Peoplevs Ferrer

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ferrer
Nos. L-32613-14. December 27, 1972.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON N.

FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO Co alias LEONCIO Co alias "Bob"
and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Constitutional law; Bill of Attainder, defined.—A bill of attainder is a

legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle
of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
Same; Bill of Attainder, history of.—History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, and it is against this evil that the -constitutional prohibition is
directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on
it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
Same; R.A. 1700, other known as The Anti-Subversion Act, not a bill of
attainder.—When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen
that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to
declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of
the Philippines" is used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not
on individuals but on conduct.
Same; Same; Under the Anti-Subversion Act guilt of accused must be
judicially established.—Indeed, were the AntiSubversion Act a bill of
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without
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People vs. Ferrer

more would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet
to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic, objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means
and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
Same; Same; Same; Mere membership in Communist Party not
punished.—As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing
membership in the Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of
conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all
who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid
of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the
statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active,
with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be
shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must
be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership"
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof
of direct participation in the organizations unlawful activities, while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal
objectives.
Same; Same; Even if Anti-Subversion Act specifies individuals it will
not be Bill of Attainder—Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of
attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities
underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks
on the basis of a legislative f inding that the persons mentioned would be
subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national
economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute
requiring every
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People vs. Ferrer
secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to

register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society
which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan, In the Philippines, the validity of section 23(b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of
union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist
Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the
overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods," was upheld by this Court.
Same; Same.—Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature
may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make
such determination.
Same; Same; Character of Communist Party as construed by Court.—
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object
of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party
of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we again found that
the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government
by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." More recently,
in Lansang vs. Garcia, we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth
organizations such the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of
the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we
said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable
group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government
and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines."
Same; Same; To be Bill of Attainder statute must not only specify
persons or groups but also it must reach past conduct.
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People vs. Ferrer
—Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it
may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement ement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legeslative legislative adjudication of guilt.
Same; Same; Same.—The statement of the U.S. Supreme Court with
respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
—"Nor the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or attainder by the fact than the
conduct which M regulates is described with such particularity that, in
probability, few organizations will come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
public welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many
persons or by one, So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the
persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can
escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present
activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder."—may be said of the
Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states 'that the prohibition
therein applies only to acts committed, "After the approval of this Act." ...
Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive
organization at the time of the enactment of the -law, were given
opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and
under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that
such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability.
Same; Anti-Subversion Act not violative of constitutional freedom 'of
speech and association.—The legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act
that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for
the overthrow of the Government is intended not to provide the basis for a
legislative finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify
the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and
freedom of association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to
occupy a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values.
Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the
existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why before enacting the
386
People vs. Ferrer
statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated

its findings in the preamble of the Act. In truth, the constitutionality of the
Act would be open to question if, instead of making those findings in
enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do so.
Remedial law; Distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative
fact.—A conventional formulation is that legislative facts—those facts
which are relevant to the legislative judgment—will not be canvassed save
to determine whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist,
while adjudicative facts—those which tie the legislative enactment to the
litigant—are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinary
standards prevailing for judicial trials.
Same; Constitutional law; Test of due process.—If laws are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. The
recital of legislative findings implements this test.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; It is not court's duty to examine
validity of legislative findings.—It is not for the courts to reexamine the
validity of these legislative findings and reject them. ... They are the product
of extensive inves-tigation by Committees of Congress over more than a
decade and a half. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded or
irrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we must, as a not
unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist
organizations pose not only to existing government in the United States, but
to the United States as a sovereign, independent Nation. ... we must
recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations
of this nature is extensive. This statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367 U.S. 94 (1961), mutatis mutandis,
may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion
Act.
Constitutional law; Political law; Dactrine of right to selfprotection.—
That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It
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VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 387
People vs. Ferrer
surpasses and transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect
its very structure from armed internal attack, ... no subordinate value can be
protected." As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States
(341 U.S. 494): "Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument
that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial govern-ments is without
force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and
orderly change. We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical
conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not within
the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the
government by force and violence."
Same; Purpose of Anti-Subversion Act does not stifle fundamental
personal liberties.—By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct
(as explicitly described in section 4 thereof), Congress reaffirmed its respect
for the rule that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." The requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from
nominal membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membership in a subversive organization.
Same; Act not unconstitutionally overbroad.—The argument that the
Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow" of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful
means, misconceives the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts proscribed
are stated in section 4 which requires that membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear
that the overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means." The
absence of this qualification in section 2 appears to be due more to an
oversight rather than to deliberate omission. Moreover, the word
"overthrow" sufficiently connotes
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People vs. Ferrer
the use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may
one speak of peaceful overthrow of governments, and certainly the law does
not speak in metaphors.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; Use of word "over-throw" in the
Act.—In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use of the word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardly consistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow," namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and place [sic] the Government under the
control and domination of an alien power," What this Court once said in a
prosecution for sedition is apropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should
be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently
intended to be understood. The word "overthrow" could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective
franchise. ..."
Same; Act does not infringe freedoms of expression and association.—
Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is
infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly
and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security
and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.
Same; Act deals with only one subject which is expressed in the title
thereof.—It is argued that the last proviso to section 4 of the Act punishes
any conspiracy to overthrow the government even if the intention is not to
establish a communist totalitarian regime, but a democratic regime. This, it
is said, is not germane or embraced in the title of the Act. HELD: The Act,
in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and
for Other Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act
shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title,
the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates t that the subject-matter
is subversion in general which has for is s fundamental purpose the
substitution of a foreign totalita-
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People vs. Ferrer

rian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion
by Communist conspiracies.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; Title of bill need not be a
catalogue of its contents.—The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an
index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid
title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or technical
construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and
reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion
Act fully satisfies these requirements.
Criminal law and procedure; Guidelines to be observed in prosecutions
under the Anti-Subversion Act.—We cannot overemphasize the need for
prudence and circumspection in the enforcement of the Anti-Subversion
Act, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and
belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in
any prosecution under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such
circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the following elements
of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other
subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist

Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is
to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to
establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination
of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;
and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the
CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957
to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country
under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the
CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
390

People vs. Ferrer
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:
I. Statement of the Case

