PVDI Safety Case PDF

03 Sep 2013
244
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Contents
1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................2

1.2. Definition .....................................................................................................................................3
1.3. Scope of the HSE Case .............................................................................................................3
1.4. Objectives of the HSE Case .....................................................................................................6
1.5. Structure of the HSE Case........................................................................................................6
1.6. Uses of the HSE Case ...............................................................................................................8
1.7. HSE Case Responsibilities .......................................................................................................8
1.8. Review Periods and Updates ...................................................................................................9
1.9. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................9
1.10. Operations HSE Management System.................................................................................10
1.11. Major Hazard Identification and Assessment ....................................................................10
1.12. Workplace Hazard Management...........................................................................................10
1.13. Leadership and Commitment.................................................................................................11
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1.1. Introduction
A Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Case is a demonstration of how the company
HSE objectives are being met in a methodical and auditable reference document. The
completed HSE Case provides a reference document to all information relevant to the
safety and health of the operation’s personnel, the environment and resources on an
installation.
The HSE Case provides stakeholders with assurance that:
• a Health, Safety and Environment Management System (HSE MS) is in place and
will continue to be applied; and
• all hazards have been identified and are being managed.
HSE Cases have been a legislated requirement worldwide for many years across a
number of industries, including oil, gas, chemical, process, nuclear and railways. The
HSE Case has evolved into the HSE Case, incorporating health and environmental
hazards, and its preparation, for hazardous facilities/ activities, has become standard for
many oil and gas companies around the world.
To specifically address the needs of Drilling Contractors and external stakeholders, the
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) issued a Global version of its
“Health, Safety and Environment Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”.
This HSE case follows those IADC HSE Case Guidelines.
The following persons were involved in production of this HSE Case
Ian Parr Rig Manager – PVD I
Ian Miller HSE Manager PVD Drilling Division
Ralph John Waller Maintenance Manager – PVD Drilling

Division
James Devenny/Richard Hughes Barge Captain – PVD I
Colin Smith / Nghiem Vu Dat Safety Training Coordinator – PVD I
Van Hoang Tung Deputy HSE Manager PVD Drilling Division
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Nguyen Si Anh Deputy Maintenance Manager – PVD

Drilling Division
Tran Tuan Marine Engineer – PVD Drilling Division
Franklin Henson / Terry Cleveland OIM – PVD I
1.2. Definition
The HSE Case is documentation that is intended to show that all hazards associated
with a particular facility or operation are known and that suitable measures are in place
to manage the risks to a level that is ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP).
In particular, the control of major hazards is demonstrated in detail, with the controls
for non-major hazards demonstrated by reference to those HSE MS components which
provide the mechanisms for hazard control.
This HSE Case is the documented programme of formal HSE assessment of operations
conducted by the PVD I Jack Up rig Management and crew. The HSE Case provides
assurance of the effective working of the PVD I HSE MS at the rig level.
1.3. Scope of the HSE Case
The HSE Case is rig specific, covering the HSE risks arising from all PVD I drilling
and well services operations, marine and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of
each well location and in-field and inter-field barge moves.
The case excludes passenger loading at the heliport and helicopter transportation of
personnel (outside the exclusion zone), transport of materials and equipment, supply
base activities and diving operations (which will be subject to a specific hazard
assessment prior to such operations commencing).
A detailed description of PVD I Jack Up rig and its operations are contained in Section
3 of this HSE Case.
Operating PVD I at a live production facility (i.e. Concurrent Production and Rig
Activities, or SIMOPS is not covered in detail in this HSE Case.
Similarly, well test package hazards are not covered in detail in this HSE Case.
Notwithstanding this, the possibility of a well test package or a live adjacent production
platform causing a Major Accident involving PVD I is acknowledged and explored as
far as possible (in the absence of specific facility / system details) within this MODU
HSE Case.
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Therefore, if a production facility at which PVD I is required to operate is to be live

during PVD I operations there, or if a well test package is to be installed and used on
PVD I, then a separate hazard identification and safety assessment shall be conducted,
with the involvement of Operator and PVD representatives, and reported to PV Drilling
and PVD I management for acceptance prior to commencement of concurrent
operations.
An Overview of PV Drilling
PV Drilling (Petro Vietnam Drilling and Well Services Corporation) is located at

Sailing Tower,111A Pasteur Street, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City , Vietnam .
Tel_ +84-39-100-662. www.pvdrilling.com.vn
PV Drilling was established in 2001, originated from the PTSC Offshore division
who’s business is mainly offshore drilling man-power supply and oil spill response
services, PV Drilling has gradually built its trade name as a highly reputable and
reliable contract drilling and well-related service provider in the region The fleet
operates widely from land to offshore with the new generation of Jack-ups and Land rig
and to deep water zone with a TAD which was brought into operation in late 2011. PV
Drilling employs locals and expatriate staff who are well-trained and well-experienced
to work in multicultural sites and will offer these drilling services to clients.
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PVD MISION AND MISSION STATEMENT
VISION:
To be an international reputable and reliable drilling contractor and drilling –
related services provider in oil and gas industry.
MISSION:
To be a leading regional provider of drilling and drilling – related services,
creating added value for clients by delivering high quality services at
competitive prices.
Founder of PV Drilling - Do Van Khanh. President & CEO - Pham Tien Dung
Scope of Work Provided by PVD I – Jack Up
PVD I is suited for offshore drilling operations, the rig can perform the following
• Work overs
• Well testing
• Drilling / re-drilling new well slots.
• Exploration Drilling
Non Drilling mode: the rig can perform the following:
Dive support
Accommodation barge.
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1.4. Objectives of the HSE Case
The objectives of the HSE Case for the PVD I operations are to:
• Show that an effective local HSE MS is in place on the rig, in compliance with the
PVD 1 HSE MS, to ensure that operations will be conducted in a safe manner.
• Show that a ‘Formal HSE Assessment’ has been, and continues to be,
systematically applied to jack up operations and include a listing of all HSE
hazards.
• Demonstrate (to a level of detail commensurate with the level of risk) how
hazards and effects are managed for rig operations and that plans and equipment
are in a state of readiness for recovery in the event that control is lost.
o for major hazards:
 Demonstrates, to the extent reasonably possible, that all foreseeable and

credible major hazards that have the potential to cause multiple fatalities,
major asset damage, major environmental effect or considerable adverse
impact to the partner companies’ reputation have been identified,
assessed and that the necessary control measures are managed so that
risks associated with these hazards have been reduced to a level that is
ALARP; and
o for non-major hazards:
 Demonstrates that procedures and practices necessary to control

workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities (e.g. hot work,
grinding, etc.) are in place, communicated and implemented, and that
responsibilities are assigned for preparing, updating and enforcing the
procedures to ensure on-going management of workplace hazards.
1.5. Structure of the HSE Case
The HSE Case follows the structure set out below, in line with the IADC HSE Case
Guidelines. HSE CASE
Management Summary
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6

Introduction HSE MS PVD I Jack Risk Emergency Performance
Description Up Management Response Monitoring
Description
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Section 1: Introduction
Section 1 describes the scope, objectives and structure of the HSE case, including a
brief explanation of the contents of each part of the HSE case. This part also contains
the justification for continued operations.
Section 2: HSE Management System Description
This part provides a description of the system in place for managing the HSE risks
associated with the drilling operations. The HSE MS ensures the identification and
assessment of hazards throughout operations; that all reasonably practicable measures
have or will be taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards and that all activities,
engaged in or sub-contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way.
Section 3: PVD I Jack Up Description and Supporting Information
Section 3 provides sufficient information to enable a clear understanding of the PVD I

operations, with an emphasis on aspects relevant to HSE.
Section 4: Risk Management
Section 4 provides a demonstration that all potential hazards have been identified, the
risk from the hazards evaluated and understood, and the controls to manage the causes
and consequences are in place. The Hazard Register is a communication document and
quality record that presents, in a clear and concise form, the results of the analysis made
of each hazard associated with the operations.
From the Hazard Register the major hazards associated with PVD I operations are
identified and a detailed bowtie analysis performed (reported in Section 4) to identify
the causes, barriers, controls and recovery measures for these hazards. HSE Critical
Tasks identified as essential to provide or maintain the necessary controls and recovery
measures identified in the bowties are listed. This part also specifies who is responsible
for the tasks, the inputs required to carry out each task and how it will be verified that
each task has been undertaken properly.
Section 5: Emergency Response
This part summarises the Emergency Response arrangements. Demonstrating that the
source of all potential major accidents have been identified and appropriate measures
put in place to prevent and reduce their effects to man and the environment.
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Section 6: Performance Monitoring
This part describes the monitoring, audit and review activities that provide assurance
that the HSE MS is being adhered to and provide a basis for continual HSE
management improvement.
1.6. Uses of the HSE Case
The HSE Case provides the primary reference and guidance source for a number of
activities essential for the HSE management of PVD I operations as follows:
• a systematic framework to enable management to assure themselves formally that

the major hazards arising from PVD I operations are adequately controlled;
• a baseline for the systematic assessment of the risk associated with any future
changes to the operations;
• a guide for all new personnel at all levels involved in PVD I operations to provide
rapid familiarisation with the hazards and the associated technical and procedural
controls used for managing them;
• a framework upon which HSE audits may be developed and programmed;
• a reference for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up;
• the HSE critical tasks listing provides a reference for managers and supervisors of
the HSE-critical tasks to be undertaken, who is responsible for them, the
documentation where the task is defined and how it will be verified that the task
has been undertaken properly;
• identification of HSE critical positions (from the HSE critical task responsibilities)
which can be linked to the competence assessment process; and
• the Remedial Action Plan assigns corrective actions and thus enables commitment
to HSE management to be included in performance appraisals.
1.7. HSE Case Responsibilities
HSE Case Owner
The Owner is ultimately responsible for the HSE management of the operations
covered by the Case and is the final approval authority for the contents of the
Case. The Owner is responsible for issuing the Statement of Fitness for
Operations, thus accepting accountability for the HSE management of the
operations and declaring that all known major HSE hazards that could occur have
been identified and are under control, The Deputy Director (in charge Jack Up’s) is
the senior management position within PV DRILLING who has overall ownership
of, and responsibility for, the HSE Case.
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HSE Case Custodian
The Custodian is responsible to the Owner for management of the HSE Case.
The Custodian is responsible for initiating the appropriate programmes to ensure
awareness and proper use of the Case. The Custodian is responsible for the technical
accuracy of the contents of the HSE Case and for ensuring that revisions and updates
are prepared when necessary. The Custodian is responsible for ensuring that
distribution of the Case and its revisions and updates is adequately controlled.
The Custodian is Rig Manager of PVD I
1.8. Review Periods and Updates
Activities necessary to maintain the HSE Case will be implemented and co-ordinated by
the Custodian, under the direction and authorisation of the Owner. These include:
• Assignment/ awareness of the HSE critical task list to the relevant rig personnel
and sub-contractors. They are charged with the task of ensuring the relevance,
currency and accuracy of their designated tasks.
o Re-issuing updated parts of the document as necessary.
o It is recommended that the HSE Case is reviewed for currency as a minimum,

on a three year basis.
o The HSE Case should also be reviewed and updated to reflect: changes in client;
major change to drilling location; and any major modifications to the rig that
impact upon HSE arrangements.
• In addition, the entire HSE Case should be subject to management review every
year.
• All signatory pages, owner and custodian, will require re-endorsement should the
signatories change.
1.9. Conclusions
The HSE Case sets out the HSE objectives of the PVD I operations and has
documented the programme of formal HSE assessment conducted by PVD I to assure
themselves that major HSE risks associated with the operations are managed such that
they are reduced to ALARP levels.
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1.10. Operations HSE Management System
The operations HSE MS, as described in Section 2, are considered to be in place for
operations on rig. The HSE MS in place is compliant with the requirements placed by
PVD I and aligns with the requirements of international standards. Where required,
additional arrangements such as interface (bridging) documents, are developed to
ensure the effective interface of all parties e.g. between PVD I and operating
companies.
It is concluded that suitable HSE management arrangements are in place to ensure

that PVD I Jack Up operations are fit for purpose and safe for operations.
1.11. Major Hazard Identification and Assessment
Major hazards have been identified for the operations associated with the PVD I, based
on comparisons with industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by experienced
specialists. These have been consolidated into major hazard bowties. Suitable and
sufficient threat barriers, recovery preparedness measures and escalation factor controls
have been identified. The HSE critical tasks identified as essential to provide or
maintain these barriers and controls have been or will be included in appropriate written
procedures, job hazard analyses, working practices or training standards.
Where it was considered practicable by the case developers and reviewers, additional
measures to further reduce the risk from major hazards have been identified for
implementation or further consideration (and are included in the Remedial Action
Plan). Shortfalls in control measures have been identified and areas requiring
improvement are also included in the Remedial Action Plan.
It is concluded that all credible and foreseeable major hazards have been identified
and that suitable and sufficient barriers and controls are in place such that risks to
people, assets, environment and company reputation are ALARP.
1.12. Workplace Hazard Management
Application of the HSE MS for the PVD I provides the required systems for continuous
improvement in the management of workplace hazards. Where existing arrangements
are not yet of the required standard, corrective actions are in place in the Remedial
Action Plan. The HSE Case contains a comprehensive list of all hazards and control
measures identified for PVD I operations, Section 4.
The management of workplace hazards will be subject to continuous performance

monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that the actual
practice meets the agreed standards.
It is concluded that workplace hazards are being managed for the PVD I operations
to a level which is ALARP.
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1.13. Leadership and Commitment
PVD are satisfied that the methods used to develop the HSE Case provide a systematic
and thorough assessment of the potential hazards associated with the PVD I operations.
PVD I confirms its full support to the uses of this document, and commits itself to the
continued improvement of hazard management using the HSE Case as a vehicle to
guide those involved in a consistent and structured manner.
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Contents
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2
2.1.1 Definition, Objectives and Scope of the HSE MS ........................................................ 2
2.1.2 Structure of the PVD Management System ................................................................. 4
2.1.3 Process Owner of the PVD HSE MS Manual ............................................................... 4
2.2 HSE Policies and Objectives ............................................................................................. 5
2.2.1 HSE Policies ................................................................................................................. 5
2.2.2 PVD Health & Safety and Environment Policy Statements .......................................... 5
2.3 Organisation Responsibilities............................................................................................. 7
2.4 Roles and Individual Responsibilities ................................................................................ 9
2.4.1 HSE Critical Activities ................................................................................................. 11
2.4.2 Resources .................................................................................................................. 11
2.4.3 Competence Assurance and Training ........................................................................ 11
2.4.4 Employee and Direct Subcontractor Induction and Ongoing Alignment .................... 12
2.4.5 Document Management ............................................................................................. 12
2.5 Risk Management ............................................................................................................ 12
2.5.1 Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control ......................................................... 12
2.5.2 Recovery Preparation ................................................................................................. 13
2.5.3 Environmental Aspect Listing Unit Particular ............................................................. 13
2.5.4 Occupational Health ................................................................................................... 13
2.5.5 Behaviour Based Safety Management ....................................................................... 13
2.5.6 Work Program ............................................................................................................ 14
2.5.7 Management of Change ............................................................................................. 14
2.5.8 Job Safety Assessment .............................................................................................. 15
2.5.9 Permit to Work System ............................................................................................... 15
2.6 Planning and Procedures ................................................................................................. 16
2.6.1 HSE Planning ............................................................................................................. 16
2.6.2 Emergency and Response ......................................................................................... 16
2.6.3 HSE Meetings ............................................................................................................. 16
2.6.4 Procedures ................................................................................................................. 17
2.7 Communications .............................................................................................................. 20
2.8 Rig Security ...................................................................................................................... 20
2.9 Interfacing Arrangements with Operators and Third Parties ........................................... 21
2.10 Implementation and Performance Monitoring .................................................................. 21
2.10.1 Operational Activities and Tasks ................................................................................ 21
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2.1 Introduction
This section of the HSE Case describes how Health, Safety and Environmental
(HSE) performance is managed by Petro Vietnam Drilling and Well Services
Corporation (PVD) in general and on the PV Drilling I Jack Up rig in particular. It
presents an overview of the PVD HSE Management System (HSE MS) and
describes the HSE policies, objectives, organization, resources, standards,
procedures, processes and controls that are in place on the PV Drilling 1 to
continuously manage HSE risks.
In addition to PVD policies and procedures, there will also be operations/ location
specific working practices (e.g. those of the Client Operating Company and
contractors) which will be incorporated into the rig operations by project-specific
HSE MS interface documents.
A bridging (interface) document will be developed for each drilling location, jointly
with the Client Operating Company. This considers those areas of overlap and
coordination required to safely perform drilling activities and provides assurance
that standards of HSE achieved by one company are not compromised by the
practices of others.
2.1.1 Definition, Objectives and Scope of the HSE MS
The HSE MS is an integral part of PVD management system for drilling activities.
Its objectives are to define:
• Business processes and controls - necessary to ensure HSE hazards are
systematically identified, assessed and controlled, and to put in place recovery
measures should control be lost.
• Performance standards - for managing HSE and to ensure these standards are
assessed and continually improved by performance monitoring, audit and
review.
The scope is defined by the business activities that PV Drilling I undertakes,
namely offshore drilling operations.
The HSE MS is for use by management to ensure processes and business controls
are in place to identify HSE risks, to manage them adequately and achieve
continuous HSE improvement. It is used by offshore staff for planning and
implementation of work and by interested outside parties, to assist in understanding
how HSE aspects are managed within PVD.
However, it is every individual’s responsibility to implement and comply with the

HSE policy.
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HSEQ POLICY
At anytime and anywhere, the first responsibility of all PV Drilling Corp. staff have
to comply fully with the requirements of Health, Safety, Environment and Quality.
We are well aware of and shall implement the following principles in daily work
activities:
1. Every hazard and risk, which could lead to the harm to people, damage to
company property and/or the environment, can be prevented or alleviated.
2. Compliance with legal requirements, and our customer’s requirements and
preventive actions shall always be implemented consciously.
3. A good understanding to satisfy the customer by offering the best quality of
services, appropriate procedures and continuous review, improvement and
development.
4. All PV Drilling rigs and worksites are managed in the manner to pursue zero
incidents.
All PV Drilling Corp. staff and sub-contractors who work with us are accountable
for the implementation of this policy.
Founder of PV Drilling President & CEO
DO VAN KHANH PHAM TIEN DUNG
ISO 9001:2008
OHSAS 18001:2007
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2.1.2 Structure of the PVD Management System

PVD has developed a system of safety, environmental and operational management
which captures the structure and culture of the Company through a system of policy
and procedure manuals, forming an integrated Management System that monitors,
controls and consistently improves the quality of its operations. The management
system is maintained electronically and is available at all PVD rigs and offices.
Additionally one set of paper manuals is kept by the OIM and is available to all
employees. A diagram showing the PVD management system is shown in figure
2.1.
2.1.3 Process Owner of the PVD HSE MS Manual
The process owner of the PVD HSE MS is the PVD Health, Safety and
Environment Manager, who is responsible for:
• issuing the HSE MS manual and any revisions under his signature;
• assuring leadership and management commitment;
• establishing that HSE management objectives are understood;
• advising line departments/ service providers on implementation;
• initiating periodic revision of HSE MS manual as required.
The HSE MS is updated when major change occurs (for example re-organizations,
staffing levels, incident rates, facility changes, work sites, legislation, etc.). As a
minimum, the HSE MS is reviewed annually during the HSE MS Management
Review.
A diagram showing the PVD HSE MS is shown in
HSEQ Management
HSE Operation and Quality HR Offshore and

Management Maintenance Management Management Onshore
System System System System Emergency
Response System
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FIGURE 2.1: PVD MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
FIGURE 2.2: PVD HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.2 HSE Policies and Objectives

2.2.1 HSE Policies
The PVD Health & Safety and Environmental Policies are prominently displayed
on all PVD facilities and made available for company employees, contractors and
external parties, as appropriate. The policy communicates the company’s HSE
intentions and defines and documents its HSE expectations.
2.2.2 PVD Health & Safety and Environment Policy Statements
The PVD Safety Handbook describes the HSE activities and performance required
to achieve the company vision and policies. Objectives and plans are periodically
reviewed by senior management to assess progress.
Health & Safety Policy Statement

It is the policy of PVD not only to comply with health and safety measures as
required by law, but to act positively to prevent injury, ill health, fire, property
damage and damage to the environment arising from its operations.
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To this end PVD sets out the following commitments, which it, and its managers,
supervisors and other employees shall adhere to.
PVD’s Commitment
PVD will provide its employees and sub-contractors with, so far as is reasonably
practicable:
• A safe and healthy place of work;
• Tools and equipment which do not cause a significant risk to the health and
safety of employees;
• A safe system of work, adherence to which will protect employees’ health and
safety;
• Information and support to promote the health and well being of employees;
• The information, instruction, training and supervision necessary for
employees to meet their responsibilities.
The Managers’ and Supervisors’ Commitment
As agents of PVD, managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that:
• PVD’s systems of work are fully implemented in their areas of control;
• The personnel reporting to them are informed of their individual
responsibilities;
• The personnel reporting to them are mentored, supervised and receive training
as they require.
All Employees’ Commitment
All Employees of PVD are responsible for ensuring that they comply with the
responsibilities they are given. They are responsible for working to, and finding
ways of improving, the systems of work that are provided by PVD.
Environmental Policy Statement
PVD provide a wide range of drilling and engineering services to the oil and gas
industry, involving operations which have the potential to affect the environment.
The Company therefore undertakes to carry out such operations in an
environmentally responsible manner.
PVD considers that the protection of the environment is an integral part of its
business activities. The PVD shall ensure that this environmental policy and
associated management system is understood, implemented, maintained and
communicated to all levels of management, supervisors and all employees.
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Our commitments in this policy and associated environmental management system

are that we:
• Carry out operations with minimum practicable disturbance to the
environment.
• Maintain an awareness of environmental responsibilities amongst personnel
employed by PVD.
• Ensure that our contractors are operating to standards which are consistent
with those of PVD.
• Provide a framework within which to gather information to allow us to set
and review environmental objectives and targets.
• Make efficient use of the materials and energy sources used in operations.
• Minimise the generation of waste through reduction, re-use or recycling, and
use environmentally acceptable means of disposing of wastes.
• Prevent pollution (including accidental releases of oils, chemicals or other
materials), and maintain contingency plans to address those potential sources
of pollution that we control.
• Ensure that a process of continuous improvement is achieved through
auditing and performance review of this policy and associated environmental
management systems. This shall include:
o complying fully with all applicable environmental laws and regulations and
achieving higher standards where reasonably practicable;
o complying with the environmental policy and other relevant requirements of
its clients; and,
o maintaining contact with industry associations, government organisations
and other outside bodies, in order to ensure the communication and
development of realistic environmental standards.
2.3 Organisation Responsibilities
PVD employs a full time Health, Safety, Environment and Quality; this department
supplies support and resource to the rigs.
An HSE Manager is based onshore to assists PV Drilling I personnel with
implementation of the HSE MS. A Safety Officer is assigned to the PV Drilling I
and assists management with on-site implementation of the HSE MS.
PVD believes that line management responsibility is a prerequisite for effective HSE
management. Organisation charts for PVD HSEQ, PV Drilling onshore and offshore are
shown in Figure 2.3 & 2.4
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FIGURE 2.3: PV DRILLING ONSHORE ORGANISATION
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR IN DEPUTY DIRECTOR IN DEPUTY DIRECTOR IN DEPUTY DIRECTOR IN

CHARGE OF CHARGE OF CHARGE OF CHARGE OF
HR & ADMIN JACK UP RIGS TAD PROCUREMENT
HR & ADMIN PROCUREMENT ACCOUNTING OVERSEAS MAINTENANCE DRILLING HSE VUNGTAU

OPERATION SHOREBASE
DEPARTMENT DEPT. DEPT. DEPT. DEPT. DEPT.
TAD PVD RIG RIG RIG LANDRIG

VENEZUELA
PVD V PV Drilling I PV Drilling II PV Drilling III PV Drilling 11
FIGURE 2.4: PV DRILLING I OFFSHORE ORGANISATION CHART
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2.4 Roles and Individual Responsibilities

With respect to HSE personnel with the following roles have responsibilities as
outlined below, other personnel’s HSE responsibilities can be found in their job
descriptions.
The PV Drilling I Rig Manager has the following HSE responsibilities:
• Familiarize himself with the PVD HSE Policy and take all reasonable care to
ensure the health and safety of themselves and persons likely to be affected by
their acts or omissions.
• Promote safe working practices and accident prevention in all areas under their
authority and that these are brought to the attention of his operations.
• Ensure that planned safety inspections are carried out on the installation in
accordance with the Company Policy.
• Ensure follow-up and closeout of remedial details as generated from incident
investigations, Incident Review Panels or audits under the PVD’s Action
Tracking Systems.
• Ensure investigations are carried out on all accidents/ incidents as required
under the Company’s HSE MS.
• Ensure that all tasks supervised are adequately planned in advance, making use
of pre-shift, Tool Box Talks (TBT)/ Job Safety Analysis (JSA), etc. and is
communicated to those involved.
• Ensure that all operations are carried out in accordance with PVD Standards
• Ensure that BOP, operational and other safety drills are held in accordance
with the PVD Safety Policy and Client requirements, and to participate in the
control and co-ordination of any emergency response action or training that
may be required.
• Ensure the Rig complies with the Marine Management System.
The PV Drilling I OIM is responsible to the Rig Manager for ensuring that
personnel maintain a safe working environment and follow safe working practices
within their departments, maintaining discipline in all matters affecting health,
safety and welfare. In particular the OIM is responsible for the following:
• In accordance with the Maritime laws, he has the onboard ultimate authority
when the unit is in drilling position and during rig moves.
• As the offshore Installation Manager he has the legal responsibility for the
safety and welfare of all personnel on board, for the safety, watertight integrity
and seaworthiness of the MODU and for the protection of environment during
the operations carried out on board the unit
• He will promote safety and PVD policies as line management responsibilities.
• He must demonstrate commitment to the PVD safety policies by frequent
discussions, review, consultations and audits made on the unit.
• He must select appropriate standards, specifications and safe working
procedures including drills and incorporate these in the operational procedures
of the rig.
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• He must monitor adherence to standards, specifications and procedures and

review performances of department staff.
• He must ensure that staff are provided with sufficient resources and training to
achieve their safety objectives.
• He must attend head of department safety meetings with senior staff and can
attend at his discretion any regular department safety meeting.
• He must ensure that incidents causing harm or damages to personnel, to the
environment or to equipment are properly investigated using formalized,
systematic procedures and that effective measures are taken to prevent any
recurrence.
• He must investigate near misses and dangerous occurrence in order to prevent
recurrence and build a risk profile database.
• He must ensure that environmental standards, international and national
regulations are adhered to.
• He must assist in developing testing and monitoring the company's
contingency plan.
• Ensures that emergency response drills are properly conducted and
documented.
• Ensures that the personnel are properly trained and with valid certificates.
In close liaison with the senior installation personnel the PV Drilling I Safety
Officer is responsible for:
• Monitoring, coaching and ensuring the safe and effective compliance with all
Company Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and contractual requirements (e.g.
Interface Documentation).
• Directing safe and efficient compliance with HSE Regulation, codes, relevant
guidance and industry best practice.
In particular the PV Drilling I Safety Officer is responsible for:
• Ensuring that all accidents and incidents are fully reported, investigated and
actioned.
• Making planned visits to worksites and carry out regular inspections,
assessments and audits in line with PVD requirements to recommend
improvements and remedial actions, in writing if appropriate.
• Carrying out any safety training, for which qualified, as requested by
management, including safety inductions.
• Attending Safety Meetings and Toolbox Talks to monitor preparation,
participation, communication, involvement, accurate recording and that
effective remedial action is taken where required.
• Providing relevant information on Health, Safety and Environmental Policies
to employees.
• Participating in safety promotions, campaigns, seminars and courses when
required.
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To meet local government requirements and also company policy PVD I shall
appoint or elect HSE committee members chosen from the offshore workforce
The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) will serve as committee chairman,
ensuring a committee is selected from the offshore workforce by nomination,
invitation. Selection shall be on a rotating basis.
Appointed members of the committee designated by the OIM and the Safety
Training Co-ordinator will serve on the committee for one meeting.
Committee Responsibility
- Investigate potential hazards
- Investigate complaints relating to health and safety issues raised by the crews
- Report to the OIM on any matter affecting the health and safety of the
workforce
- Attend committee meetings
- If necessary report any deficiencies identified by rig personnel to the OIM
- Report and commend positive acts and conditions
- Take part in incident investigation when required
- Review incident reports to assist with root cause identification
- Provide advice and support to committee members as required
- Ensure Safety related items are added to the Master Action List
- Maintain a file with safety committee reports and meeting minutes
2.4.1 HSE Critical Activities

As part of this HSE Case, bowtie diagrams have been developed for the identified
PV Drilling 1 major hazards. From these bowties, PVD has identified a range of
activities and tasks as being HSE critical i.e. they play a crucial role in managing
HSE risks and, if not carried out, could lead to serious injury/ fatality, damage to
assets, the environment or the reputation of PVD.
HSE critical tasks developed in this HSE Case will be incorporated into job
descriptions and responsibilities discussed between incumbent and his supervisor
so that mutual understanding is reached.
2.4.2 Resources
Management provides human, technology and financial resources essential to the
control of major business risks and the implementation of the HSE MS.
2.4.3 Competence Assurance and Training
For each position there are specific HSE competence requirements, including
experience and medical requirements where necessary and these will be included in
job descriptions. As per company policy P1.03.04 Crew Assessments.
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HSE training records are maintained for each employee and recorded on a
computer based program. The PVD Training Matrix shows training required for
each position.
2.4.4 Employee and Direct Subcontractor Induction and Ongoing Alignment

In line with PVD HSE Induction has in place arrangements for the induction,
mentoring and ongoing management of employees and direct subcontractors to
ensure that:
• They are made aware of PVD’s HS&E expectations; and,
• Receive the necessary support and direction in fulfilling these expectations
throughout their working life with PVD.
When employees/ direct subcontractors first begin work for PVD they receive an
induction. All personnel arriving at a location will be given a familiarisation tour
and a thorough briefing on safety precautions, safety procedures, safety facilities
and emergency arrangements.
New personnel who are engaged in physical hands-on work on the site will be
buddied by an experienced employee for seven days, or otherwise until such time
as site supervision are confident that the safety of personnel will not be
compromised. Personnel will be mentored by a site supervisor for the first three
months of their work with PVD. This means that a supervisor will be made directly
responsible for on-the-job training and coaching of new personnel to ensure that
they are made fully aware of, and can fully comply with, PVD’s HSE expectations.
On notification of intended work or endorsement of a contract, a review of HSE
requirements are undertaken to ensure all is in compliance with the contract and
applicable to the law. Prior to hiring a labour contractor, the Corporate HR
Department and Drilling Division Administration department will identify suitable
subcontractor; checking their business credentials and resumes, and assesses their
management ability and skills.
2.4.5 Document Management

