Americans On Target U S Army Tank Gunnery Excellence Canadian Army Trophy Competition USA 1989

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C') Special Report 12
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Americans
on Target:
<: U.S. Army Tank Gunnery Excellence
Canadian Army Trophy Competition
1987
John S. Caldwell, Jr.
August 1989
DTIC
ELECTE
SF" t 1-J8g
}United States Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
EDGAR M. JOHNSON JON W. BLADES
Technical Director COL, IN
Commanding
NOTICES
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Americans on Target: U.S. Army Tank Gunnery Excellence Canadian Army Trophy
Competition--1987
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) Ils PAGE COUNJT
Final FROM 7/87 TO7L89 I
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
17. COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Training Tank Glnnery
Selection Training Devices
Armor
19. ABTRACT (Conjinue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
ine Canadlan Army Trophy (CAT) competition is a biennial tank gunnery contest organized
and administered by Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe. The preparation for CAT is
intense in that the prestige of Armies and equipment often rides on the outcome. It involves
the selection and assignment of personnel, optimm use of unique capabilities of equipment an
effective utilization of training resourcs. Thus the methods used to prepare for CAT, while
not directly applicable to similar situations in the day-to-day Army, do result in sucesses
and failures that indicate possibilities for positive change in doctrine and equipment.
This report reviews the preparation and conduct of U.S. participation in CAT during 1987.
It presents these activities against a backqround of previous cmpetitions and some of the ac
tivities of other countries. The writer, a participant in one of the CAT units, attempts to
provide this information in a format that would aid in determining possible irprovements to
doctrine and equipment. In-so-far as parallels may be drawn between the conditions obtaining
during the CAT competition and those of pre-combat or cxvbat situations the information shoul
be useful to Personnel specialists, trainindely and gipnt l
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ARI Special Report 12
19. Abstract (continued)
participant in one of the CAT units, attempts to provide this in-
formation in a format that would aid in determining possible
improvements to doctrine and equipment. Insofar as parallels may
be drawn between the conditions obtaining during the CAT competi-
tion and those of pre-combat or combat situations, the information
should be useful to personnel specialists, training developers,
and equipment developers.
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Special Report 12
Americans on Target:
U.S. Army Tank Gunnery Excellence
Canadian Army Trophy Competition
1987
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Department of the Army
August 1989
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
AijJ
FORE\VrORD
The Army Research Institute maintains a program of researchi in Armor
personnel performance and training issues and continually seeks information that would
assist in the derivation of problem areas or indicate promising techniques. As a crucible
of concentrated personnel and training activity the Canadian Army Trophy (CAT)
competition provides a unique opportunity to study the results of different approaches
and methods for personnel selection, assignment and training. file result, of this
competition do not lend themselves to experimental analysis. Small nuniLhrs of units
and personnel are involved: variations in techniques occur randomly within units; and
the final performance measure, CAT score, is restricted in range. Thus, analyses of tile
competition events have been restricted t piecemeal statistics from which subjective
reviews can be attempted and observations by researchers participating in the event.
ARI has previously published two sucI, reports on CAT 85 and CAT 87. This report
adds to that body of subjective information.
The report differs from previous publications in that it \ kas written by a military
participant in one of the units participating in CAT 1987. The report )provides much
more detailed procedural information than would be available to an1 oLitside observer
and a firmer basis for subjective evaluation of the different techniques. The writer has
provided his own interpretation but the reader is provided the information to form his
own conclusions. And while the writers style may at times be considered biased by his
personal involvement, zeal, or fervent patriotism, his evalLataons of procedures are well
worth consideration.
Tile contents of this report have been disseminated to many of the participants in
CAT 87 and CAT 89. The report has also been provided to Army departments
responsible for personnel and training policies and to the materiel development
community. It is published to provide wider consideration within tile personnel and
training community.
EDGAR M. OHNSON
Technical Director
v
Preface
4
Introduction and Competition Background
Chapter
1. Warning to the Warsaw Pact 9
2. The "Lives" of CAT 12
The Purposes of CAT 13
A Review of the Competition 15
CAT: 1963-1981 16
CAT: 1982-1985 21
CAT: 1987 26
Rules and Conditions 28
Battlerun Description and Conduct 29
Building a Winning Team
3. The Baseline: Strategy and 1987 Results 43
The Winning Strategy 44
CAT '87 Results
46
Review of American Results 52
vii
b
4. Manning a CAT Winner 56
CAT '87--The U.S. Chain of Command 57
The Parent U.S. Army Divisions 58
The Battalion Commander and Staff 60
Company Leaders 62
Other Team Members 73
The Team Concept 77
Manning: Conclusions 81
5. Training a CAT Winner 84
Target Acquisition and Fire Distribution
86
Home Station Training
89
Major Training Areas
97
Training Simulators
109
UCOFT
111
SIMNET 114
Stress Control 122
Training: Conclusions 128
6. Equipping and Supporting a CAT Winner 133
Equipment and Support: Conclusions 141
Where Do We Go from Here?
7. The Benefits of CAT 145
Advanced State-of-the-Art Training. 146
The Materiel Acquisition Process 149
Recruiting and Retention 151
Human Skills Development 152
Interoperability with Our Allies 153
Conclusions 153
viii
*
8. Future CATS: Challenges and Pay-offs 155
Night Firing 156
More Realistic Terrain 158
Simulated Enemy Fires 158
Chemical Threat Environment 159
Increase the Challenges--Increase the Payoffs 159
Excellence Achieved-Keep Pushing 160
Bibliography 161
Index 164
ix
U.S. Army Tank Gunnery Excellence
Canadian Army Trophy Competition- -1987
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor
U.S. Army
Words of Winners -
Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition
1987
"We saw the opportunity there, and we said-- we've got
to do it. We could taste it. Every time we went down
range we acted lie it was the real thincj...We all wanted
it so bad. It was there and within reach-- and we
weren't going to let it go. "1
PFC Steven Kuhn
Driver, D14, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
"U.t's kind of hard to [explai]-- the feeling when they said
we had won. My brain just went eLsewhere for a second.
Then 'L thought--we actucdy won. It still blows me
away... I just couldn't believe it. I had tears in my eyes.
It was a great feeling. I felt like we'd won the Olympics
or something. That's what l would equate it to.,,
2
PFC Brent Berry
CAT '87
-That's what makes America--people reaching down and
putting out what they have when they need it."3
SSG James Traxler
Tank Commander, D23, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
3
a F
Preface
In June 1987, an American tank platoon seized the top spot in
the Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) tank gunnery competition for the
first time in the 24 year history of the NATO contest. With a margin
of victory of only a few seconds, that platoon -- First Platoon, D
Company, 4-8 Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division, bettered a near perfect
performance by the recently dominant Germans and deadly accurate
shooting by other American, Belgian, British, Canadian, Dutch and
German platoons.
Those precious few seconds that won the American victory,
earned in a year of intense preparation, will ignite a new round of
friendly competition among NATO's armored units. This competition
will advance the state-of-the art in tank gunnery, tank design and
maintenance, and crew ..nd unit training. The new levels of
excellence achieved through this competition -- once they are spread
beyond the competing units -- can serve to strengthen the
conventional ground forces of NATO at exactly the time their
deterrent role may grow in significance.
I am writing this paper to tell the comprehensive CAT story --
one far broader than those found in competitors' after action reports.
I cover what CAT is and why it is important for the U.S. Army to
compete and win, what it takes to win, what are the rewards, and my
view of how tank training and competition should develop in the
future. This paper takes an in-depth look at the evolution of this
intense and significant, but little-publicized competition, in order to
generate an appreciation for that intensity and significance.
I present first hand insight into many of the key issues,
constraints and decisions faced by the American teams on their way
to CAT '87. In some cases, I examine the details of the CAT '87
results and the key features of the winner's program (especially
training) and compare them with other American team programs in
order to determine the factors that made a difference -- that
produced the winning margin. The personal views of several CAT '87
winning soldiers enrich the paper. At the conclusion, I give my
views of the current and potential benefits of the CAT competition --
and project the direction the competitior should go in the future to
increase these benefits.
4
My target audience is far broader than the CAT competitors --
past and future -- although this work should be of immediate
interest and value to them. The audience I am really "Tving to
convert is the top leadership of the U.S. Army -- our generals that
can influence the training and support of our troops in the field and
the materiel acquisition process that equips them. They need to
know about the competition -- what it takes to win, the risks, the
cogtq, and the pay-offs. Then, through vision and innovation, much
as has been accomplished at the National Training Center for
maneuver warfare, we can extend the levels of excellence achieved
by the American competitors in CAT '87 and strengthen the U.S.
Army and our alliances.
Because my purpose for writing this paper is multi-faceted,
and because my target audience is broad, I provide this guide for
reading the paper.
The first section of the paper, "Introduction and CAT
Background", contains two chapters. Chapter I - Warning to
the Warsaw Pact, issues a strong warning to the Warsaw Pact not
to test the lethality of NATO's tank forces and thus places CAT in
what I believe to be its proper context, that is, a competitive proving
ground to develop and demonstrate improved combat capabilities.
Chapter 2 - The "Lives" of CAT, traces the evolution of the CAT
competition, discusses some of the trends, spotlights some of the
public fallout at home and abroad, and features a narration of the
winning American battlerun. All should read these two chapters.
The next section, "Building a CAT Winner", is somewhat
like an after-action report and contains four chapters. Chapter 3 -
The Baseline: CAT '87 Results, examines the results of CAT '87 to
establish the basis for comparing the programs of the American
teams. Chapter 4 - Manning a CAT Winner, gives insights into
the competing American units and describes their CAT team
personnel selection procedures. Each was a little different, and
reflected the special constraints facing each unit commander and his
solutions. Chapter 5 - Training a CAT Winner, covers the major
features of the team training programs. This is a key chapter and it
discloses the trenr-ndous training resource requirements and the
disparities among the units. It also features the story of how
Simulation Networking f!IMNET) was diverted to support the
American teams' prepara, -is for CAT '87. It is a story of innovation
inspired by competitic- iat rivals any documented in ar o
5
Excellencf. , and should be of interest to Army leaders. Chapter 6 -
Equipping and Supporting a CAT Winner, summarizes the key
equipment and support factors and describes how each unit
addressed them. These chapters will be most valuable to those
seeking lessons-learned in preparation for future CAT competitions.
The final section, "Where Do We Go from Here?", embodies my
major purposes for writing this paper and contains two chapters.
Chapter 7 - The Benefits of CAT, gives my evaluation of the
current benefits the U.S. Army and the NATO alliance is gaining from
the CAT competition. Chapter 8 - Future CATs: Challenges and
Pay-offs, presents my views on how the competition should evolve
-- that is, become more oriented on combat-like tasks in order to
substantially increase the return on our huge investment in the
competition. Our generals should read these chapters and work to
implement the ideas that have merit. Finally, the Bibliography is
extensive, and should prove valuable to those interested in winning
CAT again.
I believe my roles in CAT '87 and in developing the M-1
Abrams tank give me a unique perspective from which to write this
analysis. As Commander of 2-66 Armor Regiment from July 1985 -
June 1987, I actively supervised the organization of the battalion to
train and support two of its tank companies to prepare for the
competition. D/2-66 Armor was randomly selected to compete. Our
organization and training program produced excellent results -- but
not good enough to win. First hand knowledge of our strengths and
weaknesses does give me a powerful tool for analysis of other
programs. I personally witnessed nearly every CAT '87 battle run,
the excitement of the contest, and the awesome display of deadly
skill of the free world's best tank soldiers. As a research and
development coordinator for the Project Manager of the M-1 Abrams
tank from August 1980-July 1983, I was deeply involved in the
development, production, testing, fixing and fielding of the tank's
turbine engine and power train.
Those early times were dark ones for the Abrams tank, as its
critics gained an initial upper hand with claims that it was nothing
more than an expensive "lemon" that spewed flames from its jet
engine and then broke down every 43 miles. The credibility of the
Army's leadership was openly questioned over the acquisition of this
"inferior" tank. The program barely survived. But how wrong the
critics were! As I watched the American platoons from the 3rd
Armored Division, the 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored
6
Division (Forward) employ the Abrams with such skill and reliability
in CAT '87, my chest swelled with pride. I realized I had grown with
and helped deliver this tank from the factory floors of Connecticut,
Michigan and Ohio, to the dusty, muddy testing fields of Fort Hood
and Fort Knox, to our forward deployed troops facing freedom's
enemies in Europe, to the winner's circle of the most prestigious tank
gunnery competition in the world.
This research paper was prepared while the American
celebration of its CAT '87 victory was in full swing and, in part, is
intended to "wave the American flag" and glorify the American
soldier. After all, American tax payeis have invested billions of
dollars in their tank forces and deserve to see a return on their
investment. But I do not want this important theme diminished --
the Belgian, British, Canadian, Dutch and German competing teams
were highly skilled and professional. Some, equipped with older
model tanks, even outperformed some American and German
platoons equipped with advanced M-l's and Leopard 2's. We trained
with them and competed against them in preparation for CAT '87.
Their skills set the standard to beat in 1987, and they will be very
difficult to beat in CAT 1989. They are our allies, and their well
equipped and highly trained soldiers will be on our flanks to defeat
any Warsaw Pact ground attack into Western Europe.
This work is dedicated to the many committed people, soldiers
and civilians, who put the Abrams tank into the hands of American
soldiers and trained them to use it in the defense of freedom as well
as to win CAT '87. Special recognition goes to the late Major General
Duard D. Ball, who served as the Program Manager from July 1980 -
July 1983 and guided the program thru its darkest days.
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Author
I From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Soldier's Radio and
Television, February 1988.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
7
Unrduto
8n
Ch~pter
Warning to the Warsaw Pact:
If you make the decision to attack NATO ground forces in
Western Europe, the most highly skilled, best equipped and
supported armored forces in the world will cut you to
ribbons. You may attack in great mass and obscure the battlefield
with smoke and artillery, but your tank and motorized rifle
companies will meet face-to-face with platoons that will acquire
them at great ranges under the most adverse conditions, hit their
armored vehicles more than 90 per cent of the time with first shots,
and kill them in less than 10 seconds per shot. We can kill you from
stationary protected battle positions or we can counterattack you
with blazing speed and hit you with little or no loss of accuracy. It
makes no difference to us whether you are moving or not. Our fire
controls make your tanks and BMPs (Soviet personnel carriers) easy
prey for our gunners. If you decide to slow your attack to dismount
your infantry for close in protection of your armor, your losses will
mount faster. Our tank crews, on the move with their stabilized
coaxial machine-guns and thermal sights, have the capability to
acquire and kill nearly 100 per cent of the troops they face. You will
not be able to find a significant weakness because this capability
exists across the allied front in all the armies.
These tank gunnery skills and capabilities have been
developed over the years and demonstrated in the Canadian Army
Trophy competition every two years. After each competition, the
Americans, Belgians, British, Canadians , Dutch and Germans
carefully study the results, consult with industry and their best
tankers, initiate improvement programs, and renew their de-
termination to improve their combat capabilities and win the next
CAT.
The maneuver and war-fighting skills of the NATO ground
forces have been developed largely by the U.S. Army at its National
Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. There, its heavy battalions
have "competed" against your battle formations and doctrine under
9
the most stressful combat-like conditions. Armed with valuable
lessons and experience from the National Training Center, the U.S.
Army has significantly strengthened the NATO alliance in numerous
combined maneuvers.
We, the American victors in the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy
competition, issue this warning on behalf of our allies and from a
position of strength. The U.S. Army assembled the right combination
of team building skills, modern tanks, top quality soldiers, training
techniques and resources, maintenance capabilities, industry support,
and chain-of-command (top to bottom) commitment to the excellence
required to win. This same formula has strengthened our forces as
the cornerstone of the NATO alliance.
We Americans won because one of our tank platoons scored
slightly higher than a crack German platoon-- with a nearly perfect
score -- and defeated the remainder of the field of very proficient
American, Belgian, British, Canadian, Dutch, and German platoons.
But take no comfort in the American victory, for if you will examine
the results closely, you will find a very high level of performance by
all competitors and only a small difference between the highest and
the lowest teams. Nearly all teams performed better against higher
standards than in previous contests. So, it is a fact that the
competition is producing winners that are setting newer and higher
gunnery standards every contest.
The loser in CAT '87 and future Canadian Army Trophy
competitions is you, the Warsaw Pact! The leadership of the Allied
armies has long recognized the value of CAT competition as a
development tool, and will continue to drive contest standards to
meet or exceed realistic combat conditions, increase levels of
performance and spread the improvements throughout their armies
-- thus widening the combat capabilities gap between your forces
and ours.
This warning, as presented here, serves two purposes. First, it
places the Canadian Army Trophy competition in what I believe to
be its proper context. That is, a competitive proving ground for the
development and demonstration of allied combat gunnery skills. The
"heat" of international competition can unlock true innovation that
will push the limits of performance and set the standard for the rest
10
of the "non-CAT" force. Second, it projects a position of relative allied
military strength versus the Warsaw Pact that does not fully exist
today -- but could exist in the future, if the NATO allies continue
heavy investments in force modernization, efforts such as the CAT
competition, and the U.S. Army's National Training Center.
11
2
The "Lives" of CAT
The Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) competition Is the most
demanding and the most prestigious tank gunnery contest
In the free world. Target acquisition, accuracy and engagement
time standards far exceed national training standards. Even a re-
spectable showing requires a year of intense preparation of men and
equipment. A tank company cannot win CAT without a specific
high priority commitment from its Army's leadership and a shifting
of substantial personnel, equipment, support, and training resources
to reinforce the effort. It is the "major leagues", and those
participants who fail to realize this will see their failures and their
military credibility questioned in major newspapers. The winning
soldiers carry away experience, enhanced reputations, skill and
awards that will serve as building blocks for successful careers.
Their units gain lasting reputations among the free world's armored
forces. The tank and supporting equipment manufacturers advertise
their wares as the best in the world--and often reap the profits
accordingly. The training program is long and grueling for the
contestants--the winners and the others. Consequently, CAT may
have positive or negative effects--and the effects can be substantial
and lasting.
"Untess you're in the Armor and you know
Qbout it, tVs no b
9
decd. Zut Ws the biggest
thin 1 ever wiU attempt for the Army."
PFC Steven Kuhn
CAT '87
12
The Purposes for CAT
The Canadian Army Trophy competition is organized and ad-
ministered by Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).
The .ajcr organizational players are the Northern Army Group
(NOkRTiAG) and the Central Army Group (CENTAG). The competition
began in 1963 with twin purposes-- improve the overall stan-
dards of tank gunnery in NATO and to promote comradeship
and fraternity among the competing forces. At that time, the
Canadian Government donated a silver replica of a Centurion tank
(now known as the Canadian Army Trophy) to be awarded to the
country earning the highest tank gunnery score.
2
The awarding of the trophy for the highest gunnery results has
skewed the emphasis to the first purpose (tank gunnery improve-
ment) because it is measurable, visible, and vital. Above all, the
combat effectiveness of a tank and its crew is judged ultimately by
its efficiency in killing enemy tanks and soldiers. Although there has
not been any reduction of emphasis on tank gunnery improvement,
in recent years there has been a recognition of the growing
significance of the second purpose (close allied relations). Tanks kill
tanks, but the next war in Europe will be fought by an alliance, and
the outcome will depend upon the NATO members' capability to
merge their national resources and focus them against a common
enemy. The recent (beginning in 1983) awarding of the trcphy to
the high scoring Army Group (composed of multiple national teams),
combined with an ever increasing demand throughout Europe for
limited tank training ranges, has both facilitated and forced selected
cooperation and joint training events among the CAT competitors.
This is a very positive trend that is likely to increase and spread far
beyond the CAT competitors. Even so, everyone, especially the
Americans, will notice the colors and bumper markings of the
winning CAT platoon!
13
"rf bges JaCW~ WM uau that
.Amerim
had nem won~ it miS % detunned
AmeWm was 9 to win~ it. I wanted
America to toM it, om w"y or ano -nd
tt wou4 be damn~ ,ia if my p(atowt coi4
tut it. 3
SGT Shaun Banks
Driver, D1i, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
14
A Review of the Competition
The rankings of winners throughout the history of the Canadian
Army Trophy competition are generally accepted, but some might
argue about them, as the criteria for declaring each contest winner
have not always been the same (see Figure 1).
4
In the earlier
contests the national winner was determined by adding the cumula-
tive scores of its firing units. In recent years, the national rankings
and "bragging rights" have been determined by the score of the
highest shooting national tank platoon, while the trophy has been
awarded to the Army Group with the highest cumulative firing score.
CAT Competiti'on Results: 1963-1987
Belgium Canada Germany G. Britain Dutch USA
1963 1 4 2 5 3 -
1964 l(tie) 5 1(tie) 3 4 -
1965 2 3 5 1 4 -
1966 2 4 3 1 5 -
1967 3 1 4 2 5 -
1968 1 5 2 3 4 -
1970 - 3 2 1 - -
1973 - - 1 2 3 -
1975 3 - 1 2 - -
1977 3 1 2 4 5 6
1979 2 5 1 3 - 4
1981 2 4 1 5 6 3
1983 * 4 3 1 5 - 2
1985 * 4 6 1 5 3 2
1987 * 5 4 2 6 3 1
* Trophy to winning Army Group: 1983 CENTAG
1985 NORTHAG
1987 CENTAG
CENTAG Team: Canada, Germany, USA
NORTHAG Team: Belgium, Dutch, Germany, G. Britain, USA
Figure 1.
15
Underlying these results are some significant factors and issues--
some subtle, some not so subtle-- that have influenced the standings
and trends in performance. The early strong performance by the
Belgians persisted until the 1980's. The Belgians are still equipped
with the older German Leopard 1 tank. The Germans have
consistently given a strong performance for the duration of the
contest, virtually dominating the competition in the 1980s (six wins,
never lower than 2nd place). The German forces are equipped with a
mixture of German Leopard I and Leopard 2 tanks, but the winning
teams have been equipped with Leopard 2's since 1981. The British
team performance is in general deterioration after years of
successful finishes. British teams have been equipped with British
Chieftains until CAT '87, when the new British Challenger made its
debut. During the steady improvement of the American teams,
culminating with a win in CAT '87, at least part of the American
competitors have been equipped with the American M-1 Abrams
tank beginning with CAT '83 . For CAT '87 , all American teams had
M-1's or M-1 variants.
The competition has evolved over the years as the tanks,
supporting equipment, training techniques and devices, soldiers and
threat have become ever more capable. Throughout the evolution,
often with fierce, preliminary, administrative infighting among the
participants over rules and conditions, CAT has served its original
purposes very well. This evolution works to our benefit as long as it
continues to push the state-of-the-art of combat capabilities, and
does not depart from the promotion of partnership and cooperation
among the NATO Allies.
CAT: 1963-1981 5
From the start, Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe
(AFCENT) acted as the executive agent for Canada, conducting the
competition. A Committee of Control , chaired by an AFCENT General
Officer with representation from each competing nation , Northern
Army Group, Central Army Group and the Canadian Ministry of De-
fense, was established to formulate and issue the rules and condi-
tions for each competition. This organization has endured through
1987, and the power and influence of the- committee of control on the
outcome of the contest cannot be overstated. The committee controls
16
almost every aspect and detail of the competition--down to and in-
cluding target size and ranges, firing order, crew eligibility rules,
team selection criteria, firing unit organization, training resources
and many others. The bottom line--rules and conditions clearly fa-
vorable to any one national team are unlikely to survive a vote.
The early CATs were relatively simple contests. The national
teams, comprised of varying numbers of tank platoons organized ac-
cording to national standards, formed groups of single tanks along a
firing line and engaged stationary targets. The contest progressed to
single tanks moving along a course road engaging stationary targets.
By 1968, the complexity and costs had risen to the extent that the
decision was made to hold the competition bi-annually. By 1981, the
competing unit was a three-tank platoon negotiating a platoon battle
run firing while on the move and stationary at 18 main gun targets,
both moving and stationary, and 60 stationary troop targets. Thirty
main gun and 750 machine-gun rounds were permitted.
When the United States first entered CAT in 1977, it was initi-
ated into a new world of tank gunnery and finished dead last by a
substantial margin. The US team showed only marginal
improvement in CAT '79 with a next-to-last finish. However, some
significant issues (see Figure 2.) influencing these outcomes do not
show up in the "box score." These issues -- discussed not to offer ex-
cuses for poor performance -- give some insight into the nuances of
the competition.
ENiDU.IG CAT ISSUES
(Subtle but Substantial)
0 Location/ Control of Competition Range
0 Competing Teams' Organization
0 Team Selection Methodology
Figure 2.
17
* I
The location of the CAT competition tank range is a major issue.
Because of extremely demanding accuracy and time standards re-
quired to win CAT, range familiarity, accumulated over time, is a
winning edge. Even though exact battle run target scenarios might
be unknown or random, knowledge of target locations, distance to
targets, vegetation, dead space, etc., are almost certain to produce
additional target hits in less time. Through CAT '79 , all of the
competitions were held at Bergen-Hohne, a NATO training area
familiar to our European Allies, but with limited access for American
tank units. A serious evaluation of competition results must consider
this "home field" factor. Because the competing national armies have
come to fully recognize the potential advantages of this factor, a
change occurred. Since CAT '81 , hosted by the United States at its
training base in Grafenwoehr , Germany, the competition range
location has alternated between Bergen Hohne and Grafenwoehr.
The organization of the CAT teams relative to their standard
national organizations is another significant issue. When the directed
CAT organization materially differs from the standard national orga-
nization, there is an undeniably negative impact on team-building
potential and unit readiness. The typical CAT team is a tank
company comprised of a designated number of firing tank platoons
with a designated number of tanks. For CAT '81 , the competing
national company teams consisted of five tank platoons of three
tanks each. Although this was partially compatible with some of our
allies' standard organizations, it was completely foreign to the US
Army's tank company organization. The standard US tank company
of three platoons had recently undergone a transition from five to
four tanks. The CAT three tank configuration forced a break of unit
integrity and familiar command and control procedures in the face of
the most stringent performance standards.
A third subtle but significant issue, the method for selecting
the competing teams, tends to influence the CAT outcome. There are
three major elements here -- team selection, the timing of the selec-
tions relative to the actual competition, and resources (primarily
tank main gun ammunition and tank training ranges) allocated to the
selected teams. Although countries are free to establish their own
internal methods for CAT team selection up to a point, much of the fi-
nal selection procedure is standardized and directed by the Commit-
tee of Control in the CAT rules and conditions. The selection options
generally range from the establishment of a single "gladiator"
company of highly skilled, CAT-experienced soldiers, to a random
18
selection from a designated pool of tank companies generally
representative of the national tank forces. The timing of the team
selections, in combination with permissible resource allocations, will
have a tremendous impact upon team organization and training
strategy, as well as the combat readiness of the units. In general, the
smaller armies tend to adopt a strategy to enter their predesignated
,gadiaiur companies and force the large armies (Germany and the US)
into a random selection late in the training cycle. Late selection
tends to dilute resources and put the large army teams on an "equal"
resource basis with the smaller armies. This tug-of-war is usually
resolved by a different compromise for each CAT.
Although the US teams showed steady progress during their
early years in CAT, their highest finish, third in 1981, drew severe
criticism in our national press.
6
19
Contests Cast Doubt
on U.S. Readiness
By John J. Flaka
Washington Star Staff Writer
Tank .... crews from what are sup-
posed to be some of the most combat
-ready units in the U.S. military
have been beaten in several recent
military competitions by their NATO
counterparts.
The poor U.S. showings, coming at
a time when the Reagan adminis-
tration's defense policy is focused
on the need to buy more wt.apons,
may offer further evidence that
man- power and training probleins
are more critical than hardware
Washington Star , 19 July 1981
Figure 3.
The far-reaching implications of such criticism are difficult to
over-estimate. Major acquisition programs can be jeopardized. Troop
morale throughout the U.S. armed forces can be damaged. Public
confidence in and support of our military forces can be seriously de-
graded. The deterrence value of our alliances can be diminished, as
the readiness of the foundation forces is questioned.
