify any
weapons, he instructed SSG Diggs to maintain visual contact
with the enemy. When one individual was identified wearing
an Iraqi Army uniform, CPT Tagg still did not give the order to
engage. Upon positive identification of weapons, CPT Tagg
gave the fire command to engage the three individuals.

Following the end of major combat operations in

Baghdad during May, 2003, 3-187 IN, 101st Airborne
Division, was reattached to the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault) from the 3rd Infantry Division and moved to
positions in northern Iraq. Company A, 3-187th was given
the responsibility for the small border town of Rabea’a,
which was located on the Iraqi/Syrian border and
controlled a main road connecting the two countries.
During its seven month stay, A/3-187 essentially rebuilt
every public work and component of infrastructure in the

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town, to include implementing the first elections,
establishing a city council, and training a new police force
and border guard force. As the battalion prepared to pull
forces out of sector for another task force operation, the
former Alpha Company forward operating base was
turned into a platoon position.

The troop-to-task ratio increased because the one remaining

platoon was tasked with monitoring the previous several
months‘ worth of implemented systems, along with the
enforcement of trade across the border at the authorized
crossing site and customs house. The 1st Platoon was also
tasked with augmenting the new border patrol force to limit
illegal border crossings over a 75 kilometer span of border.
This task required nightly U.S. and Iraqi joint patrols that
occasionally were engaged in operations that frequently
resembled ―cat and mouse‖ games by both Iraqis and Syrians
who had been crossing the border covertly for years. Most of
the smugglers were moving benzene or cigarettes across the
border and trying to make as honest a living as they could, but
the occasional small weapons dealers would also attempt to
cross.
At about 1400 hrs. on October 14th, 2003, a Soldier who
was on the roof of our one-building compound pulling security
noticed a group of men and women gathered about 150 meters
to the north of the compound, on the Iraqi side of the border,
acting as if they might cross over illegally or waiting for
someone who was going to cross from Syria. It was extremely
odd for people to cross the border illegally during the day,
much less in open sight of our compound. The Soldier quickly
relayed this information to the platoon command post located
downstairs, and a squad (-) deployed to respond. The ―reaction
team‖ consisted of two sergeants, two M249 gunners, three

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riflemen, and an interpreter. This may seem like an ad hoc task
organization, but each of our platoons was short on
Infantrymen.
The people on the Iraqi side were quickly gathered and
secured in a nearby farm pen, and the interpreter began asking
them questions regarding their actions. At the same time, three
men drove to within 50 meters of the border from the Syrian
side. The men exited their vehicle unarmed and moved across
the border into Iraq where they began to get very angry about
the team‘s questioning of the people. A verbal and then a
physical fight ensued between the two sergeants and the three
Syrians who refused numerous orders to leave the scene.
The detained Iraqis told the interpreter they had no idea
who the ―Syrian‖ men were. Meanwhile, the physical fight
continued, despite the two sergeants attempting to handle it in a
passive way. Every opportunity was provided for the three
Syrian men to just leave, but they refused. One man did leave;
however, he went back across the border into Syria and
retrieved an AK47 from his van and then returned back to Iraq.
The two sergeants immediately went to a much more
aggressive posture, raising their rifles at the Syrians. A
stand-off at close range began as the sergeants began walking
the Syrians at gunpoint back across the border. About 10-15
meters inside of Syria, one of the unarmed Syrians tried to grab
a weapon away from one of the sergeants. The sergeant pushed
the man back and was simultaneously shot at by the man with
the AK47. The second sergeant rapidly returned fire and
eliminated the close range threat. With the elimination of the
threat, the situation was quickly over, as the other Syrian
became completely passive.
This entire incident took place in less than 15 minutes with
an ad hoc organization of a diminished squad with an Iraqi
interpreter.

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A very elaborate investigation followed this incident as
there are obvious political ramifications involved with killing a
Syrian in his country during a time when the tensions were
mounting between the United States and Syria. However, the
investigation found that the squad leader operated within his
rules of engagement and acted accordingly.

From the personal experience monograph by SFC David J.

Roels, who served as the Platoon Sergeant of 1/A/3-187th , and
1LT Jaron S. Wharton, who served as the Executive Officer for
A/3-187th Infantry, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives

issued by the competent military authority which delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other
forces encountered. The ROE impact on how Soldiers and
commanders conduct operations in all military operations by
imposing political, practical, operational, and legal limitations
on their actions. Regardless of any restrictions imposed by the
ROE, one factor is always constant: the right to self-defense.
In this vignette, we see the challenges posed by the ROE to
a noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the company. One of the
company‘s missions entailed combat patrols of the Iraqi-Syrian
border. During its patrols, the company operated in a complex,
uncertain, and violent environment—which included
smugglers, small arms dealers, refugees, and possibly
insurgents—since the patrols would occasionally receive direct
fire. These different scenarios illustrate the complexity in
applying the ROE to various conditions on the border. The
actions that followed are demonstrative of the NCOs in the

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company applying the ROE to a potentially politically, volatile
incident.
When we examine the vignette, we see a U.S. Soldier
observing and then detaining a group of people on the Iraqi
side of the border—much to the consternation of the Syrians
who were extremely upset at the proceedings. In the meantime,
a physical fight ensued between the Syrians and the NCOs;
however, the NCOs responded to the Syrians‘ aggression as
passively as possible. At this juncture, the American Soldiers
must have realized the political implications of getting
involved with Syrian nationals at a time when tensions between
the U.S. and Syria were tense. Furthermore, the Syrian
nationals did not produce any weapons at this point to justify
elevating the threat response.
Although the Syrians‘ hostile acts justified the Soldiers‘ use
of deadly force, once the Syrian nationals had retrieved
AK-47s from their vehicle and pointed them at the American
NCOs, the Soldiers continued to show restraint. However,
when the Syrian nationals made an attempt to wrest the weapon
away from one of the NCOs and then simultaneously
discharged his weapon, the American NCO responded with
deadly force.
Despite the fact that the NCO showed more restraint than
what the ROE required, it clearly illustrates the intent behind
the ROE. The American NCOs from the company responded to
each elevation of threat with logic and sound decision-making.
Additionally, the NCOs understood the political implications of
the ROE by using deadly force on a Syrian national in his
home country. In the end, however, the inherent right to
self-defense mitigated all of these factors and saved the life of
the NCO and his comrades.

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SPC Eric Huth, a 22 year-old Infantryman assigned to
B/3-15 IN, 3rd ID, witnessed an incident in which a Bradley
from his company engaged a van loaded with 19 civilians,
killing and injuring many of them. SPC Huth was driving
the company executive officer and was able to monitor the
radio conversations between the company commander,
CPT Ronny Johnson, and the platoon leader manning the
roadblock.

The van approached a checkpoint but would not stop, even

though the Soldiers at the roadblock held up their hands as a
―HALT‖ signal. CPT Johnson reiterated his order for the
Soldiers to halt all vehicles and not to let that van approach
American positions close enough to cause casualties, should it
be filled with explosives.
When the van ignored the signal to halt, CPT Johnson
ordered the platoon leader to shoot at the van‘s radiator and
tires to make it halt. The platoon leader did that, but the van
continued to advance, without slowing at all. As it approached
the U.S position, the 1st Platoon Leader decided to initiate
25mm High Explosive fires to disable the van.
SPC Huth drove the Executive Officer to the site within a
minute or two of the van being engaged. He witnessed the
medics treating the survivors from the van and their medical
evacuation. SPC Huth thought the unit had done the right thing,
that there was no other way to protect U.S. Soldiers from the
suicide bombers. The 1st Platoon Leader felt very bad about
killing the non-combatants, but the consensus within the unit
was that it was regrettable but unavoidable, given the situation.

From a 24 MAY 03 interview with SPC Eric Huth of

B Company, 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry; included in the OIF
Study Group publication On Point, Ch 4, pg 160.

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DISCUSSION: When conducting a traffic control point (TCP)

or checkpoint, the ROE become extremely important. It is also
imperative that the leadership employs a policy of escalation to
meet the unknown threat that is facing its forces.
Prior to the engagement in this vignette, U.S. Soldiers in
other parts of Iraq had been killed by vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devises due to the leaders‘ hesitation in using deadly
force. Having said this, when conducting a TCP, the use of
deadly force is the last resort—only used when all other means
of stopping the vehicle or threat have not worked. In this
vignette, the Soldiers effectively escalated the amount of force
as the threat approached.
Therefore, the leaders and Soldiers of B/3-15 IN acted
appropriately in accordance with the ROE. The Soldiers first
showed a visual ―halt‖ signal to the approaching van before
initiating less than lethal means to stop the van. When
necessary and proportional force did not stop the van, the first
platoon leader made the right decision to use necessary force to
stop the van before it could approach close enough to injure
American Soldiers. In accordance with the ROE, the Soldiers
of B/1-30 IN also provided medical care to injured civilians.

CONCLUSION: As we see from the events described in this

chapter, the ROE must allow for the right of self-defense, while
ensuring that the objectives of operations are met. The ROE
provide a framework for decision-making within the chaos of
the battlefield, and our Soldiers do a superb job of ensuring that
the intent, as well as the letter, of the rules is met.

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 CHAPTER 13: Casualties
It is right to be very concerned about the wounded. If
we neglect them, we will find the rest of the troops will
deliberately not fight well, and our remissness will
cause us to lose some who could have been saved.
The Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon, c. 600 AD

INTRODUCTION: Leaders have three priorities: accomplish

the mission, care for Soldiers, and steward resources. Leaders
are challenged to make good decisions that simultaneously
accomplish each of these priorities without violating the others.
Close combat is inherently dangerous. It presents hazards
to both accomplishing the mission and to caring for Soldiers.
Unfortunately, there never seems to be enough qualified
medically trained personnel available on the battlefield. This
presents hazards to both accomplishing the mission and to
caring for Soldiers, but primarily to Soldier care. Hence, the
leaders‘ challenge is to manage this risk. They do so by
understanding and employing medical treatment and
evacuation processes.
All medical operations have two basic elements—treatment
and evacuation. These elements are also categories for
analyzing risk. The leader must consider the following:
Risk to treatment: Risk to treatment is defined as the
inability to provide the casualty with proper medical
treatment which results from the wounds being beyond the
capability of the medical person at the scene.
Risk to evacuation: Risk to evacuation is defined as the
inability to move the casualty from point of injury to the
proper medical treatment in a timely fashion. This can
result from many differing factors—from presence of
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enemy to lack of evacuation platforms or to time-distance
factors.
The forms of treatment are complementary with the forms
of evacuation. That is, the relative weaknesses of treatment
capabilities are protected by strengths of evacuation assets. The
opposite is also true. The weaknesses of evacuation assets are
protected by the strengths of treatment capabilities. Therefore,
as a general rule, risk in one category is mitigated by the other
category.

On 3 October 1993, Task Force Ranger received

information that two primary leaders of the rogue clan—
headed by Mohamed Farrah Aideed—were meeting in a
building near the Olympic Hotel in downtown Mogadishu,
Somalia. What began as a mission to secure the area

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around the hotel, allowing Special operators to seize the
clan leaders, changed dramatically when two Black Hawk
helicopters were shot down by RPG fire, and TF Ranger
moved to secure the crash sites. Thus began the most
intense combat seen by U.S. forces since Vietnam.

We traveled a short distance when CPT Steele—B/3-75th

Commander—called me on the radio and told me that I was
about 100 meters from the (first) crash site and to turn left
(north) at the next intersection. We moved forward until we
reached the intersection, and, immediately, we were suppressed
by intense enemy fire. We quickly returned fire and continued
to move. With Somalis shooting at us from every direction, it
seemed as if we had run into a wall of lead. We began to bound
from wall to wall and low crawl to any available cover.
I briefly paused outside of a courtyard with Sergeant
Goodale and tried to call LT Tom Di Tomasso—2d Platoon
Leader in B/3-75th—on the radio to get him to guide us to his
location at the crash site. He answered me, but I couldn‘t
understand him due to all of the weapons‘ fire around us. As I
began to move down the street, a hail of bullets landed where I
had been kneeling. One of those bullets hit SGT Goodale. He
began yelling, ―I‘m hit! I‘m hit!‖ I looked down and saw a pool
of blood gathering underneath him. Surprisingly, his wound did
not seem to be too bad, so I immediately grabbed him under
the arms and dragged him into the courtyard. Almost
immediately, one of our medics ran into the courtyard and
began to administer first aid. I checked with the medic who
assured me the wound wasn‘t serious, so I headed out into the
street and linked up with my lead element.
Up the street, I saw two American Soldiers about a block
ahead. I figured that they were either with the Combat Search
and Rescue (CSAR) element or from LT Di Tomasso‘s chalk.

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As the first man in my lead element was crossing a small
alleyway, a large volley of fire from the west erupted, but
luckily, he was able to dive out of the way and crawl to safety.
The next few Rangers crossed and established covering
positions for the rest of the element to cross. I waited for the
signal from the man ahead of me and then sprinted across the
alleyway. I got half-way across when bullets began kicking up
the dirt at my feet. The man covering me, CPL James Smith,
fired a 40mm high explosive round from his M203 grenade
launcher toward the unknown assailant, and the enemy fire
ceased by the time I finished crossing.
We linked up with Di Tomasso‘s platoon at the crash site,
and SSG Boorn and SSG Elliot began to position their men to
secure the western portion of the perimeter of the crash site.
The volume of fire seemed to increase every minute we were
there. The Somalis began volley firing RPGs at our location,
and bullets ricocheted off the walls over our heads. My M60
machine gunners and M249 squad automatic weapon gunners
were engaging enemy targets of opportunity and met with
some success. The moment any Somali with a weapon popped
out, he was killed. Our M203 grenade launchers were also very
effective neutralizing Somalis firing at us from the windows of
buildings. Despite numerous attempts by the Somalis to
overrun us, we were effective in stopping wave after wave of
Somali gunmen.
I found cover in the street behind some stairs leading into a
small courtyard. CPL Smith was just ahead of me, behind a tin
shack. All of a sudden, I heard bullets cracking above my head.
I peered around the steps and fired my CAR-15 at a group of
Somalis about 150 meters away, firing on our position. I could
not get a good shot from where I was, so I moved a few feet
toward CPL Smith to tell him to engage with a few high
explosive M203 rounds. Suddenly, another burst of fire landed

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all around us, and CPL Smith began howling in pain. I yelled at
the men behind me to help move CPL Smith and that I needed
a medic immediately.
We dragged CPL Smith up the stairs where I had been
taking cover moments before and moved him into a small
courtyard. A medic arrived at my location almost immediately
and began to treat CPL Smith. I radioed CPT Steele that I had
another casualty and was down to ten men. I left the courtyard
and ran into SSG Elliott. I told him that CPL Smith was
wounded and that a medic was treating him in the courtyard
behind me. At that moment, another burst of machine gun fire
landed directly between us. SSG Elliott said to me, ―Uh, sir, I
think that it would be a pretty good idea if we go into that
courtyard.‖ The only reply I could think of at the time was,
―Do you really think so?‖ SSG Elliott answered by grabbing
me by the arm, and we both dove into the courtyard. The medic
was working frantically on CPL Smith. CPL Smith had two
IVs running, and another Soldier had two hands buried in
Smith‘s inner thigh, attempting to stop the bleeding. Smith was
not doing too well: the bullet had severed his femoral artery,
and the wound was too high on the leg to apply a tourniquet.
The only way to stop the bleeding was by direct pressure. I
informed my commander about the seriousness of the situation
and moved to the entrance of the courtyard to see how my
Soldiers were doing on the other side of the street.
By this time, we were receiving very heavy suppressive fire
from the north and the west. I watched helplessly as four more
of my Soldiers were wounded within four minutes. They were
all pulled to safety in a courtyard directly across the street from
my position. I radioed CPT Steele that I now had only three
able Soldiers left, including myself.
CPT Steele then told me that the ground reaction force was
unable to find our location, was under heavy fire, and was

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breaking contact to bring the wounded and the captured
prisoners back to the airfield. I looked at my watch; it was
1730 hrs. We had been on the ground for two hours, and it was
getting dark.
As my chalk and the forces following me attempted to
secure the western perimeter of the crash site, LT Di
Tomasso‘s chalk and the CSAR team were frantically
attempting to pull out the pilots of the MH-60. The frame of
the helicopter had collapsed around the pilots, pinning their
bodies inside of the wreck. They had both probably died on
impact. The rest of the crew survived the impact and assisted
the efforts in recovering the pilots‘ bodies. To protect
themselves from the enemy fire and RPG shrapnel, Sergeant
John Belman, with the help from others, pulled the Kevlar
blankets off the floor of the helicopter and used them as
shields. After much effort, the body of Chief Warrant Officer
Donavan Bailey was pulled free. The Rangers and the CSAR
team continued to try to pull out the other pilot, Chief Warrant
Officer Clifton Wolcott, but they began to suffer casualties to
the extent that LT Di Tomasso decided to move what was left
of his element to a building adjacent to the courtyard where I
was. He reported his situations, posted security, and began the
treatment of casualties as darkness fell.
Back at my position, CPL Smith was deteriorating; he was
losing blood at an alarming rate. We were running critically
short of IVs, and I realized that CPL Smith would die if he was
not evacuated immediately. I requested MEDEVAC on three
separate occasions, but each time I was denied—enemy fire
was just too great, and we had already lost three helicopters to
enemy fire. All we could do was post security and wait. We
were resupplied with ammunition and IVs at 1900 hrs.,
ensuring our ability to fight throughout the night.