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-
1
Subversion Act, which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other
similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4
of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
_______________
1 Rep. Act No. 1700, 12 Laws & Res. 102 (1957). The text of the statute is
hereunder reproduced in full:
"AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS. PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
"WHEREAS, the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political
party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien
domination and control;
"WHEREAS, the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and
"WHEREAS, in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in
scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country: Now, therefore,
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People vs. Ferrer
the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary
investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the
Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The
twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27,
recites:
"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of

Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed
_______________
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
"SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as Anti-Sub-version Act.
"SECTION 2. The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be
an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the Government
under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party and any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed.
"SECTION 3. As used in this Act, the term 'Communist Party of the Philippines' shall mean
and include the organizations now known as the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, formerly known as HUKBALAHAPS, and
any successors of such organizations.
"SECTION 4. After the approval of this Act, whoever knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association as defined in section two
hereof shall be punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently
from holding any public office, appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to vote;
in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision correccional, and in all
subsequent convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed; and any alien convicted
under this Act shall be deported immediately after he shall have served the sentence imposed
upon him: Provided, That if such member is an officer or a ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association as defined in section two hereof, or if
such member takes up arms
392

People vs. Ferrer
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the

Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines.
"That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
_______________
against the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all
the accessory penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code: And provided,
finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its political
subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means, for the
purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and
domination of any alien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision
mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same Code,
"SECTION 5. No prosecution under this Act shall be made unless the.city or
provincial fiscal, or any special attorney or prosecutor duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice as the case may be, finds after due investigation of the facts, that
a prima facie case for violation of this Act exists against the accused, and .thereafter
presents an information in court against the said accused in due form, and certifies
under oath that he has conducted a proper preliminary investigation thereof, with
notice, whenever it is possible to give the same, to the party concerned, who shall
have the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to cross-examine witnesses against him:
Provided, That the preliminary investigation of any offense defined and penalized
herein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper Court of First
Instance.
"SECTION 6, Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any. action
brought under this Act shall be punished by prision correccional.
"SECTION 7. No person shall be convicted of any of
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People vs. Ferrer
"(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with

insult to public authorities;
"(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and
"(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity."
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a

bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal
complaint was filed with the same court, charging the respondent
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended,
reads:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly

designated by the Secretary of Justice to -collaborate with the Provincial
Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case,
hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR
GARCIA, RE-
_______________
the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of at least
two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
"SECTION 8. Within thirty days after the approval of this Act, any person who is a member
of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any such association or conspiracy, who
desires to renounce such membership may do so in writing and under oath before a municipal
or city mayor, a provincial governor, or a person authorized by law to administer oaths. Such
renunciation shall exempt such person or persons from the penal sanction of this Act, but the
same shall in no way exempt him from liability for criminal acts or for any violation of the
existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines committed before this Act takes effect.
"SECTION 9. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction to freedom of thought,
of assembly and of association f or purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
"SECTION 10. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved, June 20, 1957."
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People vs. Ferrer
NATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO,

BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT
No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as
follows:
"That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and
thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named
accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or
remained as officers and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No.
1700; that BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY, in addition
thereto, knowingly, willfully and by overt acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the
above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and
feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating
and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take
up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies
and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by
force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which
are the following:
"1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused

conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused
delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise
in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized,
among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in
barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of
undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal
means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and to establish in the Philippines a Communist
regime.
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People vs. Ferrer
"2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA,
together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and
others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in
San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army,
and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or
other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a
Communist Government.
"That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of

the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity;
and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed."
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of

the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is
vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the
title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its
resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the
grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused.
The Government ap-pealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a
special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states

2
that "No bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is
a legislative act which in-
_______________
2 Delegate Jose P. Laurel (of the 1934 Constitutional Convention) referred to the
Anglo-American origin of this right, thus:
"No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. This provision is found in the
American Federal Constitution (Art 1, Sec. 9) and is applicable to the States (id. Sec. 10). An
ex post facto law is a law which makes an act punishable in a manner in which it was not
punishable when committed. It creates or aggravates the crime
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People vs. Ferrer
3
flicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substi-
_______________
or increases the punishment, or changes the rules of evidence for the purpose of
conviction. The prohibition against the passage of ex post facto laws is an additional
bulwark of personal security—protecting the citizen from punishment by legislative
act which has a retrospective operation.
"The phrase ex post facto has a technical meaning and refers to crimes and
criminal proceedings. It is in this sense that it was used in England. It was in this
sense that the convention of 1787 understood it. (Calder v. Bull, supra; Watson v,
Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Suterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters, 380; Kring v. Missouri, 107
U.S. 221.) This interpretation was upheld by our Supreme Court (U.S. vs. Ang Ken
Ko, 6 Phil. 376.)
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial
trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356.) In England, the Bill of
Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was tried, convicted and
sentenced to death without a jury, without a hearing in court, without hearing the
witnesses against him and without regard to the rules of evidence. His blood was
attained or corrupted, rendering him devoid of all heritable quality—of acquiring and
disposing property by descent. (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366.) If the
penalty imposed was less than death, the act was known as a "bill of pains and
penalties/' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuart
oppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was included in a bill of attainder
presented to Parliament because of his reform activities.
"Often, such bills were 'stimulated by ambition or personal resentment, and
vindictive malice/ (Calder v. Bull, supra.) A well known case illustrating the ruthless
manner in which a bill of attainder was resorted to was that of Thomas Wentworth,
chief adviser of Charles I. He was brought to impeachment charged with attempting
to subvert the liberties of England. He defended himself so ably that his enemies,
fearing his acquittal, withdrew the impeachment and a bill of attainder was passed
instead. Wentworth was beheaded. Bills of attainder were also passed in the Colonies
(North, The Constitution of the U.S., its Sources and Applications, p. '85.) The
prohibition in the Bill of Rights, therefore, seeks to prevent acts of violence and
injustice brought about the passage of such bills." (3 J. Laurel, Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention 661-663 [1966]).
3 Cummings vs. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1867);
397
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 397