Unfortunately, the U.S command structure in Europe was slow
to recognize the potential risks of merely participating in, rather than
winning, the Canadian Army Trophy competition. In February 1982,
General Kroesen , CINCUSAREUR, was questioned in the Senate Ap-
20
propriations Committee regarding the poor performance of American
teams.
"Q. General Kroesen, many observers look to international
competition as a way of measuring the training or readiness of U.S.
forces. What emphasis does your command place on international
competition?
A. "...... Our philosophy with respect to international
competitions has always been that they disrupt normal training, are
no measure of the true readiness or competence of the whole force,
but that they are an excellent peacetime pursuit which contribute to
high morale and esprit de corps among the soldiers and units which
compete for the honor of representing the United States. In the past
we sent our competitors into matches as normal well-trained crews.
The poor showing in past years was the result, and we had to learn
to marshall resources, engage in special training, and assure close ad-
herence to special competition practices and procedures ........ 7
In the early 1980s, with strong recruiting and retention pro-
grams taking hold, new M-1 tanks and training technologies on the
way, and some "CAT savvy" earned the hard way, the U.S. Army
made the commitment to win CAT in the future.
CAT: 1983-1985
The U.S. Army's fight to win CAT would prove to be an uphill
battle but promised to pay the rewards that accrue to winners.
Through CAT '81 , the competition was structured on a national
basis with the result that emphasis was being placed on excellence in
tank gunnery at the noticeable expense of allied cooperation. And
the competition was indeed sharp, alerting the AFCENT leadership
that it needed to bolster the second purpose, fostering teamwork
among the allies.
Beginning with 1983, in a restructured competition, the Cana-
dian Army Trophy was awarded to the Army Group team [Central
Army Group (CENTAG) or Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)] with the
highest composite score. For the most part, this has been a very pos-
itive change. The national teams have even conducted some joint
CAT training events, and the cooperation has been good.
21
The formation of Army Group teams placed German and U.S.
units on both teams, thus somewhat diluting their concentration of
effort and resources--but also increasing the numbers of firing pla-
toons and the mathematical probability of winning. There was a
more subtle positive effect for the Americans. It significantly ex-
panded the number of soldiers with CAT experience and U.S. appre-
ciation for the high levels of performance a unit can achieve.
The American tankers made a strong showing in CAT '83 , at
Grafenwoehr. But it was not strong enough to beat a German platoon
equipped with Leopard lAls. One American company (3-64 Armor ,
3 ID), the first unit equipped with M-ls, had a platoon that finished
second. Another American company (2-66 Armor , 2 AD Forward),
equipped with older M60Als finished third. Another American com-
pany (1-32 Armor , 3 AD) gave a creditable performance.
8
The 1983 British competitors, with upgraded fire controls in
their Chieftain tanks, could place a platoon no higher than ninth in a
field of 10. The British press was quick to highlight their results:
"Gunnery of British Tanks a Disaster
Serious doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of
Britain's tank force, and whether the vehicles have any hope
of surviving for long in a battle with the Soviet T72 tank.
The public debut of the new fire control system for the
Army's Chieftain and Challenger tanks in a NATO gunnery
contest in June proved a dismal flop .............
............. one very senior observer, believed to be a high-
ranking general described the British performance in the
biennial competition on Hohne ranges, West Germany, on
June 20-24 as a disaster."
9
Based on this Times article, it appears that the British at-
tributed the major blame for relatively poor performance to defi-
ciencies in the Chieftain tank. Other aspects, vital for success, were
not mentioned.
In the 1985 contest, held at Bergen-Hohne, the Americans fin-
ished only one battlerun from victory. The much anticipated show-
22
down between the American Mls and the modern German Leopard
2s ended with a narrow German victory on the very last battlerun.
The men of 3-64 Armor, 3 ID, finished second; 2-66 Armor and 3-32
Armor finished further back.
10
The first significant trend that emerges in 1985 scoring (see
Figure 4.) is the substantially better performance of the units
equipped with the more modern tanks (Mls, Leo 2s). The contrast is
clear among the three U.S. tank companies, where 3-32 Armor
competed with the older M60 series tanks.
j-CAT '85 Score vs. Firing Order
S L3
CU
0
E 3 3 Legend
I 3-32 Armor
0 00 3-64 Armor
0
0I 2-66 Armor
[]Leo 2 Platoons
FIRING ORDER (first to last)
Figure 4.
A second trend, this one not so discernible--but key to the
competitors-- is the improvement of scores with time in the units
equipped with more modern tanks. This trend peaked when the Ger-
man unit making the last battlerun scored the highest. This trend
may have been more pronounced but for heavy, cold rainfall late in
the contest.
The Americans' near victory seemed to encourage the press to
sharpen its' aim.
1
1
23
%%
If Military Contests
Were Real War, U.S.
Might Be in a Pickle
American Joy Is Short-Lived
At Competition of Tanks;
But Is Anything Proved?
By John J. Fialka
Staff Reporer of the Wall Stet Jousnal
"BERGEN, West Germany.- A bush
comes over the crowd in the stands
as four U.S. Army M-1 tanks
commanded by Lt. David Baker
rumble into position on the field.
Lt. Baker's platoon is one of the
most highly trained tank units
ever. And this is the Canadian Cup,
the Olympics of tank warfare
competition, pitting the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's best
armored units against one another.
After almost a decade of trying, the
U.S. has never won this contest.
o~ooo......-...
This has been a frustrating year
for the U.S. active services in the
little-known arena of military
competitions. Despite the huge
Reagan military buildup, the U.S.
I keeps losing .......
WlStetJunl,'3August 1985 .-: ..
Figure 5.
24
A if
On 23 August 1985, a stinging Wall Street Journal headline set
the negative tone for an article that was actually quite positive re-
garding the overall American performance. Buried deep in the arti-
cle, the reader could discover the fact that the average score of all
American units actually exceeded the German average. Although
such statistics can be likened to the loser of the World Series getting
m.o.,e ovc!a-1 hits than the winner, it paints quite a different picture
than the headline.
12
A civilian friend of mine mailed this article to me in August
1985, shortly after I took command of 2-66 Armor. He was familiar
with my role in developing the M-1, and he knew the battalion had
competed in CAT '85 . After a brief introduction, his letter asked the
pointed question--"What's wrong with U.S. tankers and their new
tank?"
The U.S. tankers knew the answer--but they could not prove
their conclusion without the elusive CAT victory.
"'L didn't even know what t M1 tookvd Like. 'L
knew nothing about it--but 'I Love t...13
PFC Steven Kuhn
Driver, D14, 44 Cavalry
CAT '157
But the foundation had been laid in 1985. In preparation for
CAT '85, the Americans trained hard on a new tank gunnery simula-
tor, the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT). Training with this
simulator (a computer configuration like the gunner and tank
commander stations in the M-1) and a customized "CAT disk" map-
ping the competition range and potential target arrays, the U.S. teams
were able to somewhat offset the lack of range time and do more
battleruns within the main gun ammunition allocation.
Unfortunately, the UCOFTs had not yet arrived in Europe, so all the
teams were flown to Florida to do the training.
14
The CAT '85 performance of the Dutch team (3rd overall, 1st
on the winning NORTHAG team) deserved notice. The Dutch pos-
sessed some obvious advantages, such as being stationed at Bergen-
Hohne and being equipped with the Leopard 2 , but they are also a
small conscript army. Also on the leading edge in some training
technology, they have made a national commitment to win CAT. The
25
Dutch clearly established themselves as leading contenders for future
contests.
The British performance in CAT '85 once again drew fire from
their press:
"British Tank Fares Badly in Contest
Deficiencies in British tanks when compared to the latest
American and West German tanks have again been exposed
in a recent gunnery competition held in West Germany.
..... .......... .. *. .............. o. . . . .. .......... . ... . . ....... . o.... . ........ ...
Military sources in Britain and NATO said the reason the
British squadrons did not do well in the competition was that
their fire control system had been overtaken by more modern
systems on the American M1 Abrams and the West German
Leopard 2 tanks. The main difference appears to be in the
speed at which targets can be acquired and the first shot fired.
One source said that although this difference produced poor
competition results, it did not make the difference between
success and failure in war."
1 5
Once again, the British attributed their poor performance to
their tank rather than to multiple sources such as personnel and
training.
CAT: 1987
The Central Army Group hosted CAT '87 on Range 301 at
Grafenwoehr Training Area, a U.S. controlled major training area.
The American competitors looked forward to the victory that they
had yet to achieve and had narrowly missed in CAT '85.
"Oh yjes, there was Lots of patrioti-sm out
there. We put flags on the sides of the tanks
and flags on the antennas, and we kind of
JUt Like--we definitdj fJet Like we were
America's entries in the Oltjmpic tank
26
gunnery~ [competition]." 16
PFC Brent Berry
Driver, D12,4-8 Cavalry
CAT 17
27
Rules and Conditions
Preparations began early in 1986 with the formulation of the
CAT '87 Rules and Conditions. The major rules and conditions that
governed the preparation for and the conduct of CAT '87 had special
significance for those who were organizing and preparing a competi-
tor. I add commentary (in italics) to amplify the significance of an
item when necessary. There were actually many more items, and
each item was significant and received intense study by competing
units in an attempt to gain some subtle advantage.
1 7
Canadian Army Trophy Committee of Control (CATCC)
0 The presence of all CATCC members or authorized
representatives is required to hold a meeting. Committee decided all
rules and conditions--and all changes.
0 At least 70% (9 of 12) members must agree on any decision.
Only one of these members was American.
The Competition
0 Competition between tank platoons from NORTHAG and tank
platoons from CENTAG is as follows:
NORTHAG CENTAG
I (Belgian) Corps 2 Platoons II (German) Corps 2 Platoons
I (British ) Corps 3 Platoons III (German) Corps 2 Platoons
I (German) Corps 2 Platoons V (U.S.) Corps 3 Platoons
I (Dutch) Corps 2 Platoons VII (U.S.) Corps 3 Platoons
2 AD (Fwd) (U.S.) 3 Platoons 4 CMBG (Canadian) 2 Platoons
5 Companies/12 Platoons 5 Companies/12 Platoons
0 Each platoon organizes with its organic number of tanks.
This was a change from the past and was urged by the U.S.
0 The host army group (CENTAG) informs HQ AFCENT of the
competition range selection not later than 1 January 1987.
0 The competition range is out of bounds to all companies in
the random selection pool from 1 January until the competition.
28
Team Selection Criteria
0 Random selection pool. Each Army Group Corps designates
minimum of one company from two different battalions; each sepa-
rate brigade designates a minimum of two companies. The U.S. urged
the random concept in an attempt to overcome a perceived advan-
tage gained in the past by some countries that pooled and concen-
trated especially skilled tankers.
0 The formation of special companies and/or alteration of na-
tional personnel assignment policies for the competition is prohib-
ited. The limits of this rule were liberally interpreted.
0 Headquarters AFCENT makes a random selection of the tank
companies to compete no later than 1 April 1987.
0 Tank commanders and gunners may not compete in succes-
sive CATs in the same duty position as the preceding CAT.
Exceptions may be made, for example, as in the case of a 1985 tank
commander promoted to Platoon Sergeant. The U.S. had lobbied for a
provision like this to break up alleged "professional CAT teams" of
some allies. It had some adverse impact on 2-66 Armor as it filled
out its required two tank companies for the random selection pool.
0 Company rosters (by crew position) for all companies in the
pool must be submitted by 27 March 1987. Only those on this
roster will be permitted to compete in June.
Other Key Rules
0 Total main armament ammunition expenditure for desig-
nated tank companies is not to exceed 134 rounds per crew from 1
October 1986 to the competition.
0 Main gun zeroing procedures must be done according to na-
tional procedures.
Battle Run Description and Conduct
Every CAT platoon battle run is supervised by the Chief Judge.
However, the national judge of the army of the firing platoon issues
all instructions to the platoon leader during the battle run.
29
'Btj this time 1L wvas so pumnpedL up I was
ruaty to co out there. l n couE do it. I
Iimew l w dto o itU anl kmA tuw otdr
guys wou[Ldoit too. I hptheywem
feulng the som Insid us 1 was. 1. new I
an" 9o out thre nd pump thosw rounms
int the trqipu.0
18
Corporal Jeffery Normand
Gunner, D11, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
About two hours before its battle run the platoor. occupies the
calibration range and is allowed one hour to zero its tank weapons.
In the case of the First Platoon, one of its tanks failed to zero
properly, requiring the crew to quickly swap tanks.
"Sge at ?UwUm, tpu've done this before.
Ut's nothn new to you." 19
ILT Edward Masser
Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon
D Company, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
Upon the completion of zeroing, the American platoon moves to
a waiting area until called forward by the national judge. On the
orders "MOVE TO BOUND ONE" and "CARRY OUT ACTION," the platoon
leader dashes (as only the Mls will dash) the platoon along a trail
past the spectator stands--full of soldiers, families, and contractors
waving unit and American colors. The platoon's favorite recording,
the background music from the movie "Top Gun," blares out over the
loud speaker system. Upon arrival at Bound One, the platoon has two
minutes to prepare the weapon systems to fire. The platoon leader
transmits "READY" in precisely two minutes.
The national judge commands, "WATCH YOUR FRONT." The
tank commanders and gunners scan their SOP-designated sectors
with an uncommon concentration. There is a delay as the computer
activates the proper targets. Then, over the platoon radio
net,"TARGETS UP" initiates the platoon's target acquisition and fire
distribution system. The platoon gunners "kill" the target array (see
Figure 6.) in seven seconds, even though 40 seconds are available!
30
Concise crew reports are transmitted to the platoon leader to account
for all targets, target hits, and ammunition fired.
V -8 Simultaneous Targets
-Moving & stationary
J-Ranges 600-1600 meters
0
Stationary Tanks
BOUND 1
Figure 6.
When the scenario calls for no more targets to be presented, all
targets are lowered. The national judge commands, "YOUR FRONT IS
CLEAR. MOVE TO BOUND TWO."
The platoon leader moves the American platoon--all eyes riv-
eted to assigned sectors. The first targets to appear (see Figure 7.)
are the troop targets (falling plates). Some of the tanks engage these
with the startling accuracy of their stabilized machine guns while
others watch for the inevitable main gun targets. "TARGETS UP"
barely beats the first blast of the main guns from the stable plat-
forms of their moving Mls. Suddenly, there is a call for help from
one of the tanks as its machine gun switch fails to operate--pre-
venting the gunner from engaging his troop targets.
31
"...we were prepared for anything to go
wrong. t happened to us aU the time. We'd
Just sayj get out of the waJ quick, do it ,jix
it .... Lt hWps if yjou have waj in the back of
your mind that sonething might happen.
then you handLe it better than saying
nothing's going to happen.- 20
SP4 Steven Kuhn
CAT '87
The wing tank switched to the partial set of troop targets in
time to hit all but three before it was unsafe to cross fire. The other
tanks switched sectors, as planned, to account for all main gun
targets, target hits, and ammunition remaining.
O3 2 Targets
I Simultaneous
1200 meters
-40 Troop targets
Stationary
200 meters
.... ..... Moving Tanks
MOVEMENT - Bound 1 to Bound 2
Figure 7.
Then the tanks accelerate their power-packed 1500 horse-
power turbine engines to sprint to the next bound to beat the
penalty clock.
32
At Bound Two, the platoon analyzes their "new" sector--they
have seen it hundreds of times before on the Simulation Network
(SIMNET) trainers. The national judge issues the command "WATCH
YOUR FRONT." The nerve-racking delay takes forever as the com-
puter activates the targets. "TARGETS UP" pierces the airway as
three targ % appear (see Figure 8.). They are quickly taken outl
Four more appear.
"I was down there. Whenever we weren't
movitng I had my binocuiars up in tnj UttLe
driver's periscope and 1 saw [target] 426
came up--and L said, it's 426--and SGT
Xnox knew ,nx voice read weL and he knew
exacdy whre .... and we got it, Like two
seconds after we hit the Lost one."
21
PFC Brent Berry
CAT '87
They are hit! The accounting procedure begins. Four more
targets appear--unlike any preceding scenario. They are quickly hit
and counted. The round count is passed to the platoon leader.
33
I
E3
-311
Staggered
targets
M
3 groups
(3-4-4)
Moving
& stationary
1000-2000
meters
Stationary Tanks
BOUND 2
Figure 8.
The national judge issues the command "YOUR FRONT IS CLEAR.
MOVE TO BOUND THREE." The platoon leader moves his platoon and
encounters a target array (see Figure 9.) very similar to the move
between Bounds one and two. The targets are hit with ease--just as
they had been during the many practice battle runs.
34
E0
3 Targets
ISimultaneous
1200-1800 m
-4G Troop targets
Stationary
200 meters
Moving Tanks
MOVEMENT - Bound 2 to Bound 3
Figure 9.
Once again, the tank drivers confidently accelerate their power-
ful turbines to get the platoon to Bound Three before the time runs
out. The speed and power of the Mls buys a large margin of safety
again.
The platoon leader knew he had eight main gun targets re-
maining and plenty of ammunition as he waited for the national
judge's "WATCH YOUR FRONT" command. He did not know how they
would appear. But his platoon was ready as the tank commanders
and gunners concentrated on their sectors.
The national judge issued the command. "TARGETS UP" soon
followed as the expected eight targets (see Figure 10.) appeared si-
multaneously, many of them tucked into the shadows of the distant
wood line. Almost instantly, four shots cracked from the tank can-
nons--then a short pause--four more tracers streaked to their
35
4M
c -8 Simultaneous Targets
-Moving & stationary
_-Ranges 1000.1600 meters
Stationary Tanks
BOUND 3
Figure 10.
targets. The tank commanders quickly reported eight targets
engaged and hit--five main gun rounds remaining. By the platoon
leader's count, all 32 targets had been sensed as hits.
"A" Lnew the st iw, s. I ktuw th" wt,
adusm' it. And %weu th." StWtmdto adhgmv
14t bd WAe Lt. 1Whun thsj hdia'I it,
tfiwr was no tdUnig mwt cm.Ed Fupp.w
22
ILT Edward Masser
CAT '87
36
The major rules and conditions that governed the actual battle
runs follow.
0 Main Gun. The scenarios, planned by the Chief Judge, will in-
clude a minimum of 18 or 24 targets and a maximum of 27 or 36
targets depending on the number of tanks in a platoon; however, the
total ,.,nber of targets will be the same for each similar sized pla-
toon (the British had three-tank platoons; all others had four-tank
platoons). The Chief Judge will advise Team Captains of the total
number of targets (the decision was 27 and 32, respectively) the day
prior to the competition. The targets will be static or moving (up to
about 20 mph). The movers may be head-on, oblique or broad side.
Without knowing the exact number of targets, there was little option
but to train against the maximum.
0 Machine gun. The scenarios are two groups of 10 targets
(falling metal plates) per firing lane (total of 20 targets per tank).
These targets will be engaged while on the move between bounds.
0 All targets may be engaged by one or more tanks within the
platoon.
0 Each main gun engagement will be comprised of two to eight
targets at various ranges. Main gun targets need not be visible to
each tank within a platoon except on the last bound where all main
gun targets are to be visible to each tank.
0 There will be a minimum of 12 different target scenarios
and two spare scenarios for reruns. In selecting the scenarios, the
Chief Judge will draw them by lot on the evening of the preceding
day at the earliest. Each scenario must include as a minimum:
--Stationary Firing Tanks: Five main gun engagements includ-
ing (1) two engagements with both ratic and moving targets, and (2)
one engagement with six/eight targets depending on platoon size.
--Moving Firing Tanks: Two main gun engagements must be
while on the move against both moving and static targets.
0 During a move, all targets must be engaged while moving.
37
* I
0 The time allowed for each move between bounds will aver-
age about 10 mph.
0 Main gun targets will be exposed for 40 seconds. Their
presentation may be staggered in time. This was new for CAT '87
and substantially increased the degree of difficulty. It was also more
in line with combat conditions.
0 All target hits will be spotted and timed by an individual
observer. All hits are verified by a physical hole count (or a downed
plate in the case of machine gun targets.
0 Scoring
Mgingun Hit Score = (Total target hits x 100) x 100
Total targets
Time Score =Total hit time +(40 sec)x(misses)x 100
Total targets x max exposure time
Hit bonus = 500 points for hits on all targets
Ammunition bonus =(Rounds Remaining)xlOO x 40
Total rounds
(only if all main gun targets are hit)
Machine gun: Hit Score = Targets Hit x 100 x 20
Total Targets
Penalties: 600 Points -not arriving on bound in time; 1000
pts./rnd. -unauthorized use of reserve ammo.
0 Ammunition. Each tank is to stow 10 target practice rounds
for the main armament and 250 rounds of machine gun ammunition.
A reserve of four main gun rounds and 125 machine gun rounds will
also be carried, but used only at the specific direction of a judge.
0 Targets will be in a configuration as shown in Figure 11.
They will be painted a dark color and heated. There will be heated
decoys on the course.
38
Main Gun Targets
70 cm
80 cm
150 cm
230 Cm
Machine Gun Targets
30 cm
30 cm
Figure 11.
0 Some type of visible hit indicator system will be used, if
possible. By about February 1987, it became evident to the
American units that the CATCC had no intention of including hit
indicators (smoke, flares, falling targets, etc.) as this rule specified.
The official reason was that no reliable (>85%) system could be found
and that a system of this reliability would be a source of numerous
protests. We believe that the real reason was that some of the other
competing nations knew that hit indicators would make an American
victory very probable because of the Ml's faster fire control system.
On the other hand, they knew that their 120 mm round penetrator
would make larger holes (thus, much easier and ftaster to sense--
especially with the higher power sights, 13x vs. lOx , of the Leopard
2) than the 105 mm round penetrator of the MI. This would be a big
advantage on the long range targets. The Dutch even made the
decision to use the less accurate 120 mm HEAT round because it
makes a much larger hole than the penetrator of the 120 mm Sabot
round. In fact, HEAT holes can easily be detected with the naked eye
at ranges over 2000 meters. As a consequence of the failure of the
CATCC to include hit indicators, the accurate and rapid sensing of
American shots became a major training issue that was never solved
satisfactorily.
39
In addition to describing the evolution of the Canadian Army
Trophy competition and exposure to the rules governing the contest,
I will cover the detailed results of CAT '87 and try to provide insight
into the intricate process of building the 1987 American CAT teams
in the next section.
2 Ronald E. Kramer and David W. Bessemer, "Tank Platoon Training for the 1987
Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition Using a Simulation Networking
SIMNET) System" (ARI Field Unit-Fort Knox, KY. report), October 1987,p.2.
3 From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Soldier's Radio and
4
5 LTC John C. Heldstab, "International Military Competitions-An Examination of
the Canadian Army Trophy Competition", US Army War College, Carlisle, PA., 15
April 1982, pp.2-4.
6 John J. Fialka, " Contests Cast Dzubt on U.S. Readiness", The Washington Star.
19 July 1981, p.2.
7 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Insert for the Record, 23 February, Line
16, p.
7 7
.
8 Major James D. Brown and Captain K. Steven Collier. "The Dinosaurs Ain't
Dead!", Armor, September-October 1983, p. 21.
9 "Gunnery of British Tanks a Disaster", The Times. 5 September 1983, p. 2g.
10 U.S. Army Armor School (ATSB-WP-GD) Memorandum, Subject: Trip Report-
1985 Canadian army Trophy (CAT) Competition, 12 July 1985, pp.
4
-
1 2
.
1 John J. Fialka, "If Military Contests Were Real War, U.S. might Be in a
Pickle", Wall Street Journal- 23 August 1985, p.1.
12 Ibid.
14 U.S. Seventh Army Training Center. Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) After
Action Report, 3 September 1985, p.
3
.
15 Rodney Cowton, "British Tank Fares Badly in Contest", The Times. 27 June
1985, p.5.
17 HQ AFCENT. Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition 15-19 June 1987 Rules
and Conditions, 2 June 1986.
40
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
41
Buildng aWinnaing Teaim
42
Chiapter
3
The Baseline: Strategy and 1987 Results
To win the Canadian Army Trophy competition, an army
must assign that specific mission to a chain of command
dedicated to excellence, willing to marshall the resources
necessary to win, and capable of focusing those resources
on hitting every target presented in the shortest possible
time. Then, the command must assemble the finest soldiers it has,
both tankers and supporters, and provide the leadership from top to
bottom that can mold a championship team. The army must issue
the team the best tanks and ammunition it has, and support the
team with the most effective state-of the-art training resources
fielded or in development. The training program must carefully
synchronize the application of these resources and must address
every facet of the soldiers' lives in order to prepare them mentally
and physically. The CAT team's leadership must thoroughly analyze
every task, condition and standard that must be accomplished to win
and chart specific progress toward perfecting those tasks. The
leadership must also anticipate the conditions and factors that cannot
be controlled during the competition, so that orderly adjustments can
be made. In the end, the winner will probably be the zam that best
overcame the "unexpected" situations that are certain to occur.
"We hmd generals come down, the Secretary
of the Army came down, the hthest ranking
generat in USAREUR came down. 7hey aM
said we wiU win it this year. After you hear
it that many times, you've 9ot to think
maybe they know something we don't .... We
hd everybody putLing jor us. If we needed
anythting, it was there. "I
Gunner, D11, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '37
43
The Winning Strategy
The 4-8 Cavalry winning strategy was formulated early and at
the top level of leadership in the 3rd Armored Division--the Division
Commander and his principal staff. They called their overall strategy
the "CAT Attack Plan". Its principal developers were members of the
division CAT Operations Cell--the G3 (Chairman), Gi, G4, Resources
Manager, Surgeon, Chaplain, Public Affairs Officer, G3 Training, Divi-
sion Master Gunner and the Support Command operations officer.
This CAT cell thoroughly analyzed after action reports from previous
competitions as well as the CAT '87 Rules and Conditions. Based on
their analysis, they performed a thorough individual and collective
task analysis, projected the competition conditions, and established
the standards of achievement for each task required to win. The CAT
cell met frequently to ensure the pieces were falling into place.
2
The CAT attack plan was a comprehensive strategy consisting
of the personnel policies, training program, logistics support and re-
source allocation for CAT. It contained the coordinated, detailed
guidance to the division and assigned chain of command
responsibility for such key items as: selection and organization of the
CAT team; emphasis of the team concept; sequence and conduct of
training; and integration of logistics support. It set the simple
training goal of developing three tank platoons capable of first-round
hits on all main gun targets and it set a path to get there. Pre-
established "cut" dates and events were set to get the best of the
tankers and induce competitive stress. The effect of the strategy--
the CAT Attack Plan--was to focus, in a coordinated manner, the
attention and resources of the division command structure toward
winning CAT '87.
3
No formulation of a grand strategy of the scope and scale of the
3rd Armored Division was done by the other two divisions. As I pro-
ceed through the detailed analysis and comparison of each units'
programs using the 3 AD approach as the baseline, it will become
evident that I believe the scope of their strategy made a winning
difference.
This section discusses in detail the major aspects of building
the three American CAT '87 tank companies. After a review of the
44
1987 competition results, you will be presented a first-hand, top-
down account of the U.S. chain-of-command's approach to organizing
and supporting a winning effort. Then, based on the unit after action
reports and the author's personal accounts, you will get a close look
at the methods used by the 4-8 Cavalry, the 3-64 Armor and the 2-
66 Armor. The factors to be examined include manning, training,
and equipment and support. Such a perspective will permit a com-
parison of the strengths and weaknesses of these programs. Finally, I
will draw some conclusions as to what factors in the winning team's
program really made a difference.
