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ARI Research Note 88-96
Human Factors and Safety Assessment:

MiA1 Abrams 120 mm Gun Tank, Follow
On Evaluation
Lawrence E. Lyons, William L. Warnick, and Albert L.

Kubala
Essex Corporation
for
Contracting Officer's Representative

Charles 0. Nystrom
ARI Field Unit at Fort Hood, Texas

George M. Gividen, Chief
Systems Research Laboratory

Robin L. Keesee, Director
November 1988 DTIC
United States Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Approved fnr the public release- listribution is unlimited.
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
EDGAR M. JOHNSON JON W. BLADES

Technical Director COL, IN
Commanding
Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army
Essex Corporation
Technical review by
Ronald E. Kraemer
Judah Katznelson
NOTICES
DISTRIBUTION: This report has been cleared for release to the Defense Technical Information
Center (DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary
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Technical Informational Service (NTIS).
FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not
return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
NOTE: The views, opinions, and findings in this report are those of the author(s) and should not
to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so
designated by other authorized documents.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMNo.0.O
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HApproved for public release;
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4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
ARI Research Note 88-96
Ga. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Essex Corporation j o- - ARI Field Unit at Fort Hood, Texas

6C. ADDRESS (Cit, State, and ZIP Codi) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
333 North Fairfax Street HQ TEXCOM PROV
Alexandria, VA 22333 Fort Hood, TX 76544-5065
Ba. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING Sb. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ORGANIZATION ap/#iable)
(Itf
U.S. Army Research Institute PERI-SH MDA903-86-C-0341
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5001 Eisenhower Avenue PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT
ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. rCCESSON NO.
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
6.37.39 A793 1.5.1 151C2
11. TITLE (Inlude Security Classification)
Human Factors and Safety Assessment: MlAl Abrams 120mm Gun Tank, Follow On Evaluation
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)iLawrence
E. Lyons, William L. Warnick, and Albert
L. Kubala
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 114. DATE OF REPORT (Year,Month, ay) 15. PAGE COUNT
Final Report PROM 86-12 TO8 7- 9 1988, November 123
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
Charles 0. Nystrom, contracting officer's representative
Charles 0. Nystrom and George Gividen, technical monitors
17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverie if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP Logistic Supportability Main Battle Tank MIAl
Follow-On Evaluation Human Factors
MANPRINT Evaluation NBC System
19, ABSTRACT (Continue on revere if necessary and identify by block number)
;This research note describes the MANPRINT assessment which forms part of the Follow-On
Evaluation (FOE) of the MlAl main battle tank conducted at Fort Bliss from December 1986
through August 1987 by the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency. MANPRINT evaluation
support was provided by the Army Research Institute's Fort Hood Field Unit.
The MlAl FOE was conducted using 41 of the tanks assigned to tie 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored
Cavalry, and their crews. Data for the assessment were obtained through structured inter-
views, questionnaires, observation of squadron operations and evaluation of calibration/
gunnery performance of crews during the FOE.
The primary issues investigated were: ease of calibration of MlAl main armament, logistic
supportability, and NBC system operations. Inquiry was also made as to the number of
previously identified MANPRINT/human factors deficiencies uncorrected in the production
version. Significant findings during the FOE were: insufficient refueling capacity in the
tested support platoon, low reliability of the Simplified Test Equipment, when used (OVER)
20. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT Sf (URITY CLASSIFICATION
K UNCASSIFIEDUNLIMITED C3 SAME AS RPT. 0-DTIC USERS Uncl ass ied
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Charles 0. Nystrom 1 817/288-9826 PERI-SH
UNCLASSIFIED
CURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THI1 PAGE(M144 D00M90POO
ARI RESEARCH NOTE 88-96
19. Abstract (continued)
-in high ambient temperature conditions, and an NBC backup system which does not
filter out carbon monoxide gas (a deficiency discovered during the MIEl opera-
tional test II in 1984).
oric
Accession For
NTIS GRA&I
DTIC TAB
lkIarnnoiinced -]
Just "ftcat ton_
By_
Eistributon/
AvalabilitY Codes
.AvP.1 ai~o/or
Dist I Spocla!
UNCLASSI FID .
r
ii SIECURIITY CLASSI FICAIOm o THIS PAGE(Wlen VAeM Ent*PDM
HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT, MiAI ABRAMS 120MM GUN TANK
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .................................. 1
General ................................ 1
Purpose and Scope........................ 1
Background. .............................. 4
DESCRIPTION. ................................ 4
METHODOLOGY. ................................ 8
General ................................ 8
Test Participants ............................ 12
HF&S Team Assignments . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12
Procedures andMaterials .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12
Structured Interviews . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16
Comment and Opinion Data Automation .................. 16
Demographic Data Collection ........................ 16
Constraints..............................19
RESULTS ................................... 19
DISCUSSION AND PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS ....................... 19
REFERENCES...................................21
APPENDIX A. TASK PERFORMANCE DESCRIPTIONS. ............... A-1
B. HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY DATA REFERENCE CODE. ....... 1
C. HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY DATA BASE - MIAl FOE ........ C-1
D. ITEMS FOR M1A1 FOE FINAL REPORT ............... D-1
E. HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY FINDINGS TO USA OTEA FOE

FINAL. REPORT ......................... E-1
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Human Factors, Safety, and Health Hazards Findings as Reported

in Previous M1 Testing Results. ................. 2
2. MlAl HF&S Data Collection Matrix. ................ 8
3. Potential Areas of Technical Manual Assessment, JPA,

and Documentation. ..... ................... 17
CONTENTS (continued)
Page
Table E-1 MIA HF&S Data Collection Matrix ..... ............... ... E-2
E-2 Previously Identified HF&S Findings ............. E-6
E-3 HF&S Data Reference Code ..... ................... E-8
E-4 Number of Responses by Category ..... ............... .. E-10
E-5 Comments on Health and Safety Topics from Crew and Test
Directorate Personnel ........ ....................... E-11
E-6 Comments on Training Topics from Crew and Key Personnel .... E-12
E-7 Previously Identified Human Factors Deficiencies ........... E-13
E-8 Comments on MiAl Systems Components .... ............... E-14
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Improved M1A1 Tank External Features ....... . . ... 5

2. Improved MIA Tank Dimensional Characteristics ... ....... 6
3. Improved MIAI Tank Dimensional Characteristics ....... . .. 7
4. MIAI FOE HF&S Task Identification Flowchart ........ 13
5. MIA1 FOE and HF&S Assessment Milestones . ......... 14
6. MIAI FOE Data Collection Milestones . . . .......... 15
iv
HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT, MIAl ABRAMS 120MM GUN TANK
INTRODUCTION
General
This report describes the Human Factors and Safety (HF&S) assessment
conducted in conjunction with the Follow-on Evaluation (FOE) of the MlAl tank.
The assessment was conducted at Fort Bliss, TX, from January through June 1987.
The FOE was conducted by the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency
(USAOTEA). THE HF&S assessment support for the FOE was provided to USAOTEA by
the U.S. Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Systems
Research Laboratory, Fort Hood Field Unit.
Purpose and Scope
The MiAI FOE used an expanded sample data collection (SDC) methodology in
a combat-unit environment (MiAl Abrams Tank Follow On Evaluation, Test Design
Plan, USAOTEA, 1986). The FOE evaluated MIAl production models and addressed
the following questions:
One, can the MiAl tank main gun be calibrated by the average soldier
using procedures prescribed in the "MiAl Calibration Policy,
FC-17-12-lAl, Tank Combat Tables"?
Two, have the materiel deficiencies disclosed during the MiEl OT II

been corrected?
Three, can the MiEl tanks be supported with planned logistics

concepts?
Four, can the MiAl tank crews effectively use the on-board nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) system?
The purpose of the HF&S assessment was to provide supporting data and
information to address the test issues Much is already known about the MIAl
tank as a result of previous Ml and M1Ei tests. Therefore, the HF&S assessment
priority was to support OTEA test issues, and to investigate HF&S areas where
additional data are needed. The test issues that the HF&S assessment addressed
included:
Calibration of the main gun. Can crews calibrate rapidly and
accurately? Are there deficiencies in printed instructions? Are
there problems caused by previous training and experience with other
armor systems?
Deficiencies found during previous testing. Table I shows the HF&S

findings from previous testing. The deficiencies were investigated
using a combination of structured interviews, checklists, and on-site
observations.
Compatibility of planned MlAl logistic concepts with other support
units. The procedures used and performance of soldiers conducting
resupply support tasks were assessed by observing ARTEP task
performances. Structured interviews concerning tasks and procedures
were conducted.
Table 1
Human Factors, Safety, and Health Hazards Findings as Reported in

Previous Ml Testing Results
Reported in: HFEA

Problem Ml OT III MiEl OT II HEL
1. Lack of means for removing CO from

turret if main NBC system fails.
(Need outside air source for backup
system.) x x
2. Problem removing unfired round from
120-, due to loading ramp design. x x
3. Tracking problem, TC-s .50 MG.

(Control too sensitive, hard to
coordinate.) x x
4. No provision for human waste elimination/

disposal during prolonged buttoned-up
operations. x x
5. Inadequate storage for personal gear. x x x
6. CVC helmet gives inadequate hearing

protection, particularly with main
NBC system ON. x
7. Variable effectiveness of microclimate

cooling system. x x
8. No "autobahn seat" for commander for

long-term open hatch travel. x x
9. Need improved access to "semiready"
ammo rack. x x
10. Difficulty using sights with masks on. x x x
11. Gunner's shoulder padding (on main gun

sight) too thin. x x x
12. Ammo case bases separate from
handling (120m). x x
13. Spontaneous firing of laser rangefinder. x x
14. Difficulty opening/closing hull stowage
compartment doors. x
2
Table 1, cont.
Reported in: HFEA

Problem M1 OT III MiEl OT II HEL
15. Difficult understanding speech over

intercom. (Worse when NBC system ON.) x x
16. Slipping of manual breech opening

handle (manual operation). x
17. TC power handle location makes target

handoff to gunner slower than required
(needs to be raised). x x x
18. No bypass switch to override the auto-

matic engine (low oil pressure) shutdown. x x
19. Driver's steering control adjustment pin

is difficult to use and unreliable
(vibrates loose). x x
20. Driver's seat does not give adequate

back support. x x
21. Driver's vision block wipers are

ineffective. x x
22. Driver's side vision blocks cause

distortion. x x x
23. Driver's night vision viewer is marginal. x x x
24. Driver's workspace is too small for

most drivers. x x
25. Turret must be traversed to fill front

fuel tanks. x x
26. Inadequate brow pad on GPS. x
27. Difficulty loading TC's .50 MG. x x
28. Difficulty positioning and aiming

loader's MG. x
29. Crew did not know location of NBC

air valve; could be blocked, causing
shutdown of system. x
Note. Raw data upon which this table was based were not available for the
writing of this report.
3
Effective use of on-board NBC system. Structured interviews and
on-site observations of crews performing tasks in MOPP uniforms under
simulated NBC environments were conducted. Moreover, the effect of
MOPP uniforms on crew calibration of the main gun and logistics
support tasks were assessed during actual task performance.
Background
MIAl tanks were supplied to the 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored cavalry Regiment
(ACR). The squadron operated and maintained 41 of the tanks during the FOE.
The USAOTEA FOE data collection effort used sample data collection (SDC)
methodology during squadron new equipment training (NET), tactical gunnery
training, and the Army training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs). ARTEP
tactical exercises, conducted over a six-month period, were planned to ensure
that the exercise scenarios developed data for the test issues.
DESCRIPTION
The MIAl Abrams tank resembles its predecessor, the M1, in most respects.
The changes made in the Al version were essentially:
Substitution of a 120mm main gun for the 105 mm used previously. (New
gun is the same design used in the West German Leopard II.) This gun
uses combustible-case ammunition, and required a new weapon mount and
a redesigned fire control system.
Improved armor protection.
Improved suspension system, transmission and final drive.
The MIAl tank evaluated in the FOE evolved from the M1 tank. The MIAl
Abram's upgrades include several modifications needed to defeat threat main
battle tanks and other threat forces into the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the modified features of the high performance MIAl
tank and include:
The 120mm, U.S. made smoothbore cannon using combustible cased

ammunition that is compatible with that used by other NATO forces.
A refitted turret integrating a new main gun mount.
A revised fire control computer.
A redesigned suspension, gun turret drive, and transmission.
Improved armor.
A weight reduction derived from improved armor quality control

techniques.
4I
COMMANDERS M2 CAMM4Ar4ERVS
LDAD(11S 7.62 MIA -SO CAL MACM4NEGUI4 WEAPON STATKON
ACH IN(GUN
DRIVERSS SMOKE GRENADE. LOADE[1S HATCH

hATCH LAUNCHER 1,4C
VENT
COMMANDERS
WEAPON SIGHT COAXIAL
/ GUNN'ERS
25 -1N. 4N TE GRALAUIAY
rAD IRACK SIGHT' *SINTROIN
VENT (AGT-1500
170 MM ~
Figure 1. Improved HLAl tank external features.
Note: Reproduced from U.S. Army Operational Test and evaluation Agency. MAI
Abrams tank follow-on evaluation test design plan (TDP-OT-623A). Falls Church,
VA, December 1986.
5
IP4
wa1u.6 CAN K P01W 5
^oMCU"D k*r
(Front View) (Rear View)
WITH GUNd P0W4VVP4G AUJ.
(Top View)
Figure 2. Improved MIAl tank dimensional characteristics.
Note. Reproduced from U.S. Army Operational

Test and Evaluation Agency. MiAl
Abrams tankfollow-onevaluationtest design
plan 9TDP-OT-623A. Falls Church,
VA, December 1986.
6
(Left Side)-
(Right Side)
Figure 3. Improved MIAl tank dimensional characteristics.
Note. Reproduced from U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency. MIAL
Abrams tank follow-on evaluation test design plan 9TDP-OT-623A. Falls Church,
VA, December 1986.
7
METHODOLOGY
General
FOE Test Design. The basic follow-on evaluation (FOE) was intended as an
evaluation of the MIAl as a component of a combined arms system within the
receiving unit. Consequently, the OTEA test directorate decided that there
would be no test artifices designed or conducted during the evaluation period.
The impact of this decision, which was made prior to the involvement of the HF
staff in the preparation of FOE plans (December 1986), was to preclude the
conduct of instrumented side tests. The HF staff requested permission to
schedule and conduct instrumented a side tests to obtain performance data
concerning the Rearm-Refuel-Resupply issues, but permission was not granted.
Sample data collection (SDC) was performed by a contractor under USAOTEA

supervision. Data were collected during New Equipment Training (NET) in "M"
company beginning in January 1987; demographic data were collected for all
units at the same time. The majority of demographic data collection was
completed by the end of February 1987. Initial observation of NET was
completed by 15 February 1987; however, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) NET
was conducted into June due primarily to changes in NBC operating instructions
which were made by the Armor School representatives on several occasions during
the FOE. Post-ARTEP crew debriefing data collection was conducted 20-24 April
1987; an additional post-ARTEP crew session was to have been conducted in May.
However, lack of funds forced cancellation of the ARTEP and field exercise.
Consequently, this iteration of debriefing was cancelled. Final data
collection, consisting of structured interviews of test directorate personnel,
contractor sample data collectors, 3rd Cavalry squadron command and staff
personnel, plus the administration of end-of-test questionnaires to crews, was
accomplished 23-29 June 1987.
The HF&S assessment obtained objective and subjective information to
fulfill the data requirements listed in Table 2.
Table 2
MIAl HF&S Data Collection Matrix.
Collection Information Writing

OTEA Title Method Source Responsibility
2.1.4.5 Crew ability to follow calibration I,Q,O C,L,S,T Shared

procedures S,G
2.1.4.6 Crew opinions on calibration and I,Q,G C,L,S Total

hitting performance
2.1.4.17 Record/report all safety related I,Q,O C,L,S Total

incidents D,S,G T,M
8
Tabel 2, cont.

2.2.6.14 Adequacy of technical manuals I,Q,O C,L,T Total

D,S,G M
2.2.6.21 Effects of terrain/environment 1,0 C,L,M Shared

of recovery operations D,S S
2.2.6.22 Observed difficulties in I,O,D C,L,M Total

recovery operations S,G S
2.2.6.23 Opinions, adequacy of M88A1 for I,Q,D C,L,M Total

recovery/towing M1Al S
2.2.6.26 Observed road types/conditions I,O,D C,L,M Shared

for transporter S,G S
2.2.6.29 Problems with HET operations I,O,Q C,L,M Shared

S,G S
2.2.6.30 Adequacy of maintenance IQ,0 C,L,M Total

organization D,S,G S
2.2.6.31 Overall maintenance problems I,O,Q C,L,M Total

D,S,G S
2.2.6.32 Adequacy, quantity, type useful- 1,0 C,L,M Shared

ness of support test equipment D,S T,S
(opinion)
2.2.6.34 Availability of support equipment I,Q,O CM Shared

(causes of nonavailability) S S
2.2.6.36 STE/Mi fault isolation I,O,S L,M Shared

a/b success/failure/causes S S
2.2.6.37 Observed difficulty with IOS C,L,M Shared

equipment S,T
2.2.6.38 Opinions, adequacy of test set I,Q,S L,M Shared

operations, tech manuals, G S,T
tool sets
2.2.6.42 Type, number of vehicles IOS C,L,M Shared

required G S,T,U
2.2.6.45 Adequacy of resources to rearm, IQO C,L,S,T Shared

refuel/resupply in the field S,G U
9
Table 2, cont.

2.2.6.46 See 2.2.6.42 (adequacy, type/

number of supply vehicles)
2.2.6.47 Observed adequacy, type/number I,O,S L,M,S Total

of supply personnel G T,U
2.2.6.48 Observed adequacy of operators on O,S,G L,M,S Total

hand to operate/maintain supply
vehicles
2.2.6.49 Observed problems chambering Q,S,G C,L,S Total

120mm round due to moisture
2.2.6.50 Observed damage to 120mm O,S,G S,T Total

round from handling
2.2.6.51 Observed casing defects prior I,Q,S C,S,U Shared

to loading 120mm
2.2.6.52 Observed 120mm unpacking/ IS L,U Shared

repacking problems G
2.2.6.56 Problems correcting equipment I,O,D CM Shared

failures
2.2.6.57 Observed new pattern failures I,O,S C,L,M Shared

G S,T
2.2.6.58 Record and report all safety See 2.1.4.17

related incidents
2.3.4.1 Observed adequacy of instructions IQO C,L,S Shared

(TM, FC, etc.) permitting the S,G T
crew to operate the on-board
NBC system effectively
2.3.4.2 Observed adequacy of instructions 0 T Total

for readability, executability,
and understanding
2.3.4.3 Observed availability of QO CLTo,Ste?

instructions for each tank crew S,G
and company/troop/squadron
staff element
2.3.4.4 Observed ability of crew to put 1,0 L,S,T Shared

the instructions to use in an S,G
NBC environment
10
Table 2, cont.