People vs. Ferrer
4
tution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of5 attainder serves to implement the
principle6
of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby 7
forestalling legislative usurpation of the
judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder 8were
employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and
it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed.
The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it,
and a legislative
9
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of
attainder.
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was con-
________________
accord, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867). This definition was
adopted by this Court in People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 544 (1947) and in People vs,
Montenegro, 91 Phil. 883, 885 (1952).
4 De Veau vs. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); United States vs. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315, (1946).
5 Chief Justice Warren referred to the Bill of Attainder Clause as an
implementation of the separation of powers, "a general safeguard against legislative
exercise of judicial function, or more simply, trial by legislature." United States vs.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1964).
6 "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would
seem to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87,
136 (1810),
7 "The legislative body in enacting bills of attainder exercises the powers and
office of judge, it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or
saf eguards of trial... it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own
notions of the enormity of the offense." Cummings vs. Missouri, supra note 3,
8 Bills of this sort, says Mr. Justice Story, have been most usually passed in
England in times of rebellion or gross subserviency to the crown, or of violent
political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well as free as
the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of
others." Comm. sec. 1344, in re Young Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 347, 440. During the
American revolution legislative punishments had been continued by state legislatures,
when numerous bills of attainder were enacted against the Torries. 1 C. Antieu,
Modern Constitutional Law, 425.
9 C. Antieu, supra note 8 at 423.
398

People vs. Ferrer
demned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and

feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a
'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.' "
By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the
powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the f orms or saf
eguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a
knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder
because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational
guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be

seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization.
The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used
solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not
only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to
"any other organization having the same purpose and their
10
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S.
Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
______________
10 The Supreme Court of the United States said in Fleming vs. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 613-14 (1960):
"In determining whether legislation which bases a disqualification on the happening of a certain
past event imposes a punishment, the Court has sought to discern the objects on which the
enactment in question was focused. Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to
be the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the disqualification is not
punishment even though it may bear harshly upon one affected,"
399
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 399

People vs. Ferrer
11 12
Disclosure Act of 1959 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, was held to be a
bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutionaL Section 504 provided
in its pertinent parts as follows:
"(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party .,,
shall serve—
"(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or

similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or
other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively
clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization ...

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in

the Communist Party...
"(b) Any person who willfully violates this section ahall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both."
This statute specifies the Communist Party, and imposes disability

and penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without
more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a
member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the
Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
"Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder,
Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to
enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate
commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political
strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority
granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or
possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in
Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold
union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons
have committed
_______________
11 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. sec. 504 (1958 ed. Supp. IV).

12 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (5-4 vote).
400

People vs. Ferrer
the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it

designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring
criminal liability—members of the Communist Party.
"Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L
ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lends support to our conclusion. That case
involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the
Communist Party to register as a 'Communist-action organization/ under the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et
seq. (1958 ed). The definition of 'Communist-action organization' which the
Board is to apply is set forth :a sec. 3 of the Act:
"'[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in
section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world Communist movement...' 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958
ed.)
"A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of
attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon
which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead
sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953
that the Communist Party was a 'Communist-action organization,' the Court
found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party
would always come within it:
"In this proceeding the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has
sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities
in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party
should at any time choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367
US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)"
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be

totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone,
without more, would suffice to
401
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 401

People vs. Ferrer
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt
still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to
prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing
its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force,
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the
control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing
membership in the Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet
device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are
liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed
as punishing mere membership devoid 13
of any specific intent to
further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically
requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful,
must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
14
overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue
15
the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes
an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
_______________
13 Keyishian vs. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt vs. Russell, 384
U.S. 11 (1966).
14 Cf. Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto vs. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961).
15 During the Senate deliberations on the bill, Senator Cea remarked: "I have
inserted the words 'overt acts' because we are punishing membership in the
Communist Party, I would like that membership to be proved by overt acts, by
positive acts, because it may happen that one's name may appear in the list of
members." Senate Cong. Rec. May 22, 1957, p. 1900.
402

People vs. Ferrer
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a
bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of
securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees
of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts
deemed inimical to the16 national economy, has been declared not to
be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret,
oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was
declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to
17
the members of the Ku KIux Klan.
In the Philippines
18
the validity of section 23 '(b) of the Industrial
Peace Act, requiring labor unions to file with the Department of
Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not
members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of
any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by19 any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by
this Court.
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inf lict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
20
become a bill of attainder. It is upon this ground that statutes which
disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the
Government
21
of the United States during the Civil
22
War from holding
office, or from exercising their profession, or which prohibited
the payment of further com-
_______________
16 Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System vs. Agnew 329 U.S. 441.
17 New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 278 U.S 63 (1928).
18 Repealed by Rep. Act 4241.
19 Philippine Ass'n of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, Feb. 27, 1969, 27
SCRA 40.
20 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
21 Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1867)
22 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).
403
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 403

People vs. Ferrer
pensation to individuals named in the Act on 23the basis of a finding

that they had engaged in subversive activities, or which made it a
crime for a member of the Communist
24
Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, have been invalidated as bills of
attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the
legislature may apply its own rules, and 25
judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination.
26
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, the New York
legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society
with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any
person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to
register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the
statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux
Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like
masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States
Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
"The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and
reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a ,difference
between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to
make the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts
and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the
absence of such a tendency on the part of the.other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal associa-
________________
23 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).

24 United States vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
25 The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder
Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 35154 (1962).
26 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
404

People vs. Ferrer
tion in the included class: 'lt is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and
gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the
people;' and later said of the other class: 'These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many
years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights
of others/ Another of the courts said: 'lt is a matter of common knowledge
that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a
member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of
sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this
society;' and later said of the other class: 'Labor unions have a recognized
lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders
Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted
special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial
rather than harmful agencies/ The third court, after recognizing 'the
potentialities of evil in secret societies,' and observing that 'the danger of
certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated/—meaning in that
state,—said: 'Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have
existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have
on the whole justified their existence."
"We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was
readily available, including the published report of a hearing, before a
committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to
the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan, If so it was
advised—putting aside controverted evidence—that the order was a revival
of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed
from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
membership was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in
part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom
for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another
exacted of its members an oath to shield and preserve 'white supremacy;'
and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be
'a dangerous
405
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 405

