[G.R. No. 108532.

  March 9, 1999]
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON
GILIG, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issues in this case are not novel:  whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to the wit of execution issued by the trial
court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) petitioner's properties were levied to
satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of
about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental.   The subject properties were sold at public
auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder.  Consequently, after petitioners’ failure to redeem the same, a final deed
of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void
and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.   In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and
heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively.  Upon their death, they left the subject
property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906.  Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property
is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act. No. 141.   Petitioners further
alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay
issued a Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home which was extrajudicially
constituted in accordance with law.  As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax
Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners’ contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which
was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale on February 12, 1966.  Said sale has become final as no redemption was made within one year from the
registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale.  The validity of the sale in favor of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of appeals in a related case
(CA No. 499965-R) entitled “Arriola v. Gilig,” where one Rufino Arriola also claimed ownership over the subject property.
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as
evidenced by an Escritura de Venta.  Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was made final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of
ownership and possession and therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
Premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the dismissal of the complaint filed by
the plaintiffs;
a) Declaring OCT No P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906 both in name of Pablo Taneo as null and void and directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the
same, without prejudice however on the part of the defendant to institute legal proceedings for the transfer of the said title in the name of defendant
Abdon Gilig;
b) Declaring Abdon Gilig as the absolute and legal owner of the land covered by OCT No. P-12820, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 851920, and hence
entitled to the possession of the same and as a necessary concomitant, admonishing the plaintiffs to refrain from disturbing the peaceful possession of
the defendant over the land in question;
c) Likewise declaring the defendant Abdon Gilig as the true and absolute owner of the house in question formerly declared under Tax Declaration No.
4142 in the name of Pablo Taneo and presently declared under Tax Declaration No. 851916 in the name of Abdon Gilig; ordering the plaintiffs or any of
their representatives to vacate and return the possession of the same to defendant Abdon Gilig;
d) Ordering the plaintiffs, except the nominal parties herein, to pay to defendant Abdon Gilig the amount of P500.00 a month as reasonable rental of the
house in question to be reckoned from February 9, 1968 until the possession of the same is returned to the defendant.
e) To pay to defendant the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
In resolving the issues, the lower court made the following findings of fact which this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb:
1.  That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro Ba-a who sold the same to the late Pablito (sic) Taneo father of the herein plaintiff on
September 18, 1941, by virtue of an Escritura de Venta identified as Reg. Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not. V, Series of 1941 of the Notarial Register of Ernie
Pelaez (Exh. 10);
2.  That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a Civil Case No. 590 for recovery of property against Pablo Taneo, et al., wherein Judgment was
rendered on June 24, 1964, in favor of Abdon Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to pay damages in the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);
3.  That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1965 against the properties of Pablo Taneo and on December 1, 1965,
a Notice of Levy was executed by the Clerk of Court Pedro Perez wherein the properties in question were among the properties levied by the Sheriff (Exh.
3);
4.  That the said properties were sold at public auction wherein the defendant Abdon Gilig came out as the highest bidder and on February 12, 1965, a
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was executed by Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1) ceding the said properties in favor of Abdon Gilig and which
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of March 2, 1966;
5.  That for failure to redeem the said property within the reglementary period, a Sheriff’s final Deed of Conveyance was executed by same Provincial
Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968, (Exhs. 4, 4-A) conveying the property definitely to Abdon Gilig.
6.  That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which he filed with the Sheriff in Civil Case No. 590 was not given due course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil
Case No. 2667 entitled Arriola vs. Abdon Gilig, et al., for Recovery of Property and/or annulment of Sale with Damages;
7.  That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge Bernardo Teves dismissing the case with costs on February 21, 1969;
8.  That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision in toto on June 20, 1979; declaring the alleged Deed of Sale
executed by Abdon Gilig in favor of the plaintiff as null and void for being simulated or fictitious and executed in fraud or (sic) creditors;
9.  That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares as a family home (Exh. F) but was
however, notarized only on May 2, 1965 and registered with the Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966;
10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant, Pablo Taneo applied for a free patent on the land in question which was approved on October 13,
1973, (Exh. B) and the Patent and Title issued on December 10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820-Exh. 12);
11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action.
Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the subject land which they inherited from their father under free patent
cannot be alienated or encumbered in violation of the law.  Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v. Porciongcola and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, the
execution or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited period and is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his
labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
We are not unmindful of the intent of the law.  In fact, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidated, to wit:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation.  Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the
grant of the patent.  After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor
the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the
homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years.  This Section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116.  It aims to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him.  It would, therefore, be in keeping with this
fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it
is made by his widow or  heirs.  This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute.
The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the case, the prohibition invoked by the petitioners under Section 118 does not apply to
them.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
x x x.
The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent commences on the date of the approval of the application for free
patent and the five-year period is counted from the issuance of the patent.  The reckoning point is actually the date of approval of the application.  In
Amper v. Presiding Judge, the Court held that:
x x x  The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by homesteads or free patents commences is “the date of the approval of
the application” and the prohibition embraces the entire five-year period “from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant.”   As stated in
Beniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA 111), the provision would make no sense if the prohibition starting “from the date of the approval of the application” would
have no termination date.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a homestead is restricted starts to be computed from the date of the
issuance of the patent.  But the prohibition of alienation commences from the date the application is approved which comes earlier.  (Underlining ours.)
Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale was not violative of the law.   The
judgment obligation of the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964.  The properties were levied and sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig
as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966.  On February 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued
after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary period.  Pablo Taneo’s application for free patent was approved only on
October 19, 1973.
The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable conclusion that even before the application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was
no longer the owner of the land. The Deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to Abdon Gilig.   As of that date,
Pablo Taneo did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he could have transferred to herein petitioners.  The petitioners are not the owners
of the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141.  The prohibition does not apply since it is clear from the records that the
judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the approval of the application for free patent.  We quote with favor the respondent court’s
valid observation on the matter:
x x x  the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19 October 1973 and Free Patent was issued on 10 December 1980.   Under
the aforecited provision, the subject land could not be made liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted from the time of the application and during
the 5-year period following 10 December 1980, or until 10 December 1985.   However, debts contracted prior to the approval of the application for free
patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973, are not covered by the prohibition.   This is because they do not fall within the scope of the prohibited period.   In
this case, the judgment debt in favor of defendant-appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of execution issued on 22 November 1965, notice of
levy made on 1 December 1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966, and the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all before Pablo
Taneo’s application for free patent was approved on 19 October 1973.  The execution, therefore, was not violative of the law.
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution.   In a last ditch effort to
save their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family.  It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy
such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicially and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with
the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of
the family home.  The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration
prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code.
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary.  Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family residence.  It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence.   From the time of its constitution and so long
as its beneficiaries actually resides therein,  the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,  forced sale or  attachment,  except  as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert execution of the family home arguing that as early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had
already constituted the house in question as their family home.  However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the
family home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in the case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals to wit:
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt
from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766).  Neither does
Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect.  It simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra).  Since petitioner’s debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code.  His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex “O,” Plaintiff’s Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78).”  (pp.
5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo)  (underscoring ours)
The applicable law, therefore,  in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite.  
Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family
home.  The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966.  The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered
on January 24, 1964.  Thus, at that time when the “debt” was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.   Clearly, petitioners’
alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements
of the law.  The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares.   By the
very definition of the law that the “family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated,” it is
understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.  Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in
the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN  BANK, INC.  vs.   HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, G.R. NO. 154132
          Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 122, dated November 8, 2001 and May 7, 2002 denying herein petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, respectively.
          The antecedent facts are as follows:
          On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor;  that his wife, acting in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein
it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or
averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases
where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts
that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and
unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time.
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to Declare Defendants in Default. Private respondent, in turn, filed
his Rejoinder.
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-
entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. As aptly pointed out in the cases cited by plaintiff, Magbaleta v. G[o]nong, L-44903, April
25, 1977 and Mendez v. [B]iangon, L-32159, October 28, 1977, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Insofar as plaintiff’s prayer for declaration of default against defendants, the same is meritorious only with respect to defendants Remedios Moreno and
the Register of Deeds of Kaloocan City. A declaration of default against defendant bank is not proper considering that the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
by said defendant operates to stop the running of the period within which to file the required Answer.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Private respondent filed his Comment, after which petitioner filed its Reply. Thereafter, private
respondent filed his Rejoinder.