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Despite all attempts to keep my Soldier alive, Corporal
Smith died at 2027 hrs. All of my other casualties were stable,
thanks to the work of our medics and combat lifesavers.
At 0155, the relief force linked up with us at CPT Steele‘s
position. Malaysian Armored Personnel Carriers stopped at our
location, and Soldiers from the QRF secured the perimeter.
SSG Elliott and I helped to load our casualties on an APC. I
then moved with the remaining two men of my chalk to link up
with Chalk 3 and the remainder of my platoon. What was left
of my platoon sat inside a building while the relief force
secured the area and attempted to pull Clifton Woolcott‘s body
out of the helicopter. It took some time, but the body was
pulled free of the wreckage at 0530.

From the Infantry School personal experience monograph of

CPT Larry D. Perino who was a platoon leader in Bravo
Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

DISCUSSION: This vignette highlights many lessons, not the

least of which is the value of Ranger training in first aid.
Moreover, it is a story of courage and adherence to the Ranger
Creed‘s call to never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the
hands of the enemy. However, it also highlights the challenges
of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for all forces, particularly
for Infantry and Special Operations forces in large cities.
Let us review the medical course of action. The medical
treatment plan was organic combat medics with no forward
physician/physician assistant. The medical evacuation plan was
to backhaul casualties on the ground assault convoy (GAC), as
the Rangers appreciated the risk to rotary wing aircraft in a
large, urban environment. The Rangers, who were concerned
about operational security on this mission, decided to accept
risk in both medical evacuation and treatment: there were no

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redundant means of forward treatment capabilities or
evacuation assets allocated to the mission. The Rangers‘
extensive training in first aid and combat lifesaving treatment
mitigated some of the risk in treatment, but there was no
mitigation in the CASEVAC piece. Ultimately, this left the
Rangers relying on the backhaul plan of evacuating casualties
on the ground assault convoy.
Only the courage and the competence of our Rangers kept
the numbers and severity of casualties down; their first aid
skills kept many wounded Soldiers alive.

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th

Ranger Regiment’s mission would involve the company air
assaulting into northern Iraq and raiding a suspected
terrorist camp. Second Platoon had been tasked to clear
OBJ Auburn and establish a blocking position to the north
of OBJ Auburn.

Off to the south of another of B Company‘s objectives, I

could see elements of 1st Platoon engaging enemy personnel
and the burning hulk of a pickup truck. It was also about this
time in the fight that I heard over the company assault net that
one of the team leaders in 1st Platoon had sustained an RPG
wound to the leg. We would later learn that SGT Walters, the
lead fire team leader for 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, had received an
RPG round to the left leg, which completely severed his leg
below the knee. He also lost a large piece of his right thigh and
sustained shrapnel throughout his body. The only place that he
did not receive any wounds was in his upper torso, which was
protected by his body armor. 1SG Rodgers quickly began to
work the CASEVAC to get SGT Walters out of there. Within
15 minutes of SGT Walters sustaining his injury, a MH-47 was
on the ground to evacuate SGT Walters back to the Forward

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Army Refueling Point where he would be flown via fixed wing
assets to Kuwait to be treated.

From the personal experience monograph of CPT Scott B.

Cheney who served as 2nd Platoon Leader, Bravo Company,
2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research
Library, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The evacuation off of Objective Alabama is a

good example of the use of nonstandard evacuation or
CASEVAC. The MH-47 in this case was much more
responsive than a standard platform could have been. The lack
of treatment capability was mitigated by the strength of
redundant evacuation means.
The other issue of importance referenced in this vignette is
the timeliness of evacuation. SGT Walters was evacuated
within 15 minutes of sustaining his injuries. Historically, 80%
of casualties who die of wounds will die within the first hour
after sustaining the injuries. This time is regarded as the
―golden hour‖ of care.
The lesson for Infantry leaders to take from this vignette is
to thoroughly plan, coordinate, and rehearse evacuation to
include nonstandard platforms. More often than not, these
nonstandard platforms can be more responsive than their
standard platform counterparts. Coordination, synchronization,
rehearsals, and good communication are imperative to the
success of CASEVAC operations.

CONCLUSION: Medical considerations must be planned and

trained for all operations, whether it be a field training exercise
or combat. When faced with another human being who has
been injured, the average Soldier will freeze. It is realistic
training that results in that Soldier taking swift action. To

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ensure that medical aid is close at hand, the Army has
increased the number and required skills of combat lifesavers,
greatly enhanced the individual Soldier first aid kit, ensured
that training in self and buddy aid has been emphasized, and
emphasized to Army leaders that planning for casualty
evacuation occurs.

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 CHAPTER 14: Civilian Considerations
…contrary to trivial opinion, all professional military
men do not walk blind and brutal. I have known some
who demonstrated as much pity as they did courage,
and they showed a lot of that.
General Curtis LeMay
Mission with LeMay, 1965

INTRODUCTION: The acronym METT-TC refers to factors

that are fundamental to assessing and visualizing; collectively,
they are the elements of the commander‘s mission analysis.
The first five— mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops
and support available, and time available—are not new.
However, the nature of full-spectrum operations requires
commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on
operations. Due to the complexity and explosive growth of
world population, civilian considerations has been added.
Civilian populations, cultures, organizations, and leaders
within the area of operations must be considered in friendly
planning and operations. How the enemy may exploit civilians
must also be considered. Civilian considerations at the tactical
level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on
the current operation and how they may limit or aid friendly
action; however, commanders must also consider the larger,
long-term diplomatic, economic, domestic, and international
informational impact as well.

In May of 2001, 2-502nd Infantry Regiment of the 101st

Airborne (Air Assault) deployed from Fort Campbell to
Kosovo for six months of peace-keeping operations in the
Vitina Opstina.

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The Vitina Opstina, an opstina being roughly equivalent to
a county, is 90% Albanian, and the few Serbians are
concentrated in exclusively Serbian towns, such as Klokot.
Klokot is known as the ―hotspot‖ in the opstina because of the
tension between its Serbian residents and the Albanians who
live in all of the surrounding communities. Because Serbs are
the minority in the area, they are regular victims of minor
assaults and, less frequently, of assassinations and house
bombings, and they are not able to move around the opstina
safely which largely prevents them from working or marketing
products.
The 2-502nd Infantry Headquarters, with one of the rifle
companies, was stationed in Vitina proper. The other
subordinate companies were stationed in outlying towns. Delta
Company—to which my Mortar Platoon was attached—was
stationed at a small, fortified base camp in the town of Klokot,
about three kilometers north of Vitina. Delta Company was
assigned to Klokot because it had adequate organic vehicular
support for the increased threat; we could respond quickly with
enough firepower and mass of troops to deal with almost any
foreseeable situation.
There were three operations that the Mortar Platoon
conducted during those six months: indirect fire missions, daily
Stability Operations, and numerous Cordon & Searches. Aside
from supervising my platoon in all of these activities, I also
was also assigned as the ―mayor‖ for Klokot. Most company
commanders assigned each of their lieutenants to one town to
act as the ―mayor,‖ which meant we were responsible for
establishing a relationship with the community leadership,
being the Kosovo Force (KFOR) point of contact for them,
disseminating KFOR information, and knowing what the local
issues were so as to preempt any problems that might arise.

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On 21 July 2001, the Serbs of Klokot had a planned
religious celebration for St. Peter. This is a yearly event and
their most robustly celebrated day. The year prior, the
peacekeeping unit in the area had granted the Klokot Serbs'
request for a one-night reprieve from the KFOR-enforced
curfew. This had created an expectation in the population that
they would be granted the same exception this year. However,
our Battalion decided to keep the curfew enforcement which
caused significant tension in the community. Part of the reason
for keeping the curfew in place was that this holiday presented
an increased security risk: Albanians had shot and killed a
prominent local Serbian religious figure as he was leaving
Klokot after the last year‘s celebration.
Delta Company‘s plan for securing the area during the
celebration included increased patrolling and joint patrols with
UNMIK-P (United Nations Mission in Kosovo- Police)
officers, the interim civilian police to whom we would turn
over any minor violators of laws.
Early in the day, with all of KFOR‘s patrols and sites in
place, the Serbs began their drinking and dancing. I took a
man-pack radio in a small rucksack and linked up with an
UNMIK-P policeman. I rode in his vehicle, and we made
periodic checks at the various static positions in and around
town. We also patrolled the outer edges of Klokot, looking for
potential sniper positions and likely avenues of approach for
any potential threats, namely Albanians who might want to
commit a terrorist-type strike on the celebration.
The celebration went on into the night with no serious
incidents. As the curfew time of 2200 hrs. drew near, Delta
Company began massing troops and vehicles near the town
center because it was apparent that much of the crowd had no
intention of dispersing. The UNMIK-P had left the area, and
we were now reinforced with the U.S. Military Police platoon

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that was supporting our battalion. I was on the ground with a
dismounted patrol. The Delta Company Commander was also
present, and he began negotiating with Trejan, the Serb mayor.
Trejan had been drinking all day along with most of the Serbs
present.
Approximately 30 minutes prior to the curfew, at the
request of the Company Commander, the Battalion
Commander granted a three-hour extension to the curfew. We
encouraged the remaining celebrants to move to a local bar,
which they did. As the new 0100 hrs. deadline approached, we
further conceded our position to the crowd by agreeing that the
people could stay in the bar beyond the deadline as long as they
did not come outside. This was a problematic position to take
because there were too many people to fit comfortably in the
bar. As I saw it, our other choices were either to back down
completely and lose our position as ―enforcers‖ in their minds
or to enter the bar and forcibly remove them. Our best option at
that point, I thought, was to do what the Company Commander
had agreed to: let them continue their party but keep them in
the bar.
Trejan, the Serb mayor, who was now quite drunk, was in a
difficult position. He was generally cooperative with KFOR
because he saw that that was the best way to help his town. He
was also being pressured by the people around him, at this bar,
to stand up to KFOR and demand that we leave them alone.
This conflict in his priorities resulted in his negotiations with
the Company Commander turning into a shouting match. The
Commander eventually told Trejan, ―if you continue to yell at
me I will detain you.‖ Ignoring this, Trejan yelled, and the
Commander signaled to a sergeant to detain him. During the
arrest, a pistol was found in his belt line which was a serious
violation of KFOR enforced rules. Trejan was taken to Vitina
for detainment.

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The following morning, a patrol reported that there was a
major incident occurring on the Main Supply Route (MSR) to
Vitina. A crowd had gathered and was blocking the road. We
all knew that the arrest of the local Serb mayor was going to
create a volatile situation. Upon getting the report that there
was a civil disobedience incident occurring, Delta Company
reacted in accordance with all of its training. The Anti-Tank
section that was designated as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
was out of the gates within moments, mounted in its vehicles
and armed with its riot control gear. It set up a position at a
safe distance from the crowd and waited while the remainder of
the company prepared and deployed to reinforce it. Battalion
had been notified, and the Battalion QRF was prepared to
reinforce us if necessary.
In accordance with our training, we quickly established a
formation within shouting distance of the crowd, dressed in our
combat gear with batons and riot shields. The desired intent
was to intimidate the crowd into dispersing. If that failed, we
were prepared to physically force the crowd off of the MSR,
detain the instigators, and use whatever minimal force was
necessary to restore order. It would have been entirely justified
by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and our training to march
into the crowd and use physical force to disperse them.
Because of our training, we were seeing a ―crowd
obstructing an MSR.‖ An equally valid, but very different,
perception of them was that they were a destitute, frustrated
minority, surrounded by hostile Albanians, who had just had its
spokesperson arrested by the only group that kept it somewhat
safe from its neighbors. The Serbs had no valid interest in
blocking the road between Klokot and Vitina, and their ―riot‖
was just a transparent plea for attention. Had we seen them in
this light, we could have approached them without our
intimidating riot gear and talked to them. We were reacting in

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accordance with our training but doing so could have caused
serious injuries to the civilians and, undoubtedly, would have
significantly degraded KFOR‘s relationship with Serbs
throughout the entire area of operations.
Fortunately, there were Special Operations Force (SOF)
Soldiers working in the same area as our Battalion, and they
heard reports of this incident. They were under different ROE,
which I believe were more appropriate for the current threat
level, and were able to walk directly up to the crowd without
riot gear, body armor, or even visible weapons. They arrived
and moved directly into the crowd to talk to them, literally only
a couple of minutes before the Delta Company Commander
would have given us the order to begin our movement forward.
After about ten minutes of non-threatening dialogue, the
SOF Soldiers got the crowd to disperse in exchange for an
assurance that there would be a town meeting between KFOR
and some of the local Serb leaders.
The Battalion Commander arrived for the town meeting
and asked them why they would engage in disruptive,
dangerous activities, such as blocking a road that KFOR
demanded to be kept open. Their response was simply ―if we
didn‘t, you wouldn‘t be talking to us right now.‖ They were
extremely upset that their mayor had been detained and
threatened that Serbs throughout the area would be completely
uncooperative with KFOR until he was returned. The Battalion
Commander assured them that Trejan would be treated fairly,
but also that KFOR peace-keeping rules were not going to be
ignored and that weapons violations were serious.
There were no major incidents following that. Trejan was
released pending a trial. The relationship between KFOR and
the Klokot Serbs was somewhat more frigid for a while but
eventually returned to the cordial status quo.

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From the personal experience monograph by CPT Anthony
George who served as the Mortar Platoon Leader in Delta
Company, 2-502nd,101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research
Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: This is an interesting case study in not only

civilian considerations, but also in the conflict that can arise
concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); rules of
engagement; and a good analysis of the situation. We have two
events here to examine: the incident in the bar that resulted in
the arrest of the town‘s mayor and the events on the MSR.
The commander showed his flexibility in dealing with the
civilians who wanted to continue their celebration, despite the
bloodshed the previous year on this holiday. When the mayor
became belligerent and was found to be in possession of a
firearm, the commander acted appropriately in arresting the
mayor. This action, while angering the townspeople, reinforced
the fact that U.S. forces were in the area to protect the peace
and could not be bullied into backing down.
The next day, the commander faced a crowd on the MSR—
a tactical mission for which he and his unit had trained. The
commander, knowing the TTPs for dealing with an angry
crowd blocking the MSR, decided, in accordance with the ROE
to employ a show of force—albeit minimal—to clear the
life-line of his unit. As the vignette‘s writer points out,
although the commander believed the show of force would
accomplish the mission, this show of force may well have
caused the situation to escalate.
The commander clearly failed to analyze the situation
beyond task and purpose. Had he analyzed the enemy, he
would have realized that the angry mob was not the enemy—it
never had been. In fact, it was his primary task to protect the
town of Klokot from the hostile elements surrounding it.

