Tison et al. v Sps.

Pomasin

FACTS: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Brgy.
Agos, Polangui, Albay, Aug. 12, 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi
City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga
City.

Respondent Version
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger's side. He
testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from
the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was
dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.

Petitioner’s Version
Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off
the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction
of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks
of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor trailer before it was thrown a few meters away.
The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.

Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. Gregorio was injured and some of his other family members.
Unfortunately, his wife, daughters (among the driver Laarni), sisters and granddaughter did not survive or expired on
the hospital. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractortrailer were injured. Tison, the owner
of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 immediately after the accident
and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorio's daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit
of Desistance.

On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the RTC of
Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and
carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the
accident, medical and burial expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, loss of income, litigation expenses.

In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarni' s negligence which proximately caused the accident.
They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by
executing an Affidavit of Desistance..

RTC Decision favored the Petitioners

1. Consideration that plaintiff authorized Cynthia to settle the case amicably for P 200,000.
2. Proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or negligence of defendants' driver/employee but from
plaintiff's driver. The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and
reliable than that of Gregorio's, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as
focused as that of the driver.

CA Decision Reversed and favored Respondent

1. It ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. In support of such finding. CA relied
heavily on Gregorio' s testimony that Jabon was driving the tractortrailer downward too fast and it
encroached the lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney resulting
in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon must be speeding. It noted that the
restriction in Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the
time of the accident. Tison (owner) was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove due diligence in
supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck.
2. Disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had no written power of attorney
from respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she did not read its
content.

ISSUE: The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law which lead back to the very issue
litigated by the trial court: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?

RULING: Petition is granted. Reversed and set aside CA.

(sorry taas ang ruling because ang facts ang magestablished for negligence.)

Negligence
According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These
requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of action by preponderance of
evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The
trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite
conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision. One
reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more
focused than that of a mere passenger.

The trial court expounded, thus: In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration
is their opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they testify
to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which oftentimes happen merely
momentarily or in the split of a second. In the case of a running or travelling vehicle, especially in highway travel
which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving continuously
from moment to moment even in long trips. While in the case of a mere passenger, he does not have to direct his
attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he may converse with other passengers and pay
no attention to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to,
rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately preceding
thereto not as much as that of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. The version of the
driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs'
vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of
the driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the
precise point of inquiry — the proximate cause of the accident — is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the
passenger's vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the driver's seat especially in
nighttime, thus rendering a passenger's opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of the collision lesser
than that of the driver.

This being so, this Court is more inclined to believe the story of defendant's driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven
by Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the
process the two vehicles approaching each other from opposite directions at highway speed came in contact with
each other, the zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to the fuel tank, the violent impact
resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck.

The appellate court labelled the trial court's rationalization as a "sweeping conjecture" and countered that Gregorio
was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that he
was not driving. While it is logical that a driver's attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere
passenger, it should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced,
and only as a general rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver
and a passenger, the former is more credible. The factual setting of the event testified on must certainly be
considered.

Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and a passenger in a vehicle
was not the only basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon's alleged vantage point to clearly
observe the incident, the trial court also took into consideration Gregorio's admission that prior to the accident, the
jitney was running on the "curving and downward" portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into
account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and when it was
about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and encroaching the jitney's lane.

We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when it
collided with the descending jitney.

During the direct examination (only the highlighted part is included), Jabon narrated that the tractor-trailer was
ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag
manner, thus:
Q: Could you please tell the Court what was your speed at the time when you saw that jeepney with top[-]load
running on a zigzag manner?

A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per hour because I was ascending plain.

Xxx

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that he was ascending, viz.
Q: You said you were ascending towards the direction of Liboro, Camarines Sur, is that correct at the time
the incident happened?
A: Yes sir.

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct examination described the road condition where the collision took
place as "curving and downward," thus:
Q: Could you please describe the place where the incident happened in so far as the road condition is concerned?
A: The road was curving and downward.

However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw the tractor-
trailer running down very fact and encroaching on their lane, to wit:
Q: Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided with your owner jeepney that you were riding testi􀀷ed
in open Court on July 24, 1997 which I quote, 'while on my way to Liboro coming to Sorsogon I met a vehicle going
on a zig-zag direction and it even fell on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way on zig-zag direction', what can
you say about this statement of this witness?
A: We were no[t] zigzagging but because we were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we saw the on-
coming vehicle going down very fast and encroaching on our lane so our driver swerved our vehicle to the right but
still we were hit by the on-coming vehicle.

Xxx

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. The recollection of
Gregorio veered from "curving and downward" to uphill. On this point, Jabon and his testimony is more credible. The
fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial court's conclusion that the
jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was
"curving and downward." It is this conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorio's testimony, that
gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the herein respondent's jitney, "loaded with
passengers with top-load" "was running in a zigzag manner."

Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss
of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. There was
no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in
fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a
fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.

Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have
swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though,
happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to
maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill .
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio's daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the
Land
Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code which would allow him to drive a
tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the
collision. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the
legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic
regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must
exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the
violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence,
is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

Controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from
the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. The
rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts
leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is
no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient,
are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to
provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of
other.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractortrailer driver's restrictions on his
license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation
Office merely erred in not including restriction code in his license.