However, in reading these chapters, one should remember that
there probably is not a "magic formula" for developing and imple-
menting the details of the process described in the first paragraph of
this section. There are many real world constraints that affect the
competing units to different degrees. I will try to point out the
major ones. There are also many professional opinions regarding
particular aspects of team building and training programs. Certain
techniques and lessons learned have worked well under a particular
set of circumstances, but they fail miserably when even a seemingly
minor ingredient is subtly changed. Sometimes even the members of
the winning team do not fully understand what gave them the very
narrow winning margin unless they also look outside their program.
But we do know that the U.S. 3rd Armored Division, and more
specifically 4-8 Cavalry, found a winning formula to build the CAT
'87 winner, D/4-8 Cavalry. They did not win by accident. Members
of the 4-8 Cavalry believed they had put together a winning
program--and they were right. The two other American teams, D/2-
66 Armor, 2 AD(Fwd) and A/3-64 Armor, 3 ID, did not win--even
though their circumstances and training programs appear to have
had many common ingredients with the D/4-8 Cavalry. All three
teams thought they had built a CAT winner. In an analytical
approach, a comparative analysis of the three programs brings out
which factors really made a difference. Under all circumstances, the
baseline case is the 4-8 Cavalry program because we know it
produced a winner.
This analysis is not a criticism of any aspect of the 4-8 Cavalry
or 3-64 Armor programs. The author appreciates more than most
the price that must be paid to win CAT and the Monday morning
quarterbacking that competing units are subjected to.
45
CAT '87 Detailed Results
Using the results of the 1987 competition, I will present the
data in several different ways to more clearly highlight the
similarities and differences in the American units' performance.
What has happened to most teams, especially the Americans, is
a quantum jump in improved performance in CAT '87 as compared to
CAT '85. Even though the competition range, the target scenarios, and
the scoring systems were somewhat different, the 1987 results show
a strongly improving trend:
4
0 In CAT '85, the maximum number of main gun targets was
24, and the platoons could shoot 40 rounds to kill them. The most
targets hit were 23. In CAT '87, the maximum number of main gun
targets was 32, but the platoons were allowed the same 40 rounds.
Two platoons hit all 32 and they did it with 35 rounds.
0 In CAT '85, the U.S. Ml platoons averaged 74.46 % of the
maximum score; the German Leo 2 platoons averaged 73.14 % (the
range of performance was 74.6 to 50.66). In CAT '87, the U.S. M1
platoons averaged 81.33 % of the maximum score; the German Leo 2s
averaged 84.26 % (the range of performance was 84.26 to 64.16. All
but the British were above 75 %).
So, the trend is clear. We're all getting better as the battle for
"Top Gun" ensues.
46
Figure 12, below arrays the platoons in descending order of
finish. The dominance of the modern tanks is clear, although the
performance of the Leo 1 - equipped Canadian platoon (6th place)
and the Belgian platoon (9th place) raised eyebrows. The Canadians
trained on the U.S. SIMNET (see Chapter 5) as guests of the 3 AD, and
this may have been a positive factor.
CAT ' 87 RESULTS
5
PLACE UNIT TANK NATION ARMY GROUP SCORE
I 1/D/4-8 CAV M1 US CENTAG 20490
2 1/4/124 PZ LEO 2 GE CENTAG 19690
3 1/A/3-64 AR M1 US CENTAG 18827
4 2/3/363 PZ LEO 2 GE CENTAG 18657
5 1/C/43 TK LEO 2 NL NORTHAG 18260
6 2/C/RCD LEO 1 CA CENTAG 18062
7 2/13/4-8 CAV M1 US CENTAG 18005
8 2/4/124 PZ LEO 2 GE CENTAG 17722
9 l/A/4 LN LEO 1 BE NORTHAG 17495
10 1/3/363 PZ LEO 2 GE CENTAG 17410
11 3/13/2-66 AR MI US NORTHAG 17352
12 1/13/2-66 AR M1 US NORTHAG 17352
13 1/C/RCD LEO 1 CA CENTAG 17157
14 2/13/2-66 AR MI US NORTHAG 17125
15 3/13/4-8 CAV M1 US CENTAG 16930
16 3/A/3-64 AR M1 US CENTAG 16792
17 2/A/3-64 AR MI US CENTAG 16700
18 3/4/324 PZ LEO 1 GE NORTHAG 16672
19 1/4/324 PZ LEO 1 GE NORTHAG 16445
20 3/A/4 LN LEO 1 BE NORTHAG 16422
21 3/C/43 TK LEO 2 NL NORTHAG 16365
22 2/B/ROY HUSS CHALL UK NORTHAG 14036
Figure 12.
47
Figure 13 depicts the speed of shooting the first round at a
target once it appears.
6
Being fast here would be a key to survival in
combat. In CAT, remember, multiple (up to eight) targets may ap-
pear simultaneously. The U.S. Ml platoons were clearly faster than
the Leo or Challenger equipped platoons.
Average Time to Fire 1st Round
ALL RANGES
7.12 sec.
LEO 4 8.08 sec.
CHALLENGER 9.34 sec.
c 1000 METERS
11" 6.67 sec.
L7E 14.0 sec.
CHALLENGER 4.5 sec.
1000 1500 METERS
7!W 6.23 sec
U[26.12 sec.
> 1500 METERS
~~tt,/ // '4 > '801 sec.
LEO 2
9.ss sec.
Figure 13.
48
Figure 14 depicts the average time to hit a target the first time
(some targets are hit more than once; others are not hit and 40
seconds is added into the total hit time).
7
These figures are a mea-
sure of speed and accuracy. The U.S. teams averaged best.
Average Time--First Round Hit
ALL RANGES
E-7 777 == = .. > 8.02 sec.
LEO -< 90 sec.
< 1000 METERS
*SLVy. '//7 ~7.14 sc.
LEO 2 13.62 sec.
CHALLENGER- 9.00 sec.
1000 - 1500 METERS
LEO .1 17.35 sec.
> 1500 METERS
IM'
>
9> .76 sec.
LEO 2 20.40 sec.
Figure 14.
49
b
Figure 15 shows the percentage of targets that were hit re-
gardless of the number of shots it took to hit a target.
8
Misses reflect
targets that were not seen, as well as those fired at but missed. Here,
there is little difference among the MI and Leo 2 platoons.
Hit Percentage--All Targets
ALL RANGES
LEO 2 9S. %
-CHALLENGER 84.7 %
< 1000 METERS
- ,, 1~X~<~t4'/ '~
4
r-''~'',-93.3 %
LEO 2 1: 88.9
CHALLENGER 100 %
1000 1500 METERS
4'" 'c-'- 4 '-2 96.3 %t
- 9. sec.
CHALENGE 1I76.41
> 1500 METERS
I LEO 2 ::93.2 %
CHALLENGER 191.9 %.
Figure 15.
50
Figure 16 depicts the average time to hit all targets presented.
9
If a target was not engaged or engaged but not hit, 40 seconds were
added to the time score. A low time here indicates speed and
accuracy. The U.S. platoons are best here.
Average Time to Hit All Targets
ALL RANGES
10.30 sec.
LEOZ '> ' ' -, '~ ''i
1
t> 11.37 sec.
1000 METERS
6.07 sec.
LEOZ . . ... . 62sc.
CHALLNGER 14.50) sec.
1000 - ISOO METERS
.7' '/.-"'4 a. ~~.. " .Y ' . 9.62 sec.
LEOs 8.7 sec.
ICHALLENGER 115.50 sec.
> 1500 METERS
-. .' . f. "' ' , ' :4 " ,,' . 11.20 sec.
LE~i.2 1.15sec.
17.21 sec.
CHALLENGER
Figure 16.
51
Review of American Results
In the 1987 CAT final scores, two of the top three platoons are
from D/4-8 Cavalry. All three of the middle platoons are from D/2-
66 Armor. Two of the bottom three platoons are from A/3-64 Ar-
mor.
10
The excellent relative performance of D/4-8 Cavalry is fairly
obvious in this display of the results. However, it is much more diffi-
cult to form conclusions regarding the relative performances of D/2-
66 Armor and A/3-64 Armor.
American Platoon Scores: CAT '87
1/D/4-8 Cavalry
IIA13-64 Armor 18,827
2/D/4-8 Cavalry
3/D/2-66 Armor 17i 5
1/D/2-66 Armor 17,3S2
2/D/2-66 Armor
3/D/4-8 Cavalry
3/A/3-64 Armor 16,792
2/A13-64 Armor 16,700
Figure 17.
If the platoon scores are combined into company averages, the
superior performance of D/4-8 Cavalry is just as clear. However, the
52
relative positions of D/2-66 Armor and A/3-64 Armor are reversed,
but with little difference in their average score.
1 1
American CAT Company Averages
D/4-8 Cavalry 9&,4 7
A/3-64 Armor
17,439
D/2-66 Armor
Figure 18.
As I did with the CAT '85 scores, I examine the scores by firing
order. Those units firing first are firing with much less intelligence
about target arrays and range conditions than those that follow--
even if security is good and the scenarios are random. In CAT '87,
the weather also was a significant negative factor affecting the early
firing platoons. As an eye witness to the competition, I expected a
display of the scores in order of firing might be revealing. Although
I am unable to determine the specific mix of factors that influenced
the trend of increasing scores as the contest grew old (excluding the
British performance), the trend, below, is undeniable.
53
IScore vs. Firing O~rder E3
S 13 - 0 a 130
c /0 0 Legnd
r
103 0
133-64Armor
g -6Armor
o
British
13
[
Figure 19.
Although such a display of the firing scores still verifies the
superiority of at least one platoon of D/4-8 Cavalry, it also tends to
insert some other significant considerations that will make it more
difficult to sort out the key factors of building a CAT winner.
In summary, the results show a relatively good performance
for the Americans across the board--and a clearly superior perfor-
mance of 4-8 Cavalry relative to the other American units.
There should be factors that we can find in their preparation
programs that account for this difference.
2 Headquarters, 4th Battalion 8th Cavalry. 3rd Armored Division Memorandum,
Subject: After ,A,';,-n Report, 1987 Canadian Army Trophy Competition, 28
August 1987, Executive Suminary.
3 Ibid.
54
t *r
4 U.S. Seventh Army Training Center Memorandum, Subject: Canadian Army
Trophy, 14 September 1987, Tab A.
Trophy. 14 September 1987, Tab A.
Trophy. 14 September 1987, Tab A.
11 Ibid.
55
Chapter
4
Manning a CAT Winner
The fundamental building blocks of an effective fighting force
are its soldiers and their leaders who mold them into a cohesive
team. CAT companies are no different. In general and across the ac-
tive duty force, particularly in the armored force, the U.S. Army of
the 1980's stands on firm footing here. But the U.S. Army's random
distribution of its personnel assets to meet worldwide mission
requirements is insufficient to concentrate the personnel talent
required to win the Canadian Army Trophy. Therefore, the first task
of the CAT '87 chain of command in each division was to identify
their best soldiers and company grade leadership--then shift them
into tank company and support unit organizations.
"7here were a lot of things we ooked at.
Number one was--are they self-motivated?
A Lot of soLdiers are just as good as another
soldier is, but some soLdiers have that extra
quaLity where they wiU start thems/ves.
7hey wiU do something on their own, or
they'EE ask questions on how something wiLt
work.. .and that's what we're ooking for." 1
SFC William Kemmits
Platoon Sergeant, 1st Platoon
CAT '87
The timing of the reorganization is crucial, for it must be both
synchronized with mission requirements and occur at least one year
prior to CAT. All of the divisions recognized and understood this
task -- but they took different approaches and had different
capabilities to get this critical first step accomplished.
56
CAT '87--the U.S. Chain of Command
In peacetime, all U.S. armored forces in Europe are commanded
by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR).
However, the Canadian Army Trophy competition army group teams
are established and administered during the competition according to
the national composition of the allied wartime organizations, Central
Army Group (CENTAG) and Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Ad-
ministrative Army Group team captains are appointed for each team,
but they have neither command authority over their teams nor re-
sponsibility for organizing, training or supporting them. It is a na-
tional responsibility to prepare the tank companies to compete in
CAT.
CINCUSAREUR, General Glen K. Otis, welcomed that responsibil-
ity. General Otis had been a division commander in Europe in the
early 1980's when the memory of the poor U.S. CAT showings was
fresh enough to call into question future American participation.
Firmly believing that his army now had the quality soldiers and a
modern tank capable of winning, he issued the emphatic challenge
to his subordinate corps commanders and his staff to "WIN CAT '87"1
Further, as the wartime CENTAG Commander, he made it clear that
he wanted CENTAG to win--especially since NORTHAG had pulled an
upset victory in CAT '85. He appointed the Commander, 7th Army
Training Center as the single point of contact to coordinate the mar-
shalling of all necessary training support. He directed USAREUR
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) to logistically support the
U.S. CAT teams. He solicited and received commitments from the
Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, and the Program
Manager, Tank Systems in Detroit to fully support the all-out effort
to win CAT '87.2
Once the challenge to win was issued, the remaining command
structure down to platoon level needed to be designated and filled.
For CAT '87, the rules and conditions specified that six platoons (two
companies) of the 12 CENTAG firing platoons and three platoons (one
company) of the 12 NORTHAG firing platoons would be American.
Furthermore, these companies were to be randomly selected from
different battalions no earlier than 1 April 1987.
3
Having learned the hard way that extraordinary numbers of
highly skilled tankers and supporters are required to win CAT --
57
numbers unlikely to be found in a standard, well trained tank
company or possibly a battalion -- , CINCUSAREUR and his corps
commanders knew the competing companies must be formed and
supported from a broad pool of talent. For the American components
of the CENTAG team, the V Corps Commander selected the 3rd
Armored Division (five tank battalions and a division support
command) to prepare two teams for the random selection and the
VII Corps Commander selected the 3rd Infantry Division (five tank
battalions and a division support command) to prepare two teams.
For the American component of the NORTHAG team, the commander
of the 2nd Armored Division (Forward), a separate brigade with one
tank battalion and one support battalion, directed 2-66 Armor to
prepare two of its four tank companies for CAT.
The Parent U.S. Army Divisions
All of these American divisions and two of the battalions (2-66
Armor and 3-64 Armor) had previous CAT experience: however, the
three-year European tour policy (which translates into roughly a 15
percent personnel turnover per quarter) pretty much decimates any
concentrated experience.
The 3rd Armored Division had competed unsuccessfully in
CAT '81 (1-32 Armor), CAT '83 (1-32 Armor) and CAT '85 (3-32 Ar-
mor). Embarrassed by its next-to-last finish in CAT '85, when it was
the only U.S. team without modern tanks (M60A3 rather than M-1),
the division was determined to write a different script in CAT '87.
The Division Commander, Major General Thomas N. Griffin, Jr., as-
signed the CAT '87 mission to his tank-heavy (two tank battalions)
2nd Brigade stationed at Gelnhausen. This choice would take advan-
tage of the relative concentration of tanker, tank and support assets.
The General simultaneously tasked his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel John
Abrams--son of the late General Creighton Abrams, whose name the
M-1 Abrams tank bears,-- to coordinate and focus all division assets
required to win CAT '87. The 2nd Brigade Commander, Colonel John
S. Luallin, commenced the task of reorganizing his two tank battal-
ions, 1-33 Armor (later redesignated 3-8 Cavalry, but not
randomly selected to compete) and 3-33 Armor (later redesignated
4-8 Cavalry, the CAT '87 winner). Each battalion would be tasked to
organize and train one company team for CAT. One of these trained
companies would be randomly selected on 1 April 1987 to compete
in June 1987.
58
In the early stages of preparation and based on previous
performance, the 3rd Armored Division representative was
considered a "long shot" to win CAT '87.
The 3rd Infantry Division also had the experience of CAT
competition under its belt. A Company, 3-64 Armor was a member
of the winning CENTAG team in CAT '83 and nearly won CAT '85 with
the second highest platoon score and the high tank company score.
The Division Commander, Major General George Stoetzer , assigned
the CAT '87 mission to his tank-heavy (two tank battalions) 1st
Brigade stationed at Schweinfurt. This was an obvious assignment
that also took advantage of concentrated tanker, tank and support
assets. These two tank battalions, 1-64 Armor and 3-64 Armor ,
were consistently among the best shooting tank battalions in
USAREUR in annual tank gunnery qualification at Grafenwoehr. The
CAT tradition and experience lived in 3-64 Armor. They knew they
were so close to total victory in CAT '85 that they would not let
victory escape again-- if they could just survive the random selection
process.
Based on their previous CAT experience and success--and their
consistently high tank gunnery qualification performance, the 3rd
Infantry Division representative was considered the favorite to gain
an American victory in CAT '87.
The 2nd Armored Division (Forward) was also long on CAT
experience. Its only tank battalion, 2-66 Armor, competed in CAT
'83 (1st in NORTHAG, 3rd overall) and CAT '85 (2nd in NORTHAG, 4th
overall). The Division (Forward) Commander, Brigadier General
William F. Streeter, had no larger concentration of tanker, tank and
support assets to choose from other than his 2-66 Armor and his
498th Support Battalion, so the CAT '87 mission passed automatically
to his veterans. General Streeter also had at least two other impor-
tant missions that would tend to diffuse the CAT preparation:
REFORGER '87, in which 2 AD(F) and 2-66 Armor would play key
roles, must be thoroughly rehearsed in Spring-Summer '87 and
executed in Fall '87; combined arms training, including a major NATO
maneuver exercise in Fall '86, which required the tank assets of 2-66
Armor and the support assets of the 498th Support Battalion. Even
so, there was a belief on my part (and other's) that the disadvantages
of a narrow asset base and multiple conflicting missions could be
overcome by the advantages of cohesion, CAT experience and
gunnery competence within the one tank battalion. After all, 2-66
59
Armor is consistently among the top qualifying tank battalions in
USAREUR and was the top shooter in 1986. But the random selection
rule would place a heavy burden on the battalion. From its four tank
companies it had to organize and train two CAT companiesl Further-
more, since A Company was a COHORT company due to disestablish in
February 1987 (COHORT is a unit specially organized under a
Department of the army program), and B Company had an annual,
high visibility, critical mission that required stability and specialized
training, the Battalion Commander's choices were realistically limited
to his C (the CAT '83 and CAT '85 competitor) and D companies.
Based on its 1986 qualification gunnery performance and its
solid CAT experience (many former competitors from CAT '85 re-
mained in the battalion, primarily in C Company), the 2-66 Armor
representative was considered a reasonable bet to win CAT '87.
Just as the pre-season college football polls often have little
bearing to the seasons' final national rankings, prior CAT experience
and the early "betting" odds would be a minor contributor to the CAT
'87 results. The winner would emerge as the product of a well orga-
nized, heavily supported strategy.
The Battalion Commander and Staff
In the U.S. Army, the initial responsibility to build the CAT
company and its organizational support rests squarely on the shoul-
ders of the tank battalion commander and his battalion staff. This
responsibility is an honor, but in turn places an extraordinary
burden on the commander and his staff. Already faced with the
standard challenges of all other similar USAREUR battalions, he also
must build and prepare a unit to carry the American colors in
international competition. He is expected to do this with little, if any,
augmentation of personnel at battalion staff level. Yet the
coordination of training and the logistical support of a CAT company
over a year's time requires precision seldom expected of a battalion
in its normal conduct of business.
Although there may be many factors (past CAT experience,
division missions, personalities, rules and conditions, etc.) that deter-
mine which battalions will prepare a team for CAT, once a battalion
is designated, the battalion commander (with input from his Com-
mand Sergeant Major) should be in the best position to assess and
select the leadership of the CAT company. The same is true
60
regarding the selection of his key assistants--the battalion executive
officer, the battalion S-3, and the battalion master gunner. This is so
because he should know and understand the strengths and
weaknesses and "chemistry" of the officer and noncommissioned
officer structure in the battalion. Others might be able to pick the
individual "superstars", but the battalion commander best knows the
formula to combine the talent. A significant consideration, often
overlooked by outsiders but not by the battalion commander, is that
much of the best talent in the other companies will be stripped out to
form the CAT company--potentially leaving a very weak structure in
the remainder of the battalion that will eventually detract from the
CAT mission. This is not to say that outside advice and guidance is
not helpful, but it should not dominate the selection process.
Once he has selected and positioned the company leaders
(down to platoon sergeant level), most of the team-building, training
and administration responsibilities for the company will transition
over time to the company commander. The battalion commander
will then focus his attention in four major areas: providing the com-
pany commander with every resource (personnel, equipment, train-
ing and logistical support, etc.) he requires to win; shielding the com-
pany commander from all the well-intended "good ideas" from out--
side sources that he does not need to win; ensuring quality control of
all company training and logistical activities; and preserving the in-
tegrity of his battalion as the majority of the command attention and
resources flow to the CAT company, yet the remainder of the battal-
ion absorbs the normal mission requirements.
In view of the significant role of the battalion commander in
the CAT process, it is interesting to note that the selection and timing
of the rotation of the CAT battalion commanders in the U.S. Army is
practically independent of the CAT competition. Commanders are se-
lected for a two-year command assignment based on past perfor-
mance and potential for command by a central command selection
board in Washington. Few of the members of the board would know
what CAT is--much less give special consideration to it as a selection
criterion. In fairness to the board members, it is also unlikely that
"top-of-the-pile"
officer efficiency reports on a lieutenant colonel or
promotable major would communicate any CAT- specific information
to the selection boards.
Once new battalion commanders are selected, they are "slated"
by a separate process against vacancies that come open in a given
61
fiscal year. Once again, it is highly unlikely that CAT receives any
visibility in this process. For the CAT '87 battalions the rotation
worked out this way: 4-8 Cavalry and 3-64 Armor--battalion com-
manders arrived approximately coincident with CAT company for-
mation and departed a year after the competition; 2-66 Armor--
battalion commander arrived one year in advance of CAT company
formation and departed after competition. My analysis of the com-
manders role would favor the latter circumstance if given a choice,
yet the winner was 4-8 Cavalry. Closer analysis of that unit's organi-
zation and personality mix, which I am unable to provide, would
likely reveal the compensating factors.
My point is tiat in spite of our recent CAT competition success,
one of the key players, the battalion commander, is on the scene by
"the luck of the draw". Will the continuation of this process be good
enough to win in the future? The question merits an answer by our
generals.
Given all of this, there is one final thought regarding the role of
the battalion commander. Throughout the entire CAT preparation
and competition process, the battalion commander needs a total
commitment (translated--extraordinary commitment of available
resources) to win CAT on the part of his superior commanders. The
degree to which this commitment exists will have a direct impact on
the outcome of the competition.
Company Leaders
Selection of the CAT company leaders--the company comman-
der, executive officer (XO), first sergeant, platoon leaders, platoon
sergeants and company level master gunner--is the first and most
critical step in building a successful CAT competitor. These selections
must be made early (about a year prior to CAT) and they must be
made correctly. There will f -- little time to correct errors in judge-
ment later. This leadership team will nave, at most, about a year to
assemble a group of talented, but diverse, individual soldiers and
mold them into a tank force capable of exceeding U.S. Army gunnery
standards under the stresses of international competition. To
achieve winning CAT gunnery standards, the company will often
operate and train autonomously as its parent battalion pursues other
missions. The CAT companies' soldiers will spend more time away
from their families and home base than their other battalion mates,
thus further creating the potential for personal and family stresses.
62
Only extraordinary young officers and noncommissioned officers will
be capable of successfully meeting these challenges.
The Company Commander, XO and First Sergeant
4-8 Cavalry
The 3rd Armored Division and 4-8 Cavalry had the opportunity
to "think big" regarding all CAT personnel matters --and they did it--
starting with the selection of the CAT company commander, XO and
first sergeant. From the beginning of the organization process, it was
clear that all of the personnel assets of the division would serve as a
pool to be tapped to build the CAT teams of both 3-8 Cavalry and 4-8
Cavalry. Previous CAT experience was considered a desirable com-
modity--but not a prerequisite for team membership. However, as
early as eighteen months prior to CAT '87, division units were re-
quired to submit rosters of personnel with previous CAT experience.
4
In the case of the company commander, the 4-8 Cavalry de-
termined that while there were many "nice-to-have" attributes
(seniority, CAT experience, M1 technical experience, etc.), there were
two essential qualities the CAT company commander must have.
First, he must be a proven trainer. This conclusion was reached
based on the careful study of past CAT after action reports that
seemed to show that training was the key to winning CAT. Second,
he must know the battalion--its people and its operating procedures
within the brigade and division. This quality was based upon the
realization that even though there would be some volunteers from
outside the battalion, the vast majority of the CAT competitors would
eventually come from within the 4-8 Cavalry.
5
Accordingly, Captain Joseph R. Schmalzel was selected
(precisely who made the choice is unknown) as Company Comman-
der, D Company, 4-8 Cavalry. Considered by his superiors as one of
the finest officers in the brigade, he had solid tank gunnery training
and maintenance experience and he had served for 14 months as the
battalion's S3 Air (often responsible for planning, executing and su-
pervising training programs). He was short on "hands-on" M-1 expe-
rience and had no previous CAT experience, but was committed to
win CAT '87 if given the opportunity.
6
63
His designated XO, ILT Joseph Weiss, was strong on "hands-on"
M-1 experience that the company commander lacked. 7
Similarly, First Sergeant Gary Fravel was selected to serve as
Captain Schmalzel's right hand man. The first choice of the battalion
Command Sergeant Major, 1SG Fravel was a noncommissioned officer
vith CAT '81 experience as a tank commander.
8
Once the company commander and first sergeant were ap-
proved by the brigade commander, they would play key roles in se-
lecting the remainder of the company leadership team as well as
building the company.
9
64
3-64 Armor
Although the 3rd Infantry Division and 3-64 Armor empha-
sized many of the same features as the 3rd Armored Division in se-
lecting the CAT company leaders, there were at least two significant
differences in their approach. First, for reasons not disclosed in after
action reports, the personnel pool from which to form the CAT teams
for both 1-64 Armor and 3-64 Armor was limited to the 1st Brigade
assets, rather than the entire division. Second, the 31D placed much
heavier emphasis on prior CAT experience as a selection criterion.
1 0
In searching for his CAT company commander, the 3-64 Armor
battalion commander emphasized two essential qualities: superior
knowledge of the entire M-1 Tank--better than any other in the
company; seniority and maturity.
1 1
Accordingly, the 1st Brigade
Commander personally selected Captain John Tisson to command A
Company, 3-64 Armor. Captain Tisson had previously participated in
both CAT '83 and CAT '85--and he had demonstrated the maturity
and expert skills required to build and train a potential CAT win-
ner.
12
Likewise, the credei.tials of the designated XO, ILT Welsch,
were very impressive. He served as a platoon leader with 3-64 Ar-
mor in CAT '85 and possessed substantial technical knowledge of the
M-1. Finally, his seniority (he was promoted to Captain just prior to
CAT '87) was an extra bonus and it is likely that he was being
groomed to command a team for CAT '89.13
Although the designated first sergeant, 1SG Walker, had no
previous CAT experience, he was selected based on his personable,
low-key leadership style. This attribute would prove invaluable, as
it would tend to keep the company relaxed during the intense prepa-
ration and competition phases.
14
2-66 Armor
The 2nd Armored Division (Forward) and 2-66 Armor sought
basically the same characteristics in its search for CAT company
leaders as the 3rd AD ( 4-8 Cavalry) and the 3rd ID ( 3-64 Armor).
However, tht; requirement to build two CAT companies from the as-
sets of a single battalion would prove to be a most demanding chal-
lenge. This meant that 2-66 Armor must produce two company
commanders, XO's and first sergeants; and six platoon leaders and
65
platoon sergeants capable of competing with and out-shooting
NATO's best. To accomplish this would require innovative
approaches and substantial risk-taking on the part of the Battalion,
Brigade and Division (Fwd) Commanders; extraordinary commitment
and performance by those selected; and unselfish cooperation and
support from the remaining leaders in the 2-66 Armor. We thought
we could do it!
