PEOPLE V FERRER

FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by instigating,
recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government with the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.

The Anti-Subversion Act Was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of
the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.' "By means
of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a
knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.

HELD:
No.

Article III, Section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a
bill of attainder.

In this case, when the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does
is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The
term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Indeed in this Act, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone,
without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character
and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force,
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder. When the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and
judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.
Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past
conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of
guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was.. doubly objectionable because
of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause —
'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' . . . Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder
it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not
are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder."

If one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must
be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the
penalties it imposes are inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed with respect to the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950:

"Nor is the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or of attainder by the fact that the conduct which it regulates
is described with such particularity that, in probability, few organizations will come within the statutory
terms. Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare, whether
that conduct is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation
is such that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation
merely by altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder."

VALMONTE V BELMONTE

FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager,
requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa
including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to those said documents. Apart
from Valmonte’s letter, he is stressing the premise of the request on the present provision of the Freedom
constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legal implications seek
the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiro’s reply letter, a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the
GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. On June 26, 1986, apparently not
having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another
letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public interest.
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In his comment,
respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS
General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek
relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were
not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents sought,
by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
RULING:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the state.
Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. People’s right to
information is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.” The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a
public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government
Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums ,
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations
which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds,
the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were
above board. Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. He further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by the
Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be
deemed outside the ambit of the right to information. There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is
constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice
Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the
GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no
right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS
through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is
purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be
violated. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees “access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions” only. Further, they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation performing
proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people’s right to access to official records. This
Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of
Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, WHETHER
carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of
service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary
function would NOT justify the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to
information. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager
of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may
specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with the
decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.
BORJAL V CA

FACTS
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing
and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking
among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving
matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never
named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered
petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently
identified to be the subject of the published articles.
RULING
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of the
Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not
necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.
As early as 1918, in United States vs. Cañete (38 Phil. 253), this Court ruled that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express
recognition in the statute punishing libels. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the
freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals, to be
more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without
doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was
so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: 'Public Policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.' The doctrine
formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be
protective of public opinion. This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to
collective self-determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-
expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal to the
individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It is therefore clear that the
restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting from liability
only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than
promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress
the healthy efflorescence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
We deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling. At any
rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public
a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in
other words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be included in his category are those who have achieved some
degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball
player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no
less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at
a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. Even assuming that the contents of
the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith
and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes
or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as
for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively
function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held — A
newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by
one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps
within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. To avoid the self-
censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing
liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for
defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual
malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement. At any rate, it may be salutary for private
respondent to ponder upon the advice of Mr. Justice Malcolm expressed in U.S. vs. Bustos, that "the
interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public
official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."

PITA v CA

Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized and confiscated
from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of
the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from confiscating more copies of
his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show
cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials but
admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for
the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine
alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and
confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the
trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it
for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?
Held: No.
Ratio:
In Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following trends in the United States, adopted the test:
"Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from
Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work rather than
isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary
community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover
to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the
wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues to journey from
development to development, which, states one authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has
been as "unstable as it is unintelligible." The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what
constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional
dimension of the problem. Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among
magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is
little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so
until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject — as in all
speech — to regulation in the interests of [society as a whole] — but not in the interest of a uniform
vision of how human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed."
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power,
to suppress smut — provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists
it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and
keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is
not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the
thirties yet their works are considered important literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was once
banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums. But neither should
we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the
divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than
resolved it. What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been,
an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the
discouraging trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not
an "acceptable" solution is in sight.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its
protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the
right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we
asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that
would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . . authorities." "There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the
validity of . . . previous restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." "To justify such a limitation, there
must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test."
As so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption
is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger,
a danger that must not only be (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech.
Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts
notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and
be held accountable for, due process. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory
injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding
the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way
of a search warrant.
OPLE V TORRES
FACTS:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a
petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O.
No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner
claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy. On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308
was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the
legislative powers of congress.
RULING
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered
under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an
individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services
and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be
in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements
for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of
building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may
be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some
of our authorities to resist. We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the
name, address and other basic personal information about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption
will not save. A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control
and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer linkage
gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system
is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose,
or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls
short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No.
308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities
of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider
that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes an reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determines the
reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and
practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics
and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. The measure of
protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the
file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely
drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
TAPUZ V DEL ROSARIO
FACTS:

1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.

2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the
disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos
and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission and against the objections of the
private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are
the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, finding prior
possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.

6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the
issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless
issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s
written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to
effectively take actual possession of the land.

9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order
of Demolition in CA.

10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify
the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too
that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited
formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and
for substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ
to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly
be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of
the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for
the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
“fishing expedition” that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.