QHSE Department is responsible for the Management System Documentation.
PVD Document and Data Control Procedure (DD/HR/Admin/001) describes the
process for creation, approval, issue and subsequent revision of Management
System documentation.
2.5 Risk Management
2.5.1 Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control
All PVD activities where hazards have a potential to cause harm to people, damage
to assets, or affect the environment are evaluated. This allows PVD to focus
resources on these risks and implement controls and recovery (mitigation) measures
to ensure the risks are eliminated or are reduced to levels which are tolerable and
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
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Where major HSE risks for PV Drilling I operations have been identified in this
HSE Case, the controls and recovery measures for the risks are evaluated in detail
using the bowtie methodology (see Part 4).
2.5.2 Recovery Preparation
In the case of a hazard being realised due to failing preventive controls, recovery
measures are in place to minimize the consequences. A hazard realisation can have
multiple consequences and, for each, sufficient mitigation controls are applied until
the likelihood of each consequence occurring is assessed to have reached ALARP
levels. PVD has written emergency response and contingency plans including an
Onshore Response to a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Emergency (P1.06.03). The
plans meet all legal requirements, are readily available to all emergency response
personnel and are regularly reviewed and updated.
See section 5 of this HSE Case for a detailed review of PV Drilling I emergency
response arrangements.
2.5.3 Environmental Aspect Listing
To ensure that all environmental aspects are identified and evaluated for their
significance, in line with ISO 14001, Environmental Aspects and Impacts have
been evaluated by PVD for all operations offshore. Registers of environmental
aspects are maintained and reviewed in line with the PVD policy P1.04.52
Environmental Aspects Assessments.
2.5.4 Occupational Health
Exposure controls for identified health hazards are defined in PVD policies
P1.04.48 Noise at Work, P1.04.49 Vibration Control, and P1.04.50 Medical
Quarantine and implemented for all appropriate personnel. These controls are
periodically reviewed and audited for improvement and compliance. PVD
personnel are subject to regular medicals meeting standards set out in UK Oil and
Gas procedures these meet all required local and international requirements PVD
has developed and implemented a Drugs and Alcohol Policy which applies to all
staff.
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are available for all chemicals onboard.
Rig Medic gives regular health presentation on relevant health topics in association
with PVD Health Advisor and ISOS onshore team
2.5.5 Behaviour Based Safety Management
The PVD Observation Card process uses a behavioural approach to incident
prevention, by pro-active observation of personnel and work groups (see PVD
Observation Report Program P1.04.06). Safe as well as unsafe act/ condition(s) are
identified, discussed and agreements are made to conduct the work utilising a safer
method. The PVD card uses a hazard spotting checklist to reinforce understanding
of work place hazards.
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As the at-risk behaviours that produce, or have the potential to produce, personal
injury are eliminated, PVD safety performance will continuously improve. All
personnel are eligible to complete a PVD card. The OIM / Safety Training
Coordinator are responsible for training, guiding and monitoring the safety and
attitude of the entire workforce on the installation.
Observations and outcomes are recorded on a PVD Card which is reviewed by the
Senior Supervisor offshore for any remedial actions that need to be carried out. At
the end of every month Safety Training Coordinator will summarize and report to
the OIM, Rig Manager, Director of Division and the HSE Manager.
2.5.6 Work Program
The scope of work is defined by the Contract and Drilling Program with all work
being conducted in accordance with policies set out in the HSE Case, PVD MS and
the project-specific interface (bridging document). In cases where a conflict
between safety and operations occurs, work will not proceed until that conflict has
been resolved.
2.5.7 Management of Change
One of the key risk management tools implemented by PVD is the formal
Management of Change (MOC) Management of Change policy P1.03.08 is applied
to all activities performed on board the TAD barge/ rig creating temporary or
permanent changes to organization, personnel, systems, procedures, equipment,
materials or substances and laws or regulatory requirements.
For any proposed change an assessment of the consequences, including an analysis
of the health, safety and environmental impacts, must be performed for all areas
affected by the proposed change. Where a proposed change has a significant HSE
impact, a formal HSE risk assessment must be performed.
All changes are then implemented in a controlled process, including the
authorization and approval of the proposed change, the competency of the
personnel implementing the change, the timescale involved and the communication
of that change to all relevant areas of the Company.
It is the responsibility of the Rig Manager and OIM to manage the change in
accordance with the MOC procedure. Tools utilised during the MOC procedure
depending on the nature of the change include:
• HAZID/ HAZOP etc;
• Engineering change procedures;
• Variation order;
• Work guideline revision, training/ procedures matrix, competence
assessments;
• Permit to Work, Job Safety Assessment (JSA), Tool-box Talk, PVD Cards;
• Business and commercial risk assessments;
• Document Control;
• Communication from External Interested Parties; and Management Review
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2.5.8 Job Safety Assessment

The purpose of the Job Safety Assessment (JSA) process is to provide a means of
identifying and quantifying workplace hazards for the more complex and non-
routine tasks for which a safe system does not already exist. It is used to identify
the measures which are necessary to reduce the risks associated with those hazards
to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable and to quantify and manage the
residual risk after control measures are put in place.
It is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure that JSAs are utilised in the safe
planning of work activities on the barge. The Risk Assessment Procedure P1 03.15
has been developed to assist preparation of JSAs.
Before commencing the work activity, all personnel involved (directly or
indirectly) in the work will be informed of the results of the JSA and fully
understand their roles and responsibilities. This communication is accomplished
via a pre-task briefing (toolbox talk) or pre-tour meeting.
2.5.9 Permit to Work System
The Permit to Work (PTW) system (P1.04.10) provides a formal safe system of
control over rig activities which are outside normal operating practice or which
have been identified as being potentially hazardous. The PTW system provides
barge management with a formal method to administratively coordinate and control
work that may adversely impact other concurrent work, impair safety systems or
otherwise endanger personnel and/ or the facility.
PTW is administered on the PV Drilling I by the OIM / Person In Charge (PIC), or
his designate. Tasks identified under the PTW system will be assigned to the
following permits:
• Hot Work;
• Cold Work.
Supplementary certificates may be required before a PTW can be issued if
specialist activities are to be performed in conjunction with a given task. These are
separate from the Work Permit but are referenced on each document. There are
two categories of supplementary certificates:
• Isolations;
• Entry (Confined Space).
• Checklists are also used for items such as Radio Active sources etc.
Spot checks are made by Supervisors to verify conditions at the worksite meet the
requirements of the permit. All personnel receive PTW awareness training and role
specific training as appropriate to their role on the rig.
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2.6 Planning and Procedures

2.6.1 HSE Planning
A HSE Plan based on identified remedial actions arising from this HSE Case has
been prepared. It is structured to achieve the PVD annual HSE goals, targets and
continuous performance improvement objectives presented in the HSE MS. The
actions clearly identify responsible parties and targeted completion dates. Progress
against the plan is reviewed periodically in communication sessions with personnel.
2.6.2 Emergency and Response
PVD periodically conducts emergency exercises and drills and desktop exercises to
test emergency response plans. Plans and drill requirements are listed in the rig
specific Emergency Response Manual P1.06.03 this also includes adverse weather
procedures for tropical storms / typhoon and severe weather. The Shipboard Oil
Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) contingencies are also documented, rig
personnel to review and revise emergency preparedness and response procedures as
necessary, e.g. after the occurrence of incidents, emergency situations or drills.
2.6.3 HSE Meetings
A wide variety of HSE meetings are conducted at different levels within PVD
operations. Meetings on the barge enable personnel to participate and become
actively involved in the work planning process and prepare for the safe
accomplishment of tasks during their next tour.
Daily Planning Meeting
The OIM, Drilling Supervisor (Company Man) and Department Heads conduct
daily planning meetings onboard the barge to review planned barge activities and
highlight task hazards and preventive measures.
Safety meetings can be held at any time a supervisor feels it necessary to

ensure continuing safety, assist with planning of work, or where there is a
significant change to an operation or task. However as stated below is the
minimum frequency and attendance requirement for all safety meetings.
General Safety meetings - Held weekly by the OIM and attended by all personnel
onboard.
Pre-tour meetings - Held daily before the start of every tour, attended by all
personnel starting work, with topics presented by the appropriate supervisors.
Pre-job meetings, Tool Box Talks – Held before the start of every critical or
unfamiliar job, or when a supervisor deems it necessary. Also held following
changes to tasks that affect safety. These meetings might include JSAs when
appropriate. All personnel involved in the task will attend. HSE Meetings
(P1.04.08).
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2.6.4 Procedures
The manuals, procedures and other documentations in use on the PV Drilling I are
listed in Table 2.1 and 2.2
HSE critical procedures are those which are crucial to the ongoing effectiveness of
controls to prevent or mitigate major hazards.
TABLE 2.1: HSEQ MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Table 2.2
HSE critical procedures are those which are crucial to the ongoing effectiveness of controls
to prevent or mitigate major hazards (see Part 4). HSE critical procedures are noted in the
“controls” column of the hazard register (Annex 4B) and are identified as inputs to the
HSE critical tasks, supporting the major hazard controls, listed in
TABLE 2.2: PV DRILLING I SPECIFIC DOCUMENTATION

Document Title
No Procedure Issued Revise
Marine Operation Procedures
Marine (PM) dd/mm/yy dd/mm/yy
1 Table of contents PM 2.00 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
2 Lowering of legs (soft pin) PM 2.01 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
3 Running anchors PM 2.02 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
4 Position rig on location PM 2.03 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
5 J/u rig to preload PM 2.04 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
6 Preload operations. PM 2.05 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
7 Dumping preload PM 2.06 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
Disconnecting tow vessel on tow
8 PM 2.07 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
bridle
9 J/u to operational air gap PM 2.08 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
10 Retrieving anchors PM 2.09 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
Skidding cantilever (stowed to
11 PM 2.10 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
drilling mode)
Transverse skidding from center
12 PM 2.11 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
line
Removing docking plugs &
13 PM 2.12 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
washout p.l. Tank
14 Engaging rack chocks PM 2.13 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
15 Installing mooring lines PM 2.14 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
16 Tie-up and release supply vessels PM 2.15 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
17 Disconnecting mooring lines PM 2.16 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
18 Disengaging rack chocks PM 2.17 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
19 Transverse port/stbd from PM 2.18 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
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centerline
Skid cantilever from drilling to
20 PM 2.19 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
stowed position
Install docking plugs in preload
21 PM 2.20 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
tanks
22 J/d to move rig PM 2.21 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
23 Hooking up towing vessels PM 2.22 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
24 Check water tight integrity PM 2.23 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
25 Jetting legs free PM 2.24 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
26 Moving off location PM 2.25 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
27 Offloading/back loading supply
PM 2.26 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
vessels
28 Receiving fuel oil PM 2.27 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
29 Receiving base oil PM 2.28 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
30 Receiving liquid mud PM 2.29 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
31 Receiving drill water PM 2.30 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
32 Receive pot water PM 2.31 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
33 Receive bulk material
PM 2.32 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
(cement/barite gel)
34 Transfer bulk cement to cement
PM 2.33 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
surge tank
35 Transfer bulk barite to surge tank PM 2.34 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
36 Mixing chemical in sack room PM 2.35 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
37 Lowering sack chemical to sack
PM 2.36 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
room
38 Forklift operations PM 2.37 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
39 Drifting casing PM 2.38 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
40 Lowering/raising lifeboats PM 2.39 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
41 Wash out and clean mud pits and
PM 2.40 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
shaker pits
42 Greasing cranes PM 2.41 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
43 Replacement of wire rope on
PM 2.42 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
cranes
44 Personnel transfer with basket PM 2.43 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
45 Handling tubulars (drill pipe and
PM 2.44 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
casing)
46 Refueling operations (helicopter) PM 2.45 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
47 Jack up (punch threw) formation
PM 2.46 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
failure
48 Rig move procedure from KFELS
PM 2.47 31-Dec-06 1-Aug-09
shipyard to Vietnam
Issued Revise
Drilling Operation Procedures M.D 01
dd/mm/yy dd/mm/yy
1 Introduction M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
2 Standard Procedure Layout M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
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3 Rig move M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12

4 Jacking & Skidding M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
5 Spud Preparation M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
6 Spudding/Drill 36” Hole M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
7 Running 30” Casing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
8 Drilling 26” Hole M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
9 Running 20” Casing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
10 Running BOP’s/Diverter M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
11 Running and Pulling Wear
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Bushings
12 Drilling 17½” and Smaller Hole
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
(Drilled Through BOP’s)
13 Coring M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
14 Rigging Up/Down Wire Line
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Logging Equipment
15 Running Casing Through BOP’s M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
16 Stabbing Board Operating
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Instructions
17 Pre/Post Operational Stabbing
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Board Checklist
18 Well Testing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
19 Abandonment of Suspension of
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Wells
20 Nipple Down BOP’s/Diverter M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
21 BOP Test on Stump M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
22 BOP on Well Head Test Procedure M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
23 Choke and Kill Manifold Test
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Procedure
24 Surface Equipment Test (Mud
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Standpipe, Valves, etc.)
25 Tripping In M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
26 Tripping Out M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
27 Picking Up/Laying Down Drill
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
String
28 Rigging Up and Running 0.092”
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Wireline Unit
29 Offloading and Preparing Casing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
30 Drifting Casing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
31 Well Control Procedure with BOPs
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
and Top Drive in Use
32 Pipe Figure Book M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
33 Drillers and Assistant Drillers Tour
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Change
34 Strapping and Tallying Casing M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
35 Bulk Product Transfer M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
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36 Opening and Closing BOP

M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Bonnets
37 Slipping & Cutting Drill Line M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
38 Mud Pump Module Change M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
39 Shallow Gas Contingency Plan M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
40 Oil Base Mud M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
41 Base oil and oil base mud
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
segregation
42 Used Drill string Inspection,
M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
Handling, Storage and
43 Transportation. M.D 01 31-Dec-06 1-Jan-12
2.7 Communications
A number of communication tools are utilised on a routine basis to establish and
maintain effective lines of communication between shore base support and the rig.
These tools include:
• POB listing;
• Operational Summaries;
• Incident Reporting;
• Environmental Reports;
• Near Miss & Property Damage Reports
• PVD Observation Cards.
• Safety Audit Reports.
• Morning call (daily telephone conference including OIM and Rig Manager).
• Daily IADC Report.
• HSE Alerts and Bulletins.
Safety & Training Bulletins and Alerts are published on an Information Centre
which is kept up to date on the rig. In addition the rig maintains a “HSE Notice
Board”.
2.8 Rig Security
When deemed necessary and in line with the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS) effective July 1, 2004 (an amendment to IMO, Safety of Life
At Sea Convention 1974/1988) each offshore rig may have a Rig Security Plan
(RSP). ISPS was designed to combat terrorism, and can also help to effectively
protect against other threats, such as piracy and hijacking, it treats vessel security as
a risk management activity requiring assessment of risks to determine the
appropriate measures to be put in place in each case.
• Identification of the restricted areas and measures for the prevention of
unauthorized access.
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• Procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security,

including provisions for maintaining critical operations of the rig or rig/port
interface.
• Procedures for responding to any security instructions Contracting
Governments may give at different security levels.
• Duties of rig personnel assigned security responsibilities and of other rig
personnel on security aspects.
• Identification of the locations where the rig security alert system activation
points are provided.
• Procedures, instructions and guidance on the use of the rig security alert
system, including testing, activating, deactivating and resetting, and limiting
false alerts.
2.9 Interfacing Arrangements with Operators and Third Parties
The overall purpose of HSE MS interface activities, and the documentation
generated from them, is to ensure that the standards of HSE performance achieved
by any one party through the application of its HSE MS are not compromised by
another (or others), whilst undertaking shared activities. The process of establishing
HSE MS interfacing arrangements is a management planning activity, with the
documented arrangements generated being used to govern the implementation of
the shared activities and control operations thereafter. The effectiveness of these
arrangements are judged by the effect their application has on existing safety and
environmental standards and consequently the monitoring of HSE performance
levels should be included.
The PVD Interface Documents Procedure (P1.03.09) is based upon UK Oil and Gas
Guidelines on Safety Management System Interfacing and Step Change for Safety
Guidance for Safety Management System Interfacing. Used in conjunction with
PVD P1.03.13 Third Party Services These procedures, along with Operator/ third
party requirements are used to produce Interface documentation that ensure that
any risks resulting from joint activities can be effectively controlled.
The extent to which HSE MS interface arrangements need to be identified and
documented is dependent upon the complexity of joint operations and the potential
severity of risks to which one or more of the parties involved may be exposed.
2.10 Implementation and Performance Monitoring
2.10.1 Operational Activities and Tasks
HSE management is integrated into all tasks performed. Operations or tasks that do
not meet the JSA criteria of being Tolerable or Acceptable will not be conducted;
the task is then reassessed, and controls/ mitigations implemented to make the risk
ALARP.
Documents that can provide evidence of conformity include:
• Job Safety Analysis;
• Toolbox-talk/Pre tour meeting;
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• PTW
• Isolation and Confined Space Certificates;
• Man Riding Checklists
• Lockout/ Tag out Registers; and
• Third Party Equipment Installation Checklists.
Activity monitoring, audits and review functions are comprehensively covered in

Section 6 of this HSE Case.
Catering and Accommodation
Standards of hygiene and food preparation and accommodation waste are
maintained by company policies
P1.04.46 Food Safety and Control
P1.04.47 Potable Water Standards
P1.04.57 Waste Control
Weekly hygiene inspection take place onboard and water sample are taken and sent
to an independent laboratory from analysis to ensure standards are being
maintained. Preventative maintenance procedures are in place to ensure all
equipment required is inspected at regular intervals as per manufactures
recommendations Management and client audits are performed on a regular basis to
ensure policies and procedures are followed
Medical Support
PVD I has a fully equipped hospital onboard and a fully qualified Medic available
24/7 – PVD have full membership of International SOS (ISOS) support scheme.
Rig Medic has telephone / internet access to the 24hr manned ISOS Alarm Centre.
A Medical Evacuation Response Plan (MERP) is in place with ISOS and helicopter
company for any emergency Medivac required – ISOS provide transportation and
medical care for patents on the ground to the nearest approved medical facility.
All members of the rig emergency response team are first aid trained as is all
member of the rig stretcher party – regular first aid drill are conducted as part of the
rig emergency drills – all drills are logged and records kept.
All injuries to personnel are reported as per IADC Guidelines - PVD is a member of
IADC Statistic reporting program.
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Lifting Operations.
PVD Lifting Management Manual DD/SB/008- devices must only be operated by
competent personnel or trainees while under direct supervision of competent
personnel.
All lifting equipment onboard PVD Installations will be ultimately controlled by
the OIM /Barge Captain.
All lifting equipment in service must have current certification showing Proof load
test and either WLL (Working Load limit) or SWL (Safe Working Load).
Equipment must have an identification marking and be colour coded with current in
service colour for that period. Equipment will be regularly inspected by Third Party
Inspection Company (Minimum once per year) a register will be kept onboard of
all lifting equipment. All Equipment deemed unsafe for use or which does not have
a current colour code will be placed in a quarantine locker and await re- inspection
from Third Party to decide if it will be allowed back into service or destroyed and
removed from the register.
Transit slings may only be used for transportation of equipment to and from the rig.
All lifting equipment must be suitable for the lift and visually inspected for
condition prior to each use.
Padeyes or lifting lugs must be properly designed, manufactured, installed and
tested prior to use.
Lifting equipment includes lifting gear and lifting appliances as described below:
 Lifting Gear - Any device that is used or designed to be used directly or indirectly
to connect a load to a lifting appliance (for example, crane or chain block) and does
not form part of the load (for example, sling, wire rope, chain, hook, plate clamp,
scissor clamp, shackle, eyebolt, lifting beam, bushing puller, lifting device, and so
on).
 Lifting Appliances - Any mechanical device capable of raising or lowering a load
(for example, crane, chain block, pull lift, winch, drawworks and so on) shackle,
either integrated/welded into a structure, piece of equipment or lifting appliance to
transfer a dynamic load or secure a static load.
Risk Assessments (JSA’s) must be conducted for all general and specialized lifting
activities, Permit to Work will be applied for the following:
• Personnel Transfers
• Non Routine lifts such as heavy lifts
• Man riding
• Tandem lifts
• OIM has discretion to decide if any other lifting task will be covered under
PTW.
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All personnel involved in rigging / slinging / lifting will be trained under as per the
company training matrix - All Crane Operators with have a current API approved
certificate.
All Manual Handling will be done under the company policy P1.04.22 Manual Handling
and be assessed using risk assessment process (JSA).
Procurement Management Summary
PVD policy P1.03.12.Third Party Services shows the selection process for vendors and
monitoring to maintain standards.
Vendors must be approved before orders are placed for materials, services, repairs, or
rentals. Company Considerations for Contractor Selection
Each vendor will be evaluated after a review of the following:
• When applicable, completion of a Vendor HSE Assessment Questionnaire,
including recordable injury and illness incident rates for the previous 3 years
• Previously demonstrated history or ability
• Quality of goods and services supplied
• Review of vendor Non-Conformances
• Evidence of an acceptable quality system, including third party certification if
applicable
• Compliance with liability requirements,
• Qualifications and requirements for a specific type of vendor, such as repair shops,
painting contractors, etc.
• Direct audit or observation
• Reliability and availability of supply
All Vendor Approval Request Forms are submitted to the Commercial Manager.
The Vendor Approval Request Form includes:
• Justification which requires Commercial Manager Approval.
• Check List of requirement approvals:
• Vendor HSE Assessment Questionnaire – HSE Manager
• Master Service Agreement – Legal personnel
• Certificate of Insurance – Legal personnel
• Repair Qualification/Evaluation – Maintenance Manager
Painting Subcontractors – Director – Projects
Performance Monitoring:
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Annual in-house management audits take place onboard as per Policy P1.03.10 Audits and
Corrective Actions
Regular independent third party audits of company Safety Management Systems are
performed. Results are followed up and changes made to policy / procedures as required.
Annual HSE performance review from management is conducted and any proactive or
reactive measures are taken to enhance performance.
The rig set annual HSE goals and these are reviewed on a regular basis.
Onboard Area Inspection as per Policy P1.04.15 take place weekly and any items requiring
attention will be added to the rig Master Action Tracing list to close out.
Weekly hygiene inspections take place as per Policy P1.04.21 Sanitation and Hygiene
Observation Card trends are reviewed at the weekly safety meeting onboard.
Page 25 of 25
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
PVD Doc Ref: DD/PVD1-HSE Case
PV DRILLING I HSE CASE Orig. Issue Date:
SECTION 3: Issued No.:
Jack-up Rig Description Issued Date:
Distribution:
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Contents
3. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4
3.1. General Information ......................................................................................... 4
3.1.1. MODU or Rig Detail ....................................................................................... 4
3.1.2. Certification, Classification and Registration .................................................. 6
3.1.2.1. Unit Particular 8
3.1.2.2. Principal Particulars 8
3.1.3. Rig Layout ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1.4. Modifications and Upgrades ............................................................................ 9
3.1.5. Selection of HSE Critical Equipment/Systems .............................................. 10
3.1.5.1. Life Rafts 10
3.1.5.2. Life boat/rescue boat 11
3.1.5.3. Life buoys 11
3.1.5.4. Fire Extinguishers 11
3.1.5.5. Sewage Equipment 13
3.1.5.6. Diesel oil centrifuge, only water separator 13
3.2. Primary Structure ........................................................................................... 14
3.2.1. Operation Limit/Design Criteria .................................................................... 14
3.2.1.1. National regulations and International Codes and Standards 14
3.2.1.2. Limiting environment operating criteria 14
3.2.2. Structural Integrity ......................................................................................... 16
3.2.2.1. Rig design life expectancy 16
3.2.2.2. Primary dimension and construction materials 17
3.2.3. Marine Integrity-Self Elevating Units (Jack-ups) .......................................... 19
3.2.3.1. Stability(Jack-ups) ......................................................................................... 19
3.2.3.2. Bilge & Preload Tank Stripping Systems ...................................................... 19
3.2.3.3. Preload System............................................................................................... 21
3.2.3.4. Spud Can and Leg Jetting System ................................................................. 22
3.2.3.5. Jacking System............................................................................................... 23
3.2.3.6. Rig Skidding System...................................................................................... 24
3.2.3.7. Mooring System ............................................................................................. 25
3.2.3.8. Towing ........................................................................................................... 26
3.3. Drilling, Completion and Well Control ......................................................... 27
3.3.1. Hoisting and Tubular Handling ..................................................................... 27
3.3.2. Mud and Cement System ............................................................................... 30
3.3.2.1. Mud System 30
3.3.2.2. Cement System 35
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3.3.3. Blow Out Preventer (BOP) System ............................................................... 37

3.4. Plant and Utilities........................................................................................... 42
3.4.1. Power Generation and Distribution ............................................................... 42
3.4.1.1. Generators ...................................................................................................... 42
3.4.1.2. Electrical Switchboards and Panels ............................................................... 43
3.4.1.3. Main 600VAC Switchboard .......................................................................... 44
3.4.1.4. Main 380 Volt Distribution............................................................................ 44
3.4.1.5. Emergency Switchboard ................................................................................ 44
3.4.1.6. AC Power-Distribution System ..................................................................... 44
3.4.1.7. AC Power-Distribution System ..................................................................... 45
3.4.2. Fuel/Lube Oil System .................................................................................... 45
3.4.2.1. Fuel Oil System.............................................................................................. 45
3.4.2.2. Lubricating Oil System .................................................................................. 46
3.4.3. Rig Air System ............................................................................................... 46
3.4.4. Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems ....................... 47
3.4.4.1. Heating 47
3.4.4.2. Ventilation System ......................................................................................... 47
3.4.4.3. Air-Conditioning 49
3.4.5. Drain, Effluent and Waste Systems ............................................................... 49
3.4.5.1. Waste Oil System ........................................................................................... 49
3.4.5.2. Deck Drain System ........................................................................................ 50
3.4.6. Communications ............................................................................................ 51
3.4.6.1. Intercom/Telephone System .......................................................................... 51
3.4.6.2. External Communications 51
3.4.6.3. Separate PA system........................................................................................ 52
3.4.6.4. Radio .............................................................................................................. 52
3.4.7. Emergency Lighting....................................................................................... 52
3.4.8. Helideck Facilities ......................................................................................... 53
3.4.9. Lifting Equipment and Material Handling ..................................................... 54
3.4.9.1. Main deck Cranes 54
3.4.9.2. BOP Handling Trolley Hoist 54
3.4.9.3. Air Tugger 55
3.4.9.4. Machinery Handling Equipment .................................................................... 55
3.4.9.5. Forklift ........................................................................................................... 56
3.4.10. . Storing and Handling of Explosives/Flammables and Other Hazardous Substances
.................................................................................................................... 4656
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3.5. Fire and Explosion Protection........................................................................ 57

3.5.1. Hazardous Area Classifications ..................................................................... 57
3.5.2. Detection Systems .......................................................................................... 57
3.5.3. Emergency Shut Down System ..................................................................... 59
3.5.4. Active Fire Protection .................................................................................... 59
3.5.4.1. Main Firewater System .................................................................................. 59
3.5.4.2. Deluge System ............................................................................................... 60
3.5.4.3. High Pressure Water Mist System ................................................................. 60
3.5.4.4. Fire Fighting Systems with Foam .................................................................. 60
3.5.5. Passive Fire Protection................................................................................... 60
3.6. Evacuation and Escape Systems .................................................................... 60
3.7. Accommodation ............................................................................................. 60
3.8. Well Testing ................................................................................................... 61
3.8.1. Well Testing ................................................................................................... 61
3.8.2. Coiled Tubing ................................................................................................ 62
3.8.3. Wireline Operations ....................................................................................... 62
3.9. Diving Support ............................................................................................... 63
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3. Introduction
3.1. General Information
3.1.1. MODU or Rig Detail
PV Drilling I is Petro Vietnam Drilling’s First Jack-up Drilling Rig. It was designed and
constructed by the Builder, Keppel FELS Limited in 2007 and approved by the
classification society, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS): ✠A1 – SELF-
ELEVATING DRILLING UNIT.
The unit is a non-propelled self-elevating mobile offshore drilling unit, designed for
operating in water depths up to 300 feet when 437 feet of leg is installed. The unit is also
designed for floating field tow with 437 feet of leg installed, and afloat on ocean tow
with leg length of 437 feet but lowered till tip of cans is 126.25feet below hull baseline.
PLAN ABOVE MAINDECK

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The Unit consists of a welded steel hull of a modified triangular shape in plan, equipped
with three truss-type triangular legs, each fitted with a spud can type footing at the lower
end. The legs can be lowered to contact the ocean floor, after which the hull can be
elevated above the surface of the sea. The legs are elevated and lowered by means of an
opposed-pinion electrically powered rack and pinion jacking system.
Besides tanks for operational liquids and ballast, the main hull constitutes various
machinery, storage, and utility spaces the engine room, compressor room, mud pump
room, sack storage room, workshops, drill tool stores, etc.
Crew accommodations for 120 persons are located on the main deck in the vicinity of the
forward leg.
The helideck is located forward of the bow of the unit and is designed for service by a
Sikorsky S-61N, S-92 or MI-17 helicopter.
Located on the Main Deck are the Change Rooms, Laundry, Gymnasium and Sick Bay.
The Galley, Mess Hall, TV Room and Recreation Room are located on the 3rd Level.
The OIM Office, Barge Captain Office, Company Office and 3rd Party Offices are
located on the 4th Level. The Radio Room and Jacking Control Room is located on the
quarter’s roof.
Just aft of the crew accommodations on the main deck are two longitudinal cantilever
beams located 30 feet off centerline Port and Starboard. The drilling structure is mounted
on the extreme aft end of these cantilever beams. This entire cantilever structure can be
skidded in a fore and aft direction, by means of a skidding system, using hydraulic
cylinders, skidding beams, to enable the drilling structure to be cantilevered over the
stern of the hull. Further, the drilling structure itself can be skidded transversely.
Max drilling depth; 25,000ft.
Operating conditions: Max wave height 36ft, corresponding wave period 8.7 sec. Current
at surface 4.0 knot, max win speed 70 knot.
Storm conditions: Max wave height 48ft, corresponding wave period 9.6 sec. Current at
surface 4 knot, max win speed 100 knot.
3.1.2. Certification, Classification and Registration