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Although the commander might have analyzed terrain, troops
available, and time, which becomes second nature to Infantry
leaders, he clearly did not analyze the civilian component. In
mistaking the Serbs in Klokot for the enemy, he skipped the
analysis of the effect that military action would have on the
civilians.
Thankfully, the SOF Soldiers who happened upon the
situation were able to defuse the situation, and the
repercussions of the commander‘s faulty analysis were never
realized. However, this vignette is worthy of study to ensure
that each element of the METT-TC is considered in the future.

On 4 April 2003, after six days of intense combat for

control of As Samawah, the 1-325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne
Division, had yet to begin transition from combat
operations to stability operations. This transition would not
occur until 8 April.

Throughout the day of the 4th of April, we continued guard

duty on the road which was adjacent to the battalion TOC and
from where we had received multiple RPG attacks, and in the
early evening, we received our next mission. During the early
morning hours of the 5th, Alpha Company was to conduct an
attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) Headquarters in
As Samawah. I had my doubts about moving through the same
road we were ambushed on the night prior, called RPG Alley,
but it was the only way through. We sped as fast as we could
and provided overwatch on the IIS building, while Alpha
Company cleared it. The remainder of the day, we secured the
outside of the building and controlled the traffic circle, a
chokepoint to get into the compound.
Iraqis began to come out and slowly circulate through the
city. They were not forward with us but looked at us from a

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distance with suspicion. The one exception was when a father
brought his injured son to us on the street. He had been shot in
the head by a 9mm bullet –a ricochet from a neighborhood
robbery attempt. The son was lying down in the back of their
pickup truck, unconscious, and breathing only with extreme
difficulty. His uncle was in the back with him, swatting the
flies away from his head. His father pleaded with me to take
his son to an American hospital since the Iraqi facilities were
not up and running. The structures themselves were intact, but
the doctors were not brave enough to come to work.
There were rules about treating the local civilians. The Red
Crescent Society was supposed to handle them since our
limited treatment facilities were reserved for American
Soldiers. I radioed to my CO and asked if we could make an
exception. One of the medics came out and said that, at this
point, there was nothing he could do because the boy‘s
condition was too far gone. The CO, after having worked
things out with the TOC, came back on the radio and said that
we could take him to the aid station; however, by this time, the
boy died. Because the boy‘s father did not yet know of his
son‘s death, SSG Cottrell and I took the boy to the aid station
anyway, so that the father would think he had done everything
he could for his son. The PA, understanding this, cooperated
and attempted to treat the boy, although knowing it was futile,
before officially declaring that the boy had died. The father
was sad about the death, of course, but believed that he had
taken all measures he could to try to help his son.
By the 6th, the fight for As Samawah was practically over.
The brigade was in firm control of the bridges and key
infrastructure in the city. By the 8th, we found ourselves fully
transitioned from high intensity conflict to stability operations.

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From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jeff Wilbur
who served as a platoon leader in Delta Company, 1-325th IN,
82nd Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: Commanders must consider the impact of

civilians on operations; our doctrine directs it, and common
sense demands it. In this vignette, we see Soldiers who have
been participating in intense urban combat operations allowing
their sense of compassion and their respect for the love
between father and son to influence their actions. Although
some readers would object to the ruse, resulting in the father
believing that the boy was still alive and that medical personnel
were rendering life-saving aid, in this case, comforting the
father outweighed an explanation of the cold, hard facts.
The immediate benefit of their actions in regard to the
treatment of the boy was that the father believed he had done
the correct thing in seeking the assistance of American troops
and that those troops had tried to help him, thus earning his
trust. The long-range benefits of their actions, although
difficult to quantify, are critical, particularly in the environment
faced by our Soldiers in Iraq. The father would not keep the
compassion shown to him a secret—this story would be told to
family, friends, and neighbors—who, in turn, would conclude
this American unit was worthy of their trust, despite rumors
and propaganda that would suggest otherwise. This trust would
then have a positive effect on combat and—later—stability
operations. ―A supportive populace can provide resources that
facilitate friendly operations…A hostile populace threatens the
immediate operations of deployed friendly forces…‖
(FM 3-07).

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On the 25 of April, 2003, 1st PLT, D Co, 1-327th IN,
th

101st Airborne Division, transitioned from brigade tactical

command post security to stability operations in the region
of Qayarrah, Iraq. Its operations focused on conducting
traffic control points (TCPs).

On the 27th of April, 2003, my platoon, along with a

reconnaissance squad, executed a TCP operation. The first two
traffic control points were at night and were successful.
At sunrise on the 28th, we moved to another location and
set up another TCP. While conducting this TCP, my platoon
searched approximately 35 vehicles in two hours time. While
conducting the TCPs, one of my section leaders noticed that a
Toyota Landcruiser did not look right. After inspecting it, I
found that it was hotwired; it had been stolen from the United
Nations. The UN Vehicle Identification Numbers were listed
on numerous plates under the hood. We confiscated this
vehicle and returned it to United Nations personnel in Irbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq.
After this excitement, we moved to the next location, about
20 kilometers to the south. Within a half hour of setting up the
TCP, there were cars lined up for a mile on each side.
Therefore, I ordered my men to search only loaded trucks,
vans, buses, or any vehicle that seemed suspicious. We spent a
long four hours at this site with a lot of progress. We
confiscated five AK-47s and 200 rounds of 7.62mm
ammunition loaded in magazines. When I called in a status
report to my company commander, he ordered me to continue
our operations at that location.
I ordered my men to employ concertina wire with chemical
lights attached to the front of each HMMWV. In addition, I
emplaced security and search teams out about 30 feet in front
of the concertina wire. With the sun about to set, I repositioned

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one vehicle to guard an adjacent road near our TCP. After
some time, local traffic started to bypass our TCP, making it
easy to move large amounts of weapons or anything else that
was illegal.
My platoon began breaking down the TCP an hour later as
darkness arrived, per my company commander‘s guidance.
When I finished talking with my company commander, I told
my Soldiers that it was time to start their vehicles, turn on their
headlights, and prepare for movement back to our FOB
(Forward Operating Base). Then one of my men heard
something moving faintly in the distance. Even with Night
Vision Goggles on, we could still barely see anything due to
the limited illumination from the moon. A car, with very, very
dim headlights, was moving in our direction at a high rate of
speed. One of my gunners yelled out to me that it was about 50
meters out. I could see the car‘s outline and signaled the driver
with a Surefire flashlight trying to get him to slow down. The
car responded, flashing its lights two times in response to my
signal. Noticing that the vehicle still had not slowed its speed, I
turned around and ran to the opposite side of my HMMWV.
When this happened, one of my gunners initiated fire with his
M249 SAW as the vehicle ran through our concertina wire.
Luckily, I had moved to the other side of my HMMWV
because that car had crashed through the concertina wire right
where I had been standing. As the vehicle entered into the
secured area of the TCP, my gunner ceased fire until the
vehicle hit an open area again. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle
came to a halt at the side of the road.
Two of my Soldiers, who were conducting forward
security, began firing at the vehicle. However, I was in
between them and the car. I went to a prone position and
shouted for a cease fire three times, along with the hand and
arm signals. Once the two Soldiers stopped firing, I called them

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in to get security on the site and immediately informed my
company commander of the situation. With all of this
happening, the vehicle I had sent to secure the bypass called up
on the radio inquiring what happened. I told that section to
return to the TCP. Meanwhile, two Soldiers from the
reconnaissance squad approached and began to help in sorting
out the situation. There was a family of five riding in the car
that had sped through our checkpoint. The father, who was
driving, and his son were both wounded. The father was the
most seriously hurt. He received two bullet wounds to the
shoulder and was bleeding profusely; additionally, he was in a
state of shock. A ricocheted bullet had grazed his son.
The whole situation turned into pure chaos because the
father would not calm down, and his family was trying to form
a perimeter around him, attempting to provide protection. A
member of the reconnaissance squad, SGT Vietch, who had
experience as a combat medic, pushed forward with a gurney
while, at the same time, two of my men pulled the family back
from the wounded man. Finally, the father calmed down and
sat still on the gurney while SGT Vietch tended to the man‘s
wounds. My company commander began calling for medical
support which arrived half an hour later.
A medic from an adjacent company showed up and made
an assessment of the father and son‘s wounds. The rest of the
family, during this tough time, was calling us thieves and
murderers. One of my men and a member of the
reconnaissance squad brought out candy for the children and
began talking respectfully with the mother, son, and daughter.
The son was medically released on site, but the father was
taken to TF 1-327th IN Intermediate Surgical Site for treatment.
Within an hour, neighbors of the family showed up, and my
men aided them in recovering the car. While aiding in the
recovery of the vehicle, I talked about the incident with a

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neighbor of the family. The man told me several vital facts that
helped me understand the situation. First, the father was nearly
blind in both eyes; thus, driving fast at night provided him little
reaction time. Secondly, his headlights were too dim for either
him or my platoon to see clearly. In addition, the neighbor
stated that most of the local populace would not stop for any
kind of traffic control point at night. In this culture, thieves
used this same technique to stop traffic in an attempt to steal
cars. None of this information made me feel any better about
the situation. There was a man and his son who we wounded,
and they will probably always remember this experience as the
night the Americans intentionally tried to kill them.
The next day, the local civilian hospital released the father,
and he was brought to the medical facility at our FOB to get a
checkup before returning home. Although this encounter was
unavoidable, it could have been mitigated by the presence of a
generator lamp set or a higher powered spotlight. I know if the
man could have identified my platoon as American Soldiers, he
would have slowed down and stopped.

From the personal experience of 1LT Daniel J. Rogne who

served as an Anti-Armor Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, Delta
Company, TF 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division, Donovan Technical Library.

DISCUSSION: With our forces currently operating in both

Afghanistan and Iraq and dealing with a complex insurgent
campaign, conducting traffic control points (TCPs) and
checkpoints are vital in controlling the flow of illicit arms. The
difficulty in executing these tasks, which are difficult in and of
themselves, is compounded by the plethora of civilians
operating in the area.

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In this vignette, the leadership responded to an obvious
breach of the TCP in accordance with its published ROE.
Unfortunately, the vehicle that attempted to crash through the
TCP was filled with civilians; subsequently, a child and his
father were injured by direct fire from American Soldiers.
However, the issue here does not revolve around the ROE, it
centers on the leadership‘s positive reaction to the unfortunate
incident and how the leadership focused its efforts to diffuse
the understandably tense atmosphere. The Soldiers
immediately began to apply first aid and eventually saved the
father‘s life. Additionally, the American Soldiers recovered the
vehicle and placated the family by, in part, offering candy to
the kids and comforting the other passengers.
It is important to note that the leader immediately began a
self-assessment to understand what could be improved in the
future to prevent such accidents from happening again. By
talking to the victims‘ neighbor, the platoon leader came to
understand why the vehicle would not stop at the checkpoint.
Based on that conversation, the platoon leader came away with
a better understanding of civilian interaction at checkpoints and
on the battlefield.

On the 23rd of May, 2003, the 1st Platoon, Delta

Company, 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division, was responsible for patrolling villages near
Makmuhr, Iraq.

While we patrolled the area, we surveyed the village sheiks

to find out their living conditions with regard to water,
electricity, and their schools and to inquire about criminal
activities in the area. The surveys highlighted a common
problem: the newly-trained policemen would patrol the
economic centers of their region but not the outlying villages.

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This caused the crime rate to rise in the countryside farm
communities. Because of the increasing crime rate, the local
populace had little respect for the police departments and their
legitimacy. This was not a new problem; most police
departments under Saddam Hussein‘s regime performed
minimal duties. They were primarily used to report troubled
areas to local Iraqi Army units, and then the Army would
suppress any criminal activity with overwhelming combat
power. This destroyed the common trust in the abilities of the
police departments.
MAJ Blain A. Reeves, S-3 for TF 1-327th IN, coordinated
with each of the newly formed police departments to conduct
joint patrols with platoons of our Delta Company. My platoon
was responsible for patrolling with the Karach and Makmuhr
Police departments. The Karach Police Department was
responsible for 27 villages within its region, but many of these
villages had a population ranging from 25 to 40 people. The
Makmuhr Police Department was responsible for Makmuhr
and the four small towns clustered on its border.
Daily, we would link up with a squad of policemen (nine
men) and escort it to each town in its area. After several of
weeks of joint operations, the Karach Police Department would
lead the patrols, with my platoon in trail. Both the Chief of
Police and his assistant would lead these patrols. The chief was
Arabic, and his assistant was Kurdish. Between the two of
them, they commanded the respect of both Arabic and Kurdish
families.
It was obvious that the local nationals respected the U.S.
Army and its Soldiers, as evidenced by the number of people
who brought their troubles to us instead of their local
government agencies. They knew that we would help solve
their problems but, given their lack of trust in their local police,
did not trust the local police to do the same. By conducting

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joint patrols with the local police departments, we established
their legitimacy. Eventually, the local populace approached
their policemen rather than us when they had a problem. This
aided the locals in a more efficient manner as the policemen
knew the individuals who lived in their area of responsibility.
Also, as the number of their rural patrols increased, the police
departments were able to answer a call faster than U.S. forces
in the region could.
The beginning of June marked a reduction in crime, but it
did not disappear. By this time, however, the local populace
had a trustworthy, trained police force on which they could
depend. This was one facet in creating an environment that
moved Iraq one step closer to a self-governing body. As the
Iraqi people began taking care of their own problems, their
level of independence increased.

From the personal experience of 1LT Daniel J. Rogne, who

served as the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, Delta Company,
TF 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division,
Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort
Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The vignette by 1LT Rogne demonstrates the

importance of understanding the local culture. The U.S. force
conducted joint patrols that were made up of several different
ethnicities to mirror the villages that were being policed. The
platoon leader also conducted his initial surveys to the cultural
leaders in the village to discover the Iraqis‘ needs in terms of
electricity, water, and medical care. This set a positive climate
for future interaction.
This vignette illustrates how the lieutenant initially
established his platoon‘s legitimacy, used that legitimacy to
shore up joint patrolling, and then eventually stepped back into

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a supporting role. This evolution cannot be on a time-table; it
will vary from area of operations (AO) to AO; the variables in
each AO will impact on when the transitions can occur.