People vs. Ferrer
ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our
national commonwealth;' that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics,
Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices;
that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship
over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times
it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its
27
members conceived to be crimes."
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the
object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the
28
Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In
1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the
"overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to
establish in the Philippines a communist29form of government similar
to that of Soviet
30
Russia and Red China." More recently, in Lansang
vs. Garcia, we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth
organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing
the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the
existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in
arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in
order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills
of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and
reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a
bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Jus-
______________
27 Id. at 75-77.
28 People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 375 (1932); see also People vs. Evangelista, 57
Phil. 372 (1932); People vs. Capadocia, 57 Phil. 364 (1932); People vs. Evangelista,
57 Phil. 354 (1932); People vs. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451 (1932); People vs. Nabong, 57
Phil. 455 (1932).
29 People vs. Lava, L-4974-78, May 16, 1969.
30 L-33864. Dec. 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.
406

People vs. Ferrer
tice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was . . .

doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the
historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause—'No
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.'. . . Therefore,
if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if
it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish 31
that it is not
are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 32
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles
which provided:
"... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or
employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5)
years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught,
or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or
affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which
advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years
advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States of America or of the State of California."
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective

application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
"... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision
insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its
effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service
persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or
reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become
affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service
by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the
United States.
______________
31 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946).
32 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
407
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 407

People vs. Ferrer
"... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which
petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare
general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility
for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensation to named individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statute was
held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial."
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress

thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then It must be demonstrated
that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct
and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. As the U.S.
Supreme Court observed with respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950:
"Nor is the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or of attainder by the fact that
the conduct which it regulates is described with such particularity that, in
probability, few organizations will come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
public welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many
persons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the
persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can
escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present
33
activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder,"
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the Anti-

Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states that the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts aff iliate themselves with, become or remain members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of
any subversive association" after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those
who were members of the Party or of any other subversive
association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability by
______________
33 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1960).
408

People vs. Ferrer
renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party.
The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to
34
exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed
by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of

the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government
is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative finding
of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression
and freedom of association are so fundamental that they are
thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the
35
hierarchy of constitutional values. Accordingly, any
limitation on their exercise must be justified by the
existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why
before enacting the statute in question Congress conducted
careful investigations and then stated its findings in the
preamble, thus:
"...[T]he Communist Party of the Philippines although purportedly a

political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to
alien domination and control;
"... [T]he continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of
the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security
of the Philippines
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion,
national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope with
________________
34 Sec. 8.
35 E.g., Kovacs vs. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Vera vs. Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28
SCRA 351,
409
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 409

People vs. Ferrer
this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country."

In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if,
instead of making these findings in enacting the statute, Congress
omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial
magistracy, the trial court failed to take proper account of the
distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor
Paul Freund elucidates the crucial distinction, thus:
"... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containing more than 3.2 per cent
of alcohol would raise a question of legislative fact, i.e., whether this
standard has a reasonable relation to public health, morals, and the
enforcement problem. A law forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
(assuming it is not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)
would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether this or that
beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statute and the limits on
governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean
by fact in each case is itself an ultimate conclusion founded on underlying
facts and on criteria of judgment for weighing them.
"A conventional formulation is that legislative facts—those facts which
are relevant to the legislative judgment—will not be canvassed save to
determine whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist,
while adjudicative facts—those which tie the legislative enactment to the
litigant—are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinary
36
standards prevailing for judicial trials."
37
The test formulated in Nebbia38vs. New York, and adopted by this
Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, is that "if laws are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and
_______________
36 Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in Su preme Court and

Supreme Law 47-48 (Cahn ed. 1954).
37 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
38 L-33964, Dec. 11, 1971, 41 SCRA 448.
410

People vs. Ferrer
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio."

The recital of legislative findings implements this test
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findings in the
U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (that
"Communist-action organizations" are controlled by the foreign
government controlling the world Communist movement and that
they operate primarily to "advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement"), the U.S. Supreme Court said:
"It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of these legislative findings
and reject them. ... They are the product of extensive investigation by
Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as
unfounded irrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we must, as a
not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist
organizations pose not only to existing government in the United States, but
to the United States as a sovereign, independent Nation. ... we must
recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations
39
of this nature is extensive."
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative

findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act. That the
Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration, Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcends every other
value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed
40
internal attack, ... no subordinate value can be protected" As Chief
41
Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States:
"Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a

'right' to rebellion against dictatorial gov-
________________
39 Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367 U.S. 94 (1961).

40 Dennis vs. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
41 Id. at 501.
411
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 411

People vs. Ferrer
ernments is without force where the existing structure of government

provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which
principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one
could conceive that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts
intended to overthrow the government by force and violence,"
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as

explicitly described in section 4 thereof), Congress reaffirmed its
respect for the rule that "even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
42
be more narrowly achieved." The requirement of knowing
membership, as distinguished from nominal membership, has been
held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive
43
organization. For, as has been stated:
"Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the

organization; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge
that the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting
or retaining membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to the
44
unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged."
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because

section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow" of the Government and
overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the
function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in
section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts
prescribed are stated in section 4 which requires that membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first
"whereas" clause makes clear that
____________
42 Shelton vs. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

43 Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see also Noto vs. United States,
367 U.S. 290 (1961).
44 Frankfeld vs, United States, 198 F. 2d, 879 (4th Cir. 1952).
412

People vs. Ferrer
the overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and

violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means." The
absence of this qualification in section 2 appears to be due more to
an oversight rather than to deliberate omission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow" sufficiently connotes the use of
violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may
one speak of peaceful overthrow of governments, and certainly the
law does not speak in metaphors. In the case of the Anti-Subversion
Act, the use of the word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardly consistent with the clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow," namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and place [sic] the Government under the control and
domination of an alien power." What this Court once said in a
prosecution for sedition is apropos: "The language used by the
appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by
violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense
in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word
'overthrow' could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary
change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip
[which the accused exhorted his audience to use against the
Constabulary], an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of
adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the
45
appellant would have us impute to the language."
IV The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to

overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means.
Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association
is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the
overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of
democratic institutions in this country.
_______________
45 People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455, 458 (1932).
413
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 413

People vs. Ferrer
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in

many respects to the membership provision of the Anti-Subversion
Act. The former provides:
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or

assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of
persons, knowing the purpose thereof—
"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United
States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following
46
his conviction. . .."
In sustaining the validity