2.3.4.5 Observed ability of the crew to 1,0 L,S,T Shared

use the NBC system properly S,G
during a no-notice NBC attack
without referring to instructions
2.3.4.6 Observed ability of the crew to 1,0 L,S Total

properly use the backup NBC system S,G
2.3.4.7 Adequacy of instructions to state I,Q,O C,L,S Shared

conditions in which NBC system is S,G T
to be used
2.3.4.8 Observed ability of the crew to 1,0 L,S Shared

properly use the system during S,G
NBC tactical operations
(firing, open hatch, closed
hatch, silent watch, road march)
2.3.4 Record/report any NBC system I,Q,O C,L,S Total

(added) related safety incident S,G M,U,T
2.3.4a See paras 2.1.4.6; 2.2.6.14;

(1),(2) 2.2.6.30 thru 2.2.6.38; and
(3) 2.3.4.1 thru 2.3.4.9, above
Note 1. "OTEA DR" means OTEA Data Requirement.
Note 2. "Collection Method" identifies which of six collection methodologies

was employed. The meaning of the six code letters is as follows:
I = structured interview by HF staff.
Q = questionnaire administered by HF staff.
O = observation of field operations and examination of documentation by HF
staff.
D =debriefing of crew upon mission or task completion (post-ARTEP).
S = sample Data Collectors observation.
G = general narrative comment form.
Note 3. "Information Source" refers to six coded sources of information, whose

meanings are as follows:
C = tank crew performance.
L = Unit leaders (Cmds, PLT ldrs, etc.)
S = sample data collectors.
T = Test directorate staff personnel.
M = Maintenance personnel.
U = Unit supply personnel.
11
Note 4. "Writing Responsibility." "Total" means that the contractor HF&S
sta-ffdid all of the writing regarding a Data Requirement. When both OTEA and
contractor staff contributed to the writing, the term "shared" appears.
Test Participants
The 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR, fielded 41 MIAl tanks and crews. A total of
164 crewman participated in the test. Data were obtained from personnel in the
following MOSs.
a. 19K-19Z (tank crew)

b. 41C, 45E/K/G, 63A1E/G/H, 421A (maintainers),
c. 76Y-76Z, 761A (supply personnel).
In addition to the above personnel, other groups that were asked to provide
information included:
a. Test Directorate personnel, including sample data collectors,

b. Squadron personnel,
c. "M" Company personnel,
d. "I" Troop personnel (crews, unit leaders, and maintainers),
e. "K" Troop personnel (crews, unit leaders, and maintainers),
f. "L" Troop personnel (crews, unit leaders, and maintainers).
HF&S Team Assignments
Four different Essex contractor personnel played a role in performing the

contract task to do a Human Factors and Safety assessment of the MlAI during
OTEA's Follow-on Evaluation of that system.
Management. Management functions were performed by Mr. Larry Avery from

the Alexandria, VA. office of Essex.
Team Leader. The role of Team Leader was filled by Mr. Lawrence Lyons
(LTC, USAR), Essex Senior Scientist from Essex's Fort Hood Facility. He
performed most of the effort.
Support. Mr. William L. Warnick, Staff Scientist, assisted in the area of

training assessment methodology. Dr. Albert Kubala, Senior Staff Scientist,
assisted with the conduct of structured interviews. Both were from the Essex
Fort Hood Facility.
Procedures and Materials

Permission to conduct side-tests to obtain performance data on refueling,
rearming and resupply of the MIAl was not granted. The procedures used to
perform the assessment of the MlAl FOE are described as a series of tasks in
Figure 4. Appendix A contains worksheets listing the subtasks required to
perform the assessment methodology. Figure 5 shows timelines for the
completion of the HF&S tasks for the FOE test. Figure 6 shows specific
milestones for the data collection effort. The major portion of the assessment
was to support the OTEA FOE data requirements.
12
REQUIRED INPUT/RESOURCE HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY TASk OUTPUT/PRODUCT
IReview rut Documents I ~iX

AJ/b I lUdt Kequirement Ust I
ITest Issues IReview/Analyze Data Requirements l- OEvdludtion Outline Plani
Test Design Plan
1010 Plan
IDraft IEP I_______
ITACOI Sample Data IDrdft/FlnAlze -I 9I led Ha s I
'de
I Collection Plan (SDCP) I Detailed Support Plan I IJEvdluatlon Plan I
IMIA1 OP/AINT Documentation I
1IA1 OT 1I Test Results
ICAV SQON ARTEP TO
Develop raft Data I IDdG Collectionl
Collection Instrumentsi -jMdterldls
115-w Data Source I_____________
lIdentification-I
__etermine Data Collection ,Data Collection I

Icoordinatlon with I Resource Requirements 1Schedule Dates I
ITest Director I1 Data Collection I
I(Ft Blss Visit) IISupport & Data pr
_________ Ianagement Suppot
SValidate ta Collection I I(OTEA) I
IOITAIAiI/3d Squadron I Procedures/Materials/Datd I
13d ACR Input I Quality; Modify Interview/I
IPilot Test I Questionnaire Update I
Data Reduction I
IReview OTEA Data I _ _ _
ICollection Plans/ I ,Revlsed Data Forms I

lInstruments to PreventI IFinallze Data ollection Plans . Collection Schedule I
IRedundancy I . 4. Dates, Times I
ILocitions I
ICrew Debriefing Form I FULL TEST PHASE II

IUpdate, Comment Form
IUpdate, Structured
I Interview Update I
HF&S - Data Collection I
hTank Crews I Brief Data Collecto-s I
idintenance Personnel I Demographics I
ISupply personnel I Data Reduction & Input to Data Base I IDemographic I
IUnlt Leaders I End-of-Test Interviews of key Participantsl [Information I
ITest Directorate Members '-- 1 Questionnaire to Other Participants t Initial HF&S I
IDemographiC Data I I Collate/Reduce Interview, I IFindings List I
I I I Questionnaire & Comment Data I
IStructured Interview Datal Scoring of Findings
IQuestionndire Data I Data AnalYsis/QualitY Control Actions I
IAndlysls of OTEA
IPerformance Data
Findings List l
I repare Fi WAS FindingsUIs
IFInal Update A Scorlngl Assist Test Director __
Iof HF&S Findings " Appendix Development Iutline of MANPHINI

I .Portion of OTEA
I N Test Report I
IOTEA Test Dlrector/ l Outline of ARI I
lEvaludtor Review
nte I u IMA1 HF&S Report I
IMIT RepresentativeI_________________
IReview Ilest
---- 1Report Input I I
IFInal ARI HF&S Report[
Figure 4. HF&S task identification flowchart for MIA1 FOE.
13
4"10
NII
p..j
C..)
Ed L IJ L IEn Z 0 0 f ..) L.) C 92 /
100
-4-1N U~E, ) .
- - 4]4U
La ~ .
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- - - - - 4- - - - - -
I- En ~~ v
c -4
LLn 415
z z 'n
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w §n -J-
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14)
'DATA COLLECTION TYPE MONTH IN WHICH DATA IS TO BE COLLECTED
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE
!DEMOGRAPHIC DATA L -/'
!OBSERVATION OF FIELD
!OPERATIONS OF UNITS : :
POST COMPANY LEVEL ARTEPI

1DEBRIEFINGS : '-
1POS1 SQUADRON LEVEL

IARTEP CREW DEBRIEFINGS
1POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRES
1POSTTEST KEY PERSONNEL

!INTERVIEWS
Figure 6. MlAl FOE data collection milestones.
aa a aa a
Ia
aI II
I I a
I
a a a ... a.a
15!
Structured Interviews
General. A major portion of the HF&S assessment was conducted using

structured interviews. Interview forms are shown in Appendix C. The
structured interviews were revised after the first site visit. The major
change consisted of the addition of a section concerning simplified test
equipment to the Maintainer interview.
Interviews. The structured interviews were designed to be used for

obtaining data from players, test directorate and supply personnel. The
structured interviews were developed as requested by USAOTEA using a Yes/No
checklist format with space to record comments for each interview item.
Separate interviews were conducted for~each crew position, key support unit
personnel, and maintainers. In some cases, a single interview item may have
covered many conditions (e.g., daylight, darkness, rain, fatigues and MOPP
uniforms). Each condition which affects behavior is represented in the
analysis.
Technical manual, job performance aid, and documentation assessment.

These documents were assessed using methods described in Table 3.
Crewmen, maintainers, support and key personnel. Structured interviews

were the primary means of collecting data from crewmen, maintainers, logistics
support and key personnel. Crewmen and maintainers were interviewed concerning
previously identified deficiencies. Maintainers provided information
concerning pattern failures, line replaceable unit (LRU) failures not meeting
LRU remove and replace criteria, and parts resupply problems. Logistics
support personnel and MlA1 crewmen were interviewed concerning MlAl resupply,
supply packaging, supply handling, and loading of the tank. Key personnel were
interviewed concerning their observations of MlAl operations and
maintainability.
Comment and Opinion Data Automation
A five field code taxonomy was used to identify comments received during
the test. There is a field for HANPRINT primary category, MANPRINT secondary
category, M1Al equipment component, FOE test design plan issue/subissue, and
critical task(s). The number of categories identified were: HANPRINT, 13;
MlAl component, 22; issue/subissue, 10; and critical task, 5. This code allows
for sorting and is listed in Appendix B. All coded data were automated for
storage and retrieval in format suitable for report writing purposes. (See
Appendix C for HF&S data base descriptions.)
Demographic Data Collection
Extensive demographic data were collected during the MlA1 FOE. The
demographic data collection form is shown in Appendix A. Correlational
analyses of individual task performance and demographic data were intended, but
were not possible due to the non-acquisition of performance data.
16
Table 3
Potential Areas of Technical Manual Assessment, JPA, and Documentation
Potential Items Evaluation Methods
Issue 1: Firepower
Evaluation of Field Circular 17-12-lAl Observation, interview,

"MiAl Calibration Policy and Procedures" performance measures
Live-fire accuracy screening test or Review of results of

proofing to confirm calibration screening and gunnery
JPA assessment Observation, documentation

review, questionnaire
Issue 2: Logistic Supportability
Evaluation of critical maintenance Observation, interview,

task performance data base, performance
measures
Evaluation of critical tasks performed Observation, interview,

during vehicle recovery operations data base, performance
measures
Evaluation of performance of maintenance Observation, interview,

and recovery tasks (to include special tools, data base
test equipment, and technical manuals
Evaluation of physical environment for Observation, interview

maintenance and recovery operations
Evaluation of Ths, JPAs, other Interview, questionnaire,

documentation documentation, review
Subissue 2: Special Suroort

and Test Equipment
Evaluation of tasks performed in the use of Observation, interview

special support and test equipment (STE/Ml)
Evaluation of equipment used to support the Observation, interview

maintenance and operation of the MlAl in an
operational environment
17
Table 3, cont.
Potential Items Evaluation Methods
Subissue 3: Conduct of Resupply of

Class III, V, & IX During Field Operations
Evaluation of transportation, handling Observation, interview

perservation and packing of class III, V
& IX supplies
Evaluation of tasks involved in Observation during ARTEP

resupplying for the MIAl tank interview
Issue 3: NBC Doctrine and Techniques
Evaluation of crew tasks and procedures while Observation, interveiw,

operating in an NBC environment performance measures
(OTEA SDC Data)
Evaluation of the correctness, completeness, Observation, interview

understandability, and useability of printed performance measures
instructions (OTEA SDC Data)
Issue - Miscellaneous
Technical manuals and related instructional

materials will be evaluated on the following
factors:
a. Determining reading grade level Computer analysis

b. Evaluate ease of use, ability to Interview
find information, format, accuracy
Additional DR coverage
a. ARTEP task deficiencies Interview

b. Individual & collective deficiencies Interview
c. Performance deficiencies Interview
Note. "Performance measures" methodology referred to above consists of

selection, analysis, and correlation of pertinent data obtained in accordance
with the OTEA Test Design Plan by the test directorate sample data collectors.
18
Constraints
The methodology section of the original 1ANPRINT assessment plan discusses

the procedures and materials to be used for the study. However, the
methodology was impacted by several constraints that shaped the extent of the
assessment procedures. The constraints include:
a. The initial MANPRINT planning was based upon obtainable documents.

Plans and procedures were modified on the basis of initial visits to
the test site and instructions from the Test Director.
b. The minimum-interference nature of the USAOTEA SDC methodology has

several advantages for unbiased FOE operation of the squadron.
However, the methodology did leave some variables uncontrolled.
c. Performance measure instrumented side-tests were not conducted.
The constraints are partially compensated for by the duration of the

six-month FOE. The six-month duration of the test permitted the HF&S
researchers to develop a workable methodology and to collect considerable data,
albeit not of a performance measure nature. The process is also facilitated by
the knowledge and experience the HF&S researchers gained from the MIEl test.
RESULTS
Data collected in accordance with the schedule and procedures described

above were available for analysis on 29 June 1987. Inputs were prepared,
reviewed, and submitted to USAOTEA for inclusion in the FOE final report.
Results of the limited MANPRINT (warranting the more restricted term "Human
Factors and Safety") assessment efforts were presented to the final meeting of
the Data Analysis Group on 8 July 1987.
In conformance with USAOTEA's instructions, comment and opinion narratives

were extracted from the structured interviews for use in specific tables in the
main body of the OTEA FOE final report. These extracts are collected into
Appendix D of this report. OTEA also requested a stand-alone appendix of the
(limited) MANPRINT data for attachment to their final report. This material is
included in this report as Appendix E.
Tabulations of the comments made by operators, maintainers, and other key

participants are presented in appendices D and E.
DISCUSSION AND PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of the data presented in Appendices D and E resulted in the

following primary conclusions:
The TOE is Inadequate. It does not provide enough maintenance personnel.

More experienced turret mechanics are needed. See page D-1.
There is a Maintenance Doctrine Problem. PLL is inadequate. A vehicle is

needed to carry Palletized Load List (EL--,and a wheeled vehicle mechanic. All
maintenance personnel stated that they did not have metric tool sets. See
pages D-2 and -3.
19
J1
The M88A1 Recovery Vehicle is Inadequate. It lacks the power, weight, and
durability for safe and reliable recovery of MIAl tanks. See page D-4.
Problems with Technical Manuals. They are not up to date. They aren't
rugged enough for use in the field. Too many - too bulky. Should include the
parts number/NSN on same page with TM illustration. See pages D-6 and -7.
Problems with STE-MIAI. Insufficient testing of NBC systems; gives false

indications, more so in high temperatures; too bulky; too long to setup. See
page D-8.
Problems with Rearm, Refuel, Resupply. Fuel supply was inadequate. There
are enough fuelers only if all are operational; therefore need another five,
one per troop/company and squadron support platoon. See page D-9.
NBC System Operation. TCs, gunners, drivers, loaders predominantly

asserted that their unit's NBC SOP was effective; whereas key unit personnel and
test directorate personnel (6 of 12) viewed the units as having no SOP. A
warning page for insertion in TM902350-264-10-2 arrived during the FOE. It
said:
WARNING
"Protective mask and filter unit will not protect against carbon
monoxide. The mask and filter unit will only get rid of odors which
would normally indicate the presence of carbon monoxide."
This deficiency in the mask and filter, discovered in 1985 testing, appears not
to have been corrected. See page D-13.
Operations Problems
Speech over the Intercom. Intercom speech is difficult to understand, and

the difficulty is increased when the NBC system is on. See page E-7.
Driver's Conditions. The driver's seat does not give adequate back
support; the vision block wipers are ineffective; the side vision viewer is
marginal; the night vision viewer is marginal; the workspace is too small for
most drivers. See page E-7.
System Safety
Exhaust. The NBC system is very hot, could cause burns or start fires.
See page E-11.
Turret Power. Be sure turret power is off before anyone goes on deck near
the main gun. A touch of the TC's or gunner's control handle can cause the gun
to "bounce". Page E-11.
Ammo Handling. All eight loaders reported dropping rounds or falling

while loading, particulary while moving over rough terrain. Page E-16.
Training. Don't retrain the 19K's; concentrate on 19E's.
20
REFERENCES
Lane, N.E. (April 1986), Issue in performance measurement for military aviation
with applications to iir combat maneuvering (Contract DAAG29-81-D-O100,
D.O. 1443). Orlando, FL: Naval Training System Center.
U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency. (December 1986). MiAl
Abrams tank follow-on evaluation test design plan (TDP-OT-623A). Falls
Church, VA
U.S. Department of the Army. (March 1982) The armored cavalry squadron (ARTEP
No. 17-55). Washington, DC: Headquarters.
U.S. Department of the Army. (April 1986) Tank combat tables (FC 17-12-lAl),
Draft.
U.S. Department of the Army. (April 1986) MIAl calibrations policy (FC
17-12-lAl). Appendix), Draft.
21
APPENDIX A
TASK PERFORMANCE DESCRIPTIONS
TASK 1
REVIEW AND ANALYZE DATA REQUIREMENTS
Subtask Internal Due Date External Due Date
A. Obtain source documents fron OTEA 15 Dec 86 N/A
B. Review FOE documentation 26 Dec 86 N/A
C. Document analysis
(1) Determine FOE test event schedule
(2) Identify & analyze data 31 Dec 86 N/A

requirements having HF&S
information input requirements
(3) Develop outline of HF&S 2 Jan 87 N/A

evaluation
D. Resource Requirements Source Date Required
(1) FOE documentation OTEA 10 Dec 86

(2) Access to Test Director OTEA 15 Dec 87
(3) Access to FOE Data Manager OTEA 5 Jan 87
(Outside resources listed above imply coordination requirements between the

HF&S staff element and the listed source.)
A-i
TASK 2
PREPARE HF&S DETAILED SUPPORT PLAN
A. Develop HF&S data requirements 5 Jan 87 N/A
B. Develop detailed HF&S data 5 Jan 87 N/A

collection plan
C. Expand outline test support plan 7 Jan 87 N/A
D. Coordinate expanded draft with OTEA 9 Jan 87 13 Jan 87

and ARI
E. Revise, finalize, publish and distribute
F. Resource Requirements Source Date Required
(1) Detailed Test Plan OTEA 2 Jan 87