In March, 2004, Task Force Courage (2nd Battalion,

22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division and an
attached company from 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry
Regiment, 10th Mountain Division,) conducted Operation
Mountain Snow—its largest operation of Operation
Enduring Freedom IV deployment. Its purpose was to
destroy or detain anti-coalition forces in the Char China
Valley, north of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

We conducted Operation Mountain Storm in the Char

China Valley, lying due north of the Deh Rawod Firebase. The
companies had multiple cordon and search missions in small
villages north of the firebase, while A-Troop, 3-17 Cavalry,
conducted an isolation operation south of Deh Rawod.
Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, faced fierce resistance
at the town of Mimdo on the 18th of March, resulting in two
American KIA and two WIA and the end of enemy resistance
from inside a large compound. The other companies of the
Task Force faced similar challenges in rugged terrain against
sometimes hostile local populations.
Approximately six days after this action, after
accomplishing its purpose, the Task Force began exfiltration
from the Char China Valley. An important component of the
exfiltration process was the distribution of Civil Affairs‘
supplies and equipment. The distribution of these materials
ensured that the local population believed in the sincere
commitment U.S. and Coalition forces were making with the
Afghan people. Company commanders fulfilled their promise

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to local leaders, which we hoped would have positive long
range impacts in this area for generations to come.
Planning for this Civil Affairs operation began several
weeks earlier through the coordination of local officials and the
Task Force Civil Affairs Section. LTC Joseph Dichairo, the
Task Force Commander, had directed his staff to requisition
two Massey-Ferguson farm tractors for the farmers in our area
of operations. The Civil Affairs Section worked with Afghan
General Gallali, who was in charge of the Kandahar area. A
contract was drafted between the Task Force S5 and the
Kandahar Finance Office to purchase the two tractors on the
local economy. Upon receipt and approval of the contract,
General Gallali directed the acquisition of the two tractors and
two sets of farming implements that could be connected to the
rear portion of the tractors. Additionally, the local population
would receive school supplies, wheelbarrows, hand tools,
medical supplies, small generators, and bundles of blankets.
While my logistical section and the Civil Affairs Section
worked on the acquisition of the aforementioned supplies and
equipment, I worked with the Task Force S3 Air Officer to
develop a distribution plan. The plan was based on the
recommendations of each company commander and the Task
Force S3, with the Task Force Commander making the final
decision. Each village was evaluated based on local
requirements, local cooperation with U.S. forces during the
operation, and need.
The final distribution plan was solidified on March 22, two
days prior to the planned exfiltration of the Task Force. The air
movement plan required multiple trips by CH-47 aircraft to
complete the exfiltration. Each lift would deliver supplies and
equipment to the selected village and return the companies to
Kandahar Airfield. Detailed supply and equipment
configurations and weight information were incorporated into

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Infantry in Battle
the air movement plan to ensure aviation weight and space
restrictions. The two Massey-Ferguson tractors were the crucial
planning consideration.
The vehicles arrived at Kandahar Airfield on March 23, one
day prior to execution. I directed my logistical team to weigh,
measure, and configure the tractor implements for air-loading.
The tractor‘s exhaust system‘s length did not permit the
loading of the two tractors on CH-47 Aircraft; therefore, the
system was removed and secured to the tractor‘s frame. The
next issue we had to contend with was operators for the
vehicles, as no one had operator experience on the vehicles. A
quick class by the Civil Affairs Officer (a reservist officer with
farming experience) rectified the situation. The supplies and
equipment were also configured for delivery the next day. On
the morning of 24 March, the supplies and equipment were
delivered as planned, and exfiltration was completed late in the
afternoon.

From the personal experience of 1LT Craig Johnson, who

served as the BN S-4 of 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment,
10th Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The civil affairs (CA) team supporting the

maneuver battalion obtains relevant information about specific
areas within the unit‘s area of operations (AO), area of interest
(AI), and area of influence from host nation governmental
organizations and the civilian population. Fundamental to the
CA team‘s success in the AO is integration with the staff. Civil
affairs teams must plan, synchronize, and rehearse operations
with maneuver commanders to ensure that the local civilian
communities and their leaders understand what projects and
priorities military leaders have inside their areas of

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responsibilities. Ultimately, this mutual understanding
contributes to setting a positive condition for cooperation with
the civilian population.
1LT Johnson‘s unit, TF 2-22 Infantry Regiment, was
successful in executing civil military operations (CMO) due, in
part, to the close relationship built with the civil affairs team
operating with his unit and local civic leaders. As the battalion
S4, he and the CA team sought out opportunities and planned
for the sequel that followed combat operations in the Char
China Valley.
Considering long-range CMO activities and controlling the
ability to understand the requirements of the local population
contributed extensively to securing the respect of local citizens.
Providing vital heavy farm equipment and supplies added to
the legitimacy of the operation and demonstrated to the Afghan
people that the United States and Coalition forces were
operating in the best interest of the people. Prior to making
agreements with indigenous citizens and leaders, an operator
must be one hundred percent sure that the organization is in a
position to follow through on its commitments. TF 2-22
Infantry set the example by ensuring the staff synchronized the
CMO operation and then ensured that the promised equipment
and supplies were delivered.

CONCLUSION: The media guarantees that a global audience

views U.S. operations in near real-time. Many times, the focus
of this media attention is on the civilians in the area and how
military operations effect the population. The activities of the
force—including individual Soldiers—can have far reaching
effects on domestic and international opinion. As we have seen
in the vignettes in this chapter, Soldiers must ―treat others how
they wish to be treated.‖ This will not only ensure that the
civilian population will assist rather than inhibit operations, but

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it will also help to ensure that the global audience understands
that our Soldiers strive to do the right thing. In this case, doing
the right thing will always involve helping the civilian
population they are striving to protect.

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 CHAPTER 15: U.S. Army Values
At a difficult time, a prince of my royal family sent me
a small portrait of Frederick the Great on which he had
inscribed these words that the great King addressed to
his friend, the Marquis d‘Argens, when his own defeat
seemed imminent. ―Nothing can alter my inner soul: I
shall pursue my own straight course and shall do what I
believe to be right and honourable.‖ The little picture I
have lost, but the King‘s words remain engraved on my
memory and are for me a model.
Colonel General Heinz Guderian
Panzer Leader, 1953

INTRODUCTION: The majority of this book focuses on

everything outside of the Soldier—his tactics, his equipment,
his leadership. This chapter focuses on the character of the
Soldier, and with good reason: it is the values of the Soldier,
captured in the Army Values, that lead to our success as an
Army. This chapter was the most rewarding to write, as it is
filled with descriptions of Soldiers doing great things under the
most difficult of situations.

INTEGRITY
A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war.
Character is a habit. The daily choice of right and
wrong. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in
peace and is not suddenly developed in war.
General Sir James Glover
―A Soldier and His Conscience‖
Parameters, September, 1973

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In late November of 2003, the 1st Battalion (Airborne),
508th Infantry, was tasked to conduct a cordon and search
of the town of Pir Ahmed, located approximately 60 miles
south of the city of Kirkuk, to locate and detain suspected
anti-coalition personnel and seize illegal weapons and
equipment found in the process.

Upon reaching Pir Ahmed, CPT Kilbride confirmed that

Alpha Company was in position to block any personnel fleeing
from the town towards the south. Upon confirmation, 2nd
Platoon immediately established a cordon on the southwest
outer edge of the town, while 1st Platoon simultaneously
established its cordon on the northwest portion of the town.
1LT Jeter, accompanied by CPT Kilbride, led 3rd Platoon to the
middle of the town, where each squad began a systematic
search of its assigned areas.
The Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) at 1st
Platoon‘s traffic control point (TCP) was SSG Dus. One issue
that became a concern was the handling of personnel who were
detained as they tried to come into the town. The guidance to
the Soldiers was that all personnel attempting to come into
town were to have their identification checked and to be
searched if necessary. Furthermore, personnel on the
Battalion‘s black and grey lists were to be detained.
Detainment of personnel on the two lists was easy since
Soldiers knew exactly where to take them: to the detention
facility, which was located near Pir Ahmed.
The problem arose when more and more personnel who
were not on these lists attempted to come into town. While
some of these personnel were men, most were women and
children. The only guidance given regarding handling of these
personnel was to keep them at the TCPs until told differently.
By noon, SSG Dus, the NCOIC at 1st Platoon‘s TCP, was faced

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with over 50 personnel held at his TCP. Most of these people
had been there since 0800 hrs., and despite repeated requests
from me and SSG Dus, we were told to continue to keep them
at the TCP. Some of the older women and men were obviously
frustrated and refused our offers to give them food and water
while they waited, or blankets to sit on, since the ground was
damp. Equally as frustrating to some Soldiers was that many
children on their way to school had been kept at the TCP for
several hours.
Finally, at approximately 1300 hrs., the Battalion S3 gave
instructions to allow searched personnel, who posed no threat,
to enter the town. This situation brought to light the importance
of a plan for dealing with all personnel other than anti-coalition
and non-compliant forces. The sentiment among some Soldiers
at the TCPs was that Battalion needed a more detailed plan
concerning the handling of locals at TCPs on the cordon.
With the exception of the larger-than-expected number of
civilian personnel at the TCPs until 1300 hrs., the search of the
town went smoothly. However, later in the day, at
approximately 1400 hrs., another situation arose at the
detention facility, which was run by the Battalion Mortar
Platoon. Earlier in the morning, a search of a suspected
insurgent yielded a large sum (approximately $1,200.00 in U.S.
currency) of money. The man was detained, and the 1st Platoon
Soldiers who detained him transferred his belongings,
including the U.S. currency. Several hours later, prior to the
Battalion‘s departure from Pir Ahmed, the man was released,
but when given his belongings, all the U.S. currency was
missing. Nobody knew what happened to the man‘s money,
and the money was never found.
Following the discovery that the money was missing, the
Mortar Platoon took accountability of all remaining detainees‘
personal effects and accounted for every other possession kept

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from detained personnel. This incident was the only one of its
kind in the Battalion in which detainees‘ personal property
came up missing while in the possession of the detention
facility‘s Soldiers. This incident emphasized the importance of
a meticulous, accurate chain of custody.
By 1800 hrs., Charlie Company‘s 3rd Platoon was nearing
completion of its searches in Pir Ahmed. 1LT Chris Guderski,
Alpha Company XO, recalls that Alpha Company, located to
the south, was now finished and focused on maintaining its
position to block any personnel moving to or from Pir Ahmed.
Upon Charlie Company‘s completion of its searches, at
approximately 1815 hrs., the Battalion detained over 24
suspected anti-coalition and non-compliant personnel,
including one suspected Iraqi insurgent wounded, and seized
several AK-47 rifles with hundreds of rounds of ammunition.
After returning to the FOB, CPT Kilbride had an After
Action Review (AAR) with his platoon leaders, the FSO, the
First Sergeant, and me. During this meeting, we identified key
issues, particularly establishing SOPs for handling non-
combatants at TCPs, chain of custody for evidence handling,
and establishing the requirement to bring all radios on missions
so that all vehicles in the convoy have communications
established with each other. This became important because
some detainees had vehicles which we had to drive to the
Bayonet Base detention facility impound lot. We did not have
enough radios for the Soldiers driving these vehicles (other
than unsecured short range radios) and had to pay close
attention to their locations and disposition within the
company‘s convoy on the way to Bayonet Base.

From the personal experiences of CPT Robert Przybylski, who

served as Executive Officer, for 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th

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rd
Infantry, 173 Airborne Brigade, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Integrity means doing the right thing, legally

and morally. People of integrity do the right thing, not because
it‘s convenient or because they have no choice; they choose to
do the right thing because their character permits no less. The
operations highlighted in this book and the contemporary
operational environment reflect a wealth of cross-cultural
interactions; but regardless of the peoples involved, the concept
of integrity is both recognized and valued around the globe.
Our actions as Soldiers and as an Army must always reflect our
underlying sense of integrity to justify trust and cooperation for
our efforts worldwide.
In this vignette, we see two examples of integrity, one a
positive example and one a negative one. Detaining obviously
innocent civilians, including women and children, for an
extended period of time violated what SGT Dus, CPT
Przybylski, and the other Soldiers at the TCP knew to be the
right thing. Although the civilians were offered food, drink,
and blankets, their pride would not let them accept that, and the
Soldiers understood this. Therefore, CPT Przybylski and SGT
Dus repeatedly requested the release of the civilians detained at
the TCP, even at the risk of annoying higher—the epitome of
doing what is right.
The second example provides the reader with a violation of
integrity, and that is the case of the missing money. The
Soldiers conducting the searches did the right thing by turning
over the money to the Mortar Platoon manning the detention
facility; however, apparently one of the Soldiers there took the
money. We can only imagine the damaging effect this single
act might have had on efforts to earn Iraqi trust and confidence
in our efforts to stabilize and rebuild their country. Our goal

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was to end the legacy of corruption that characterized the
former regime and its military—unfortunately the message this
Iraqi man received in this case is that the legacy continues
despite our claims of freedom and democracy. Soldiers,
particularly in the current operating environment, must ensure
they are doing the right thing, as the civilians in the area will
either judge Soldiers‘ actions or emulate them. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, where the people are establishing their own
governments, the new government officials must see what
―right‖ looks like, and those examples must come from
Soldiers with integrity.

RESPECT
Friends, I promise you this conquest, but there is one
condition you must swear to fulfill—to respect the
people whom you liberate…otherwise, you will not be
the liberators of the people, you will be their scourge.
Napoleon
27 March 1796
Warriors‘ Words, 1992

On April 3, 2003, the Soldiers of the 2-327 Infantry

moved into AN NAJAF, which is the home of one of Iraq’s
leading holy men, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein Sistani,
to gain crucial support for their stay in the town. As they
turned a corner, a group of men blocked their way,
shouting in Arabic, “God is great.” The crowd quickly
grew, many of whom mistakenly thought the Americans
were trying to capture the town’s holy man and attack the
Imam Ali Mosque, a holy site for Shiite Muslims around
the world. Someone in the crowd lobbed a rock at the
troops, then another. LTC Hughes was hit on the head,
chest, and the corner of his sunglasses with rocks.

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Appraising the situation and thinking as he was leading his
troops: ―Why does a guerrilla want to fight? Give him what he
needs, and he will not fight.‖ LTC Hughes lived by the
philosophy of Sun Tzu: ―A great commander is one who does
not shoot a weapon.‖
Contemplating these thoughts, he yelled to his troops,
―Take a knee, point your weapons to the ground, smile, and
show no hostilities.‖ Some of the Iraqis backed off and sat
down, which enabled LTC Hughes to identify the
troublemakers in the crowd. He identified eight. Wanting to
make sure that it would be clear where the shooting would
come from, he gave the order: ―We‘re going to withdraw out of
this situation and let them defuse it themselves.‖ With his own
rifle pointed toward the ground, the Lieutenant Colonel bowed
to the crowd and turned away. LTC Hughes and his
Infantrymen marched back to their compound in silence. When
tempers had calmed, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a
decree (fatwa), calling on the people of Najaf to welcome LTC
Hughes‘ Soldiers.
―This gesture of respect helped defuse a dangerous
situation and made our peaceful intentions clear,‖ commended
President George W. Bush during his weekly radio address.

From an 11 JUL 03 interview with LTC Christopher Hughes,

Commander of 2nd Battalion, 327 Infantry, 101st Airborne
Division, included in the OIF Study Group publication On
Point, Ch 5, pg 271

DISCUSSION: LTC Hughes‘ actions in Najaf obviously

represent how an effective combat leader rapidly adapts to
changing conditions within the contemporary operational
environment, but more importantly, they demonstrate a deep
understanding of respect. Faced with a riot, in which LTC

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Hughes himself was pelted with rocks, the easy answer would
have been to engage the people throwing rocks with
proportional force, which would have resulted in civilian
casualties. However, understanding the ―sociological
demographics‖ of Shia Muslims in the area and the power of
―information‖ that a negative media could use to inflame
anti-coalition sentiment, LTC Hughes chose the difficult course
of action—that of ordering his men to point their weapons at
the ground and assume a non–threatening stance. This decision
took an extreme amount of ―gumption,‖ considering it would
leave his Soldiers in a position in which they could not quickly
engage. As President George W. Bush himself commended this
action during his weekly radio address, ―This gesture of respect
helped defuse a dangerous situation and made our peaceful
intentions clear.‖

On Dec 2, 2003, the 2-503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd

Airborne Brigade conducted a cordon and search of the
village of Hawija, 40 miles west of the city of Kirkuk, Iraq.
The 2-503rd occupied Kirkuk during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) 1 to stabilize the city after the fall of the
Ba’ath Party. The village of Hawija, predominantly Arab,
was responsible for harboring anti-coalition forces and
terrorists who would frequently destabilize support
operations in Kirkuk.