47
of this provision, the Court said in Scales
vs. United States:
"It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is
not constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a
combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what
purports to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the
first Amendment. We can discern no reason why membership, when it
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from
the guarantees of that Amendment."
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of

accommodating the exigencies of self-preservation and the values of
liberty are as complex and intricate as in the situation described in
the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, the legislative judgment as to how
that threat may best be met consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedoms is not to be set aside merely because the
judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have chosen other
48
methods.
_______________
46 18 U.S.C. sec. 2385. (emphasis added)

47 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
48 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control Board. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
414

People vs. Ferrer
For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom to hire or

freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromise between the
claims of the social order and individual freedom, and when the
legislative compromise in either case is brought to the judicial test
the court stands one step removed from the conflict and its
49
resolution through law."
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional command that "no

bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
50
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the
Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
"And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit,
subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien power,
shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the
accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code."
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes not only

membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines or similar
associations, but as well "any conspiracy by two persons to
overthrow the national or any local government by illegal means,
even if their intent is not to establish a totalitarian regime, but a
democratic regime, even if their purpose is not to place the nation
under an alien communist power, but under an alien democratic
power like the United States or England or Malaysia or even an
anticommunist power like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwan or
Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Out law the
Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar
____________
49 P. A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States 75 (1961).

50 Const., art. VI, Sec. 21 (1).
415
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 415

People vs. Ferrer
Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other

Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall
be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title,
the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject-
matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental
purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of
the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist
conspiracies.
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its
51
contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title
if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and
52
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow or
technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read
fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. We
hold that the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements,
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-Subversion

Act, we cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and
circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it does in the
sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we
set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such
circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the following
elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippines or any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the
Commmunist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the
organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime
under the domination of a
______________
51 Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 66 Phil. 483. (1938).
52 Lindasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28089, Oct. 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 496.
416

People vs. Ferrer
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization; and (c)
that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that
the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in
1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the
country under the control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused
joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by
overt acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime of
remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of
any other subversive association; we leave this matter to f uture
determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September 15,
1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the
court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ.,

concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Antonio, J., did not take part.
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is with regret that I find myself unable to join the rest of my

brethren in the decision reached upholding the validity of the Anti-
1
Subversion Act. It is to be admitted that the learned and scholarly
opinion of Justice Castro has the impress of conscientious and
painstaking scrutiny of the constitutional issues raised. What is
more, the stress in the concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines
that
______________
1 Rep. Act No. 1700 (1957).
417
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 417

People vs. Ferrer
will assure in the trial of those prosecuted under such Act respect for
their constitutional rights is to be commended. Nonetheless, my own
reading2
of the decisions cited, interpreting the bill of attainder
clause coupled with the fears, perhaps induced by a too-
latitudinarian construction
3
of the guarantees of f reedom 4of belief
and expression as well as freedom of association as to
impermissible inroads to which they may be exposed, compels a
different conclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that the equally
pressing concern of state saf ety and security should be ignored. The
political branches of the government would lay themselves open to a
justifiable indictment for negligence had they been remiss in their
obligation to safeguard the nation against its sworn enemies. In a
simpler era, where the overthrow of the government was usually
through the rising up in arms, with weapons far less sophisticated
than those now in existence, there was no constitutional issue of the
magnitude that now confronts us. Force has to be met with force. It
was as clearcut as that. Advances in science as well as more subtle
methods of inducing disloyalty and weakening the sense of
allegiance have introduced complexities in coping with such
problems. There must be then, and I am the first to recognize it, a
greater understanding for the governmental response to situations of
that character. It is in that light that the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act is to be appraised. From my standpoint, and I am not
presumptuous enough to claim that it is the only perspective or that
is the most realistic, I f eel that there was an insufficient appreciation
of the compulsion of the constitu-
______________
2 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 11: "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted."
3 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 8: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances."
4 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 4: "The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired."
418

People vs. Ferrer
tional commands against bills of attainder and abridgment of free

speech. I am comforted by the thought that even had my view
prevailed, all that it would mean is that a new legislation, more in
comformity to my way of thinking to what is ordained by the
fundamental law, would have to be enacted. No valid fear need be
entertained then that a setback would be occasioned to legitimate
state efforts to stem the tide of subversive activities, in whatever
form manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significance of the
bill of attainder clause is the meaning attached to it by the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people who adopted
it. As was explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P.
Laurel in his address on November 19, 1934 as Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court:
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L
ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament
by which a man was tried, convicted and sentenced to death without
a jury, without a hearing in court, without hearing the witnesses
against him and without regard to the rules of evidence. His blood
was attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid of all heritable
quality—of acquiring and disposing property by descent. (Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less
than death, the act was known as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills
of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuart
oppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was included in a
bill of attainder presented to Parliament because of his reform
5
activities." Two American Supreme Court decisions were thus in
6
the minds of the framers. They are Cummings v. Missouri and Ex
7
parte Garland. They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no
matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or
easily
_____________
5 Footnote 2, p, 9 of Opinion of the Court.

6 4 Wall. 277 (1867).
7 4 Wall. 333 (1867).
419
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 419

People vs. Ferrer
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict on them

punishment amounting to a deprivation of any right, civil or
political, without judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
8
Constitution.
9
Cummings v. Missouri was a criminal prosecution of a Catholic
priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath required by the state
Constitution of Missouri of 1865. Under such a provision, lawyers,
doctors, ministers, and other professionals must disavow that they
had ever, "by act or word," manifested a "desire" for the success of
the nation's enemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the American
Civil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of perjury. If they
engaged in their professions without the oath, they were criminally
liable. The United States Supreme Court condemned the provision
as a bill of attainder, identified as any legislative act inflicting
punishment without judicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil
or political, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment. Why
such a conclusion was unavoidable was explained in the opinion of
Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act, which
inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less
than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the
meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains
and penalties. In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its
legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it
assumes, in the language of the 'textbooks, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs
produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or
otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with
its own notions of the enormity of the offense. * * * If the clauses of
the 2d article of the Constitution of Missouri, to which we have
referred, had in terms declared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or
should be held guilty, of having been in armed hostility to the United
______________
8 Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 US 303 (1946).