(2) Sample Data Collection Plan OTEA 2 Jan 87
(3) Operator & Maintainer Manuals ARI, III Corps 2 Jan 87
(4) Access to Test Director Library System
(5) Access to ARI Coordinator OTEA, ARI

A-2
TASK 3
DEVELOP DRAFT DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
A. Review HF&S data requirements 15 Feb 87 N/A
B. Review SDC data available from 15 Feb 87 N/A

OTEA data base
C. Draft HF&S data collection 12 Feb 87 12 Feb 87

instruments
(1) Structured key personnel interviews
(2) Crew questionnaires
(3) Crew debrief forms
(4) General comment forms
D. Draft automated data base support 2 Mar 87 2 Mar 87

requirements with OTEA data manager
E. Resource Requirements Source Date Required
(1) MIAI FOE TDP OTEA 10 Dec 86

(2) Access to SDC Data Base OTEA 10 Feb 87
(3) Access to Data Manager OTEA 2 Mar 87
(4) Data collection document
creation & production support

A-3
TASK 4
DETERMINE DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
A. Finalize sample size limits in 6 Feb 87

coordination with test director
B. Determine data collection 6 Feb 87

support available from OTEA,
verify available SDC data pertinent
to HF&S DRs
C. Confirm Essex staff requirements 31 Mar 87

for obtaining HF&S data
(1) Administering questionnaires

(2) Conducting interviews
(3) Conducting crew debriefs
(4) Observing field operations
D. Compute financial support requirements 31 Mar 87
(1) Access to Data Manager OTEA 1 Feb 87
(2) Access to Test CAV SQDRN 3/3 Armored Cavalry 1 Feb 87

CDR/OPNS staff personnel SQDN - OTEA
(3) Sample Data Collection Data Management I Feb 87

Forms (SDC) Office
(4) Sample size information Data Manager 1 Feb 87

from SDC effort
(5) Access to 3/3rd CAV CDR, 3/3rd 6 Feb 87

Field OPNS

A-4
TASK 5
VALIDATE DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES AND MATERIALS
A. Coordinate with unit for test respondent 6 Feb 87 6 Feb 87

crew(s) for validation of instruments
B. Coordinate with OTEA test director for 6 Feb 87 6 Feb 87

respondents for validation of instruments
C. Test, analyze draft data collection 16 Mar 87

instruments
D. Revise, upuate instruments 30 Mar 87
(1) Crew debriefing form

(2) Interview/questionnaire forms
(3) Comment form
(1) Access to 2 tank crews 3/3rd CAV 16 Mar 87

2 platoon leaders;
1 platoon NCOIC
(2) Access to FOE Test OTEA 16 Mar 87

Director for
directorate interviews
(3) Access to computer and OTEA 10 Mar 87

word processing support
(4) Data collection instrument OTEA 20 Mar 87

production support (for
revisions)

A-5
TASK 6
FINALIZE DATA COLLECTION PLANS
A. Review all HF&S evaluation plans, 20 Mar 87

data collection instruments, and
resource allocations
B. Incorporate all required changes 20 Mar 87
C. Provide final form HF&S evaluation 22 Mar 87

support documentation to ARI and OTEA
(1) Access to ARI Coordinator ARI 22 Mar 87
(2) Access to OTEA Test Director OTEA 22 Mar 87

A-6
TASK 7
HF&S OBSERVATIONS AND DATA COLLECTION
A. Collect demographic data 30 Mar 87
B. HF&S staff field observations 20 Jun 87
C. SDC observaLions and data collection 20 Jun 87 20 Jun 87
D. Administer after-ARTEP interviews 30 Jun 87 N/A
E. Complete administration of crew debriefs 30 Jun 87 N/A
F. Draft HF&S problems list (emerging 20 Jun 87

results)
G. Resource Requirements Source Date Required

(1) Access to OTEA data base for OTEA 10 Feb-25 Jun 87
SDC and comment data
(2) Data entry support OTEA 10 Feb-30 Jun 87
(3) Access to tank crews 3/3rd CAV SQDN 20-30 Jun 87
(4) Access to Test Directorate OTEA Test Director 20-30 Jun 87

personnel
(5) Access to DS/GS maintenance Unit Commander(s) 20-30 Jun 87

personnel of Personnel
(6) Access to LOG/Supply support Unit Commander(s) 20-30 Jun 87

personnel

A-7
TASK 8
PREPARE FINAL HF&S FINDINGS LIST
A. Collate, reduce, analyze data 10 Jul 87

(1) Interview data
(2) Questionnaire data
(3) Crew debriefing information
(4) Comment data
B. Integrate SDC observations and data 10 Jul 87
C. Integrate gunnery performance data 10 Jul 87
D. Integrate maintenance/log support data 10 Jul 87
E. Analyze and integrate photo data 10 Jul 87

documentation
F. Revise, update, finalize HF&S 14 Jul 87

Problems list in coordination with DAG
G. Compute financial support requirements 31 Mar 87
(1) Reduced SDC data OTEA 30 Jun 87
(2) Reduced gunnery data USATACOM 30 Jun 87
(3) Access to collected TV/ OTEA 30 Jun 87

photo imagery
(4) Access to FOE DAG OTEA Test Throughout

Director FOE

A-8
TASK 9
DRAFT HF&S TEST REPORT
A. Draft test report 14 Jul 87

(1) HF&S problems
(2) Critical task performance
(3) Interview/questionnaire data
B. Coordinate draft report with 17 Jul 87

OTEA test director
C. Finalize draft report and input to 20 Jul 87

OTEA test report
Access to Test Director, OTEA 30 Jun 87

Data Manager, DAG

A-9
TASK 10
FINAL HF&S TEST REPORT
A. Coordinate final draft 25 Jul 87

(1) OTEA Test Director
(2) OTEA Evaluator
(3) ARI coordinator
B. Complete final HF&S report,

distribute
(1) OTEA
(2) ARI
C. Resource Requirements Source Date Required
(1) Access to OTEA Test OTEA

Director, independent
evaluator, OTEA human
factors personnel
(2) Access to ARI coordinator ARI

A-10
APPENDIX B
HF&S DATA REFERENCE CODE
Data Codes (5 fields)
Reference HF&S HF&S MiAI

Category Primary Secondary Component
Field 1 2 3
Code: 0 Not Applicable Same as Column 1. A. GPS
A. Training & Training B. Ballistic
Aids (NET) Computer
B. Safety & Health Hazards C. MRS
C. Manpower D. TIS
D. Crew station design E. GASRV
E. Communications F. Laser RNGFDR
F. G. Main Gun
G. Controls & Displays H. Coax MG
H. Anthropometric & Biomechanics I. Main NBC
I. Environment system
J. Personnel J. Backup NBC
K. Maintainability system
L. Logistics K. Driver's station
M. Other L. Loader's station
N. M. 120mm ammo
0. storage
P. N. 120z ammo
Q. 0. BITE/STE-Mi
R. P. Repair parts/
S. tools
T. Q. Operator's
U. instructions
V. R. Maintainer's
W. printed
X. instructions
Y. S. Maintenance
Z. Organization
T. Supply
organization
U. Transportation
assets
V. Supply assets
W.
X.
Y.
Z.
B-i
Reference
Category Issue/subissue Critical Task
Field 4. 5.
Code: 0 Not Applicable A. Activate gunner's station

(TM9-2350-264-19-2)
1. Calibrate MIAI Main Gun B. Prepare GPS for boresighting
2. Operate NBC Protection (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
3. Materiel defect C. Prepare ballistic cmputer/MRS
4. Refuel or rearm (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
5. Replace component D. Boresight main gun (FC17-12-1A],APP A)
6. Evacuate vehicle/component E. Conduct live-fire screening tests
7. Previously identified F. Operate main NBC system
8. New problem (materiel) (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
9. Other G. Use protection mask
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
H. Operate turret vent
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
I. Operate NBC backup system
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
J. Rearm or stow 120mm ammo
K. Transfer 120mm ammo
L. Pack or unpack 120mm ammo pallets
M. Chamber 120mm rounds
N. Isolate faults- STE-Mi
0. Remove or replace components
P. Correct faults - repair
Q. Drive
R. Communicate
S. PMCS
T. Operate machineguns
U. Refuel tank
V. Handoff target to gunner (TC)
W. Engage targets - machineguns
X. Operate microclimate system
Y. Acquire targets
Z. Other
B-2
7>
APPENDIX C
HF&S DATA BASE
General
HF&S Data Source Documents.
Structured interviews were conducted with crew members, unit leaders, test
directorate personnel, maintenance personnel and supply personnel. These
structured interviews consisted of questions covering all the HF&S test data
requirements. The questions provided for "Yes-No: answers and for narrative
comments. Data processing of the structured interviews forms included tallying
to determine the total number of Yes-No answers for each question in a "type"
interview (e.g., TC/Gunner, etc.), listing of all comments pertinent to each
question, and sorting of responses into groupings based upon the five assigned
HF&S Data Reference Code (HDRC) characters.
End-of-test crew questionnaires were administered to tank commanders,

gunners, drivers and loaders who participated in the FOE. This questionnaire
differs from the structured interview in that there is a five-point rating
scale instead of Yes-No responses. It also provides for much fewer narrative
comments. Data processing requirements for each type of questionnaire (e.g.,
TC/Gunner, etc.) include determining the total number of item. Other
processing were the same as for interview data.
Comment and opinion data were collected in narrative form and assigned a
HF&S Data Reference Code.
Specifics
. Details of the inputs, processing requirements and desired outputs are

attached.
C-I
IP
Input Data Description Interviews
Element Size Description
Q.number 32 characters, MAX Numeric, Q.# plus the pertinent test

plan para number(s) (e.g., 12).
(2.2.6.47; 2.2.6.48; 2.2.6.49)
Question Five 80 column lines Alphanumeric. Includes the

per question complete actual question, plus the
MAX size (400 char) HF&S Data Reference Code and
Yes No space (e.g., "Were
there enough maintenance personnel
available? Yes No (COK60)"
Comment Four 80 column lines Alphanumeric. Includes space for

per question narrative comment plus the
MAX size (320 char) HF&S Data Reference Code
(e.g., "Not enough orgn/maint
pers - need at least two more; but if
drivers were trained or more mainte-
nance, we'd have enough." (CAJ5N
MDRC)
C-2
Structured Interviews.
Data Files were set up for each category of personnel interviewed; that is the
TC/Gunner, Driver, Loader, Unit Leader/Test Directorate, Maintainer, and Supply
Personnel. Data Input elements are shown below with amplifying information.
Data element: Description Field Size
1. Question number Numeric Two 2-character
2. Question Alphanumeric Five 80 column lines per

(Includes DR#, and HF&S Data Ref Code) MAX size Q; includes Yes/No
response space.
3. Comments Alphanumeric Five 80 column lines

(Includes HF&S Data Ref Code) per question.
4. HF&S Data Alphanumeric Five characters

Ref Code (MDRC)
5. Total number of questions
C-3
Structured Interview File. Data processing requirements are shown below,
starting with the application of the six sorts that were performed.
Sort # Sort Reference Category
1 HF&S Primary
2 HF&S Secondary
3 M1A1 Component
4 Test Issue/Subissue
5 Critical Task
6 Item/Question# Sequence
ADP Functions: Arrange by data code within the specified divisions.
Print out according to examples furnished in the sequence of:
Division - HF&S Primary A-K; HF&S SECONDARY A-K; MIAI

Component A-Z; Issue/Subissue 0-9; Critical Task A-Z; Item/
Question# Sequence (rollup)
Output Required:
1. Sort ID Name (e.g., HF&S Primary A Training, etc.)
2. Source Instrument ID (e.g., TC/Gunners; L/TD, etc.)
3. Question Number, DR ID, Question, __Yes#, No#
4. Comments Made:
Example of Above:
HF&S Primary B Safety/Health Hazards
TC/Gunner
Q#16: "Have you been injured, or do you know of a person who has been
injured while participating in this test? Yes 12 No 45
Comment: "The ballistic doors over the ammo storage rack slammed shut and
cut my finger", etc.
Note that the same Q#16 example shown could also appear in one or more of
the other sorts, if so coded.
C-4
APPENDIX D
ITEMS FOR M1Al FOE FINAL REPORT
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings that was contained in the OTEA
Report Table 3-62, "Opinions on Maintenance Organization."
Opinions:
1. The TOE is inadequate - does not provide enough personnel. There were
instances in the ARTEP when a dead tank never did get a maintainer forward
to check it out.
Comment in response to "Were there enough maintenance personnel available?"
Q7, TC/Gunner Interview Yes 16 No 17

Q9, Driver Interview Yes 13 No 7
and "Was the squadron/troop's maintenance operation effective in terms of:

Personnel authorization?"
Q8, Unit/TD Interview Yes 10 No 13

Q3, Maintainers Interview Yes 18 No 5
2. Both troop/company and squadron maintainers stated that more trained and
experienced MIAl turret mechanics were needed. Part of the perception that
the TOE personnel authorizations are inadequate was caused by the fact that
a number of the current mechanics had been trained to maintain M3 Bradleys
or M113s rather than MIAls (per squadron motor officer, squadron executive
officer, and squadron commander).
These comments were made by both company/troop and squadron level

maintenance personnel in response to the same set of questions as the
preceding question; response was concurred in/repeated by the squadron
maintenance NCOIC and motor officer.
3. Throughout the FOE, some tools were not available at all echelons. This
was particularly true of metric tool sets.
Comment made by crew members in response to "Was the maintenance operation

organized so that test equipment, tools, parts and qualified maintenance
personnel were always available in forward areas (company trains) when
needed to sustain combat operations?"

QIO, Driver Interview Yes 13 No 7
Q7, Loader Interview Yes 10 No 1
and "Was the squadron/troop's maintenance operation effective in terms of:

tools?"
010, Unit/TD Interview Yes 8 No 15
D-1
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew "Opinions on Maintenance Organization,"
continued.
Opinions:
1. There is a power cable (1WOOf) that keeps coming loose; this cable gets
cut all the time and the computer goes out; has to go to maintenance to be
fixed, the crew can't fix it. It is under the left rear of the gun tube.
Statement was made by one tank crew during the first ARTEP debriefing in
response to "Did the M1Al built-in test equipment (BITE) in the control
computer work correctly?"
The TC who made this observation described the cause and effect of this
occurrence and indicated that the cable had to be replaced by DS
maintenance; merely reconnecting or splicing at user lever did not work.
This difficulty was mentioned later by a specific question.
2. PLL is inadequate, the parts are not on hand in the field when you need
them. We need a larger PLL out in the field. This is a maintenance
doctrine problem. We need a vehicle to carry PLL, also a wheeled vehicle
mechanic. (About half of the maintenance personnel agreed. Half stated
that current transportation assets are inadequate.)
This observation was obtained in response to the question about the

maintenance operation adequacy:

Q11, Unit/TD Interview Yes 2 No 21
The vehicle sufficiency comments were in response to:

3. Organization is adequate, but parts supply is not.

This comment pertains to the preceding response.
4. The maintenance data key locks up.
This comment was made by one crew member in response to the question
concerning the built-in test equipment (control computer BITE).
D-2
5. All maintenance personnel stated that they did not have metric tool sets.
some noted that US-sized sockets had been pounded onto metric nuts on
occasion in order to effect repairs.
As noted, all maintainers stated a lack of metric tools CQ5, Maintainers

Interview). Only one of these described the process of pounding sockets
onto bolts, but all the other maintainers present agreed that some crews had
done this.
6. There were problems getting some parts because incorrect stock numbers
appeared on illustrations in the TM (or stock numbers were copied
incorrectly onto requisition forms). Some parts were just not yet
available in local supply due to the newness of the MlAl at Fort bliss.
This comment also was obtained in response to Q1l of the Unit/TD Interview
and Q6, Maintainers Interview.
Several maintainers collaborated in describing problems they had

encountered obtaining some replacement parts because the wrong part was
ordered. There was disagreement as to the specific cause; whether the NSN
was wrong in the TM parts list, or copied wrong on the requisition. No
specific example was cited.
7. There were problems with STE-MIAl (from OTEA report Table 3-68).
Even though not asked about STE-MIAl specifically, a number of TCs

indicated there had been problems with this equipment. Q9, Unit/TD
Interview dealt specifically with test equipment. STE was considered a
problem.
"Was the troop/squadron's maintenance operation effective in terms of: test

equipment?"
Q1l, Unit/TD Interview Yes 7 No 16

A supplemental interview guide was prepared after the first crew

debriefings to obtain more detailed information about STE-MIAl. This was
done as a result of complaints heard from crews, maintainers and Unit/TD
personnel during April and May 1987.
During the interviews several maintainers stated that more work could be
done by crews that was now reserved for maintenance personnel. This was in
response to Q15, Maintainers Interview; about changes needed to improve
maintenance effectiveness (Yes 16; No 3), however, about half of the
TC/Gunners interviewed proposed letting crews do more in response to Q7,
"Were there enough maintenance personnel available?" Yes 16; No 17.
D-3
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S crew Debriefings on "Support and Test Equipment"
(OTEA Report Table 3-64).
Opinions:
1. Some M27 boresight devices were calibrated for 105mm, not 120mm guns.
This comment was made by two gunners in the initial post-ARTEP crew
debriefing. Additional support was provided by comments made by our sample
data collectors during the Unit/TD interviews in response to question
numbers 2 and 3 on the TC/Gunner and Unit/TD interviews, respectively.
2. HETs were too slow, we can road march to the field in 45 minutes; HET takes
3-4 hours.
Comment made by one TC in response to Q6, TC/Gunner Interview, "Did you

notice any problems when the heavy equipment transporter (HET) was used?"
Yes 5; No 24.
3. There are weight problems; blew three HET tires the other day loading an
MiAl onto the truck.
4. HET tire pressure must be maintained at between 90 lbs. Any more or less
pressure will produce blowouts; in other words, there is only a 6 lb
tolerance. Drivers must constantly check air pressure in the tires.
(Opinions 3 &4). Both of these comments were repeated by the NCOIC of the
squadron support platoon, the squadron motor officer, and squadron
maintenance NCO.
"Did you note any HET operation problems?"
Q1l, Unit/TD Interview Yes 13 No 9

"Are your transportation assets satisfactory during field operations?"
Q2, Supply Personnel Interview Yes 5 No 7
5. The M88A1 is inadequate. It does not have the power, weight, or durability
to be either safe or reliable for recovery of M1A1 tanks. There aren't
enough M88A1s authorized to use one as a braking vehicle as required by SOP
when operating in uneven terrain. When the post-ARTEP data collection was
being conducted, all but one squadron-level M88A1 was deadlined due to
transmission failures caused by recovering M1Als (per squadron motor
officer).
This opinion was expressed by both the squadron motor officer and the
squadron maintenance NCO. All the maintenance personnel interviewed
agreed. When the posttest interview of the squadron maintenance personnel
was conducted, the motor officer pointed out that all but one of the M88A1s
on had were deadlined due to damaged five trains (transmission and/or drive
shaft) due to the extra weight of the MIAI.
D-4
6. Maintainers liked the "breakout box" tester; about half of those
interviewed also liked the STE-MiAl; the rest did not. This comment was
obtained in response to Q4, STE-MIAl Supplemental Questions, "What is your
preferred method of troubleshooting?" STE-MIAl (13); Breakout Box (6).
7. Most maintainers interviewed and some tank crew members stated that the
maintenance allocation chart (MAC) should be reviewed because there are
some maintenance tasks now performed by unit or squadron-level personnel
that crews could accomplish. This would allow some disabled vehicles to be
returned to operational status more rapidly. Specific examples were not
given.
D-5
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings on "Problems on Technical
Manuals" (OTEA Report,Table 3-65).
General: All responses provided for this table were obtained in a question
such as "Are the task performance procedures in TM 9-2350-264-10-1,2,3 easy
to read, understand and use?"