My selection process for the two CAT company commanders
began in January-February 1986, and was heavily influenced by two
overriding concerns--finding the required skills (very similar to 3AD
and 31D specifications) from a relatively narrow personnel pool--
preserving the integrity and operational viability of the remainder of
the battalion. The process would be a long one, and there would be
slightly different considerations for the commanders of the two com-
panies that won the right to compete in CAT '87 by virtue of their
April 1986 tank gunnery qualification scores-- C Company and D
Company. With the CAT companies decided, I reached a major mile-
stone in the company commander selection process in April 1986.
In my mind, there was no debate concerning who should com-
mand and prepare my "Charlie" company for the CAT '87 competi-
tion. Captain Armor Brown. had assumed command of C Company in
July 1985, immediately after its participation in CAT '85. He and his
new XO, ILT Bill Walker. (CAT '85 platoon leader) rebuilt the com-
pany around a strong nucleus of the remaining CAT competitors.
And one must understand that C Company simply assumed they
would be the CAT '87 competitor, so many of the noncommissioned
officers extended and positioned themselves in the company for June
1987. The company set high standards for the rest of the battalion
in almost everything during the next year, including a truly brilliant
performance at qualification gunnery in April 1986, where it was the
highest shooting tank company in USAREUR for 1986. I felt Captain
Brown possessed sufficient personal skills in all the required areas--
and a-- of his weaknesses would be more than compensated for by
the strong bonds of cohesion and esprit he had built in the company.
Additionally, if he were. not selected, it would require me to shorten
his command assignment to one year (a potentially career damaging
move) or change company commanders in the January '86 time
frame--only six months prior to CAT '87 and right in the middle of
the training period.
66
On the other hand, the considerations were quite different for
selecting the commander of the second CAT company, which turned
out to be my "Delta" Company. We had analyzed the " Delta"
situation in February. Captain John Hanna., an experienced and very
successful company commander, was scheduled to rotate back to the
United States in September 1986, so he would have to be replaced.
Further, much of "Delta" Company would also be leaving prior to CAT
'87, so the company would have to be "rebuilt" from battalion assets
during the early summer of 1986. Even though Captain Hanna would
not take the company to CAT '87, I considered him fully capable of
building the company and handing it off to his yet undetermined
successor. He knew the company and the battalion personnel very
well--and I had no captain in hand that would be available to lead
"Delta" to CAT '87.
Therefore, I had to develop some alternatives in the February-
March time frame. I had three highly skilled, very junior captains in
the battalion capable of doing the job. There was another in the
brigade staff. Unfortunately, they were ineligible to command be-
cause they had not attended the Officers Advanced Course (a six
month course). Two of these were near the end of their three-year
tours and were programed to attend. Perhaps there would be a way
to get one of them reassigned to 2-66 Armor afterwards. There was
also a possibility to send one of the other two on temporary duty to
the Advanced Course and return him to 2-66 Armor to command D
Company. I also had a promotable ILT in the battalion in this list
category. I would spend a great deal of time talking with each of
these officers about the "Delta" command--and I asked them to speak
with their wives about it.
After all of these discussions--and considering the other future
requirements for captains within the battalion, newly-promoted Cap-
tain Dave Shutt. and I agreed (in March just prior to his departure)
that he was the man for the job and that we would make every ef-
fort to get him reassigned to command the second CAT company
upon his graduation from the Infantry Advanced Course (and M-1
Tank Commanders Course) in August 1986. This reassignment effort
would prove to be a time consuming one with an uncertain outcome.
Captain Shutt was a selection worth the persistence it would
take to get him reassigned. Having served three years in 2-66
Armor as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader and
Headquarters Company XO, he had earned a reputation as a highly
67
skilled and well respected young officer. I was convinced that his
knowledge of the battalion's personnel, war plans, and training areas,
combined with a well established working relationship with his
battalion commander and most of his future fellow company
commanders, would more than offset his lack of seniority.
Additionally, he was very familiar with the CAT competition, even
r-' he had not personally competed. He had been in the
battalion during its preparation of C Company for CAT '83, and had
assisted the scoring and record keeping of the company. All of these
attributes would also give him a quick "start-up" time in command
relative to an officer new to the battalion. This would be especially
important, since the circumstances caused the change of command
for "Delta" to occur in September 1986, only nine months before CAT
'87.
While I was generating my company commander alternatives,
General Streeter. was justifiably concerned with the narrow selection
pool for the two commanders and six platoon leaders. After listening
thoughtfully to my considerations and alternatives, he deferred his
approval of my select: ons and directed me to contact Armor assign-
ments branch at the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). in
Washington to see if they could help with the company commander
issue as well as platoon leaders.
After several discussions with assignment officers at
MILPERCEN and many weeks of consideration, we could not develop
better alternatives. While identification and validation of the re-
quired skills through this source was difficult, at best, it was proba-
bly too late to get them on orders for a timely arrival from the
States. However, MILPERCEN did agree to give "consideration" to
reassigning Captain Shutt if it became "absolutely necessary".
By June, the passage of time had finalized the selections of
Captains Brown and Shutt--and MILPERCEN had agreed to send Cap-
tain Shutt back to 2-66 Armor.
Both companies needed new XO's. They were selected based on
the following criteria: maturity, leadership and compatibility with
the company comrrander; demonstrated expert skill as a tank pla-
toon leader, with emphasis on gunnery and maintenance--for they
would be a back-up platoon leaders in an emergency. 1LT Jeff In-
gram was assigned to "Charlie" and 1LT Mike Baker was assigned to
"Delta".
68
The first sergeant situation was somewhat different for each
company. In each case, the same high standards of leadership skill
and technical expertise sought by the other CAT teams was needed.
Although quite junior, 1SG Travis was selected to remain the first
sergeant of C Company. By June 1986, he had served well for four
months as a platoon sergeant in C Company and had served six
months as Captain Brown 's hand-picked first sergeant. 1SG Travis
knew the "Charlie" soldiers and NCO's well, and he and Captain Brown
were an effective team. We chose recently promoted 1SG Swift to
move from A Company (our COHORT company) to become the "Delta"
first sergeant. He had served as a platoon sergeant in A Company for
more than two years. He had all the required skills--plus he knew
well the soldiers and NCO's in A Company (about a platoon) that
would also transfer to "Delta" in July 1986.
Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sergeants. and Master Gunners
4-8 Cavalry.
D Company, 4-8 Cavalry was provided the assets to organize
and train four tank platoons for CAT, rather than the standard three
platoons. One would be competitively eliminated in March 1987
(more discussion on this strategy later). Therefore, the battalion
needed to select four platoon leaders and four platoon sergeants
(master gunners discussed separately). The selection criteria were:
leader experience and performance with emphasis on individual and
platoon gunnery results; platoon battle run (TT X) results; demon-
strated ability to supervise and conduct training; and a firm
commitment to an armor career. The battalion reviewed all of it's
lieutenants platoon sergeants and interviewed two volunteer platoon
leaders and several NCO's from other battalions. All four platoon
leaders (three 1LT's and one 2LT) were selected from within 4-8
Cavalry. Only orie platoon sergeant came from another battalion.
15
Master Gunner.s are specially trained NCO's that have met
stringent prerequisites of unit leadership and gunnery skills and
have graduated from a certified three-month course at the U.S. Ar-
mor School at Fort Knox. They are experts in tank gunnery, gunnery
training and turret and fire control maintenance. The really good
ones are recognized leaders. They are in short supply.
69
The 3AD allocation of its master gunner assets to its CAT com-
panies was a clear indicator of its commitment to win CAT '87. Nor-
mally, a battalion will have a battalion level master gunner in the S-
3 shop and each tank company will have one authorized in the com-
pany headquarters. 4-8 Cavalry ensured that each platoon of D Com-
pany had a master gunner in addition to the normal company and
battalion authorizations! They selected their company master gun-
ner, SFC Tony Smith., based on his extensive platoon experience. He
was also a recent graduate of the master gunner school with many
Fort Knox contacts.
16
3-64 Armor.
The 3-64 Armor did not specify in their after action reports the
details of their selection process and criteria (other than those for
company leaders in general) for their platoon leaders, platoon
sergeants and master gunners. They clearly wanted the best avail-
able. However, it does appear that all of their selections were
"homegrown" in the battalion. Also, it is significant "- nte that all of
the selected platoon sergeants had been tank corn,: .--rs in CAT
'85.17
2-66 Armor.
We recognized very early that the requirement to select six
CAT quality platoon leader.s from one battalion was going to be a
major challenge. At any one time, a normal tank battalion will have
approximately 22 Armor lieutenants. Eight of those, almost always
the most capable and most experienced (as determined by at least
one year of service as a tank platoon leader) will be currently serv-
ing as the four tank company XO's, the Headquarters Company XO,
the Support Platoon Leader, the Mortar Platoon Leader, and the Scout
Platoon Leader. A battalion will have great difficulty functioning
well under even routine circumstances without high quality officers
in these positions. Of the remaining 16 Armor lieutenants, about half
will have been in the Army less than one year and in the battalion
less than six months. They are untested. The situation is further
complicated by the three year overseas tour--that is, at any one
time, about a third of the lieutenants will have less than one year
remaining on their tour. The bottom line was that in February 1986,
2-66 Armor had to fill the six CAT platoon leader slots and the other
eight key lieutenant positions from a realistic pool of about 15-16
70
lieutenants. We would obviously have to take some risks on some
relatively untested young officers.
We used the March-April 1986 tank gunnery qualification, pe-
riod at Grafenwoehr to eliminate some of the uncertainty. This was a
genuine "trial by fire" for the incumbent platoon leaders and helped
to finalize our choices based on individual and platoon results. There
was only one exception. One of our most skilled lieutenants, after his
being selected, opted out of the chance t3 compete in CAT and forced
us to examine our untested lieutenants more closely. Of the six pla-
toon leaders we selected by May 1986, one (ILT Bob Steele , C Com-
pany) had been a tank platoon leader about a year, two (2LT Ralph
Moore , C Company and 2LT Steve Witkowski , D Company) had been
tank platoon leaders about five months, and three (2LT Joel Williams
, C Company; 2LT Ken Carroll , D Company; and ILT Jeff Erickson , D
Company) were brand new tank platoon leaders ( although Erickson
had served his first year as the Mortar Platoon Leader). Personally, I
felt very confident in three of these and considered the other three a
moderate risk, for which I developed back-up replacement contin-
gency plans.
The requirement to select six CAT platoon sergeant.s was just
as important as the selection of the platoon leaders, but in many
ways it was a much easier task. All three of the incumbent platoon
sergeants in C Company as of April 1986 (SFC Ronald Jones , SSG
James Miller , and SFC Reggie Wheeler ) had previous CAT experience
as tank commanders. Their assignments in 2-66 Armor were
stabilized through June 1987 and their company commander, Captain
Brown, strongly recommended their retention for CAT '87 to
capitalize on their experience and maintain company cohesion. I
agreed.
The platoon sergeant situation in D Company was quite differ-
ent. After careful analysis, we agreed that all of the platoon
sergeants in the company must be replaced to prepare for CAT '87.
We reviewed the skills, performance, experience and availability of
all remaining Sergeants First Class (SFC) and senior Staff Sergeants
(SSG) and selected the following: SSG P. Rodrigues, acting platoon
sergeant in D Company, would move to 1st Platoon and be teamed
with 2LT Carroll; SFC Norman Hardin., platoon sergeant and master
gunner in B Company, move to 2nd Platoon and be teamed with ILT
Erickson; SFC William Hoback., senior platoon sergeant in A Company,
would move to the 3rd Platoon and team with 2LT Witkowski., also
moved from A Company.
71
By the summer of 1986, 2-66 Armor and 2AD(Fwd) found
themselves short of CAT quality master gunners. But most of the
ones we had were excellent, and I believed they would be sufficient
to cover all CAT requirements as well as the remainder of the bat-
talion's needs--if they could all be exclusively focused on the mis-
ills Uf the battalion.
The C Company master gunner., SFC Robert Wolford., was the
company master gunner for CAT '85. He was highly skilled, thor-
oughly respected by his company and totally committed to ensure
that the 2-66 Armor representative won CAT '87--no matter which
company was randomly selected to compete. SFC Norman Hardin, a
very bright NCO long on troop leading experience, would inherit the
heavy responsibility of serving as both the D Company master gun-
ner and the 2nd Platoon Sergeant. My battalion level master gunner,
SFC Powell., was also excellent and made significant contributions in
the early stages of CAT preparation. But SFC Powell was scheduled to
rotate back to the U.S. in February 1987, only a few weeks prior to
the battalion's deployment to Grafenwoehr for qualification gunnery
and the bulk of the CAT live fire training.
I needed a replacement for SFC Powell badly. When a normal
tank battalion, now equipped with both Bradley Fighting Vehicles
and M-1 tanks, prepares for and shoots qualification gunnery, the
battalion master gunner is mentally and physically consumed in the
process. With the CAT training superimposed on our qualification
gunnery, it would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of the
battalion master gunner's role.
Early on, I thought I had a more than satisfactory solution to
fill the 2-66 Armor battalion master gunner position, but I did not
control the asset. SFC Butler, former platoon sergeant in B Company,
then assigned to the brigade G-3 Training, was a senior, bright M-1
master gunner. He knew the battalion leadership well and knew
many of the NCO's that transferred from B Company to D Company to
train for CAT '87. However, at the G-3 level, he was performing at
least two key functions. He was doing much of the early CAT
resource coordination and he was assisting the Bradley-equipped
infantry battalions prepare for their first qualification gunnery
period.
72
The Brigade Commander, Colonel Tommy Baucum. and I dis-
cussed the possible reassignment of SFC Butler to the 2-66 Armor
several times and at great length. In the end, Colonel Baucum de-
cided that SFC Butler could better serve the brigade as a whole, in-
cluding 2-66 Armor, by remaining on the brigade staff. Given that
decision, SFC Wolford. served as both the battalion master gunner
and the C Company master gunner during the critical battalion quali-
fication gunnery and CAT live fire period in March 1987. Then,
when C Company was not selected for the CAT competition, I moved
SFC Wolford to the battalion master gunner position.
Other Team Members
After selection of the company leaders, came the difficult task
of choosing the remainder of the company team. The leaders would
play be key in this process. The remaining team members would be
the men that would drive the tanks, load the ammunition, aim and
fire the guns and precisely perform the myriad of other tasks
required to seriously compete.
"Someone who knows their job, someone who's
wItincj to put forth the effort cnd won't quit
when the first thing goes wrong or when they
miss % Fr'rdcty or Satturdaj night out with their
girlfriend, or something. "18
PFC Steven Kuhn
CAT '87
Each unit would use a selection process particularly tailored to
its own strategy and resource constraints. And even though the best
available soldiers were picked, one would be surprised how
representative they were of the American armored soldier.
4-8 Cavalry.
The original strategy of the 3AD was to form two six-platoon
CAT companies, one in each of the two tank battalions (3-8 Cavalry
and 4-8 Cavalry) of the 2d Brigade. These would be gradually whit-
tled down (by individual soldiers, not crews or platoons) to the stan-
dard three-platoon company through a competitive process by late
March 1987. The personnel and equipment assets of the entire divi-
73
sion were potentially available to implement this concept. However,
this plan was eventually deemed unworkable due to personnel,
equipment, logistic support, training resource and various adminis-
trative constraints However, the battalion did adopt and resource a
very bold two 'our-platoon CAT company organization.
19
The CAT company commander and first sergeant were respon-
sible for selecting the remaining tank commanders, gunners, loaders,
drivers and support personnel. They made their final selections only
after personal interviews of all candidates.
"The CO wouLd tae us in and the First
Sergeant wouLd take us in. 7hy 9apve us a
Long speech--Like you're fitxing to 9o to heL--
you're in the butt of the world, and we're
9oing to dog you and it's not going to be Jun.
And the people that say, th t's what I want;
I want a chaene--fie accepted those
people.-20
SGT Shaun Banks
Driver, DlI, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
Most of the battalion's candidates came from a list comprised of
recommendations of other company commanders and first sergeants
and based on the following criteria:
21
0 True volunteer--no pressure to compete.
0 No indication of serious financial, family, drug or alcohol
problem.
0 Recent (July 1986) tank gunnery qualification, scores.
0 Screening test results (exercises 324111, 342111, 333110
and 346311) on the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT.). A
minimum acceptable rating of B (second highest) in all
scored areas (target acquisition, reticle aim and systems
management) was established. The battalion also reviewed
each crew's position on the regular UCOFT matrix.
0 Special qualifications and experience such as
Excellence-in-Armor(EAI). track, CT score, Skills Qualification
Test.
score, master gunner experience, previous CAT competition,
others.
74
The remainder were "walk-ons" that expressed a strong desire
to compete, but had not made the original list for some reason.
About 15 % of those selected were in this category.
2 2
The end result was a team comprised mainly of soldiers from
the 4-8 Cavalry. Of the 48 platoon members that actually- competed
in June, 44 were from 4-8 Cavalry (including all of the platoon lead-
ers, platoon sergeants and tank commanders). The other four were
from outside the brigade.
2 3
3-64 Armor.
In contrast to the 3AD and 4-8 Cavalry, the 31D and 3-64 Ar-
mor took a more conventional approach in organizing its two CAT
companies. These companies were organized as the standard three-
platoon companies and the asset pool was limited to the resources of
the Ist Brigade ratht~r than the entire division. Even with this appar-
ent limitation, great emphasis was placed on getting the best soldiers
for the CAT team. The 3-64 Armor used the following considerations
in selecting its remaining team members:
2 4
0 Previous CAT experience, and/or tank gunnery qualification.
scores for tank commanders and gunners.
0 Knowledge of the tank systems.
0 Leadership and trainer skills.
0 GT scores (indicator of trainability).
0 Discipline and appearance.
0 Team player attitude.
0 Ability to perform under pressure.
0 General competence and self confidence.
The formation of the team members into tank crews and pla-
toons would follow as the training program unfolded.
2-66 Armor.
The process to build the remainder of the two CAT companies
was similar to the other battalions', but was complicated by some
factors unique to 2-66 Armor. As in the other battalions, there was a
detailed identification and interview process to sort out the very best
crewmen that would be available in June 1987. The selection criteria
were also basically the same. But there the similarities ended.
75
The requirement to form two CAT companies from one battal-
ion was the major differentiating factor. This placed a severe limita-
tion on the asset pool from which to draw qualified personnel. And
it forced us to use other than pure volunteers when the volunteer
quality cut dropped too low. But we believed that if we preserved as
much unit cohesion as possible, we could overcome this limitation.
o-r ana!lys;s indicated the best approach was to find individual fillers
for C Company and to build whole crews and platoons for D Company.
A related, but additional unique factor was that one of the re-
maining two tank companies (A Company) was a COHORT company.
The soldiers had entered the Army together, completed basic train-
ing together, and trained and lived together for nearly three years.
These personnel were, theoretically, centrally managed by Depart-
ment of the Army in Washington and their reorganization was not
permitted until February 1987. This would have been much too late
to begin CAT training.
It was obvious that B Company and the Headquarters Company
could not provide enough CAT quality soldiers to round out C and D
companies. Therefore, we had no choice but to tap the resources of A
Company in August 1986 and announce our justification by letter to
Department of the Army.
By mid-August 1986, we had essentially moved one of A Com-
pany's platoons and one of B Company's platoons to D Company to
form their 3rd and 2nd Platoons, respectively. Individual replace-
ments from A, B, and Headquarters Companies filled out the remain-
,"er of both C and D Companies' personnel requirements.
By August 1986, the entire nature of the battalion had
changed. After all personnel shifts were completed, the battalion
had two newly organized tank companies of stable, highly skilled
tankers. Morale was high. A and B Companies remained as newly
organized companies of re'itively "short-timers" and the lesser
skilled tankers. Morale suffered. A Company would disestablish in
February 1987 and be replaced by a completely new COHORT
company from i-ort Hood, Texas. CAT'87 would be foreign to them--
but CAT '89 would loom on their horizon. B Company would repeat
its 1985 role as a "non-CAT" company and would designate
themselves as the "Stray Cats".
76
The Team Concept
"The whoe company won it together, I think.
Even tugh our patoon went down and
actuayU won it, we voudn't have done it
without them .... Toetherness Cs what won it. "2
SP4 David Segrest
Loader, D13, 4-8 Cavaly
CAT '87
The Canadian Army Trophy competition is won by a team --
not a loose collection of highly skilled individual tankers. And that
team must be broadly based -- much broader than SP4 Segrest,
above, can imagine. The boundaries of the team must be genu.nely
extended far beyond the company and battalion and into the support
units and the community. This was done especially well in the case
of the CAT '87 winner.
Team concept is used here to convey this thought -- "every
soldier was a necessary link in the chain of excellence."
2 6
Some elements essential to making the team concept a reality are
discussed earlier. Many are covered in subsequent chapters,
especially the training chapter. Almost all elements are mentioned
subtly. In this section I briefly consolidate the discussion so that the
reader can recognize the elements of this key concept where ever he
sees them.
All US divisions preparing companies to compete in CAT '87
recognized this team concept would be an important ingredient for
victory. The three CAT company commanders discovered the
concept was essential. The timing of their discoveries and the degree
to which each division's policies supported the permeation of this
team concept from the top of the organization to its roots, would
define their company's winning opportunity.
77
4.8 Cavalry
"Our company was so tight.. .we were a1l brothers."27
PFC Steven Kuhn
CAT '87
The 3d Armored Division recognized from the beginning that a
broadly based team concept would be an essential ingredient for
victory. The command implemented policies to institutionalize the
concept. The CAT attack plan (Chapter 3) was the first step. Support
personnel, with few exceptions, were assigned to D Company and
treated the same as the tank crewmen. All soldiers received
distinctive nomex combat vehicle crewman uniforms and CAT
patches at the same time and as early as possible. A "block leave"
program applied to all team members. A stress management trip to
Berchtesgaden for soldiers and family members further molded and
rewarded the team during training. Leaders stressed a supportive,
internally non-competitive environment to achieve professional
excellence. Athletic competition served as useful tool to develop and
maintain a competitive
edge.
28
Some often underestimate -- or forget -- the importance of the
small, seemingly unimportant, unifying symbols.
"Everybody wanted to K-now where I got the uniform
from .... the tanker's uniform. Everybody was
issued a tanker uniform with an American flag,
a unit patch, and a CAT patch, aso .... Ut was
important because at the time not everybody had
the opportunity to get one and wear one .... Everybody
Looked at you--the way you carried yourse[J and the
way you worked as a team, whether you're a cook,
a mechanic, or whatever. And whenever we'd go
somewhere we'd acways go as a team."
29
SSG Drake
Mess Sergeant, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
78
Likewise, it would be hard to convince PFC Berry, below, that
the company athletic program did not contribute in a big way to the
CAT '87 win.
"...our platoon was so close .... We'd wreste...
We were close pfhysicaLy. We were dose mentagy.
We were dose ernotionatjy, tnteUectualUt ....
We also didn't take ourselves too seriously.
PFC Brent Be-rry
CAT '87
In summary, it would be difficult to document the precise
recipe for 3 AD's team concept. But we do know they won -- and
we do know that they tangibly resourced team building efforts
throughout the entire training period.
3-64 Armor
The foundation of the team concept in the 3 ID seemed more
narrow than in the 3 AD, primarily due to the early decision to form
the CAT company from the assets of only one brigade, rather than
the whole division. The impact may have been purely psychological,
for I have found no documentation of lack of support for their CAT
program. As in 4-8 Cavalry, many of the support troops were
attached to the CAT company for the training period.
One technique the battalion commander used to broaden the
team concept beyond the CAT company was the active participation
of the company personnel in battalion activities. General Defense
Plans work and support to battalion qualification gunnery training
were major activities.
3 0
Training focused on building interchangeable crew members
within a tank crew and platoon. The forming of the crews into
cohesive, confident platoons with "a will to win" was viewed as the
key to victory.
3 1
79
There is little emphasis on the team concept in the 3-64 CAT
After Action Report, especially relative to 4-8 Cavalry and 2-66
Armor.
80
2-66 Armor
The 2nd Armored Division (Forward) encountered some
difficulty in extending the boundaries of the team concept much
beyond 2-66 Armor, its only tank battalion. The major exception
was the CAT support element from the 498th Support Battalion. The
rest of the division focused on its other missions for the most part --
and expected the 2-66 Armor to support those missions and prepare
for CAT.
Within the 2-66 Armor, both of the CAT companies (C and D)
worked in very close support of one another -- before and after the
random selection of D Company as the final competitor. In many
respects, this was the most positive aspect of CAT '87 for 2-66
Armor. The other company commanders, with only occasional
exceptions, actively supported the CAT program with all assets at
their disposal. As the battalion commander, I constantly tried to sell
the concept that winning CAT was a battalion mission and it would
require the best efforts of the entire battalion to win. Most bought
that theme.
In the final analysis, D Company overcame some major
obstacles (disciplinary problems, lack of dedicated support team,
shortage of Range 301 training time, long distances to Grafenwoehr)
to form a cohesive unit capable of competing with the best tankers in
NATO. Many programs worked well for them (physical training,
family support, training with Allies, etc.) that reinforced their team
concept. I am convinced that without constant attention to
strengthening this team concept by the battalion and company
leadership, the performance of D Company would have been
considerably less.
Manning: Conclusions
Having examined in great detail the procedures used by each of
the American divisions to build their CAT '87 teams--and based on
my own personal involvement in the process, the following are the
factors regarding manning the units (in priority) that earned the
winning margin for the 4-8 Cavalry:
81
WINNING FACTORS:
Manning
0 Chain of Command Commitment
0 Four-platoon Company Organization
0 Platoon Master Gunners
0 Chain of Command (division, brigade, battalion, and
company) total commitment to win . The 3 AD Commanding General
was personally and actively involved in the planning strategy and
made the personnel resources of the entire division available to
support the CAT effort as determined by the battalion chain of
command.
0 The decision to organize the CAT company as a four-platoon
company and eliminate members based on performance. This
proved to be a very effective incentive for those who really wanted
to compete and it provided the company commander maximum
flexibility in personnel assignments.
0 Placing a master gunner in each platoon. This facilitated the
expert and detailed supervision of crew training and tank mainte-
nance that otherwise could not be accomplished.
2 Interview with General Glen K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, 21 January 1988.
3 HQ AFCENT. Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition 15-19 June 1987 Rules
and Conditions, 2 June 1986, pp.47-48.
82
4 Headquarters, 4th Battalion 8th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Divisior' Memorandum,
Subject: After Action Report, 1987 Canadian Army Trophy Competition, 28
August 1987, p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. A-1-1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 64th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division
Memorandum, Subject CAT After Action Report, 24 August 1987, p. B-1.
1 1 Ibid.
12 Ibid, p.3.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 op.cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. A-1-1&2
16 Ibid., p. A-1-2.
17 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. B-1.
19 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. A-3-1.
21 Ibid., p.A-2-1.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p.3.
24 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. B-1
26 op.cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. E-7-1.
28 op.cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. E-7-1.
30 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. 2.
31 ibid., p. E-3.
83
Chalpter
5
Training a CAT Winner
The peacetime key to preparing units tc win on the battlefield
is a well planned, combat-task oriented, properly resourced and
supervised, well executed training program. The excellent units in
the U.S. Army today operate under the premise that everything they
do is part of their training program. Therefore, everything they do
must be done according to a task - condition - standard and
should contribute to the accomplishment of the unit's wartime
mission. The training program must develop individual and
collective (unit) skills that surpass expected standards -- and build
the individual pride and unit cohesion necessary to overcome the
stresses of combat.
"'1 yjou provide an environment in which
you're not being attacked, abused or
assauLted, but an environment where 'L can
tnake mistakes, then those people--being so
bright--wiU ta" that with them and want
to train and want to earn."
I
1LT Edward Masser
CAT '87
In a similar but more specific manner, the tank companies that
compete for the Canadian Army Trophy must, to a very large degree
and for at least one year, redefine their principal mission. CAT
preparation must dominate, if not monopolize the units' time. The
tasks, conditions and standards related to winning CAT must be
precisely defined. These tasks, conditions and standards will far
exceed the normal target acquisition, fire distribution, tank gunnery
84
accuracy and tank maintenance standards expected of normal units.