9 4 Wall. 277 (1867).
420

People vs. Ferrer
States, or of having entered that state to avoid being enrolled or

drafted into the military service of the United States, and, therefore,
should be deprived of the right to preach as a priest of the Catholic
church, or to teach in any institution of learning, there could be no
question that the clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within
the meaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, instead of
mentioning his name, had declared that all priests and clergymen
within the state of Missouri were guilty of these acts, or should be
held guilty of them, and hence be subjected to the like deprivation,
the clauses would be equally open to objection. And further, if these
clauses had declared that all such priests and clergymen should be so
held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they did not, by a day
designated, do certain specified acts, they would be no less within
the inhibition of the Federal Constitution. In all these cases there
would be the legislative enactment creating the deprivation, without
any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the
10
citizen in the administration of justice by the established tribunals."
On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings was handed
11
down, Ex parte Garland was also decided. That was a motion for
leave to practice as an attorney before the American Supreme Court.
Petitioner Garland was admitted to such bar at the December term of
1860. Under the previous rules of such Court, all that was necessary
was that the applicant have three years practice in the state courts to
which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule was changed by the
addition of a clause requiring that an oath be taken under the
Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865 to the effect that such
candidate for admission to the bar had never voluntarily borne arms
against the United States. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience
subscribe to such an oath, but he was able to show a presidential
pardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such act of clemency, he
moved that he be allowed to continue in
_____________
10 Ibid, 323, 325.

11 4 Wall. 333 (1867).
421
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 421

People vs. Ferrer
practice contending that the test oath requirement was

unconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any rate, he was
pardoned. The same ruling was announced by the Court again
through Justice Field. Thus: "In the exclusion which the statute
adjudges, it imposes a punishment for some of the acts specified
which were not punishable at the time they were committed; and f or
other of the acts it adds a new punishment to that before prescribed,
and it is thus brought within the f urther inhibition of the
Constitution against the passage of an ex post facto law, In the case
of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, * * * we have had occasion
to consider at length the meaning of a bill of attainder and of an ex
post facto law in the clause of the Constitution forbidding their
passage by the states, and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we
there said. A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution against
enactments of this kind by Congress; and the argument presented in
that case against certain clauses of the Constitution of Missouri is
equally12
applicable to the act of Congress under consideration in this
case."
There was a reiteration13
of the Cummings and Garland doctrine in
United States v. Lovett, decided in 1946. There it was shown that
in 1943 the respondents, Lovett, Watson, and Dodd, were and had
been for several years working for the government. The government
agencies, which had lawfully employed them, were fully satisfied
with the quality of their work and wished to keep them employed on
their jobs. Over their protest, Congress provided in Section 304 of
the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, by way of an
amendment attached to the House Bill, that after November 15,
1943, no salary or compensation should be paid respondent out of
any money then or thereafter appropriated except for services as
jurors or members of the armed forces, unless they were prior to
November 15, 1943, again appointed to jobs by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Notwithstanding such
Congressional enactment, and the
______________
12 Ibid, 377-378.
13 328 US 303.
422

People vs. Ferrer
failure of the President to reappoint the respondents, the agencies

kept all the respondents at work on their jobs for varying periods
after November 15, 1943, but their compensation was discontinued
after that date. Respondents brought this action in the Court of
Claims for the salaries to which they felt entitled. The American
Supreme Court stated that its inquiry was thus confined to whether
the action in the light of proper construction of the Act presented a
justiciable controversy, and, if so, whether Section 304 is a bill of
attainder insofar as the respondents were concerned.
After holding that there was a justiciable view, the American
Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Black categorically
affirmed: "We hold that Section 304 falls precisely within the
category of Congressional actions which the Constitution barred by
providing that 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.' In Cummings v. State of Missouri, * * * this Court said, 'A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed
a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution,
bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.' * * * On the
same day the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Ex parte
Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds an Act of Congress
which required attorneys practicing before this Court to take a
similar oath. Neither of these cases has ever been overruled. They
stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their
form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder
prohibited by the Constitution. Adherence to this principle requires
14
invalidation of Section 304. We do adhere to it."
15
United States v. Brown a 1965 decision was the first
_______________
14 lbid, 315-316.
15 381 US 437,
423
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 423

People vs. Ferrer
case to review a conviction under the Labor-Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or, except in clerical or
custodial positions, an employee of a labor union. Respondent
Brown, a longshoreman on the San Francisco docks, and an open
and avowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a century was
elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union for consecutive one-
year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961. On May 24, 1961, respondent
was charged in a one-count indictment returned in a district court of
California with serving as a member of an executive board of a labor
organization while a member of the Communist Party, in willful
violation of the above provision. The question of its validity under
the bill of attainder clause was thus properly raised for adjudication.
While convicted in the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. It was sustained by the American Supreme
Court. As noted in the opinion by Chief Justice Warren, "the wide
variation in form, purpose and effect of anteConstitution bills of
attainder indicates that the proper scope of the Bill of Attainder
Clause, and its relevance to contemporary problems, must ultimately
be sought by attempting to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the
Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate. The best
available evidence, the writings of the architects of our
constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was
intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be
outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise
16
of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature." Then
after referring to Cummings, Garland, and Lovett, Chief Justice
Warren continued: "Under the line of cases just outlined, Sec. 504 of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under the
_____________
16 Ibid, 442.
424

People vs. Ferrer
Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from

positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use such
positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution.
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing
that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain
characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view,
make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union
office, and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what
persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the
persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot
hold union office without incurring criminal liability—members of
17
the Communist Party."
18
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
where the provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950 requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register
was sustained, the opinion of Justice Frankfurter for the Court,
speaking for a fiveman majority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummings principle. Had the American Communist Party been
outlawed, the outcome certainly would have been different. Thus:
"The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches not to specified
organizations but to described activities in which an organization
may or may not engage. The singling out of an individual for
legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes an attainder whether
the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct
which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of
particular persons. * * * The Subversive Activities Control Act is
not of that kind. It requires the registration only of organizations
which, after the date of the Act, are found to be under the direction,
domination, or control of certain foreign powers and to operate
primarily to advance certain objectives. This finding must be made
_____________
17 Ibid, 449-450.
18 367 US 1 (1961).
425
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 425