Q1O, Driver Interview Yes 20 No 0
Q11, Unit/TD Interview Yes 7 No 16 (reverse wording concerning
ease)
and Q14, Are there any problems with the maintenance manuals you have been
furnished for the MIAl?" Yes 4 No 19
Opinions:
1. Manuals do not have all the MIAl - specific changes.
About half the crew members interviewed stated they did not always get the
new issue of MIAl-specific changes in a timely manner.
2. None of the manuals are up to date.
One driver made this statement.
3. There should be a separate manual for MIAl.
One driver made this comment; other crew members who heard this comment
concurred (7 other persons).
4. The manuals are not rugged enough, should have plastic pages like other job
aids.
This comment was made by four maintenance personnel who observed that they
were prone to destroy the manuals while working on the tanks. Wind blows
the pages loose; the pages become covered with grease, oil, etc.
5. Breechblock-firing pin repair descriptions are confusing; they illustrate an

upside-down installation, causing broken firing pins. It doesn't mention
opening the breech to insert the firing tester.
This problem was described in a round-about way by crew members who

commented that there had been a number of main gun firing pin failures.
Investigation by HF personnel discovered that the cause was incorrect
installation/breechblock reassembly. The sample data collectors
interviewed stated that incorrect assembly was caused by an erroneous
illustration in the TM. This illustration was shown to the HF interviews.
D-6
6. Used the checklist instead; it was good.
This comment was made in response to G2, TC/Gunner Interview. Made by one
TC (refers to FC 17-12-lAI).
7. The maintenance manuals:
a. Too many.
b. Too bulky.
c. Foldouts are too large.
d. Too much reference to one or more additional manuals to complete a
particular maintenance task.
e. The parts number/NSN for ordering replacement parts, along with correct
nomenclature, should be printed on the same page as the Th's
illustrated task performance descriptions. Troops now must look up
parts data separately; this causes delays and parts requisition errors
which could be avoided.
Maintainers were the only group asked about the maintenance manuals (Q14,
Maintainers Interview). Items 7a-e were demonstrated to the HF
Interviewers by "M" Company maintainers (4 persons) in the motor pool while
actually using the manuals to perform the task of replacing a recuperator
in an MlA1 engine. Each observation was valid in that the reference from
one manual to another, the manual size, and the need to spread out
illustrations on the oily floor added significantly to the time spent
trying to accomplish the task. Additionally, the pages got oil-soaked and
became hard to read. The need to further refer to other charts to obtain
part numbers added an additional distractor to task performance.
D-7
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings regarding "Problems on
TMDE/STE" (OTEA Report, Table 3-68).
Opinions:
1. The maintenance data key locks up.
2. STE-MiAl has only one NBC system test. The pressure gauge needed to test
the NBC system are not incorporated in any of the current equipment.
Made in response to Q4, Maintainers Interview, regarding test equipment.

Comment made by one troop maintenance NCO.
3. STE-Mi gives false indications. 'Often when a "faulty" component was

replaced, it again tested bad. When the actual problem was found, several
parts which subsequently proved good had been replaced as having been
defective. The majority of maintenance personnel stated that STE-M1Al was
accurate about 75-80% of the time. However, all mechanics in one troop
(five persons) stated that their STE-M1Al was faulty, worked correctly
less than 20% of the time.
Response to Q4, Maintainers INterview. All maintainers interviewed agreed

that STE-M1Al gives false indications. The only area of disagreement about
this concerned the percentage of the time that the false indications
occurred. Only five persons thought the STE-M1Al accuracy was 20% or less
(as noted in the comment). All maintainers agreed that high temperatures
cause STE-M1Al to become ineffective.
4. All maintenance personnel stated that STE-M1Al is too bulky, is difficult

to transport, and takes too long for hookup and testing. One troop
maintenance NCO stated that using STE-MiAl often results in exceeding
current doctrinal time allowances for operational status. This factor
might necessitate a review of these time limits. Another comment was that
due to size and time requirements the STE-M1Al should not be deployed
forward of squadron field trains. Due to the nature of cavalry operations,
the battlefield is less linear that is the case for armor battalions which
are part of a brigade or division. Consequently, cavalry squadron disabled
vehicles are apt to be found at more widely scattered locations. This
necessitates recovery of vehicles to a more centralized location to
optimize the employment of test and repair assets.
The detailed comments concerning STE-M1Al were in response to Q6, STE-M1Al

Supplemental Interview Questions: "What is wrong with the STE?" All
agreed that STE was too bulky and hard to move to forward locations; most
maintainers also indicated that hookup and testing took too long, but three
or four did not agree with this comment. One maintainer observed that
waiting for engine components to cool enough to test was a major contributor
to increased maintenance time. While this observation is not STE-specific,
it could contribute to a perception of an STE deficiency which is due to
another factor.
D-8
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings regarding "Rearm, Refuel,
Resupply" (OTEA Report, Table 3-87).
Opinions:
1. Fuel supply was inadequate. There are enough fuelers if all are
operational. There should be five more fuelers, one each per troop/company
and squadron support platoon. "We have to resupply personnel
carrier/fighting vehicles (M3s) and self-propelled howitzers as well as
MIAls".
Comment concerning fuel resupply deficiency was in response to the question

"Where forward resupply operations adequate to keep your tank supplied with
fuel, rations, and ammo?"
QiO, TC/Gunner Interview Yes 15 No 18

"Were the forward resupply operations able to sustain the required tempo of
combat operations?"
Q12, Unit/Interview Yes 6 No 17
"Did your section have enough trucks to keep the unit's supplies moving
forward adequately during field operations?"
Qi, Supply Personnel Interview

Fuel Yes 6 No 6
The squadron commander stated that there were enough fuel trucks in the
TOE, provided all were operational. (Equipment readiness 100%.) Both the
squadron executive officer and the support platoon leader stated that the
squadron needed a 50% increase in fuel trucks, since they never had a 100%
available rate of authorized vehicles.
2. The resupply capabilities are not adequate for sustained operations. Tne
support platoon personnel who participated in the ARTEP (12 persons) all
concurred that the platoon needed about 50% more personnel and
transportation resources. Specifically mentioned was the problem
experienced by the support platoon in refueling contaminated vehicles.
There are not trained decontamination personnel in the platoon; not are
there sufficient personnel of any type to perform this task as an
additional duty and still refuel MIAls in a timely manner. The problem is
significantly compounded if the support platoon is at MOPP-IV.
Comment concerning inadequacy of resupply capabilities to support sustained

operations was made by one person, a company commander. The comment
concerning the decontamination requirement was made by the support platoon
NCOIC; all members of the support platoon who were interviewed concurred
with observation.
D-9
3. Ammo was a problem due to a bad lot; one instance of a reported swollen
120m round which would not chamber.
One loader reported a swollen round which would not chamber (QI, Leader
Interview). The bad lot of ammo was brought to HF personnel's attention by
the Deputy Test Director who described the problem: primer tubes blowing
off of the brass case heads when the round was fired.
D-1O
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings regarding "Supply Vehicle
Operation and Maintenance" (OTEA Report, Table 3-90).
Opinions:
1. A lot of the time HMMTs are deadlined. A truck maintenance problem.
This comment was made by the Support Platoon leader (one person). (Q2,
Supply Personnel Interview).
2. Supply vehicles can't keep up with the MIAls; they move too fast.
Sometimes tanks would operate for 10-12 hours before they could be
refuelled.
This observation was made by the Support Platoon leader (one person). (Q2,
Supply Personnel Iute,-view).
D-11
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings regarding "120mm Ammunition
Problems" (OTEA Report, Table 3-92).
General: All these comments, except for 4 below, were made by loaders in
response to questions 1-3, Loader Debriefing.
Opinions:
1. One round seemed a little oversized but it chambered.
Made by one loader.
2. Stick with combustible ammo.
Suggested by one loader; the rest of the loaders interviewed agreed that the
caseless ammo was better than the type used before (105mm metallic).
3. One swollen round of 120mm ammo was reported which could not be chambered.
No one interviewed was certain of the cause.
Reported by one loader.
4. Ammunition with scratches or nicks was classified unserviceable when it was

not actually cracked through the case. A clear understanding of actual
unserviceability must be gained by ordnance personnel, supply personnel and
tank crews.
Comments expressed by the Squadron Commander and Executive Officer during

interview in response to Q14 of the Key Unit/TD Personnel Interview.
D-12
J
Comment/Opinion Data From HF&S Crew Debriefings on NBC (OTEA Report, Table
3-93).
Opinions:
1. Filters clog up too much, then it doesn't work. The backup NBC system in
our tank didn't work at all.
Comment made by one tank commander in response to Q12, TC/Gunner Interview,

"Were you able to operate the NBC system by using the instructions in
Tt9-2350-264-1O-1, 2 & 3?" Yes 33; No 0. This problem may have been limi-
ted to one vehicle. No other comments of this specific nature were obtained.
2. Our unit NBC SOP needs to be revised to conform to the MiAl capabilities
and characteristics.
Made by one company commander in regard to his unit's NBC SOP, in response
to Q13, TC/gunner INterview, "Was your unit's NBC SOP effective?" Yes 26;
No 3. Note that while drivers answered Yes 11; No 4; to the same question,
loader response (Q11, Loader Interview) was somewhat different: Yes 18; No
0; Don't know, 3. Additionally, Key Unit/TD personnel responded to Q16,
"Did any crews have problems complying with unit SOP regarding NBC system
employment?" as follows: Yes 6; No 6; "Had no SOP"; 11.
3. About 60% of all crews did not use the NBC system during the FOE (2 Test
Directorate personnel).
Opinion expressed by two Test Directorate NCOs in response to Q15 and Q16,
KeyL| Unit/TD Interview. |
4. They only taught us how to turn it off and on, not how it works or how to
troubleshoot the NBC system when it quits. (Comment made by a number of
tank crew members and several maintainers. Supported by Test Directorate
samiple data collectors interviewed.)
Comment made in response to NBC system questions cited above.
5. Although there were no reported injuries caused by the MlAl or any

associated equipment during the FOE the following warning appears on page
2-373, change 4, TM902350-264-10-2, received while the FOE was in progress:
WARNING
"Protective mask and filter unit will not protect against carbon
monoxide. The mask and filter unit will only get rid of odors which
would normally indicate the presence of carbon monoxide."
This carbon monoxide poisoning hazard was one of the serious deficiencies
identified during the MIEl OT II conducted in 1985. It appears that this
deficiency has not been corrected.
Observation made by Test Directorate HF personnel at the time of receipt of
Change 4, TM 9-2350-264-10-2 at the Fort Bliss Field Office, USAOTEA.
D-13
APPENDIX E
HF&S FINDINGS TO USAOTEA FOE FINAL REPORT
This section would have been entitled MANPRINT if a full and complete
MANPRINT evaluation of the MIAI had been conducted as a part of the FOE.
Specifically, no attempt was made to do a thorough study of (a) the personnel
strength authorizations contained in TOE 17-55J, or (b) the appropriateness of
the task performance capabilities of the MOSs available within the test
squadron. Additionally, the New Equipment Training (NET) sufficiency question
was addressed only subjectively by way of opinions obtained in tank crew
debriefings, key personnel interviews, and questionnaires.
Table E-1 contains a list of test report data requirements which were
either assigned to the FOE staff HF&S representative for investigation by the
OTEA Test Director, or for which the HF&S representative assumed an
investigative responsibility without being specifically tasked to do so.
HF&S data obtained has been entered in a separate data base. This data is
arranged according to pertinent test report data requirement paragraph numbers
and can be accessed in a number of ways, e.g., DR para no., or by "HF&S Data
Reference Code" number. (See Table E-3.) Table E-4 shows the numbers of
persons from whom data have been obtained.
The preponderance of investigation in MANPRINT areas during the FOE was

focused upon the man-machine interface, health hazard and safety issues; the
HF&S data collection effort produced information applicable to test issues
addressed in the body of the report as well as those which appear nowhere in
the report outside of this appendix. Specifically, information was solicited
about previously identified deficiencies of the MIA1 which were not encompassed
within the OTEA definition of materiel pattern failures (see Tables E-2 and
E-7).
Tables E-5 through E-8 contain comments/opinions obtained during crew

debriefings which did not specifically pertain to tables in the body of the
report.
E-1
Table E-1
MiAl HF&S Data Collection Matrix
Source Writing
DR Para Title Method Group Responsibility
2.1.4.5 Crew ability to follow IQO C,L,S,T Shared

calibration procedures S,G
2.1.4.6 Crew opinions on calibration I,Q,G C,L,S Total

and hitting performance
2.1.4.17 Record/report all safety I,Q,O C,L,S Total

related incidents D,S,G M
2.2.6.14 Adequacy of technical manuals IQO C,L,T Total

D,S,G T,M
2.2.6.21 Effects of terrain/environ- 1,0 C,L,M Shared

ment of recovery operations D,S S
2.2.6.22 Observed difficulties in I,O,D C,L,M Total

recovery operations S,G S
2.2.6.23 Opinions, adequacy of M88A1 I,Q,D C,L,M Total

for recovery/towing MiAl S
2.2.6.26 Observed road types/conditions I,O,D C,L,M Shared

for transporter S,G S
2.2.6.29 Problems with HET operations I,O,Q C,L,M Shared

S,G S
2.2.6.30 Adequacy of maintenance I,O,Q C,L,M Total

organization D,S,G S
2.2.6.31 Overall maintenance problems I,O,Q C,L,M Total

D,S,G S
2.2.6.32 Adequacy, quantity, type use- 1,0 C,L,M Shared

fulness of support test D,S T,S
equipment (opinion)
2.2.6.34 Availability of support IQO C,M Shared

equipment (causes of non- S S
availability)
2.2.6.36a/b STE/Mi fault isolation IOS L,M Shared

success/failure/causes G S
E-2
Table E-1, cont'd
Source Writing
2.2.6.37 Observed difficult with I,O,S C,L,M Shared

equipment G S,T
2.2.6.38 Opinions, adequacy of test I,Q,S L,M Shared

set operations, tech manuals, G S,T
tools sets
2.2.6.42 Type, number of vehicles IOS C,L,M Shared

2.2.6.46 required G S,T,U
2.2.6.45 Adequacy of resources to re- I,Q,O C,L,S,T Shared

arm, refuel/resupply in the S, U
field
2.2.6.46 See 2.2.6.42 (adequacy, type/

number of supply vehicles)
2.2.6.47 Observed adequacy, type/ IOS L,M,S Total

number of supply personnel G T,U
2.2.6.48 Observed adequacy of operators O,S,G L,M,S Total

on hand to operate/maintain
supply vehicles
2.2.6.49 Observed problems chambering Q,S,G C,L,S Total

120m round due to moisture
2.2.6.50 Observed damage to 120mm Q,S,G S,T Total

round from handling G
2.2.6.51 Observed casing defects prior I,Q,S C,S,U Shared

to loading 120m
2.2.6.52 Observed 120mm unpacking/ IS L,U Shared

repacking problems
2.2.6.56 Problems correcting equipment I,O,D CM Shared

failures
2.2.6.57 Observed new pattern failures IOS C,L,M Shared

C S,T
2.2.6.58 Record/report all safety See 2.1.4.17

related incidents
E-3
Table E-1, cont'd
Source Writing
2.3.4.1 Observed adequacy of instruc- IQ,O C,LS Shared

tions (TM, FCetc.) permitting S,G T
the crew to operate the on-
board NBC system effectively
2.3.4.2 Observed adequacy of ins~ruc- 0 T Total

tions for readability, execut-
ability, and understanding
2.3.4.3 Observed availability of QO C,L,S Total

instructions for each tank S,G
crew and company/troop/
squadron staff element
2.3.4.4 Observed ability of crew to 1,0 L,S,T Shared

put the instructions to use S,G
in an NBC environment
2.3.4.5 Observed ability of the crew to 1,0 L,S,T Shared

use the NBC system properly S,G
during a no-notice NBC attack
without referring to instructions
2.3.4.6 Observed ability of the crew L,O L,S Total

to properly use the backup S,G
NBC system
2.3.4.7 Adequacy of instructions to I,Q,O C,L,S Total

state conditions in which NBC S,G T
system is to be used
2.3.4.8 Observed ability of the crew 1,0 L,S Shared

to properly use the system S,C
during NBC tactical operations
(firing, open hatch, closed
hatch, silent watch, road march)
2.3.4 Record/report any NBC system I,Q,O C,L,S Total

added related safety incident S,G M,U,T
2.3.4a See paras 2.1.4.6; 2.2.6.14;

(1),(2),(3) 2.2.6.30 thru 2.2.6.38; and
2.3.4.1 thru 2.3.4.9, above
E-4
Note 1. "OTEA DR" means OTEA Data Requirement, and is carried forward from the
UEC!Iest Report
Note 2. "Collection Method" identifies which of six collection methodologies

was employed. The meaning of the six code letters is as follows:
I - structured interview by HF staff.