The VESSEL and its equipment, was built and surveyed during construction in
accordance with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) "Rules for Building and
Classing Offshore Mobile Drilling Units", 2001, including all amendments to these Rules
up until the date that the Builder applies to ABS to class the Vessel. Upon completion,
the Vessel bears the following ABS class notation:
ABS, ✠A1SELF-ELEVATING DRILLING UNIT
The Vessel is registered under the laws/regulations of the Republic of Vietnam, and
International Codes/ Standards are compliant with:
(Compliance with Certificate):
• Rules for Building and Classing Offshore Mobile Drilling Units, 2001
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• The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) "Code for the Construction of

Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit", 1989 Resolution A.649 (16) (generally known as the
1989 IMO MODU Code).
• The International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships
1973, 1978 Protocol and later amendments (MARPOL 73/78).
• The International Convention on Load Lines 1966, 1988 Protocol.
• The International Convention of Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969.
• International Convention for the Prevention of Collision at Sea.
• ABS Guidance for Certification of Cranes.
Compliance (without certificate)

• The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, 1978
Protocol and later amendments where being referred by the IMO MODU Code.
The Vessel's deck cranes, crane pedestals, and appurtenances thereto were approved by
ABS in accordance with "ABS Guidance for Certification of Cranes" &issued ABS
Cargo Deck Register and appropriate documentation demonstrating such compliance was
issued by Builder to Owner.
The certificates obtained are as follows:

By Builder
• Interim Class Certificate, as issued by ABS.
• Statement of Fact as issued by ABS for compliance with International
Convention of Load Line
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) “Code for the Construction of Mobile
Offshore Drilling Unit” (IMO Resolutions A.649 (16))
• Statement of Fact as issued by ABS for compliance with International Oil
Pollution Prevention
Convention of Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969.
By Owner
Registration of Vessel to Vietnamese Flag shall be done by Owner based on the
above Certificates.
3.1.2.1. Unit Particular
Name of Vessel: PV Drilling I
I.M.O. Number: 8768684
Type of Vessel: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (Jack up)
Date of ship delivery: 2007
Gross tonnage: 10,058
Net tonnage: 3,017
Port of Registry: Saigon
Flag: Vietnam
Owner: PetroVietnam Drilling and Well Services
Corporation.
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Operator: TBA
3.1.2.2. Principal Particulars

Hull Length Moulded 234.00ft
Hull breadth Moulded 208.00ft
Depth of Hull at centerline 25.52ft
Depth of Hull at side 25.00ft
Length of Legs (including Cans) 437.00ft
Depths of Cans (including 4ft can tip) 19.00ft
Diameter of Cans (Approx.) 47.20ft
Legs Below Hull for Dry tow 0ft
Center of Fwd. Leg to Centerline of Aft Legs 129.00ft
Center to Center of Aft Legs 142.00ft
Load line Displacement (Spud Cans – Free Flooded) Tip of
Can 0” below hull baseline 31.759 kips
Load line Displacement (Spud Cans – Free Buoyant) Tip of
Can 0” below hull baseline 34.386 kips
Load line Draft (Molded) 16.00 ft
3.1.3. Rig Layout

Copies of all rig layouts are maintained on board the installation (See attached
drawings for rig lay out information)
• Drawing No. D001 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement outboard profile.
• Drawing No. D002 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement tank arrangement
inner bottom..
• Drawing No. D003 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement machinery deck (5 ft
level)..
• Drawing No. D004 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement mezzanine deck (16 ft
level).
• Drawing No. D005 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement main & cellar deck..
• Drawing No. D006 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement quarters arrangement
(1st& 2nd level).
• Drawing No. D007 Alt 3, Sht 1 of 1: General arrangement quarters arrangement
(3rd, 4th& 5th level).
Note: And other relevant plans are available both softcopies and hard copies onboard.
3.1.4. Modifications and Upgrades
Since delivery, the PV Drilling I has undergone four modifications. The first one is to
upgrade the living quarter from 110 men to 120 men total in June 2009. The second job is
to install lifeboat no. 5 under helideck. The third job is to convert Preload tank 3S to
Brine Tank/ Preload. The final modification job was to install the KFDJ fixed Diverter
System in June 2012. Details of procedures and responsibilities are given in the MOC
(Management of Change).In terms of safety, quality and cost efficiency it is necessary to
have a systematic approach to the control of all elements affecting technical projects.
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Controls ensure that the integrity of the operating unit is not adversely affected by any
technical modifications. That correct inspection, maintenance, operating and verification
requirements are implemented and that pertinent documentation is updated accordingly.
Projects will be subject to the PV Drilling management of change process.
The scope of work was reviewed by suitably qualified personnel who involved the
supervisory personnel responsible for the areas affected by the scope of work.
Applicable rules and regulations were identified, complied with and defined within the
project description and appropriate risk assessments conducted.
A commissioning & testing plan was prepared and appropriate acceptance tests
conducted.
3.1.5. Selection of HSE Critical Equipment/Systems
Performance standards have been developed for Safety Critical Systems or Equipment
(SCE) to ensure that they achieve their intended purpose.
The performance standards for SCE systems are assessed in terms of the functionality,
reliability/availability, and survivability of the system. Functionality and survivability are
judged qualitatively whereas reliability/availability may be judged qualitatively or
calculated using accepted techniques. The standards also detail the requirements in terms
of interaction and dependency.
Safety equipment is provided and installed on the Vessel as specified herein and the
equipment and installation was in accordance with the Regulatory Body Requirements.
Locations of safety equipment, is as shown on the Contract Plans and as directed by
Owner or the Regulatory Bodies.
The Builder provided the necessary fittings, rigging, and foundations for the proper use
and stowage of the equipment specified herein according to best marine practices and
Regulatory requirements.
3.1.5.1. Life Rafts
Eight (8) twenty five (25) person, davit launched type inflatable life rafts are installed.
Rafts are self-inflating and are complete with cover and survival gear (food, first aid kits,
fire protection). Complete with davit wire that is long enough to reach water for air gap
of 120ft.
Each life raft is inspected and serviced once every twelve (12) months.
3.1.5.2. Life boat/rescue boat
Five (5) fifty-five (55) person lifeboats located on Port Side, Starboard Side and under
helideck. The lifeboats complete with frame, davits and winches with the exception of #
5were installed by the Builder as shown on Contract Plans. #5 was subsequently fitted in
June 2009. The Builder provided foundations, gratings, etc…, for access and handling.
Lifeboat1 also serves as a rescue boat if required.
Wire for the davits is sufficient for 120ft air gap.
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Lockers on deck are provided for work vests. The lockers are located as per the general
arrangement drawing main and cellar deck D005 as built.
Sixty (60) lifejackets are provided.
3.1.5.3. Life jackets and lifebuoys
Life jackets provided are (55 port & stbd & 12 under Heli Deck)
The life buoys are stowed in suitable galvanized steel brackets secured to the railings
and/or bulkheads. The buoys are provided with a life line, water tight lights and
accessories as required by Regulatory Bodies.
3.1.5.4. Fire Fighting Equipment
A. Fire Main System:
The Fire Main System provides a supply of water at required pressure to fire stations
throughout the vessel, as required by the classification society. Two independent
centrifugal fire pumps are used to ensure the availability of water during emergency
conditions – one in the Stbd Aft Auxiliary Machinery Room and another in the Port Aft
Auxiliary Machinery Room. In the event of fire at least one pump shall be able to
perform.
The Two (2) main fire pumps are connected to the fire stations via a ring main. Both fire
pumps get their water supply from the sea chests during afloat conditions and from the
raw water header when in the jacked-up position (sea water supply from deep well
pumps). In the event of an emergency while jacking up the rig, drill water pumps are able
to take suction from any drill-water tank and supply the fire pump.
B. CO2 systems:
For protection of Engine Room & VFD Room, Emergency Generator Room, Paint
Locker and Galley Hood.
See reference drawings:
B270-P132, Piping Diagram – CO2 System – Engine Room & VFD Room.
B270-P133, Piping Diagram – CO2 System – Emergency Generator Room.
B270-P134, Piping Diagram – CO2 System –Galley Hood.
B270-P135, Piping Diagram – CO2 System – Paint Locker.
Before operating a CO2 system, evacuate the protected space and close all doors and
opening (except for Galley Hood). To activate the CO2 system, pull the valve handles
and open the screw valves on the pilot cylinders located in the release cabinets. Release
cabinets for the Engine Room CO2 system are located in the port aft and starboard aft
auxiliary machinery rooms, with manual emergency release handles located in the CO2
Room. Release cabinets for the Emergency Generator Room and Paint Locker CO2
systems are located in the cylinder enclosure outside the protected spaces. The release
cabinet for the galley hood CO2 system is located in the galley.
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C. Foam System:
For protection of the Helicopter Deck and Helicopter Refueling System. (See reference
drawing B270-P119, Piping diagram – Helideck Foam System)
The foam pump system is activated by a pushbutton located on the helideck access
platform. Foam protection for the helideck has two foam monitors located at the helideck
access points. Foam protection for the helicopter refueling system is from either of the
two foam hose reels located on the helideck access platform.
D. Deluge System:
For protection of Drill Floor, Cellar deck (See reference drawing B270-P120, Piping
Diagram – Deluge System).
Water curtain: For protection of side shell area around the burner boom for both sides
(See drawing B270 – P104, Piping Diagram – Raw/Salt Water System).
Water curtain systems of fixed pipe-nozzle type to protect the side shell are around the
burner boom area for both sides.
Each hand portable extinguisher, semi-portable fire extinguisher, and fixed fire
extinguishing system is to be tested and inspected at least once every twelve (12) months
by the appropriate Regulatory body approval methods.
E. Portable:
Portable extinguishers are mounted inside the fire station enclosures whenever possible
and elsewhere on suitable brackets. Portable extinguishers are provided in machinery
spaces and living quarters and as required by Regulatory Bodies.
All portable extinguisher locations are clearly marked.
Extinguishers are mounted on suitable brackets and located at fire stations where
practicable. Spares charges for extinguishers are furnished as required by Regulatory
Bodies.
3.1.5.5. Sewage Equipment
Two (2) x 50%, type salt water flushing Hamworthy units. The units are complete with
pump, blower and all standard accessories. A sewage high level alarm arranged to sound
in the Chief Mechanic’s office is fitted.
Discharge line is fitted with the discharge water discharging into the 12” overboard line.
3.1.5.6. Diesel oil centrifuge, only water separator
A. Diesel Oil Centrifuge
Two (2) diesel oil centrifuges, 1,000 GHP each, non-self-cleaning type are installed in
the engine room.
B. Oily water Separator
One (1) oily water separator of 0.5 m3/hr is provided.
The separator is fitted with an automatic oil drain control, oil drain sight glass, overboard
discharge, and oil detectors, recorder, relief valve and other required connections.
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Oily water supply to the separator with a discharge capacity of 15 ppm oil is provided
using an electric pump with a maximum capacity of 0.5m3/hr at 100 foot head.
C. Fuel Oil Meters
The Fuel oil flow meter has been provided and installed to monitor fuel taken on board
the Vessel at fuel oil manifold in the Engine room, as shown on the Contract plan.
Flow rate: Min: 27 USG/min; Max: 300 USG/min.
3.2. Primary Structure
3.2.1. Operation Limit/Design Criteria
3.2.1.1. National regulations and International Codes and Standards:
PV Drilling I complies with the applicable Regulatory Requirements as follows except
that ABS (Or other equivalent & recognized Rules & Class) requirements shall prevail
where contradictory to any of the other ABS rules (Or other equivalent & recognized
Rules &Class) for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling Units:
• Cargo Gear Survey (Every year)
• Annual Hull Survey (Every 2 years)
• Annual Machinery Survey (Every 2 years)
• UWILD (Not more than 3 years since the last dry-docking survey)
• Dry docking Survey (Every 5 years)
• Special Periodical Survey - Hull (Every 5 years)
• Special Periodical Survey - Machinery (Every 5 years)
3.2.1.2. Limiting environment operating criteria:

3.2.1.3.
RIG working area (OFFSHORE SITE) will comprise of, but not be limited to,
Offshore Vietnam, South East Asian Seas, East Asia & the Far East Seas, Australia &
Oceania Seas.
The Installation steelwork is of all welded construction to ABS Rules for the
Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, which includes material specifications.
In order to ensure the integrity of the MODU throughout its operating envelope,
special consideration was given to structural design and materials selection. During
the construction of the MODU, the materials were thoroughly and continuously
tested.
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a) Storm Survival Conditions.
Water Depth (ft) 300

Leg length (included spud can tip) (ft) 437
Air gap (ft) 50
Operating condition Storm
Maximum Wind Velocity(knots, one minute
100
average)
Maximum Wave Height (ft) 48
Corresponding Wave Period (sec) 9.6
Current -Surface (knots, profile piece-wise linear) 4
Current - 5m below surface (knots) 2.4
Penetration (ft) 30
0
Steel Design Operating Temp ( C) -10
Total Elevated Load (kips) 23,316
b) Design conditions for systems and accommodation shall be as follows:
• Sea water temperature is based on zero to 36 degree C.

• Air temperature is based on zero to 45 degree C with 85% humidity.
• LQ HVAC design, based on zero to 40 deg C with 85% relative humidity.
c) Normal Drilling Conditions.

Water Depth (ft) 300
Leg length (included spud can tip) (ft) 437
Air gap (ft) 50
Operating condition Drilling
Maximum Wind Velocity(knots, one minute
70
average)
Maximum Wave Height (ft) 36
Corresponding Wave Period (sec) 8.7
Current -Surface (knots, profile piece-wise linear) 4.0
Current - 5m below surface (knots) 2.4
Penetration (ft) 30
Steel Design Operating Temp (0C) -10
Total Elevated Load (kips) 25,405
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d) Helicopter environmental operating criteria:

The helideck is located forward of the bow of the unit and is designed for service by a Sikorsky
S-61N, S-92 or MI-17 helicopter.
The weight and rotor diameter details considered in the design are given below:
Helideck is not designed to have a helicopter stowed while the Unit is afloat.
SIKORSKY S-61 SIKORSKY S-92
Maximum Length 72ft 10in (22.25m) 68ft 6in (20.88m)
Rotor Diameter 62ft 0 in (18.90m) 56ft 4in (17.17m)
Under carrier Width 16ft 2 in (4.90m) 10ft 5in (3.18m)
Under carrier length 23ft 6 in (7.16m) 20ft 4in (6.20m)
Max. All Up Weight 20,400lbs 26,800lbs
3.2.2. Structural Integrity

The VESSEL including its hull, machinery and equipment designed and constructed in
accordance with latest ABS Rules forBuilding and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling
Units 2001 for assignment of the following class notations: ABS ✠A1,IMO
MODU Code 1989 (Res.A.649 (16), SOLAS1974(including all Amendments up to the
Protocol of 1988)Or other equivalent & recognized Rules & Class.
Statutory certification is displayed onboard the rig (e.g. Certificate of Fitness, MODU
Code Certificates, etc.) and, with the structural survey regime conducted by ABS,
provides verification to the onboard personnel that safety and class standards of the
unit are being maintained.
• Fire rating of the main structural components:
Reference: as drawing No.: J101-01 (structural fire protection plan (machinery space);
and No.: J101-02 (structural fire protection plan (quarters); safety plan.
3.2.2.1. Rig design life expectancy:
- The builder warrants that the designed life of the RIG approved by
CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY is for 20 years.
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3.2.2.2. Primary dimensions and construction materials:

MAIN DIMENSIONS
Hull Length Moulded 234 ft
Hull Breadth Moulded 208 ft
Depth of Hull at centerline 25.52 ft
Depth of Hull at side 25 ft
Length of Legs (including cans) 437 ft
Depth of Cans (including 4 ft can tip) 19 ft
Diameter of Cans (Approx.) 47.20 ft
Legs Below Hull for Dry Tow 0 ft
Center of Fwd. Leg to Centerline of Aft Legs 129 ft
Center to Center of Aft Legs 142 ft
Load Line Draft (Molded) 16 ft
Load Line Displacement (Spud Cans – Free Flooded) Tip of 31,759 kips
Cans 0” below hull baseline
Load Line Displacement (Spud Cans – Buoyant) Tip of Cans 34,386 kips
0” below hull baseline
DRILL FLOOR
Length 48.5ft
Breadth 67.67ft
Height above main deck at C.L. 36.42ft
Derrick Base 36 ft x 36 ft
Derrick height (top) 263 ft
Derrick top 16 sq.ft
Travel Fore and Aft None
Travel Stbd side of C.L. 15 ft

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Travel Port side of C.L. 15 ft
CANTILEVER SUBSTRUCTURE
Maximum Distance CL of Well over Transom 70 ft
Center to Center of Cantilever Beams 60 ft
Height of Bottom of Cantilever Above Vessel Baseline 26.79ft
Height of Substructure (above Main Deck at C.L.) 30.27 ft
Height of Pipe Rack Deck (above Main Deck at C.L.) 22.27 ft
Length of Pipe Rack Deck 65.83 ft
Width of Pipe Rack Deck 62.16 ft
Travel Fore and Aft 90 ft
QUARTERS
Accommodation 120 persons
Sick Bay 2 beds
HELIDECK
Polygon with Included Circle 83.17 ft diameter
VARIABLE DECK LOAD (VDL)
- Operational 3,400 MT. 7,600 KIPS
- Survival 2,500 MT. 5,511 KIPS
- Field transit 2,500 MT. 5,511 KIPS
MOORING SYSTEM
4 units, Plimsoll, model PC-EMW/SD-40/100 2-speed
Anchor Winches
Anchor Wire 4 ea x Anchor Wires (with Fairleads), 13/4" diameter x

800m + spare, 6 x 36 WS, IWRC, RHRL, EEIPS,
galvanized steel wire rope@ 9 layers – MBL: 150 MT
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Maximum breaking strength
Storage Drum Capacity 2,756 ft with1-3/4” wire
Anchors 4 ea + 1 spare Delta Flipper type7000 Kg c/w high

quality shackle, Fluke angle 36°
3.2.3. Marine Integrity- Self Elevating Units (Jack-Ups)

3.2.3.1. Stability(Jack-ups)
a) PV Drilling has been approved by REGULATORY BODIES for ocean wet tow and
for field transit.
b) Rig Move Service Company(appointed by PV Drilling or Client) will provide
“Allowable Motion Curve” of RIG for the above two, ocean wet tow and field transit.
The curves are to be derived with series of periods. The structure of RIG design
allows for dry tow.
The Rig meets the requirements of movement and stability studies for areas of operation
with regard to operation limits at maximum operating / environment limits.
The PV DRILLING I’s damage and intact stability criteria complies with the
requirements of the ABS ‘Rules for Classing and Building Mobile Offshore Drilling
Units’. A computer program for stability calculations is used onboard the PV DRILLING
I. Hand calculation scan also be performed to calculate rig loading conditions.
3.2.3.2. Bilge& Preload Tank Stripping Systems
(Ref to Dwg. No: B270-P102 Piping Diaphragm Bilge & Preload Stripping
System)
The system serves two different areas, namely port and starboard side. A centrifugal
bilge pump and an air-operated diaphragm pump serve each area. In normal conditions,
its own pumps will serve each side. If necessary the pumps can take suctions from the
opposite side manifolds via a crossover line.
All suctions are from non-hazardous area bilge sumps, void tanks and preload tanks. The
manifolds are located in the AFT auxiliary machine room port &starboard. Suction from
the bilge sumps and void tank is discharged to a hull skimmer tank and the suction from
preload tanks is discharged overboard.
Coaming drains from the machinery areas are led into the bilge sumps. The oily water
separator takes suction from the hull skimmer tank.
The oil discharged from the oily water separator will be either re-circulated back to
skimmer tank or piped to the dirty oil tank while the clean water is piped overboard via
the 12"overboard dump line at the starboard side.
Main deck drains and cantilever drains are specified as follows:
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Normally the clean main deck periphery drains are led overboard via the overboard
discharge funnel at aft/stbd transom. When the Unit is put in the zero discharge mode,
these drains are diverted to SW Tank (Preload) No.17.
The bilge pumps then take suction from SW Tank (Preload) No.17 and discharge to the
skimmer tank. The Oily water separator takes a suction from the skimmer tank and after
processing, the oily water separator will discharge clean water overboard. The oily bilge
water will be directed to the dirty oil tank or re-circulated back to hull skimmer tank.
The mud-contaminated drains from the cantilever and drillf1oor are piped to the
cantilever separation tank located on the cantilever. The cantilever separation tank is
internally divided into two (2) compartments for settling. The discharge from cantilever
separation tank is led to hull skimmer tank.
All coaming drain around mud process pumps and process area are led to drain sumps
located on same area and are connected to dump overboard header pipe.
The water-based cuttings from mud process equipment, e.g. shale shakers, will bled
overboard via an overboard discharge funnel. The dump from the mud pits can be
pumped by mud mixing pumps to the loading stations or dumped overboard by opening
the dump valves in bottom of mud pits which have secondary isolation valves in void
tank below and the Master Dump Valve in Preload tank 4S
The drains from mud mixing pumps, charge pumps coaming, HP mudpump coaming and
mud mixing hopper area coaming drain scupper are led to a sump located in mud pump
room and fwd port aux machinery room. Thereafter the drains are pumped overboard via
12" dump line at starboard side.
The clean drain from the cementing area is led directly overboard via an overboard
discharge funnel.
Notes:
When the electric bilge pump takes suctions individually from bilge sump or stripping of
preload tanks, it shall be carried out with the bilge pump running at low flow rates. The
pump discharge valve has to be throttled in order for the pump to achieve suction.
When it is required that the electric bilge pump takes suction at full capacity of 1100gpm,
the pump can only work when taking suction of three (3) or more tanks at the same time.
The air-operated diaphragm pump is to be used for stripping and at severe angles of
inclination if the centrifugal pump suction height is affected.
3.2.3.3. Preload System
Ref to Dwg. No: B270-P101 Piping Diaphragm – Preload Tank Dumping
System&B270-P104 Piping Diaphragm – Raw/Salt Water System)
The Unit is equipped with a seawater preload system for preloading the legs. The preload
tanks are filled via a 12" header with 8" branches equipped with manual control valves
that can be operated from the machinery deck level.
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The preload water is supplied to the rig via the preload pumps located at the individual
leg wells. Dumping of the preload tanks is done via 12" dump valves manually operated
from the main deck.
All preload tanks are equipped with 4" stripping lines connected to the electrical driven
bilge pumps. The tanks can be further emptied by means of the air driven bilge pumps
and docking plugs.
During elevated mode, salt water for the Unit is provided through a combination of any
of the 4 preload pumps situated on the legs, while during afloat through the sea chest and
seawater pump.
Preload Tanks
TANK CAPACITY @ 100%
VOLUME WEIGHT
CUFT KIPS
S.W TK NO. 10-P 19999.23 1279.73
S.W TK NO. 10-S 19999.23 1279.73
S.W TK NO.11-P 6068.76 388.33
S.W TK NO.11-S 6068.76 388.33
S.W TK NO.13-P 12345.02 789.94
S.W TK NO.13-S 12345.02 789.94
S.W TK NO.15-P 22084.25 1413.14
S.W TK NO.15-S 22084.25 1413.14
S.W TK NO.17-C 34693.41 2219.99
S.W TK NO.3-P 21160.94 1354.06
S.W TK NO.3-S 16262.00 1040.58
S.W TK NO.4-P 10292.42 658.60
S.W TK NO.4-S 10292.42 658.60
S.W TK NO.6-C 9133.60 584.45
S.W / D.W TK NO.1-C 33032.68 2062.16
S.W / D.W TK NO.2-P 22308.36 1392.67
S.W / D.W TK NO.2-S 22308.36 1392.67
S.W / D.W TK NO.14-P 23132.75 1380.24
S.W / D.W TK NO.14-S 23132.75 1380.24
3.2.3.4. Spud Can and Leg Jetting System
Ref to Dwg. No: B270-P103 Piping Diaphragm – Leg Jetting System&B270-
P104 Piping Diaphragm – Raw/Salt Water Service System)
The Unit's legs are equipped with a jetting system. Along one side of the truss of each leg
two (2) 6" pipe lines are led to the spud can and each pipeline has connection branches
distributed over its length.
At the spud can, the branches from the jetting supply headers penetrate the spud can at
the top and bottom. Both headers are located inside the spud can. A total of 12 jetting
nozzles each are provided for spud can top and bottom plating jetting.
Any of the two jetting lines or nozzle headers can accommodate high pressure jetting.
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Water is supplied to the jetting system from the seawater pump and high-pressure mud
pump system with a max working pressure of 2000psi. The final connection between the
manifold near the leg well and the jetting pipeline alongside the legs is made by means of
flexible hoses.
Each spud can is to be filled with seawater before lowering the legs, and is constructed as
a single compartment. A vertical entrance trunk provides access to this compartment.
The flooding line is located at the spud can with a shut off valve that has an extended
spindle operable from the top of the entrance trunk.
Before flooding the can, the cover for the entrance trunk is to be opened to allow for
venting. The flooding valve is then opened to fill the can. A 1 1/2" air blow down line is
provided for clearing the flooding line if the flooding line is clogged up. The flooding
valve must be closed after the spud can is filled.
To empty the can, the flooding valve is closed and seawater is driven out by an eductor
located in the can. A seawater pump drives the eductor. The outlet pipe is located outside
of the can for discharge into the sea.
3.2.3.5. Jacking System
The rig jacking system is for elevating and lowering the rig and is a OTD1000FV80
model elevating system. The system consists of a central console, 3 Motor Control
Centers (MCCs), 3 local consoles and 9 elevating jack assemblies each consisting of 4
pinions with necessary gearing and AC motors.
Each jacking unit comprises of a main pinion shaft which is driven by one 56.5 HP (42
kW) electric motor complete with a fail-safe electromagnetic brake via one gearbox
which is completely filled with lubricant. There are 4 jacking units installed on each jack
house. The jacking speed is approx 1.5 ft/min.
The 3 Motor Control Centers (MCCs), one MCC per leg, are located as follows: two (2)
MCC - in VFD Room and one (l) - in Main Storage Room. The control and main
monitoring of the rig jacking operations are carried out from the Central Console located
in the Jacking Control Room.
The 3 local consoles (1 console for each leg), are for transferring the load from the
pinions to the rack chock system and vice versa. This operation is known as the" Electric
Load Transfer" or ELT. To operate the local console permission must be granted from
the central console by switching to the Local mode.
A PC-based pinion load monitoring system for monitoring and recording the individual
pinion load is located at the central console.
For the safe operation of the jacking system the operator must be familiar with and
adhere to the rig jacking procedures given in the rig’s Marine Operation Manual as well
as the jacking system manufacturer's operation manual.
3.2.3.6. Rig Skidding System

The term 'Rig Skidding System' refers only to systems used to move the cantilever with
respect to the main hull and drillfloor.
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The cantilever is intended to be stored on the main hull and extended aft to maximum of
70ft over the vessel transom during operations. A hydraulic skidding system is installed
on port and starboard sides of the cantilever to enable it to be extended from its stowed
position to operating position and withdrawn from operating position to its stowed
position.
Each set of hydraulic skidding cylinders is designed for a maximum hydraulic working
pressure of 3,000psi. Each comprising of two hydraulic cylinders installed on the port
and starboard sides of the cantilever.
The four hydraulic cylinders for cantilever skidding are powered by a hydraulic power
pack, located on main deck port aft, comprising 350 gallons oil tank, two pumps driven
by 100 HP electric motors, and local control panel. The skidding system is intended to
move the cantilever at a maximum speed of 1.5 ft/minute. The cantilever skidding control
console is located on main deck port aft.
The drillfloor is intended to move transversely relative to the cantilever in order to drill
wells at a maximum distance of 15 ft either side of vessel centerline. There is one (1)
hydraulic skidding cylinder installed on the forward and aft sides of the drillfloor for this
purpose.
Each cylinder is fitted with a reversible locking claw for skidding port/starboard, and
designed for a hydraulic pressure of 3,000psi.
The two hydraulic cylinders for drillfloor skidding are powered by the NOV HE 75-
3100V-300G hydraulic power pack, located on the drillfloor. The skidding system is
intended to move the drillfloor at a maximum speed of 1.5 ft/minute. A drill floor
skidding control console is also located under the drillfloor.
Before any skidding operations the skidding beams (strong back) will be adequately
greased.
3.2.3.7. Mooring System

a) Anchor Winches
Four (04) units, PC-EMW/SD-40/100.Electrically driven, two - speed units with pull
capacity of 40 tons each. Wire on the drum is 1-3/4” OD, 800 m each, IWRC, EIPS
galvanized plus one spare length, long enough for operation in maximum rated water
depth, c/w single drum storage reels. Units can be operated locally or remotely from the
control room.
Drum capacity: 2756 ft of 1-3/4” diameter wire rope, 153 MT MBL.
Anchor winches having the following corresponding line pulls:
• 1st Layer Low Speed (40T x 4.5m/min)
• 1st Layer High Speed (18T x 9.0m/min)
• 1ft Layer 60 T stall pull
• Break holding capacity 100 Ton 2nd layer.
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Anchor winches are each driven by an electric motor, 50Hz and PLC control system.
Four (04) each, Remote Deck Anchor Winch Control Console c/w Starter Panel Control
System.
Read out of the line tension is provided locally at the winch and remotely at the console
in the control room. A recording system is also fitted to record all operations of the
anchor winches.
b) Anchor Fairleads
MacGregor Plimsoll line a double sheave swivel fairlead and a swivel head flange
mounted for marine-duty applications.
Swivel fairlead is designed for breaking strength of wire rope at 90° wrap on sheave and
360° rotation.
Cast steel sheaves provide minimum rope wear and maximum service life.
c) Anchor Wire
4 each, Anchor wire 1-3/4” Diameter, 6 x 36, IWRC,EEIPS, galvanized steel wire rope,
length of 800 meters, one end c/w merlionfr-speltor socket, other end plain, MBL 150
MT. Fitted on the rig with one (1) spare available in town.
d) Anchor Buoys
Four (04) each plus one (1) spare in town, 5ft x 8ft cylindrical steel construction, filled
with polyurethane foam Merlion anchor buoys, marked and numbered.
Painted with final coat of finishing polyurethane orange colour (high visibility coat)
They are also fitted with top crucifix and bottom pad eye to suit SWL 42.5 tons green
pinG-4163 safety anchor shackles, bolt type.
e) Anchors and Anchor Racks
Four (04) ea Delta Flipper type 7.4 MT type anchors/w high quality shackle plus (1)
spare in town. All components are completed with ABS Certificate.
The rig is equipped with four (04) anchor racks at Port and Starboard side at Aft and
Forward. Anchor is Delta flipper type.
3.2.3.8. Towing
a) Towing Bridle
Two (02)tow lines consisting of 3-1/4” chain and 2 ½” x 50ft wires connected to a Delta
plate which has a 2 ½” x 100ft tow wire leading to the tow vessel, located at forward of
the rig. The Delta plate is secured to a tugger wire for ease of tow wire recovery. The
system is ABS and Underwriter surveyor approved. One emergency tow bridle is located
at Port forward and is fitted with buoyant line and buoy for emergency deployment
which is situated aft and below the helideck port side.
Four (04) Brackets are mounted on the main deck forward. There is a tow gear handling
air hoist located in-between the brackets.
In general, the towing bridle set shall comprise of the following as minimum:
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• Two (02) “Smit” bracket, oval pin 170 x 115 mm.