Our company was responsible for searching half of the

village. Each platoon had its own sector. By 0700 hrs., the
village was isolated, and the search for specific individuals on
our Black and Gray list was underway. Due to little resistance
during the initial isolation, our operational tempo and use of
force diminished. Instead of kicking down doors and storming
houses, we transitioned into what we called ―Cordon and

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Knock‖—Soldiers simply knocked on doors and were
permitted into homes to conduct their search.
The Company Commander, 1SG, and I (XO) traveled with
each one of the platoons as additional Command and Control. I
traveled with 1st Platoon as it conducted a systematic search of
its assigned platoon sector. At one particular house, Soldiers
from 1st Platoon discovered a large quantity of blasting caps
and wire. Traditionally, blasting caps are an integral element in
creating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Since our
company had lost two Soldiers to an IED two weeks prior
while returning from R & R, I ordered a more thorough search
be conducted. Upon further discovery, Soldiers found nine
sticks of PE-4 explosives and a banner that read: ―We will die
in support of you Saddam,‖ with a picture of Saddam Hussein.
We questioned both occupants in the house, both in their 80‘s.
Due to their age and physical capabilities, I assumed that the
paraphernalia did not belong to them. They claimed that the
items belonged to their son, Adel, and that he was not around.
We continued the search and discovered more bomb-making
paraphernalia. If the parents‘ story were true, their son, Adel,
needed to be found and captured. With the amount of IED
material we found, coupled with pro- Saddam propaganda, he
was unquestionably acting against Coalition Forces. Although
fully knowing the seriousness of the situation, the old couple
refused to give up Adel‘s location.
I radioed the CO and asked him to meet me at the house.
Upon his arrival, I showed him the cataloged items we had
found in the house and told him the family refused to tell us
their son‘s location. We both agreed that Adel needed to be
found to prevent further loss of friendly lives. I told him about
how I had heard U.S. forces further south using M1 Tanks to
destroy houses where bomb-making material was discovered.
He radioed the S3 and requested that one of the M1 tanks in

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support of the Cordon be brought down to our location. He
informed the S3 of his intent: to posture the tank outside the
house as a show of force to get the location of the bomb maker.
The S3 radioed back, ―The tanks are tasked to the Cordon—all
I can send is a bulldozer.‖
Fifteen minutes later, engineers from our Brigade showed
up with the bulldozer. I directed them to position it in front of
the wall that surrounded the property to the house. Following
behind the bulldozer were the Brigade Public Affairs Officer
and reporters from PBS Frontline. This created a dilemma for
both the Commander and me. We discussed the ramifications
of media coverage of this event and decided that capturing
Adel was worth it. Preventing the loss of Soldiers‘ lives is our
job as leaders, no matter what the situation.
While our company translator informed the couple of our
intent, a crowd began to gather. One of the reporters walked up
to me with a camera and asked, ―what do you plan to do with
the bulldozer?‖ I went into detail that the two occupants of the
house were harboring a terrorist and refused to give his
location. I stated, ―if you are going to harbor a terrorist, we are
going to remove you from the community.‖ I informed the
reporters that Adel‘s parents had one last chance to inform us
of their son‘s location; otherwise, we were going to destroy
their house. The house had become a military target. It was a
definite source of bomb-making material intended to kill
American Soldiers. I also informed the reporters of our mission
intent: ―to embolden local authorities through this show of
force.‖ This was to help legitimize the local police force and
show our sincerity against anti-Coalition forces and activities.
With the bulldozer positioned to push down the outer wall,
Adel‘s parents stood firm: they were not going to tell their
son‘s location. By this time, Adel‘s brother arrived with other
members of his family. A significant crowd had gathered from

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the community, along with other Command elements from
both our Battalion and Brigade. I signaled the engineer who
was operating the machine to move forward. The wall
crumbled effortlessly as the bulldozer loudly progressed
forward. The effect was decisive. The community thought the
act was a bluff until they realized we were taking action. The
message was clear: harboring terrorism in Hawija was not
tolerated.
Adel‘s brother stepped forward and spoke with his mother.
After about 15 minutes of deliberating, the brother informed
me and the CO that he would lead us to his brother Adel. ―I am
only doing this because I don‘t want them to destroy the
house,‖ he said. My commander took his Command HMMWV
and two other gun trucks to escort the brother to Adel. Adel
was located in a field working four miles from central Hawija.
As the HMMWVs approached, he raised his hands behind his
head, knowing his arrest was inevitable. Our forces captured
and processed him through our detention center in Kirkuk.

From the personal experience monograph by 1LT Steve

Brignoli, who served as Executive Officer of C Co. 2-503rd,
173rd Airborne Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Donovan
Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This is a remarkable example of small unit

leaders demonstrating respect in difficult circumstances.
Although most would say that threatening to knock down
someone‘s home would be the epitome of disrespect, a close
read of the vignette reveals that the leaders on the ground chose
the courses of action that, in fact, did illustrate their respect for
the people and their culture, which recognizes strength as a
value, while still accomplishing their mission.

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The Army defines respect as ―treat(ing) people as they
should be treated.‖ In the first part of the mission, the men
conducting the search modified their search technique of the
homes in the area out of respect for the innocent people in the
area. Military necessity dictated that the Soldiers search every
home in the village to find contraband and anti-U.S. forces.
However, they knew that there were very few likely insurgents
in the search area and transitioned to the Cordon and Knock.
This search technique allowed the Soldiers to perform their
duty while showing respect for the good people in Hawija.
Once the men located a cache, the leaders directed a more
detailed search and found more contraband. The Executive
Officer used common sense and treated the elderly occupants
with respect by attempting to determine the weapons‘ owner.
In the Islamic culture, respect for elders and to women is very
important and, in this case, ultimately allowed the U.S.
Soldiers to get the information they needed. Had he treated
them without respect, he would have alienated the local
population and risked failure.
Although it may seem unlikely, the commander‘s use of the
bulldozer further demonstrates his respect for others, while
accomplishing his mission. The commander understood that
what he was asking the elderly couple to do was counter to the
strong cultural bonds of family in Iraq and that their sense of
pride would cause them to resist. He used the dozer in a
graduated response that began with positioning it near the outer
wall. Once he had the driver knock the wall down, he allowed
the family time to talk about the situation. The commander
demonstrated respect for the family by giving them one final
opportunity to save their home and retain their inherent sense
of pride. The decisions that the commander and Executive
Officer made throughout this operation ultimately paid off, as
they caught the IED maker, without having to destroy a

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family‘s home. This clearly demonstrated that respect in every
part of this operation was clearly visible to all present and
contributed to the favorable news coverage they received as
well.

From 10 January until 06 April 2004, members of the

3rd Ranger Battalion established a forward operating base
(FOB) 1,200 meters from the Pakistan border in Shkin,
Afghanistan. The establishment of the FOB was intended to
be short-term and serve as a platform for time-sensitive
missions throughout the region. The Rangers relied heavily
on the local population for supplies due to the austere
environment and severe weather that limited the use of
helicopters.

The camp that we controlled had been occupied one week

prior by the Afghanistan Military Force (AMF). With roughly
ten Rangers present, it was obvious we needed additional labor
to construct a functional FOB. We met with the local elders
and explained that we wanted to hire personnel to live in our
camp with us; we would provide a standard of living much
better than other bases. Due to Operational Security (OPSEC),
we did not want the Afghanis to return home at night or roam
outside of the FOB during the day.
In the previous three years, many units, particularly Special
Operations Forces (SOF), gave false promises in an effort to
ease their particular deployment. We paid the locals more than
the other FOBs paid their workers and provided clothing,
shelter, and food, as well as many other amenities. When we
departed, we also made sure our replacements from the 2nd
Ranger Battalion would adhere to the wages and amenities we
had provided during our mission.

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It was important for us to use the locals in tactical
operations as well for construction. Since many of our workers
had experience with the AMF, we used them for indigenous
operations such as a Close Tactical Reconnaissance (CTR) of
potential objectives. These missions gave the locals a sense of
ownership by patrolling their villages and provided us with
capabilities we did not organically possess.
We demonstrated a humane side to the Ranger persona by
involving the locals in our games and events during our time
between missions. The Paktika Province of Afghanistan is
extremely austere, and available entertainment is very limited.
For a small price, we were able to purchase a television set and
a DVD player for our workers, something they had never seen.
Overall, the workers respected our position of authority but
also saw the human dimension of our forces. I believe their
willingness to put their lives in harm‘s way stemmed from their
genuine concern for our well-being.
The locals even risked their lives when enemy personnel
entered our area of operations on March 22, 2004. It was
evening, and we had just returned from a meeting with the
village elders when suddenly we heard two AK-47s and loud
explosions to our immediate south. B Co, 3-75th, had just
departed two days prior for a five-day mission. With most of
the Rangers away from the FOB, our strength was less than
twenty, and we had been rocketed less than twenty-four hours
earlier.
1SG Dennis Smith and I ran to the perimeter wall with our
weapons and a pair of binoculars. We immediately saw
movement, possibly two to three individuals, running to the
hilltop. Another NCO was relaying the information to the
Ranger Tactical Operations Center in Bagram while we were
trying to gather the facts. We both flipped the cover on the
optics of our rifles to identify and engage enemy personnel.

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Then, out of nowhere, a group of ten to fifteen locals (many of
whom we employed) appeared in our scopes as they chased the
other individuals over the hilltop. Less than five minutes later,
we heard a large explosion similar to a hand-grenade. The
locals later delivered a handcuffed enemy soldier as well as one
of their villagers who was bleeding profusely.
A team of five Al Qaeda fighters had crossed over from
Pakistan the night prior in an effort to fire upon our FOB as
well as to engage a coalition rotary-wing asset. When identified
by local Afghanis, the Al Qaeda terrorists stated they only
wanted to harm Americans. A quarrel broke out, and four of
the terrorists managed to escape, but one began throwing
grenades before he was caught. The injured villager attempted
to throw back a grenade, but it exploded in his hand.

From the personal experience monograph by 1LT Chris

DeMure, who served as Assistant S-4, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th
Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph
Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Army doctrine outlines six critical

considerations leaders and units must address while conducting
stability operations: leverage interagency, joint, and
multinational cooperation; enhance the capabilities and
legitimacy of the host nation; understand the potential for
unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions;
display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner;
act decisively to prevent escalation; and apply force selectively
and discriminately. The Rangers of 3/75 applied them all, but,
most notably, the consideration of enhancing the capabilities
and legitimacy of the host nation.
Through demonstrating proper respect to the local people
of Shkin by inviting them into the Ranger FOB, employing

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them, and always being cautious of how the actions of the
Rangers would be perceived, the Rangers earned their respect
to such a degree that the local men took up arms against the Al
Qaeda fighters.
The Rangers‘ long-term investment in winning over the
minds of the local populace with dignity, respect, and
responsibility was paramount when the enemy attacked on
6 APR 2004 and had, moreover, set the conditions for future
full-spectrum operations in that region.

PERSONAL COURAGE
Bravery is the capacity to perform properly even when
scared half to death.
Omar Bradley
J. Garagiola,
Baseball is a Funny Game

Throughout the night of 4 April, TF 2-7, 3rd ID,

received routine shelling in its positions at the Four
Corners. The next day, while planning operations, the TF
received orders to conduct a relief in place with 2-187th,
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), to allow TF 2-7 24
hours of rest and refit. A few hours after moving into the
airfield itself, TF 2-7 received orders to secure 2d Brigade’s
LOC. The TF then moved to the southwest of Baghdad to
the intersection of Highway 1 and Highway 8. To make
arrangements to conduct a relief in place with TF 3-15,
MAJ Coffey, TF 2-7 Operations Officer, moved north along
Highway 8 and reached an overpass known as Objective
Curly, TF 3-15’s TOC, receiving sporadic gunfire all the
way.

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Fire became heavier, and rocket propelled grenades
engaged us from both sides of the highway. Shocked, MAJ
Coffey looked around and realized no one was returning fire.
Instead, the Soldiers cowered behind anything providing cover,
leaving their weapons unmanned. He tried to communicate
with his Bradley crew and get the Soldiers back in the Bradley.
―Move forward and engage the enemy!‖ he yelled. Two
minutes later, the Bradley thundered forward, dropping the
two-man Infantry security team that began suppressing the
enemy, killing several with well aimed M16 shots. The gunner
began firing the Bradley 25mm chain gun, suppressing and
destroying the enemy. A Special Forces Soldier at the Tactical
Operations Center manned one of the .50 caliber machine guns
and returned fire. Enroute to his Bradley, MAJ Coffey was
severely injured when an RPG struck his communications
HMMWV. Despite his injuries, MAJ Coffey manned his
Bradley, getting the crew and Infantrymen into the fight on
Objective Curly.
With the report of the S3 injured, LTC Rutter began rapidly
moving with TF 2-7 to stabilize the situation. LTC Rutter,
working with the Fire Support Officer (FSO) and the Enlisted
Tactical Air Controller (ETAC), destroyed the building the
enemy had been using as a base of fire, ensuring the security of
that portion of 2nd BCT's Line of Communication (LOC).

Unit History of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1LT Mark K.

Schenck, TF 2-7 Infantry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d
Infantry Division, and On Point, page 367.

DISCUSSION: Personal courage is the ability to face fear,

danger, or adversity. Although it can be said that personal
courage is inherent in certain individuals, it is clear that good
training and discipline can facilitate ordinary individuals to do

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extraordinary things. In this summary of operations conducted
by TF 2-7, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, we
see the importance of courage and discipline to combat
operations. Discipline was the contributing factor that allowed
Soldiers to overcome the initial shock and fear associated with
hostile fire and the human instinct for self-preservation—
displayed here—and begin to engage the enemy. More than
any other factor, an environment of realistic and battle-focused
training will inculcate the discipline necessary in military
forces and create brave Soldiers and leaders who are confident
in battle.
One of the ten principles of training in U.S. doctrine is
―train for combat proficiency.‖ This principle includes the
requirement to train under ―realistic conditions,‖ which builds
competence and confidence by developing and honing skills
and develops aggressive and disciplined Soldiers. (FM 7-1)
This said, the vignette highlights the difficulty in replicating
conditions encountered on the modern battlefield, especially
fire on a ―two-way range.‖ However, we also see that once the
operations officer identified the need for his intervention and
direction to get effective fires on the enemy, and directed the
Soldiers accordingly, they reacted to his command instinctively
and executed the drills learned through hours of repetitive
training. Although at first not evident, the discipline and
courage displayed to expose themselves to hostile fire—when
the Soldiers‘ natural reaction was to take cover—demonstrates
how training in a realistic and stressful environment is a
valuable tool to the commander who must ask ordinary
individuals to commit themselves to situations that common
sense tells them should be avoided.
The commander‘s continuous quest in training is, therefore,
not only to recreate the conditions encountered in war, but also
to increase the challenges faced by Soldiers and leaders in

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training. By continual exposure to demanding and stressful
situations, Soldiers and leaders alike will gradually become
desensitized to the fear associated with the highly dangerous
tasks that they are expected to perform. They will also learn to
identify and manage stress in themselves and in others. By
doing this, and through continually exercising discipline in
battle drills and tactics, techniques, and procedures, Soldiers
can overcome the stresses and shock associated with the
unfamiliar and dangerous situations of war, and leaders will
encourage personal courage in their Soldiers.

DUTY
If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself.
General George S. Patton
8 November 1942
The Patton Papers, Volume II

In March, 2002, elements from 187th Infantry Regiment,

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and from the 87th
Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, conducted an
air assault into the Shah-I-Kot Valley in Eastern
Afghanistan.