Q - questionnaire administered by HF staff.
0 - observation of field operations and examination of documentation by HF
staff.
D - debriefing of crew upon mission or task completion (post-ARTEP).
S - sample Data Collectors observation.
G - general narrative comment form.
Note 3. "Information Source" refers to six sources of information via six code
values, whose meanings are as follows:
C - tank crew performance.

L - Unit leaders (Cmds, PLT ldrs, etc.)
S - sample data collectors.
T - Test dliectoraLe staff personnel.
H - Maintenance personnel.
U - Unit supply personnel.
Note 4. "Writing Responsibility." Where the contractor HF&S staff did all of
the writing regarding a Data Requirement, the term "total" appears in the
column. When both OTEA and contractor staff contributed to the writing, the
term "shared" appears.
E-5
Table E-2
Previously Identified HF&S Findings
Reported in:
HFEA
Finding MI OT III MIEl OT II HEL FOE
1. Lack of means for removing CO from

turret if main NBC system fails.
(Outside air source for backup
system?) x x
2. Problems removing unfired round form

120mm due to loading ramp design x x
3. Tracking problem, TC's .50 MG.

(Controls too sensitive, hard to
coordinate.) x x
4. No provision for human waste elimination/

disposal during prolonged buttoned-up
operations. x x x
5. Inadequate storage for personal gear x x x x
6. CVC helmet gives inadequate hearing

protection, particularly with main
NBC system ON. x
7. Variable effectiveness of microclimate

cooling system. x x x
8. No "autobahn seat" for commander for

long-term hatch open travel. x x x
9. Need improved access to "semiready"
ammo rack. x x
10. Difficulty using sights with masks on. x x x
11. Gunner's shoulder padding (on main gun

sight) too thin. x x x
12. Ammo case bases separate from
handling (120mm). x x
13. Spontaneous firing of laser rangefinder. x x
14. Difficulty opening/closing hull stowage

compartment doors. x
E-6
Table E-2, cont'd
Reported in:
HFEA
Finding MI OT III MIEl OT II HEL FOE
15. Difficulty understanding speech over

intercom. (Worse when NBC system ON.) x x x
16. Slipping of manual breech opening

handle (manual operation). x
17. TC power handle location makes target

handoff to gunner slower than required
(needs to be raised). x x x
18. No bypass switch to override the

automatic engine (low oil pressure)
shutdown. x x
19. Driver's steering control adjustment pin

is difficult to use and unreliable
(vibrates loose). x x x
20. Driver's seat does not give adequate

back support. x x x
21. Driver's vision block wipers are

ineffective x x x
22. Driver's side vision viewer is

marginal. x x x
23. Driver's night vision viewer is

marginal. x x x
24. Driver's workspace is too small for

most drivers. x x
25. Turret must be traversed to fill front

fuel tanks. x x
26. Inadequate brow pad on GPS. x
27. Difficulty loading TC-s .50 MG. x x
28. Difficulty positioning and aiming

loader's MG. x x
29. Crew did not know location of NBC

air valve; could be blocked, causing
shutdown of system. x
E-7
Table E-3
HF&S Data Reference Code
Data Codes (5 fields)

Reference HF&S HF&S MIAI
Category Primary OTEA Report Table Component
Field 1 2 3
Code: 0 Not Applicable 0 N/A A. GPS

A. Training & Training Aids A. Table 3-55 B. Ballistic Computer
(NET) B. Table 3-62 C. MRS
B. Safety & Health Hazards C. Table 3-63 D. TIS
C. Manpower D. Table 3-64 E. GASRV
D. Crew Station design E. Table 3-65 F. Laser RNGFDR
E. Communications F. Table 3-68 G. Main Gun
G. Controls & Displays G. H. Coax MG
H. Anthropometric & H. Table 3-87 I. Main NBC system
Biomechanics I. Table 3-88 J. Backup NBC system
I. Environment J. Table 3-89 K. Driver's station
J. Personnel K. Table 3-90 L. Loader's station
K. Maintainability L. Table 3-92 M. 120mm ammo storage
L. Logistics M. Table 3-93 N. 120mm ammo
M. Other N. Not assigned 0. BITE/STE-Mi
N. 0. Other P. Repair parts/tools
0. P. Prey Id's Q. Operator's printed
P. problem instructions
Q. Q. Not assigned R. Maintainer's
R. Not assigned R. Not assigned printed
S. S. Health/Safety instructions
T. T. Training S. Maintenance
U. organization
V. T. Supply
W. organization
X. U. Transportation
Y. assets
Z. V. Supply assets
W.
X. Not assigned
Y.
Z.
-------------------------------------------------------------
E-8
Table E-3 cont'd
Reference
Category Issue/subissue Critical Task
Field 4. 5.
Code: 0 Not Applicable A. Activate gunner's station

1. Calibrate MiAl Main Gun (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
2. Operator NBC Protection B. Prepare GPS for boresighting
3. Materiel defect (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
4. Refuel/rearm C. Prepare ballistic computer/MRS
5. Replace component (TM9-2350-264-10-2)
6. Evacuate vehicle/component D. Boresight main gun
7. Previously identified problem (FC 17-12-lAl, APP A)
8. New Problem (materiel) E. Conduct live-fire screening tests
9. Other (FC 17-12-1A1, APP A)
F. Operate main NBC system
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
G. Use protection mask
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
H. Operate turret vent
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
I. Operate NBC backup system
(TM9-2350-264-10-2)
J. Rearm/stow 120mm ammo
K. Transfer 120mm ammo
L. Pack/unpack 120mm ammo pallets
M. Chamber 120mm rounds
N. Isolate faults- STE-Mi
0. Remove/replace components
P. Correct faults - repair
Q. Drive
R. Communicate
S. PMCS
T. Operate machineguns
U. Refuel tank
V. Handoff target to gunner (TC)
W. Engage targets - machineguns
X. Operate microclimate system
Y. Acquire targets
Z. Other
E-9
Table E-4
Number of Responses Collected by Category
Comment/Opinion Data
Interview Data Collected:
Staffa SDC TCsb Gunners Drivers Loaders Maint Supply
SQD HQ 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 12
TD PERS 2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0
*M CO 1 0 13 9 11 3 4 0
*I Troop 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0
**K Troop 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0
**L Troop 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 8 15 21 12 20 11 19 12
Questionnaire Data Collected From:
TCs Gunners Drivers Loaders
M CO 14 10 13 5
I Troop 7 7 5 6
K Troop 6 5 5 3
L Troop 5 3 11 3
TOTAL 32 27 34 I
aStaff includes commanders

bTCs include Co/TRP CDR, LY LDR
Note 1. "M" CO and I Troop figures include post-ARTEP debriefings
Note 2. No unit level ARTEPs were conducted for K-L troops. No post-ARTEP troops
debriefings were possible; K-L commanders were interviewed as part of the final
data collection effort.
E-10
Table E-5
Comments on Health and Safety Topics from Crew and Test Directorate Personnel
The NBC system exhaust on the left side of the tank is very hot, can
cause burns to personnel or possible fires
Dust fills the heater; this might cause dangerous fumes; we don't
know yet.
Hoffman device Lanyard-guards on turret rings.
My foot caught in the turret ring.
One can get hurt opening the loader's door.
The extension on the main gun breech causes tripping and bruising your
legs.
The ammo doors are too slow opening and closing.
Front fuel caps can't be kept open while fueling; hurt wrist trying
to refuel the tank.
The base stub deflector takes up too much room.
You can't keep your balance.
All eight loaders reported instances of dropped rounds or falling

while loading, particularly when vehicle is moving over rough
terrain.
Make sure turret power is off before you allow anyone on the deck
near the main gun. A touch of the gunner or TC's control handle can
cause the gun to "bounce" or jump - very dangerous.
E-11
Table E-6
Comments on Training Topics from Crew and Key Personnel
NET was good; instructors were good. (All respondents concurred)
Add a NET for the people who were already 19Ks. It doesn't make
sense to retrain those of us who have M1 experience on things that
are the same in both the M1 and the M1A1,
Also give some M1A1 training to the scout people; they have to work
with us and need to know about the M1A1, particularly the speed
factor.
Delete the part about the manuals; all TMs are pretty much the same.
(1 leader)
Screen the regiment; don't retrain 19Ks, concentrate on 19Es.
Need more thorough training on the NBC system in NET. (1 TD NCO; 3

TCs)
Need io be trained to break track. (2 drivers)
Need backup NBC system troubleshooting training; it didn't work and

we didn't know how to fix it. (1 TC)
Loaders should get more training on EL uncouple; u-ring handle has

to be in SAE to open breech, etc. (1 TC)
Delete the DTT course; it is not really necessary. (1 loader)
Have the U-COFT first, then gunnery. It is confusing to alternate.

Each crew should go through U-COFT before operating the actual tank.
(1 loader, 1 TC)
Maintainers wanted to work on tanks with actual rather than

artificially created problems as the hands-on part of NET.
Not enough emphasis on tactical planning before an operation. (Not

MIAl comment)
Note. The comments/opinions above were obtained in crew debriefings and

end-of-test structured interviews of Test Directorate personel,
company/troop commanders, squadron commander and staff personnel.
E-12
Table E-7
Previously Identified Human Factors Deficiencies
NBC system does not protect against CO gas.
The NBC system was so loud it interfered with intercom. (2 respondents)

Radios don't allow operation of two secure nets. (All commanders)
Radios are inadequate; failed too often.
Need autobahn seat for tank commanders.
Driver's seat is uncomfortable for long periods of use.
Steering control adjustment pin vibrates loose. 0I respondent)
Hard to aim while wearing ventilated facepiece. (Not MIAl specific

problem)
Note. The comments/opinions shown above pertain to specific human factors

problems identified in previous testing of the M1 or MIAl.
E-13
Table E-8
Comments on M1A1 System Components
Gun and fire control system are basically OK, but I noticed that there is
considerable drift due to the Stab system, which has to be constantly
corrected out about every 15 minutes or so. DS maintenance hasn't been
able to do anything about this. (All gunners concurred that this is true;
they said drift is worse than the M60's 105mm.)
Seat hard to move. (Loader)
Get rid of the loader's seat. (1 loader, 2 troop commanders)
All air must be out of the hydraulics of the 120mm gun to preclude
inaccuracies.
Note. The comments'and opinions shown above were obtained in crew debriefings
and structured interviews.
E-14
ENCLOSURE 1
RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW ITEMS, SUMMED ACROSS PARTICIPANTS
Explanation
In the remaining pages of this appendix, copies of the various interview

forms have been reproduced that contain the participant totals and subtotals as
they responded to the various items. The responses are given separately for
the different categories of respondents.
Raw data - the individual comments and responses by participant to the

various interview and questionnaire items - are presented in this document.
These responses were input to a dBase III+ and written on a floppy disk by
Essex contractor personnel.
E-15
MIAI FOLLOW-ON EVALUATION
The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify difficulties you experienced

operating the MIAI tank during the testing just conducted. Please take as much
time as you wish and give us narrative comments on subjects you think
appropriate. Particular emphasis should be placed upon evaluating the
calibration of the main gun system. In order to help us assess your answers, we
need some information about your experience in the M1 tank. There are no right
or wrong answers to any of the questions. Out purpose is to discover as much
as we can about the MIAI system--good and bad.
SAMPLE
E-16
SAMPLE
MIAl FOE
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET
PART I
Date:
1. Player Name: 2. SSN:
3. Position: TC G LDR DR MAINT SUPP
Other (specify)
4. Tank No.
5. Height:_ 6. Weight: 7. Ages:

Feet Inches Lbs Years
8. Grade/Rank: E-. 0- 9. Time in Svc: (Yrs) (Mos)
10. Unit: (circle one): M60 I trp K trp L trp
Yrs Mos
11. Primary MOS: 12. Time in Pri MOS:

13. Secondary MOS: 14. Time in See MOS:
15. Duty MOS: 16. Time in Dut MOS:
17. How many weeks have you been working with the M1 tanks? (weeks)
18. How many days have you been working with the M1 tanks? (days)
19. Please estimate the number of hours of MIAl training you have had:
a. Transition
b. NET (individual)
c. NET (crew/collective)
d. OJT
20. Civilian Education Level: (Circle number that applies)
1. No High School Diploma 5. 1-2 years of college

2. GED 6. 3-4 years of college
3. High School Graduate 7. College Graduate
4. Trade School Graduate 8. Advanced Degree
21. Degree (major) or Trade (specialty):
22. Do you wear prescribed glasses or contacts _: If yes, why? (To correct
what specific vision problem)
Seeing close (reading) Seeing far (driving) Astigmatism
Other
E-17
SAMPLE
23. If you have ever had an eye injury, please explain:
24. Have you ever had any hearing problems? : If Yes, explain:
25. Have you ever had any problem with your arms, legs, hands, neck, and/or
torso that made it difficult or impossible for you to drive, lift/carry,
walk/run, or perform other motor activities : If Yes, explain:
26. Have you been sick or injured during or in the three months prior to this
test? : (Hospitalized or in quarters) If Yes, explain:
27. If you are taking any prescribed medication, please name it and tell why
you are taking it:
E-18
MiAl FOE
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET
PART II
1. Player No: __________________
2. Player Name: ____________________ _____
3.SSN: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
OBTAIN FOLLOWING FROM PERSONNEL RECORDS:
ASYAB Score____ GT Score____ EL Score____
GM Score____ Latest SQT Score____
S AMP L E
E-1 9
UNIT I Troop; M Co
TC/GUNNER INTERVIEW
The purpose of this debriefing is to learn if you experienced any problems with
the MiAl concerning main gun boresighting and zeroing; maintaining and
supplying the tanks during field operations; using the NBC protection system;
and if you observed any safety problems operating, maintaining, or resupplying
units because of the MIA1 tank.
I am going to ask a series of questions relating to the functions I just

mentioned to guide our discussion; however, you should feel free to bring up
any other problems you think are important, even if there are no specific
questions asked about that subject.
(Record numbers of Yes/No responses; record the specific comments concerning

problems encountered.)
E-20
TC-GUNNER
1. (2.1.4.5): Were there any problem with the MIAl main gun calibration
procedures in APP A, FC 17-12-lAl? Yes No 33
2. (2.2.6.14): Are there any of the task performance procedures for main gun
operation described in FC 17-12-lAl that were hard to understand or use?
Yes No 33
3. (2.2.6.15): Are the task performance procedures in TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2,

and 3 easy to read, understand and use? Yes 22 No 11
4. (2.2.4.6): Overall, is the MIAI's main gun and associated fire

control/sighting system reliable, accurate? Yes 33 No
5. (2.2.6.21; 2.2.6.22; 2.2.6.23): Were there any problems recovering

disabled MIA; tanks? Yes 7 No 21
6. (2.2.6.26; 2.2.6.29): Did you notice any problems when the heavy
equipment transporter *HET) was used? Yes 5 No 24
7. (2.2.6.30): Were there enough maintenance personnel available?

Yes 16 No 17
8. (2.2.6.34): Was the maintenance operation organized so that test

equipment, tools, parts and qualified maintenance personnel were
always available in forward areas (e.g., company trains areas) when
needed to sustain combat operations? Yes 15 No 18
9. (2.2.6.38): Did the MIAl built-in test equipment (BITE) in the control
computer work correctly? Yes 27 No 6
10. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.45): Were the forward resupply operations adequate to

keep your tank supplied with fuel, rations and ammo? Yes 15 No 18
11. (2.2.6.47; 2.2.6.48): Did you observe any shortage of supply personnel or
trucks, etc., needed to keep supplies moving forward? Yes 6 No 27
12. (2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2): Were you able to operate the NBC system by using the
operating instructions in TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2 and 3? Yes 33 No __
13. (2.3.4.7): Was your unit's NBC SOP effective? Yes 26 No -3
14. (2.1.4.17; 2.2.6.58; 2.3.4): Do you know of any noise, vibration, smoke/
toxic fumes/gas, electrical shock, heat/cold, mechanical (moving parts,
hatch locks, wire/cables, etc.), or structural (edges, ledges, sharp
corners, etc.) safety hazards in the MIAl or its support equipment?
Yes 24 No 2
E-21
15. (2.1.4.17; 2.2.6.58; 2.3.4): Have you been injured, or do you know of a
person who has been injured, while participating in this test?
Yes 1 No 32
16. (P): Were there any operational task performance problems due to
difficulty communicating with other crew members because of engine/NBC
system noise levels? Yes 1 No 22
17. T): What should be added to the training program?
18. T): What would you delete from the training program?
19. CT): Are there any changes you would recommend for the M1A1 training
program? Yes 5 No 28
20. CT): Are you aware of any ARTEP task for which you or any other persons
were not sufficiently trained? Yes 3 No 30
E-22
UNIT I Troop; M Co
DRIVER DEBRIEFING
1. (P): Do you consider the seat satisfactory for driving for extended
periods? Yes 6 No 14
2. (P): Could you see well enough to drive safely using the vision blocks
and/or the night viewer? Yes 11 No 9
3. (P): Was there sufficient interior space for you to perform all your
driving tasks while buttoned-up?, Yes 20 No __
4. (P): Did you have enough storage space for your gear? Yes 3 No 17
5. P): Did your steering control adjustment pin cause trouble?

Yes 1 No 15
6. (2.2.6.15): Are the task performance procedures in TM9-2350-264-10-1,

2, 3 easy to read, understand and use? Yes 20 No
7, (2.2.6.21; 2.2.6.22; 2.2.6.23): Did you observe any problems recovering

disabled MIA1 tanks? Yes No 20
8. (2.2.6.26; 2.2.6.29): Did you observe any problems with the heavy
equipment transporter (HET) during the test? Yes No 20
9. (2.2.6.30): Were there enough maintenance personnel available?