• Two (02) lengths towing chain of MBL 520MT. Chain is 3-1/4" dia. x 18 ft, both
ends with enlarged links and end links.
• Two (02) Green Pin “P-6036” Safety Bolt & Nut Shackles, SWL 120 MT, MBL
600 MT.
• Two (2) lengths steel pendant wire 2-1/2" dia. by 50 ft length of MBL 300 MT.
Both ends mechanically spliced with thimble eyes.
• Two (02) Green Pin “P-6036” Safety Bolt & Nut Shackles, SWL 120 MT, MBL
600 MT.
• One (01) Delta plate, bollard pulls 120 MT.
• One (01) Green Pin “G-5263” Bolt & Nut Super Shackle, SWL 150 MT, MBL
750 MT.
• One (01) length pennant wire, 2 ½ inches x 100 feet, (6x36) IWRC RHOL
galvanized, both ends mechanically spliced with thimble, MBL 300 MT.
All towing gear has a manufacturer's test or class certificate
b) Bollard Pull& TowFittings
The rig requires a minimum of 120 tonnes total continuous bollard pull. This requirement
is increased to 140 tonnes during the monsoon season. For rig moves using more than
one tow vessel, the minimum requirement is 150 tonnes combined bollard pull. This
requirement is increased to 180 tonnes combined minimum bollard pull during the NE
monsoon season.
Four (4) sets of Smit bracket are installed Forward. They are sized for a 3-1/4” chain end
link.
Under deck stiffening is fitted to withstand the breaking strength of the towing bridle.
3.3. Drilling, Completion and Well Control

3.3.1. Hoisting and Tubular Handling
a) Derrick Structure
The MH-PYRAMID/ API STD 4F – Q1 derrick has a 36ft x 36ft base, 16ft x 16ft top
and a height of 170ft clear working height, and has the following overall capacities:
Max. Static hook Load (12 lines) with wind loading of 70 knots and 750 kips setback
load conditions is 1,300 kips.
Max. Static hook Load (12 lines) with wind loading of 70 knots and zero setback load
conditions is 1,275 kips.
Max. Static hook Load (12 lines) with wind loading of 100 knots and zero setback load
conditions is 550 kips.
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Major Machinery and Features:

Varco TDS-8SA Top Drive System
WCI Crown Sheave assemblies consist of 6 x 60” diameter cluster, one tandem 60”
diameter fast-line sheave and one 60” diameter deadline sheave grooved for 1-5/8”
diameter drill line.
Varco 720 ton Travelling Block
Varco ADS-10T Automated Drawworks System
Pyramid air winch type stabbing board
Derrick Mounted Deadline Anchor

NOV Survey Wireline Unit
Pipe Racking Board capacity:
- 210 stands of 5-7/8” drill pipes;
- 10 stands of 8” drill collars.
- 8 stands of 9-1/2” drill collars.
The Survey Wireline Unit located on top of LER roof Starboard side of rig floor. .
The Deadline Anchor located on the port/fwd at Level 1 can access from derrick incline
ladder.
Gin Pole, 28,000lbs capacity located on top of derrick approximately 30 feet high for
servicing the crown block fitted with 4 x 25 ton pad-eyes and 1 x 35 ton pad-eye.
Refer to the relevant operation and service manuals for detailed drawings, instructions
and operating limits.
b) Hoisting System
Drawworks
The rig is served by one (1) Varco ADS-10T Drawworks located on the drill floor for
hoisting and handling drilling equipment.
The Drawworks comes complete with three (3) GEB 22A -2 (1150 hp continuous power
rating) AC variable speed motors, two (2) hp single speed gearbox two (2) plate disc
brakes housing 36 inch dia. (when grooved) by 71 inch long hoisting drum with 1-5/8”
wireline.
For further information, refer to the following:
a) KFELS Dwg no. M102-06 Machinery Arrangement – Drill floor.
b) NOV General Service Manual for Model ADS-10DT Drawworks for the drawings,
diaphragms, instructions and operational limits.
Top Drive
One (1) no of VARCO Top Drive Drilling System (Model TDS-8SA) is installed on the
derrick to rotate drill strings and handle pipe stands, max continuous torque is 62,250ft-
lbs, max speed gearbox is 270 RPM.
The Top Drive System is designed to handle, make up and breakout operations with
triple (93 ft stands). TDS provides full rotation and circulation when tripping out. Back-
reaming and forward-reaming capacities, drilling through bridges and tight spots without
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picking up a Kelly, max makeup torque is 95,000 lbs/ft, max breakout torque is 103,000
lbs/ft.
TDS-8SA comes complete with one (1) nos. of GEB-20 AC 1.150hp motor and is
capable of 750T hoisting capacity. A 3100cfm complete pressurized closed loop motor
cooling system, counterbalance system, guide dollies, service loops and TDS control
system are provided. It also has 1 set weldless link 350T, 2-3/4” x 132” and 1 set
weldless link 500T, 3-1/2” x 180”.
A HP 100 model Pipe handler is available to assist in initial make-up and breakout of
connections and pipe hoisting in the derrick at any height. It can pick up and set down
93ft stands, and permit connecting and disconnecting of stands from the drilling motor.
The Pipe Handler has a hoisting capacity of 750T and a breakout of 100,000 ft.lbs. It can
handle drill pipes with sizes ranging from 3-1/2 inch to 6-5/8 inch. It comes complete
with torque wrench, link tilt actuator, rotating head, and drill pipe elevator link.
Refer to NOV Top Drive Drilling System Service Manual for detailed specifications and
operating limits. Traveling Block (Model: 660TB-650-8C), one NOV traveling block
rated capacity of 650T consists of 6 x 60” sheaves grooved for 1-5/8” drill line are string
to the crown sheaves.
Crown Block
One (01) each, Crown Block Comprise of 12-Line, 09 grooved sheaves, rated for
1,500,000 lbs hook capacity. It includes 06 nos. of 60” Sheaves Working Clusters + 02
nos. of tandem fast-line 60” sheaves + 01 nos. of 60” Deadline Sheaves, 750 Tons.
Crown Sheave grooved for 1-5/8” OD Drill line.
Travelling Block
One (01) each Travelling Block, 12-Line 6-Sheave Cluster, 650 Tons, 1– 5/8” sheaves
groove size. Assemblies with tapered roller bearings requiring regular greasing have a
lubrication system consisting of grease points with individual grease passages to each
center bearing. Assemblies with sealed tapered roller bearings do not require greasing.
One 80 tons hang-off pad-eye on top of the block.
Swivel Gooseneck
One (01) each, Swivel Gooseneck integrated with AC Top Drive System - Standard NOV
TDS-8SA Top Drive, have the 3.82"ID largest water course, available in TDS-8SA
model. The Mud Rotary Hose will have 4"ID fluid passage terminate at Top Drive 6"
male fig 1002 S-Pipe.
NOV Wash Pipe Assembly or equivalent with complete unit removal.
3.3.2. Mud and Cement System
3.3.2.1. Mudsystem
a) Mud pits:
Ref to Dwg D015 GA plan (Tank capacity main hull).
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All low pressure mud systems (mix pumps, charge pumps, mud tanks…) are designed to
have enough capacity to handle thefluid weight of 2.2sg.
Mud Tanks are compartmented into active tanks and reserve tanks and Pill pits with
3,679 bbls total capacity.
Separate Brine system - isolated at mud manifolds by means of spectacle flanges.
Active tanks: Five (5) including brine/ base oil, active tanks with a total capacity of 2,192
barrels. Each tank is equipped with heavy-duty mud agitators, suction and discharge
manifolds, piping and drains. Piping meets API Spec 14Especifications and is
manifolded to allow suction from any compartment by each mixing pump and discharge
into any compartment. Each compartment is equipped with suction sumps, drains and
manhole covers. Each tank is fitted with 2mud guns.
Slug/Pit : 01each, 196 barrels capacity, agitator. PillPit: 01 each, 150 barrels capacity,
agitator.
Reserve tank system: Two (02), reserve tanks, with minimum a total capacity of
1,141bbls, which can be used for reserve mud, brine or mix water. Each tank is coated
with anon flaking corrosion resistant coating and painted white.
Brine tank system: One (01) independent brine tank with capacity of 855 bbls. and a
second storage only facility in Preload #3 tank.
Equalizer valves are required to be between active/active mud pit tanks and
reserve/reserve mud pit tanks.
Mud Agitator: At least 16 each horizontal surface agitators to be sized to meet the pit
volume and mud density as requirements.
Mud Shearing System/Mixing Hopper: The Mud Shearing System is consolidated with
the mud hopper as follows: 2 units, Mixing Educator are composed of 6" carbon steel
housing with dual suction. 6" Lobestar jet nozzle insert and a 6" conical diffuser
(pressure recovery tube). All the eductor components are constructed in a high density,
high abrasion resistant urethane. Mixer is furnished with an inlet pressure gauge (0-100
psi) and a vacuum gauge (0-30"/HG). Each gauge is furnished with a non-plugging
diaphragm. The offset conical chemical hopper and work table is constructed in 316
stainless steel. Radial pre-mixer is composed of a 6" tangential feed header with 4"
Victaulic connections. A 2" manifold consisting of a 2" induction tee, 2" ball valve and
2" elbow. Steel manifold is assembled with quick disconnect Victaulic. The mixing
eductor, chemical hopper and butterfly valves are assembled with Victaulic couplings.
Assembly is furnished with 6" anchor clamps. Each unit c/w:
• 1 each, Full view sight glass, type W-FVSG 6C
• 1 each, 4" Butterfly Valve, type W-VT-GF-4
• 2 each, 4" Victaulic Coupling, Type 78 W-VTC-78-4
• 2 each, 6" Victaulic Nipple Adapter, groove x male NPT.
• 4 each, 3" Tungsten Carbide Jet Nozzle, fabricated and 3,000 psi WP
Brine Shearing System: 1 each, Brine Shearing System composed of 1 x 6" stainless steel
housing, 6" Lobestar jet nozzle insert and a 6" conical diffuser insert (pressure recovery
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tube). Nozzle and diffuser are constructed in a high density, high abrasion resistant.
Mixing eductor is fitted with grooved suction inlet. Eductor is mounted on a base frame
with eductor housing supports. 1 each, Brine Centrifugal Pump, 8x6x 14 aluminum
bronze casing, 11" aluminum bronze impeller and driven by a 100HP motor, IP44, 1800
RPM, 3 phase, 50HZ, 380V, totally enclosed, explosion proof electric motor c/w skid
mounted.
01 Main deck Salt Hopper (01 tonne bag) furnished with at least 10” dia. discharge pipe
line and necessary piping for bulk mud mixing directly on main deck.
Air Circulating System: Ventilation is provided to areas below deck c/w fans and
necessary ducts. Air is provided to spaces in accordance with the following:
One air change per minute for: Mud pump room to include auxiliary pump rooms, main
engine/generator room, cementing unit room and chemical storage and mixing room
Foam Unit For the Fixed Fire Main System: 1 each, Foam Pump System, 115 m3 per
hour capacity and driven by a 5.5HP BURT Type AE VBGC, 3450 RPM electric motor
or equivalent, located at sack storage room.
Mud Laboratory and facilities: 1 each, fully air conditioned for zone 2 area, situated at
main deck level off the Mud pump room starboard and equipped with compressed air
supply, lighting, electric wall sockets, fresh water (cold), stainless steel sinks, wall
cupboards, drawers, spark proof air conditioner, compressed nitrogen supply, furnished
with desk, executive chair, lockers, adequate loc, Sand content kit benches, telephone and
power 120V, 208V/240V, 50HZ, c/w Mud balance, Marsh funnel, Filtration kit, etc.
b) Mud pumps:
The three (3) GEB-22A-2 high torque motor 2200HP, continuous power rating per motor
is 1150hp, max working pressure is 7500 psi AC, 14 inch stroke Mud Pumps are
installed to the manufacturer’s specifications.
Each mud pump c/w:
- 5-1/2”, 6”, 7” & 7-1/2” liners.
- Piston liner lubricant spray system.
- 500kg Jib crane for handling liner / piston.
- One set of handling tools for maintenance & repair.
c) Mud lines:
+ Mud Hoses:
2 each, 4" ID x 88 ft Long, Gates Black Gold Rotary Hose, 7500 PSI W.P 15000 PSI
Test, One End Fitted With 6" FIG 1502 Male Sub With Wing Nut, Other End With 6"
FIG 1502 Female Sub. Each End Includes Lifting Eye, Safety Clamp and Cable. Used
from Main deck to cantilever.
2 each, 45" ID x 39 ft Long, Gates Black Gold Rotary Hose, 7500PSI W.P, 15000 PSI
Test, One End Fitted With 6” Fig 1002 Male Sub W/ Wing Nut and O-Ring, Other End
With 6" Fig.1002 Female Sub, Both Ends Equipped With Lifting Eye Collars and Safety
Clamps & Chains, Used from cantilever to rig floor.
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+ Kelly Hose
1each, 4" ID x 91FT Long, Gates Black Gold Rotary Hose , API Spec 7K Grade E, 7500
PSI W.P, 15000 PSI Test, Bend Radius 60IN, One End Fitted With 5" FIG 1002 Male
Sub With Wing Nut, Other End With 6" FIG 1002 Female Sub. Each End Includes
Lifting Eye, Safety Clamp and Cable. Used from mast standpipe to top drive.
+ Mud Stand Pipe Manifold
1 each, 6"NB (5" ID) 7500 psi MWP, 11,250 psi TP Dual Mud Standpipe Manifold
supplied in accordance with API 6A PSL3, PR-2, Material Class - DD, temperature class
– P-U+X(PR- 2) comprising of following components, others as required.
5 each, 5" API 7,500 Mud Gate Valve, Butt weld 6.75" OD x 5.00" ID, Hand Operated.
4 each, 3" API 7,500 Mud Gate Valve, Butt weld SCH XXSends, Hand Operated.
2 each, 2" FIG 1502 Pressure Gauge Assembly, AISI 4130 4 each, 2" 10K Flanged
Pressure Transmitter 4-20mA c/w Fig.1502 H2S trim male hammer union connection
and 2-1/16” 10K API flange to be supplied for interface with mud standpipe
manifold and pressure readout in Amphion (2 each) and in Choke Control Panel (2
each).
Mud standpipe Manifold Fabricated, Assembled, all items are pressure & function tested,
painted & certified to API 6A &API 16C.
The entire standpipe manifold including the valves, fittings, instruments, etc. are suitable
for H2S and CO2 service and comply with latest revision of the NACE requirement.
All valves on mud standpipe manifold are capable of pressure on both sides.
All flange connections on the manifold come with in Inconel inlay. (Basis is SS316,
Hammer Union will not have inlay)
All rated blind flanges are fluid cushion type.
One (1) remote standpipe manifold readout is provided on the choke & kill manifold.
The PI for the standpipe manifold pressure readout is positioned visible from both
manual chokes. Pressure indicator and Pressure sensing device (c/w with flange
connection) for this remote readout is provided on the standpipe manifold.
1 each, Manual Choke Assembly, 2.1/16" 10,000 psi WP, manually operated c/w
2.1/16" 10,000 psi WP flanged connections with API BX-152 ring grooves inlaid
with Inconel 625 in order to regulate down pressure to fill up the 02 trip tanks, fill up
the MGS and before bleeding off the mud to mud trough.
Service platform and support for stand pipe manifold are clear for removing inner part of
valves, and greasing for valve.
Mud lines are installed from Mud pump to rig floor, mud lines are in accordance with
mud pumps working pressure 7500 psi.
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d) Mud treatment
+ Shale Shaker: five (5) shale shakers, NOV Brandt VSM 300, capacity of 1,000 gpm
total, independently driven by explosive proof motor.
+ Gumbo box: Dual gumbo conveyer, capacity 2,000 gpm total independently driven by
electric motor.
+ De-sander: 3 x 10” cones, capacity 1000 gpm, c/w explosion – proof electric pump and
accessories as required.
+ Mud cleaner: 20 x 4” cones, capacity 1000 gpm at 75ft head, screwed together type
cones.
+ De-silter: 16 x 4” cones rated for 1000 gpm at 75ft head
+ Vacuum degasser unit: One (1) x 1,000 gpm c/w explosion proof vacuum pump.
e) Trip tank:
Two (2) trip tanks with 74bbls, located on mezzanine deck of cantilever c/w 2 pumps
and 3” manifold c/w valves system.
Ref Dwg P217 (Piping arrangement cantilever)
f) Mud/gas separator:
One (1) mud/gas separator which fixed on the rig floor c/w 10” vent line to top of
derrick.
Ref Dwg P219 (Piping arrangement derrick)
3.3.2.2. Cement System
a) Cement Unit:
Is situated on the Main Deck below the cantilever.
Location affords easy change out of the cementing unit either offshore or at shipyard.
Cement surge tank: Fitted aft of the cement unit.
b)High Pressure Cement Lines
01 each, 3”" ID - 4.5’’ OD - 10,000 psi WP lines manifolded for the cement pump c/w
cement transfer hoses from the cement unit to the cement standpipes on the rig floor.
c) HP Cement Discharge Hose:
01 each Cement Discharge Hose Assembly, 3" ID x 88FT Long, Gate Black Gold
Cementing Hose, With 10,000PSI W.P, 15,000 PSI Test, One End Fitted With 4" Fig
1502 Male Sub W/ Wing Nut, Other End With 4" - Fig.1502 Female Sub W/ Seal Ring,
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Both Ends Equipped With Lifting Eye Collars and Safety Clamps & Chains,
Manufactured In Accordance With API Spec.7K Standard and ABS/CDS Certification,
For Use in Drag Chain.
Cementing Hose, With 10,000PSI W.P, 15000 PSI Test, One End Fitted With 4" Fig
1502 Male Sub W/ Wing nut, Other End With 4" Fig.1502 Female - Sub W/Seal Ring,
Both Ends Equipped With Lifting Eye Collars and Safety Clamps & Chains,
Manufactured In Accordance With API Spec.7K Standard and ABS/Decertification, For
Connecting Between Jumper Hose Cantilever and Rig Floor,
Cementing Hose, 10,000PSI W.P, 15000PSI Test, One End Fitted With 4" Fig 1502
Male Sub W/ Wing Nut, Other End -With 4" Fig. 1502 Sour Service Female Sub W/Seal
Ring, Both Ends Equipped With Lifting Eye Collars and Safety Clamps & Chains,
Manufactured In Accordance With API Spec.7K Standard and ABS/CDS Certification,
For Connecting With Rig Floor Cement Manifold.
d) Cement Stand Pipe Manifold
3" NB (3" ID) 10,000 psi MWP, 15,000 psi TP Cement Standpipe Manifold supplied in
accordance with API 6A PSL-3, PR-2, Material Class-DD, Temperature Class P&U,
Inconel Inlay (Hammer Union connection will inlay– Basis is SS316) of RTJ Grooves,
Comprising of following components, others as required:
05 each, 3-1/16"" API 10K Lo-Torq Plug Valve, API BX-154 Flanged, Hand-wheel
Operated for cement manifold.
Wash-out line comes off from 01 leg of cement stand pipe and discharges to the mud
trough furnished with 01each,3.1/16"" API 10K Lo-Torq Plug Valve, BX-154 Flanged,
Hand wheel Operated.
The cement manifold shall provide the following rated instruments: two (02) pressure
transducer c/w 2.1/16" 10K API flange to be supplied for interface with Cement
Manifold and readout in Amphion Systems.
Cement standpipe manifold fabricated, assembled, all items are pressure & function
tested, painted & certified for API 6A.
All valves on cement standpipe manifold are capable of pressure on both sides.
The entire standpipe manifold including the valves, fittings, Instruments etc. are complied
with latest revision of the NACE requirement.
All rated blind flanges are fluid cushion type.
Cement standpipe will be furnished with one (01) 10 ft - cement goosenecks with
connection on the other end (hard pipes) up to the mast.
e) Grout/Pressure Testing Hoses
1 each, 3" ID x 39-ft long, Gates Black Gold Cementing Hose, 10,000 psi WP, 10,000 psi
TP, One end fitted with 4" Fig. 1502 Male Sub c/w Wing Nut, other end fitted with 4"
Fig. 1502 Female sub c/w Seal Ring.
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1 each, 3" ID x 88-ft long, Gates Black Gold Cementing Hose, 10,000 psi WP, 15,000 psi
TP, One end fitted with4" Fig. 1502 Male Sub c/w Wing Nut, other end fitted with 4"
Fig. 1502 Female sub c/w Seal Ring.
3.3.3. Blow Out Preventer (BOP) System
PV-Drilling I was equipped 02 set of BOPs included:
LOWER PRESSURE BLOWOUT PREVENTER
Cameron- U type 21-1/4” BOP stacks consist of:
01Cameron type DL annular 2Mstudded on top connection. Annular packing element
working temperature range bases on API 16A Temperature Class XX (40 deg F to 180
deg F).
Fix ram assembly working pressure 5,000psi with following configuration:
• Pipe Ram
• Shear/blind
• Pipe ram
BOP assembly were designed to API Spec 6A, 16A.
BOP system is maintained in accordance with API RP 53.
All component H2S rated. All rams preventer fitted with Ram lock.
Control system for preventers, main valves, choking and kill manifold.
Ram Blocks:
2 sets 5"/2 set / Flex packer NR - Hang off Capability 600,000 lbs - Temp Class "BF"
2 sets 5-1/2"/2 set / Flex packer NR - Hang off Capability 600,000 lbs - Temp Class
"BF".
1 set blind/shear,1 set (Upper & Lower) / Upper : SBR-21.1/4" 2M# MODEL II - Temp
Class "BF"; Lower : SBR-21.1/4" 2M# MODEL II - Temp Class F" Shearing Capability
of 5"DP Grade S-135 25.6 lb/ft.
1 set 13 3/8"/1 set / Flex packer NR - Temp Class "BF"
Side outlet included:
* Kill line valves
02 ea Cameron type FC
Size: 4-1/16” for manual and 3-1/16” for HCR
Working pressure: 10,000psi
Ring joint gasket: BX-155 for manual & BX-154.for HCR
* Choke line valves:
02 ea Cameron type FC
Size: 3-1/16”
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Ring joint gasket: BX-154 hydraulic.

HIGH PRESSURE BLOWOUT PREVENTER
Cameron- type U 13-5/8” BOP stacks consist of:
01Cameron type DL annular 5Mstudded on top connection and flanged on bottom.
Annular packing element working temperature range bases on API 16A Temperature
Class XX (40 deg F to 180 deg F).
Fix ram assembly working pressure 10,000psi with following configuration:
• Pipe Ram
• Shear/blind
• Pipe ram
BOP assembly was designed to API Spec 6A, 16A.
BOP system is maintained in accordance with API RP 53.
All component H2S rated. All rams preventer fitted with Ram lock.
Control system for preventers, main valves, choking and kill manifold.
Ram Blocks:
1 set (Upper & Lower) / Upper : H2S SBR-13.5/8" 10M# - Severe Service 350
Deg.Lower : SBR-13.5/8" 10M# - Severe SERVICE 350 g.F;Shearing Capability
of 5"DP Grade S-135 25.6 lb/ft;2 sets / BLIND-CAMRAM (™ ) 350 Deg.F
Severe Service
3 set / 5-1/2" OD DP Hang off - CAMRAM (™ ) High Temp 350 Deg.F Severe
Service
3 set / 5" OD DP Hang off - CAMRAM (™ ) High Temp 350
1 set / 4" OD DP Hang off - CAMRAM (™ ) High Temp 350 Deg.F Severe
Service Deg.F Severe Service
2 set / 3.1/2" OD DP Hang off - CAMRAM (™ ) High Temp 350 Deg.F
2 sets / Hang off - VBR 2.7/8" to 5" OD PIPE
2 sets / Hang off - VBR 4-1/2" to 7" OD PIPE
1 set / 9.5/8"OD Casing - CAMRAM (™) 350Deg.F Severe Service
1 set / 7"OD Casing - CAMRAM (™) 350Deg.F Severe Service
2 sets / 2.7/8"OD Tubing - CAMRAM (™) 350Deg.F Severe Service
2 sets / 2.3/8"OD Tubing - CAMRAM (™) 350Deg.F Severe Service
Side outlet included:
* Kill line valves
02 ea CAMERON/Double Acting Hydraulic Actuator & Manual Locking Screw
and Cameron /"FLS" MANUAL GATE VALVE.
Size: 3-1/16”
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Ring joint gasket: BX-154 for manual & BX-154.for HCR
* Choke line valves:
02 ea CAMERON/Double Acting Hydraulic Actuator & Manual Locking Screw
and Cameron /"FLS" MANUAL GATE VALVE.
Size: 3-1/16”
Ring joint gasket: BX-154.
Choke Line:
1 each, 3" ID x 10,000 psi WP, Copper state / SS Armored Choke Hose, H2S suited, fire
rated with stainless steel outer wrap, hose standard API 16C, API 16A & API 6A, one
end fitted with 4” Fig 1002 Female sub, other end fitted with 4” Fig 1002 Male sub &
Nut.
Kill Line
1 each, 3" ID x 10,000 psi WP, Copper state / SS Armored Choke Hose, H2S suited, fire
rated with stainless steel outer wrap, hose standard API 16C, API 16A & API 6A, one
end fitted with 4” Fig 1002 Female sub, other end fitted with 4” Fig 1002 Male sub &
Nut.
Choke & Kill Manifold
1 unit, Choke & Kill Manifold Assembly, manufactured to API Spec 6A 19th Edition
with FLS gate valve4-1/16", rated 10,000 psi WP, API 6A, Material Class EE-NL,
Temperature Class P-U+X, PSL 3 suitable for H2S Service per NACE MR-01-75 c/w the
following, others as required.
Twenty (20) Gate Valve, Hand-wheel Operated, API-6A, 4-1/16" 10,000 psi WP, 3-1/16"
bore,BX-155 & BX-152 flanged ends with Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves,
Manufactured to API Specification 6A, Nineteenth Edition, July 2004 and NACE
MR0175 per API Specification 6A. Material class DD, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3,
complete with hand-wheel, PR-2.
One (02) Buffer chamber 6-3/8” ID -10K, with 4-1/16" 10,000 psi WP BX-155& 4-
1/16” 10,000 psi WP BX-155 Connection, studded outlets with Stainless Steel Lined
Ring Grooves. Manufactured to API Specification 6A, Nineteenth Edition, July 2004 and
NACE MR0175 per API Specification 6A, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3.
Two (02) Drilling Choke Hydraulically Operated,4-1/16" API10,000 psi WP BX-155
flanged ends with Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves, Manufactured to API
Specification 6A, Nineteenth Edition, July 2004 and NACE MR0175 per API
Specification 6A. Material class DD, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3, PR-2.
Two (02) Varco Best model 3” Nominal H-2 Adjustable Choke Assembly with Stainless
Steel Lined Ring Grooves 4-1/16" 10,000 psi WP API Flanges, BX-155, Body Type:
Angle, Body Material: AISI 4130 Alloy Steel, Bonnet Type: Hammer Lug. Seat: 2"
Stainless Steel Tungsten Carbide, Stem: Inconel 718 w/ Tungsten Carbide, Operator:
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Manual Hand-wheel, Manufactured to API Specification 6A, Nineteenth Edition,