People vs. Ferrer
after full administrative hearing, subject to judicial review which

opens the record for the reviewing court's determination whether the
administrative findings as to fact are supported by the preponderance
of the evidence. Present activity constitutes an operative element to
which the statute attaches legal consequences; not merely a point of
reference for the ascertainment of particular persons ineluctably
19
designated by the legislature."
The teaching of the above cases, which I find highly persuasive
considering what appeared to be in the minds of the framers of the
1934 Constitutional Convention yields for me the conclusion that
the Anti-Subversion Act falls within the ban of the bill of attainder
clause. It should be noted that three subsequent cases upholding the
Cummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in the opinion
of the Court. The interpretation accorded to them by my brethren is,
of course, different but I am unable to go along with them especially
in the light of the categorical language appearing in Lovett. This is
not to Iose sight of the qualification that for them could deprive such
a holding of its explicit character as shown by this excerpt from the
opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the AntiSubversion Act a bill of
attainder it would be totally unnecessary to charge communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
conviction and punishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to
be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the
trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other
illegal means and place it under the control and domination of a
20
foreign power. While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding
acceptance. In Cummings, there was a criminal prosecution of the
Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.
________________
19 Ibid, 86-87.
20 Opinion of the Court, p. 15.
426

People vs. Ferrer
Again in Brown, there was an indictment of the labor leader who,

judging by his membership in the Communist Party, did transgress
the statutory provision subsequently found offensive to the bill of
attainder clause. If the construction I would place on the oft-repeated
pronouncement of the American Supreme Court is correct, then the
mere fact that a criminal case would have to be instituted would not
save the statute. It does seem clear to me that from the very title of
the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and similar associations," not to mention other specific
provisions, the taint of invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my
inability to concur in the judgment reached as the statute not
suffering from any fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional
prohibition against bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancy of the
Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual liberty saf eguarded by the
Constitution in terms of the f ree speech and f ree association
21
guarantees. It is to be admitted that at the time of the enactment of
Republic Act No, 1700, the threat that Communism, the Russian
brand then, did pose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders
and the then President. Its shadow fell squarely across the lives of
all. Subversion then could neither be denied nor disparaged. There
was, in the expert opinion of those conversant with such matters, a
danger to our national existence of no mean character. Nonetheless,
the remedies to ward off such menace must not be repugnant to our
Constitution. We are legally precluded from acting in any other way.
The apprehension justly felt is no warrant for throwing to the discard
f undamental guarantees. Vigilant we had to be, but not at the
expense of constitutional ideals.
One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost sig-
_______________
21 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 6: "The right to form associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged/' Paragraph 8 of this section
reads as follows: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for redress of grievances."
427
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 427

People vs. Ferrer
nificance, is the right to dissent. One can differ, even object; one can
express dissatisfaction with things as they are. There are times when
one not only can but must Such dissent can take the form of the most
critical and the most disparaging remarks. They may give offense to
those in authority, to those who wield power and influence.
Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection. Insofar as
the content of such dissent is concerned, the limits are hardly
discernible. It cannot be confined to trivial matters or to such as are
devoid of too much significance. It can reach the heart of things.
Such dissent may, for those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,
possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democratic
form of government cannot be silenced. This is true especially in
centers of learning where scholars competent in their line may, as a
result of their- studies, assert that a future is bleak for the system of
government now favored by Western democracies. There may be
doubts entertained by some as to the lawfulness of their exercising
this right to dissent to the point of advocacy of such a drastic
change. Any citizen may do so without fear that thereby he incurs
the risk of a penal sanction. That is merely to affirm the truth of this
ringing declaration f rom Jefferson: "If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this union or to change its republican form,
let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which
error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat
22
it." As was so well put by the philosopher, Sidney Hook: "Without
holding the right to the expression of heresy at any time and place to
be absolute—for even the right to non-heretical speech cannot be
absolute—it still seems wise to tolerate the expression even of
Communist, fascist and other heresies, lest in outlawing them we
include other kinds of heresies, and deprive ourselves 23of the
opportunity to acquire possibly sounder ideas than our own,".
_______________
22 Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, in Padover, ed., The

Complete Jefferson, 385 (1943).
23 Hook, Heresy, Yes-Conspiracy, No. 71 (1953).
428
People vs. Ferrer
The line is to be drawn, however, where the words amount to an

incitement to commit the crime of sedition or rebellion. The stage
has been reached, to follow the formulation of Cardozo, where
thought merges into action. Thus is loyalty shown to the freedom of
speech or press ordained by the Constitution. It does not bar the
expression of views affecting the very life of the state, even if
opposed to its f undamental presuppositions. It allows, if it does not
require as a matter of fact, that unorthodox ideas be freely ventilated
and fully heard. Dissent is not disloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutional
principle "that even though the governmental purposes be legitimate
and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. For precision of regulation is the touchstone
24
in an area so
closely related to our most precious freedoms." This is so for "a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
25
area of protected freedoms." It is indispensable then that "an
overbreadth" in the applicability of the statute be avoided. If such be
the case, then the line dividing the valid from the constitutionally
infirm has been crossed. That for me is the conclusion to be drawn
from the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take In the dissent of
Justice Black in the Communist Party case discussed above. What is
to be kept in view is that a legislative measure certainly less drastic
in its treatment of the admittedly serious Communist problem was
found in the opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the First
Amendment of the American Constitution safeguarding
______________
24 Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 871 (1969) citing Shelton

v. Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960) and NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963).
25 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964).
429
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 429

People vs. Ferrer
free speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain about the First
Amendment it is that this Amendment was designed to guarantee the
freest interchange of ideas about all public matters and that, of
course, means the interchange of all ideas, however such ideas may
be viewed in other countries and whatever change in the existing
structure of government it may be hoped that these ideas will bring
about. Now, when this country is trying to spread the high ideals of
democracy all over the world—ideals that are revolutionary in many
countries—seems to be a particularly inappropriate time to stifle
First Amendment freedoms in this country. The same arguments that
are used to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here could be
used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracy in other
26
countries." Further he stated: "I believe with the Framers of the
First Amendment that the internal security of a nation like ours does
not and cannot be made to depend upon the use of force by
Government to make all the beliefs and opinions of the people fit
into a common mold on any single subject. Such enforced
conformity of thought would tend only to deprive our people of the
bold spirit of adventure and progress which has brought this Nation
to its present greatness. The creation of public opinion by groups,
organizations, societies, clubs, and parties has been and is a
necessary part of our democratic society. Such groups, like the Sons
of Liberty and the American Corresponding Societies, played a large
part in creating sentiment in this country that led the people of the
Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father of the
Constitution—James Madison—said, in speaking of the Sedition
Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party, that had that law been in
effect during the period before the Revolution, the United States
might well have continued to be 'miserable colonies, groaning under
a foreign yoke/ In my judgment, this country's internal security can
better be served by depending upon the affection of the people than
by attempting to instill them with fear and dread
________________
26 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 148.
430
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED E1.