Yes 13 No 7
equipment, tools, parts, and qualified maintenance personnel were
always available in forward areas (e.g., company trains area) when needed
to sustain combat operations? Yes 13 No 7
11. (2.2.6.38): Did the MiAl built-in problem warnings (lights) work
correctly? Yes 15 No -5
12. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.45): Were the forward resupply operations effective in

keeping your tank supplied with fuel, rations and ammo? Yes 11 No 9
trucks, etc., needed to keep supplies moving forward? Yes No 20
_
14. (2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2): Were the NBC system operating instructions in

TM9-2350-264-10-I, 2, & 3 easy to read and understand? Yes 20 No
15. (2.3.4.7): Was your Unit SOP regarding NBC system use sufficient?
Yes 11 No 4
E-23
16. (2.1.4.17; 2.2.6.58; 2.3.4): Do you know of any noise, vibration, smoke/
hatch locks, wire/cables, etc.), or structural (edges, ledges, sharp
corners, etc.) safety hazards in the M1A1 or its support equipment?
Yes 12 No 8
17. Have you been injured, or do you know of a person who has been injured,
while participating in this test? Yes No 20
19. T) What should be added to the training program?
20. T) What would you delete from the training program?
21. CT) Are there any changes you would recommend for the M1A1 training
program? Yes 3 No 17
22. T) Are you aware of any ARTEP task for which you or any other persons
E-24
UNIT I Troop; M Co
LOADER DEBRIEFING
1. (2.2.6.49): Did 120mm ammo cause any chambering problems? Yes 1 No 10

2. (2.2.6.50): Did you observe any damage to 120mm ammunition due to
handling? Yes No 11
3. (2.2.6.51): Did you find any defective 120mm round casings before
chambering a round? Yes No 11
4. (P): Were there any problems inserting or removing 120mm rounds form any
of the stowage tubes? Yes No 11
5. (P): Was there enough floor space for keeping a good solid footing or
maintaining your balanced while loading the main gun? Yes No 10
6. (P): Did loading/ammo handling cause problems while wearing MOPP IV

gear? Yes No 11

equipment, tools, parts and qualified maintenance personnel were
always available in forward areas (e.g., company trains area) when needed
to sustain combat operations? Yes 10 No 1
8. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.45): Were the forward resupply operations adequate to

keep your tank supplied with fuel, rations and ammo? Yes 6 No 5
trucks, etc., need to keep supplies moving forward? Yes No _
Not observed 11
10. (2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2): Were the NBC system operating instructions in

TM9-2350-264-I0-1, 2, & 3 easy to read and understand? Yes 11 No
11. (2.3.4.7): Was your Unit SOP regarding NBC system use satisfactory?
Yes 8 No __ Don't know 3
12. (2.1.4.17; 2.2.6.5;8; 2.3.4): Do you know of any noise, vibration, smoke/
hatch locks, wire/cables, etc.,) or structural (edges, ledges, sharp
corners, etc.) safety hazards in the MiAI or its support equipment?
Yes 3 No 8
13. Have you been injured, or do you know of a person who has been injured,
while participating in this test? Yes 6 No 4
E-25
_ J
15. (T) What should be added to the training program?
16. (T) What would you delete from the training program?
17. (T) Are there any changes you would recommend for the MIAl training
program? Yes 2 No 9
18. (T) Are you aware of any ARTEP task for which you or any other persons
were not sufficiently trained? Yes No 11
E-26
KEY UNIT LEADERS/TEST DIRECTORATE
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW OUTLINE
The purpose of this interview is to record any problems you identified during
the follow-on evaluation of the M1A1.
Areas of concern are:
a. Main gun calibration procedures.

b. Maintaining and resupplying MIA1 units.
c. Using the NBC protection system of the M1A1.
d. Significant safety hazards/problems you have identified associated
with operating, maintaining, and resupplying MlAl equipped units.
I am going to ask a series of questions relating to the functional areas just

mentioned; but these are not intended to limit your discussion of problems.
Please feel free to discuss any problem you believe important, even if there
are not specific questions about that subject.

E-27
UNIT/TD INTERVIEW
1. (2.1.4.5): Did you note any specific deficiencies in the new equipment
training (NET) given for the MIAl? Yes 9 No 13
2. (2.1.4.5): Could the crew understand and follow the task performance
instructions in App A, FC 17-12-lAl without difficulty? Yes 22 No 0
3. (2.1.4.5): Were crews able to perform the main gun calibration to time
and accuracy standards? Yes 19 No_3
4. (2.1.4.6): Did you note any situations in which targets were missed
because of an M1A1 main gun system accuracy problem? Yes 9 No 15
5. CM): Did you note any problems in the areas of command, control and
communications caused by the M1A1 or its support requirements?
Yes 17 No 6
6. (2.2.6.21; 2.2.6.22; 2.2.6.23): Did you note any problems recovering

M1Al? Yes 7 No 15
7. Did you note any HET operations problems? Yes 13 No 9
Was the squadron's/troop's maintenance operation effective in terms of:
8. (2.2.6.30): Personnel authorization? Yes 10 No 13
9. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Test equipment? Yes 7 No 16
10. (2.2.6.3;0; 2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Tools (type and availability)?

Yes 8 No 15
11. (2.2.6.3;0; 2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Spares and replacements?

Yes 2 No 21
12. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.45): Were the forward resupply operations able to

sustain the required tempo of combat operations. Yes 6 No 17
13. (2.2.6.47; 2.2.6.48): Were there any TOE deficiencies in the combat
service support resources caused by the change to the M1Al?
Yes 12 No 11
E-28
14. (2.2.6.49; 2.2.6.51; 2.2.6.52): Do you know of any problems caused by the
design, packaging, handling, or transportation of the "caseless" 120mm
main gun ammunitions? Yes 2 No 17
15. (2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2): Did any crews have difficulty reading, understanding,
or using the NBC system operating instructions in TM9-2350-264-1, 2 &3?
Yes 7 No 16
16. (2.3.4.7): Did any crews have problems complying with unit SOP regarding
NBC equipment employment? Yes 6 No 6 (11 "had no SOP")
17. (2.1.4.17; 2.2.6.58; 2.3.4): Do you know of any noise, vibration,

smoke/toxic fumes/gas, electrical shock, heat/cold, mechanical (moving
parts, hatch locks, wire/cables, etc.), or structural (edges, ledges,
sharp corners, etc.) safety hazards in the M1Al or its support equipment?
Yes 13 No 10
18. Are you aware of any injuries to personnel during this FOE period
attributable to the M1Al or its associated support equipment?
Yes 0 No 23
difficulty communicating with other crew members because of engine?NBC
20. (T): What should be added to the training program?

"Nothing" 5
"More TTS training" 1
"More extensive individual training" 1
"Don't know" 1
21. What would you delete from the training program?

"Nothing" 17
"Delete DTT" 2
"Don't know" 3
22. (T): Are there any changes you would recommend for the MIAl training
D grams? Yes 4 No 19
23. (T): Are you aware of any ARTEP task for which you or any other persons
E-29
MAINTAINER'S INTERVIEW GUIDE
The purpose of this interview is to try to identify problems and

deficiencies which have occurred in maintenance support operations because of
the changeover to the MIAI tank and its associated support equipment.
Questions will be asked about:
a. Adequacy of maintenance personnel authorizations.

b. Adequacy of maintenance organization/procedures.
c. Sufficiency of test equipment, tools, and parts resupply.
d. Sufficiency of maintenance publications.
The questions are intended to guide the discussion. If you think of

something else that needs to be brought out, please don't hesitate; all
information we nan get helps.
E-30
p
1. (2.2.6.21; 2.2.6.22; 2.2.6.23): Did you note any problems recovering
M1AI? Yes 10 No 9
2. Did you note any HET operations problems? Yes 5 No 14
Was the maintenance operation satisfactory in terms of:
3. (2.2.6.30): Personnel authorization? Yes 16 No 3
4. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Test equipment? Yes 2 No 17
5. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Tools (type and availability)?

Yes 10 No 9
6. (2.2.6.302.2.6.31; 2.2.6.32): Spares and replacements? Yes 13 No 6
7. (2.2.6.34): Number and types of maintenance support vehicles?

Yes 8 No 11
8. (2.2.6.32; 2.2.6.36): Are the M1A1 fault indicator lights, gauges, etc.,
adequate? Yes 12 No 7
9. Do the built-in warning lights give false indications? Yes 12 No 7
10. (2.2.6.32): Do the crews usually react correctly to the warning

indicators? Yes 19 No 0
11. (2.2.6.32; 2.2.6.36 a/b)): Does the following BITE indications help you
diagnose and isolate malfunctions quickly? Yes 19 No 0
12. (2.2.6.35 a/b): Is the STE/Mi test equipment you have sufficient to
support sustained operations? Yes 6 No 13
13. (2.2.6.35 a/b): Were there any significant failures of the STE/Mi?
Yes 18 No 1
14. (2.2.6.38): Are there any problems with the maintenance manuals you have
been furnished for the MIAI? Yes 11 No 8
E-31
15. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.27; 2.2.6.38): Is there anything that needs to be
changed about organization, procedures, equipment or supply operations to
improve the effectiveness of M1A1 maintenance? Yes 16 No 3
attributable to the M1A1 or its associated support equipment?
Yes 7 No 12
E-32
MAINTAINER SUPPLEMENTAL STE-MIAl QUESTIONS
In addition, maintenance personnel were asked the following questions

specifically concerning STE-MIAl:
1. Have you used the STE since the MIAl's arrived? Yes 19 No __
Comments:
None
2. Is the STE usually available at your field maintenance sites when you need
it? Yes 19 No
Comments:
None
3. What alternate troubleshooting procedures are available to you?
Comments:
Breakout box; Swing test
4. What is your preferred method of troubleshooting?
Comments:
STE-MI (13)
Breakout box (6)
5. What do you like about the STE?
Comments:
It is only comprehensive testing available (1 maintainer).
6. What is wrong with the STE?
Comments:
Too bulky (19).

Too complex and time consuming to hook up and run a test (6).
Doesn't easily isolate a specific fault component (23).
Gives false indications (about 50% said 80% accurate; 50% said 25-30%
accurate).
E-33
7. What percent of the time does the STE correctly isolate a faulty component?
Comments:
About 75-80% of the time (50% of respondents).

About 25-30% of the time (50% of respondents).
8. Overall, does the STE make it faster or slower to identify the causes of a
malfunction?
Comments:
Faster (because it is the only complete troubleshooting method).
9. What training did you receive on use of the STE?
Comments:
About 2 weeks in NET.
E-34
CAVALRY SQUADRON SUPPLY PERSONNEL INTERVIEW
The purpose of this interview is to record any problems you identified

during the follow-on evaluation of the MlAl.
Areas of concern are:
a. Organization of supply operations.

b. Personnel staffing of supply elements.
c. Supply element equipment authorizations.
d. Resupply operational problems.
I am going to ask a series of questions relating to your squadron's supply

functions; these questions are intended to help recall any difficulties you may
have observed during resupply operations, but are not intended to limit what
you have to say in any way. Please feel free to bring up any problem you
believe important, even if there are no specific questions about that subject.

E-35
TOTAL SHEET
CAVALRY SQUADRON SUPPLY PERSONNEL INTERVIEW
1. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.45; 2.2.6.46): Did you sections have enough trucks to

keep the unit's supplies moving forward adequately during field operations?
a. Ammunition Yes 11 No 1
b. Fuel Yes 6 No 6
c. Rations N/A
2. (2.2.6.42; 2.2.6.46): Are your transportation assets satisfactory during
field operations? Yes 5 No 7
Are your TO&E supply section personnel authorizations satisfactory in terms of:
3. (2.2.6.47): Number of supply personnel? Yes 0 No 12
4. (2.2.6.47): MOSs of supply personnel? Yes 12 No 0
5. (2.2.6.47): Did you actually have enough people present for duty?
Yes 7 No 5
6 (2.2.6.49): Do you know of any instances in which 120mm rounds could not
be chambered in the gun? Yes 12 No 0
7. (2.2.6.50): Do you know of any instances in which 120mm rounds were

damaged in handling? Yes 12 No 0
8. (2.2.6.51): Did you find any 120mm ammo which had defective casings?
Yes 5 No 7
9. (2.2.6.52): Were there any unpacking or repacking problems with 120mm

ammo? Yes 5 No 7
10. (2.2.6.56): Did any of the M1AI associated equipment or supplies cause
new problems for supply personnel? Yes 5 No 7
11. Is there anything about the way your supply section is organized, staffed,
equipped, or operated that should be changed because of the squadron being
equipped with the M1Al? Yes 12 No 0
attributable to the M1A1 or its associated support equipment?
Yes 0 No 12
E-36
ENCLOSURE 2
COMPLETE RESPONSE DATA FROM END-OF-TEST QUESTIONNAIRES
E-37
MiAI FOLLOW-ON EVALUATION
The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify difficulties you experienced

operating the MIAI tank during the testing just conducted. Please take as much
time as you wish and give us narrative comments on subjects you think
appropriate. Particular emphasis should be placed upon evaluating the
calibration of the main gun system. In order to help us assess your answers, we
need some information about your experience in the M1 tank. There are no right
or wrong answers to any of the questions. Our purpose is to discover as much
as we can about the MIAI system--good and bad.
E-38
L
MIAl FOE
QUESTIONNAIRE ID DATA SHEET
PART II
1. Player Name: (optional)
2. SSN: (optional
3. Tank No:
E-39
TANK COMMANDERS
Not Very Very

applicable easy Easy Adequate Difficult difficult
NA 5 4 3 2 1
Please use the above scale to rate the ease of performing the following tasks
by circling the appropriate number.
NA 5 4 3 2 1 i mean
1. Perform prefiring PMCS

(Table 2-2, TM9-250-264-10-1). 0 19 9 4 0 0 32 4.47
(2.2.6.14)
2. Perform prepare-to-fire checks

M1Al Prepare to Fire Checklist,
USAARMS, 1986). (2.1.4.5) 0 19 9 3 1 0 32 4.44
3. Perform prepare to calibrate

tasks (APP.A, FC 17-12-lAl). 1 14 14 2 1 0 31 4.32
(2.1.4.5)
4. Install M27 muzzle boresight

device (MBD). (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 17 10 4 1 0 32 4.34
5. Lay M27 MBD on the target aiming

point. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 16 11 5 0 0 32 4.34
6. Move the GPS aiming dot to the

boresight aiming point. 2 16 12 2 0 0 32 4.50
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
7. Check by moving and relaying gun

tube ("G" pattern check). 0 18 12 2 0 0 32 4.50
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
8. Identify causes of faults found

during "G" pattern test. 2 6 12 9 3 0 30 3.70
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
9. Correct boresight system faults. 0 6 12 9 5 0 32 3.59

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6; 2.2.6.56)
10. Correct boresight procedure

errors. 0 6 16 5 5 0 32 3.71
E-40
TANK COMMANDERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
11. Verify boresight M27 inserted

1800 from original orientation, 0 11 17 2 2 0 32 4.16
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
12. Determine average of the two

AZ/EL readings. 0 10 15 6 1 0 32 4.06
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
13. Adjust GPS reticle to the average

AZ/EL. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 12 18 2 0 0 32 4.31
14. Enter/verify correct data in the

CCP. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 15 15 2 0 0 32 4.41
15. Adjust GAS to correspond to GPS. 0 17 12 3 0 0 31 4.44

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
16. Adjust TIS reticle. 1 17 11 3 0 0 31 4.44

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
17. Boresight the MRS. 0 18 10 4 0 0 32 4.38

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
18. Enter manual CCP inputs. 1 18 11 2 0 0 32 4.38

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
19. Fire main gun; confirm zero. 0 15 16 1 0 0 32 4.44

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
20. Adjust/operate GPS. 0 18 14 0 0 0 32 4.56

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
21. Adjust operate TIS. 0 16 13 3 0 0 32 4.41

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
22. Adjust/operate GAS. 0 16 14 2 0 0 32 4.44

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
23. Range with laser rangefinder. 0 14 11 7 0 0 32 4.22

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
E-41
TANK COMMANDERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 14 3 2 1 n mean
24. Range with optical rangefinder. 8 9 8 7 0 0 24 4.08
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
25. Adjust using BOT technique. 11 6 7 6 2 0 0 3.41

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
26. Track and lead using power mode. 1 13 13 5 0 0 31 4.26

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
27. Track and lead, manual controls. 3 2 10 10 7 0 32 2.94
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
28. Aim with protective mask/

ventilated facepiece on. (P) 0 4 6 12 8 2 32 3.06
29. Maintain 120mm gun. (2.1.6.31) 0 11 13 7 1 0 32 4.06
30. Unload unfired 120mm rounds

from guns. (P) 0 8 15 5 4 0 32 3.84
31. Maintain machineguns. (2.1.6.31) 0 10 17 5 0 0 32 4.16
Did you have difficulty performing any of the above tasks? Yes No
If "Yes," what was the problem? (Comments extracted for use in other
displays.)
E-42
TANK COMMANDERS
Unacceptable!
Not Very Very (must be
applicable effective Effective Ineffective Ineffective corrected)
NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
32. Main gun calibration procedures. 0 5 25 2 0 0 32 4.09

(2.1.4.6)
33. Main gun hitting performance. 1 12 18 1 0 0 31 4.35

(2.1.4.6)
34. Coax MG hitting performance. 0 14 17 1 0 0 32 4.41

(2.1.4.6) (P)
35. TC's .50 cal MG hitting

performance. (2.1.4.6) (P) 3 12 13 3 1 0 29 4.24
36. M1A1 operation instructions

(TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, & 3). 0 11 19 2 0 0 32 4.28
(2.2.6.14; 2.2.6.38)
37. MiAl crew maintenance instructions

(TK9-2350-264-10-1, 2, &3). 0 10 18 3 1 0 32 4.16
(2.2.6.38)
38. M88A1 for M1A1 recovery

operations. (2.2.6.23) 6 2 13 7 2 2 26 3.42
39. Cavalry squadron organizational

maintenance capabilities. 0 2 15 6 5 4 32 3.13
(2.2.6.30)
40. Direct support maintenance opera-

tions during the test period. 1 3 22 2 3 1 31 3.55
(2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31)
41. Heavy equipment transport

(HET) operations. (2.2.6.29) 1 4 21 4 1 1 31 3.84
42. Standardized test equipment
(STF/M1). (2.2.6.32; 2.2.6.38) 1 4 18 4 2 3 31 3.58
E-43
TANK COMMANDERS
Unacceptable!
applicable effective Effective Ineffective Ineffective corrected) 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
43. Tool types available to you. 0 3 19 7 2 1 32 3.66

(2.2.6.38)
44. Tool quantities furnished. 0 2 21 6 2 1 32 3.66

(2.2.6.38)
45. Availability of support equipment.1 3 21 5 2 1 31 3.84

(2.2.6.38)
46. Field resupply (ammo, fuel,

rations) operations. (2.2.6.47) 1 0 17 10 1 3 31 3.32
47. Types/numbers of resupply

personnel. (2.2.6.42) 1 3 21 5 0 2 31 3.74
48. Types/rumbers of resupply

vehicles. (2.2.6.42) 0 0 18 8 2 4 32 3.25
49. Ability of 120mm to meet field

conditions. (2.2.6.50) 0 8 21 2 1 0 32 4.13
50. NBC system operating

instructions. 0 9 17 5 1 0 32 3.91
(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2; 2.3.4.3)
51. NBC system unit SOP. 3 6 17 5 0 1 29 3.93

(2.3.4.7; 2.3.4.8)
52. Cooling capabilities of the

"micro-climate" system. (P) 0 6 20 6 0 0 32 4.00
53. Procedures for equipment problem

identification. (2.2.6.37) 0 4 22 4 1 1 32 3.84
54. Procedures for correcting/

repairing failures. (2.2.6.56) 0 5 22 4 1 0 32 3.81
55. Communicating over intercom,

NBC system OFF. (P) 0 9 23 0 0 0 32 4.28
NBC system ON. (P) 0 7 21 4 0 0 32 4.09
E-44
GUNNERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
1. Perform prefiring PMCS

(Table 2-2, TM9-250-264-10-1). 0 11 12 4 0 0 27 4.26
(2.2.6.14)
2. Perform prepare-to-fire checks

(M1A1 Prepare to Fire Checklist,
USAARMS, 1986). (2.1.4.5) 0 9 16 2 0 0 27 4.26
3. Perform prepare to calibrate

tasks (APP.A, FC 17-12-lAl). 0 7 12 8 0 0 27 3.96
(2.1.4.5)
4. Install H27 muzzle boresight
device (MBD). (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 16 9 2 0 0 27 4.52
5. Lay M27 MBD on the target aiming

point. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 11 14 1 1 0 27 4.30
6. Move the GPS aiming dot to the

boresight aiming point. 0 14 13 0 0 0 27 4.52
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
7. Check by moving and relaying gun

tube ("G" pattern check). 0 12 14 0 1 0 27 4.37
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
8. Identify causes of faults found

during "G" pattern test. 0 4 14 9 0 0 27 3.81
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)

errors. 0 3 13 10 1 0 27 3.67
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6; 2.2.6.56)

errors. 0 3 13 10 1 0 27 3.67
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
E-45
GUNNERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
11. Verify boresight M27 inserted

1800 from original orientation. 0 8 14 5 0 0 27 4.11
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
12. Determine average of the two

AZ/EL readings. 0 12 11 4 0 0 27 4.30
(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
13. Adjust GPS reticle to the average

AZ/EL. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 9 14 4 0 0 27 4.19
14. Enter/verify correct data in the

CCP. (2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 14 11 2 0 0 27 4.44
15. Adjust GAS to correspond to GPS.