July2004 and NACE MR0175 per API Specification 6A. Material class EE, temp class P-
U+X, PR-2, PSL 3
Two (02) Assy cross studded 4-way Valve, API-6A, 4-1/16" 10,000 psi WP BX-155
flanged ends, with Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves, Manufactured to API
Specification 6A. Material class DD, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3, complete with hand-
wheel, PR-2
Two (02)Assy cross studded 4-way Valve, API-6A, 4-1/16" 10,000 psi WP BX-155
flanged ends, with Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves, Manufactured to API
Specification 6A. Material class DD, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3, complete with hand-
wheel, PR-2
Two (02) Manual Gate Valve, API-6A, 2-1/16" API 10,000 Flange with alloy 625 with
Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves, Manufactured to API Specification 6A, Nineteenth
Edition, July 2004 and NACE MR0175 per API Specification 6A. Material class
DD, temp class P-U+X, PSL 3, complete with hand-wheel, PR-2.
Four (04) 0-15,000 psi pressure gauge, on 2-1/16" bore x15,000 psi WP BX-152 flange,
Stainless Steel Lined Ring Grooves.
Two (04) each assembly Pressure Transducer flange2-1/16" API 10M BX-152 x 2” Nom
WECO FIG 1502 4-20mA, mounted on Choke & Kill Manifold (upstream of chokes).
One (1) assembly flange Instrument 4-1/16” API 10,000 tapped with two ½” NPT; API
6A 19th Edition, Temperature class: P-U+X; Material class: DD-NL, EE-NL, PSL-3.
All discharge lines from choke manifolds are properly secured.
A pressure gauge is mounted on the standpipe and choke manifolds. The gauge is of the
same nominal pressure rating as the equipment on which it is installed.
There is calibrated choke manifold and standpipe gauges in close proximity to the choke
controls.
Gauges suitable for accurately reading low drillpipe and casing pressures are available
along with a suitable manifold arrangement.
Service platform and support for choke and kill manifold must be clear for removing
inner part of valves, and greasing for valve.
Accumulator unit /BOP Control System
The CAMERON Accumulator and BOP control system is mounted on a skid which is
located under Cantilever Deck (Port side),.The Accumulators use 02ea electric-driven
hydraulic triplex pumps, each driven by motor of power 50HP (37Kw), Flow rate of each
pump (US Gal/min) is 24 gpm. Hydraulic pressure from the two triplex pumps is stored
in Accumulator bottle banks. There are four banks o each bank consisting of 6 bottles,
total 24 accumulator bottles, all with a working pressure of 3,000 psi (207 bar).The
Accumulator capacity is 264 gallons
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In addition, there are two remote control panels: the Driller’s control panel and the Tool
pusher’s control panel. The Driller’s and Tool pusher’s panels are identical in operation
and remotely operate the rams, annular and choke/kill valves on the master hydraulic
control manifold on the HPU and the diverter packer valve on the Diverter unit. It should
be noted the remote panels do not interfere with the manual operation of the control
valves at the Accumulator and BOP control panels. The valves may be remotely operated
at the Driller’s or Tool pusher’s panel or manually at the Accumulator unit.
BOP Testing Unit
1 each CAMERON type RO6 - 15,000 psi WP with two air-operated hydraulic pumps
c/w Mounted Chart Recorder range 20,000psi with sing pen.
3.4. Plant and Utilities
3.4.1. Power Generation and Distribution
3.4.1.1. Generators
a) Main Engines and Generators
There are four (4) diesel engine sets Caterpillar 3516B DITA rated at about 1717 kw at
1,500 rpm come with 600 volts, 3 phases, 50Hz air cooled. generator’s. The engines are
air started and provided with a common fresh water header,
The AC ABB alternator power system is provided by four (4) turbo-charged diesel
engines with four (4) 2500kVA generator sets. Each Main Diesel engine is fitted with
hot engine, over speed trip, oil level, water level, oil pressure, crankcase pressure,
starting air pressure low, high oil temperature and low oil temperature and spark arresting
safety devices.
b) Emergency Generator
The emergency synchronous generator is rated for 1000kVA/800kW at 1500rpm, 380
volts, 3 phase, 50HZ, class F insulated using Vacuum Pressure Impregnated (VPI)
temperature-resistance materials, Air intake without filters, resistor heating, complete
with Resistance Temperature Devices (RTDs) for stator windings and for operation at
maximum 90°C. All associated electrical equipment is rated for 45°C
Emergency diesel drive generator is equipped with two (02) independent starting
systems electric and pneumatic which comply with all applicable rules and Regulatory
Requirement.
3.4.1.2. Electrical Switchboards and Panels
General:
The Main 600VAC and 380VAC system are mounted in the VFD Room. The Emergency
380VAC system is mounted in the Emergency Generator Room. The Auxiliary 380VAC
system is mounted in the LER Room.
The Main and the Emergency systems are electrically interconnected at the 380VAC
voltage level via bus tie circuits. During normal operations the main power plant provides
the necessary power.
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The following will describe the major assemblies comprising the power system described
herein:
• 600 VAC Main Generator Control Switchboard
• 380 VAC Main Distribution Switchboard and Motor Control Centers
• 380 VAC Emergency Switchboard and Motor Control Centers
• 380 VAC Auxiliary Switchboard and Motor Control Centers
• 230 V Distribution Boards and Panels for Main and Emergency Systems
All Switchboards, MCCs and DBs comply with IEC standards.
All circuit breakers above 630AF on Main Distribution Switchboards (600v, 380v, 230v)
and Motor controllers (motor starters) on MCCs are with- drivable unit design. Circuit
breakers of switchboard, distribution panel and controllers of MCC are provided at least
one (1) complete, installed but not used, for every ten active units (or fraction thereof),
installed.
3.4.1.3. Main 600VAC Switchboard
One (1) 600VAC Main Switchboard distributes 600VAC 3-phase 50HZ power to
transformers, Jacking MCCs and Variable Frequency Drives (VFDs).
3.4.1.4. Main 380 Volt Distribution
One (1) 380VAC Main Switchboard distributes 380VAC 3-phase 50HZ power to various
MCCs power panels and other feeder loads.
3.4.1.5. Main 380 Volt Auxiliary
One (1) 380VAC Auxiliary Switchboard distributes 380VAC 3-phase 50HZ power to
various MCCs power panels and other feeder loads.
3.4.1.6. Emergency Switchboard
One (1) 380VAC Emergency Switchboard distributes 380VAC 3 phase 50HZ emergency
power to Emergency MCC and all other Essential feeder loads.
The Emergency Switchboard is connected to:
• 1 each, Emergency fire pump.
• 1 each BOP control unit pump
• Battery chargers
• 1 each Foam Pump
• 1 each Bilge Pump
• 1 each Welding machine
• 1 each Fuel pump
• 2 each Raw water pumps
• 1 each Crane
• Emergency lighting system
• 5 each Lifeboats
• Shore connection box
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• 1 each Service air dryer

• 1 each Sewage treatment plant
• Refrigeration plant
• 1each Service air compressor
• 1 each Diesel oil purifier
• Helideck foam pump
• 1 each VFD room A/C unit
• 1 each Driller cabin A/C unit
• 30 kVA UPS
3.4.1.7. AC Power-Distribution System

The basic AC power system for RIG is ungrounded 600 volt, 3 phase, 50Hz supplied by
the main generators, all capable of parallel operation. The generators supply power to
two (2) separate 2000KVA banks of 600/380 volt transformers for Rig’s service power,
to the VFD’s units and to the Jacking MCC’s.
The secondary of transformers are connected to a 380 volt distribution bus. The 380 volt
distribution buses provide power and control to the various 380 volt power equipment
located on the Rig.
3.4.2. Fuel/Lube Oil System
3.4.2.1. Fuel Oil System
(Ref to Dwg. No: B270-P110 Piping Diaphragm – Fuel Oil System)
General:
A fuel system is provided for the main diesel engines, emergency diesel engine and third
party equipment.
Fuel oil system comprises filling, transfer, purifying, service and drain system. Fuel oil
filling from loading station shall be provided with a flow meter.
Fuel oil system for main diesel engine and emergency diesel engine shall be capable of
operating on marine diesel oil at normal operation.
Fuel Oil Transfer System
All fuel tanks in engine room are fitted with two suctions, both low
Fuel Oil Purifiers
Two (02) purifiers are provided.
Purifiers take suction from respective settling tank & discharge to respective day tank.
Fuel Oil Supply System
Fuel oil supply to main engines shall be provided from day tank. The return fuel oil from
main diesel engines shall be led to the respective day tank.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
Pages: 38/50
3.4.2.2. Lubricating Oil System

General
A lubrication oil system comprising filling and transfer is installed.
Lubrication oil storage/reservoir systems are provided as a minimum for following
equipment:-
• Main diesel engines
• Mud pump.
Lubrication Oil Transfer
A 1" Wilden P2 or equivalent pneumatic driven diaphragm pump 8 m3 per hour capacity
with air regulator is to be provided for pumping the Main Engine lube oil tank to main
engine sump. The pump is to be operated locally only.
A 1" Wilden P2 or equivalent pneumatic driven diaphragm pump 8 m3 per hour capacity
with air regulator is to be provided for pumping the mud pump lube oil tank to mud
pumps. The pump is to be operated locally only.
Lube oil filling to main engines and mud pumps is by fixed piping with flexible
connection/hose
3.4.3. Rig Air System
Three (03) 125 psi 431cu.ft/min rotary screw type rig air compressors sea water-cooled
with acoustic enclosure. The units are mounted on a skid base. Two air dryers are
provided with a separate skid base. Units are connected to a sequence panel for control.
Low pressure alarm, arranged to sound on the Engineer's alarm panel.
Two (02) air cooled Bulk air compressors, 431cfm, 125 psi and one (1) bulk air dryer are
provided.
One (01) cold start air compressor of 300 L/min displacement.
3.4.4. Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems
3.4.4.1. Heating:
The rig is designed for minimum ambient temperature of o0C (32oF) and heating is
provided for machinery spaces (Mech/Elect Workshop and Main Store Room). For the
accommodation, heaters are installed inside the LQ AHU. The air handling units for the
driller’s cabin have built-in electric heaters.
Ventilation General:
All ventilation and air conditioning installation complies with the Class and Regulatory
Body requirements and ASHRAE guidelines for design, installation; testing and
commissioning
Arrangement of ducts are such that all air supply intakes are as far as practically possible
from all air exhaust outlets.
Spaces requiring natural supply or exhaust ventilation, without direct connection to the
weather have doors fitted with louvers in the lower panel.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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Where door louvers or door undercuts are not desired or are impractical, a bulkhead
opening fitted with fixed louver, wire mesh or deflection grille, is used.
All possible care has been taken to avoid water intake, or gas intake in safe areas during
drilling conditions as well as fire spreading from one room to another.
3.4.4.2. Ventilation System
Ventilation is available mechanically and naturally. Machinery spaces are served by
single speed supply and/or exhaust fans. Sanitary and other accommodation areas are
served by single speed supply and exhaust fans. Other accommodation areas are
ventilated through natural supply and exhaust means.
Ventilation fans are in general adjustable pitch axial flow types. Ventilation ducts for
both machinery spaces and accommodation areas are fitted with volume control dampers
to adjust the amount of airflow. All fans for hazardous areas are equipped with brass anti-
spark rings at fan casing in way of fan blades.
a) Engine Room
Two (2) supply fans and two (2) exhaust fans serve the Engine Room. Two supply fans
are fitted with silencers and storm louver box, one exhaust fan is fitted with silencer and
weather louver box and the other exhaust is fitted with galvanized W.T. cover.
In addition, three ( 3) stand-alone turbulence fans are installed inside the room for better
air circulation. The duct entrances and exits to engine room are fitted with pneumatic
shut off damper fail-safe closed.
b) Sack Storage Room
This room is served by one (1) supply fan and one (1) exhaust fan, each with watertight
cover.
c) Mud Pump Room
One ( 1) supply fan and one ( 1) exhaust fan serve this room. An additional exhaust duct
is connected to Mud Pump AC motor blower outlets through silencers.
d) Mud Pit Room
This room is served by two (2) supply fans and two (2) exhaust fans This room is
maintained negative pressure at least 50Pa against neighboring Mud Pump Room.
e) Auxiliary Machinery Space (Port/Fwd, Stbd/Fwd, Port/Aft, Stbd/Aft)
Each auxiliary machinery room is served by one (1) supply fan and one(1) exhaust fan.
f) Heavy Tool Room
This room is served by one (1) supply fan and one (1) exhaust fan.
g) Mud Process Area
The mud process area is a semi-opened area. Exhaust ducting is connected to shale
shakers to extract gases. The area is fitted with Two (2) exhaust fans
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h) CO2 Room
The room is fitted with natural supply and one (1) exhaust fan.
i) (Paint Locker)
The room is fitted with one (1) natural supply and one (1) exhaust fan.
j) Battery Store
The room is fitted with one (1) natural supply and one (1) centrifugal exhaust fan
k) Welding Shop
The room is fitted with one (1) natural supply and one (1) exhaust fan
l) Fire Fighting Store
The room is fitted with one (1) natural exhaust
m) Emergency Generator Room
When the Emergency Generator is operating, the room is ventilated using natural supply
and engine radiator exhaust fan. When the Emergency Generator is not operating, the
room is ventilated using one (1) supply fan and natural exhaust. All openings / ducts at
emergency generator room are fitted with C02 dampers closed when C02 is released in
the room.
n) Drill floor
The drill floor is a Zone 2 hazardous area. Two (2) bug blowers are installed on Derrick
facing the rotary table Generally all supply and exhaust fan are fitted with watertight
covers, except two(2) of the engine room fans are equipped with storm louver boxes.
3.4.4.3. Air-Conditioning
The air conditioning system for accommodation spaces consists of a total of ten (10) air
handling units c/w built-in electric heaters, distributed over the five levels of the living
quarters. The system is using R407C refrigerant. All spaces in quarters including
staterooms, recreation rooms, gymnasium, mess rooms, storage rooms, treatment rooms
and central control rooms are air conditioned. All air-handling units are served by two
seawater-cooled chillers located in stbd/fwd aux. room. Fans are installed in the quarters
to exhaust and supply air from the galley, and to exhaust from sanitary spaces.
The cross-over ducts are installed between LQ’s AHU at each level to serve as back up.
3.4.5. Drain, Effluent and Waste Systems
3.4.5.1. Waste Oil System
The dirty oil tank will receive dirty drain from the lube oil system, fuel oil system, oily
water separator and drain from the engine sumps.
There is one dirty oil tank, located in the inner bottom below the engine room.
The dirty oil pump shall discharge the content of the dirty oil tank to either the main deck
port or starboard loading stations.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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3.4.5.2. Deck Drain System

(Refer to Dwg. No: B270-P112 Piping Diagram – Deck Drainage System)
In normal operations the clean main deck periphery drains are led overboard via the over
board discharge funnel at the stbd aft transom. When the Unit must be put in the zero
discharge mode, these drains are diverted to Preload tank 17C.
The bilge pumps take suction from Preload tank 17C and discharge to the skimmer tank.
The oily water separator takes a suction from skimmer tank and after processing will
discharge clean water overboard. The oily water will be directed to the dirty oil tank or
re-circulate back to the hull skimmer tank.
The mud-contaminated drains from the cantilever and drillf1oor are piped to the
cantilever separator tank located on the cantilever. The cantilever separator tank is
internally divided into two (2) compartments for settling. The discharge from the
cantilever separator tank is led to the hull skimmer tank.
All in- coming drains around mud process pumps and process area are led to drain sumps
located on same area and are connected to the overboard dump header pipe.
The water-based cuttings from mud process equipment, e.g. shale shakers, will be led
overboard via the overboard discharge funnel.
The dump from mud pits is to be pumped by mud mixing pumps to the loading stations.
The pits can also be drained via a master dump valve located in 14P P/L tank.
The drains from main hull mud mixing pumps & charge pumps in-coming, mud pump
in-coming and mud mixing hopper area in-coming drain scupper are led to a sump
located in mud pump room and fwd port aux. machinery room. Thereafter the drains are
pumped overboard via 12" dump line at starboard side.
The clean drain from cementing area led directly overboard via an overboard discharge
funnel.
3.4.6. Communications
A communication system is installed so that the Barge Engineer can adequately
communicate with other on the Vessel, with the supply and anchor handling boats and
with the cranes.
3.4.6.1. Intercom/Telephone System
Drilling Communication System is provided with six (06) Stations. Located in the
Driller's Cabin, Drill floor, Monkey Board, BOP Area, Mud Treatment House (Shale
shaker area), Mud Pump Room and the.
The Talkback system serves as a secure and proven intercom system which provides
operational and emergency communications between strategic locations. These are rated
and suitable in hazardous areas.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
Pages: 42/50
3.4.6.2. External Communications

In the event of an emergency situation, external communication is paramount to the
safety of the crew. Vital communication equipment is maintained, available for use and
protected in the TR.
The following radio communication equipment complete with antenna and special radio
equipment cables were provided. A GMDSS Area 3 system including the following
equipment:
- 1 each Fleet 77 c/w fax machine
- 2 each (1 for spare) SSB Single Side Band Radio located in the radio room
- 3 each fixed VHF Radios, located in the Radio / Jacking Control Room, OIM’s office
and Barge Captain office.
- 1 each Satellite EPIRB in the Central Control Room and one (1) for Port Lifeboat
area platform.
- 1 each Nav Tex receiver installed in the Radio Room.
- 7 each GMDSS Radar Transponders, 1 each installed in each lifeboat and 2 stowed
for use in the life rafts.
- 2 each fixed long range Aviation VHF installed in the radio room and heli-ready
room for helicopter communications.
- 1 each ICOM VHF/AIR fixed aviation VHF installed to the radio room for medium
range heli-comms.
- 2 each portable aviation VHF for helicopter communications c/w chargers.
- Aircraft radio system beacon Transmitter (NDB) is installed in radio room
- GMDSS 4000, 250W, MF/HF shall be installed in radio room and second radio back
station.
3.4.6.3. Separate PA system
A PA system is provided to broadcast announcements and alarms. The PA system is
equipped with intercoms come also with two goose-neck microphones (one in Radio
Room and one in Driller's House) shall have higher priority over telephones for paging
and speakers in all major areas of the unit. Volume controls were provided in10-office
location.
Independent UPS supplies part of the PA system. The UPS is fed from 230VAC Main
Switchboard and 230VAC Emergency Switchboard. In the event both power supplies are
cut off, the UPS batteries shall automatically changeover to supply power to the PA
system for duration of 30 minutes.
3.4.6.4. Portable Radio
The following portable radios were provided:
Twelve (12) each, Motorola GP328UHF radio (16 channel)
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
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Twelve (12) each – Motorola GP 388 VHF radio.

Each crane is provided with:
Fixed Motorola GM 338 VHF-128 channels
3.4.7. Emergency Lighting
The emergency lighting system shall be designed for operation at 230 V AC, single
phase, 50Hz power via the 380 volt/230 volt, three-phase Switchboards7.2.1 Permanently
fixed, individual automatically charged relay-operated accumulator fluorescent light with
a battery back-up time of 30 minutes provides emergency light.
Emergency lights are installed at escape routes, embarkation areas, launching appliances,
sick bay, stowage positions for firemen's outfits, control stations that must be manned in
an emergency. The locations of the emergency lights are shown in the lighting
arrangement drawings.
The areas of water into which lifeboats are launched are provided with floodlights
suitable for Zone 2 and powered by a 230VAC Lighting UPS. Perimeter lights suitable
for Zone 2 and powered by the same UPS are installed on the helideck. The 230VAC
Lighting UPS will ensure a continuity of electrical power supply to these services in the
event of loss of both main and emergency generators for a period of 30 minutes.
Each emergency light and the 230VAC Lighting UPS should be inspected and tested at
least once a week.
The helideck is fitted with omni-directional orange lights so that the landing area is easily
identified at night. These lights are positioned along the perimeter of the helideck above
the landing area level, in accordance with Regulatory Body requirements.
Switches located in the Radio Room control the helideck perimeter lights. The sources of
power for these lights are provided from 230VAC Lighting UPS that is capable of
supplying the service for a minimum of 30 minutes.
3.4.8. Helideck Facilities
The following minimum rescue equipment complying with REGULATORY BODIES

are placed within easy access or near the helicopter platform:
• 1 axe.
• 1 crow bar
• 1 hack saw with 2 spare blades
• 1 rescue grab hook
• 2quick release knives
• 1 Bolt cropper
• 2pair fireman gloves
• 1 fire blanket
• 1 set of 4 screwdrivers
• 1 adjustable wrench
• 1 safety harness with D-ring on front and back
• 1 fireproof safety lifeline
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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• 03 sets BA (3 spare bottles)

• 1 small hammer
• 2 helmets
• 2 pair rubber boots
• 1 hand held radio
• 1 unit, Unitor Helideck Foam System, low expansion AFF foam application
system capable of discharging foam solution onto the landing area at a rate of not
less than 2,330 LPM. The unit is driven by 4 kw electric motor. Sufficient foam is
provided to maintain that rate for a period of not less than 10 minutes.
• 2 each fire hose reels.
• 2 each hoses for foam
• 5 each CO2 extinguishers.
• 5 each, Dry chemical extinguishers.
3.4.9. Lifting Equipment and Material Handling

3.4.9.1. Main deck Cranes
Three (03)Electro – hydraulic cranes, King Post Crane / 48 DNS-120 HD-2.25with 120
feet boom are installed on the main deck at the Port/ Forward, Port /Aft and Starboard
locations with a maximum working capacity of 50MT at 9.1 meters on main hoist. At the
maximum reach of 120 feet, the main hoists of cranes have a working capacity of
10.4MT at 27.4 meters while the auxiliary hoists have a working capacity of 8.2MT at
33.5 meters.
The crane operators must ensure that the crane safe working load is not exceeded at any
time. The crane load chart is extracted from its operation manual and included in this
section. The cranes are not to be operated during wind speeds above 35 knots (40 mph).
Radio operator has to inform the crane operator regarding the wind speed, reading taken
from control room, before any crane operation can take place.
3.4.9.2. BOP Handling Trolley Hoist
The BOP handling system consists of two sets of Ingersoll Rand Air Hoist CFE located
in the Cellar Deck area in the Cantilever Lower Deck. They are designed to lift, transport
and position BOP stack from BOP Storage Area (Port) to the conductor casing at the well
center and vice-versa. Trolley hoist are pneumatically driven and are controlled by a
control panel. Each trolley hoist has a safe working load of 40MT (88,160 lbs).
The trolley hoists are limited to movements within the Cellar Deck area only. Trolley
hoists are operable when the rig is in the jacked up drilling position and cantilever set
back position with limited height limitations. Trolley hoists must be stowed and secured
in the storage position at all other times.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
Pages: 45/50
3.4.9.3. Air Tugger

The rig uses a total of 12 various types of air tugger for general lifting, handling and
servicing of utilities and personnel as shown below:
Qty Location Purpose Type
Drill floor Personnel FA150kgi-FA 150 KGI -MR/3737A

1
Drill floor General FA5i-16MX1GJ1235M1PV
3
Cantilever General FA5i-16XK1GJ1235M1PV
1
Bow Deck General FA5i-16XK1GJ1235M1PV

1
Cellar floor handling Texas deck FA2.5i-MR3737A
2
Cellar floor General FA5i-16MX1GJ1235M1PV
1
Cellar floor General FA5i-16MX1GJ1235H1PV
1
Monkey board General LS15000R-PH10-M1GPJ
2
3.4.9.4. Machinery Handling Equipment

Manually operated gear trolley hoists and trolley are provided for handling of major
equipment within machinery spaces.
A) Engine Room:
• 1 spur geared chain hoist with manual trolley, SWL 10 MT.
• 5 manual plain trolleys, SWL 10 MT.
• Two manual chain spur geared chain hoist with manual trolley, SWL 3 MT
B) Mud Pump Room:
• One spur gear chain hoist with manual trolley, SWL 12 MT
• One spur gear chain hoist with manual trolley, SWL 3 MT
C) Heavy Tool Room:
• One manual chain geared trolley with hoist, SWL 1.5 MT
• Two manual plain trolleys, SWL 2 MT
D) Under Cantilever
• One trolley hoist, SWL 15 MT
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E) Sack Store Room

• One 3 MT forklift.
F) Mechanical Workshop
• One manual geared trolleys with hoist, SWL 3 MT
G) Operator Storage Room
• One manual chain geared trolley with hoist, SWL 1 MT.
3.4.9.5. Forklift
One (01) electric 3 MT forklift including a quick charger and a barrel handling
equipment is provided.
The forklift is suitable for marine application (butcher house type), explosion proof, the
electrical system shall be able to switch off in gas alarm condition.
3.4.10 Storing and Handling of Explosives/Flammables and Other Hazardous Substances
Explosion proof and intrinsically safe equipment located on the open deck shall be
installed in hazardous areas in accordance with the requirements of the Classification and
REGULATORY BODIES.
3.5. Fire and Explosion Protection

3.5.1. Hazardous Area Classifications
Hazardous Areas are classified in following Drawings:

DwgE011, Hazardous Area Plan - Main Deck.
DwgE012, Hazardous Area Plan - Tween Deck.
Dwg E013, Hazardous Area Plan - Tank Top.
DwgE014, Hazardous Area Plan - Outboard Profile.
DwgE015, Hazardous Area Plan - Drill Floor / Cellar Deck
3.5.2. Detection Systems
a) Combustible Gas Detection System
A combustible gas detection system are installed to detect the presence of combustible
gas in minimum of the areas described below and as required by REGULATORY
BODIES.
• Shale Shaker Area.
• Mud pits room.
• Below drill floor (Mud Flow Line).
• Drill floor.
• Machinery spaces Ventilation air intakes.
• All Living quarters fresh air intakes (1 for each intake).
• Engine room supply fan.
• Mud pump room.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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The colors of the light and sound level are as required by REGULATORY BODIES.
b) Toxic Gas (H2S, CO) Detection System
A toxic gas detection system is installed to detect the presence of toxic gas in the areas
described below and as required by REGULATORY BODIES
• Shale Shaker Area.
• Mud pits.
• Below drill floor.
• Drill floor.
• Ventilation system Machinery spaces fan inlet.
• Living quarters fresh air intakes.
• Mud pump room.
• Engine room supply fan.
Each controller have a low and high alarm LED and 0-100ppm or 0-100 percent LED
dial meter for combustible and toxic gas detection.
A 230 V AC power supply to the gas detection system shall be supplied from the
emergency 230 V bus and normal power source per regulatory body requirements.
The Combustible & Toxic Gas Detection System will show the location and
concentration of the gas hazard and give visual and audible alarms at the panel and
remotely at the control stations at the following location:
• OIMs office
• Rig floor (Doghouse)
This Fire & Gas Detection System, General and Abandon alarm signals shall be
interfaced with the Fire & Gas Detection System and vice-versa. All alarm signals to be
interfaced with the Page/party system for tone generation.
c) Portable Detector
A testing kit is supplied and equipped with appropriate flammable material for testing.
Appropriate spares and instruction/operating manuals are held in the warehouse.
• 4 each, combustible gas detectors
• 4 each, Oxygen meters
• 4 each, Toxic gas detector kit
3.5.3. Emergency Shut Down System
Emergency shutdown stations on the RIG is outside the machinery spaces to stop motors
driving the fuel oil pumps, main & emergency engines, the machinery space ventilation
fans, and the mud pump room - mud pit room fans and the HVAC.
An emergency shutdown station is provided in the OIM’s office and Drill Floor for
stopping all ventilation fans and for shutting down all fuel oil pumps and HVAC.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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Emergencies shut down (ESD) facilities; one (1) in the OIM’s office, one (1) in the
driller’s Console, one (1) in Control Room and one (1) at main deck accommodation
capable of selectively shutting down the following electrical equipment.
All emergency shutdown feeders shall be tripped their circuit breakers.
Each ESD button has suitable warning plates. These ESD buttons are designed to prevent
accident contact by people to shut down. Safety guard or break glass is provided.
Emergency stop stations are provided at the deck discharge stations for the fuel oil
transfer and bilge separator pumps.
3.5.4. Active Fire Protection
3.5.4.1. Main Firewater System
The purpose of the Fire Main System is to provide supply of water at required pressure to
fire stations throughout the vessel, as required by the classification society. Two
independent centrifugal fire pumps are used to ensure the availability of water during
emergency conditions - one in Stbd Aft Auxiliary Machinery Room and another in Port
Aft Auxiliary Machinery Room. In the event of fire at least one pump shall be able to
perform.
The two (2) main fire pumps with 880 US gals/min capacity, driven by 63.6 KW electric
motor, are connected to the fire stations via a ring main. Both fire pumps get their supply
from sea chest during afloat condition and from raw water header when in jacked-up (sea
water supply from deep well pumps). In the event during emergency while jacking up the
rig, drill water pumps are dedicated to take suction from any drill water tanks and boost
to the fire pump.
3.5.4.2. Deluge System
Water deluge systems of fixed pipe-nozzle type are provided for drill floor, well testing
area. Manual deluge jet monitors on main deck near rig transom is provided to protect the
well area.
3.5.4.3. Fire Fighting Systems with Foam
Fixed Foam firefighting systems are installed, they are provided for the helideck.
Refueling type foam systems consist of a 265gal foam tank, with 3% AFFF, foam liquid
pump rate max 5,000 little/min (1320 gal/min).
The second foam tank with a capacity of 60gal, type 3% AFFF, pump rate max 3,000
little/min (793gal/min) is located at well head area,
The foam tank shall be made of fiberglass or stainless steel. Three water/foam monitors
are provided on the helideck.
3.5.4.4 Passive Fire Protection
Detail of Passive Fire Protection as per Drawing No.J101 Alt.3.
3.6. Evacuation and Escape Systems
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
Distribution:
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The Installation is equipped with its own self-contained means of evacuation to sea
consisting of:
• 5x Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft and5x Davits for launching
the survival craft.
• Lifeboat #1 can be used as rescue boat.
• Life jackets for use in an emergency are available on board the vessel.
• 02 escape ladders located Port and Stbd side main deck.
10 minute escape packs are supplied in each cabin.
3.7. Accommodation
The accommodation, has been soundproofed with regard to noise from helicopters, refer
compressors, the Emergency Generator and other machinery.
Isolation valves are provided for isolation of systems at each level of the accommodation.
The quarters are located at the forward part of the main deck providing accommodation
for maximum 120 men. It has spaces for galley, mess room, sick bay, recreation rooms,
gymnasium, laundry, offices, radio room and cabins arranged for 1, 2 and 4 persons. The
living spaces are as far as possible arranged to be separated from the working spaces. The
heliport is on the forward of rig and designed for Sikorsky S61N, S92, MI-17 and Super-
Puma L2 helicopters. The quarters are located as far forward as possible so as to cater for
a larger open main deck aft of the quarters.
3.8. Well Testing
Special Well Testing equipment is supplied by third party, located at the Port Aft corner
of the rig.
Well Testing, Coiled Tubing and Wireline Operations
3.8.1. Well Testing
Well testing, carried out to ascertain the quality of the reservoir, is a non-standard
operation which requires specialist procedures, equipment and elevated safety awareness.
The well test contractor will have available on board, specialist procedures in place for
this operation. The equipment footprint for well testing equipment will generally be
within the “well test equipment area”. However, the footprint may change, depending on
the type of well being drilled. The equipment will be determined on a “case-by-case”
basis and the hazardous area drawings amended accordingly - with all hazards being
identified and controlled for each location specific condition.
The following list of equipment is typically utilized in well testing:
• BOPs.
• Surface separation system.
• Choke manifold.
• Flow lines.
• Heater.
• Associated electrical equipment.
• Knockout pots.
Issued Org.: PVD-DD
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• Burner booms.
• Emergency shutdown system.
• Additional fire and gas detection equipment.
3.8.2. Coiled Tubing
Coiled Tubing (CT) operations, carried out to assist well operations, are non-standard
operations which require specialist procedures and equipment and elevated safety
awareness. Approximately 25 m2 of space is provided on the cantilever for a CT unit of
50 tons.
The CT control cabin, workshop, etc will generally be located on the cantilever.
However, this will be determined on a “case-by-case” basis and the hazardous area
drawings amended accordingly.
The following list of equipment is typically utilized in CT operations:
• Service air
• Electrical power
• Drain
• Telephone
• PA/GA
• Fan and ESD
• Water
• CCTV
3.8.3. Wireline Operations

Wireline operations are carried out to assist in a number of ways - e.g. fishing, running
tools, etc. Wireline operations are non-standard operations which require specialist
procedures and equipment and elevated safety awareness. The wireline operations
contractor will have developed specialist procedures for these operations which will be
available onboard.
The following list of equipment is typically utilised in wireline operations:
• Control cabin with winch
• Workshop
• BOPs
• Lubricators
• Associated Electrical Equipment
3.9. Diving Support