Then the companies must develop and execute a training program
that focuses all available time and other training resources on
perfecting those tasks under the prescribed conditions and
standards. The companies will need a lot of help from their higher
headquarters to perfect these tasks. The extent to which a chain of
command can marshall training resources in support of their CAT
company, permitting it to focus its efforts on the CAT tasks, will
determine performance at the final competition.
All of the American battalions truly believed they could win
the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy competition. Victory was the clear
- cut objective. And based on the CAT '85 results, all knew that every
main gun target must be hit in order to have a charce to win. Each
battalion would develop its own training program based on its analy-
sis of its training status, CAT experience and available training re-
sources.
'-tjot&'t "o to train~ for the findL ojectiam.
lJou've C
9
ot to "v the pCOpe room. i1p h
Jamin invdtnv as much as vou can,
because thazt wUif WO~ nwraLe. flakz sur d"i
tAkt it sezious[4j. tJou've
9
~ot to undferstanid
thtat this is not just dutaj--this is an extra
duty. 7h is a dgiven mision
2
SGT Shaun Banks
Driver, Dl1, 44 Cavalry
CAT '87
This section will describe the major features of the training
programs of the three American tank battalions and their competing
CAT companies in order to determine the significant similarities and
differences. Since many portions of the programs were similar for all
three battalions, I will use the 4-8 Cavalry's as the baseline and
highlight differences in the 3-64 Armor and 2-66 Armor programs.
With these differences, combined with the final CAT '87 scores, I will
85
draw some conclusions as to what training factors provided the win-
ning margin for 4-8 Cavalry.
Target Acquisition and Fire Distribution
Tn combat, especially in units with potentially overwhelming
:. i such as tank and mechanized infantry companies, fast
target acquisition and the efficient distribution of your firepower to
destroy the enemy is a vital function. In CAT, it is the key to victory.
Therefore, CAT companies and their parent battalions spend nearly a
year of training developing and perfecting their standard operating
procedures (SOP) to hit all presented targets in the shortest possible
time using the smallest number of bullets. The 4-8 Cavalry called
theirs the "CAT Attack SOP".
The main features of any viable CAT SOP (and I submit, a
combat
SOP) are:
3
-- Target acquisition and sensing.
-- Firepower distribution.
-- Command and Control (movement and reporting).
A fundamental principle in developing a winning SOP is to
build it from the ground up -- allowing maximum input from the
soldiers that must execute it. All of the units did this to a large
degree, although using different techniques. 4-8 Cavalry and 3-64
Armor developed a very detailed and range specific (targets
numbered according to Range 117 or 301 layout) SOP.
2-66 Armor developed a more generalized SOP (we called it a
grid system) that it could quickly adapt to any range. This decision
was driven by three major factors -- our belief that a generalized
system could better adjust to the uncontrolaM"e factors; the desire to
increase combat proficiency as well as w, AT. the limited time we
would have on the competition ranges. The 2-66 Armor grid system
was a significant difference among the three teams, as the other
teams used a precise target numbering system that was Range 301 -
specific. In retrospect, it is possible that a range-specific type SOP is
required to win. I am not sure, given the other major resource
differences among the units.
86
Let us examine some of the key features of the unit SOPs and
their development.
4-8 Cavalry
The D Company commander made the formulation of the attack
SOP a company project to be developed "from the ground up" in
phases. In phase one, after some initial guidance, each of the four
platoons would develop its own internal SOP based on trips to Campo
Pondand Grafenwoehr. In phase two, after their Grafenwoehr train-
ing period in the November - December period, the platoons were re-
quired to combine their best efforts into a single company SOP. This
SOP was finalized prior to the company's Christmas leave period. 4
"i'f v=14 the ls lrS rnAz dthe Oan, t
am nm rd~nto rnfL tp with it, togw"
110 Z effmot. TJ it's dU=Wdt an than, tf"a'ne
oLng to do Ow wyr
V
mUi m."
5
ILT Edward Masser
CAT '87
After that, all platoons in the company were required to con-
duct all training according to the company SOP. Refinements were
made through May 1987, based on lessons learned from UCOFT,
SIMNET and live fire battleruns.
6
3-64 Armor
The battalion took much the same approach as did 4-8 Cavalry,
except that the basic fire distribution SOP was built in June 1986 --
much earlier than the 4-8 Cavalry and somewhat earlier than 2-66
Armor.
An imaginative technique was used by 3-64 Armor to build
their fire distribution plan. Each crew was required to make range
sketches--what they could and could not engage--while mounted in
their tanks in their assigned competition lanes. This technique, in
87
combination with memorizing target pit locations and the distance
and angle to targets, resulted in an extremely detailed knowledge of
the competition range.
During training, the following key points were stressed:
7
0 Even though the basic fire distribution plan will be modified
as the training program evolves, always conduct practices according
to the latest version of the SOP.
0 Force the tank commander to observe different sectors than
the gunner. Develop special drills to support this.
0 Use target numbers and force all tank commanders and
gunners to know the target numbers.
0 There is no substitute for a detailed knowledge of the com-
petition range. Live fire on it as much possible. Dry run on it when
ever it is available.
0 Precision sight reticle lay is an essential skill to achieve CAT
accuracy standards. The combination of speed and accuracy must be
stressed. Their analysis indicated best results were achieved by
making the final reticle lay an upward movement. Against moving
targets, the aiming dot must be placed on the target in the direction
the target is moving fo" best accuracy.
0 Target acquisition and sensing skills are fundamental to
making the plan work. Crews constantly trained to improve their
acquisition ability to quickly acquire and engage the targets -- and
then determine a hit or miss, in order to quickly re-engage if missed.
2-66 Armor
There was a major difference between the fire distribution
plans of 4-8 Cavalry and 3-64 Armor, versus that of the 2-66
Armor. Whereas the former units developed a very range specific
target numbering system, 2-66 Armor developed a more general
grid system. The 2-66 decision was based on several factors. First,
we knew we would be severely limited in the amount of time that
we could train on either of the Grafenwoehr ranges, making target
memorization very difficult. The addition of new targets on Range
301 after it was placed off limits, reinforced this choice. Second,
88
we believed the grid system would better accommodate the
unknown factors -- those things that are bound to go wrong and
cause panic when they do. Third, we believed that a grid system was
more akin to methods that should be used in combat -- an6 we
believed we could win CAT with it.
It is very difficult for me to determine if the difference in fire
distribution plans made a significant difference in the team
standings. Others believe you cannot win without a range - specific
plan.
The 2-66 Armor SOP was also built from the ground up. The
procedure began with a review of the procedures used by C Company
in CAT '85 at Bergen Hohne. Since the battalion was initially training
two companies, each company (really each platoon) was permitted to
develop the beginnings of their SOP and put it into practice during
the August 1986 training period at Bergen (main gun rounds did not
count against the allowed 134).
After the August live fire training period, and based on live
fire experience, the leadership of the battalion and the two CAT com-
panies (NCO and officer) constructed the basis for the grid system
SOP. Then each platoon adapted its lessons learned to that basic
plan. This "fire - and -adjust" process continued, with each company
building a company SOP by the end of the January Bergen live fire
training period. While there was much cross - feed between the
companies, there remained some differences in their SOPs going into
the March gunnery training period.
With the random selection of D Company to compete in CAT,
the final SOP selection was determined. In hindsight, I believe we
would have been further ahead had I forced the two company com-
manders to agree upon a standard SOP prior to January 1987.
Home Station Training
Home station training is a term applied to the training that is
done using the local resources at or near a unit's home base, as op-
posed to the training that can only be accomplished at the major tank
gunnery ranges and maneuver areas such as Grafenwoehr, Bergen
Hohne and Hohenfels. There is often a wide variety in the resources
89
available at different stations. However, the best units in the Army
habitually use the most imagination and conduct excellent training
on these "limited" resources.
4-8 Cavalry
Based on their analysis of the after action reports of previous
CAT units, 4-8 Cavalry concluded that: the lack of a stable and coher-
ent training program hindered results; and previous units had con-
centrated their training almost entirely on periods at the major
training areas, while effectively ignoring the home station training
opportunities.
8
Based on this observation, 3 AD and 4-8 Cavalry took the fol-
lowing steps:
0 In an effort to stabilize the training by eliminating distrac-
tors, they excused CAT team members from all guard duty and other
work details. This was further supported by their brigade and divi-
sion decisions to reduce the entire battalion's taskings accordingly.
The decision to excuse the team members was common to all
teams after I April 1987. But the decision to reduce the entire bat-
talion's guard and detail commitment was unique and innovative.
This decision would enhance the battalions' team concept as well as
reduce the battalions' administrative burden. Such a decision was
not an option in the 2 AD (FWD), where there were only five
battalions.
0 The division Engineers constructed a 1/4 th scale range in a
local training area (Campo Pond) that simulated the two potential
competition ranges. With this facility, the CAT team was able to con-
duct numerous practice CAT battle runs in their tanks (sometimes
using sub-caliber ammunition).
No comparable facility was built by the other American
units. 2-66 Armor attempted to coordinate the construction of a
similar facility, but was unsuccessful.
0 Heavy emphasis was placed on tank commander - gunner
training in the unit conduct of fire trainer (UCOFT). The UCOFT is a
computer that generates specified target scenarios and measures the
crew's performance as it engages these targets. The trainer facility
90
actually approximates the physical layout of the tank commander
(TC) and gunner stations.
All American CAT teams made extensive use of the UCOFT. A
more complete explanation of the UCOFT and its use by all of the
American units is included later in this chapter.
o The unit developed a standardized procedure for conducting
after action reviews (AARs) that was used after every battle run,
simulated or live. The objective of the review process was to sort out
the real lessons learned from unstructured, emotional reactions to
poor performance.
9
Neither of the other two units placed as much emphasis on
the formal structure of the AAR as the 3 AD did.
There are many other aspects of individual and company
training conducttd by 4-8 Cavalry that deserve mention here.
0 To solidify the team concept (discussed later), much of the
company level training was based strongly on the input from the
soldiers' assessment of their training deficiencies. Also, where
possible, lower ranking members of a team would be assigned as
instructors. This not only increased their expertise, it also
encouraged more interaction between the lower and higher ranks.
0 The normal certification matrix for UCOFT training was used.
The goal was to certify all TC-gunner combinations by 21 December
1987.
3-64 Armor
The foundation of the home station training program was the
basic fire distribution plan. This plan was formulated based on a
leaders reconnaissance of Ranges 117 and 301 in June 1986. Then
local resources such as sand tables, scaled target ranges and mini-
tank ranges were constructed to represent the potential competition
ranges. From June 1986 forward, all battlerun exercises were con-
ducted in accordance with this SOP. 10
The 3-64 Armor home station gunnery program emphasized
the following key features:
1
1
91
* U
0 Basic gunnery skills aimed at identifying the best mix of
crews for the platoons.
0 Formulation of the basic fire distribution SOP and the bore-
sight and zero procedures; constant practice of both.
0 Learning the CAT Rules and Conditions.
Other classes were taught on automotive and turret theory so
that crewmen would truly understand how their equipment was
supposed to work--and how to recognize when it is malfunctioning.
The unit constructed a fairly simple (but effective) scale model
of Range 301 (they called it the Monroe Complex after their Master
gunner).
2-66 Armor
At the outset, 2-66 Armor knew it would have limited
scheduled time at major training areas -- especially relative to the 3
AD and 3 ID CAT units. Also, due to other mission requirements
established by the brigade, combined with the fact that half of its
tank companies were preparing for CAT, it was clear that the
selected CAT company would be unable to train exclusively for CAT
until after 1 April 1987 (only 2 1/2 months before the competition).
The training strategy that was developed to cope with this situation
had four main thrusts: the equipment must be finely tuned; the
soldiers must be mentally and physically fit; there should be an early
emphasis on crew gunnery; and, once trained, the expert crews
would be melded into winning platoons.
To implement the strategy, the battal.n .,-veloped a fully in-
tegrated training program to take maximum antage of time and
local resources --while maintaining the flexibility to add "scrounged"
major training area time. The major elements of this program
contained demanding tasks, conditions and standards that were to be
met. These elements were:
1 2
0 Personnel Training. This included physical and mental
training, as well as medical, dental and eye examinations to deter-
mine potential health problems that would hinder training.
92
0 Maintenance Training. This included all checks and services
and extensive maintenance instruction.
0 Gunnery Training. This included progressive training of
individuals, crews and platoons using all available resources.
0 Supplemental Training. This included all the standard
training events (common task training, skill qualification testing,
ARTEP tasks, etc.) that maintain the soldiers, platoons and the com-
pany in a readiness posture to execute the wartime missions.
The cornerstone of our home station training program was a
concentration on training for a 36 - target scenario (the maximum
possible), beginning very early in our program. This concept
overcame any complacency and sloppiness that might have existed in
the CAT companies. It put tremendous pressure on everyone to
perfect all procedures. Even when the "rumor" began to circulate in
January '87 that there would be a maximum of only 32 targets, we
still concentrated on engaging 36. There was at least one down side
to this, at least at the live fire ranges. It cost us more main gun
ammunition per battlerun, therefore, if we had shifted concentration
to the 32 target scenario earlier, we could have done more live fire
battleruns (assuming available ranges).
While we made good use of the available ranges in the
Garlstedt local training area, our efforts were not in the same league
with 3 AD and 4-8 Cavalry. Through a general lack of urgency by
some, and the battalions' heavy concentration on UCOFT and SIMNET,
2 AD (FWD) and 2-66 Armor failed to construct a programed, first
class mini-tank range. In hindsight, I believe this had a detrimental
impact.
Other Key Local Training Resources
and Techniques
At the insistence of all of the competing battalions, 7th Army
Training Center funded and directed the manufacture of very de-
tailed, scale model terrain boards of both ranges 117 and 301.
These boards had lights designating known and estimated CAT target
locations. A set of these terrain boards was provided to each CAT
team. With these terrain boards, the CAT platoons could devise
93
methods to conduct battle runs in the class room -- as well as
conduct precise AARs. The terrain boards were also invaluable tools
to help develop and troubleshoot the platoon attack SOPs.
4-S Cavalry developed a detailed program of company class-
room instruction ranging from the CAT rules to the finest details of
gunnery theory and technology. Each class was taught at least twice-
-once by an NCO and again by a junior enlisted soldier. The objective
was that each crewman needed to know the others' jobs thoroughly.
The end result was a standardization of all procedures ( boresighting,
zeroing, etc.) throughout the company. The CAT battalions followed
much the same procedure and philosophy.
1 3
Crew level and organizational maintenance tiaining were
done by the book -- every time. The same is true for the other units.
This has been a hallmark of the CAT units for some time and is one
of the major beneficial carry-overs after CAT.
14
The Armor suhool at Fort Knox, Kentucky formed a mobile
training team to teach a week-long mini-Master Gunner's Course
to all CAT companies. The course was believed to be so valuable by
the units that it was taught twice at each unit. All crewmen
attended, not just the tank commanders and gunners. The following
subjects were taught:
1 5
0 Theory and functions of the Ml fire control system.
0 Troubleshooting the Ml fire control system.
0 Random, variable, and bias errors in the fire control system.
0 Main gun functions.
0 Characteristics of the main gun practice ammunition (105
mm).
0 Machine gun (both the M240 and M2) functioning and trou-
ble shooting.
0 Conduct of fire and degraded mode gunnery to include ad-
justment techniques.
94
0 Preparation to fire checks, boresight and zero procedures to
include adjustment techniques.
0 Range determination.
In April, very late in the training cycle, all of the American
units received a platoon set of 50 caliber in-bore devices. With
these devices installed in the main gun breeches of the tanks, the
platoons could conduct numerous live-fire (sub-caliber) drills and
battle runs without expending any of the valuable 134 main gun
rounds. These devices were heavily used and based on the CAT
teams' experiences, they may be purchased for the rest of the Army.
All of the CAT teams recognized the tremendous potential
value of a through-the-sight video device. The Dutch CAT team
used their sophisticated device extensively -- and nearly beat us.
With such a television system, commanders and instructors can view
the same sight picture as the tank gunner when he is engaging
targets. Recordings of the action can also be made. Such a device can
greatly assist in the discovery of deficiencies and speed their cor-
rection. Fort Knox and 7th ATC worked desperately to get reliable
systems to the CAT teams but they were unsuccessful. Work is
underway already for CAT '89.
CAT Battle Run
Tank Crew Proficiency Course
The construction of the CAT battle run tank crew proficiency
course (TCPC) at Campo Pond was one of the most significant com-
mitments made by the 3AD to win CAT.
1 6
It was certainly one of the
most valuable training resources and it made a very large contribu-
tion to the winning margin of victory.
When preparing for normal tank crew gunnery qualification, a
unit will conduct many dry-fire runs in their tanks of a simulated
qualification course to perfect target acquisition, crew duties and fire
commands. Generally, the closer the conditions of the dry-run course
are to the actual qualification standards, the better ,vill be the per-
formance on the qualification course.
95
The same is true for CAT preparation -- but the construction of
a CAT - like practice range requires substantial training area and
equipment support. 3 AD recognized the requirement to
conduct numerous dry-fire CAT battle runs In the actual
tanks and between trips to major training areas. Therefore,
the division committed the resources to convert the training area at
Cpa ,- Fujid into a 1/4 scale model of the potential CAT competition
ranges (first Range 117 and then Range 301). The terrain was
contoured precisely and the suspected target areas were surveyed in.
This scaled range was so accurate that the crews were able to
transfer their knowledge of the terrain and potential target arrays to
the competition range.
"21 the time we went down rcange 301 we
knew evertj nch of it." 17
PFC Brent Berry
CAT '87
There are at least two other benefits from this scaled range.
The first is improved target acquisition -- as the scaled targets are
smaller and tougher to see than actual CAT targets. The second is
that such a facility provides the ideal environment to develop and
test the platoon attack SOP.
In order to gain the full benefit of the scaled range, 2d Brigade
was given scheduling priority for the training area until June 1987.
Even when other units occupied the facilities, they were not
permitted to disturb the CAT range construction.
18
96
Major Training Areas
As mentioned before, major training area is a generic term that
applies to areas where units can deploy and conduct live fire training
and large scale maneuvers. Since CAT '87 was to be held at Grafen-
woehr on either Range 117 or 301, the control of these two ranges
was a valuable lever.
Furthermore, the control and access to Range 9 at Bergen
Hohne was key. It is the best equipped range in Northern Germany
and is the most in demand all year.
There were three major factors influencing the scheduling of
major training area time, especially Ranges 117 and 301 at Grafen-
woehr and Range 9 at Bergen Hohne. First, there was the key date of
1 October 1986, after which all main gun rounds fired counted
against the 134 round limit specified in the CAT 1987 Rules and Con-
ditions. The main thrust here was to get some live fire range time
(preferably on Ranges 117 and 301, or 9) scheduled after one orga-
nized for CAT, but before 1 October. Second, there was the key date
of 1 January 1987, when Commander, AFCENT, would make the deci-
sion on the competition range (Range 301 was selected). Beginning 1
January, the selected CAT ' 87 competition range (Range 301) was off
limits to all members of a potential CAT company until the week of
the actual competition. Once again, there was a mad scramble to get
live fire (or any other time) time on the potential competition ranges
prior to I January. To the uneducated, this does not appear to be a
prohlem until nne is informed that these two ranges are the primary
qualification training ranges for the U.S. Army Europe and some al-
lied forces. There is hardly a day of unscheduled time (at least a
year in advance) for these ranges. Third, the actual control of the
ranges and the timing of that control is significant. U.S. divisions, like
the 3 AD and 3 ID control large blocks of range time at Grafenwoehr.
It is their habitual major training area and is locatcd feasonb=ly
nearby (Gelnhausen, about 140 miles; Schweinefurt, about 80 miles).
Normally, this range time is prorated about evenly to all the brigades
(and subsequently, tank battalions) in the division. But for divisions
with CAT teams, the range time is shuffled internally to give the CAT
companies maximum possible time. On the other hand, the 2 AD
(Fwd) and 2-66 Armor habitually train at Bergen Hohne (about 80
miles), with one trip per year to Grafenwoehr (about 400 miles).
97
Between the time they organized for CAT and mid-June 1987,
both 4-8 Cavalry and 3-64 Armor trained (live fire and dry fire) for
considerable periods of time on both Ranges 117 and 301. On the
other hand, from May 1986 until the week prior to the competition,
2-66 Armor had four days of live firing time on Range 1 17(including
the time required to shoot qualification gunnery for two + non - CAT
conmIan'es) and three days of shared time for dry fire on Range 301.
As partial compensation, the 2-66 Armor had approximately 10 live
fire days on Bergen Range 9 -- much of it shared time.
Considering the above factors, each of the American CAT units
were able to fire their tanks at major training areas as follows:
4-8 Cavalry
No matter how intensive the gunnery training is on simulators
such as UCOFT and SIMNET, battles -- both real battles and CAT bat-
tles -- are won by putting holes in targets. The 4-8 Cavalry program
at major training areas emphasized that point by very carefully de-
termining whether or not each and every main gun round fired hit
the target -- where it hit, or where it missed. Through their after
action review (AAR) process, they could determine the cause for each
miss and develop corrective action for each error. Over time (4-8
Cavalry spent 45 days on Range 117)19, this process would develop
skill and confidence in the men, equipment and procedures.
20
-- Prior to 1 October 1986 --
During the period 20 September - 4 October 1986. the
battalion's crews (and some from outside the battalion) participated
in a 3 AD organized "shoot-off" at Grafenwoehr (Range 112), whereby
all prospective CAT crews would be evaluated in live-fire tests
according to CAT standards. During this period, each crew fired at
least 50 main gun rounds, and this formeo the basis for initial CAT
crew selection and placement into the CAT company. All zeroing of
the CAT tanks was done after the 1 October cut-off date.
2 1
-- After 1 October 1986 --
During the 14 November - 5 December 1986 training density at
Grafenwoehr, the 4-8 Cavalry stressed range familiarization on both
potential competition ranges, 301 and 117 (18 possible days,
98
although '.5 were lost to fog). This was the first time full-up platoon
battleruns were conducted. These battlerun scenarios were based on
"best guesses" for stressful target arrays rather than known firing
data that would be developed later. This firing data would become
invaluable for determining specific weaknesses and corrective ac-
tion.22
During this 3 AD density, all of the Range 117 and Range 301
time allocated to the entire division was dedicated to the CAT teams.
With this much time available, the CAT teams conducted numerous
dry fire exercises and range walks. They studied actual and
potential target locations, distances from various firing positions to
these targets, and began to develop the best methods for the
platoons to engage target arrays. Following these activities, two full
days on Range 301 were used for a competitive shoot-off among the
platoons. Recognizing the significant support role the family
members would play on the long road to CAT, the division arranged
transportation to Grafenwoehr for the tankers' family members to
observe the platoon shoot-off. 23
For its next major training area opportunity, the battalion
deployed to Baumholder, FRG, for three weeks 30 January - 21
February 1987 (15 possible firing days, 6 lost to fog). During this
time, it accomplished the following: 24
0 Developed and verified a new zeroing system that it
believed simplified the procedure, thus reducing errors and
increasing speed.
0 The company further reduced its roster through
performance screening, trimming the company to a standard three -
platoon configuration.
0 After extensive firing exercises where actual target hits
(confirmed by checking holes in targets after firing) were
significantly different (as much as 42 one day) from target hit
sensings (as determined by dedicated observers during shooting), the
battalion was convinced of the need for a more precise scoring
system. This realization was a turning point in their program.
0 The CAT platoons began to shoot at smaller targets (2/3
size) than the official CAT targets.
99
0 The fire distribution procedures were further refined due to
the demands of the more narrow ranges at Baumholder. Narrow
ranges make it more difficult for the crews to quickly define the
responsibility for some targets, creating the potential for multiple
engagement of a single target and wasted ammunition.
April 1987 (and Kitty CAT 1). During April 1987, the CAT team
conducted live fire gunnery on Range 117. Going into this period, the
company had used less than half of its allocated 134 rounds per
crew. The company began using its new scoring and tracking system.
A computer was kept in the range tower to immediately record firing
data. Thus a database of information was created that facilitated the
quick identification of weaknesses and the adjustment of battlerun
scenarios to correct problems.
2 5
During their April training density at Grafenwoehr, the 3 AD
organized a pre - CAT practice competition (they called it Kitty CAT I,
25-28 April) on Range 117. Only CENTAG teams were invited -- and
those attending were D/4-8 Cavalry, Royal Canadian Dragoons 4th
CMBG, 363 Panzer Battalion, and the non-selected 31D company, D/1-
64 Armor. The concept was to subject their team to the pressures of
full competition prior to the actual CAT competition. Accordingly, the
target presentations, battlerun procedures and crowd presence were
created to closely duplicate the expected conditions on Range 301.
The team even pre-selected the actual platoon firing order for CAT
and implemented it for both Kitty CAT I and II. This had the advan-
tage of teaching the platoons the subtleties of that position. This was
a brilliant maneuver and the event was a great success.
2 6
Some of the key points determined from the use of the com-
puter-based scoring system were:
2 7
1. Faster engagement times result in higher first round hit per-
centage (just the opposite oi what one might think).
2. Range-to-target was not a strong factor in target misses.
3. Sensing the sabot round was a definite problem. Only 25% of
the targets missed were reengaged.
4. Target acquisition and hand-off using a grid method was a
problem relative to a target numbering system. More targets were
100
reengaged using the target numbering system. Based on this finding,
the battalion developed and implemented a target numbering system
that would work for both Ranges 301 and 117. It became the com-
petition SOP.
5. Long range targets should be engaged first to avoid the
problems of lasing and engaging through dust.
6. The SOP's, especially reporting requirements, were not
strictly followed by some crews under the heat of competition (Kitty
CAT).
7. Quarantine procedures were weak (did not develop
confidence in and use of the reserve tanks).
These lessons would be used to develop the scenarios for the
final live fire density.
May-June 1987 (and Kitty CAT I). D/ 4-8 Cavalry's final live
fire gunnery period was 17 May-8 June 1987 -- the last three weeks
before the CAT competition. Once again, even though much of this
period was scheduled for qualification gunnery for the division, 3 AD
gave the CAT team priority on Range 117. Knowing this, the team
had programmed their bullet expenditure such that they had 30-35
rounds per crew going into the last week.
To take maximum advantage of the few remaining bullets, they
developed special target arrays consisting of 20-24 targets. With
these arrays, they could conduct more battleruns, using less
ammunition per run.
Also during this period, Dr. Dennis Forbes, stress coach from the
Department of Physical Education, United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York, joined the team. He was to play a major role
in the final -.cparation of the team. Essentially, he transformed the
team from -; a participating team into a competing team.
28
A more ,-plete discussion of his role will be explained later
in the se tion ,n stress management.
Because of the great success of Kitty CAT I, the 3 AD organized
another pre-CAT competition (Kitty CAT II) 24-26 May on Range
101
117. This time invitations were issued to both CENTAG and
NORTHAG team members. Those attending were D/4-8 Cavalry,
Royal Canadian Dragoons 4th CMBG, the Royal Hussars. Neither of the
other American teams attended. Once again, this competition was a
great success and D/4-8 Cavalry claimed the winning honors.
2 9
The subject of pre-CAT competitions is important. In early
1986 at a meeting of representatives of all potential American
competitors, all units were in favor of an All-American pre-
competition shoot. The objectives would be to expose the teams to
the pressures of open competition and reward those American
companies (three) that would ultimately not be selected. While all
agreed in concept, the timing of the contest (relative to each unit's
training program and bullet expenditure) and whose range assets
would be used became major obstacles. They were not overcome. As
a result, the Kitty CATs I&fl, arranged by the 3 AD were the closest
thing to realizing the originally conceived goals. In my opinion, D/4-
8 Cavalry gained a major advantage from these contests.
June 1987 (Pre-competition week on Range 117). Each platoon
was permitted time to conduct one final battlerun, as specified in the
CAT Rules and Conditions.