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6) 0 12 9 6 0 0 27 4.22
16. Adjust TIS reticle. 0 13 10 4 0 0 27 4.33

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
17. Boresight the MRS. 0 13 9 2 3 0 27 4.19

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
18. Enter manual CCP inputs. 0 15 9 2 1 0 27 4.41

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
19. Fire main gun; confirm zero. 0 11 12 2 2 0 27 4.19

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
20. Adjust/operate GPS. 0 12 11 4 0 0 27 4.30

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
21. Adjust operate TIS. 0 11 12 3 1 0 27 4.22

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
22. Adjust/operate GAS. 0 10 9 6 2 0 27 4.00

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
23. Range with laser rangefinder. 0 10 10 6 1 0 27 4.07
E-46
GUNNERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
5 3
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
24. Range with optical rangefinder. 0 3 3 11 10 0 27 2.96

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
25. Adjust using BOT technique. 2 4 6 13 2 0 25 3.48

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
26. Track and lead using power mode. 0 9 11 6 1 0 27 3.85

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
27. Track and lead, manual controls. 0 2 7 14 4 0 27 3.26

(2.1.4.5; 2.1.4.6)
28. Aim with protective mask/

ventilated facepiece on (P). 0 2 7 13 5 0 27 3.22
29. Maintain 120mm gun. (2.1.6.31) 0 5 11 9 2 0 27 3.70
30. Unload unfired 120mm rounds

from guns. (P). 0 6 9 8 3 1 27 3.59
31. Maintain machineguns. (2.1.6.31) 0 8 12 7 0 0 27 4.04
Did you have difficulty performing any of the above tasks? Yes No
If "Yes," what was the problem? (Comments extracted for use in other
displays.)
E-47
GUNNERS
Unacceptable!
Not Very Very (must be 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1
Please use the above scale to rate the effectiveness of the following factors
of the M1A1 system by circling the appropriate number.
NA 5 4 2 1 n mean
32. Main gun calibration procedures. 0 6 20 1 0 0 27 4.19

(2.1.4.6)
33. Main gun hitting performance. 1 12 13 1 0 0 26 4.42

(2.1.4.6)
34. Coax MG hitting performance. 0 15 10 2 0 0 27 4.48

(2.1.4.6) (P)
35. TC's .50 cal MG hitting

performance. (2.1.4.6) (P) 3 5 16 3 0 0 24 4.08
36. M1A1 operation instructions

(TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, &3). 0 11 16 0 0 0 27 4.41
(2.2.6.14; 2.2.6.38)
37. M1A1 crew maintenance instructions

(TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, &3). 0 9 17 1 0 0 27 4.30
(2.2.6.38)
38. M88A1 for M1A1 recovery

operations. (2.2.6.23) 4 4 15 4 0 0 23 4.00

(2.2.6.30)
40. Direct support maintenance opera-

tions during the test period. 3 2 12 8 1 1 24 3.54
(2.2.6.30); 2.2.6.31)

(HET:) operations. (2.2.6.29) 1 0 20 5 1 0 26 3.73

(STE/Mi). (2.2.6.32; 2.2.6.38) 2 1 17 5 1 1 25 3.64
E-48
GUNNERS
Unacceptable
NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean

(2.2.6.38)
44. Tool quantities furnished. 0 2 18 7 0 0 27 3.81

(2.2.6.38)
45. Availability of support

equipment. (2.2.6.38) 0 1 15 10 1 0 27 3.59

47. Types/numbers of supply

personnel (2.2.6.47) 1 0 21 5 0 0 26 3.81

vehicles. (2.2.6.42) 1 1 18 7 0 0 26 3.96
49. Ability of 120mm ammo to meet

field conditions. (2.2.6.50) 2 1 24 0 0 0 25 4.04
50. NBC system operating

instructions. 0 2 22 3 0 0 27 3.9;6
(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2; 2.3.4.3)

(2.3.4.7; 2.3.4.8)

"micro-climate" system. (P) 0 3 18 5 0 1 27 3.81

identification. (2.2.6.37) 0 2 20 5 0 0 27 3.89

repairing failures. (2.2.6.56) 0 1 21 4 1 0 27 3.81
55. Communicating over intercom, NBC

system OFF. (P) 0 3 21 2 0 1 27 3.93
56. Communicating over intercom, NBC
system ON. (P) 0 2 22 2 0 1 27 3.89
E-49
-- ;,-, ,,MUWM,,m m mr ii mlni n~ lam ii u i

DRIVERS
Not Very Very

applicable easy Easy Adequate Difficult difficult 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1
5 3
Please use the above scale to rate the ease of performing the following task
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
1. Perform driver PMCS. 0 10 16 8 0 0 34 4.06

(2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.37)
2. Check battery fluid level. (P) 0 14 14 4 2 0 34 4.18
3. Check/replace filters in gas

particulate units. (P) 16 1 2 12 2 1 18 3.00
4. Fill front fuel tanks. (P) 0 0 6 13 13 2 34 2.68

5. Driving, MOPP IV gear on (P) 0 2 3 10 13 6 34 2.47
6. Driving, MOPP II gear on. (P) 0 4 13 10 5 2 34 3.35
7. Driving, using night vision

viewer at night. (P) 0 3 8 17 6 0 34 3.24
8. Driving, using night vision

viewer at night while main gun
is firing. (P) 1 0 2 15 12 4 33 2.45
9. Seeing outside through the side

vision blocks. (P) C 2 8 14 9 1 34 3.03
10. Driving with hatch open, 1 26 2 3 1 1 33 4.55
(2.2.6.37)
11. Driving with hatch closed. (P) 0 2 15 13 4 0 34 3.44
12. Reading, understanding and using

TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, & 3). 0 13 17 4 0 0 34 4.26
(2.2.6.14; 2.2.6.38)
13. Operating hull stowage

compartment doors. (P) 2 4 7 8 10 3 32 2.97
14. Understanding and using NBC

system operating instructions. 1 8 15 10 0 0 33 3.94
(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2)
E-50
DRIVERS
Unacceptable:
NA 5 4 3 2 1
of the MIA1 system by circling the appropriate number.
INA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
15. Durability of MIA1 roadwheels. 0 11 21 2 0 0 34 4.26
(P)
16. Durability of MIA1 track. (P) 1 2 14 5 5 7 33 2.91
17. M1A1 crew maintenance instructions

(TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, & 3). 0 8 25 1 0 0 34 4.21
(2.2.6.14; 2.2.6.38)
18. MIA1 built-in test equipment/fault

indicators. 0 9 17 6 1 1 34 3.94
(2.2.6.36a/b; 2.2.6.37; 2.2.6.38)
19. M88A1 for MA1 recovery

operations. (2.2.6.23) 7 2 13 9 1 2 27 3.44

(2.2.6.30)
21. Direct support maintenance

operations during the test
period. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31) 0 0 20 6 3 5 34 3.21

(HET) operations. 0 8 20 5 1 0 34 4.03
(2.2.6.26; 2.2.6.29)

(STE/Mi). (2.2.6.36a/b) 5 0 17 7 2 3 29 3.31

(2.2.6.38)
25. Tool quantities available. 0 3 20 7 2 2 34 3.59

(2.2.6.38)
E-51
I liii I II gE ini n•n ~
DRIVERS
Unacceptable
NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean

equipment. (2.2.6.34) 2 0 20 8 3 1 32 3.47

28. Types/numbers of supply

personnel. (2.2.6.47) 4 0 19 8 1 2 30 3.47

vehicles. (2.2.6.46) 2 1 21 7 1 2 32 3.56


(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2)

"microclimate" system. (P) 3 10 16 4 0 1 31 4.10

identification. (2.2.6.37) 2 3 24 4 0 1 32 3.88

repairing failures. 1 1 24 6 2 0 33 3.73
(2.2.6.56)

NBC system OFF. (P) 0 7 20 4 2 1 34 3.88

NBC system ON. (P) 1 0 20 8 0 5 33 3.30
E-52
. . N I. II .. II- bI • -J
LOADERS
Not Very Very

NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 3 2 1 n mean
1. Operating hull stowage

compartment doors. (P) 0 1 5 6 3 2 17 3.00
2. Rearming/restocking M1A1 with

main gun ammo. (2.2.6.45) 0 1 6 6 4 0 17 3.24
3. Rearming/restocking M1A1 with

12.7mm (.50) and 7.62mm MG
ammo. (2.2.6.45) 0 3 8 5 1 0 17 3.76
4. Loading/unloading coax MG. (P) 0 3 8 4 1 1 17 3.65
5. Opening 120mm breech using

manual opening handle. (P) 0 2 7 6 2 0 17 3.53
6. Handling 120mm ammo. (2.2.6.50) 0 2 7 6 1 1 17 3.47
7. Transferring 120mm ammo from

hull storage to ready rack. (P) 0 0 1 5 4 7 17 2.00
8. Transferring 120mm ammo from

hull storage to ready rack in
MOPP IV gear. (P) 0 0 1 5 4 7 17 2.00
9. Loading from ready rack. (P) 1 2 9 5 0 0 16 3.81
10. Loading from ready rack in

MOPP IV gear. (P) 1 0 8 5 3 0 16 3.31
11. Unloading/clearing 120mm. (P) 0 4 6 5 2 0 17 3.71
12. Reading, understanding and using

TM9-2350-264-10-1, 2, &3). 0 4 7 6 0 0 17 3.88
(2.2.6.14; 2.2.6.38)
13. Understanding and using NBC

system operating instructions. 0 2 10 4 1 0 17 3.71
(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2)
14. Distinguishing HEAT from SABOT
in the ready rack. (P) 0 6 8 2 0 1 17 4.06
E-53
LOADERS
Unacceptable!
NA 5 4 3 2 1
of the MiAl system by circling the appropriate number.
NA 5 4~3 1 n mean
15. Procedures for cleaning/repair

of main gun. (2.2.6.14; 0 2 9 6 0 0 17 3.76
2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.37; 2.2.6.38)

of coax MG. (2.2.6.14; 0 2 12 3 0 0 17 4.47
2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.37; 2.2.6.38)

of TC's 12.7mm MG. (2.2.6.14; 0 1 13 1 2 0 17 3.76
2.2.6.31; 2.2.6.37; 2.2.6.38)
18. MIAI built-in test equipment/

fault indicators. (2.2.6.31; 2 1 10 4 0 0 15 3.80
2.2.6.36a/b)

(2.2.6.30)
20. Direct support maintenance

operations during the test
period. (2.2.6.30; 2.2.6.31) 0 0 10 3 3 1 17 3.29

(HET) operations. 0 1 14 1 1 0 17 3.88
(2.2.6.26; 2.2.6.29)

(STE/Mi). (2.2.6.36a/b) 0 3 9 4 1 0 17 3.82

(2.2.6.38)
24. Tool quantities available. 0 1 9 5 1 1 17 3.47

(2.2.6.38)
equipment. (2.2.6.34) 0 0 9 6 1 1 17 3.35
E-54
LOADERS
Unacceptable!
NA 5 4 3 2 1
NA 5 4 2 nn mean

rations) operations. 0 3 8 5 1 0 17 3.76
(2.2.6.45)

vehicles. (2.2.6.46) 0 0 10 7 0 0 17 3.59


(2.3.4.1; 2.3.4.2)

"microclimate" system. (P) 0 4 7 5 1 1 17 3.88

identification. (2.2.6.37) 0 2 7 5 2 1 17 3.41

repairing failures. (P) 0 2 11 2 1 1 17 3.71

NBC system OFF. (P) 0 5 11 0 1 1 17 4.18

NBC system ON. (P) 0 1 13 2 1 0 17 3.82
E-55
I'a
ENCLOSURE 3
NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS, OPINIONS, AND OBSERVATIONS
EXTRACTED FROM CREW DEBRIEFINGS AND END-OF-TEST STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
(All data requirements (DRs) having HF&S implications are included.

In those cases where a HF&S finding or observation considered significant
resulted, a .3 subparagraph entitled "Significant observation" has been
added to the OTEA format. This subparagraph summarizes the finding or
observation.)
E-56
2.1.4.5 Data requirement: (Contributory) crew ability to follow
calibration procedures. Narrative MANPRINT contributions:
Narrative of comments obtained concerning understandability and
ease of accomplishing tasks in FC 17-12-lAl. Obtained from
interviews of crew members, unit leaders, sample data collectors,
and test directorate personnel
2.1.4.5.1 Narrative discussion: There were no observed difficulties with

crews' ability to perform tasks as described in APP A, FC
17-12-lAl. Most crew members who were interviewed reported this
document to be easy to use. The only problems occurred when crews
tried to calibrate without following the procedures step-by-step.
2.1.4.5.2 Question(s): "Were there any problems with the MIAI main gun
calibration procedures in APP A, FC 17-12-lAl?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 0 33
Driver N/A N/A
Loader 0 N/A
TOTAL 0 33
"Could the crew understand and follow the task performance
instructions in APP A, FC 17-12-lAl without difficulty?"
Yes No
Test Directorate 16 0
Unit 6 0
TOTAL 22 0
2.1.4.6 Data requirement: Crew opinions on calibration and hitting

performance. Subjective information from crew members, unit
leaders, and sample data collectors of MIAl component-caused
calibration or main gun hitting performance deficiencies.
2.1.4.6.1 Narrative discussion: Personnel interviewed considered the

calibration and hitting performance of the 120mm gun system to be
extremely effective. One comment was made that one tank commander
believed 1200 meters to be too short a range to learn much about
the 120mm gun. One gunner stated he thought the stabilization
system required him to correct his zero too often - about every
15 minutes. Another gunner added "Train everyone to make sure
there is no air in the 120mm hydraulics." One member of the
Test Directorate confirmed that air in the main gun system causes
accuracy problems.
E-57
2.1.4.6.2 Question(s): "Overall, is the MIAI main gun and associated fire
control/sighting system reliable, and accurate?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 33 0
TOTAL 33 0
"Did you note any threat tank killing deficiencies in the overall
120mm main gun/fire control system of the MiA1?"
Yes No
Unit 0 8
TOTAL 1 22
2.2.6.14 Data requirement: Adequacy of technical manuals. Subjective

information as to readability, indexing, completeness,
understandability, and ruggedness of MIAl operator's/maintainer's
technical publications (including TMs, job performance aids, and
other furnished documentation). Responses were obtained from crew
members, maintenance personnel, unit leaders, and test directorate
personnel.
2.2.6.14.1
2.2.6.15.1 Narrative discussion: Two gunners commented that they had trouble
understanding the breechblock disassembly - firing pin replacement
task description. The illustration was upside-down. Assembly
using illustration caused broken pins. Eight gunners suggested
that the inclusion of assembly/part nomenclature and stock numbers
in the TM 9-2350-264-10 series would speed maintenance and
preparation of DA Forms 2404/2407. All maintainers agreed with
this idea.
The majority of persons responding to interview questions found FC

17-12-lAl and TM 9-2350-264-10s easy to read, understand and use.
However, no one considered the TMs rugged enough for continuous
field use. Plastic laminated pages were recommended. Several
maintainers stated that the maintenance manuals were too bulky and
had too much cross referencing within tasks.
Question(s):
"Are there any of the task performance procedures for main gun
operation described in FM 17-12-1A1 that were hard to understand
or use?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 0 33
TOTAL 0
E-58
• .- li iil
illi
li OlllllIN
I o 4
"Are the task performance procedures in Th 9-2350-264-10-1, 2 and
3 easy to read, understand and use?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 25 8
Driver 20 0
Unit 8 0
Maintenance 8 11
TOTAL 75 19
2.2.6.14.3 Significant observations:

2.2.6.15.3
a. The suggestion for inclusion of parts nomenclature and stock
numbers in TM would speed maintenance functions.
b. TMs should be rugged enough to survive field use.
2.2.6.21 Data requirement: (Contributory) Effects of terrain/environment

on recovery operations. Narrative subjective information obtained
in structured interviews.
2.2.6.22 Data requirement: Observed difficulties in recovery operations.