There are no permanent facilities for diving on board the PV Drilling I however if fitted
appropriate procedures will adopted to ensure compliance with company procedures and
legislative requirements.
Issued Org.: PVD - DD
PVD Doc Ref: DD/PVD -HSE Case
PV DRILLING 1 HSE CASE Orig. Issue Date:
Issued No.:
SECTION 4: Issued Date:
Risk Management Third party review:
Distribution: Public
Pages: 1/140
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. RISK MANAGEMENT ..............................................................................................3

4.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................3
4.1.1 Hazard Identification ................................................................................3
4.1.1.1 Risk Assessment..................................................................................4
4.1.1.2 Risk Control ........................................................................................5
4.1.1.3 ALARP ................................................................................................5
4.2 Qualitative Risk Assessments ..............................................................................6
4.2.1 Compartment Study ..................................................................................6
4.2.1.1 Summary of Results ............................................................................8
4.2.2 Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment (MAHRA) ............................10
4.2.2.1 Blowouts............................................................................................14
4.2.2.2 Subsea Pipelines ................................................................................28
4.2.2.3 Well Testing ......................................................................................32
4.2.2.4 Entrained Gas within the Mud System ..............................................36
4.2.2.5 Generator Room Fire .........................................................................40
4.2.2.6 Accommodation Fire .........................................................................44
4.2.2.7 Dropped Objects ................................................................................48
4.2.2.8 Helicopter Transport .........................................................................59
4.2.2.9 Ship Collision ....................................................................................64
4.2.2.10 Toxic Gas (H2S)..............................................................................69
4.2.2.11 Loss of Stability ..............................................................................75
4.2.2.12 Loss of Integrity ..............................................................................80
4.2.2.13 Loss of Control in Transit ...............................................................84
4.2.2.14 Mechanical Failure ..........................................................................89
4.2.2.15 Perforating Gun Charges .................................................................93
4.2.2.16 Emergency on Attended Platform ...................................................97
4.2.2.17 Summary of MAHRA Results ......................................................102
4.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) .............................................................105
4.3.1 Frequency Analysis...............................................................................105
4.3.2 Consequence Analysis ..........................................................................105
4.3.3 Risk Evaluation .....................................................................................105
4.3.4 Data Sources .........................................................................................106
4.3.5 Uncertainty............................................................................................106
4.3.6 Human Factors ......................................................................................107
4.3.7 Results...................................................................................................108
4.4 Temporary Refuge Integrity Assessment ........................................................112
4.4.1 Temporary Refuge Integrity Criteria ....................................................112
4.4.2 Thermal Radiation and Explosion Study ..............................................112
Issued No.:
Pages: 2/140
Drill Floor Blowout .....................................................................................113

4.4.2.1 Subsea Blowout ...............................................................................118
4.4.2.2 Well Test Area Fire/ Explosion.......................................................120
4.4.3 Smoke and Gas Ingress Study ..............................................................125
4.4.3.1 Flammable Gas ................................................................................126
4.4.3.2 Toxic Gas (H2S)..............................................................................130
4.4.3.3 Smoke Obscuration .........................................................................133
4.4.3.4 Combined Incapacitating Dose .......................................................135
4.5 Risk Communication .......................................................................................138
4.6 Conclusions .....................................................................................................139
4.7 References........................................................................................................140
Issued No.:
Pages: 3/140
4. RISK MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
This part of the PV Drilling I HSE Case describes the Risk Management Processes in
place to ensure that the risks associated with operations onboard the PV Drilling I are
reduced to a tolerable level.
PV Drilling is committed to develop and maintain an effective risk management

process that is continuously reviewed and updated as required, and to promote a
workplace safety culture among all personnel within the organisation.
This part of the HSE Case describes the process by which hazards on the PV Drilling
I have been identified and assessed, and how the risks are being managed.
4.1.1 Hazard Identification
Hazard identification is the first stage of the risk assessment process.
A hazard is an intrinsic property of anything with the potential to cause harm. Harm
includes ill health and injury, damage to property, plant, products or the
environment, production losses, or increased liabilities.
The definition of a major accident, according to the UK Offshore Installations (HSE

Case) Regulations 2005 [10] is as follows:
(a) a fire, explosion or the release of a dangerous substance involving death or

serious personal injury to persons on the installation or engaged in an activity
on or in connection with it;
(b) any event involving major damage to the structure of the installation or plant
affixed thereto or any loss in the stability of the installation;
(c) the collision of a helicopter with the installation;
(d) the failure of life support systems for diving operations in connection with the
installation, the detachment of a diving bell used for such operations or the
trapping of a diver in a diving bell or other subsea chamber used for such
operations; or
(e) any other event arising from a work activity involving death or serious
personal injury to five or more persons on the installation or engaged in an
activity in connection with it.
Issued No.:
Pages: 4/140
The major hazards considered to be applicable to the PV Drilling I are identified in

section 4.2.
4.1.1.1 Risk Assessment
‘Risk’ is the combination of the probability of occurrence of a consequence and the

severity of that consequence.
Risk Acceptance Criteria
The UK HSE has indicated that the upper tolerable limit for individual risk for
workers in high risk industries is 1 x 10-3 (1 in 1,000) fatalities per year. This level is
accepted as an industry standard. All risk levels above this criteria value are
unacceptable. Risk levels below this value, but above the broadly acceptable level of
1 x 10-5 (0.01 in 1,000) fatalities per year, are stated to be within the tolerable region.
In the tolerable region, risk levels to individuals are only acceptable if it can be
demonstrated that the risks are ALARP. The tolerable region is also therefore
referred to as the ALARP region.
In UK, the risk to personnel is expressed as the frequency of major accidents causing
fatalities among personnel multiplied by the resulting number of fatalities. Risk is
calculated on an accident by accident basis. Major accident fatalities could occur as a
result of an accident, such as an engine room fire, causing initial fatalities at the
incident location. Alternatively the fatalities could be due to entrapment or hazards
encountered during escape, evacuation, rescue or recovery.
Issued No.:
Pages: 5/140
4.1.1.2 Risk Control
When risks have been analysed and assessed, decisions can be made about control
measures. Decisions about risk control measures take into account the relevant legal
requirements which establish minimum levels of risk prevention or control. PV
Drilling will then take this further by reducing risks to ALARP.
A hierarchical approach should be used for managing major accident hazards, taking
account of the effect of each measure in a balanced and integrated way. The
recommended hierarchy is:
1. Elimination and minimisation of hazards by design (inherently safer design)

2. Prevention (reduction of likelihood)
3. Detection (transmission of information to control point)
4. Control (limitation of scale, intensity and duration)
5. Mitigation of consequences (protection from effects)
4.1.1.3 ALARP
Further risk reduction will also be sought and implemented on an ALARP (As Low
as Reasonably Practicable) basis if the analysis shows the risk exposure to be within
the ALARP region.
“Reasonably practical” implies that an evaluation of the risk is to be made and this is
to be weighed against the potential measures for averting the risk in terms of money,
time and complexity. If there is a gross disproportionally between the risk and the
cost of reducing it, the risks are deemed to be ALARP.
Issued No.:
Pages: 6/140
4.2 Qualitative Risk Assessments
4.2.1 Compartment Study
A compartment study was carried out on board the PV DRILLING I by onboard rig
management and reviewed by onshore management.
• Ian Miller HSE Manager – Drilling Division

• Van Hoang Tung HSE Deputy Manager
• Colin Smith / Nghiem Vu Dat Safety Training Coordinators
• Ralph Waller Maintenance Manager
• James Devenny/ Richard Hughes Barge Captain
• Frank Henson / Terry Cleveland OIM’s
The compartment study involved visiting each compartment on the installation and
assessing it for the risk of fire, explosion and flood. The general approach adopted
was to assess the frequency and consequences of each hazard using the “what if?”
approach to hazard identification.
Where the team judged that none of the components required to make up a hazard are
present no further evaluation of the scenario was required. For all other scenarios the
team qualitatively assessed the frequency of the scenario occurring and the resulting
consequence(s) on a risk matrix.
Due regard was taken of the explosive/ combustible/ permeability inventory present,
the initiating event and subsequent chain of events, as well as existing hardware,
procedures and contingency arrangements in place to control or mitigate the realised
hazard.
Full details of the compartment study assessments can be found section 3 of the PV
DRILLING I Risk Study [15]. A sample compartment assessment form is provided
overleaf.
Issued No.:
Pages: 7/140
Sample compartment risk assessment form:
Port Pump Room

Hazard Hazard Components Reducing Factors Ref
COMPONENTS
Fire Fuel: Electric cables

Ign: Motors, pumps, electrics
Oxy:
Expl Negligible possibility of explosion

Flood Valves, pipework, heat exchangers Pump room inboard
Human Error Frequency Reduction Ref

Fire Welding Carried out under permit, fire watcher
Pump running on closed valve Formal DPO training
Light indication on ballast control
panel when pump running
Regular pump room drills
THREATS
Flood Incorrect maintenance Task procedure in place
System Failure Frequency Reduction Ref

Fire Pump or motor failure PMS
Flood Pipework failure Maintenance thickness checks

Valve body failure PMS
Possible Consequences Reducing Measures Ref

Fire Space burns out Hoses and hydrant; extinguishers;
CONSEQUENCES
smoke detection; pump room

redundancy
Persons trapped 2 Escapes
Consider BCO simulator training Recom
Consider if fire fighting equipment Recom
is adequate
Flood Loss of all pumping services Bilge sensing and pumping available.
Redundancy in pumping services
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
No Effect 0
Minor 1
Serious 2 Fire Flood
Severe 3
Major 4
Catastrophe 5
Negligible Improbable Remote Possible Probable
A B C D E
Issued No.:
Pages: 8/140
4.2.1.1 Summary of Results
Compartment Event Freq Con Risk

Main 600V Switchboard and drilling VFD Room Fire D 3 D3
Laundry Room Fire D 2 D2
Engine Room Fire C 3 C3
Port Pump Room Flood C 2 C2
Mud Pump room Fire C 2 C2
Galley Fire C 1 C1
Forward Switchboard Room Fire B 3 B3
Water Mist Equipment Room Fire B 2 B2
Warehouse Fire B 2 B2
Stbd P Tank Room Fire B 2 B2
Sack Storage Room Fire B 2 B2
Rubber Store Fire B 2 B2
Port Transformer Room Fire B 2 B2
Port Pump Room Fire B 2 B2
Port P Tank Room Fire B 2 B2
Port Aft Winch Room Fire B 2 B2
Mud Pit Room Fire B 2 B2
Mechanical Store Fire B 2 B2
Mechanic’s Office Fire B 2 B2
MCC room Fire B 2 B2
Maintenance workshop Fire B 2 B2
Koomey Room Fire B 2 B2
Emergency Generator Room Fire B 2 B2
Diesel Purifier Room Fire B 2 B2
Ballast Control Room Fire B 2 B2
Welder Shop Fire B 1 B1
Toolpusher Office Fire B 1 B1
Toolpusher Cabin Fire B 1 B1
Staff Recreation Room Fire B 1 B1
Sewage Treatment Room Fire B 1 B1
Sewage Treatment Room Flood B 1 B1
Service Engineer Office Fire B 1 B1
Server Room Fire B 1 B1
Server Room Expl B 1 B1
Safety Officer’s Office Fire B 1 B1
Radio Room Fire B 1 B1
Paint Store Room Fire B 1 B1
Office Fire B 1 B1
Mess Room Fire B 1 B1
Issued No.:
Pages: 9/140
Compartment Event Freq Con Risk

Medic Room Fire B 1 B1
Hospital Fire B 1 B1
Electrician’s workshop Fire B 1 B1
Electrician’s Office Fire B 1 B1
Crew Recreation Room Fire B 1 B1
Crew Meeting Room Fire B 1 B1
Conference Room Fire B 1 B1
Company Store Room Fire B 1 B1
Company Man Office Fire B 1 B1
Company Man Cabin Fire B 1 B1
Barge Engineer Office Fire B 1 B1
AHU Rooms Flood B 1 B1
4 Man Cabin Fire B 1 B1
Air Compressor Room Fire A 3 A3
Water Mist Equipment Room Expl A 2 A2
Cable Trunk Rooms Fire A 2 A2
Wash and Changing Room Fire A 1 A1
Stbd Fwd Column VFD Room Fire A 1 A1
Stbd Dry Store Room Fire A 1 A1
Service Equipment Room Fire A 1 A1
Safety Store Room Fire A 1 A1
PPE Store Fire A 1 A1
Port Dry Store Room Fire A 1 A1
Mud Engineer Office Fire A 1 A1
Library Fire A 1 A1
Gym Room Fire A 1 A1
Freezer Room Fire A 1 A1
Fireman’s Room Fire A 1 A1
Electric Panel Room Fire A 1 A1
Crane Column Fire A 1 A1
Chiller Room Fire A 1 A1
Battery Room Fire A 1 A1
Battery Room Expl A 1 A1
AHU Rooms Fire A 1 A1
Compartment Study on Appendix A

Issued No.:
Pages: 10/140
4.2.2 Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment (MAHRA)
In order to identify and assess the major accident hazards associated with the
operation of the PV DRILLING I, personnel familiar with the design and operation
of the rig conducted a Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment (MAHRA)
Aims
The aims of the process were to:
• identify and qualitatively examine the major accident hazards associated with
the PV DRILLING I
• identify and assess the preventative and contingency measures which are in
place, or required to reduce any risks associated with the hazards to a level
which is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
• identify any deficiencies within the current system
• make recommendations which should be implemented so as to reduce the
probability of a major accident being initiated and reduce the consequences
should one ever occur
Participants
The MAHRA was undertaken by a team comprising a mix of onshore and offshore
personnel from various disciplines. Team members included:
• Ian Miller HSE Manager, Drilling Division

• Van Hoang Tung HSE Deputy Manager, PVD Drilling
• Nguyen Hoang Phong HO, HSEQ Staff
• Tran Tuan Marine Administrator
• Ian Parr Rig Manager
• Frank Henson / Terry Cleveland OIM
• Ralph Waller PVD Maintenance Manager
• Colin Smith/ Nghiem Vu Dat STC
• James Devenny/Richard Hughes Barge Captain
Decisions reached were based on team consensus and therefore represent the
collective knowledge, experience and judgement of the team.
Major Accident Hazard Identification

The following is a list of the major accident hazards identified by the team:
• Shallow gas
• Hydrocarbons in formation during drilling
• Hydrocarbons in formation during coiled tubing work
Issued No.:
Pages: 11/140
• Hydrocarbons under pressure on the seabed

• Well testing
• Entrained gas within the mud system
• Generator room fire
• Accommodation fire
• Dropped objects – crane operations
• Dropped objects – derrick lifting
• Helicopter transport
• Ship collision
• Toxic gas
• Loss of stability
• Loss of integrity
• Loss of control in transit
• Mechanical failure
• Perforating gun charges
• Emergency on attended platform
As can be seen above, fires and explosions have been analysed separately for
different areas since the threats and consequences from these areas are very different,
as indeed are the barriers to prevent them from occurring (e.g. a fire in the
accommodation area will be very different in terms of consequence from a fire in a
machinery room).
Method
The workshop was conducted using the computer program ‘BowTieXP’. The
program displays by way of a bowtie diagram the hazard, top event, threats,
consequences and associated prevention and contingency measures (barriers) which
are in place, along with any related escalation factors.
The terms used are defined as follows:
• Hazard – An intrinsic property of anything with the potential to cause harm.

• Top Event – The initial consequence that occurs immediately after the
hazard is released.
• Threat – The cause of the top event, the means by which the potential is
released.
• Consequence – An event or chain of events that results from the release of a
hazard.
• Barrier – Measure which reduces the probability of releasing a hazard’s
potential for harm or which reduces its consequences.
• Escalation Factor – This can cause a barrier to fail.
Issued No.:
Pages: 12/140
Barrier Effectiveness
Each barrier in the bow tie diagrams is graded by the team according to its perceived
effectiveness. The three levels of effectiveness are presented below.
In place &
Effectiveness Illustration Reliability Human Factors
being used
No human involvement,
Very reliable simple instructions, easy to
> 95% of time
Very Good (works >99% of operate, intuitive, proven
in place
the time) operator performance, or
errors practically impossible.
Clearly defined task, defined

operating procedures,
Reliable
> 75% of time operator is trained and
Good (works > 95% of
in place experienced, or errors
the time)
conceivable but very
unlikely.
Undetermined Unknown Unknown Unknown

Issued No.:
Pages: 13/140
Risk Assessment Matrix

The consequences for each major accident hazard have been evaluated on a risk
assessment matrix. The matrix allows the frequency and consequence of an event to be
combined to enable the evaluation of risk.
The team made an evaluation of the frequency and consequences by best judgement. The
"tolerability" or otherwise of the event can then be determined. The risk was evaluated
taking into account the existing prevention and contingency measures which are in place.
Frequency:
A Negligible Not credible, e.g. the team have never heard of event
occurring in industry.
B Improbable Conceivable, but would require multiple failures of systems
and controls.
C Remote Less than average, easy to postulate a scenario for accident
but considered unlikely.
D Possible More than average, represents a credible scenario.
E Probable Likely to occur.

Issued No.:
Pages: 14/140
Consequences:
Personnel Assets Environment

0 No Effect No harm to No damage to the No damage to the
personnel installation environment
1 Minor Injuries Does not affect the Contained
unlikely integrity of any part of onboard
the installation
2 Serious Some minor May affect mechanical Less than 1 bbl
injuries systems, limited
possible structural damage
3 Severe Some major May affect several 1 to 5 bbl
injuries mechanical systems with
possible extensive but non-critical
structural damage
4 Major Single fatality Only a few safety critical 5 to 100 bbl
mechanical systems
survive, extensive
structural damage places
the integrity of the
installation in serious
doubt
5 Catastrophe Multiple Possibly no mechanical More than 100 bbl
fatalities systems remain,
structural damage such
that integrity of
installation lost, with
potential for immediate
collapse
4.2.2.1 Blowouts
A blowout is defined as an uncontrolled release of well fluids and can occur at the drill
floor, at the blowout preventer (BOP), at the seabed or underground between reservoirs.
During a blowout there is a risk of missiles and debris ejected from the well causing
fatalities. Ignited blowouts resulting in jet fires have the potential to cause fatalities and
impair lifeboats and escape routes in a variety of combinations due to high radiation levels.
In the event of delayed ignition there is a possibility that gas will accumulate to form an
explosive cloud. This will depend on the wind speed and direction.
Shallow Gas
Threats and Preventative Measures
Consequences and Contingency Measures
PVD Doc Ref: DD/PVD HSE Case
Issued No.:
Distribution:
Pages: 18/140
Risk Evaluation
PV Drilling staff attending the MAHRA workshop determined the following risk
evaluations for shallow gas:
Consequence Likelihood People Assets Environment

Severity Risk Severity Risk Severity Risk
Ignited release Improbable Catastro B5 Catastroph B5 Catastrop B5
phic ic hic
Loss of buoyancy Improbable Catastro B5 Catastroph B5 Catastrop B5
phic ic hic
Actions/ Recommendations
No actions/recommendations were noted
Hydrocarbons in Formation during Drilling
Hydrocarbons in Formation during Drilling
PVD Doc Ref: DD/PVD V-HSE Case
PV DRILLING I HSE CASE Orig. Issue Date: 21 Oct 2012
Issued No.: 01
SECTION 4: Issued Date: 21 Oct 2012
Risk Management Third party review: MAREX
Pages: 23/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for hydrocarbon in formation during drilling:

Ignited release Improbable Catastroph B5 Catastroph B5 Catastrop B5
ic ic hic
No actions/recommendations were noted.
Hydrocarbons in Formation during Coiled Tubing Work
Hydrocarbons in Formation during Coiled Tubing Work
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 27/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for hydrocarbon in formation during coiled tubing work:

Ignited release Improbable Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 28/140
4.2.2.2 Subsea Pipelines
There is a close relationship between hydrocarbon releases from subsea pipelines and
shallow gas releases. The actions taken to keep the personnel on the rig safe are exactly the
same, and the means of preventing such releases is by management of the operations which
might cause the failure of pipelines or manifolds in the proximity of the rig.
Subsea Pipelines
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 31/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for hydrocarbon under pressure on the seabed:

Ignition at sea Negligible Catastrophic B5
Severe A3 Severe A3
surface
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 32/140
4.2.2.3 Well Testing
During well testing, reservoir fluids (including hydrocarbons) are brought onboard the rig
and tested to evaluate reservoir conditions and ascertain the exact nature of the
hydrocarbon deposits. There, therefore, exists the potential for a hydrocarbon leak and a
subsequent fire/ explosion.
Well Testing
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 35/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for well testing:

Ignited release Improbable Major B4 Severe B3 Major B4
Explosion of well test Negligible Catastrophic A5 Severe A3 Severe A3
vessels
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 36/140
4.2.2.4 Entrained Gas within the Mud System
Gas-cut mud occurs when formation gases mix with the mud as small gas bubbles. When
gas-cut mud is detected, the mud is routed to the degasser unit, which allows evolved gas
to be vented through pipework at the top of the derrick. The degassed mud is then returned
to the system. For an explosion to occur, the gas cloud, in flammable concentrations, has to
come into contact with an ignition source; however, much of the entrained gas will be
removed in the degasser.
It is unlikely that hazardous quantities of gas will exist in the mud downstream of the
shakers. However, it is feasible that an explosion in the mud pit room could be caused by
gas cut mud entering the mud pits due to failure of the degassers and shale shakers to fully
degas the mud, and subsequent failure of the mud pit ventilation system, allowing gas to
accumulate.
With gas detectors located in the mud pit room, there would be an early warning that a
combustible vapour is forming prior to reaching the lower explosive limit, so the well
could be shut-in and the space ventilated to pre-empt an explosion. And as all equipment in
the mud pit room are intrinsically safe and explosion proof, there are no ignition sources.
Entrained Gas within the Mud System
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 39/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for entrained gas within the mud system:

Explosion/Fires Improbable Catastrophic B5 Major B4 Catastrophic B5
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 40/140
4.2.2.5 Generator Room Fire
Generator room fires may begin with a fractured fuel line or any leak from the fuel system
coming into contact with a hot surface such as the exhaust manifold. Oily rags left close to
or in contact with hot machinery surfaces can also initiate small fires in machinery spaces.
Generator Room Fire
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 43/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for generator room fires:

Smoke / fire spreads Possible Severe D3 Severe D3 Serious D2
through engine room –
possible escalation
No actions/recommendations were noted
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 44/140
4.2.2.6 Accommodation Fire
Crew accommodation for 120 persons is located at the aft end of the rig. Potential causes
of fires in the accommodation include galley fires fuelled by cooking oil and oil
impregnated extraction fan filters. Lint and dust collecting in the filters of laundry dryers
are another potential source of fires as are oil stained coveralls.
Accommodation Fire
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 47/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for accommodation fires:

Smoke / fire spreads Improbable Severe B3 Severe B3 Severe B3
through accommodation
Personnel trapped and Improbable Severe B3 - - - -
overcome by smoke
1. Ensure that galley is always manned during cooking
2. Investigate if furnishings in accommodation are flame retardant
3. Implement standard for the purchase of furnishings
4. Implement purchasing standard for new electrical equipment
5. Include cleaning of laundry ducting within PMS
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 48/140
4.2.2.7 Dropped Objects
Dropped objects from crane operations jack equipment were identified as major hazards
for the PV Drilling 1. The rig is equipped with deck cranes; the derrick is stowed on the rig
Crane Dropped Object
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 53/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for crane dropped object:

Large energy impacts on Improbable Major B4 Major B4 Major B4
rig
Impact on subsea assets Negligible No effect A0 No effect A0 Catastrophic A5
Impact on attended Improbable Major B4 Major B4 Minor B1
platform
1. Procedure to be developed for change-out/inspection routine for crane main line
wire.
2. PV Drilling to review frequency of third party inspections of crane wires and
running gear
3. Include formal requirement for visual inspection of crane after 110% alarm and log
in PMS
4. Review of existing policy for PMS on crane weight indicators
Derrick Dropped Object
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 58/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for derrick dropped object:
Large energy impacts Remote Major C4 Severe C3 Serious C2
on the drill floor
Impact on BOP Negligible Catastrophic A5 Major A4 Serious A2
equipment
1. Ensure that PVD vendor audit procedures are followed
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 59/140
4.2.2.8 Helicopter Transport
Every landing of a helicopter onboard the rig is considered as a possible crash, and suitable
preparations made. Therefore, as part of the emergency response for this event the
effectiveness of the equipment, procedures and personnel provided to mitigate against any
possible crash are considered.
Helicopter Crash
Helicopter Crash
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 63/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for helicopter transport:

Helicopter impacts Improbable Catastrophic B5 Severe B3 Severe B3
helideck
Helicopter ditches into Improbable Catastrophic B5 No Effect B0 Major B4
sea within 500m zone
Helicopter impacts on Improbable Catastrophic B5 Severe B3 Major B4
some area of rig
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 64/140
4.2.2.9 Ship Collision
The risk assessment considers the possibility of a high energy head on collision between
rig and a passing vessel travelling at speed. Such an impact is expected to result in damage
to the rig and may lead to sinking.
The risk of collision between the rig and visiting vessels manoeuvring close to the rig
(such as supply boats, etc.) is also considered but it was evident that the consequences
would be limited.
Ship Collision
Ship Collision
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 68/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for ship collision:

Structural damage Possible Severe D3 Severe D3 Severe D1
Rig sinking Negligible Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 69/140
4.2.2.10 Toxic Gas (H2S)
Toxic gas may exist naturally in the reservoir in the form of hydrogen sulphide (H2S).
Significant quantities of toxic gas could be released onto the rig following an un-ignited
blowout or an un-ignited release during well testing activities.
Toxic Gas
Toxic Gas
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 74/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for toxic gas:

Personnel exposure to Improbable Major B4 No Effect B0 No Effect B0
H2S gas when H2S
expected
Personnel exposure to Improbable Catastrophic B5 No Effect B0 No Effect B0
H2S gas when H2S not
expected
Personnel exposed to Improbable Major B4 No Effect B0 No Effect B0
H2S during tank
cleaning
No action / recommendations were noted.
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 75/140
4.2.2.11 Loss of Stability
Malfunction of human error could result in flooding of internal compartments and

subsequent loss of stability of the rig.
Loss of Stability
Loss of Stability
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 79/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for loss of stability:

Rig sinking Improbable Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 80/140
4.2.2.12 Loss of Integrity

Loss of Integrity
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 83/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for loss of integrity:
Rig sinking Improbable Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5 Catastrophic B5
1. In pre load tanks
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 84/140
4.2.2.13 Loss of Control in Transit
The scenario considered here is loss of control during transit resulting in grounding or
collision with another vessel or installation. The collision results in the rig sustaining
structural damage, with subsequent flooding.
Loss of Control in Transit
PV DRILLING I HSE CASE Orig. Issue 25 Oct 2012
SECTION 4: Issued No.: 01
Risk Management Issued Date: 25 Oct 2012
Pages: 88/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for loss of control in transit:

Collision / Improbable Major B4 Major B4 Catastrophic B5
grounding
1. Consider requirement for replacement for tow bridle at 5 year surveys
2. Confirm that operations manual contains guidance on collision/grounding
whilst on tow
Pages: 89/140
4.2.2.14 Mechanical Failure
Major mechanical failure is defined as a catastrophic failure of static (pressurised) or

rotating equipment in such a way as to cause an uncontrolled release of kinetic energy
resulting in casualties to personnel in the vicinity of the projectiles.
Pressurised plant requires to be fitted with Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) to relieve over-
pressure and prevent catastrophic failure. Rotating machinery therefore represents the
greater potential for an accident.
Mechanical Failure
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 92/140
Risk Evaluation
evaluations for mechanical failure:

Harm/damage Remote Major C4 Major C4 Severe C3
Structural damage Negligible Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5
below waterline
Issued No.: 01
Pages: 93/140
4.2.2.15 Perforating Gun Charges
Perforation involves the lowering of shaped explosive charges into the well on a wireline
tool string and detonating them by remote control. The charges puncture the steel casing
and cement allowing the passage of well fluids into the well bore. The charges are made up
on deck before being lowered down hole and while the explosives are being handled, the
possibility of accidental misfire due to stray electrical currents is carefully managed. The
charges themselves incorporate high resistance components to prevent accidental
detonation.
Perforating Gun Charges
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Risk Evaluation
evaluations for perforating gun charges:

Harm to personnel due Improbable Major B4 Severe B3 No Effect B0
to explosion at
drillfloor, explosives
storage or gun
assembly areas
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4.2.2.16 Emergency on Attended Platform
A fire/ explosion on the attended platform could be caused by pipework system failure,
cellulosic debris, processing plant failure, support vessel contact during transition or
contact with rig manoeuvring alongside. These are all seen to have the potential to cause
the burning of platform or ignition on rig with harm to PV Drilling personnel.
Emergency on Attended Platform
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Risk Evaluation
evaluations for emergency on attended platform:

Platform burnt Improbable Catastrophic B5 Major B4 Catastrophic B5
down
Ignition on rig Negligible Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5 Catastrophic A5
from platform
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4.2.2.17 Summary of MAHRA Results
In order to provide a means of addressing the areas of greatest risk, the following table
shows the levels of risk as determined by the qualitative assessment of each consequence
associated with the identified major accident hazards.
Consequence Risk
Personnel Asset Environment
Shallow gas
Ignited release B5 B5 B5
Loss of buoyancy B5 B5 B5
Hydrocarbons in formation during drilling
Hydrocarbons in formation during coiled tubing work
Subsea pipelines
Ignition at sea surface A3 A3 A5
Well testing
Explosion of well test vessels A5 A3 A3
Entrained gas within the mud system
Explosion / fires B5 B4 B5
Generator room fire
Smoke/ fire spreads through engine room – possible D3 D3 D2
escalation
Accommodation fire
Smoke / fire spreads through accommodation B3 B3 B3
Personnel trapped and overcome by smoke B3 - -
Dropped objects – crane operations
Large energy impacts on rig B4 B4 B4
Impact on pontoon – possible sinking A5 A5 A5
Impact on subsea assets A0 A0 A5
Impact on attended platform B4 B4 B1
Helicopter transport
Helicopter impacts helideck B5 B3 B3
Helicopter ditches into sea within 500m zone B5 B0 B4
Helicopter impacts on some area of the rig B5 B3 B4
Ship collision
Structural damage D3 D3 D1
Rig sinking A5 A5 A5
Toxic gas
Personnel exposure to H2S gas when H2S expected B4 B0 B0
Personnel exposure to H2S gas when H2S not expected B5 B0 B0
Personnel exposure to H2S gas during tank cleaning B4 B0 B0
Loss of stability
Rig sinking B5 B5 B5
Loss of integrity
Rig sinking B5 B5 B5
Loss of control in transit
Collision / Grounding B4 B4 B5
Loss of position
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Collision with another installation B5 B5 B5