As the helicopter touched down, the platoon rushed off in

anticipation of enemy contact. I swear, we got off of the bird in
30 seconds. With the weight of our rucks, along with the added
burden of having a Gator multipurpose vehicle, I expected to
be on the landing zone for five minutes or more. Thankfully,
we did not receive any enemy fire as we moved to where I
thought our link-up would take place.
Once the helicopter cleared the area, I called the Battalion
S3 to verify our location. The original intent was for our
platoon to land just east of a road that bisected the objective

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area. It was now about 0500 hrs. and still dark, and a haze of
dirt created by the departing Chinook helicopter covered the
area. It was hard to determine my exact location by terrain
association, but I knew that our battalion positions were located
along the ridgeline of the mountains to our east.
We began establishing our position when I received an
urgent call on the radio from CPT Kuth, the Bravo Company
Commander. He told me that two F-16s were inbound and that
I was in the middle of their engagement area. Evidently, the S3
had thought that our helicopter had landed on target. We
frantically threw our gear back in our rucks and quickly moved
toward one of Bravo Company‘s observation posts to the east,
which was signaling us with IR flashes. The move was about
400 meters, but it felt like a thousand miles. The combination
of adrenaline, weight of our equipment, and the altitude made it
impossible for us to move as quickly as the situation warranted.
In fact, two of my guys couldn‘t make it up the final last hill to
the position. They both fell and physically could not get up and
make it the last 100 meters. I can think of no other motivational
tool to get them up and moving more inspiring than the fact
that we were getting ready to die, but their bodies refused to
cooperate. Finally, I instructed them to ditch their gear in place,
and we pulled them to safety. The F-16s conducted their strike
on time, and we were left gasping for air in the comfort of
covered positions.
Once we got word that the area was safe, we returned to get
our equipment and searched for anything else we may have
dropped. It was now sunrise, and I could see how far off course
the landing had been. It was then that we experienced our first
enemy contact. Apparently, a sniper decided that our close call
had not been enough. He shot a couple of rounds at us, forcing
us to again move to cover. Almost immediately, we heard the
distinct report of a friendly .50 caliber machine gun engage the

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enemy sniper position. This allowed us to retrieve our gear and
move to a more secured location farther to the east.
Once my platoon was consolidated at a prospective mortar
firing position, I met face-to-face with the S3. Together, we
walked some of the terrain to identify where we could best
support the battalion. He conveyed to me the importance of
mortar indirect fires in this mountainous terrain and instructed
me to set our position oriented to the south. He also told me
that the biggest threat to my platoon would be the enemy‘s
indirect fires.
We emplaced our mortars and immediately began digging
protective positions. Once our mortars were emplaced, I
radioed to the Operations Officer and the Battalion
Commander that we were in position, ready to fire.
Over the span of the next few hours, we fired several
missions, mostly targeting groups of three or four Al Qaeda
personnel or supply points. Our primary forward observers, our
own Battalion Scouts, did a terrific job of adjusting fires using
the ―polar‖ method of call-for-fire. The Scout Platoon Leader,
1LT Justin Overbaugh, emphasized the art of calling for fire
during his long train-up, and it certainly paid off. In fact, the
most remarkable thing to me during this time was how much
these missions seemed like training. That all changed in the
afternoon of March 6.
At about 1400 hrs., we heard the distinct report of an
enemy mortar firing from the south. It is distinct because the
deep, guttural ―thump‖ of the 82mm mortar is loud when the
tube is facing you. At first, I really wasn‘t concerned. My first
thought was that the 1-87th Infantry Mortars were firing from
the north. That theory was disproved exactly 34 seconds later
when an incoming mortar round landed 300 meters from our
position. We knew it was 34 seconds because SSG Johnson
timed the flight of the round. I called the Operations Officer

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and informed him that we were under enemy indirect fire. At
this point, we had a decision to make. We could displace the
platoon to a different location. However, I knew that the
position we were in was the best available to enable our
support of the battalion. We were far enough south to range
Ginger Mountain, the TF Rakkasan name for the hill thought to
have the highest concentrations of enemy. We also had the
luxury of having a small hill to our west, which concealed us
from a huge hill mass in the west known as ―The Whale.‖ This
position, too, was thought to have high concentrations of
enemy. The bottom line was that moving at this point would
have negatively impacted on our mission and our ability to
support the mission.
We heard it again. ―Thump.‖ This time, the round exploded
about 100 meters to the west of our position. It landed just on
the other side of that little hill that protected us from view of
The Whale. I knew that the round landing so close was
evidence that the enemy was targeting my platoon and that he
had the range and distance to fire for effect. We jumped back
out of our holes after the round impacted and continued firing
our mission, all the while waiting for the inevitable sound of
multiple mortar rounds being fired.
After a couple of minutes, I began to feel a little more
relaxed, thinking that we had been forgotten. However, just a
few minutes later, we again heard the distinctive ―thump‖
along with three other ―thumps.‖ We moved to our fighting
positions, yelled ―incoming,‖ and waited for the rounds to
impact right on top of us. SSG Johnson immediately began
calling out the time of flight every ten seconds. I remember
lying flat on my stomach, wishing that I had spent more time
digging my own position. I also remember thinking how
helpless we were. There was nothing we could do. Enemy
mortar rounds were on the way, and all I could think was how

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surreal all of this was. This wasn‘t like being shot at with direct
fire where you didn‘t have time to think and everything was
instinctive. No, we knew for 34 seconds that this could be it,
and we were powerless to do anything about it.
The rounds did not explode. I don‘t know where they
landed or if they exploded in a completely different area and I
didn‘t hear them impact, but they did not land on our position.
My relief was quickly replaced with anger as I radioed a
situation report to our Tactical Command Post (TAC). I was
actually mad that someone was shooting at me. Seconds later,
two AH-64 Apaches screamed overhead and began firing on a
position thought to be where the enemy mortars were located.
Again, I‘m not sure whether the enemy was killed or whether
he took cover in a cave and moved on to other targets, but we
never heard from him again.
We continued to support the battalion for the next couple of
hours, targeting enemy personnel and vehicles with good
success. At one point, my RTO and I walked to the TAC just to
get a better view of the battlefield. The TAC was located along
the ridgeline, which overlooked not only my position, but also
most of the valley. This visit to the TAC also gave me the
opportunity to see 1LT Overbaugh, the Scout Platoon Leader.
His platoon was also located along the ridgeline and had been
the one who called the majority of our fire missions. I can not
say enough about their call-for-fire skills.
After a few minutes, my RTO and I returned to the platoon
position. At the time, the platoon was in the process of firing
another mission. Suddenly, I looked up and actually saw a
huge, incoming round screaming our way. Of course, it
impacted at almost the same time, and all I could do was yell
―incoming.‖ I dove to the ground and felt the earth shake. Dirt
and debris filled the air, as I was sure the round had impacted
within 50 meters of my location. After the impact, I got out of

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my hole to survey the damage. Miraculously, the round had not
exploded. This was incredible considering the amount of dirt
and noise it had produced. As it turns out, the round was
actually a 2000-pound Air Force JDAM (Joint Direct Attack
Munitions), which had flown off-course and had landed
virtually on top of our Bravo Company. This was the same type
weapon that was involved in the accidental deaths of Special
Forces Soldiers in November. Initially, I believed that our
enemy mortar friend had returned, but these fears were
dismissed when I radioed a situation report to the S3.
We concluded firing our mission and actually had time to
continue digging our positions. At this point, I had a little time
to reflect on the day‘s events. In our first day in the valley, we
were engaged by a sniper, bracketed by a mortar, and
inadvertently targeted by our own Air Force. I was wondering
what the rest of the day and tomorrow would bring. As it turns
out, the events of March 6 marked the highlight of our combat
experience. For the next seven days, we fired only two more
missions.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Edward

Mills, who served as the Mortar Platoon Leader, 1-187th
Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. Donovan Research
Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The Army values consist of loyalty, duty,

respect, selfless service, honesty, integrity, and personal
courage. Duty—perhaps the most important Army value—
means fulfilling obligations.
In addition to vividly describing the psychological impact
of indirect fire, this vignette showed tremendous aspects of
duty in the actions of the Mortar Platoon Leader and his
platoon. Civilians become Soldiers, and Soldiers defend the

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Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign
and domestic. The Soldiers of the mortar platoon understood
their mission and, regardless of the risk, immersed themselves
into the hazardous duty. Duty is critical in assuring Soldiers
complete their missions even if they are performed under
extreme conditions or circumstances. Lastly, a sense of duty
ensures cohesion among Soldiers, which, in turn, ensures the
safety and protection of the Soldiers to the right and left of
them. Duty is the essence of being a Soldier in garrison and
even more so in combat.
Soldiers from the Mortar Platoon serve as the epitome of
duty by meeting their obligations to the Nation. The Soldier‘s
Creed best summarizes the actions of each individual in the
platoon:
I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people
of the United States and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and
proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always
maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert, and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of
the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.

The 1st BN, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, was given
control of Fallujah, Iraq, on 11 September 2003. The

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battalion’s task was to secure Fallujah to allow support and
stability operations to be conducted in the area.

I was appointed the Liaison Officer for the Battalion, in

charge of Civil Military Operations and rebuilding the
government of the city. Being the Liaison Officer involved
going into the city every day to check on the Mayor and how
he was running the city, as well as to hear about the problems
of the city populous.
On the morning of 31 October 2003, an Iraqi insurgent had
infiltrated the police force and put a satchel charge in my
office. Luckily, my team had not planned to go downtown that
day, so, when the time charge blew, it didn‘t kill us. Insurgents
then tried to storm the compound and kill Mayor Taha.
Luckily, he had called us before they attacked.
The Battalion Commander, LTC Drinkwine, wanted to take
a team down to the office, assess the damage, and defend if
needed. We had Bravo Company, minus, commanded by CPT
Mobley; some scouts as snipers; and an anti-tank section. LTC
Drinkwine asked CPT Zahczewsky, who was the intelligence
operations officer, and me to go as well because we knew the
people and the location the best. The Battalion Commander
also had SPC Dudin with him; SPC Dudin is a Jordanian-
American who enlisted as a medic and became our interpreter
in Fallujah; he was a valuable asset to the battalion.
We arrived in the afternoon, and LTC Drinkwine assessed
the area. The bomb had been placed in my office, completely
destroying it, and the Mayor‘s office had been totally burned.
In the confusion of the bombing, some of the people ran out
and grabbed all the gas being sold on the side of the road and
started burning everything. The building and vehicles around it
were still on fire, and the Iraqi policemen, although frightened,
had their RPK machine guns out and guarding. When we got

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there, we set up a perimeter, and the Battalion Commander put
me in charge of the Iraqi Police and security. After we got set
up, he decided to stay and help defend. We established our
position for the night and received chow and supplies.
I was in the front of the building at about 2030–2100 hrs.,
about an hour after we had established the perimeter, when the
first attack began. I was talking to the Mayor‘s assistant when
an RPG and small arms started whizzing past me. CPT
Zahczewsky and I ran to the roof. Tracers were flying by my
head; I saw where they were coming from, so I shot at them, as
did the team on the roof. We estimated that we killed at least
five out of about twenty insurgents. I noticed that everyone was
on one side of the roof, so I yelled for everyone to establish a
360-degree defensive perimeter.
Then I noticed some flashlights on the ground beneath me.
I shouted, ―Is someone hurt?‖ They said ―yes,‖ so I shouted for
the medics. We had four wounded in total. We got them
stabilized and placed them on a Bradley fighting vehicle that
the Battalion Commander had requested for CASEVAC. I then
focused on setting up roadblocks with the Iraqi Police. We had
insurgents shooting randomly throughout the night. We stayed
awake and defeated some minor attacks. The Battalion
Commander left at about 0500 hrs., leaving me with B CO and
CPT Mobley to defend.
By the morning of 1 November 2003, most of us had been
up through the night because of the random fire we received.
The Battalion Commander had said he wanted us to defend
until at least that evening or the next morning, so we could be
sure the Iraqi Police were prepared to assume their duties.
Some of the mayor‘s staff came back to work (mostly the
interpreters); however, we didn‘t want too many people
around, so we just kept our two best local interpreters and told
everyone else to leave. This actually helped because we had

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been having trouble speaking to the Iraqi policemen through
the night, and all I could do to position them was use hand and
arm signals, pictures, and broken Arabic/English. The mayor‘s
staff was impressed that we were still defending there, and
some sheiks came by to say they would help rebuild. We didn‘t
suffer a major attack during the day, probably because it was
Ramadan.
As soon as the sun started going down, though, we were
attacked from the north. As the Support and Transportation
Platoon arrived with a resupply of ammunition, I looked out to
see who was there, and a rocket flew by the window, about two
feet in front of me. I went on the roof with CPT Zahczewsky
and returned fire. I directed the seven Iraqi policemen we had
with us to get the roadblocks set up; however, communicating
with them was, again, very difficult because we only had two
interpreters, and they were stretched thin.
The Battalion Commander showed up at about 2130 to
2200 hrs., but he had left SPC Dudin at the Forward Operating
Base (FOB VOLTURNO) to interrogate some prisoners
captured the day before. Right after the Commander showed
up, we had a rocket and small arms attack from the south side,
engaging the Bradleys that had come with the Battalion
Commander. I happened to be standing next to them instructing
the Iraqi policemen on their roadblock, and, again, luckily, no
one got hurt.
When the Assistant Police Chief, LTC Jalaal Khamis,
arrived, we decided to try and turn the operation over to him.
We told the assistant police chief we would withdraw at 0300
hrs., and he needed to have the security established. We finally
withdrew at about 0345 on the morning of 2 November 2003.
We had been through seven major attacks and about a dozen
harassments in total; most of us had not slept since 31 October.

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It was a very trying experience for all but showed the will and
intestinal fortitude of our Soldiers to the enemy.

From the personal experiences of 1LT Ryan Edward Huston,

Sr. who served as Liaison Officer for 1st Battalion, 505th PIR,
82nd Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library,
Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Duty and personal courage, two of our Army

values, are a testament of our military culture. They serve as a
guide for a Soldier‘s everyday life and, most importantly, on
the field of battle. The actions of the men of the 1st Battalion,
505th PIR, in Fallujah, Iraq, on 30 October, 2003, symbolize a
Soldier‘s duty and personal courage.
Faced with a difficult situation, CPT Mobley and Bravo
Company maneuvered to a position to assess and take charge
of the situation. LTC Drinkwater, the Battalion Commander,
issued orders, and Bravo Company began to execute the plan.
Confronted with attacks from insurgents, the team developed a
sound plan to defend the area and provide security for the
mayor and local citizens. The team held together under heavy
enemy fire because the Soldiers understood their duty and
remained loyal to their leaders. The Soldiers were committed to
the team, and the presence of leadership instilled confidence.
The operation proved valuable for several reasons. It
demonstrated to the Iraqi Police that United States forces
would support them when they were under attack. The Iraqi
Police learned that they could rely on American and coalition
forces to fulfill their promises. The American Soldiers set an
example for the Iraqi people about the values of courage and
integrity, cornerstones necessary to build a system built on
values-based laws.

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The American Soldiers earned the respect of the Iraqi
people in the area by demonstrating their unwavering
commitment to the mission, protecting the rights and freedoms
of the Iraqis, and eliminating insurgent activity in the area. The
Soldiers in the battalion exhibited personal courage and sent a
message to the insurgents: America was there to stay and help
the Iraqi people, and Americans would not run from a fight.

SELFLESS SERVICE
It so often happens that, when men are convinced that
they have to die, a desire to bear themselves well and to
leave life‘s stage with dignity conquers all other
sensations.
Winston Churchill
Savarola, 1900

The QRF from 10th Mountain, led by Company A, 2-

th
14 Infantry, left its base at 2200 on 3 October 1993 and
moved through the downtown streets of Mogadishu toward
the downed Blackhawks and TF Ranger. As soon as the
convoy turned on National Street and headed west, it came
under heavy fire. What followed was continuous combat.

When I made the turn back north, the company was

stopped, with a lot of incoming and outgoing fire. Both 1st and
2nd platoons were taking and receiving heavy small arms fire
from the Olympic Hotel and nearby buildings and alleys. The
Commander was with 1st Platoon, suppressed by effective
crossfire coming from the hotel and several other buildings.
The company was only five or six blocks from TF Ranger and
having a hard time pinpointing which street we should take to
affect a linkup (the maps did not match the ground).