-- Range 301 --
November-December 1986. The team got four days of firing
time, including two days of competitive shooting against the other
3AD CAT team. Activities included an emphasis on section (half -
platoon) gunnery and numerous range walks during range
maintenance time. These walks featured some "reverse angle" views
of the range to verify platoon SOPs. 30
In summary, the following are the major lessons learned by 4-
8 Cavalry from its extensive major training area periods: 31
1. Practice battle runs must strictly duplicate actual competi-
tion tasks and conditions.
2. The strike (or miss) of all main gun rounds fired must be
determined precisely.
102
3. Validate crewman skills before the official round count be-
gins.
4. Tanks must be zeroed using a simple system.
5 Live fire pre-competition competition is a must.
6. SIMNET is not a gunnery trainer.
7. Schedule a major portion of your main gun rounds to be
fired late in your live fire program.
103
3-64 Armor 32
August-September 1986 (Grafenwoehr). Unlike the other CAT
teams, the 3-64 Armor had the opportunity to conduct crew qualifi-
cation gunnery (Range 117) for the CAT company prior to beginning
the official round count. They used the opportunity wisely by using
the gunnery scores as an additional evaluation factor to select CAT
crew members. Additional range time and ammunition were
available to run other crew and wingman exercises to help select CAT
crew firing lane assignments.
The CAT company also had the range and ammunition re-
sources available to conduct both live-fire and dry-fire battleruns on
Ranges 117 and 301. In approximate numbers, the 3d Infantry
Division provided the CAT team 3000 main gun rounds of
ammunition during this period to improve its gunnery skills.
December 1986 (Grafenwoehr). In addition to live-fire on both
ranges 117 and 301, the company spent countless hours of range
reconnaissance and dry-fire exercises. The fire distribution SOP was
continuously revised and rehearsed. 33
March 1987 (Grafenwoehr). The major emphasis was on live-
fire battleruns against increasingly difficult target arrays. 34
May 1987 (Grafenwoehr). Same activities as in March.
-- Range 301 --
September 1986. As mentioned earlier, the CAT team had the
opportunity to conduct live-fire and dry-fire battleruns on Range
301. In combination with the firing done on Range 117, each crew
fired approximately 200 main gun rounds in a three week period.
104
December 1986. Conducted more wet- and dry-fire exercises.
2-66
Armor
3 5
August 1986 (Bergen Hohne). This was the first live-fire op-
portunity for both CAT companies after their formation. "Shake-out"
CAT battleruns of 24-27 main gun targets were conducted with am-
munition saved by the battalion during the FY 86 training year.
Each platoon made numerous dry-fire battleruns to rehearse their
SOP and then made one live-fire run (10 rounds).
18-31 October 1986 (Bergen Hohne). The battalion returned
from a major NATO field training exercise in late September and
prepared 28 tanks for turn in -- a monumental task. Then we were
issued 28 new tanks and we immediately married the CAT crews to
their new weapons. They were now ready to deploy to Bergen to
zero and battlerun their tanks to CAT standards. Crew, section, and
platoon firing drills were conducted. Beginning with this training
period, all platoon scenarios consisted of the maximum 36 targets.
This was very stressful, but we had little time to "ramp-up". This
early stress would pay off, but when combined with imprecise
scoring, would mask some firing accuracy deficiencies.
January 1987 (Bergen Hohne). The entire battalion deployed to
Bergen Hohne in late January to prepare for crew qualification gun-
nery and CAT. The weather is normally severe in Northern Germany
at this time, so one cannot count on high range utilization time. To
compensate for this potential shortage and to add an element of
competition to our training, we packaged our Range 9 time with that
controlled by the Dutch CAT battalion, 43rd Tank, and shared the
range operation. Our battalion had developed an informal
partnership with the 43rd Tank based on close cooperation in CAT
'85. We knew they were good -- and would likely be a top contender
in CAT '87.
March 1987 (Grafenwoehr). The battalion deployed to Grafen-
woehr in early March to conduct crew qualification gunnery for two
companies (one company was newly arrived from Fort Hood, Texas,
105
four days before deployment), conduct company team live fire exer-
cises, and train two companies for CAT. This period would be
followed immediately by an all night road march to Hohenfels and
the battalions' annual ARTEP (primarily tactical maneuver training)
evaluation.
The battalion was allocated a total of four days on Range 117 to
conduct both crew qualification gunnery for two companies and CAT
battleruns for two companies -- a very tall order. I split the time --
two days for each activity. And since these were our only
programmed days on Range 117, we conducted 24 CAT battleruns in
those two days, four per platoon. Our two CAT companies were well
prepared and organized for this monumental task -- and they made
significant progress. However, in hindsight, we did not get the
maximum value from this time because we still had not developed
an error - free spotting system to score the battleruns and the hectic
firing pace left inadequate time for adjustments between runs.
But there was a bonus from the internal competition between
the two companies. Both knew that for the non - selected company,
this would be the last opportunity to display the skill they had
worked so hard to develop. They both believed they were good
enough to win CAT, if selected, and they wanted to prove it by out-
shooting the other company. As a result, those 24 battleruns in
about 16 hours of firing time were a truly awesome display of
precision tank gunnery firepower.
In the spirit of allied cooperation, the 2-66 Armor responded to
an urgent request by the British 2nd Royal Tank Regiment for range
time assistance. We coordinated facilities at Grafenwoehr for them;
allowed them to observe our training techniques and range opera-
tions; permitted them to dry run behind our platoons' live fire bat-
tleruns; and permitted some live fire at the tail end of our last day of
range time on Range 117.
At the end of the CAT training period, the two CAT companies
returned to Garlstedt for maintenance and a short block leave period.
The rest of the battalion deployed to Hohenfels. However, the offi-
cers from both CAT companies were required to join the battalion
later at Hohenfels to provide an evaluation team to the brigade for
ARTEP support.
106
April 1987 (Bergen Hohne). Originally, the battalion had no
major training area time programmed for April. However, early in
the year we actively encouraged the British and Dutch CAT units
(who controlled the range most of April and May) that it would ben-
efit all of us to organize some sort of joint competition in the April -
May time period. They needed no encouragement and the British al-
located some range time and established the procedures for a four-
day NORTHAG informal competition. D/2-66 Armor, now officially
selected, joined the selected CAT companies of the British, Dutch and
Germans in the competition. While the battleruns were not stan-
dardized, but customized to team training requirements, and there
were no posted results, the Dutch team established themselves as the
best we had seen. D Company knew it would have to improve to
beat the Dutch in CAT, just two months away.
Near the end of April, the 3 AD invited D/2-66 Armor and A/
3-64 Armor to compete with them in their Kitty CAT 11 (24-26 May).
Without question, we wanted to compete. We still believed an
American team would win CAT '87 and we needed a head-on-head
competition to determine exactly where we stood. However, to say
that we had scheduling and resource problems was a gross under-
statement. But my staff and I worked feverishly with the brigade
commander and his staff to develop the best alternatives, and if
possible, participate in Kitty CAT II.
I proposed an alternative that would have us ship the D Com-
pany tanks to Grafenwoehr in time for Kitty CAT II, compete, and
then secure the tanks (under 2-66 Armor control) at Grafenwoehr
for the two weeks until the already scheduled final deployment to
CAT '87. As there was no time or money to permit an unscheduled
rail deployment to Grafenwoehr, this alternative solved that
problem. For the already scheduled period on Range 9 in early June
with the Dutch, I proposed that D Company shoot on C Company's
tanks (also CAT - quality tanks that were already programmed for
deployment to Bergen). In effect, this alternative would give D
Company an extra opportunity to shoot under competitive conditions.
This alternative did have some disadvantages that troubled the
brigade commander, who had substantial exposure to the subtleties
of CAT:
0 The short notice deployment would be disruptive to an al-
ready full training program.
107
O There was some risk involved with having the competition
tanks out of the direct control of D Company.
0 D Company would be firing someone else's tanks late in the
training cycle.
0 There was a slim chance of getting additional Range 9 time
in late May (although this fell through before the final decision was
made).
In the end, all of these concerns swayed the brigade comman-
der, Colonel Baucum, to decline the 3 AD invitation.
June 1987 (Bergen Hohne Most of the battalion, including D
Company deployed to Bergen in early June. D Company had one final
opportunity to fine tune its procedures on Range 9 before deploying
to Grafenwoehr for CAT. Once again, we combined our range time
with that of the Dutch 43rd Tank and trained together. At the en of
these two days, D Company believed it was ready to win CAT.
-- Range 301 --
The 2-66 Armor CAT teams had no programmed time on Range
301 between the time they organized and 1 January 1987. The last
time any of the battalion had fired 301 was April 1986 under non-
CAT conditions. We tried to break some time loose that would
accommodated our other mission requirements. We sent special
teams to photograph and walk the range. Through early December
1986, we were unsuccessful in obtaining the much needed live fire
time. Then we had an offer from 3 ID to take any unused time on
Ranges 117 and 301 from their density between Christmas and New
Year's Day. There were no guarantees of live fire time (this is the
worst time of the year, weather-wise), but there was a possibility if
the weather permitted 3 ID CAT teams to complete their program.
There would likely be plenty of dry fire time.
A decision to position ourselves for the possibility to live fire
would have required the deployment of almost half the battalion to
108
Grafenwoehr on short notice over the Christmas and New Year's holi-
day. After much staff work and soul searching, I chose another
alternative. I decided to deploy C and D Companies with a platoon
of tanks and a small support package each on 27 December. This
would permit us up to four days (weather and 3 ID permitting) to
conduct dry runs on both potential competition ranges inoutanks.
As it turned out, the decision was made on 29 December that Range
301 would be the CAT '87 range. Therefore, we were able to spend
the majority of three days in our tanks on this range proofing our
SOPs and learning the range layout.
The major function that occurs at the major training areas for
CAT companies is firing the main gun rounds under the stressful
conditions of a CAT-like battle run. To be successful in the live fire
training program a team must be able to determine with a high de-
gree of confidence the exact strike location of every main gun round
fired. With this accuracy data, weaknesses can be positively identi-
fied for corrective action. Otherwise, one is guessing on a large num-
ber of the shots. This would be simple if one could inspect the
targets after battle run. But to do so requires shutting down live
firing on most of the rest of the training area as you go down range
to inspect. This cannot be done in most cases, especially at Bergen. 3
AD did the best job of solving this problem. The other two units
never did solve the problem satisfactorily.
Training Simulators
All of the American CAT teams relied heavily on the use of
training simulators to prepare for CAT '87. I discuss the two primary
ones here, the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT )-- a tank crew
(commander and gunner) trainer, and Simulation Networking
(SIMNET) -- used as a platoon operations trainer in CAT training. To
varying degrees, all units attributed much of their success to their
training time on these simulators.
"I'd say being ready for it: having done it so
many times, simulated it so manj times,
and simulated what vouLd 9o wrong and
what couLd go right. We got a reafy easy
scenario and we'd been practicing on such
109
ncrediby hard scenarios. U* was hard to
lose. t wouLd have been incredibly hard for
us to lose."
36
PFC Brent Berry
Driver, D12, 4- Cavalry
CAT '87
Training simulators have been developed by the U.S. Army to
meet at least two important needs. The first, and the one often
getting the most priority, is the need to meet and sustain established
training readiness levels at reduced costs--shoot fewer bullets, drive
fewer miles, spend fewer hours, etc. The second, and the one gaining
prominence, is the need to train on combat tasks to specified
standards under combat-like conditions-- and have performance
measured (and recorded for analysis) so that corrective action by
leaders can drive improvements.
"...% a 9reat .... and' think the best part of it
was the after action [review]. tjou couEd watch
where everj round went, who fired it, how Long
it took them to react .... After about two weeks of it,
we did one [battle run] and it was perfect. We didn't
have antj wasted rounds. I Looked over to Sergeant
Knox and I said, we're gotn to win this." 37
PFC Brent Berry
CAT '87
CAT units' achievements have added credibility to the training
simulator concept, and these units are on the leading edge of pushing
simulator technology to meet the Army's training needs. The strong
performance of the American teams in CAT'85 and the victory in CAT
'87 are strong indicators that the Army is earning large returns on its
investment.
110
Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT)
The UCOFT is a gunnery training simulator that very closely
approximates the physical layout of the tank commander (TC) and
gunner stations of the MI Abrams tank (there is also a version for
the M2/3 Bradley). A trained instructor (experienced tanker)
evaluates the two-man crew as the UCOFT computer generates pre-
programmed animated target scenarios under various conditions of
visibility and difficulty (including emergency action and degraded
mode). Others, primarily the crew's platoon leader and platoon
sergeant, can also evaluate the performance through a separate
screen that duplicates the crewmen's views of the target area. As
the crew engages the targets, the computer records their perfor-
mance in such areas as target acquisition speed and accuracy, reticle
lay (precision gunnery aiming skill) and fire commands (target
management). These target scenarios were designed by the
contractor (General Electric) in coordination with the Army. They are
organized in a matrix that leads the crews through drills of ever-
increasing difficulty as they attempt to certify on the UCOFT.
As mentioned earlier, the UCOFT had not been fielded in time
for CAT '85 , so the CAT units trained on early production models at
General Electric's facilities in Florida. In addition to the standard
target array matrix, the teams used a specially developed Range 9-
specific program disk to generate CAT target arrays. This training
was very successful and there was a positive correlation between the
amount of UCOFT training and the final unit standings in the 1985
CAT competition.
38
Since fielding, the UCOFT has become the cornerstone of the U.S.
Army tank units' home station gunnery program. Every tank and
mechanized battalion in Europe has at least shared-use access to one.
Most have their own and it is their premier home station gunnery
training device. Consequently, the UCOFT has been the subject of
much study and analysis. The major findings are:
3 9
0 Crews are able to detect, engage, and hit targets 20 percent
faster.
0 The negative impact of personnel turbulence on crew
gunnery performance is reduced.
Ill
a * I I I
0 Degraded mode gunnery training is facilitated where it
would otherwise be dangerous or impractical.
For CAT '87, as for CAT '85, a special CAT program disk was
developed (by General Electric and 7th ATC) for the UCOFT. It
simulated the terrain of the competition range and presented target
arrays that were estimated to be similar to those that might be faced
during the actual competition. Given the proven success of the
UCOFT in CAT '85 preparation and in other tank units, UCOFT training
was the mainstay of the home station training program.
40
It was
heavily used by all American CAT units. They even borrowed time
on 7th ATC's UCOFT while deployed to Grafenwoehr.
4-8 Cavalry
As mentioned earlier, training on the battalion's Unit Conduct
of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) was the cornerstone of the 4-8 Cavalry's
home station training program. It was used heavily, beginning with
initial screening tests for tank commander/gunner combinations and
extending through Range 301 battlerun scenarios using a specially
developed CAT disk. Key features of the UCOFT training program
were as follows:
4 1
0 Initial TC/gunner screening using selected standard UCOFT
exercises.
0 Certification (in accordance with the standard training ma-
trix, except protective masks) of all TC/gunner combinations NLT 21
December 1986. This was especially significant because certification
demands mastery of degraded mode gunnery skills--and ideal
gunnery conditions are almost always degraded in CAT by the
weather. In order to certify all crews on schedule, they found it
almost essential to establish intermediate time and performance
objectives.
0 Training specified reticle aim standards--maximum of .25
error in deflection or elevation.
0 Standard crew fire commands (as specified in the gunnery
manuals) were not permitted, as they are too time consuming and
congest the communications nets.
112
0 The CAT '85 disk was used until the Range 301 specific, CAT
'87 disk was delivered in March 1987. Drills consisted of battlerun
exercises (unique for each lane), remedial exercises tailored to indi-
vidual crew weaknesses, and wingman exercises.
In the opinion of 4-8 Cavalry, the Range 301 CAT disk
(prepared by General Electric and 7th ATC) was the single most im-
p~dhku, , li ng device provided to the team. Additionally, they
stressed that since degraded mode gunnery is so important to CAT
preparation, all crews must be required to certify on the standard
matrix before moving to the CAT disk.
4 2
3-64 Armor
The key features of the 3-64 Armor UCOFT training program
are as follows:
4 3
0 CAT tezm tank commanders and gunners were required to
certify on the UCOFT according to the contractor (General Electric)
developed training matrix. This process was completed by
November 1986.
0 Once the crews were certified on the GE matrix, they were
required to train according to a unit-developed matrix using the CAT
disk.
0 3-64 Armor believed UCOFT was key to developing speed
and accuracy in gunners. For them, it was the best stress ind.jcing
gunnery training short of live-fire.
2-66 Armor
The battalion's approached the UCOFT training much the same
as the other battalions. However, the requirement to train two CAT
companies and prepare the rest of the battalion for qualification
gunnery placed heavier demands on the battalion's single UCOFT.
Some important features of the 2-66 Armor program were:
0 Certification of the CAT crews could not be accomplished
prior to March 1987.
0 Intermediate performance objectives were established and
reviewed thoroughly at platoon, company and battalion level.
113
0 Late in the training program, we discovered the need to
immediately move from simulator training to some type of training
requiring manipulation of the fire controls of actual tanks.
Otherwise, subtle differences between the simulators and the tanks
tended to induce negative training lessons.
Simulation Networking (SIMNET)
Simulation networking (SIMNET) is a concept whereby
simulators of various types are electronically linked to form a local
area network (LAN), much as office computers are linked to
exchange data among themselves. Environmental factors (terrain,
weather, target arrays, enemy forces, etc.) can also be plugged into
the LAN. On a larger scale, these LANs can be electronically linked
by various communications means, for example, satellite, to form a
long haul network (LHN). With this connection, the LANs can
interact, much as geographically separated divisions of major
corporations exchange business data. In the case of military
applications, the simulators might be tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces,
command posts, etc. and their crews. Mixtures of simulators can be
plugged into LANs to form units and task forces with their
commanders and staffs. These units can be plugged into a LHN, along
with designated environmental conditions, to fight with or against
each other. Given this arrangement, computers are not fighting
computers. Real people and units are fighting others--maintaining a
crucial element of war.
4 4
The SIMNET concept is a powerful one and takes advantage of
burgeoning technologies. To get the concept from the laboratory to
the battlefield, the SIMNET program was established by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in partnership with the
U.S. Army and Air Force.
I devote considerable, and perhaps excessive, coverage of
SIMNET here for several reasons:
0 SIMNET played a major role in the perfection of the CAT '87
unit fire distribution SOPs. That role, combined with the U.S. victory,
gave the SIMNET concept and program visibility it needed and may
not have otherwise obtained.
114
O The SIMNET concept has tremendous potential for future
military training and development programs (briefly discussed in
Chapter 7).
0 SIMNET's capabilities were diverted on very short notice to
support the CAT '87 training effort. That story needs to be told. It is
one of innovation, inspired by the heat of international competition,
that rivals any found in popular books such as In Search..f
CAT '87 SIMNET
The CAT '87 competitors used a version of SIMNET that
represented only a small fraction of the potential capabilities of the
concept. However, those capabilities they used were substantial
relative to previous training devices. It would just take a little time
for the platoons to learn the system.
" The most important thing that hIped us win
tht competition was SIMNET .... 7iat 9ot us
together. That had al 16 people in therre in the
simuators taving to one another, doing wfhat
you'd actuaty do on the range. 7hat is what
puUed it together." 45
Gunner, Dl, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
The CAT '87 SIMNET configuration consisted of four Ml
simulators plugged into a local area network to form a tank
platoon.
46
115
CAT '87 SIMNET
4 M1 Simulators
Other Modules
- Management, Command and Control
- Data Logger
- Plan View Display
. Range Controller
- Target Projector
Printer
The MI simulators provided functional (but not necessarily
exact replicas) crew stations for all four crew members. A schematic
of an M1 simulator is shown below: 47
M1 Simulator (SIMNET)
Vision Blocks Sound Generato
& Sights 4
Microcomputer Host
"Graphics 4- Own Vehicle
- Other Platoon Vehicles
- Data base
- Network Communications
The network provided the controllers (company leaders) the
capability to precisely design target scenarios, view crew and platoon
116
battlerun performance in real time, play back the battleruns for
after-action reviews, and record the battleruns for subsequent
analysis. In fact, the system was initially believed to be a gunnery
trainer -- which it was not. As stated earlier, SIMNET is a
concept whereby simulators (in the case of the CAT competitors --
Ml tank simulators) are electronically linked together in a local area
network (LAIN). For the CAT competitors, the LAN represented their
platoon.
"For driving, it was totay reatistic." 4
PFC Steven Kuhn
CAT '87
Link-up: CAT and SIMNET
From a previous exposure to the SIMNET concept in 1985, 1
was pretty sure that SIMNET was never intended to be applied to
anything like CAT preparation. So as I observed the evolution of the
SIMNET support to the American CAT teams, and then began
research on this paper, my intuition told me there was an interesting
story to be discovered an told.
My source was Colonel (USA, Retired) Gary W. Bloedorn, a
consultant to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and to Perceptronics Corporation , the prime contractor to
DARPA for SIMNET. 49 Bloedorn had been the Battalion Commander
of 2-81 Armor, the first U .S. Army CAT competitor, in 1977. He
acknowledged that he and his unit had been embarrassed by their
relatively poor performance -- and that embarrassment had stuck
with him all these years. When the opportunity to vindicate that loss
presented itself, he was ready to seize it.
Prior to his retirement from the Army, Bloedorn had been
responsible for training at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox.
This was the in the early stages of training simulator development to
support Armor requirements. Upon retirement, he worked very
closely with the Armor Center to develop the task-by-task
requirements for SIMNET.
117
Bloedorn had a good friend, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Eldridge,
who worked in Department of the Army Headquarters (Training) and
was actively involved in the development of SIMNET for the Army.
When LTC Eldridge discovered he was soon to take command of 1-64
Armor, a potential CAT '87 competitor, he immediately recognized
the SIMNET potential for training CAT units. Eldridge and Bloedorn
began to figure a way to make it happen.
After discussing the feasibility of their idea for CAT support
with Lt. Col. Jack Thorpe, USAF, the SIMNET Project Manager at
DARPA, Bloedorn and Eldridge sought and received the full support
of some key Army leaders. They sold the idea to General Otis,
CINUSAREUR, MG Rick Brown (and later, MG Tom Tait, Brown's
replacement), Commander of the Armor Center, and BG Phillip
Mallory, Commander of 7th Army Training Center (7th ATC) at
Grafenwoehr. Mallory had been an old friend of Bloedorn's and was
key to providing facilities support at Grafenwoehr and gaining
approval to use SIMNET from the German Chief Judge of CAT.
Once they got the go-ahead (December '87), the Army
established the goal to complete the installation of SIMNET at
Grafenwoehr in time to provide approximately 120 days of training
time prior to CAT. That meant that from a dead start, the facilities at
Grafenwoehr and the SIMNET database had to be established in
about three months. Needless to say, there were many key people
required to make this happen, in addition to some already
mentioned.
One was Major Bill Bell, 7th ATC range operations officer and
CAT project officer. It was no accident that Bell was assigned these
duties. CAT-experience was his calling card. He had served as the
company commander for 3-64 Armor's CAT team in 1985. Bell
would ultimately contribute as much to the overall success of CAT
'87 as anyone.
Relative to SIMNET, his role was vital. He was responsible for
verifying all range measurement data for Range 301 and getting it
accurately inserted into the SIMNET database. He then monitored
the progress and validated the results each step of the way.
Another key SIMNET player was Dr. Duncan C. Miller, project
manager for SIMNET software development at BBN Laboratories
118
Incorporated, a subcontractor to Perceptronics.
50
Dr. Miller owned
many of the engineers and technicians that would put SIMNET in
place and make it productive for the troops.
Dr. Miller received the telephone call from Bloedorn proposing
the SIMNET support to CAT at Christmas time, 1986. He immediately
saw this as an opportunity to breath new life into his project that
had begun to stagnate. Miller described himself as a person always
seeking new challenges, and he saw the SIMNET application to CAT
as fundamentally new -- and a chance for his people "to do
something real". He knew CAT would be a high visibility contest and
a tool for innovation -- that is as he defined it, collecting bright
people committed to excellence. The clearly defined objective of
winning CAT '87 in June provided a recognizable objective to shake
up his bureaucracy and get it moving. According to Miller, the final
spark of inspiration for his people was the very obvious commitment
and professional skill of the soldiers training for CAT.
Between that Christmas phone call and the initial training
period for CAT in early April, much had to be accomplished. The
SIMNET facility was assembled under the direction of Mr. Ulf
Helgesson in the Perceptronics facility in California and shipped later
to Grafenwoehr. It was assembled in a new modular fashion to
permit simultaneous work. The software engineers had to learn the
CAT rules and think like a tanker to modify the software -- and in
some cases (scoring and target representation), built completely new
software modules. The software engineers moved to Grafenwoehr to
support the training. There the software underwent continuous
revision and improvement as the engineering skill of the developers
was combined in a "critical mass" with the tanking skills and drive to
win of the CAT soldiers. The product was important to the June
victory.
SIMNET Training Program
Once the SIMNET trainer was in place at Grafenwoehr and the
training facility was ready for troop use, each CAT company was
permited to select equal amounts of time that were most compatible
with their training programs. Each selected two training periods of
about one week duration each, and some additional time during the
actual CAT competition.
119
Each team developed its own training program, since there was
no significant experience to build upon. There was some cross-
fertilization of experience among the teams as they progressed, but
not much. The SIMNET staff and the Army Research Institute data
recorder, Mr. Ron Kramer, were very helpful in passing along lessons
learned. The details of the SIMNET training periods of each unit are
captured in an excellent report written by Mr. Kramer (see
bibliography). The following are highlights from the units' own
accounts.
4-8 Cavalry
"I think anybody in the company couLd Fsrve J t
into another platoon just like clockwork because
our SOP was all the same. Everybody worked
together and perjormed the same type of tss.
Even the maintenance people. "51
SSG James Traxler
CAT '87
D/4-8 Cavalry did a lot of smart things during their SIMNET
training periods:
5 2
0 They designated the Company Commander, Captain
Schmalzel, and the company master gunner, SFC Smith, to serve as
the instructor-operators for all of the platoon training. This would
better facilitate the isolation of SIMNET equipment/software
problems and platoon training weaknesses, especially failure to
adhere to the company fire distribution SOP.
0 They recognized some significant differences between the
SIMNET trainer and actual conditions (some tank-related, some
environment-related) and they made excellent adjustments.
- SIMNET did not require the gunners to "dump lead" as the
moved their sights from one target to another. This is a critical skill
to acquire to shoot accurately with the M-1. Their adjustment was to
emphasize this shortcoming to the gunners, limit the time spent
120
SIMNET, and quickly follow SIMNET training with UCOFT training
(which required the dumping of lead).
- SIMNET had no thermal sight capability, a key part of the
CAT SOP. Platoons had to compensate for this without forgeting this
technique.
0 In addition to simply conducting CAT battleruns, the
company commander also used SIMNET to design especially difficult
situations to stress the SOP and the degraded operations procedures
of the platoons.
0 Based on the known differences between SIMNET and the
actual conditions, Dr. Forbes did not permit the 1st platoon to train
on SIMNET just prior to their competition battle run, as the other
platoons
had done.
5 3
3-64 Armor
A/3-64 Armor considered SIMNET to be a tremendous asset,
especially since the competition range was off limits until the week
of competition. Much of their training program was similar to the
other CAT companies'. However, they found SIMNET to be most
helpful to their program in the following areas:
5 4
0 Platoon could switch crew members and improve crew
interoperability.
0 The fire distribution SOP could be drilled numerous times.
0 They could design and wargame the various target
scenarios.
2-66 Armor
D/2-66 Armor considered SIMNET its most effective SOP
training device. With as little range time as the unit had, it is easy to
see why. In my opinion, SIMNET was absolutely key to the
121
relatively good performance of D/2-66 Armor -- given the lack of
total range time and especially the lack of live-fire time on Range
301.