Mechanical failure
Harm / damage C4 C4 C3
Structural damage below waterline A5 A5 A5
Perforating gun charges
Harm to personnel due to explosives at drillfloor, explosives B4 B3 B0
storage or gun assembly areas
Emergency on attended platform
Platform burnt down B5 B4 B5
Ignition on rig from platform A5 A5 A5
A total of 18 actions/ recommendations were identified during the process.
Accommodation Fire
1. Ensure that galley is always manned during cooking
2. Investigate if furnishings in accommodation are flame retardant
3. Implement standard for the purchase of furnishings
4. Implement purchasing standard for new electrical equipment
5. Include cleaning of laundry ducting within PMS
Dropped Objects – Crane Operations

6. Procedure to be developed for change-out/inspection routine for large crane main
line
7. PV Drilling to review frequency of third party inspections of crane wires and
running gear
8. Include formal requirement for visual inspection of crane after 110% alarm and log
in PMS
9. Review of existing policy for PMS on crane weight indicators
Helicopter Transport
10. PV Drilling to consider joining client during audit of helicopter company
Ship Collision
11. Consider fitting AIS receiver to rig
Loss of Stability
12. Consider fitting CCTV for both ballast pump rooms
13. Ensure that ballast drills are contained within the ERP
Loss of Control in Transit

14. Consider requirement for replacement for tow bridle at 5 year surveys
15. Confirm that operations manual contains guidance on collision/grounding whilst on
tow
Mechanical Failure
16. Investigate which standard PRVs are maintained to
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17.
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4.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
This section details the process undertaken to analyse those major accident hazards
identified for the PV DRILLING I, in order to quantify the potential risks to personnel
onboard.
The output from the Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment (MAHRA) workshop
carried out with PV Drilling staff is used as the main input into the Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) described here. The QRA makes a more informed assessment of the
identified major accident hazards.
The QRA process is split into three main steps, namely:
• frequency analysis;
• consequence analysis; and
• risk evaluation.
4.3.1 Frequency Analysis
The purpose of the frequency analysis is to determine the frequency of each of the main
hazardous events or accident scenarios identified at the major accident hazard risk
assessment. The basic approaches used are:
• historical accident frequency data;

• theoretical modelling;
• event tree analysis; and
• Judgmental evaluation.
4.3.2 Consequence Analysis
The consequences of the major accident hazards identified are estimated. The typical
consequences from a hazardous incident are analysed in terms of immediate fatalities from
a hazard’s potential being realised and subsequent fatalities in the event of evacuation,
escape and rescue.
4.3.3 Risk Evaluation
When evaluating risk, consideration is given to the following factors:
• The frequency of occurrence of a hazardous incident. This is typically expressed as

an average frequency of occurrence per operating year.
• The potential for escalation. Whilst a hazardous incident may occur, it may in itself
present no immediate risk. Scenarios are developed to reason the potential
escalation of a hazardous incident to a fatal outcome event.
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• The population type exposed to the hazard. The population types exposed to a
specific hazard can vary from all POB; down to nominated work groups such as
accommodation based staff, drilling crew and deck crew. Non-work related groups
such as helicopter passengers are also considered.
• The duration of exposure to the hazard. The proportion of the year during which an
individual may be exposed to a hazardous incident is noted, taking into account an
individual’s duties and expected location.
• The magnitude of the hazard’s realised potential. For example, these could be
release rates, impact energies, etc.
The risk to personnel is expressed as:
• Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA). This is the frequency per year at which an
individual (usually from a particular worker group) could be expected to suffer a
fatal accident due to specific hazards. The risk figure is calculated from the risk
models based on the quantification of the major accident hazards identified.
• Potential Loss of Life (PLL). This is the predicted long term average number of
fatalities per year. This risk figure is calculated in a similar way to the IRPA.
The relationship between IRPA and PLL is as follows:
PLL = Average IRPA x POB

Fraction of time an individual spends offshore
The average IRPA for each worker group has been calculated. Also, the individual with the
highest IRPA has been identified and this value has also been calculated.
4.3.4 Data Sources
The key sources of data used in the QRA for the PV DRILLING I are as follows:
• International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, Risk Assessment Data Directory,
Report No.434 [1].
• “Accident statistics for offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf 1990-2007”
RR738 [5].
• DNV Worldwide Offshore Accident Data (WOAD) [4].
4.3.5 Uncertainty
There are limitations in quantifying the likelihood of major accidents, as follows:
• Location Specific – Several of the major hazards are location specific, in particular
ship collision.
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• Statistical Validity – All calculations have been based on limited data sets.
It is noted that incident data obviously cannot be from identical scenarios, as
installations will not be operating under the same operations and environmental
conditions, nor will experience the same sequence of events for an incident.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that incident rates in the future will concur with
those derived from historical data.
• Improving Industry Standards – The majority of the historical accident data used
has been based on experience gained over a number of years, during which time
there has been a steady improvement in both technology and safety regimes. The
assessment is therefore conservative, by including events that occurred during the
early years of operation.
There are also limitations in quantifying the severity of the consequences of major
accidents. Where there is uncertainty in the probabilities used:
• A cautionary approach has been used to take conservative and reasoned

estimations.
• It is believed that serious harm might occur, even if the likelihood of harm is
remote.
• Ranges of probabilities have been considered where appropriate, for example,

escape from fire hazards have been modelled with a range of probabilities,
depending on the detection and control possibilities and also access to escape
routes.
4.3.6 Human Factors
The influence of human factors in causing major accidents is assumed to be implicit in

generic event frequency data. Human factors are, however, considered explicitly in the
context of the response of the installation to a major accident. Event tree analysis considers
the influence of decision making and human actions on risk levels.
The possible beneficial aspects of human factors in the control of major accidents are not
normally included, thereby adding conservatism to the analysis.
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4.3.7 Results
The results of the QRA study are summarised below. The risks from the various hazard
scenarios have been summed and an overall risk for the personnel on the PV DRILLING I
has been calculated.
It should be appreciated that many of the hazards were reduced to tolerable or broadly
acceptable by the application of the ALARP principle in the qualitative assessment, and a
further QRA was not necessarily required as the risk assessment process was deemed
suitable and sufficient proportionate with the hazard and its associated risk. However, a
QRA has been undertaken for all the major accident hazard scenarios identified.
Hazard Personnel group average IRPA

Drilling Maintenance Deck Accom. 3rd Party
-4 -4 -4 -4
Blowout 1.33 x10 1.24 x10 1.24 x10 1.24 x10 1.24 x10-4
Subsea Pipelines N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Well Testing 0 0 0 0 6.81 x10-6
Entrained Gas 1.83 x10-9 0 0 0 0
Dropped Objects 1.31 x10-4 8.67 x10-6 1.30 x10-5 0 1.30 x10-5
Engine Room Fire 0 6.34 x10-6 0 0 0
Mechanical Failure 0 1.80 x10-6 0 0 0
Loss of Stability 5.27 x10-5 5.27 x10-5 5.27 x10-5 5.27 x10-5 5.27 x10-5
Loss of Integrity 7.02 x10-6 7.02 x10-6 7.02 x10-6 7.02 x10-6 7.02 x10-6
Loss of Control in Transit 5.97 x10-8 5.97 x10-8 5.97 x10-8 5.97 x10-8 5.97 x10-8
Ship Collision 3.31 x10-6 3.31 x10-6 3.31 x10-6 3.31 x10-6 3.31 x10-6
Toxic Gas 2.22 x10-5 0 0 0 3.05 x10-5
Accommodation Fire 4.47 x10-5 4.47 x10-5 4.47 x10-5 8.94 x10-5 4.47 x10-5
Helicopter Transport 7.64 x10-5 7.64 x10-5 7.64 x10-5 7.64 x10-5 7.64 x10-5
Perforating Gun Charges 1.25 x10-5 0 0 0 0
Emergency on Attended
Platform N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Occupational Accidents 1.09 x10-4 1.09 x10-4 1.09 x10-4 1.82 x10-5 1.09 x10-4
TOTAL 6.09 x10-4 4.51 x10-4 4.47 x10-4 3.88 x10-4 4.84 x10-4
The total sum of the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) for each of the worker groups falls
within the ALARP region of the personnel risk acceptance criteria specified at 4.1.1.1.
The individual person with the highest risk has been calculated as a member of the drilling
crew who is also responsible for the handling of perforating guns. Their specific IRPA has
been calculated as 7.44 x10-4. This again falls within the ALARP region of the personnel
risk acceptance criteria.
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The qualitative risk assessments described in section 4.2 identify a number of

recommendations which, provided they are considered by PV Drilling and those which are
endorsed by management are put in place, risks will be ALARP.
The relative contributions to the total risk figure from each of the major accident hazards
for a member of the drilling crew are shown in the diagram below. It can be seen that the
major contributors to the overall risk figure are ‘Blowouts’ (22%), ‘Dropped Objects’
(22%), ‘Occupational Accidents’ (18%), and ‘Helicopter Transport’ (13%).
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Drilling Crew Average IRPA
Potential Loss of Life
A total PLL figure for the installation has been calculated as 0.145 fatalities per year.
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4.4 Temporary Refuge Integrity Assessment
This section summarises the assessments which have been carried out in order to evaluate
the measures taken to protect persons on the installation from hazards of explosion, fire,
heat, smoke, toxic gas and fumes.
The Temporary Refuge (TR) should be a place where personnel can muster safely in an
emergency, monitor and assess the developing situation, and either take control action or
initiate evacuation. The TR should be maintained for the period of time required in order to
perform these actions. The TR on the PV DRILLING I has been defined as the whole
accommodation block.
4.4.1 Temporary Refuge Integrity Criteria
A loss of TR integrity means a loss of the TR’s capacity to perform its required functions.
It is considered that TR integrity is required to be maintained for at least 30 minutes in the
event of a major accident hazard.
The selected criteria which exist to describe Temporary Refuge Integrity are:
• ingress of flammable gas to levels above 60 % of the Lower Flammable Limit

(LFL)
• the concentration of H2S should not exceed 40ppm
• the combined effects of increased CO and CO2, O2 depletion and temperature
effects should not exceed a normalised value of 1
• visibility, as a result of smoke ingress, should not be reduced to less than 10m
4.4.2 Thermal Radiation and Explosion Study
The thermal radiation and explosion study has been carried out to determine the potential
for impairment of the TR, escape routes and the lifeboat embarkation stations in the event
of an ignited blowout and of a fire / explosion in the well test area.
All of the events considered in this study refer to a worst case scenario. For example, in the
event of a blowout at the drill floor it is assumed the rig is unable to disconnect from the
platform/well and move-off and that the TR is positioned downwind of the well centre.
The results for the escape routes and lifeboat embarkation areas have been evaluated
against the following thermal radiation flux criteria [3].
Consequences Maximum Radiation Levels

(kW/m2)
Impairment of escape routes 6
Impairment of lifeboat embarkation areas 5
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Drill Floor Blowout
A drill floor blowout is analogous to a reservoir blowout, in that all control over the well
has been lost and that therefore there are no further actions which can be taken to mitigate
against the escape of hydrocarbons.
When it is accepted that all control has been lost, all personnel are required to muster
within the TR and wait for instructions. The most suitable procedure is to take whatever
steps are possible to reduce the possibilities of ignition and gas ingress into the TR, to
safeguard personnel and then carry out the move-off.
The modeling carried out has assumed vertical releases, as would be expected to be
equivalent to full bore ruptures. Release rates of 10kg/s and 35kg/s have been modelled for
‘normal’ wells, plus release rates of 150kg/s and 300kg/s have been modelled for High
Pressure High Temperature (HPHT) wells. In each case the following wind speeds were
considered:
• 1 m/s
• 8 m/s
• 17 m/s
For the purposes of this study, the operation of the rig at the Wellhead Platform was taken
as a generic example. The drill centre is therefore assumed to be located at a horizontal
distance of 31m from the bow of the rig and the drill floor elevated at a height of 29m
above the main deck.
Escape Routes
Before a blowout occurs it is most likely that the progressive loss of well control will
provide sufficient warning for all non-essential personnel to be evacuated. However, for all
those personnel remaining onboard the unit, viable escape routes should be provided.
Thermal contour plots at pipe rack deck level are presented overleaf. The yellow contour
represents the upper radiation limit for escape routes of 6kW/m2. The green and purple
contours represent thermal radiation levels of 4kW/m2 and 2kW/m2 respectively.
The results show that for the lower release rates (10kg/s and 35kg/s) the maximum levels
of thermal radiation predicted at the pipe rack deck level are below the 6kW/m2
impairment criteria. Therefore the escape routes on pipe rack deck would remain viable.
For the higher release rates (150kg/s and 300kg/s) the results show that, with the exception
of the low wind speed scenario (1m/s), large areas of the pipe rack deck level would
experience levels of thermal radiation in excess of the escape route impairment criteria of
6kW/m2. However, the provision of protected escape routes on main deck suggests that it
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should be possible for personnel located forward to make their way towards the TR
without being exposed to excessive levels of thermal radiation.
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Temporary Refuge
The maximum levels of thermal radiation at the forward TR bulkheads in the event of a
drill floor blowout have been calculated using the computer model. The results are
presented in the table below.
The model has assumed that the surfaces are oriented to receive the maximum amount of
radiation. Target surfaces which are not perpendicular to the radiation or which do not
have an unobstructed “view” of the flame would receive smaller radiant fluxes.
Release rate Wind speed Thermal radiation Equilibrium

(kg/s) (m/s) (kW/m2) Temperature of Steel
(°C)
10 1 0.4 26
8 0.5 23
17 0.5 22
35 1 1.1 39
8 1.4 30
17 1.6 29
150 1 3.2 88
8 5.0 71
17 5.9 68
300 1 4.7 127
8 8.7 121
17 10.9 123
The final column in the table presents the equilibrium temperature of steel, which is the
surface temperature which might be reached after long exposure at the receiver, taking into
account heat loss by radiation, convection and wind cooling. The predicted temperatures
are not considered to result in impairment of the TR.
Lifeboat Embarkation Stations
The fwd , port and starboard lifeboat stations onboard the PV DRILLING I are located at a
horizontal distance of approximately 85 metres from the centre of the drill floor. The levels
of thermal radiation predicted by the computer model at the port and starboard lifeboat
embarkation stations are given in the table below.
Release rate Wind speed Thermal radiation

(kg/s) (m/s) (Port & Stbd)
(kW/m2)
10 1 0.6
8 0.7
17 0.7
35 1 1.3
8 1.9
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17 2.1
150 1 3.3
8 6.0
17 7.3
300 1 4.6
8 9.7
17 12.3
The results show that for the lower release rates (10kg/s and 35kg/s) the maximum levels
of thermal radiation predicted at both the port and starboard lifeboat embarkation stations
are below the 4kW/m2 impairment criteria. Evacuation via lifeboat would therefore be
possible in these scenarios.
For the higher release rates (150kg/s and 300kg/s) the results show that, with the exception
of the low wind speed scenario (1m/s), the predicted levels of thermal radiation at the port
and starboard lifeboat embarkation stations are in excess of the impairment criteria.
The modelling can, however, be considered to be pessimistic as it has not taken into
account any shielding offered by rig structures, which would reduce the levels of thermal
radiation to which a person could be exposed to. It has also assumed a worst case wind
direction of from the drill floor to the rig.
It was not clear from drawings what level of shielding there would be between the drill
floor and the port and starboard lifeboat embarkation stations.
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4.4.2.1 Subsea Blowout
Depending on the formation composition, a subsea blowout may lead to a gas and/or oil
release on the sea surface. The size and location of this will depend on the release rate, the
sea depth and current. If ignited, a sea surface fire could result.
The shallow gas will surface at a point in relation to the rig which will be dependent on the
depth of the water and the current. There is also the possibility that in very deep water the
gas will disperse altogether. Where there is a strong current it is probable that the gas will
surface some distance away from the installation, and that nothing at all need be done.
Additionally in water depths in excess of 300 metres the probability is that the gas will
disperse before reaching the surface.
In order for a fire to occur the dispersed gas must encounter an ignition source, while
within its flammable limits. If a sea surface fire were to form in the vicinity of the rig there
would be the potential for structural damage.
The most likely scenario where shallow gas will have an effect is therefore one where there
is little or no wind and little or no subsurface current in water depths of less than 250
metres.
The position of the release at the sea surface is governed by subsea currents and hence
difficult to predict. The modelling carried out for this scenario has assumed a pool fire
centred beneath the drill floor, with a wind speed of 5m/s.
The pool fire diameter has been estimated for a continuous release of fuel by assuming that
the pool spreads until the burning rate at the surface (0.27 kg/m2s) balances the release
rate.
Release Rate Pool Fire Diameter

(kg/s) (m)
10 6.9
35 12.8
150 26.6
300 37.6
Escape Routes
None of the escape routes will be directly affected by the thermal radiation emanating from
a pool fire given the shielding offered by the rig structure. The levels of thermal radiation
affecting escape routes on the installation have therefore not been assessed. High ambient
temperatures could, however, be experienced at deck level.
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Temporary Refuge
The maximum levels of thermal radiation predicted on the underside of the hull, beneath
the TR, are given in the table below.
Release Rate Pool Fire Diameter Thermal Radiation

(kg/s) (m) (kW/m2)
10 6.9 0.1
35 12.8 0.2
150 26.6 0.6
300 37.6 1.0
Based on the low levels of thermal radiation predicted at the underside of the TR, it has
been concluded that an ignited subsea release centred below the drill floor would not result
in a loss of TR integrity.
The levels of thermal radiation predicted at the forward and aft lifeboat stations are given
in the table below.
Release Pool Fire Thermal Radiation (kW/m2)

Rate Diameter Fwd Lifeboat Port Lifeboat Station Stbd Lifeboat
(kg/s) (m) Station
10 6.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
35 12.6 0.3 0.3 0.3
150 26.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
300 37.6 1.4 1.4 1.4
The predicted levels of thermal radiation are below the impairment criteria.
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4.4.2.2 Well Test Area Fire/ Explosion
During well testing, reservoir fluids (including hydrocarbons) are brought onboard the rig
and tested to evaluate reservoir conditions and ascertain the exact nature of the
hydrocarbon deposits. There, therefore, exists the potential for a hydrocarbon leak and a
subsequent fire/ explosion. The well test area is assumed to be located at the aft end of the
rig.
The three events considered are:
• Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

• Oil pool fire
• Gas jet fire
BLEVE
A BLEVE results from the rupture of a vessel containing a liquid substantially above its
atmospheric boiling point. The sudden drop in pressure causes violent boiling of the liquid,
which forces the fluid out and disperses it as a large cloud of droplets and vapour. If an
ignition source is present at the time of rupture, the vapour cloud will burn as a large rising
fireball.
Modelling has been carried out to simulate the fireball resultant from a BLEVE in a
standard 2.8m3 well test separator. The fluid is assumed to be LPG with a propane
concentration of 50% (LPG was one of only two fluids available in the computer model)
filled to 70% volume.
The resultant fireball would have a diameter of 46m and last for a duration of 12.8 seconds.
The damage plot below gives an indication of the extent of the fireball. Note that the model
is of an idealised scenario which does not take account of any obstructions which may
restrict the fireball and limit its development, e.g. walls, containers, etc.
Escape Routes
In the event of a BLEVE, high levels of thermal radiation would be experienced across the
pipe rack deck, but this would only be for short duration. It is therefore anticipated that
sufficient escape routes would remain available for personnel to make their way towards
the TR.
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Temporary Refuge
The forward bulkhead of the TR is a horizontal distance of 60m from the well test area.
The maximum level of thermal radiation at the TR in the event of a BLEVE has been
calculated as 23kW/m2.
The fireball is of short duration and it is therefore not predicted to result in TR impairment.
The fwd, port and starboard lifeboat embarkation stations are a horizontal distance of
approximately 60m from the well test area. The maximum level of thermal radiation
predicted at the lifeboat stations was 33kW/m2.
It is considered highly unlikely that personnel would be mustered at the lifeboat stations
prior to an explosion at the well test area and, given the short duration of the fireball, the
lifeboat stations are therefore considered to remain unimpaired.
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Oil Pool Fire
In the event of a release of oil from the well test separator or associated equipment an oil
fire may form. The extent of the pool fire will be dependent on the physical layout of the
well test area. In the event of a leak from the well test equipment the system would be shut
down, limiting the available fuel and the fire duration. A maximum pool fire diameter of
8m has been assumed and a wind speed of 5m/s has been considered.
Escape Routes
The modelling carried out for a crude oil fire at the well test area demonstrates that the
effects of the fire would be restricted to the forward areas of the rig.
The levels of thermal radiation which could be expected at pipe deck level in the event of a
crude oil pool fire at the well test area. Personnel within the immediate vicinity of the pool
fire could be exposed to high levels of thermal radiation, however, given the diversity of
escape routes available it is determined that an oil pool fire should not impede the ability of
personnel to make their way safely towards the TR.
Temporary Refuge
The maximum level of thermal radiation predicted at the forward bulkhead of the
accommodation block predicted by the model, is 0.4kW/m2. Therefore the possibility of
TR impairment as a result of a well test area pool fire is considered to be negligible.
The maximum level of thermal radiation predicted at the lifeboat stations are detailed in
the table below.
Thermal radiation (kW/m2)

FWD Lifeboat Port Lifeboat Station Stbd Lifeboat
Station Station
0.9 0.9 0.9
The levels of thermal radiation predicted by the model are below the lifeboat station
impairment criteria of 4kW/m2, therefore an oil pool fire at the well test area would not
result in impairment.
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Gas Jet Fire
Early ignition of a gas release from the well test equipment could give rise to a jet fire. It is
considered that a typical separator would be operated at approximately 50 bar. A 25mm
diameter sized hole would therefore result in a release rate of 3.5kg/s. A horizontal release
has been assumed. As for the oil pool fire scenario, a wind speed of 5m/s has been
assumed.
During well testing operations there will be a number of ESD points provided, which will
enable personnel to shutdown the operation, therefore limiting the available inventory and
the duration of the release.
Escape Routes
Similar to the oil pool fire scenario, the modelling carried out for a jet fire release at the
well test area demonstrates that the effects of the fire would be restricted to the forward
areas of the rig.
The levels of thermal radiation which could be expected at pipe deck level in the event of a
jet fire at the well test area. Personnel within the immediate vicinity of the fire could be
exposed to high levels of thermal radiation, however, given the diversity of escape routes
available it is determined that a jet fire should not impede the ability of personnel to make
their way safely towards the TR.
Temporary Refuge
The radiation modelling shows that the maximum level of thermal radiation at the TR in
the event of a gas jet fire at the well test area would be approximately 0.2kW/m2.
Therefore, the possibility for TR impairment is considered to be negligible.
The maximum levels of thermal radiation predicted at the port and starboard lifeboat
stations are detailed in the table below.
Thermal radiation (kW/m2)

FWD Lifeboat Port Lifeboat Station Stbd Lifeboat
Station Station
0.7 0.7 0.7
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The levels of thermal radiation predicted by the model are below the lifeboat station
impairment criteria of 4kW/m2, therefore a jet fire at the well test area would not result in
impairment.
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4.4.3 Smoke and Gas Ingress Study
The ability of the Temporary Refuge (TR) to endure a hazard is dependant upon limiting
smoke or gas ingress. This requires the TR HVAC systems to be shutdown prior to, or
immediately following the initiation of, a major accident hazard event. This section of the
Risk Study evaluates the ability of the TR, when shutdown, to remain habitable for the
required 30 minute endurance period in the event of all identified smoke and gas hazards.
A combination of dispersion modelling and air change rate calculations has been used to
evaluate TR integrity.
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4.4.3.1 Flammable Gas
An un-ignited blowout or well test leak could result in a large volume of hydrocarbon gas
being discharged into the atmosphere. The potential therefore exists for an explosive
atmosphere to be present onboard the rig.
The TR will be considered impaired when there is ingress of flammable gas to levels above
60% of the LEL. The LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) for natural gas is 4.7% volume;
therefore the TR will be considered impaired when the level of natural gas inside the TR
exceeds 2.8% volume.
Air change calculations carried out show that for the TR to remain unimpaired for the full
30 minute endurance period the averaged concentration of natural gas at the TR must not
exceed the values given in the table below.
Wind Speed (m/s) Concentration of Natural Gas (%)

2 -
4 80.2
6 53.9
8 40.8
10 32.9
12 27.7
14 23.9
16 21.1
18 18.9
20 17.2
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Release at Drill Floor
Models were constructed for 10kg/s, 35kg/s, 150kg/s and 300kg/s releases of natural gas at
the drill floor in wind speeds of 2m/s and 20m/s.
For the purposes of this study, the operation of the rig at the Wellhead Platform was taken
as a generic example. The drill centre is therefore assumed to be located at a horizontal
distance of 31m from the bow of the rig and the drill floor elevated at a height of 29m
above the main deck.
The results show that, even for the higher wind speed the concentration of flammable gas
at the TR vents will be considerably less than that which would result in impairment of the
TR. Two example dispersion plots are shown below. The TR is a distance of
approximately 102m from the drill centre and at a maximum height of 16m above main
deck (0m).
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Subsea Release
A subsea release of gas will, on reaching the sea surface, disperse into the atmosphere. The
nature of the dispersion is governed by the molecular weight of the gas, the momentum of
the release at the surface and the ambient wind conditions. Natural gas is lighter than air
and a subsea release can therefore be expected to rise in a buoyant plume.
Subsea plume modelling has been carried out using a simple cone model as described in
the HSE report OTH 95 465 [12]. A water depth of 150m was chosen. Bubble plume radii
at the sea surface are given in the table below for the 2 bounding cone angles quoted in the
HSE report.
Water Depth (m) Cone Angle (degrees) Bubble Plume Radius (m)
150 10 26
150 23 64
The position of the release at the sea surface is governed by subsea currents and the further
distribution of the flammable gases is dependent on wind direction. Given the large plume
radii, it has been qualitatively determined that the concentrations of flammable gas at the
TR would not result in TR impairment.
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Well Test Leak
A typical well test separator will be rated to a maximum pressure of approximately 78 bar,
however an operating pressure of 50 bar is considered to be more realistic. Provided the
well test equipment shut down is activated, any release will be of a limited duration.
A pressurised release of natural gas from the well test separator has been modelled based
on two hole diameters, with corresponding release rates. A horizontal release has been
assumed.
Pressure Hole Release Rate

(bar) Diameter (kg/s)
(mm)
50 5 0.13
50 25 3.2
Models constructed for the above release rates at the well test area (assumed to be located
at the forward end of the rig) show that the concentration of flammable gas at the TR
would be minimal. Example dispersion plots are shown below. The extent of the release
can be seen to be far less than that for a release at the drill floor and the impact on the
integrity of the TR would be minimal. The well test area is located a horizontal distance of
approximately 60m from the forward edge of the Temporary Refuge.
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4.4.3.2 Toxic Gas (H2S)
Toxic gas may exist naturally in the reservoir in the form of hydrogen sulphide (H2S).
Significant quantities of toxic gas could be released following an un-ignited blowout or an
un-ignited release during well testing activities. The effects likely to be experienced by
humans exposed to various concentrations of H2S are described in the following table.
Concentration (ppm) Effect

20-30 Conjunctivitis
50 Objection to light after 4 hours exposure, Lacrimation
150-200 Objection to light, irritation of mucous membranes, headache
200-400 Slight symptoms of poisoning after several hours
250-600 Pulmonary edema and bronchial pneumonia after prolonged
exposure
500-1000 Painful eye irritation, vomiting
1000 Immediate acute poisoning
1000-2000 Lethal after 30 to 60 minutes
>2000 Rapidly lethal
The TR will be considered impaired if the levels of H2S exceed 40 ppm. For the TR to
remain unimpaired for the full TR endurance time the averaged concentration of H2S at the
TR vents must not exceed the values in the following table.
Wind Speed (m/s) Concentration of H2S (ppm)

2 2245
4 1132
6 761
8 576
10 465
12 391
14 338
16 298
18 267
20 242
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Release at Drill Floor
Models were constructed for 10kg/s, 35kg/s, 150kg/s and 300kg/s releases of sour gas at
the drill floor in wind speeds of 2m/s and 20m/s. Sour gas is assumed to be composed of
28% H2S.
The models show that for low wind speeds the concentration of H2S at the TR would not
exceed the impairment criteria. Examples of sour gas dispersion plots are shown below. As
for the flammable gas scenario, the TR is at a horizontal distance of approximately 100m
from the drill centre and at a height of 16m above main deck.
Analysis of the higher wind speed scenarios (20m/s) demonstrates that the concentrations
of sour gas at the TR for all four release rates (10kg/s, 35kg/s, 150kg/s, 300kg/s) will be
less than 200ppm. The TR impairment criterion with respect to H2S with a 20m/s wind
speed has been calculated as 242ppm. Therefore a sour gas release at the drill floor is not
considered to result in TR impairment during the 30 minute endurance period.
Subsea Release
H2S is heavier than air; hence in the event of a subsea release, dispersion is predicted along
the sea surface. For low wind speeds the gas will spread in all directions around the release
point. Higher wind speeds will result in a spread in one direction along the sea surface. It is
qualitatively determined that the levels of H2S onboard the rig would be minimal.
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Well Test Leak
Models have been constructed for a release of sour gas from a separator during well testing
based on the following.
Pressure (bar) Hole Diameter (mm) Release Rate (kg/s)

50 5 0.13
50 25 3.2
As discussed above, provided the well test equipment shut down is activated, the release
will be of a limited duration, allowing less potential for gases to accumulate in high
concentrations onboard the rig.
Models were constructed for the higher release rate (3.2kg/s) at the well test area. The
results suggest that, for a prolonged release, high levels of H2S could be present at the
lower levels of the TR (main deck level). However, the concentrations of H2S at the higher
levels of the TR would be much less, and significantly below the TR impairment criteria.
An example dispersion plot is shown below.
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4.4.3.3 Smoke Obscuration
The initial optical densities of the smoke from hydrocarbon gas and condensate/ oil fires
are given in the table below [13].
Material Initial Optical Density (dB/m)

Fuel Controlled Ventilation Controlled
Gas 14 29
Condensate/ Oil 47 70
The TR will be considered impaired if the concentration of smoke results in a visibility

reduction of 1dB/m. This is equivalent to having visibility reduced to 10 metres within the
TR.
For the purposes of this study a smoke plume is assumed to totally engulf the TR at a
uniform concentration and any smoke or gas which enters the TR is rapidly dispersed
around the whole interior space.
For the TR to remain unimpaired for the full 30 minute endurance period, air change rate
calculations have determined that the averaged concentration of smoke at the TR vents
must not exceed the values in the following tables.
Gas Fire
Wind Speed (m/s) Concentration of Smoke (%)

2 - -
4 - 97.6
6 - 65.6
8 - 49.7
10 83.0 40.1
12 69.8 33.7
14 60.3 29.1
16 53.2 25.7
18 47.7 23.0
20 43.3 20.9
Oil Fire
Wind Speed (m/s) Concentration of Smoke (%)

2 - 80.2
4 60.2 40.4
6 40.5 27.2
8 30.6 20.6
10 24.7 16.6
12 20.8 14.0
14 18.0 12.1
16 15.9 10.6
18 14.2 9.5
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20 12.9 8.7
Drill Floor Blowout
An ignited release of natural gas at the drill floor would produce significant amounts of
smoke, but given the unconfined nature of the flame and the large buoyancy forces which
would be generated, smoke ingress to the TR can be discounted as it is qualitatively
determined that any smoke would be carried well clear of the TR.
Subsea Blowout
As discussed above, the position of a subsea release as it reaches the surface is governed
by subsea currents. If it were to surface directly below the rig much of the smoke
emanating from a fire at the sea surface would be deflected beneath the main deck. Smoke
emanating from a subsea blowout is not considered to pose a threat to the integrity of the
TR.
Well Test Oil Pool Fire
The forward edge of the TR is a distance of approximately 50m from the well test area. A
well ventilated oil pool fire would produce smoke with an initial optical density of
47dB/m.
Given the dilution factors for increasing wind speeds and the position of the TR ventilation
inlets, it has been qualitatively determined that smoke from a well test oil pool fire will not
pose a threat to the integrity of the TR within the 30 minute endurance period.
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4.4.3.4 Combined Incapacitating Dose
The combined incapacitating dose approach looks at the combinational effects of

impairment due to exposure to hazards. Impairment is taken to occur if the total
incapacitating dose of carboxyhaemoglobin, carbon dioxide, oxygen deficiency and
temperature effects exceeds 1.0.
COHb
FTot = FCO2 + Fo2 + FTemp +
0.15
The selection of appropriate impairment criteria for this approach is important, to avoid
gross over or under estimation of the consequences of a combined exposure. The
impairment criteria selected are based on UK HSE guidance [3].
Carboxyhaemoglobin Level
The toxicity of carbon monoxide is due to the formation of blood carboxyhaemoglobin.