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After fighting through the city streets, becoming pinned
down by enemy fire at several locations, the lead elements of
1st Platoon, 2-14, made contact with the TF Ranger at 0300 hrs.
Under continuous fire, the Quick Reaction Force and TF
Ranger began loading the casualties in the armored personnel
carriers while some of the Rangers and one squad from the
QRF moved to the helicopter crash site to try to extricate the
body of the pilot. By 0600 hrs., the pilot‘s body had been
removed, casualties were loaded, and the column began
moving out as fast as possible toward base.
Small arms fire whizzed over my HMMWV, and an RPG
round exploded near the vehicle in front of me. Everyone in the
column was firing into every building and alley that could be
used as an enemy firing point. I had stepped out of the
HMMWV, crouching for cover and trying to monitor the
company and battalion nets. The sound of small arms fire
mixed with enemy RPG fire, friendly MK19 grenade launcher
fire, and exploding M203 rounds was deafening. My RTO
yelled that he saw some Somalis and started firing down an
alley. I turned, spotted the running men, and engaged them.
The Malaysian APC gunners were now suppressing the
second and third floors of the surrounding buildings. The lead
platoon of the company was now moving so fast that 2nd
Platoon and the Rangers were falling behind. As my RTO and I
neared the hotel, an RPG round exploded several feet behind
me. A few moments later, my RTO was wounded in the arm by
a bullet, which spun him around and knocked him down.
Although bleeding, he picked up his M16 and the 1st Sergeant
applied an ace bandage on the move.
I returned my attention to TF Ranger, now beginning to
break contact with us. They were visibly tired, having to fire
and maneuver continuously throughout the city, and many of
them were walking wounded. I moved back to encourage them

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to keep moving and continued to bang on the APCs to keep
them moving. I moved with TF Ranger to ensure that everyone
stayed together. The rest of A Company had now reached
National Street, and the Commander told everyone to get on a
vehicle any way they could. When we linked up with the rest
of the battalion, there was still a lot of fire, incoming and
outgoing especially near the rear of the column at the
intersection we had just passed.

From a November 1994 article in Infantry Magazine by

Captain Charles P. Ferry, who was a company executive
officer in 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.

DISCUSSION: The U.S. Army defines its Army value

―selfless service‖ as follows:
―Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and your
subordinates before your own. Selfless service is
larger than just one person. In serving your country,
you are doing your duty loyally without thought of
recognition or gain. The basic building block of
selfless service is the commitment of each team
member to go a little further, endure a little longer,
and look a little closer to see how he or she can add
to the effort.‖
This is a strong charge and one that every Soldier faces in
the most difficult of circumstances. Yet again, the Soldiers of
today have shown themselves equal to the task, measuring up
admirably to the ―Greatest Generation‖ of World War II and
living up to the highest standards established by our
revolutionary founders.
In truth, CPT Ferry‘s men are representative of all the
Army‘s Soldiers today who are continuing the glorious
tradition of American Soldiers. The rebuilding of the ―hollow

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Army‖ of the 1970s is complete, and these men and women, as
well as their deployed contemporaries around the world, are the
current generation‘s heroes. There is a bit of irony in this
statement, for, like their predecessors, they do not view their
actions as noble, historic, or heroic. But they are.
Is staring at your enemy and death, charging that weapon-
wielding adversary, and putting your all against his in mortal
combat different today than it was during the Revolutionary
War, WWII, Vietnam or the battles in between? It is not. Ask
any of those who have been in combat, either today or in the
past, and they will tell you that they do not view their actions
as heroic. They look at their peers as being heroic, but not
themselves—they believe they were just doing their jobs. That
is the essence of selfless service.
A Purple Heart, Silver Star, and even a Medal of Honor do
not mean less because you earned it. Instead it confirms your
place in the honored rolls of American heroes and that your
actions are as exemplary for those who will follow you. It is
not about the medal; it is about selfless service. It is not
proactive, but reactive and awarded in retrospect. The medal is
the Army‘s way of codifying your actions for history.
For those new Soldiers reading this, the lesson is that war
heroes are, by their own admission, just like you. They were
dirty and scared, but they did their jobs, and they were selfless
in their service when it mattered most, and you can be, too.

LOYALTY
Loyalty is developed through the unifying of action.
The more decisive the action becomes, the greater the
bond.
BG S.L.A. Marshall
The Armed Forces Officer
1950

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For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his

life above and beyond the call of duty: Sergeant First Class
Paul R. Smith distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and
intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with an
armed enemy near Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad,
Iraq on 4 April 2003. On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith
was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding
area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a
company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of
over 100 fellow Soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly
organized a hasty defense consisting of two platoons of
Soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and three armored
personnel carriers. As the fight developed, Sergeant First Class
Smith braved hostile enemy fire to personally engage the
enemy with hand grenades and anti-tank weapons and
organized the evacuation of three wounded Soldiers from an
armored personnel carrier struck by a rocket propelled grenade
and a 60mm mortar round. Fearing the enemy would overrun
their defenses, Sergeant First Class Smith moved under
withering enemy fire to man a .50 caliber machine gun
mounted on a damaged armored personnel carrier. In total
disregard for his own life, he maintained his exposed position
in order to engage the attacking enemy force. During this
action, he was mortally wounded. His courageous actions
helped defeat the enemy attack and resulted in as many as 50
enemy Soldiers killed, while allowing the safe withdrawal of
numerous wounded Soldiers. Sergeant First Class Smith‘s
extraordinary heroism and uncommon valor are in keeping
with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect
great credit upon himself, the Third Infantry Division ―Rock of
the Marne,‖ and the United States Army.

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Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Sergeant
First Class Paul R. Smith, 4 April 2005.

HONOR
A man has honor if he holds himself to a course of
conduct because of a conviction that is in the general
interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead
to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation, or grave
personal risk.
BG S.L.A. Marshall
The Armed Forces Officer
1950

Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon, United States Army,

distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the call of
duty on 3 October 1993, while serving as Sniper Team Leader,
United States Army Special Operations Command, with Task
Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sergeant Gordon‘s
sniper team provided precision fires from the lead helicopter
during an assault and at two helicopter crash sites, while
subjected to intense automatic weapons and rocket propelled
grenade fires. When Master Sergeant Gordon learned that
ground forces were not immediately available to secure the
second crash site, he and another sniper unhesitatingly
volunteered to be inserted to protect the four critically
wounded personnel, despite being well-aware of the growing
number of enemy personnel closing in on the site. After his
third request to be inserted, Master Sergeant Gordon received
permission to perform his volunteer mission. When debris and
enemy ground fires at the site caused the first attempt to be
aborted, Master Sergeant Gordon was inserted one hundred
meters south of the crash site. Equipped with only his sniper
rifle and a pistol, Master Sergeant Gordon and his fellow

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sniper, while under intense small arms fire from the enemy,
fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and shacks
to reach the critically injured crew members. Master Sergeant
Gordon immediately pulled the pilot and the other crew
members from the aircraft, establishing a perimeter which
placed him and his fellow sniper in the most vulnerable
position. Master Sergeant Gordon used his long range rifle and
side arm to kill an undetermined number of attackers until he
depleted his ammunition. Master Sergeant Gordon then went
back to the wreckage, recovering some of the crew‘s weapons
and ammunition. Despite the fact that he was critically low on
ammunition, he provided some of it to the dazed pilot and then
radioed for help. Master Sergeant Gordon continued to travel
the perimeter, protecting the downed crew. After his team
member was critically wounded, and his own ammunition was
exhausted, Master Sergeant Gordon returned to the wreckage,
recovering a rifle with the last five rounds of ammunition, and
gave it to the pilot with the words, ―good luck.‖ Then, armed
with only his pistol, Master Sergeant Gordon continued to fight
until he was fatally wounded. His actions saved the pilot‘s life.
Master Sergeant Gordon‘s actions were in keeping with the
highest standards of military service and reflect great credit on
him, his unit, and the United States Army.

Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Master

Sergeant Gary I. Gordon, 23 May 1994.

Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, United States

Army, distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the
call of duty on 3 October 1993, while serving as a Sniper Team
Member, United States Army Special Operations Command
with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sergeant First
Class Shughart provided precision sniper fires from the lead

314
 Chapter 15, U.S. Army Values
helicopter during an assault on a building and at two helicopter
crash sites, while subjected to intense automatic weapons and
rocket propelled grenade fires. While providing critical
suppressive fires at the second crash site, Sergeant First Class
Shughart and his team leader learned that ground forces were
not immediately available to secure the site. Sergeant First
Class Shughart and his team leader unhesitatingly volunteered
to be inserted to protect the four critically wounded personnel,
despite being well-aware of the growing number of enemy
personnel closing in on the site. After their third request to be
inserted, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader
received permission to perform this volunteer mission. When
debris and enemy ground fires at the site caused them to abort
the first attempt, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team
leader were inserted one hundred meters south of the crash site.
Equipped with only his sniper rifle and pistol, Sergeant First
Class Shughart and his team leader, while under intense small
arms fire from the enemy, fought their way through the dense
maze of shanties and shacks to reach the critically injured crew
members. Sergeant First Class Shughart pulled the pilot and the
other crew members from the aircraft, establishing a perimeter
which placed him and his fellow sniper in the most vulnerable
position. Sergeant First Class Shughart used his long range rifle
and side arm to kill an undetermined number of attackers while
traveling the perimeter, protecting the downed crew. Sergeant
First Class Shughart continued his protective fire until he
depleted his ammunition and was fatally wounded. His actions
saved the pilot‘s life. Sergeant First Class Shughart‘s
extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping
with the highest standards of military service and reflect great
credit upon him, his unit, and the United States Army.

315
Infantry in Battle
Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Sergeant
First Class Randall D. Shughart, 23 May 1994

316
 CHAPTER 16: Conclusion
Editor’s note: In most instances, the Soldiers who
wrote the personal experience monographs would
conclude their papers with lessons learned. Therefore, I
thought it appropriate to end this book with the lessons
learned from CPT Self‘s monograph, as they apply to
so many of the vignettes found in this book.

Although peacekeeping operations can in no way replicate

the conditions and stresses of combat, my deployment to
Kosovo started me along that road. I began to gain an overall
understanding of how the world really is and how the
complicated people who live and die for competing causes
relate to each other. I quickly saw that the environment we
operate in does not have cleanly drawn lines, but blurry edges
of what we all see as good and evil, depending on the viewing
lens. I learned that a man‘s intentions may not be played out
until it‘s too late for you to do anything about it, but that‘s the
benefit of the doubt we give to everyone out there who chooses
to blend in. I learned that you don‘t have to be shot at to be
killed and that just training for war produces casualties. I
learned that a quick reaction force that is not informed will not
have a very beneficial reaction, but one that is too informed
will not be very quick. I learned that easy decisions are still
hard to carry out and that hard decisions will never have a right
answer, aside from your gut. Most importantly, I learned that
death is seldom planned, is always final, will always move you,
is profound in and of itself, and despite all its pain, provides a
comfort in knowing that those who know Him will live
eternally.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Nathan E.

Self, who served in both Kosovo, conducting peacekeeping
317
Infantry in Battle
operations, and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring
Freedom, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection,
Fort Benning, GA.

318
The legitimate object of war is a more perfect peace.
General of the Army William T. Sherman,
20 July 1865

319
 GLOSSARY
ACE armored combat earthmover
AI area of interest
AMF Afghanistan Military Force
AO AREA OF OPERATIONS
APC armored personnel carrier
APOD aerial port of debarkation

BFIST Bradley fire support vehicle (M7)

BRT brigade reconnaissance team
BTR Bronyetransporter (Russian class of armored
vehicles)

CA civil affairs
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CCP casualty collection point
CLU command launch unit
CMO civil military operations
COA course of action
COLT combat observation and lasing team
COP common operational picture
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSS combat service support
CTCP combat trains command post
CTR close tactical reconnaissance

DLS desert landing strip

EA engagement area
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESV engineer Stryker vehicle

321
Infantry in Battle
ETAC enlisted terminal attack controller

FARP forward army refueling point

FO forward observer
FOB forward operating base
FSC forward support company
FSO fire support officer
FYROM former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GAC ground assault convoy

GMV gun mobility vehicle
GPS Global Positioning System

HA humanitarian aid
HE high-explosive
HEDP high-explosive, dual-purpose
HEMMT heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck
HLZ helicopter landing zone
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HVT high value target

IAWS Infantry Antiarmor Weapon System

ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
IED improvised explosive devise
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR infrared
ITAS Improved Target Acquisition System

JDAM joint direct attack munitions

KFOR Kosovo force

322
 Glossary
LMTV light medium tactical vehicle
LOC line of communications
LOGPAC logistical package
LZ landing zone

MDMP military decision-making process

METL mission-essential task list
MGS mobile gun system
MRE meals ready-to-eat
MSR main supply route

NCO noncommissioned officer

NLA National Liberation Army
NOD night observation devise
NVG night vision goggles

OBJ objective
OP observation post
OPSEC operational security

POI Programs of Instruction

PSG platoon sergeant

QRF quick reaction force

R&R rest and relaxation

RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RPK Ruchnoi Pulemet Kalashnikov (Russian light
machine gun)
RTO radio/telephone operator

S1 adjutant
S2 intelligence officer

323
Infantry in Battle
S3 operations and training officer
S4 supply officer
S5 civil affairs officer
SALUTE size, activity, location, uniform, time, equipment
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SBF support by fire
SITREP situation report
SKEDCO litter without poles
SOF Special Operations Forces
SRG Special Republican Guard

TAC tactical command post

TCP traffic command post
THT tactical human intelligence team
TLP troop-leading procedures
TOC tactical operations center
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
missile
TOW ITAS TOW Improved Target Acquisition System
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UNMIK-P United Nations mission in Kosovo-Police

VBIED vehicle borne improvised explosive devise

XO executive officer

324
 INDEX

PEOPLE

Abas, Aziz: 106 Butler, CPT Kevin: 66-69

Acevedo, CWO Angel: 8, 9
Adorno, SGT Jose: 90 Caraccilo, LTC Dominic: 214
Aideed, Mohamed Farrah: Carr, SSG Luke: 79, 80, 85
110, 248 Cheney, CPT Scott: 58, 59,
Albert, PFC: 190 190, 255
Al-Douri, Izzat Ibrahim: 144, Cirino, CPT: 208
146 Coffey, MAJ Robert: 294, 295
Al Sadr, Moqtada: 16 Cottrell, SGT: 265
Alfaro, SSG Ryan: 81, 82, 86
Armstrong, SSG Peter D.: Daniel, SGT Cory: 67, 68T
113-115 Davis, CPT Jason: 88
DeMure, 1LT Chris: 12, 25,
Bailey, CWO Donavan: 252 293
Bailey, CPT Jimmy: 7, 9 Dennis, 1LT Kirby: 63, 64,
Barnett, CPT C. Quay: 101 188
Bartels, 1LT Gary: 82, 85, 87 Dichairo, LTC Joseph: 275
Barton, CPT Gabe: 203 Diggs, 1LT: 211-213
Belman, SSG John: 252 Diggs, SGT: 238-240
Black, SGT: 73 Di Tomasso, CPT Thomas:
Blanton, 1LT Paul: 116, 117 235, 236, 249, 250, 252
Boone, CPT: 202 Drinkwine, LTC Brian: 304
Boorn, SSG: 250 Dudin, SPC: 208, 304, 306
Bowling, CPT Martin Jeremy: Duran, 2LT Mike: 120, 121,
4 125
Bradford, CPT Jonathan: 143 Durante, Art: 168
Brady, SPC Behan: 86 Dus, SGT: 280, 281, 283
Brignoli, CPT Steve: 53, 54,
214, 289 Elliott, SSG Charles: 251, 253
Brown, SGT Joe: 116, 117,
179 Ferry, CPT Charles: 185, 186,
Bush, President George 310
Herbert W: 109 Fletcher, PV2 Jacob: 213, 214
Bush, President George W.
285, 286
325
Infantry in Battle
Gallagher, CSM Robert: 167 Johnson, CPT Kendrick: 86
Gallali, General: 275 Johnson, CPT Ronnie: 30,
Garcia, SPC Carlos: 116, 117 167, 168, 245
George, CPT Anthony: 263 Johnson, SSG: 299, 300
Gittins, CPT Timothy: 73, 74
Goodale, SGT Mike: 249 Karcher, MAJ Tim: 127
Gordon, MSG Gary I.: 213, Kaster, 1LT Vince: 106, 177
214 Kelly, CPT Todd: 75, 77
Greek, CPT Eric: 230 Khamis, LTC Jalaal: 306
Guderski, 1LT Chris: 282 Kilbride, CPT: 280, 282
Kilgore, 2LT Dan: 121, 122,
Hall, MAJ James: 70 125
Hansen, SPC Bill: 116, 117 Knapp, MAJ Denton: 7
Hawley, SPC: 235, 236 Kuth, CPT: 298
Healy, SFC Robert: 70
Heard, PFC: 236 LaCamera, LTC Paul: 74
Henson, SFC: 200
Herniak, SPC Jarod: 83, 85 Matthews, CPL Jason: 190
Hollis, CPT Mark: 138 McColloh, CPT Timothy: 196
Horn, 1LT James A.: 92, 95, McDowell, SFC: 112
96, 201 McGahey, CPT James: 83,
Hornbuckle, CPT Zan: 27, 30, 85-87
165-167 Mills, CPT Edward: 302
Hubbard, CPT Dan: 165 Minucci, SGT Joseph: 213,
Hughes, LTC Chris: 284-286 214
Hussein, Qusay: 101, 102 Mobley, CPT: 304, 305, 307
Hussein, Saddam: 96, 101, Moreno, 1LT: 180, 182
104, 164, 272, 287 Morgan, SFC: 11
Hussein, Uday: 101, 102 Morrow, 1LT Sean: 206, 223,
Huston, 1LT Ryan Edwards 224
Sr.: 209, 307
Huth, SPC Eric: 245 Naylor, Sean: 69
Neal, SGT: 52, 53
Inman, 1LT M. Jordan: 20 Nielson, CPT Shannon: 203
Irwin, SFC: 94
Ohlemann, SFC: 206
James, LTC Buck: 144, 179 Overbaugh, 1LT Justin: 299,
Jeter, 1LT: 280 301
Johnson, 1LT Brian: 198, 199
Johnson, 1LT Craig: 276, 277

