G.R. No. 176102.  November 26, 2014.

*
 
ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Penalties; Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.—Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when
he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prisión
mayor.

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*  FIRST DIVISION.

488

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hubilla vs. People

Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty; For the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence, prisión mayor in its medium period — eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years — was proper because there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.—Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prisió
n correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence, prisión mayor in its medium period — eight
years and one day to 10 years — was proper because there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA
imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one
day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prisi
ón mayor, as maximum.
Same; Children in Conflict with the Law; Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law; A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases
involving a child in conflict with the law.—A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of
them is that found in Section 46(2), in conjunction with Section 5(k),
whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited
to the minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the
CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act
No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to
reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child
in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9344; Penalties; Although Section 38 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child
in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is
available only until the child offender turns twenty-one (21) years of age,
pursuant to Section 40 of RA No. 9344.—Although Section 38 of Republic
Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict
with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only
until the

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Hubilla vs. People

  child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of

Republic Act No. 9344, to wit: Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict
with the Law to Court.—If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court
for execution of judgment.  If said child in conflict with the law has reached
eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of
age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006.
Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or
permissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(c) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment.—A review of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with
the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5(c) of Republic Act No.
9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a
disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for
the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate
courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by
imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the
penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified
from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

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Hubilla vs. People

Same; Same; Same; Same; Following Section 51 of Republic Act (RA)

No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it
in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections
(BuCor), in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), in a manner consistent with the offender child’s best
interest.—Following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner,
although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp
or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent
with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in
lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

PETITION for review on certiorari of an amended decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Ruben N. Villaluz for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.

 
RESOLUTION
 
BERSAMIN,  J.:
 
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest
of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,1
and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies
and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.2 The
mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to
impose the penalty of

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1  Republic Act No. 9344, Section 2(b).

2  Republic Act No. 9344, Section 2(f).
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Hubilla vs. People

imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the

law.
 
Antecedents
 
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
charged the petitioner with homicide under the following
information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 PM, in
Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA y BANTA
with a knife, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus,
directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as annex
“A” and made an integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the
deceased’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.3

 
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and
the Defense as follows:

Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of

March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of
Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony of the high
school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim,
arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the
latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed
the victim, this witness demonstrated that with

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3  Rollo, p. 21.

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492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hubilla vs. People

the appellant’s left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed
the victim using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and
later brought him to the hospital.
 Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the
incident, corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was
stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol
Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the
hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son
went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her son’s
stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation,
but died the day after.
She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police
authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and
burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico-legal expert, testified that the cause of death of
the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ
failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause
of death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this
manner:
He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he
was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching the high school
graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of
Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of
four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy
and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who
attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus, how-

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Hubilla vs. People

ever, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who
ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then,
carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he
used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was
graduating that day. He went home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought
him to the barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the
town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason
Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.4

 
Judgment of the RTC
 
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner
guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prisión mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.5
 
Decision of the CA
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction but modified the penalty and the civil liability through the
decision promulgated on July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus:

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4  Id., at pp. 31- 33.

5  Id., at pp. 22-27.
6   Id., at pp. 29-44; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (deceased),
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente (retired) and
Sesinando E. Villon.

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494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hubilla vs. People

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275,
finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (
sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years of prisión
correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of
prisión mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual
damages in the amount of
Php81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php50,000.00,
is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.

 
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA
promulgated its amended decision on December 7, 2006, decreeing
as follows:7

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the
subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment
shall now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275,
finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of
prisión cor-
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7  Id., at pp. 58-62.

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Hubilla vs. People

reccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión
mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual
damages in the amount of Php81,890.04, representing expenses for medical
and funeral services, is reduced to Php16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the
amount of Php50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason
Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga,
Branch 20, for appropriate action on the application for probation of,
herein, appellant.
 SO ORDERED.

 
Issues
 
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the
CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending
his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the
mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the
findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and
limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or not
the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the
Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation
and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3)
whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international
agreements.
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Hubilla vs. People

Ruling of the Court

 
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of
reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was
then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17
years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide
on March 30, 2000,8 such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prisión mayor.9
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next lower than
the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prisión correccional (i.e.,
six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence, prisión mayor in its medium period — eight
years and one day to 10 years — was proper because there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months and one day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prisión mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prisión mayor
should be reduced to only six years of prisión correccional to enable
him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the
Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other
relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence
would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.

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8  Per his birth certificate, Rosal’s date of birth was November 2, 1982.
9  Article 68, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Hubilla vs. People

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the

Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in
cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that
found in Section 46(2), in conjunction with Section 5(k), whereby
the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to
the minimum.11 Consistent with this principle, the amended decision
of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate
penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its
part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate
courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for
the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12
which disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the
petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul
the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to
determine if he was qualified for probation.
 Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the
suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law
adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only

_______________

10  Resolution dated November 24, 2009.

11   Section 46(2), A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law. See also Sec. 5(k) of RA 9344 which provides: Every child in conflict with the
law shall have the following rights, including but not limited to:
x x x x
(k)  the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the
minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether to
impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine being preferred as the more
appropriate penalty. (Emphasis supplied)
12  Establishing a Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes (July 24, 1976).

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Hubilla vs. People

until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section

40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section  40.  Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.—If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

 
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the
time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006.
Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible
or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would
be in violation of his rights as a child in conflict with the law as
bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals,
however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by
no means prohibited. While Section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 9344
bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a
proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain
restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the
detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the
detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time.

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Hubilla vs. People

Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and
spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was
imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from
probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of
his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the
course of action taken herein. The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines),14 the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of
Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty15 are
consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of
disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the
minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the
petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an
agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau

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13  The provisions of all these agreements are adopted by or incorporated in RA

9344, per Section 5.
14  19.1 of the Beijing Guidelines (November 29, 1985) provides: “The placement
of a juvenile in an institution shall be a disposition of last resort and for the minimum
necessary period.” Also 17.1(b) also provides that: “Restrictions on the personal
liberty of the juvenile shall be imposed only after careful consideration and shall be
limited to the possible minimum.”
15  Fundamental Perspectives No. 2 states: “Juveniles should only be deprived of
their liberty in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in these Rules
and in the United Nations standard minimum rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (The Beijing Rules). Deprivation of the liberty of a juvenile should be a
disposition of last resort and for the minimum necessary period and should be limited
to exceptional cases. The length of the sanction should be determined by judicial
authority, without precluding the possibility of his or her early release.”

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 Hubilla vs. People

of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social

Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender
child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of
service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on
December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the
order to remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation;
and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner
for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr.

*
* and Perez, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, amended decision affirmed.

Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,

or whose sentence will be reduced by reclusion perpetua by reason
of Republic Act No. 9346, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended. (People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551 [2014])
——o0o——

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* * Designated acting member, vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,

per Special Order No. 1885 dated November 24, 2014.

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