This results in a reduction of the supply of oxygen to critical body organs. The proportion
of haemoglobin in the form of carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb) increases steadily as CO is
inhaled. COHb levels in the range 10-20% have the potential to reduce the ability to escape
or carry out functions requiring dexterity or conscious effort. An upper limit for
survivability of 15% has been chosen.
The carboxyhaemoglobin level is given by:
dCOHb (100 − COHb)

= × 3.317 × 10 −5 × (10 4 CO )1.036 × B.R. × 1000
dt 100
where CO is the carbon monoxide concentration (%) in air and B.R. is the actual breathing
rate because of the effects of CO2 (m3/s).
exp(0.2496 × CO2 (%) + 1.9086)

B.R.(actual ) = × B.R.(nom)
6.8
An average person’s nominal breathing rate of 7.5 litres per minute (one breath of 500ml
every 4 seconds) has been assumed for our calculations.
Carbon Dioxide
Carbon dioxide is not considered to be particularly toxic at low levels, but it can lead to an
increased breathing rate, increasing the intake of toxic or irritant gases. At large
concentrations breathing can become laboured as it represents a significant level of oxygen
depletion. The fraction of incapacitating dose for CO2 is calculated as:
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1
FCO2 = ∫ dt
60 exp(6.1623 − 0.5189.CO2 )
where CO2 is the concentration of CO2 (%) in air. Concentrations of less than 3% are
considered to have no effect.
Oxygen Deficiency
Oxygen constitutes 20.9% v/v in clean air. Oxygen concentrations below 15% volume
produce oxygen starvation effects such as increased breathing, faulty judgement and onset
of fatigue. The fraction of incapacitating dose for oxygen deficiency is given by:
1
FO2 = ∫ dt
60 exp(8.13 − 0.54(20.9 − O2 ))
where O2 is the oxygen concentration (%) in air. Concentrations greater than 18% are
considered to have no effect.
Temperature
Inside the TR, where personnel should be safe in a fire situation, the air temperature may
become too high. The fraction of the incapacitating dose for the effect of high temperature
is given by:
1
FTemp = ∫ dt
60 exp(5.1849 − 0.0273C )
where C is the air temperature (Celsius). Temperatures less than 37˚C are not considered to
be hazardous.
Drill Floor Blowout
An ignited release would produce a significant amount of smoke but, as discussed

previously, given the unconfined nature of the flame and the large buoyancy forces it has
been qualitatively determined that any smoke would be carried well clear of the TR.
Despite this, calculations have still been carried out in order to determine the vulnerability
of the TR. An ignited release at the drill floor is assumed to result in a well ventilated gas
fire, with the following gas concentrations [3].
Material Gas Concentration in Smoke (%)

CO2 10.9
CO 0.04
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O2 0
Assuming no temperature rise is attributable to heat transfer through the TR bulkheads, air
change calculations show that there is no amount of smoke from an ignited release at the
drill floor which would result in impairment of the TR through combined incapacitating
dose.
Subsea Blowout
All ignited subsea releases are assumed to result in a well ventilated, fuel controlled fire.
Therefore, similar to above, calculations show that no amount of smoke from an ignited
subsea release will result in impairment of the TR through combined incapacitating dose.
Well Test Oil Pool Fire
The concentrations of gases in the produced smoke from a well ventilated oil fire are as
follows.
Material Gas Concentration in Smoke (%)

CO2 11.8
CO 0.08
O2 0
Air change calculations show that there is no amount of smoke which will result in
impairment of the TR through combined incapacitating dose
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4.5 Risk Communication
The objective of risk communication is to share the results of the risk management process
with relevant stakeholders and to establish a framework where stakeholders can provide
input to continuously improve the overall risk management.
All of the actions/recommendations emanating from the risk assessment process are
collected in the following table.
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4.6 Conclusions
The major accident hazards identified for the PV DRILLING I have been analyzed in a qualitative
assessment, in order to form a comprehensive list of initiating events and to consider the measures
in place to prevent their occurrence, to mitigate the consequences of the initial incident and to
prevent escalation. The risk to the personnel and the installation from each accident scenario has
been qualitatively assessed, based on the perceived frequency and severity of the potential
consequences The qualitative assessments have concluded that all risks have been reduced to a
broadly acceptable or tolerable state after ALARP measures have been implemented.
The major accident scenarios have also been subjected to a QRA to determine if both the
installation POB and individual worker group risks are acceptable. The QRA concludes that the
risks from the major accident hazards are within acceptable limits.
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4.7 References
[1] International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) Risk Assessment Data Directory, 2010
[2] Scand power Risk Management AS 2006, Blowout and Well Release Frequencies – Based on
SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database, Report No. 90.005.001/R2, 2006
[3] HSE, SPC/Tech/OSD/30 ‘Indicative Human Vulnerability to the Hazardous Agents Present Offshore
for Application in Risk Assessment of Major Accidents’, January 2006
[4] DNV, Worldwide Offshore Accident Data (WOAD), 1996
[5] HSE, Accident statistics for offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf 1990-2007, RR738, 2009
[6] HSE, SPC/TECH/OSD/24 – ‘Accident/Incident Data’, March 2004
[7] DNV, WOAD Statistical Report 1996
[8] Oil & Gas UK, UK Offshore Public Transport Helicopter Safety Record (1977–2006), September
2007
[9] HSE, “Update of the UKCS Risk Overview” Report No. OTH 94 458, 1995
[10] HMSO, “The Offshore Installations (HSE Case) Regulations 2005”, 2005, SI 2005/ 3117
[11] BSI, BS 5925:1991, Code of practice for ventilation principles and designing for natural ventilation,
1991
[12] HSE, OTH 95 465 ‘Dispersion of Subsea Releases – Review of Prediction Methodologies’ 1995
[13] SINTEF, Handbook for Fire Calculations and Fire Risk Assessment in the Process Industry, 1992
[14] HSE, SPC/TECH/OSD/24 ‘Accident/Incident Data’, March 2004
[15] PVD, PV DRILLING I Risk Study. September 2012

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Contents
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 2
5.1.1. Objective ............................................................................................................. 2
5.1.1. Scope................................................................................................................... 2
5.2. Emergency Response Management......................................................................... 2
OFFSHORE EMERGENCY ORGANISATION.................................................................. 3
Emergency Response Procedures .......................................................................................... 5
5.3. Emergency Response Procedure ............................................................................. 6
5.4. Command and Communication ............................................................................... 6
5.4.1. Command during Emergencies........................................................................... 6
5.4.2. External Emergency Response Support.............................................................. 9
5.4.3. Communications ................................................................................................. 9
5.5. Training for Emergencies ...................................................................................... 10
5.5.1. Emergency Response Training ......................................................................... 10
5.5.2. Drills and Exercises .......................................................................................... 10
5.7. Arrangements for Down-manning, Escape, Evacuation and Recovery ................ 11
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5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. Objective
The purpose of Part 5 of the HSE Case is to demonstrate that emergency response
arrangements have been systematically assessed and that suitable plans are in place
to respond to all foreseeable emergency situations. Policy P1.06.03 Emergency
Response Manual is in use and can be used in conjunction with Client Emergency
Response plans as per Bridging Documents.
5.1.1. Scope
The following HSE management objectives are described in this section:

• Emergency response management;
• Command and communication;
• Training/ drills for emergencies;
• Details of evacuation and escape equipment;
5.2. Emergency Response Management
Controlling major hazards and threats (i.e. those capable of causing incidents of
potential severity for loss of life or asset)
Preventing major incidents by responding to the threat in a controlled and planned
response.
Reducing the consequence of potentially major accident events.
The following procedures describe the responsibilities of MODU personnel and the
action they are required to take in certain specific emergency situations.
When the rig is on location these procedures should always be used in conjunction
with applicable procedures developed by the well operator.
The Emergency Response Manual PI.06.03 procedures are drafted in a simple format
which can readily be used as a check list. The OIM, other rig supervisors and any
post holder who has emergency responsibilities must be thoroughly familiar with the
document and understand the consequence of the actions required. Only this close
familiarity, coupled with exercises and drills in team work, exercises in decision
making and analysis of the actions taken in these drills, will ensure that real
situations will be dealt with swiftly and competently.
However, it should be recognised that no manual can take into account all of the
circumstances which may arise in an emergency situation. The procedures in this
section of the manual are intended as guidelines in certain situations and OIM’s and
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other responsible persons will have to rely on their own experience and judgement
depending on the particular circumstances.
The Manual will be reviewed for effectiveness during offshore and onshore drills –
Feedback from Management / Crew / Third Party personnel will be reviewed and
incorporated into the manual if relevant.
The Incident Management Guides (IMG) are located within the offshore response
section and provide a very useful management tool for offshore command to quickly
and easily react to most emergencies.
These procedures should be used in conjunction with the following Company
Policies and Manuals:-
• Rig Operations Manual
• Well Control Manual
• Permit to Work System
• Client generated “Bridging Documents”
SIMOPSOFFSHORE EMERGENCY ORGANISATION
The emergency organisation offshore is made up of the following groups of personnel:-
• Command and Control Team
• Response Team 1 ( Fire Team 1 )
• Response Team 2 ( Fire Team 2 ) , Back up
• Medic and stretcher party
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OFFSHORE ORGANISATION
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Emergency Response Procedures

The Emergency Response Procedure (ERP) for the PVD I is based on overviews of
onshore and offshore emergency response.
The Incident Management Guides (IMG’s) also detail emergency response procedures in
the form of checklists for the following emergencies:
• Fire and Explosion.
• Helicopter Emergency – a) Onboard rig, b) Off-rig.
• Severe Storm/ Weather.
• Loss of Station or Tow.
• Vessel Collision.
• Serious Medical Emergency.
• Bomb/ Terrorist Threat.
The Emergency Response Plan for oil pollution events is in the SIMOPS document with
Client
OVERVIEW OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ONSHORE
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5.3. Emergency Response Procedure
For each field location the Client specific Bridging Document and SIMOPS will
reference PVD I ERP.
The current ERP and SIMOPS and Bridging Documents for the PVD I include the
following:
o Responsibilities (of the OIM and rig crew and Client specific duties).
o Emergency mobilisation flowchart.
o Rig emergency organisation chart.
o Description of safety equipment available of both Platform and PVD I
o Communications during an emergency.
o Instructions for key positions during emergency response situations.
o Fire & Explosion on the PVD I;
o Fire on the Platform;
o Gas or Condensate Leakage on the Platform;
o Well Kick or Blowout;
o Collision with the vessel;
o Helicopter Crash;
o Man Overboard Emergency;
o Missing Person;
o Emergency Response Plan During Towing Operations.
o Evacuation of the PVD I.
o Medical Evacuation (Medivac).
5.4. Command and Communication
5.4.1. Command during Emergencies
The Person in Charge (PIC) responsible for managing response to an emergency is

the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) or authorised deputy, The Onshore Rig
Manager is responsible for the onshore response to an event.
PVD I Accommodation can be used as Temporary Refuge (TR) in event of
emergencies –Accommodation is equipped with HVAC, there are GMDSS Stations
in Radio Room and Helicopter Waiting room – these areas have additional fire /
explosion protection fitted as per ABS Class requirements. Galley can be used as an
alternate muster area if required – escape routes to Helideck / Lifeboats / Liferafts
are available from TR.
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Description of Accommodation construction design specifications:

"A" class divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads and decks which comply with
the following criteria:
.1. They are constructed of steel or other equivalent material;
.2. They are suitably stiffened;
.3. They are insulated with approved non-combustible materials such that the average
temperature of the unexposed side will not rise more than 140°C above the original
temperature, nor will the temperature, at any one point, including any joint, rise more than
180°C above the original temperature, within the time listed below:
class "A-60" 60 min
class "A-30" 30 min
class "A-15" 15 min
class "A-0" 0 min
.4. They are constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame to
the end of the one-hour standard fire test; and
.5. The Administration required a test of a prototype bulkhead or deck in accordance with
the Fire Test Procedures Code to ensure that it meets the above requirements for integrity
and temperature rise.
4. "B" class divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads, decks, ceilings or linings
which comply with the following criteria:
.1. They are constructed of approved non-combustible materials and all materials used in
the construction and erection of "B" class divisions are non-combustible, with the
exception that combustible veneers may be permitted provided they meet other appropriate
requirements of this chapter;
.2. They have an insulation value such that the average temperature of the unexposed side
will not rise more than 140°C above the original temperature, nor will the temperature at
any one point, including any joint, rise more than 225°C above the original temperature,
within the time listed below:
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class "B-15" 15 min
class "B-0" 0 min
.3. They are constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of flame to the end of
the first half hour of the standard fire test; and
.4. The Administration required a test of a prototype division in accordance with the Fire
Test Procedures Code to ensure that it meets the above requirements for integrity and
temperature rise.
PVD I OFFSHORE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANISATION
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All personnel involved in Emergency response onboard will have the required training for
the position they are assigned for as per company training matrix, this will include Well
Control / Advanced Fire Fight /Fire Fighting / Fire Team Training /Lifeboat Coxswain /
Stability / Spill Response /Management of Major Emergencies training.
The required drills will be held to ensure personnel are competent in these positions and
refresher training competed as required to ensure certificates are valid.
Regular audits of crew’s certification will be carried out by onboard and onshore
management to ensure compliance. The companies Simplesoft database will track all
training requirements and has a 90 day warning message on all certificates that will expire
allowing re-booking to be conducted.
5.4.2. External Emergency Response Support
External emergency services are alerted if appropriate, by the OIM /PIC, with external
support for medical emergencies co-ordinated by the Onshore Rig Manager. PVD
Onshore Emergency Response team will be called into PVD Emergency Control
Center (ECC) if required and the team will support the rig in any request for external
assistance from outside agencies – i.e. Oil Spill Response, Search and Rescue from
Vietnamese government, helicopters, medical providers etc.
Client also has Onshore Emergency Response Plan and Control Center to assist with
providing any external assistance required i.e. Oil Spill Response, Search and Rescue
from Vietnamese government, helicopters, medical providers etc.
Regular drills and exercises to be conducted with Client and said providers to ensure
emergency preparedness.
5.4.3. Communications
Individual supervisors (have a responsibility to notify the OIM of any emergency on

the PVD I. Individual crew members must notify their supervisor if they notice a
potential emergency.
The OIM is responsible for deciding on the level of the emergency and for
communicating/ liaising with the Onshore Rig Manager.
Communications Equipment as per section 3 - 3.4.6
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5.5. Training for Emergencies
5.5.1. Emergency Response Training
Induction and on-going training for personnel includes appropriate emergency response
training. Applicable training for newly appointed members of emergency response
teams and first aider’s will be identified in company matrix and will be conducted as
soon as possible after personnel become members of the ERT. Regular drills and
exercises to be conducted. Onshore training will be conducted for personnel identified
as per station bill and company training matrix who are part of ERT.
5.5.2. Drills and Exercises
Drills and exercises for emergencies are listed below.
Type of Drill / Frequency of Comments

Exercise Drill
Fire Drill Fire Teams to address fire scenario - ALL non-

WEEKLY
essential to muster as per Station Bill
Abandonment All personnel to muster at Lifeboats - maximum 10

Drill persons to enter the lifeboat for familiarization
WEEKLY purposes.
PTW Required for Entry to Lifeboats - safety
pennants must be fitted - remove after drill.
Alternate Muster Personnel to be directed to their Alternate Muster

EVERY 3
Point Point by PA Announcements - This will be in
MONTHS
conjunction with Fire / Abandonment Drills.
Life Raft Drill Personnel to Muster at their Life raft Station and be
EVERY 6
advised on how to launch Life raft by Competent
MONTHS.
person.
Onboard Spill Can be done offline - Onboard Spill Response Crew

Response Drill ONCE PER to simulate a Spill onboard the vessel - Utilize all
MONTH. required PPE and spill equipment / MSDS Sheets
Man Overboard Can be done offline- Liaise with Standby boat and
Drill EVERY 3 have dummy put into water then raise the alarm.
MONTHS weather conditions to be taken into account before
FRC is launched
Confined Space ONCE EVERY Rescue drill to be performed using dummy for
6 MONTHS (or rescue purposes - if prolonged tank work then drill
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Rescue Drill before any tank to take place before and during the tank work. Can
work) be done offline.
H2S / Toxic Gas EVERY 3

Drill MONTHS - If
Drilling in Personnel to Muster as per Station Bill for H2S /
anticipated H2S Toxic Gas Alarms
Zone drill to be
held weekly
Helicopter Crash Can be done offline - Simulated Helicopter Crash,

EVERY 3
Drill Utilized Crash Box Equipment and Fire Fighting
MONTHS
Equipment
First Aid Drill Can be done offline by Medic and Stretcher Party -
EVERY 2
On deck and in Sickbay - Ensure different crews
WEEKS
participate.
Exercises for other environmental incidents may also be carried out as required
Management of Major Emergencies Training for all senior rig personnel is on the company
required training matrix.
Desk top exercises to be carried out for onshore support teams to ensure preparedness.
5.6. Emergency Detection, Protection and Response Equipment
The following emergency response equipment is described in Section 3.5 of the HSE
Case
• Fire and Gas detection.
• Emergency Shutdown Systems,
• Fire Fighting e.g. CO2 extinguishing systems, firewater pumps, portable
extinguishers deluge systems etc.
5.7. Protective equipment e.g. fire retardant gloves
5.8. Arrangements for Down-manning, Escape, Evacuation and Recovery
When down-manning is necessary due to an emergency, it is reference in ERP and

describes the down-manning procedure. The following escape, evacuation and
recovery arrangements are described in Section 3 of the HSE Case Escape Routes and
Muster Locations.
• Lifesaving Appliances (SOLAS Approved)
• Preferred Means of Evacuation – Helicopter.
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• Primary Means of Evacuation – Lifeboats (SOLAS Approved).

• Secondary Means of Evacuation – Life Rafts (SOLAS Approved).
• Escape Direct to Sea – by Jacobs’s ladders and fixed ladder on rig legs.
• Rescue Facilities.
There will always be a minimum of one Standby Boat at the facility which will be
used to rescue any persons escaping by lifeboat / liferaft or direct to sea.
Rig also has GMDSS capability to call for ‘mayday’ PAN PAN to alert any ships
in the area to assist with any emergency.
Vietnamese Navy can also be called for support and assistance from either the rig
or Emergency Control Center in HCMC.
PVD I Emergency Response Manual – Offshore.

Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) Manual,
Procedure: Emergency Drills and Exercises
HSE Induction
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Performance Monitoring and Review Issued Date:
Distribution:
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Contents
6. PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND REVIEW ..................................................... 2

6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2
6.2 Performance Monitoring .............................................................................................. 2
6.3 Safety Management ..................................................................................................... 3
6.4 Incident and Occupational Illness Reporting ............................................................... 3
6.5 Audits ........................................................................................................................... 4
6.6 Maintenance, Inspection and Testing of Rig/ Drilling Equipment ............................... 5
6.2 Management Review 5
Rig Site Review 5
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6. PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND REVIEW
6.1 Introduction
This section of the HSE Case describes how PV Drilling ensure that risks for the PVD I
are maintained at ALARP levels. Performance monitoring and review ensure that
preventive and mitigation barriers identified in Parts 2, 3, 4 and 5 are effectively
implemented and that the effectiveness of the barriers will be maintained for the life of
the PVD I.
6.2 Performance Monitoring
The objective is to confirm that key parts of its management systems are being
implemented properly across its entire operations by way of actively monitoring work
activities.
Active monitoring is the task of critically reviewing a work activity being carried out to
ensure that the personnel carrying out the activity have recognised the hazards inherent
in the activity and have taken appropriate action to prevent, control or mitigate these
hazards. Active monitoring is undertaken in three ways:
• At the rig-site or work-site by senior site personnel;
• Of the rig-site or work-site remotely by management personnel from onshore.
• At the rig-site or work-site by visiting management personnel.
•
PVD Management should:
• Review HSE Performance against HSE Management Objectives
• Personally be satisfied that monitoring takes place for the sites or activities for
which they have a responsibility.
• Conducting regular site visits
• Reporting their monitoring activities of sites for which they are not directly
responsible to the onshore Manager (for example, a Director should provide
feedback from a rig visit to the Rig Manager).
Onshore Managers are responsible for:
• Ensuring that monitoring is taking place on their sites, operations or activities.
• Reviewing and discussing evidence of effective management of HSE for their
operations and making such intervention as is necessary to assure continual
improvement.
• Making site visits for monitoring.
• Providing feedback and lessons learned to other crews on their rig and to other
operations' rig teams, where appropriate.
• Reporting to their Manager the measures taken to ensure the continuing safety of
their operations.
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OIM is responsible for:

Conducting monitoring of activities of their site, ensuring that a broad range of tasks
are actively monitored.
• All daily activities are in compliance with procedures and standards.
• Ensuring that weekly reports are kept and sent onshore to the relevant onshore
Manager for review.
• Providing onshore Management with details of HSE management activities that
have been undertaken for the operations or activities taking place at the site.
• Identify and address any trends both technical issues and behaviour based.
6.3 Safety Management
The PVD Card Observation process uses a behavioural approach to incident

prevention, by pro-active observation of personnel and work groups. Safe as well as
unsafe act/ condition(s) are identified, discussed and agreements are made to conduct
the work utilising a safer method.
Rig Reports used to Monitor HSE Performance
Reports which are used to monitor operational performance and provide feedback to
the rig include:
• Daily Rig Safety Statistics;
• Incident Reports;
• Monthly Waste Disposal Logs;
• Effluent Logs;
• Hazardous Waste Accumulation Logs;
• Annual personnel performance appraisals;
• PTW Logs, Closed PTW;
• HSE Meeting Reports;
6.4 Incident and Occupational Illness Reporting
It is PVD’s policy to report and maintain detailed records of all injuries, incidents, near
misses and occupational illness occurring in any work area under the control of PVD,
and to investigate each incident thoroughly before taking the appropriate action to
prevent any recurrence. PVD Policy P1.06.01Incident Reporting and PVD Policy
P1/06.02 Incident Investigation details the requirements to:
• Establish all the facts and circumstances relating to the incident in order to
support a prompt, impartial and thorough investigation.
• Establish the root cause(s) of the incident and, where appropriate, to assign
responsibility.
• Take prompt action to prevent the recurrence of same or similar incidents.
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• Inform others within the Company of the circumstances of the incident, the
conclusions reached and the immediate measures taken to prevent recurrence.
• Provide data for subsequent analysis, engineering design review and operational
action to improve performance and safeguard personnel.
• Correctly complete an incident report.
6.5 Audits
INTERNAL RIG AUDIT PROGRAM

PVD Drilling Division personnel from Safety, Marine and Maintenance, which
includes Electrical, Mechanical will perform the annual audits. Auditors shall be
independent of the areas/ systems being audited, e.g., rig personnel cannot perform
the required annual audits for their rig.
HSE: General Safety and Environmental audits performed HSE personnel
Mechanical: Mechanical safety audit performed by Maintenance personnel
Electrical: Electrical safety audit performed by Maintenance personnel
Marine: Marine safety audit performed by Marine personnel
Drilling: Drilling safety audit performed by Drilling personnel
Customer audit – audits performed by the Client (Operator).
3rd party audit: performed Third party inspection companies,
Rig Based audit: audits performed by rig personnel, e.g., Safety Committee, etc.
The Lead Auditor shall be responsible for Audit program and the audit program shall
be informed to the rig 01 week in advance for arrangement.
Regulatory: Audits performed by VR, ABS.
• ABS -
Type of Survey Last Survey Next Survey
Special Survey every 6 30 May 2012 11 April 2013
months
Annual Survey every 30 May 2012 11 April 2013
year
Vietnam Registry (VR)
Type of Survey Last Survey Next Survey
Special Survey 30 May 2012 11 April 2013
Annual Survey 30 May 2012 11 April 2013
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6.6 Maintenance, Inspection and Testing of Rig/ Drilling Equipment
All rig equipment and systems are built, maintained, inspected, and tested in
accordance with good industry practice and standards published by the American
Petroleum Institute (API), International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC)
and the International Standards Organization (ISO). PV Drilling I complies with the
applicable Vietnamese Regulatory Requirements, ABS (Or other equivalent &
recognized Rules & Class) requirements will prevail where contradictory to any of
the other ABS rules (Or other equivalent & recognized Rules & Class) for Building
and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling Units:
Vessel is flagged under Vietnam Registry (VR) and meets all class requirements
from VR.
6.2 Management Review
Continuous reviews of management systems will be conducted and will include but not
limited to:
• Review of previous minutes/ report.
• Results of Audits (Internal and External).
• Customer Feedback (positive and negative).
• Status of preventive and corrective actions.
• Recommendations for improvement.
• Changes that could affect the quality management system.
• Actions are documented, monitored and closed out.
Rig Site Review
On the rig the OIM reviews aspects of the Company HSE SMS on a continual basis
and ensure that records of safety meetings, incidents, hazardous occurrences or other
related reports are retained onboard as objective evidence of the continued
effectiveness of the Company HSE SMS and are available for audit purposes, including
but not limited to:
• all current areas of nonconformity within the HSE SMS identified at the rig
site;
• incidents and near misses;
• suggested modifications and improvements to the HSE SMS;
• the effectiveness of corrective and preventive actions;
• a review of safety meetings and emergency drills;
• a review of relevant audits, external and/ or internal;
• Action Tracking of observation cards – follow up and close out of
improvement suggestions and of equipment damaged repairs.

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What is the purpose of an HSE case?

What is the purpose of an HSE case?

What are some of the major components covered in an HSE case?

What are some of the major components covered in an HSE case?

03 Sep 2013

1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................2

The HSE Case provides stakeholders with assurance that:

• all hazards have been identified and are being managed.

The following persons were involved in production of this HSE Case

Ian Parr Rig Manager – PVD I

Ian Miller HSE Manager PVD Drilling Division

Ralph John Waller Maintenance Manager – PVD Drilling

James Devenny/Richard Hughes Barge Captain – PVD I

Colin Smith / Nghiem Vu Dat Safety Training Coordinator – PVD I

Van Hoang Tung Deputy HSE Manager PVD Drilling Division

Nguyen Si Anh Deputy Maintenance Manager – PVD

Tran Tuan Marine Engineer – PVD Drilling Division

Franklin Henson / Terry Cleveland OIM – PVD I

1.3. Scope of the HSE Case

Therefore, if a production facility at which PVD I is required to operate is to be live

PV Drilling (Petro Vietnam Drilling and Well Services Corporation) is located at

PVD MISION AND MISSION STATEMENT

Scope of Work Provided by PVD I – Jack Up

• Drilling / re-drilling new well slots.

Non Drilling mode: the rig can perform the following:

1.4. Objectives of the HSE Case

o for major hazards:

 Demonstrates, to the extent reasonably possible, that all foreseeable and

o for non-major hazards:

 Demonstrates that procedures and practices necessary to control

1.5. Structure of the HSE Case

Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6

Section 2: HSE Management System Description

Section 3: PVD I Jack Up Description and Supporting Information

Section 3 provides sufficient information to enable a clear understanding of the PVD I

Section 4: Risk Management

Section 5: Emergency Response

Section 6: Performance Monitoring

1.6. Uses of the HSE Case

• a systematic framework to enable management to assure themselves formally that

• a framework upon which HSE audits may be developed and programmed;

• a reference for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up;

1.7. HSE Case Responsibilities

HSE Case Owner

HSE Case Custodian

The Custodian is Rig Manager of PVD I

1.8. Review Periods and Updates

o Re-issuing updated parts of the document as necessary.

o It is recommended that the HSE Case is reviewed for currency as a minimum,

1.10. Operations HSE Management System

It is concluded that suitable HSE management arrangements are in place to ensure

1.11. Major Hazard Identification and Assessment

1.12. Workplace Hazard Management

The management of workplace hazards will be subject to continuous performance

1.13. Leadership and Commitment

However, it is every individual’s responsibility to implement and comply with the

Founder of PV Drilling President & CEO

DO VAN KHANH PHAM TIEN DUNG

2.1.2 Structure of the PVD Management System