326
 Index
Parrott, 1LT Demetrius: 121 Smith, CPT Robert: 90
Paul, CPT Matthew: 90 Smith, SPC: 31
Pecina, CPT Michael: 77, 78 Stanton, MAJ Martin N.: 44
Pena, SFC Juan: 211, 212 Steele, CPT Mike: 249, 251,
Perdue, SGT: 181 253
Perino, CPT Larry D.: 236, Stever, SSG Robert: 9
253 Stone, SFC Jeffrey: 84-87
Polsgrove, CPT Aaron: 9, 10 Storm, CPT Rick: 112
Powell, 1LT Dave: 203, 204 Swift, 1SG Robert: 144
Przybylski, CPT Robert: 282 Sypherd, SGT Jason: 84

Reeves, MAJ Blain A.: 272 Tagg, CPT Nathaniel: 240

Rice, CSM Earl: 214 Taha, Mayor: 304
Richards, CPT Arie: 51-53 Tanaka, SPC: 53
Rivier, CPT Andre: 50, 51 Taniguchi, PFC: 29
Robinson, CPT Robert: 117, Taylor, CPT: 218
144, 145, 179, 180 Thomas, 1LT Joe: 80, 81, 87
Robinson, SSG: 90, 91 Tiffner, 1LT Benjamin: 118,
Rodgers, 1SG: 254 146, 181, 182
Roels, SFC David J.: 243 Trejan, Mayor: 260, 262
Rogne, 1LT Daniel: 270, 273 Tusa, SPC: 52
Rolling, 1SG Nick: 51-53, 214 Tuttle, SSG: 219, 220
Rutter, CAPT Jay: 38, 39 Twaddell, CPT Ed: 120-125,
Rutter, LTC Scott: 168, 295 128
Twitty, LTC Stephan: 7, 30,
Sanchez, LTG Ricardo: 101 164, 165, 167
Schake, SPC Michael: 82, 85
Schenck, 1LT Mark K.: 295 Vietch, SGT: 269
Self, CPT Nathan: 317 Vigil, 1SG Steven: 121
Shughart, SFC Randall D.: Volesky, LTC Gary: 15
314-316
Sistani, Ali Hussein, Grand Walters, SGT: 254, 255
Ayatolla: 284, 285 Walters, LTC Robert P.: 114
Slaton, SGT Eric: 85 Wharton, 1LT Jaron: 172,
Smalley, SFC Calvin: 125, 173, 242
126 Wheatley, Chaplain: 214
Smith, 1SG: 12 Whyte, CPT John P.: 239
Smith, 1SG Dennis: 292 Wilbur, CPT Jeff: 204, 266
Smith, CPL James: 250-253 Wiley, 1LT Hank: 121, 126
Smith, SFC Paul R.: 312, 313 Wilkes, SSG: 219, 220

327
Infantry in Battle
Williams, SSG: 57, 190 Wright, CPT Josh: 165
Wojcik, 2LT Matt: 121, 122,
124 Zahczewsky, CPT: 304-306
Wolcott, CWO Clifton: 252
Woodruff, CPT Robert: 32
UNITS
st rd
1 Armored Division 3 Infantry Division: 23, 78,
st
1-41 Infantry: 80 79, 114, 115, 164, 168, 171,
th
A/2-70 Armor: 140 197, 202, 221, 240, 312
st rd
1 Brigade, 3 Infantry
st
1 Cavalry Division: 13, 20 Division: 170
nd th nd rd
2 Battalion, 5 Cavalry: 13, 2 Brigade, 3 Infantry
20 Division: 164, 168, 294
nd th rd rd
2 Battalion, 7 Cavalry: 119, 3 Brigade, 3 Infantry
127, 128 Division: 113, 204
th
A/2-5 Cavalry: 15-18 Brigade Reconnaissance
th
C/2-5 Cavalry: 14-20 Troop: 228
th nd th
A/2-7 Cavalry: 120, 121, 127 2 Battalion, 7 Infantry: 77,
th
C/3-8 Cavalry: 120-125 89, 168, 169, 197, 294-296
rd th
B/1-12 Cavalry: 16, 18 3 Battalion, 7 Infantry: 238
th rd th
C/2-37 Armor: 14, 16, 17, 19 3 Battalion, 15 Infantry: 5,
nd
C Battery, 1-82 FA: 16, 18 9, 27, 164, 166, 168, 169,
294
nd st th
2 Infantry Division 1 Battalion, 30 Infantry: 245
rd st th
3 SBCT: 103, 174 1 Battalion, 64 Armor: 27,
th th rd
5 Battalion, 20 Infantry, 3 164
th th
SBCT: 103 4 Battalion, 64 Armor: 27
st rd rd rd th
1 Battalion, 23 Infantry, 3 3 Battalion, 69 Armor: 75,
SBCT: 103, 104, 174 238
rd th
A/1-23 Infantry: 104, 174, A/2-7 Infantry: 89, 92, 93, 95,
175 197-199, 201
rd th
B/1-23 Infantry: 104, 118, B/2-7 Infantry: 197
th
143, 144, 146, 174, 175, C/2-7 Infantry: 75
th
179, 181 B/3-7 Infantry: 75
rd th
C/1-23 Infantry: 104, 106, C/3-7 Infantry: 238
th
174, 175, 177 A/3-15 Infantry: 28, 29, 32,
164, 165
th
B/3-15 Infantry: 164, 167,
169, 245, 246

328
 Index
th rd th
Team Zan, 3-15 Infantry: 28, 3 Battalion, 75 Ranger
33, 165-167 Regiment: 10, 12, 23, 291,
th
A/1-30 Infantry: 238, 240 293
th
B/1-30 Infantry: 206, 223 TF Ranger: 130, 184, 233,
th
C/1-30 Infantry: 218 248, 249, 308, 309, 313,
th
A/3-69 Armor: 75 314
th th
B/4-64 Armor: 28, 29, 164, A/2-75 Ranger Regiment:
165 186, 188
th
B/2-75 Ranger Regiment:
th
4 Infantry Division: 103, 54, 189, 190, 254, 255
th
212 A/3-75 Ranger Regiment:
10, 12, 13
th th
10 Mountain Division: 109 B/3-75 Ranger Regiment:
th
87 Infantry Regiment: 297 235, 236, 249, 253, 292
nd th th
2 Battalion, 14 Infantry: C/3-75 Ranger Regiment:
138, 185, 217, 218, 209, 10-13
th
310 HHC/3-75 Ranger Regiment:
rd th
3 Battalion, 17 Cavalry: 42 25, 293
st nd
1 Battalion, 22 Infantry:
nd
110, 112 82 Airborne Division
nd nd st th
2 Battalion, 22 Infantry: 1 Battalion, 325 Infantry:
274, 276, 277 202, 264
st th st th
1 Battalion, 87 Infantry: 69, 1 Battalion, 505 Infantry:
73 207, 209, 303, 307
nd th th
2 Battalion, 87 Infantry: 39, A/1-325 Infantry: 203, 264
th
44, 274 B/1-325 Infantry: 203
th th
A/2-14 Infantry: 130, 138, D/1-325 Infantry: 202, 204,
183-185, 308 266
th th
C/2-14 Infantry: 130, 137, B/1-505 : 304
th
184 HHC/1-505 Infantry: 208
th
A/3-17 Cavalry: 274
nd st
A/1-22 Infantry: 110 101 Airborne Division
nd
A/2-22 Infantry: 274 (AA): 55, 73, 79
th th
A/2-87 Infantry: 40 187 Infantry Regiment: 297
st th
1 Battalion, 187 Infantry:
th
75 Ranger Regiment: 23, 302
nd th
167 2 Battalion, 187 Infantry:
nd th
2 Battalion, 75 Ranger 65, 294
rd th
Regiment: 58, 59, 63, 186, 3 Battalion, 187 Infantry:
188, 291 170, 172, 240

329
Infantry in Battle
st th th
1 Battalion, 327 Infantry: C/1-508 Infantry Regiment:
139, 267, 269, 272 53, 282
nd th rd
2 Battalion, 327 Infantry: C/2-503 Infantry Regiment:
139, 140, 143, 284, 285 51, 53, 214, 286, 289
rd th
3 Battalion, 327 Infantry:
st
96, 101 1 Marine Division: 119
nd nd st
2 Battalion, 502 Infantry: 1 Regimental Combat Team:
45, 50, 227, 230, 231, 257, 119, 127
rd st
258 3 Battalion, 1 Marines: 123,
rd nd
3 Battalion, 502 Infantry: 124, 126
th
79 L/3-9 Marines: 35, 36, 38
th
A/1-187 Infantry: 193, 196
th nd
A/2-187 Infantry: 66-69 2 Marine Division:
th th
A/3-187 Infantry: 170, 240, 26 MEU: 194
241, 243
th st
D/1-327 Infantry: 267, 270, 1 MEF: 164
271, 273
th
B/2-327 Infantry: 143 V Corps: 113, 164, 170
th th
D/2-327 Infantry: 140-142 E/165 Military Intelligence
th
B/3-327 Infantry: 97 Battalion: 113, 114
th
C/3-327 Infantry: 97
th th
D/3-327 Infantry: 97 13 Russian Tactical Group:
nd
A/2-502 Infantry: 229 218
nd th th
C/2-502 Infantry: 229 5 Battalion, 113 Albanian
nd
D/2-502 Infantry: 259, 263 National Liberation Army
nd
B/3-502 Infantry: 79, 88 Brigade: 50, 51
A/3-11 Military Intelligence:
140
th
A/2-44 Air Defense Artillery:
140
th
A/326 Engineers: 140
st
431 Civil Affairs: 140
rd
173 Airborne Brigade: 210,
213
st th
1 Battalion, 508 Infantry:
280, 292
nd rd
2 Battalion, 503 Infantry
Regiment: 286
th
A/1-508 Infantry: 282

330
 PLACES

Afgoi, Somalia: 40 FOB Eagle: 14, 16, 19

Al Mussayib Euphrates FOB Marez: 116, 174, 180
Bridge: 78 FOB Pacesetter: 103, 104,
Al Qaddisiyah, Iraq: 186, 188 144
An Najaf, Iraq: 113, 114, 139, Fort Campbell, Kentucky: 82,
141, 284, 285 257
As Samawah, Iraq: 202, 264, Four Corners: 89, 93, 294
265
Assembly Area Raider: 197 Golden Mosque of Ali: 141
Awlo, Somalia: 36
H1: 10, 12, 13
Baghdad Int’l Airport: 23, 89, Hawija, Iraq: 286, 289, 290
93, 312 Highway 8: 5, 7, 9, 27, 31,
Baghdad, Iraq: 2, 5, 9, 10, 14, 164, 169, 222-224, 294,
25, 27, 78, 88, 89, 92, 93, Highway 9: 197
101, 164, 168, 204, 240, HLZ 13: 70, 74
294, 312 HLZ 13a: 70, 74
Bagram, Afghanistan: 73, 292
Baidoa, Somalia: 36, 38 Iraqi Missile Defense School:
Balad, Iraq: 211, 213 238
Baledogle Airfield: 41, 42 Iraqi Secretariat: 170
BP Ginger: 70, 71, 73, 300
BP Heather: 70 Jacobabad, Pakistan: 193,
194
Char China Valley, Jolan District: 119, 122-124,
Afghanistan: 274, 277 126-128
Columbus, Georgia: 2
Kandahar, Afghanistan: 274-
Debelde, Macedonia: 229 276
Dhex-Yaal, Somalia: 36-38 Karach, Iraq: 272
Karbala Gap: 78, 79, 88
Euphrates River: 2, 75, 77, Karbala, Iraq: 78-80, 87, 88,
78, 119, 202 197, 222
Kirkuk, Iraq: 51, 211-213, 280,
Fallujah, Iraq: 55, 118, 119, 286, 289
121, 126, 127, 189, 207, Klokot, Kosovo: 258, 259,
208, 210, 303, 304, 307 261, 263, 264
FOB Blickenstaff: 174

331
Infantry in Battle
Kosovo: 45, 49, 50, 217, 227- OBJ Larry: 6, 7, 27, 28, 30,
231, 257-259, 317 164-166, 168-170
Kumanovo, Macedonia: 50, OBJ Moe: 6, 7, 27, 28, 30,
230 164-166, 168-170
Kuwait: 75, 103, 255 OBJ New Hampshire: 122,
123
Lantabur, Somalia: 40, 42 OBJ Peach: 75, 78
Letnica, Kosovo: 229 OBJ Pennsylvania: 122-126
Lipkovsko Valley, Kosovo: 49 OBJ Rams: 113
OBJ Saints: 27, 30, 164, 167
Macedonia: 45, 227-231 OBJ Vermont: 122
Makmuhr, Iraq: 271, 272
Marka, Somalia: 40 Qatar: 210, 211
Mijack, Macedonia: 229 Qayarrah, Iraq: 267
Mogadishu, Somalia: 44, 109,
110, 130, 138, 167, 183- Rabea’a, Iraq: 172, 240
185, 233, 248, 308, 313, Ramadi, Iraq: 55, 189
314
Mosul Airfield: 174 Saddam Int’l Airport: 170,
Mosul, Iraq: 96, 116, 118, 173, 238
144, 146, 174, 175, 179, Sadr City, Iraq: 14-16, 20, 21
181 Samarra, Iraq: 103, 104, 106
Shah-I-Kot Valley: 66, 69, 72,
National Street: 130, 131, 74, 297
308, 310 Sorbaghi River: 70
Spiral Hill: 170
OBJ Auburn: 55, 57, 58, 189, Syria: 55, 96, 172, 189, 240-
254 242, 244
OBJ Curly: 6, 7, 27, 30, 164-
169, 294 Takur Ghar Mountain: 71
OBJ Daly: 164 Tetovo, Macedonia: 230
OBJ Fox: 140
OBJ Grady: 164 Vitina, Kosovo: 257, 258, 260,
261

332