Narrative description of recovery operation problems including
cause identification, if known.
2.2.6.23 Data requirement: Opinions, adequacy of the M881A1 for

recovering/towing M1A1. Narrative subjective information obtained
from crew members, maintainers, sample data collectors, and unit
leaders.
2.2.6.21.1, Narrative discussion: Few crew members interviewed had an

2.2.6.22.1, opportunity to observe any recovery operations. The only reported
2.2.6.23.1 difficulties were:
"The M88A1 is too light - in loose soil (sand) or mud the MIAl
tends to push the M88 down slopes."
"The M88A1 is underpowered for the weight of the MIAl."
"The M88A1 drive train is not rugged enough for the MiAl."
E-59
2.2.6.21.2, Question(s): "Were there any problems recovering disabled MIAl
2.2.6.22.2, tanks?" "Did you note any problems recovering MIAls?"
2.2.6.23.2
Yes No
TC/Gunner 7 27
Driver 0 20
Loader 0 0
Unit 2 4
Maintenance 14 5
Logistics N/A N/A
TOTAl. 28 64
2.2.6.21.3, Significant observations: M88A1 is too light, underpowered, and

2.2.6.22.3, weak in construction to recover MIAl tanks safely and repeatedly.
2.2.6.23.3
2.2.6.26 Data requirement: (Contributory) Observed road types/conditions

for transporter. Narrative of problems encountered using MIAl
transporter caused by road types/conditions.
2.2.6.29 Data requirement: (Contributory) Problems with HET operations.

description of observed HET problems encountered not specifically
due to road types/conditions.
2.2.6.26.1 Narrative discussion: The majority of personnel interviewed

2.2.6.29.1 observed no problems with HET operations due to road
types/conditions. Comments received were:
"HET tire pressure must be maintained at between 90 and 96 LB at

all times to prevent tire failure."
"The trailer has to be supported with sections of railroad ties or

telephone poles when loading and unloading MlAls."
"The other day I observed a HET sustain three blown tires when
they tried to load an MIAI." (This incident was due to failure to
use support blocks.)
"We can road march the tanks to the field faster than using the
HET." (This appears due to speed limit policy at Fort Bliss
rather than equipment limitations.)
E-60
Question(s): "Did you notice any problems when the heavy
equipment transporter (HET) was used?" "Did you note any HET
operations problems?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 5 28
Driver 0 20
Loader 0 0
Unit 1 7
Maintenance 5 14
Logistics 0 12
TOTAL 19 86
2.2.6.30 Data requirement: Adequacy of maintenance organization.
Subjective information evaluating adequacy of personnel
authorization level, HOS type organizational structure, and
employment doctrine for the FOE MiAl maintenance support
organization.
2.2.6.31 Data requirement: Overall maintenance problems. Narrative

description of maintenance problems requiring attention to
effectively eliminate.
2.2.6.30.1 Narrative discussion: The majority of those interviewed thought

2.2.6.31.1 that the maintenance support was generally adequate. Those who
did not were about equally divided as to the reasons for
deficiencies. Half stated that the maintenance personnel staffing
was inadequate; some of these stated that the TOE authorization
was adequate but many positions were vacant or filled by persons
trained to maintain K113s or Bradleys. Additionally, many
respondents commented that parts were not available when and where
needed to conduct sustained operations. Parts and tool
availability was the major concern expressed by tank crews. There
were no metric tools available for most of the FOE. These tools
began arriving toward the end of the test period.
2.2.6.30.2 Question(s): "Were there enough maintenance personnel available?"

2.2.6.31.2 "Was the maintenance organization satisfactory in terms of
personnel by numbers and MOS?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 16 17
Driver 13 7
Loader 0 0
Unit 7 1
Maintenance 13 4
Logistics 0 0
TOTAL 32 41
E-61
2.2.6.34 Data requirement: Availability of support equipment (causes of
nonavailability). (Contributory) List of narrative reasons for
nonavailability of support equipment experienced by users
throughout the FOE.
2.2.6.34.1 Narrative discussion: Except for a lack of metric tools,

respondents rated the availability of maintenance support
equipment as generally satisfactory, including STE-MIAl.
2.2.6.34.2 Question(s): "Was the maintenance operation organized so that

test equipment, tools, parts, and qualified maintenance personnel
were always available in forward areas (e.g., company trains area)
when needed to sustain combat operations?" "Was the maintenance
organization satisfactory in terms of (a) tool availability, (b)
spares/replacement parts, (c) numbers and types of vehicles?"
a. Tools Yes No
TC/Gunner 15 18
Driver 13 7
Loader 10 1
Unit 7 1
Maintenance 9 10
Logistics N/A N/A
TOTAL 54 52
b. Spares/replacement parts Yes No
TC/Gunner 15 18
Driver 13 7
Loader 10 1
Unit 7 1
Maintenance 14 5
Logistics N/A N/A
TOTAL 60 46
c. Vehicles Yes No
TC/Gunner 15 18
Driver 13 7
Loader 10 1
Test Directorate N/A N/A
Unit NAI N/A
Maintenance 9 8
Logistics N/A N/A
TOTA 47 34
E-62
2.2.6.32 Data requirement: Adequacy, quantity, type, usefulness of support
test equipment. (Opinion). Listing of opinions about support
test equipment used during the FOE.
2.2.6.32.1 Narrative discussion: Majority of crew members and maintainers

interviewed thought M1Al built-in warnings and indicators were
effective and that crews had been trained to react correctly; in
other words, there were few instances detected wherein damage had
been incurred in an M1Al attributable to a crew failing to heed a
built-in warning. There were, however, several M1Al engine
failures which might have been caused by failing to follow
specified engine cool-down/shutdown procedures.
One tank commander commented that the STE-M1Al became unreliable

when air temperatures rose much beyond 900 F. When interviewed,
all maintenance personnel concurred with this assessment. About
half of the maintenance personnel believed their STE-MIAl
equipment correctly isolated faulty components 75-80% of the time.
One troop's maintainers (five persons) stated their STE-MIAl was
correct only about 20% of the time. This same STE-MiAl set was in
the process of being turned in for maintenance.
The most often heard complaints about the STE-MiAl are that it is
too large, bulky, and difficult to transport; is too complicated
and time consuming to hook up for testing; and that STE-MiAl takes
too long to run the tests required to isolate the actual problem.
Additionally, due to the way STE tests subsystems, often good
components are identified as faulty because these are in a circuit
with the bad component.
Most maintainers suggested more vehicles for PLL or STE-M1Al

movement.
2.2.6.32.2 Question(s): "Were there any significant failures to the
STE-MiAl?"
Yes No
Maintenance 18 1
TOTAL 18 1
"Did M1Al built-in warnings (lights) work correctly?" "Are M1Al

fault lights, gauge, etc., adequate?" (maintenance)
Yes No
Driver 15 5
Maintenance 14 5
TOTAL 29 10
E-63
"Do crews usually react correctly to the warning indicators?"
Yes No
Maintenance 19 0
TOTAL 19 0
"Does following the BITE indications help you to diagnose and

isolate malfunctions quickly?"
Yes No
Maintenance 19 0
TOTAL 19 0
"Is the STE-MiAl test equipment you have sufficient to support

sustained operations?"
Yes No
Maintenance 8 11
TOTAL 8 11
"Is there anything that needs to be changed about the

organization, procedures, equipment, or supply operations
to improve the effectiveness of MIAI maintenance?"
Yes No
Maintenance 16 3
TOTAL 16 3
2.2.6.32.3 Significant observations: Many maintainers are not confident of

the accuracy and effectiveness of the STE-MIA1s. Operation in a
hot environment as well as unfamiliarity with the MiAl and
STE-MiAl may contribute to this perception. One troop's set
appears to have been faulty.
2.2.6.36a/b Data requirement: STE-MIAl fault isolation success/failure/causes.
2.2.6.36a/b.1 See 2.2.6.32 above.

2.2.6.36a/b.2
2.2.6.36a/b.3
2.2.6.37 Data requirement: Observed difficulty with equipment:

(Contributory) Narrative description of problems personnel
experienced operating M1A1 and its associated equipment during the
FOE. Causes and possible means of overcoming; where known, may
also be listed.
E-64
2.2.6.37.1 Narrative discussion: No specific difficulties operating the MIA1
or its associated equipment were observed or reported, except as
discussed in the context of other data requirements listed in this
appendix.
2.2.6.42 Data requirement: Type, number of vehicles required.

(Contributory) Opinions concerning MTOE authorizations for
numbers and types of maintenance and logistic support vehicles.
Also discussed in para 2.2.6.22, 2.2.6.23, 2.2.6.26, 2.2.6.29
pertaining to recovery and Heavy Equipment (HET) vehicles.
2.2.6.45 Data requirement: Adequacy of resources to rearm, refuel,

resupply in the field. (Contributory) Opinions and observations
concerning any noted deficiencies in resources available to rearm,
refuel and resupply MIA1 units during field operations.
2.2.6.42.1 Narrative discussion: Respondents were about evenly divided

2.2.6.45.1 concerning the effectiveness of forward resupply operations. Most
believed that the support operations were effective. One unit
commander stated that the logistic support resources would not
have been able to sustain continuous operations for an extended
period of time. Specifically mentioned were fuel and 120mm
ammunition shortages. Fuel resupply vehicles were sufficient only
if all were operational. The addition of five more fuelers was
suggested; one per troop/company and another for the support
platoon. Another observation was that more trained decontamination
personnel are required to rearm/refuel contaminated vehicles if
this is to be accomplished quickly enough to support fast moving
operations.
2.2.6.42.2 Question(s): "Were the forward resupply operations effective in
2.2.6.45.2 keeping your tank supplied with fuel rations and ammo?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 5 18
Driver 11 9
Loader 6 5
TOTAL 32 22
"Are your transportation assets satisfactory during field

operations?"
Yes No
Logistics 5 7
TOTAL 5 7
E-65
"Were the forward resupply operations able to sustain the required
tempo of combat operations?"
Yes No
Unit 7 1
TOTAL 8 17
"Were there any TOE deficiencies in the combat service support

resources caused by the change to the MiA1?
Yes No
Unit 3 3
TOTAL 12 11
2.2.6.47 Data requirement: Observed adequacy, type/number of supply

personnel. Narrative description of personnel or manpower
deficiencies of the logistics organization.
2.2.6.48 Data requirement: Observed adequacy of operators on hand to

operate/maintain supply vehicles. Narrative description of any
supply vehicle maintenance or operational problems due to
operators.
2.2.6.47.1 Narrative discussion: The sufficiency of personnel and equipment

2.2.6.48.1 available for logistics support operations was addressed by the
question below. The significant deficiency identified is a need
for additional resources for d,,contamination of vehicles as
mentioned previously.
2.2.6.47.2 Question(s): "Did you observe any shortage of supply personnel or

2.2.6.48.2 trucks, etc., needed to keep supplies moving forward?" (Asked in
crew debriefings only.)
Yes No
TC/Gunner 6 27
Driver 0 20
Loader 0 0
TOTAL 6 47
2.3.4.1 Data requirement: Observed adequacy of instructions (TM, FC, etc.)

permitting the crew to operate the on-board NBC system
effectively. Narrative description of deficiencies found in MIAI
NBC system and backup system written operating instructions.
E-66
2.3.4.2 Data requirement: Observed adequacy of instructions for
readability executability and understandability. List of
deficiencies in written instructions in readability, executability
and understandability. Extracted portion for examples.
2.3.4.1.1 Narrative discussion: No deficiencies were reported in the NBC

2.3.4.2.1 system operating instructions contained in the M1A1 technical
manuals. During the first unit level ARTEP, it was discovered
that refueling/rearming/resupplying necessitated breaking the
M1Al's NBC seal. New procedures were developed to overcome this
deficiency. Test Directorate personnel stated that all units were
not trained in the new procedures throughout the remainder of the
FOE.
2.3.4.1.2 Question(s): "Were you able to operate the NBC system using
2.3.4.2.2 operating instructions in TM 9-2350-264-10-1, 2, & 3?" Were NBC
system operating instructions in TM 9-2350-264-10-1, 2, & 3 easy
to read, understand and use?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 33 0
Driver 20 0
Loader 11 0
TOTAL 64 0
2.3.4.3 Data requirement: Observed availability of instructions for each

tank crew and company/troop/squadron staff element. List of
instances of nonavailability of necessary NBC system operating
information.
2.3.4.3.1 Narrative discussion: Tank crews surveyed stated that NBC system
operating instructions were available when required. However,
respondents in two units stated their unit had no NBC system SOP
that they knew about.
2.3.4.3.2 Question(s): "Did you always have printed M1A1 NBC system
operating instructions with you during field operations?"
Yes No
TC/Gunner 33 0
Driver 20 0
Loader 11 0
TOTAL 64 0
2.3.4.4 Data requirement: Observed ability of crew to put the

instructions to use in an NBC environment. (Contributory)
Narrative description of instances and circumstances in which
crew(s) were able to perform NBC protection system operating tasks
in accordance with the available instructions.
E-67
2.3.4.1 Narrative discussion: There were no observed instances of crew
inability to implement written NBC system operating instructions.
(One Test Directorate respondent stated that NBC systems were
often not used during the FOE when they probably should have
been.)
2.3.4.4.2 Question(s): "Did you observed any instances in which any person
was unable to use the written NBC system operating instructions
which had been provided?" (This question was asked of Test
Directorate and Unit personnel during final data collection. It
does not appear on the data collection forms.)
Yes No
Unit 0 8
TOTAL 0 25
2.3.4.5 Data requirement: Observed ability of the crew to use the NBC
system properly during a no-notice NBC attack without referring to
instructions. Narrative description of any observed instances in
which crews had to refer to written instructions for operation of
NBC system during a no-notice attack; narrative description of
observed instances in which crews were unable to effectively
operate the NBC system during a no-notice attack.
2.3.4.5.1 Narrative discussion: Data collectors and/or unit leaders

reported no incidents of crew difficulties activating MIAI NBC
systems during an emergency situation when written instructions
could not be used. All problems reported were apparently due to
system failure (or an engine shutdown when the NBC system was
turned on). This failure was traced to small holes found burned
through the recuperators of several MIA1 engines.
2.3.4.5.2 Question(s): "Did you observe any instances in which crew members
were unable to effectively operate the MiA1 NBC system during a
surprise NBC attack without using their written operating
instructions?" (This question was asked of Test Directorate and
Unit personnel during final data collection. It does not appear
on the data collection forms.)
Yes No
Unit 0 8
TOTAL 0 25
2.3.4.6 Date requirement: Observed ability of the crew to properly use

the backup NBC system. See 2.3.4.4 above.
E-68
2.3.4.6.1 Narrative discussion: There were no reported instances wherein
the NBC backup system was used.
2.3.4.7 Data requirement: Adequacy of instructions to state conditions in

which NBC system is to be used. List of conditions for NBC system
use which have been omitted from current instructions.
2.3.4.7.1 Narrative discussion: One commander stated that his unit NBC SOP
needed revision to conform to the characteristics of the M1A1.
Most respondents who knew of the existence of their unit's NBC
SOP believed it to be effective. However, some crew members were
not award of a unit NBC SOP.
2.3.4.7.2 Question(s): "Was your unit SOP regarding NBC system use
sufficient (effective)?"
Yes No Unaware
TC/Gunner 26 3
Driver 11 4 5
Loader 8 3
TOTAL 45 7 8
2.3.4.8 Data requirement: Observed ability of the crew to properly use
the system during tactical operations. Narrative description of
any circumstances inhibiting NBC system effectiveness (firing,
open hatch, closed hatch, silent watch, road march).
2.3.4.8.1 Narrative discussion: No events were observed during the FOE

which inhibit NBC system effectiveness during tactical operations;
however, the warning on page 2-373, change 4 to TM 9-2350-264-10-2,
has been interpreted by some members of the test team to mean that
it would be unsafe to fire the main gun in the closed hatch mode
if the backup NBC system had to be used.
2.3.4.8.2 Question(s): "Did you observe anything during field operations

that inhibited the effectiveness of the NBC system or the crew's
ability to use it?" (This question was asked of Test Directorate
and Unit personnel during final data collection. It does not
appear on the data collection forms.)
Yes No
Unit 0 8
TOTAL 1 21
E-69

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ARI Research Note 88-96

Human Factors and Safety Assessment:

Lawrence E. Lyons, William L. Warnick, and Albert L.

Contracting Officer's Representative

ARI Field Unit at Fort Hood, Texas

Systems Research Laboratory

November 1988 DTIC

United States Army

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction

EDGAR M. JOHNSON JON W. BLADES

Research accomplished under contract

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Essex Corporation j o- - ARI Field Unit at Fort Hood, Texas

ARI RESEARCH NOTE 88-96

19. Abstract (continued)

DISCUSSION AND PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS ....................... 19

APPENDIX A. TASK PERFORMANCE DESCRIPTIONS. ............... A-1

B. HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY DATA REFERENCE CODE. ....... 1

D. ITEMS FOR M1A1 FOE FINAL REPORT ............... D-1

E. HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY FINDINGS TO USA OTEA FOE

Table 1. Human Factors, Safety, and Health Hazards Findings as Reported

3. Potential Areas of Technical Manual Assessment, JPA,

E-2 Previously Identified HF&S Findings ............. E-6

E-3 HF&S Data Reference Code ..... ................... E-8

E-4 Number of Responses by Category ..... ............... .. E-10

E-7 Previously Identified Human Factors Deficiencies ........... E-13

E-8 Comments on MiAl Systems Components .... ............... E-14

Figure 1. Improved M1A1 Tank External Features ....... . . ... 5

Purpose and Scope

Two, have the materiel deficiencies disclosed during the MiEl OT II

Three, can the MiEl tanks be supported with planned logistics

Deficiencies found during previous testing. Table I shows the HF&S

Human Factors, Safety, and Health Hazards Findings as Reported in

Reported in: HFEA

1. Lack of means for removing CO from

3. Tracking problem, TC-s .50 MG.

4. No provision for human waste elimination/

5. Inadequate storage for personal gear. x x x

6. CVC helmet gives inadequate hearing

7. Variable effectiveness of microclimate

8. No "autobahn seat" for commander for

10. Difficulty using sights with masks on. x x x

11. Gunner's shoulder padding (on main gun

Reported in: HFEA

15. Difficult understanding speech over

16. Slipping of manual breech opening

17. TC power handle location makes target

18. No bypass switch to override the auto-

19. Driver's steering control adjustment pin

20. Driver's seat does not give adequate

21. Driver's vision block wipers are

22. Driver's side vision blocks cause

23. Driver's night vision viewer is marginal. x x x

24. Driver's workspace is too small for

25. Turret must be traversed to fill front

26. Inadequate brow pad on GPS. x

27. Difficulty loading TC's .50 MG. x x

28. Difficulty positioning and aiming

29. Crew did not know location of NBC