D Company was the first CAT team to train on SIMNET and
experienced many of the growing pains associated with that during
their first training week. In addition, quite a bit of training time
(especially leader time) was diverted to briefing visitors curious
about this new trainer.
By the second training week, D Company had "broken the code"
on some of the shortcomings of the SIMNET trainor and made
adjustments. In addition to supplementing SIMNET time with
substantial UCOFT training at Vilseck, we got some generous support
from the l1th Cavalry during their tank crew qualification gunnery
period. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Tom White, permitted D
Company crews to train on l1th Cavalry tanks. This allowed our
crews to manipulate actual fire controls and optics (dry-fire) against
target arrays on Range 117 while the cavalry was shooting, thus
overcoming some of the previously discussed SIMNET shortcomings.
This was a significant breakthrough for D Company, and confirmed
that SIMNET time must be immediately integrated with "hands-on a
real tank" time to be most effective.
SIMNET Conclusion
SIMNET was an invaluable training resource for all of the
American CAT teams. It was a major 'factor -- but not the only one -
- that enabled all of the American companies to be within striking
distance of the CAT '87 winner's circle. I believe this was especially
true for D/2-66 Armor, since it had significantly less live-fire time at
Grafenwoehr than the others. While I do not cite SIMNET as a factor
providing the winning edge to 4-8 Cavalry (see training conclusions),
this is because other training resources were so vast that they
overshadowed the full impact of SIMNET. If CAT training for all
units (U.S. and Allied) were severely resource constrained, SIMNET
could clearly provide a winning margin.
Stress Control
122
For the young soldiers -- and most of the veteran tankers --
the pressure of the CAT competition would prove more stressful than
anything they had faced in the Army. Not only would the
competitors have to develop uncommon skills, but to win their
performance would have to peak far above established standards.
There would be many distractors to prevent the required peaking of
performance -- spectators, waving national flags, equipment
malfunctions, target malfunctions, poor weather conditions, self-
doubts and numerous other "boogy men". The CAT teams would
have to develop a program to overcome the effects of stress if they
were serious about winning.
"I drov it post the crowd and didn't se the or notffa .
Looig at the range, I w'.s asorbed. U was =4f~ weid."
FFC Steven Kubn 55
Driver, D14, 4- Cavulry
CAT '87
4-8 Cavalry
4-8 Cavalry solved the problem late in their preparation
program by enlisting the help of Dr. Dennis Forbes, sports
psychologist on the staff of the Department of Physical Education,
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Dr. Forbes
had over twenty years of experience in coaching athletic teams and
teaching stress reduction. He knew the nature of competitions and
men's reactions to them. But in addition to all that, he served as an
ombudsma within the unit, seeming to smooth some of the
emerging organizational tensions.
5 6
I visited Dr. Forbes at West Point to discuss his role in the CAT
preparation and to try to determine the impact he had on the
victory. The following is an account of that meeting. 57
Dr. Forbes arrived at Grafenwoehr to support the 4-8 Cavalry
CAT team in May, about three weeks before the competition. He had
123
been invited by the Division Commander, MG Griffin, thru the Corps
Commander, LTG Woodmansee. This was not Forbes' first exposure
to CAT. He had previously worked with the 3 AD's 1981 CAT team,
1-32 Armor, that finished third -- and according to Forbes, "should
have won".
When he arrived at Grafenwoehr, the CAT tankers of D/4-8
Cavalry were far off the winning CAT standard. The platoons were
consistently hitting only 26 Of 32 main gun targets (most misses
occured at bound one). This was bad enough, but Forbes' experience
had taught him that teams typically suffer a 20 percent degradation
from peak practice performance when they enter actual competition.
Without major improvement, the team was setting itself up for
defeat and embarassment.
Forbes initially watched and did not interfere with the training.
He immediately interviewed all the participants and discovered they
were not concentrating at bound one, but were being distracted by
their external environment. He needed to teach them quickly:
0 First focus inward (monitor one's self physiologically to
relax);
0 Next focus on the equipment (inspect proper functioning);
0 Then focus on the specific tasks (including mental rehearsal).
124
"1)r. Forbes made a retL big contribu ton--the way
he came in and settled us down when we first started
and he first came out to watch us. fvertbody was
hollerinj. We couldn't wait for people to see us come
roling up in tanks-- screamin and yvIng at the
crowd, and stuff .... he got us focused, He got us
concentrating on our objectives, reatizing what we were
out there to do. 7hat's when we reaUtj started noticing
a dijjerence in oursdves."
SSG James Traxler
5
s
CAT '87
In addition to calming the crews and improving their
concentration, Forbes needed to convince them they could win. To do
this, Forbes felt he needed to make adjustments to the training
program. The platoons had been training to a standard less than the
32 of 32 targets required to win. Forbes immediately began practice
battleruns against tougher than CAT standards -- smaller targets and
more of them, and allowing in less time to shoot them. He
established the obsession, "target and time", and he stressed that the
platoon must attack he targets, not merely negotiate the course.
Within one week, the platoons improved to 30 of 32 targets.
There were then 2 1/2 weeks until the competition!
"When I first started out %jou think how
everybody in the world is watching you.
Then we got Dr. Forbes from West Point
and he taught us to concentrate on your
job ..... t's not yjou weren't thinking, but
you just weren't aware of anything else
around you."
PFC Steven Kuhn 5 9
Driver, D14,4-8 Cavalry
CAT '87
125
Forbes began to force rehearsal of emergency actions, eg.
equipment malfunctions, and personnel substitutions. He would
designate tanks broken, pull tank commanders at the last moment,
install long pauses at bound one to shake the crews -- in short, he
created havoc for the firing platoons. All of this would pay off in
June.
"...we were prepared for anijthing to go wrong.
Ut ippened to us aW the time. We'd just saj get
out of the way qui"k, do it, fix it, .. it hdps if
ijou have way' in the back of jour mind that
something might happen. Then you handLe it
better than saing nothing's going to hmppen.
PFC Steven Kuhn 6 0
Driver, D14, 4- Cavalry
CAT '87
"Barring nuc4ar destruction, we'd been through so
much afreadyj, so tnany things going wrong. 7here
wasn't anything we didn't fee( we couLd deat with
because it had careaLj happened once and we had to
deaL with it. We were doing it a Lot for ourseLves."
PFC Brent Berry 6 1
CAT '87
All of the platoons were consistently hitting 32 of 32 targets by
the completion of Kitty CAT II, about one week before the
competition.
Dr. Forbes
also instituted an isolation period for the platoons whereby
they would be quarantined and placed on a strict schedule the day
before their competition battlerun. The purpose was to facilitate
126
concentration and relaxation. None of the other American teams had
this feature in their final preparation programs.
3-64 Armor
While 3-64 Armor executed an intense training program
featuring considerable live-fire exercises to build confidence, there
is no indication of a formal stress control training emphasis.
2-66 Armor
The battalion and company leadership recognized from the
beginning that stress mangement might play a key role in a CAT '87
victory. However, we were not as successful as 3 AD in soliciting
support. The D/2-66 program featured:
-- Stress management training conducted by iLT Witkowski,
based on training he had received at West Point as a member of the
pistol team.
-- Additional stress management and relaxation classes were
taught by the staff of the Community Counselling Center at Garlstedt.
127
Training: Conclusions
The U.S. Army focused unprecedented training resources on
winning the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy Competition. All of the U.S.
CAT battalions planned and executed extensive training programs to
prepare their competing companies for final victory in CAT '87. And
all of the companies produced remarkable results within the
constraints imposed by their parent command structures, mission
requirements, and the unpredictable factors of the competition.
Every Americar platoon had a chance to win when its tankers
charged into their initial firing positions at Bound One -- and this
time, their competitors knew it.
The best American team, D Company/ 4-8 Cavalry, won the
competition. It was no fluke. Features of their training program
accumulated the winning margin over time (but especially in the late
stages) that yielded three consistently high-performing platoons,
each with a high probability of achieving the highest score. The
following is my summary of the features that produced the winning
margin.
WINNING FACTORS:
Training
o Division-level training & support plan.
o Live-fire on Range 301.
o Scaled competition range.
o Allocation of Division range time.
o Professional stress management training.
128
0 Division-level training and support plan. The 3rd Armored
Division was the only U.S. division to develop a comprehensive plan
that focused all essential division training and support assests on
winning CAT '87. This permitted the battalion and company
leadership to devote maximum possible attention to the finest details
of CAT training, rather than diffusing their energy on other
important, but non-CAT, missions and incredible administrative
detail.
0 Live-fire on Range 301. The CAT platoons from 3 AD and 3
ID conducted extensive live-fire training, some under competitive
conditions, on Range 301 (the CAT competition range). Those from 2
AD (Fwd) did not. Since range familiarity (especially under "combat"
conditions) is such a key ingredient for victory, this feature provided
both a technical and a psychological edge for D/4-8 Cavalry and A/3-
64 Armor platoons.
0 Scaled competition range. The 3 AD scaled range (to Range
301 specifications) at Campo Pond facilitated continuous training
opportunities under actual competition conditions while mounted in
their tanks for D/4-8 Cavalry platoons as they trained at home
station. Neither of the other divisions invested the extensive
resources to approach this capability.
0 Allocation of division range time. There are only two
ranges, Rangell7 at Grafenwoehr and Range 9 at Bergen, that can
adequately duplicate the target arrays of the CAT competition range.
The capability of both 3 AD and 3 ID to allocate the preponderance of
the entire division's time (enough for five tank battalions each) on
ranges 117 and 301 to their CAT teams yielded a significant
advantage. Both used this advantage well, as 4-8 Cavalry spent 45
days on Range 117 in addition to their Range 301 time. The added
feature of the pre-CAT competitions (Kitty Kats I & II) on Rang. 117
against other CAT teams produced a major psychological boost.
0 Professional stress management training. 3 AD was the only
division to use professional sty'ess management training in support of
their CAT team. While difficult for me to quantify a winning edge as
a result of this, I believe the supporting evidence is strong. The
rapid improvement of all the 4-8 Cavalry platoons after the arrival
of Dr. Forbes is indisputable. The capability of 1st Platoon to block
129
out all distractions, overcome several mishaps, and beat a near-
perfect German score was remarkable and probably could not have
been duplicated by the platoons of 3-64 Armor or 2-66 Armor.
3 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. b-2.
4 Ibid., p. C-3-1.
6 Ibid.
7 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. b-2.
8 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. C-1.
9 Ibid.
10 op.cit., 3-64 Armor, p. B-2.
11 Ibid., pp. F-i thru F-6.
12 op. cit., 2-66 Armor, LOI.
13 Ibid., p. C-1-2.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. c-6-1.
16 Ibid., p. c-2-1.
18 Ibid.
19 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. B-5-1.
20 Ibid., p. D-1.
21 Ibid., p. d-2-1
22 Ibid., p. D-1-2.
23 Ibid., p. D-3-1.
24 Ibid., p. D-4-1 thru 2.
25 Ibid., p. D-1-3.
26 Ibid., p. D-8-1.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. D-9-1.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. E-6-1.
31 Ibid., p. D-2,
32 Op. cit., 3-64 Armor
33 Ibid., p. F-3.
34 Ibid.
130
35 op. cit., 2-66 Armor
38 Barbara A. Black and Millicent H. Abel, "Review of U.S. Armor Crew and
Platoon Training in Preparation for the 1985 Canadian Army Trophy (CAT)
Competition"(Draft) , U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences (Fort Knox Field Unit) Fort Knox, Kentucky, March 1987, p. vii.
39 Ronald B. Walker. " Armor Training Systems for the 1990's", National
Dfense November 1987, p. 76.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., pp. C-4-1 thru 2.
42 Ibid., p. C-4-2.
43 op. cit. 3-64 Armor, pp. E-2 - F-5.
44 Lt. Col. Jack A. Thorpe,"The New Technology of Large Scale Simulator
Networking: Implications for Mastering the Art of Warfighting", Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia. November 1987.
46 op. cit. Kramer, p. 13.
47 op.cit., Thorpe,
p.4.
49 Interview with Gary W. Bloedorn, Colonel, USA Retired, 24 November 1987.
50 Interview with Dr. Duncan C. Miller, BBN Laboratories, 24 November 1987.
52 op. cit. 4-8 Cavalry, pp. D-7-1 thru 7-3.
53 Interview with Dr. Dennis Forbes, Department of Physical Education, USMA.
11 December 1987.
54 op. cit. 3-64 Armor, p. F-5.
56 op. cit. 4-8 Cavalry, p. E-2-1.
57 Interview with Dr. Dennis Forbes, Department of Physical Education, USMA.
11 December 1987.
5 8
From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Soldier's Radio and
5
9
From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Soldier's Radio and
6(,From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Soldier's Radio and
relevision, February 1988.
131
6 1
From transcripts of personal interviews conducted by Solier's Radio and
132
Chu pter
6
Equipping & Supporting a CAT Winner
W We a[ knew the tan&.s were in top shape.
If we had to get off one and go to another
one, we were confident that tank wouLd hit,
its comm was good--eerjthing was good."
1
Gunner, DlI, 4-8 Cavalry
CAT'S?
A team cannot win the Canadian Army Trophy unless
Its tanks and support equipment are reliable and kept in an
exceptionally high state of readiness throughout the entire
training program -- not just during the competition week.
Attaining and sustaining such a state of readiness requires a
substantial investment of equipment and personnel resources. The
U.S. Army made such an investment.
The logistical support of all the U.S. CAT teams was a massive
undertaking requiring comr mitment and coordination at all levels
from Department of the Army to the CAT companies. The sheer
magnitude of the effort, including the issue of new tanks to 3-64
Armor and 2-66 Armor and new gun tubes to 4-8 Cavalry, is an
important story within the overall CAT story that deserves full
coverage. However, I hit only the high points here.
"First of "W, like I said, totaL support. you need that" .2
PFC Stevm Kuhn
CAT '87
133
The Support Personnel
While much of the discussion in this chapter focuses on the
equipment, primarily the tanks, the organization and commitment of
the support personnel (mechanics, cooks, drivers, medics, etc.) are an
equally important factor. These soldiers are the equivalent of a
championship football team's interior linemen. That is, they are in
the "trenches" at Grafenwoehr, Bergen Hohne, Baumholder, and other
training areas backing up the tankers as they train -- yet they get
little glory. But just as the football team's quarterback and running
backs cannot win a game without the blocking of their interior
linemen, CAT tankers cannot hit CAT targets fast enough to win if
malfunctioning equipment diverts their concentration from their
shooting.
There are several key factors regarding the support personnel.
First, just as with the tank crews, the chain of command must pick
the best people they have in the required specialties to support CAT.
The supporters will be subjected to most of the same stresses as the
tankers and they must perform to unprecedented standards. Second,
the support personnel must be solely dedicated to the CAT support
mission as early as possible in the training program. This early
assignment will breed more in-depth knowledge of the CAT tankers
and tanks -- and will actually reduced the management
requirements of the CAT company commander due to his tighter
control of his assets. Finally, the support personnel must become full
fledged members of the CAT team with equal status to the tank
crews. This means the same uniforms, same privileges, same
discipline standards -- the same everything.
The Equipment
All of the equipment supporting the CAT teams must be the
best the Army has available. In addition to bringing the best
possible performance characteristics to the competition, the
equipment must build tank crew confidence to such a degree that
virtually no concentration is diverted from hitting all targets in the
shortest possible time with the least number of bullets.
134
I discuss the equipment and support personnel topics according
to the specific CAT battalion. Once again, 4-8 Cavalry will be the
baseline program from which significant differences will be noted.
4-8 Cavalry
-- Assignment of Support Personnel -- 3
In order to fully support their philosophy that training and
logistics were inseparable, mutually supporting concepts, 4-8 Cavalry
reassigned all (with the exception of battalion critical shortages) CAT
support personnel (24) from the HHC to D Company very early in
their preparation program. The 45th Support Battalion , the
division's direct support unit, also designated a dedicated CAT
support team (68 people). All support personnel became full-fledged
members of the CAT team. This close association of supporters and
shooters is credited with the teams' capability to rapidly isolate
training problems from equipment problems when performance
standards were not met.
-- Medical, Dental, and Eye Examinations -- 4
All prospective CAT team members were administered very
basic medical, dental, and eye examinations prior to the 1 October
critical date when the 134 main gun round count began. The
battalion made two key recommendations based on their experience:
0 All examinations should be accompanied by an in-depth
interview by medical experts to screen out those with chronic
problems that would not be detected in a basic examination. Because
crew stability is so important to winning CAT, early identification of
those who are likely to miss training or drop off of the team entirely
is critically important.
0 All crew members should receive a complete eye
examination (in a specialized clinic). Those otherwise qualified
crewman requiring glasses should be issued contact lenses at
government expense (two of the gunner's in the winning platoon
wore contact lenses).
135
-- Competition Tanks -- 5
Early in the program the determination was made that the 3
AD CAT :tt. would compete with their recently issued (!,!ss than
two years) M1 Improved tanks (MI IP 's), rather than being issued
new tanks. However, given that decision, the division pressed for
and received new gun tubes selected to meet their precise
specifications.
A significant issue regarding the tanks for all the U.S. CAT
teams was the vision filter in the gunner's primary sight (GPS) The
original equipment filter (blue filter) was satisfactory for all
expected combat requirements, but under certain visibility
conditions, was not satisfactory for CAT standards (very small
targets). This had become a serious issue in CAT '85 and did not get
a satisfactory resolution. For CAT '87, the Army's leadership decided
in early 1987 to accelerate development, production, and installation
of an improved GPS filter (yellow filter) on all production tanks --
beginning immediately with all CAT competition tanks. This filter
replacement was a massive effort and was completed in mid-April.
-- Repair Parts Priority -_ 6
The 3 AD Commanding General, MG Griffin, instituted policies
ensuring that no CAT tank missed an hour of training for want of a
repair part that was present in the division. No effort was spared to
get critical parts that were outside the division. The DISCOM
established a minimum safety level for critical Ml parts, and once
breached, only requisitions for CAT tanks for that part were filled.
-- Tank Maintenance
-- 7
In addition to the organizational maintenance program, there
are several aspects of the 4-8 Cavalry tank maintenance that deserve
special mention. First, the company commander directed that every
practice battlerun be followed by an after action review, (AAR) that
included maintenance interrogation of the crews and a detailed
maintenance debrief by the company executive officer (or
maintenance sergeant). This feature was key to sorting out the
136
equipment problems from the training "head space" prohlems, so
that real corrective action could be initiated immediately. Second, all
the gun tubes were replaced in February by the organic maintenance
assets of the division. Finally, based on after action reports from
previous CAT's, all divisions requested and received a special tank
"peak-up," (lasting six days) conducted by a General Dynamics, team
of technicians. Primary focus was on the tank fire controls. The
peak-up was combined with the installation of the yellow GPS filter
in early April. 4-8 Cavalry gave mixed reviews to the conduct of this
effort, but did concede that it probably bolstered their confidence in
the division's technical skills.
-- Transportation Requirements -- 8
The division Movement Control Center (MMC) carried the ball
for all transportation requests. The transportation requirements for
CAT are enormous and often an administrative nightmare.
Transportation requirements cover the entire spectrum from
numerous rail requests to move troops and tanks to training areas to
requests for buses to carry family members to observe the
competition. Since many of these requirements are relatively short
term and therefore unprogrammed, they require intensive
management to be met. 4-8 Cavalry was very pleased with the
support of the division MMC.
-- Training Ammunition -- 9
The accuracy requirements to win CAT are so stringent that the
practice training ammunition, and the actual competition training
ammunition must be from a single dedicated lot selected to very
exacting performance standards. The Army's Test and Evaluation
Command, (TECOM) made the ammunition selections (main gun and
machine gun) after screening the U.S. inventory. The ammunition
was shipped to Europe prior to October and the accuracy validated
by the CAT companies. All U.S. CAT teams fired the same lot of
ammunition.
3-64 Armor,
137
-- Assignment of Support Personnel -- 10
A dedicated organizational support team was selected
according to very high standards and assigned as an integral part of
the CAT team. The DS support, while excellent, was limited early in
the training program but shifted into full support in the latter
months.
-- Med.al, Dental, and Eye Examinations --
I could find no documentation that this area received any
special attention.
-- Competition Tanks -- 11
Since 3-64 had owned their tanks about three years, the Army
decided to issue their potential CAT teams new MI tanks.
Accordingly, 3-64 Armor received 14 new tanks and turned in 14
old ones during July-August 196o (with substantial assistance from
29th Area Support Group,). The new tanks would not only serve to
reduce the maintenance burden on the CAT teams, but they were
also a significant boost to troop morale. The issue of new tanks was a
huge resource commitment and tangible evidence of the Army's
intent to win CAT '87.
-- Repair Parts Priority -- 12
Repair parts were never a serious problem for the CAT team.
The new tanks were a major factor here. While I could find no
specific policy statement documented, it is clear that the CAT tanks
had top priority.
-- Tank Maintenance -- 13
The tank organizational maintenance program was intense and
by the book. Maintenance was recognized early as a key to gunnery
success. The CAT tanks received the same peak-up by the General
Dynamics team as did 4-8 Cavalry.
138
44
-- Transportation Requirements -- 14
The division provided a 60 passenger bus and two vans to
meet many of the company's smaller transportation requirements.
Other support was adequately covered.
-- Training Ammunition .. 15
Same as for 4-8 Cavalry. The 3-64 Armor was extremely
pleased with the accuracy of the selected ammunition.
139
| 4
a
2-66 Armor,
-- Assignment of Support Personnel --
Because 2-66 Armor was preparing both C Company and D
Company for CAr until he random draw on 1 April, the battalion
was unable to permanently augment the normal company support
teams. However, quality screens were used to ensure our best
support was assigned to CAT. Only after 1 April, were we able to
assign a full up support package to D Company. Additionally, the
498th Support Battalion, identified a dedicated CAT support package,
but was unable to totally devote its efforts to CAT until after 1 April
due to other assigned missions.
-- Medical, Dental, and Eye Examinations --
Thorough medical, dental and eye examinations were
administered to all tank crew members. A special effort was made
to authorize contact lenses, at government expense for those gunners
and tank commanders that required glasses. We were successful
after a long struggle (including excellent justification analysis by our
soldiers) and major support from Dr. Robert Messner,, CPT., Medical
Service Corps, Ophthalmologist.
-- Competition Tanks --
The battalion reteived 28 new tanks to replace those that C and
D Companies had owned for about two years. These had the same
positive affects as discussed for 3-64 Armor.
-- Repair Parts Priority --
The battalion experienced no serious repair parts problems.
The CAT tanks clearly had priority within the battalion. If we had
not drawn new tanks and distributed the best of the rest to the other
two companies, we could have had serious problems. A and B
Companies would have paid the bills for the CAT company priorities.
-- Tank Maintenance --
140
All maintenance was performed to very strict standards. The
General Dynamics peak-up and GPS filter swap were accomplished as
with the other teams. This took place in late April for D Company --
after its last major live-fire period prior to departing for the actual
competition.
-- Transportation Requirements --
Our long distance from Grafenwoehr, combined with our
relatively short notice requirements (driven by attempts to get range
time), virtually consumed the battalion staff and D Company
leadership. The battalion was provided a dedicated sedan to help
ease the transportation burden.
-- Training Ammunition --
Same discussion as for 4-8 Cavalry and 3-64 Armor.
Equipment & Support Conclusions
The U.S. Army committed massive equipment and support
resources to win CAT '87. Every effort was made to apply those
resources evenly to all of the American units -- and that effort was
quite successful. I may be "splitting hairs" to isolate equipment and
support factors that made a winning difference. However, since 4-8
Cavalry was not issued new tanks and incurred the associated
additional maintenance burden, I cite two factors that may have
been significant enough to overcome that burden and permit a
victory.
141
WINNING FACTORS:
Equipment & Support
0 Organic Company Support Team
0 Repair Parts Priority
0 Dedicated Organic Company Support Team. The early
assignment of a dedicated support team to the CAT company
commander provides the unit significant advantages. Maintenance
personnel become much more attuned to the competition tanks and
the crews. The adnmilk,rative burden for the company commander
is actually reduced because he does not have to rely on ad hoc
support arrangements that unnecessarily divert his attention from
training matters. Both 3 AD and 3 ID committed the personnel and
equipment resources to enable early assignment of support teams to
their CAT teams. 2 AD (Fwd) was unable to do this until April 1987,
two months before the competition.
0 Repair parts priority. During CAT training, CAT tanks (and
any other equipment) must be the top maintenance priority in the
respective divisions. This was especially true for 4-8 Cavalry, since
they competed with older tanks. Otherwise, valuable training time
will be lost due to down equipment, and often incorrect training
adjustments will be made because of undiagnosed faulty equipment.
All of the divisions took this approach. However, full divisions (3 AD
and 3 ID) with more tanks and larger repair parts inventories have
an advantage over separate brigades with only one tank battalion. 3
AD obviously did what it took to win.
3 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. B-I thru 2.
4op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, pp. A-4-1 thru 2.
5 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. B-2-4.
142
6 Ibid.
7 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry. pp. B-3-1 thru 3.
8 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. B-4.
9 op. cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. H-2-3.
10 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. I-1.
11 - :*' "' 4 Armor. p. H-i1.
12 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. 1-1.
13 op. cit.. 3-64 Armor, p. H-2.
14 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p . 1-2.
15 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p . 1-2.
143
Whtie DoWt Go firom tiere?
144
Chapter
7
The Benefits of CAT
T here is virtually no limit to the high-value benefits that
can accrue to the U.S. Army and the NATO Alliance as a
result of the Canadian Army Trophy competition. 0 u r
training and equipment development are gaining only a small
portion of those benefits now because we have lacked the
imagination and vision to capitalize on our huge investments in CAT.
Perhaps the incentive was never there before because the U.S. Army
was not winning, -- lending its lessons little credibility. All that
should change now with the CAT '87 victory.
"It wasn't just a job. U. wasn't just duty.
We were actuaUy doing somethin
that counted. "I
SGT Shaun Banks
Driver, DII, 44 Cavalry
CAT '87
The timing for this change could not have been better. At the
same time that East-West nuclear arms negotiations are causing a
reexamination of conventional forces in Europe, the capability of the
Warsaw Pact armored forces has increased substantially, placing
ever-increasing demands on the NATO forces to counter the threat.
For example, the reactive armor protection being added to the Soviet
tank fleet will demand a more precisely placed shot (maybe two in
rapid succession) by our gunners to get a kill. At the same time, the
on-board ammunition carried by our tanks has dropped steadily
from 63 rounds (M60 series tanks) to 55 (Ml tank) to 40 (MIAl
version). Changes like these demand the continued development of
both human skills and equipment capability.
145
Continued good showings in CAT can help respond to this
demand. This chapter will concisely list the benefits the U.S. Army
and the NATO Alliance are gaining now and propose areas where we
can get a much higher return on our investment.
Currently, there is no formal system that captures the
experience and skills of the CAT teams and spreads them throughout
the rest of the Army. However, to a varying degree and through the
efforts of the battalion commanders of the CAT teams, CAT skills and
experience often benefit the parent battalions as whole. For
example, the 3-64 Armor battalion commander used his CAT tankers
to help train and prepare the rest of the battalion for qualification
gunnery.
2
In the 2-66 Armor, the CAT lieutenants almost always
move on to become executive officers in other companies. Over the
years, there can be a cumulative effect from this type of feedback
Not surprisingly, the tank gunnery qualification scores of the 1st
Brigade, 3 ID (parent brigade of 2-64 Armor and 3-64 Armor) and
the 2-66 Armor habitually are among the tops in Europe.
Also evidence indicates that the maintenance posture of
habitual CAT battalions is better than average.
3
The increased
knowledge and skill of the tank operators and mechanics appears to
have a major impact in at least two areas -- potential breakdowns
are prevented, and actual malfunctions are properly diagnosed
quickly. Both translate to a more combat ready unit.