People vs. Ferrer
of the power of Government. The Communist Party has never been

more than a small group in this country. And its numbers had been
dwindling even before the Government began its campaign to
destroy the Party by force of law. This was because a vast majority
of the American people were against the Party's policies and
overwhermingly rejected its candidates year after year. That is the
true American way of securing this Nation against dangerous ideas.
Of course that is not the way to protect the Nation against actions of
violence and treason. The Founders drew a distinction in our
Constitution which we would be wise to follow. They gave the
Government the fullest power to prosecute overt actions in violation
of valid laws but withheld any power 27
to punish people for nothing
more than advocacy of their views."
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in my mind and
congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot share the conclusion
reached by my brethren as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully
meeting the test of validity on free speech and freedom of
association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the constitutional questions
involved arises from an appraisal of the challenged statute which for
me is susceptible of an interpretation that it does represent a
defeatist attitude on the part of those of us, who are devotees at the
shrine of a liberal-democratic state. That certainly could not have
been the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an assumption is
not devoid of plausibility for why resort to this extreme measure
susceptible as it is to what apparently are not unfounded attacks on
constitutional grounds? Is this not to ignore what previously was
accepted as an obvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism
sends its shafts in many directions? It can illuminate, and it can win
the hearts and minds of men. It is difficult for me to accept the view
then that a resort to outlawry is indispensable, that suppression is the
only answer to what is an admitted evil. There could have been a
greater ex-
____________
27 Ibid, 167-168.
431
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 431

People vs. Ferrer
posure of the undesirability of the communist creed, its

contradictions and arbitrariness, its lack of fealty to reason, its
inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience to centralized dictation
that brooks no opposition. It is thus, in a realistic sense, a
manifestation of the fear of free thought and the will to suppress it.
Far better, of course, is the propaganda of the deed. What the
communists promise, this government can fulfill. It is up to it then to
take remedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymen
whose lives are in a condition of destitution and misery. It may not
be able to change matters radically. At least, it should take earnest
steps in that direction. What is important f or those at the bottom of
the economic pyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for
a better life. If they, or at least their children, cannot even look
forward to that, then a constitutional regime is nothing but a
mockery and a tragic illusion. Such a response, I am optimistic
enough to believe, has the merit of thinning, if not completely
eliminating, the embattled ranks and outposts of ignorance,
fanaticism and error. That for me would be more in accordance with
the basic proposition of our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of abject surrender to the forces apparently bent on the
adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt
traditions of our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the
vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of regret that it
could not have been more impressively set forth in language worthy
of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself
unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice
Castro for the Court sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion
Act.
Resolution set aside and cases remanded to court a quo for trial
on the merits.
Notes.—Membership in the Communist Party per se was not

punishable as conspiracy to commit rebellion before the passage of
R.A. No. 1700 in 1957, unless coupled with
432

People vs. Ferrer
action or advocacy of action to rebellion (People vs. Hernandez, 11

SCRA 223).
R.A. 1700, which is known as the Anti-Subversion Act, and
which penalizes membership in any organization or association
committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to criminal
cases filed before the said law went into force nor can it be applied
to acts committed before its passage, (People vs. Lava. 28 SCRA
72).
Freedom of Speech; Right of Association and Assembly.
The State has the power to regulate the rights of free speech and
assembly. (Gallego vs. People, 8 SCRA 813), Thus, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, (27 SCRA 835), it was held that the
freedom of expression is "not absolute for it would be too much to
insist that at all time and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained as there are other social values that press
for recognition." The freedom of expression may be limited if there
is a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. (Ibid.)
The "balancing-of-interest" test may also be applied in
determining whether the point of viable equilibrium represented by
the legislative judgment embodied in the law is an appropriate and
reasonable one, in the light of both the historic purpose of the
constitutional safeguard of speech and assembly and the general
conditions obtaining in the community. (Ibid.) To be considered in
restricting individual freedom are such factors as (a) the social
importance and value of the freedom so restricted, (b) the specific
thrust of the restriction, (c) the value and importance of the public
interest; (d) the propriety and reasonableness of the restriction and
the possible achievement by other measures of the safeguard to the
public interest. (Ibid.)
The stress on the f reedom of association, as held in Gonzales vs.
COMELEC, .supra, should be on its political significance. The
Constitution limits this particular freedom
433
VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 433

People vs, Ferrer
of association in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the

right to form an association or societies when their purposes are
contrary to law. (Ibid.; Imbong vs. Commission on Elections, 35
SCRA 28). The law that would regulate the purposes for which
associations and societies may be formed or would declare their
purposes mala prohibita must prove, however, the usual
constitutional test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not
abridge the freedom of speech and press, (In re Kay ViIIegas Kami,
Inc ., 35 SCRA 429}.
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 375 on

Constitutional Law; volume 2, page 1928 on Statutory Construction.
See also Velayo's Digest, volume 5, page 1 on the Constitutional
Law; volume 21, page 191 on Statutes,
Aruego, J.M. and Others, The Philippine Constitution, 5
volumes, 1969-72 edition.
Cuaderno, M., The Framing of the Constitution of the
Philippines, 1937 edition.
Fernando, E.M., The Power of Judicial Review, 1968 edition,
Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 edition.
Singco, V.G., Philippine Constitutional Law, 1960 edition,
Cortes, L, Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 1970 edition.
________________
434
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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Ferrer

Nos. L-32613-14. December 27, 1972.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON N.

Constitutional law; Bill of Attainder, defined.—A bill of attainder is a

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 383

People vs. Ferrer

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Ferrer

secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 385

People vs. Ferrer

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Ferrer

statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 387

People vs. Ferrer

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Ferrer

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 389

People vs. Ferrer

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

I. Statement of the Case

"AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 391

the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 393

"(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a

"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly

NATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO,

"1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 395

"That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of

On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of

II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 397

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

demned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and

1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 399

"(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in

This statute specifies the Communist Party, and imposes disability

11 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. sec. 504 (1958 ed. Supp. IV).

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 401

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 48, DECEMBER 27, 1972 403