Although significant on a local scale, these exdmples have little
impact on the rest of the Army, but in some areas the CAT
experiences could make a significant impact if there were a
mechanism to capture and spread them.
Advanced State-of-the-Art Training
The winning American platoon put 35 holes in the 32 main gun
targets it faced and brought back its remaining five rounds for a 100
percent first round-hit performance! What we are now
demonstrating in CAT is a level of systems (man and machine
combined) performance that far exceeds national training standards.
What this should tell us is that our normal standards are too low and
they need to be raised. Why accept less?
146
Gunnery results illustrate this point. At the National Training
Center, battalion task forces attempt to engage and destroy an array
of targets presented in a manner to simulating an attacking Soviet
mechanized regiment. The targets are engaged with all weapons
available to the task force commander -- tanks, Bradleys, artillery,
attack helicopters, mines, etc. This is the closest thing to combat
gunnery the U.S. Army is facing today. In a typical live fire
engagement at the NTC, a task force might kill only 54 percent of the
targets presented. The tanks average 5.4 main gun rounds per kill! 4
Why are these results so low -- especially since units intensively
prepare for their training periods at the NTC?
Some of the major reasons are: 5
0 Crews do not know target range or location--especially
when dust, smoke and other obscurants reduce their vision.
0 Crews are unable to sense their own rounds.
0 There is poor coordination and communication among
crews within a platoon as well as platoons within a company. Crews
are fighting their own individual battles. The command radio
frequency is too busy to enter and pass information and orders.
0 There is heavy reliance on battlesight gunnery (a technique
using default computer inputs--usually 1200 meters and sabot
ammunition) at ranges over 1800 meters. This causes rounds to
strike short of their targets.
0 Gunners fail to continue scanning the target area.
0 Gunners fail to use the thermal sight as their primary sight.
0 No viable, practiced sensing SOP is used.
In short, NTC gunnery results consistently show our units sadly
lacking in the areas of precision tank gunnery and target
acquisition/target coordination procedures. These are exactly the
skills that are mastered by the successful CAT competitors!
The competitive pressures of CAT have forced innovation in the
training arena, producing an evolution in practices which
coincidentally address most of the deficiencies noted at the NTC.
147
There is little reason why these practices cannot be used throughout
the Army:
0 The methods of target acquisition and fire distribution
developed by the CAT competitors are built "from the ground (crew
level) up" and continuously practiced and refined.
0 Thermal sights were used for every engagement by at least
a portion of the platoon. The procedures enable the units to defeat
far more targets in a shorter time than standard methods.
0 Section gunnery with wing tank sensing is a key to rapid
reengagement.
0 The radio communications nets are rarely used -- and then
only to transmit vital information and orders in concise, standard
form.
0 The accuracy of the weapons, both main gun and machine
gun, is achieved through a combination of highly skilled and trained
crews, careful ammunition selection, precisely adjusted equipment
and proper maintenance of that equipment. The crews basically
know all there is to know about the functioning of their tank and its
weapons. Their eyesight is carefully controlled and contact lenses
prescribed where appropriate. The standard training ammunition is
fired and its flight characteristics documented and precise inputs
furnished to the tank ballistic computers. The tanks are zeroed
rather than calibrated by standard methods. Fire control
components are thoroughly tested and close tolerances demanded.
Every aspect of tank maintenance is done according to the book--
every time.
0 Zero procedure for the main gun ( according to Mr. Doug
Waters, AMCCOM): simple, same sight picture. Precision gunnery
may be needed to defeat reactive armor and other specialized armor
configurations. And extra rounds for zeroing may translate to more
first round hits--probably saving ammunition.
0 Range to targets is determined precisely--either by using
the tank laser range finder or refined range estimation techniques
(including thorough reconnaissance and the use of target reference
points).
148
0 Simulator use can pay off as the CAT units have
demonstrated --especially to drill crew duties and platoon SOPs. The
credibility that CAT has given to UCOFT and SIMNET should launch a
new era in the use of these devices. CAT units also validated some
concerns regarding the limitations of these devices as total
substitutes for firing live rounds. One key point learned was the
requirement to integrate "hands-on-real-tanks" time with the simu-
iacr tic to have the best effects.
0 Other devices, including thru-sight video and in-bore
devices, contributed to gunnery skills.
0 Maintenance training (diagnostics) is provided for operators,
cutting down-time on equipment.
Materiel Acquisition Process
The DoD materiel acquisition process is almost universally
criticized for taking too long to develop equipment that does not
work very well. Much of the criticism is valid--but remedies are less
than plentiful. With the right approach by the Army's top
leadership, the CAT experience can provide some potential
improvement.
The environment of competitive training provides the
opportunity -- actually, almost a mandate -- for the materiel
developers ( both government and civilian contractors) and the "real
users" (in this case, the most qualified tankers) to work very closely
together to solve field soldier's problems and push the limits of
performance.
One of the best examples of this process at work is the recent
British CAT experience and their resultant action to improve their
tank. The British experience in CAT '83, '85 and now '87 has been
very painful, at best. The British press noted the poor performances
in 1983 and 1985. Shortly after CAT '87, the following article
appeared:
149
"Challenger Tank Loses NATO Fight
The Challenger battle tank, which cost 620 million pounds
(-1 billion dollars) to develop, failed last week for the third
consecutive time to defeat its main NATO rivals in a gunnery
competition.
The Ministry of Defense admitted that it was disappointed
the Challenger gunnery team came last in the Canadian Army
Trophy competition ..........
A ministry official said that the competition was only a test
of gunnery capability and did not include vital aspects such as
tactics and agility. 'The results of the competition should not
be taken as a reflection of our armed warfare capability as a
whole."
The Army sources said that the Americans and Germans
had spent several months training a special gunnery team,
whereas the British gunners were selected at random from a
standard Challenger squadron on the Rhine."
6
There are some inaccuracies in this article and a continuing
failure to publicly attribute poor performance to factors other than
equipment. Even so, that performance forced a critical examination
of the Challenger's fire control system. Based on that examination,
there will be changes to decrease target acquisition and engagement
times. Once the British tank fleet is updated with these changes, its
combat capability -- and thus deterrent value -- will be increased.
Let me cite another example -- this time American. In the
preparation for CAT '85, CAT gunners reported having difficulty
seeing targets in the daylight mode under certain visibility
conditions. The problem was the shading effects of a filter in the
gunner's primary sight. This was not a problem for regular tankers
training to normal training standards. At least they did not recognize
it as a problem. However, in the pursuit of perfect performance
where every shot must hit and every second counts, this filter was a
major problem. Consequently by the spring of 1987, a much
improved filter had been designed, tested, and approved for
production for the entire M1 tank fleet. These filters were installed
in the CAT '87 tanks prior to the competition and will soon be in
tanks owned by the rest of the Army.
150
The development and advanced fielding of SIMNET is another
spin off of the cooperation of the CAT competitors and the materiel
developers. Many changes suggested by the CAT teams were
incorporated into the simulator software, enhancing the value of the
training simulation. SIMNET, by virtue of the CAT victory, has
received widt spread recognition as a training device concept of the
future. This is one example of modification of existing equipment.
But the real problem in the acquisition process is getting the best
"real user" input on the front end of the process--where the concepts
are formed and the design alternatives are first tested. Potentially
huge gains could accrue if the CAT competitors were taken to the
Tank Automotive Command or Fort Knox as expert consultants for
future tank or tank training device systems.
In a responsive materiel acquisition system, we could capitalize
on the lessons of the CAT teams regarding the necessity to integrate
simulator time with real hands-on time. This lesson could drive us to
include on-board computer capability in our future combat vehicles
that would permit them to function as their own self-contained
simulators. What a potential payoff!
Recruiting and Retention
Winners a:,ract winners--and right now the U.S. Army views
itself, and is viewed by others, as a first rate organization.
Currently, the Army, along with the rest of the military
services, is able to recruit and retain soldiers at a very high level of
quality. We are at this point as a result of very heavy investments
in modernized equipment (like the MI tank) and large pay and
benefit raises in the early 1980s. But circumstances are certain to
change as the civilian-military pay gap widens. When they do, we
need to have some offsets in place.
Gunnery competitions like CAT, especially as long as we win,
can serve as a powerful recruiting and retention tool for the Army in
general and the armored force in particular. With the notoriety of
the Ml and its turbine engine and sophisticated fire controls, the
added ingredient of winning international competition lends some
"macho appeal" to the armored corps. A professional advertising
151
campaign by the Army could turn this to an advantage, much like
Top Gun did for the Navy. The benefits could be long last, g.
Human Skills Development
For a long time, the Army did not do a very good job of
establishing performance requirements and equipment designs with
"the man-in-the-loop."
In other words, the Army was almost
ignoring one of the most important components of a weapon system.
The competitive "laboratory" of CAT provides a ripe opportunity to
document human performance and interaction with the equipment,
while the stress of competition forces innovation that can have
major positive impacts. Research on a level similar to that for
Olympic games preparation is likely to evolve.
152
Interoperability with the Allies
If the United States fights a war in Europe, we will fight as a
member of the NATO alliance. In order to be an effective alliance
each member must understand the organization, tactics and skill of
the other members. The Canadian Army Trophy competition has
developed into an excellent vehicle to foster understanding.
4-8 Cavalry developed a very close relationship with the Royal
Canadian Dragoons. This began with an initial visit by the Canadians
to view some home station training. It extended through their
participation in Kitty CATs I and II, and into the week before the
actual competition when the 4-8 Cavalry shared time on SIMNET. It
is likely that the performance of both teams was enhanced by this
cooperation.
7
2-66 Armor trained extensively with the Dutch. We learned a
great deal about their tank, their training devices, and their training
techniques. I am sure they learned the same from us, as we shared
range facilities and held several social events. The relationship
between the 2-66 Armor and the 43rd Tank Battalion could easily
serve as a model for future partnership development.
In addition to the Dutch, the 2-66 also trained a good deal with
the German 324 Tank Battalion (our normal partnership unit), other
German CAT units, and the British CAT unit. All benefited from these
training events.
Conclusion
Given so many areas of potential pay-off, there must be a
better way to disseminate the CAT experience other than the normal
personnel reassignment process. Let me suggest that the Army
Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, would be
the first place to start. The center is already in that general
business--focusing on the National Training Center. It would be an
excellent forum to combine the lessons and establish professional,
broad based dialogue.
153
2 op. cit., 3-64 Armor, p. 1.
3 MG Charles M. Murray, "USAREUR Battalion Level Maintenance Programs",
(unpublished memorandum, DA DCSLOG, 14 July 1987).
4 I.TC "nulas B. Campbell, "Combat Gunnery: Observations from the NTC",
Armor.
September-October 1987, pp. 34-36.
5 Ibid.
6 "Challenger Tank Loses NATO Fight", The Times. 22 June 1987, p. 2h.
7 Op. Cit., 4-8 Cavalry, p. E-1-2.
154
Future CATs: Challenges and Pay-offs
T he combat capabilities of the U.S. Army armored forces
can be substantially increased through the competitive
pressures of the Canadian Army Trophy competition. By
constantly raising the thresholds of ditficulty of the CAT tasks and
simultaneously forcing these tasks to mirror the conditions of actual
combat, American innovation and competitive will to win will push
the frontiers of human and equipment performance. The increased
performance levels will spill over to our allies. To evolve the CAT
competition into a more challenging contest, I am advocating
revolutionary transformation to gain the payoffs that will better
justify the current and future expenses.
It will be difficult to make such a transformation for at least
two reasons. First, CAT will have to be approached as a research and
development (R&D) program, much like an operational test--but
using front line armored units. This idea does not set well with
many field commanders, who feel that other people are paid to do
R&D work. But this is an excellent way to get the "real users" --
incl,,,ding those reluctant commanders-- involved in key human,
tactical and equipment development decisions. Second, the larger
and wealthier armies, the U.S. and Germans, will tend to have a
competitive advantage in a more challenging CAT structure.
Therefore, there will be a great reluctance on the part of some
nations--and outright opposition by others--to move toward this
kind of competition.
This chapter will propose some areas where competition
performance limits and conditions could be made more realistic and
155
difficult. It will be up to the NATO leadership to make the
appropriate changes and incorporate the benefits to the U.S. and
Allied military.
Night Firing
A substantial amount of the fighting in modern warfare, past,
present, and future, occurs during the hours of darkness or other
periods of reduced visibility. With the advent of long range, highly
accurate anti-tank weapons, the survivabilit) of armored forces is
inversely proportional to their ease of acquisition--and darkness
tends to make their acquisition more difficult, or at least more
expensive. The U.S. Army has invested heavily in night vision
capabilities for its soldiers and equipment to give it control of the
darkened battlefield. And for years now, the U.S. Army has trained
long and hard during darkness--both maneuver and live fire--to give
us a winning edge in combat. For example, approximately one third
of the live fire tasks in the U.S. Army tank crew qualification course,
the platoon qualification battle run, and the company team exercise
are night time requirements. The Ml tank has extraordinary night
fighting capabilities at extended ranges. Our UCOFT and SIMNET
training simulators include substantial reduced visibility exercises
and training opportunities. Our allies have iot made the same
investments in equipment or night training time.
At present, none of the CAT tasks are fired during te hours of
darkness--although some are frequently fired during reduced
visibility as a result of poor weather. We need to change this for our
own and our allies benefit because substantial combat will take
place at night or during reduced visibility. And since the operation
and support funds spent to support the CAT competition are
earmarked by the allied governments to maximize the combat
capability of their forces, the military commanders have an
obligation to fully develop these night fighting capabilities.
The competitive pressures of CAT, fostering R&D work, will
push the limits of technology and inspire innovation in equipment
design, training devices, tactics, and gunnery techniques. American
tankers long ago learned that the night (thermal) sights could be
used to tremcndous advantage in the day -ti me--especially to acquire
personnel targets. During CAT '87, some American units discovered
the thermal sights could be use in conjunction with the day sights to
156
pick up difficult to acquire main gun targets. A major design change
in the optics of the MI was made between 1985 and 1987 at least
partially because of the target acquisition difficulties faced and
loudly criticized by the CAT '85 teams. These examples are only the
beginning of what could be gained Army-wide from night time
competitions.
157
4
More Realistic Terrain
Rarely does armored combat take place in open, smooth terrain
with tanks rolling slowly down hard-packed roads. Terrain of that
description seldom exists in a war zone, and where it does, the
acquisition capabilities of modem armies and the lethality of modern
weapons virtually assure defeat for those forces that use it. To
survive, armored forces will use every fold of the terrain, every
building and rock pile, every gully and every vegetated area to cover
and conceal movement. This is the terrain where the fighting will
take place.
The CAT competition, as well as most live fire tank gunnery
training, is conducted in relatively open, smooth terrain and the
tanks do not travel cross-country. There are very valid
administrative justifications (safety, environmental damage,
maintenance costs, spectator convenience, equality of difficulty,
scoring, etc.) for this. But where possible, we need to use our
collective imaginations to make the terrain conditions more
realistically challenging. If we do not compete on realistic terrain, a
lot of money can be spent developing target acquisition and fire
distribution techniques (and other SOPs) that will be ineffective in
combat.
Simulated Enemy Fires
While the pressure of international gunnery competition is
great, it is nothing like the pressure of knowing your tank may be in
the sights of a crack Soviet gunner. Reactions and SOPs for operating
under competition pressure might be quite different from those in
combat.
Actually, the criteria that determine the winner in CAT , hitting
the most targets in the fastest time with fewer bullets, are good
measurements of combat skills. However, the techniques to achieve
the winning standards in CAT competition might not be adequate or
even correct for a combat situation. For example, the standard CAT
practice of the tank commander riding high in the commander's
hatch to sense rounds fired would be a loser in combat. For that
matter, even having the hatch open during contact with the enemy
would be hazardous. What is needed to make CAT more realistic and
a better training tool is a simulated enemy that can shoot back at the
158
competitors. This could be accomplished with something like the U.S.
MILES (for Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) system
that is frequently used to interject realism ii't force-on-force
exercises. The competitors could be "shot" when exposed too long,
maneuvering incorrectly or employing other poor practices. Penalty
points could be assessed and subtracted from total scores.
While this change would certainly add administrative
complications to the already difficult task of conducting CAT
precisely and fairly, the pay-off in new and better fighting
techniques make this idea worth pursuing. It would also tend to
reward and test the investments some countries have made in faster,
more agile, lower silhouette tanks -- those harder to hit and destroy.
Chemical Threat Environment
A review of the Soviet chemical capabilities and doctrine,
combined with more frequent use of chemical warfare in the world's
current "hot spots," indicates a high probability that NATO would
have to fight many of its battles in a chemical threat environment.
However, none of the CAT tasks are accomplished in a simulated
anti-chemical mode. Perhaps they should be included for the
benefits of better training and equipment that accompany CAT
competition.
The U.S. has invested substantial monies to give its M1 and
MIA1 tank crews chcmical protection. We conduct some
qualification tank gunnery tasks and portions of many maneuver
exercises in the chemical protective mode ( tank hatches closed, crew
protective suits and masks on). Our UCOFT and SIMNET permit play
of the chemical environment, but there is really no technical reason
that a simulated chemical threat could not be interjected to add
realism and cause more realistic SOPs to be developed.
Increase the Challenges-Increase the Payoffs
Every country wants its teams to win CAT and every tank
manufacturer wants its tank to wear the tag "the worlds best tank."
The peacetime competition payoffs are already large and growing.
The United States and some of its NATO allies are making the huge
159
investments in time and other resources necessary to win those titles
in the future, but the real payoffs will be tangible, undeniable
increases in the combat capability and the deterrent value of our
conventional ground forces--if we push the competition in that
direction. The competing NATO countries should work closely
together to make the modifications to the competition that will most
closely simulate real combat.
Excellence Achieved--Keep Pushing
The 1980's have seen the publication of several widely read
books regarding the pursuit of excellence. The first, and perhaps
most noteworthy, was In Search of Excellence , by Thomas J. Peters
and Robert H. Waterman. Published in 1982 during an apparently
hopeless decline of America's competitive position in the business
world and at the tail end of a severe U.S. business recession, In
Search asserted that American business was not dead --indeed, it
said there were many very successful American corporations. The
authors described the common characteristics that made them
successful. This book, and its sequel, A Passion for Excellence , by
Tom Peters, are credited with reviving the confidence of American
management. In June 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Panel on
Defense Management published its findings and recommendations
regarding how to improve the management of the nation's defense.
Entitled A Ouest for Excellence , the President's panel proposed
organizational and philosophical changes that could lead to excellence
in defense management. Encouragement of innovation in a
competitive environment was a major theme.
In harmony with that theme, the American Army victory in
the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy Competition is the story of
excellence achieved, and victory that did not come easily or quickly.
Other victories will be even more difficult in the future. But a close
look at the ingredients that led to the CAT '87 win shows much of the
substance that yields excellence. In compiling this account of the
American effort, I have tried to give our leadership a look at the
winning ingredients in hopes that they will continue the push for
excellence in the future.
160
Bibiiography
BBN Laboratories Incorporated. "Simulation & Training Products
Overview". Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.
Black, Barbara A. and Millicent H. Abel. "Review of U.S. Armor Crew
and Platoon Training in Preparation for the 1985 Canadian Army
Trophy (CAT) Competition"(Draft). U.S. Army Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Fort Knox Field Unit) Fort Knox,
Kentucky, March 1987.
Black, Dr. Barbara A. and Dr. Kathleen A.Quinkert. "Simulation Net-
working: A M. NPRINT Tool". Army Research. Development & Acqui-
sition Bulletin, November-December 1987, pp. 8-10.
Bloedorn, Gary W. A discussion with Gary W. Bloedorn. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: 24 November 1987.
Brown, Major James D. and Captain K. Stephen Collier. "The Dinosaurs
Ain't Dead!" Armor. September-October 1983, p. 21.
Cowton, Rodney. "British Tank Fares Badly in Contest". The Times, 27
June 1985, p. 5.
Fialka, John J. "Contests Cast Doubt on U.S. Readiness". The Wall Street
Journal, 19 July 1981, p. 2.
Fialka, John J. "If Military Contests Were Real War, U.S. Might Be in a
Pickle". The Wall Street Journal, 23 August 1985, p. 1.
Forbes, Dr. Dennis. A discussion with Dr. Dennis Forbes. United States
Military Academy, West Point, New York: 11 December 1987.
"Gunnery of British Tanks a Disaster". The Times, 5 September 1983,
p. 21.
Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe. Canadian Army Trophy
(CAT) Competition 15-19 June 1987 Rules and Conditions. 2 June
1986.
161
Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, 2nd Armored Division
(Forward). 1987 Canadian Army Trophy After Action Report. Garlst-
edt, FRG. November 1987.
Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d Infantry Division. CAT87
After Action Report. Schweinfurt, FRG. 24 August 1987.
Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 3d Armored Division. After
Action Report. 1987 Canadian Army Trophy Competition. 4-8 Cav-
alry. 2d Brigade. 3 AD. V Corps. Gelnhausen, FRG. 28 August 1987.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Armor School (ATSB-WP-GD). "Trip Report-
1985 Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition", Fort Knox,
Kentucky. 12 July 1985.
Headquarters, U.S. Seventh Army training Center. Caaian Army
Trophy After Action Report, Grafenwoehr, FRG. 3 September 1985.
Heldstab, LTC John C. "International Military Competitions-An Exami-
nation of the Canadian Army Trophy Competition". U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Pennsylvania. 15 April 1982.
Helms, Douglas W. "SIMNET". National Defense November 1987, pp.
67-71.
Kramer, Ronald E. and David W. Bessemer. "Tank Platoon Training for
the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) Competition Using a Simula-
tion Networking(SIMNET) System". Army Research Institute, Fort
Knox, Kentucky. October 1987.
Kuhn, Steven. Letter reflecting personal account of CAT '87.
Gelnhausen, Federal Republic of Germany: May 1988.
Miller, Dr. Duncan C. A discussion with Dr. Duncan C. Miller.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: 24 November 1987
Murray, Major General Charles M. "USAREUR Battalion Level Mainte-
nance Programs". Unpublished memorandum, DA DCSLOG, Washing-
ton, D.C. 14 July 1987.
162
Otis, General Glen K. A discussion with General Glen K. Otis. Washing-
ton, D.C. : 21 January 1988.
Peters, Thomas J. and Nancy Austin. A Passion for Excellence. New
York: Warner Books, Inc., 1985.
Peters, Thomas J. and Robert W. Waterman. In Search of Excellence.
New York: Warner Books, Inc.,1982.
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.
A Ouest for Excellence. Washington, D.C.: June 1986.
Shutt, Captain David L. "CAT '87 Lessons Learned". Unpublished fact
sheet, D/2-66 Armor, 2 AD(Forward), Garlstedt, FRG. 30 June 1987.
Soldiers Radio and Television. Transcripts of personal interviews
with CAT '87 winners. Washington, D.C., February, 1988.
Thorpe, Lt. Col. Jack A. "The New Technology of Large Scale Simulator
Networking: Implications for Mastering the Art of Warfighting". Un-
published article submitted for publication, Ninth Interservice In-
dustry Training Systems Conference, November 1987, Arlington,
Virginia, November 1987.
Thorpe, Lt. Col. Jack A. A discussion with Lt. Col. Jack A. Thorpe. Ar-
lington, Virginia: 27 October 1987.
Walker, Ronald B. "Armor Training Systems for the 1990's". National
D November 1987, pp. 75-77.
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. Insert for the Record, 23 Febru-
ary 1982, p. 77.
163
Index
1-32 Armor( 22, 58, 124
1-33 Armor( 58
1-64 Armor( 59, 65
11th Cavalry( 122
2-66 Armor( 22, 45, 65, 70, 75, 81, 88, 92, 105, 113, 121, 127, 140,
146, 153
29th Area Support Group( 138
2nd Armored Division (Forward)( 58
3-32 Armor( 58
3-33 Armor( 58
3-64 Armor( 22, 45, 59, 65, 70, 75, 79, 87, 91, 104, 113, 121, 127,
137, 146
3rd Armored Division( 44, 58
3rd Infantry Division( 58, 59
4-8 Cavalry( 44, 63, 69, 73, 78, 87, 90, 98, 112, 120, 153
164
4t |p B l 13
45th Support Battalion( 135
498th Support Battalion( 140
7th ATC( 95
Abrams( 58
acquisition process( 151
after action review( 91, 98, 136
Army Center for Lessons Learned( 153
Athletic competition( 78
Baker( 68
Banks( 14, 74, 85, 145
Battalion Commander and Staff( 60
Baucum( 73, 108
Baumholder( 99
BBN Laboratories Incorporated( 118
Belgians( 10
Bell( 118
Berchtesgaden( 78
Bergen Hohne( 18, 105, 108
Berry( 27, 33, 79, 96, 110, 126
Bloedorn( 117
British( 10, 106, 149, 153
Brown( 66, 69, 118
Butler( 72
Campo Pond( 87, 90, 95
Canadian Army Trophy competition( 10
Canadian( 10, 153
Canadians( 47
Carroll( 71
CAT' 87 RESULTS( 47
CAT '79( 17, 18
CAT '81( 18, 21
CAT '83( 16, 22
CAT '85( 25, 46, 53, 111
CAT '87( 16, 26, 46
CAT Attack Plan( 44, 78
CAT Competition Results( 15
CAT disk( 112, 113
CAT experience( 60, 63, 65, 75, 149, 153
CAT patches( 78
Certification( 112, 113
chain of command( 56, 57, 82, 85
Challenger( 16, 150
Chemical Threat( 159
165
Chieftain( 16, 22
cohesive team( 56
combat vehicle crewman uniforms( 78
commitment to win( 82
Committee of Control( 18
concept( 81
contact lenses( 135, 140, 148
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)( 114, 117
Degraded mode gunnery( 112
distractors( 90
Drake( 78
Dutch( 10, 25, 95, 105, 153
Eldridge( 118
Erickson( 71
Excellence-in-Armor(EAI)( 74
eyesight( 148
filter( 150
Fire Distribution( 86, 88, 158
Forbes( 101, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126
Fravel( 64
General Dynamics( 137
General Electric( 111
German( 10, 153
Grafenwoehr( 18, 97, 98, 109, 112, 119
grid system( 86, 88
Griffin( 58, 124, 136
gunner's primary sight( 136
Hanna( 67
Hardin( 71
Helgesson( 119
Hoback( 71
Home station training( 89
in-bore devices( 95
Ingram( 68
Jones( 71
Kemmits( 56
Kitty CAT( 100, 102, 107, 126, 153
Kramer( 120
Kroesen( 20
Kuhn( 12, 25, 32, 73, 78, 117, 123, 125, 126, 133, 161
Leopard 1( 16
Leopard 2( 16, 25
Luallin( 58
166
Oi
M-1 Abrams( 16
M1 IP( 136
.M.160A3( 58
maintenance( 93, 146
Major Training Areas( 97
Mallory( 118
Masser( 30, 36, 84, 87
master gunner( 62, 69, 72, 82
materiel acquisition process( 149
Messner( 140
Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)( 68
Miller( 71, 118
mini-Master Gunner's Course( 94
Monroe Cjmplex( 92
Moore( 71
national judge( 30
National Training Center( 10, 147, 153
NATO alliance( 153
Night Firing( 156
night vision( 156
Normand( 30, 43, 115, 133
Otis( 57, 118
peak-up( 137
Perceptronics( 117, 119
Platoon Leader( 69, 70
Platoon Sergeant( 69, 71
Powell( 72
Program Manager, Tank Systems( 57
Quarantine( 101
R&D( 156
Range 117( 98, 104
Range 301( 26, 98, 102, 104, 108
Range 9( 97
reticle lay( 88
Rodrigues( 71
rules and conditions( 17, 37
Schmalzel( 63, 120
Scoring( 38
Segrest( 77
Sensing( 100
Shutt( 67
SIMNET( 33, 87, 93, 109, 114, 115, 120, 122, 151, 153
simulator( 109, 149
167

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