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001, considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the
family, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is not a ground for a Motion to Dismiss.
Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code,
being a member of the same family as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 
xxxHence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
 I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward
a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved
in the suit. Corollarily, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he applied the decision
in the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead of the ruling in the case of De Guzman v. Genato.
 II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to
the family of the litigants could not invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
 At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court
pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance of this doctrine, this Court held in Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor that:
 Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
As we stated in People v. Cuaresma:
 This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.  It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals.  This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom
of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.  There is after all a hierarchy of courts.  That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.   A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.   A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.   This is [an]
established policy.  It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
 The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.  Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on bail in extradition proceedings; (c)
Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called “Win-Win Resolution” of the Office of
the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy.   There is no
reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
 And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
 Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues that what is applicable to the present case is the Court’s decision in
De Guzman v. Genato and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong, the former being a case involving a husband and wife while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
 Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
 No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
         Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
 No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
          The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
           In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject property. The Court, taking into
consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in its report, ruled that:
 [T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for
the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one
who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between or
among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way
the latter would settle their differences among themselves.  x x x.
 Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest
efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
          In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged paramour of the wife.  The Court ruled that due to the efforts
exerted by the husband, through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that
even in the presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be
complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.
          While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in
the subsequent cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, and the most
recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.
 The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving
husband and wife.
 Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the
Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to
suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear
that the provisions therein apply to suits involving “members of the same family” as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:
 ART. 150. Family relations include those:
 (1)  Between husband and wife;
(2)  Between parents and children;
(3)  Among other ascendants and descendants;  and
(4)   Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half    blood.
  and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
 ART. 217.  Family relations shall include those:
 (1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3)  Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4)  Among brothers and sisters.
          Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same
family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.
          Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are
exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that
same family.
           WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
           Costs against petitioner.
           SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., respondents.
MELO, J.:
Following the dismissal of his petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 23651 by the Thirteenth Division of respondent Court (Justice Buena (P), Gonzaga-
Reyes and Abad Santos, Jr., JJ.; Page 60, Rollo), petitioner airs his concern over the propriety thereof by claiming in the petition at hand that the
disposition, in practical effect, allows a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court of origin against his corporation to be implemented on his
family home which is ordinarily exempt from the mesne process.
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent
herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of
the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel
of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein petitioner.
In lieu of the original complaint, private respondent submitted an amended complaint on August 18, 1989 intended to substitute Manacop Construction
with Florante F. Manacop as defendant who is "doing business under the name and style of F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.". After the motion for
issuance of summons to the substituted defendant below was granted, petitioner filed his answer to the amended complaint on November 20, 1989.
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed on September 5, 1990 grounded on (1) irregularity that attended the issuance of the disputed writ inspite the absence
of an affidavit therefor; (2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to his submission as party-defendant, and (3) exemption from attachment of his family
home (page 3, Petition; page 8, Rollo), did not merit the serious consideration of the court of origin. This nonchalant response constrained petitioner to
elevate the matter to respondent court which, as aforesaid, agreed with the trial court on the strength of the ensuing observations:
Anent the petitioner's claim that the writ of attachment was issued without jurisdiction because of the lack of supporting affidavit, We subscribe to the
recent ruling of the Highest Tribunal that a verified statement incorporated in the complaint without a separate affidavit is sufficient and valid to obtain
the attachment (Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783). In the case at bar, the original as well as the amended complaint filed by herein private
respondent were verified, in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt
from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does
Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code (Mondequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex "O", Plaintiff's Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78). (pp. 5-
6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo).
The attempt to reconsider respondent court's stance was to no avail (page 75, Rollo); hence, the petition at bar.
Did respondent court err in dismissing the challenge posed by petitioner against the denial of his omnibus motion?
We are not ready to accept the negative aspersions put forward by petitioner against respondent court in the petition before Us.
Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the
personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in
custodia legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and employed in exculpation by petitioner,
during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the appellate court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for
such subtle experiment is prescribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so
that multiple and piece-meal objections may be avoided (Rafanan, et al. vs. Rafanan , 98 Phil. 162 [1955]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court with Notes and
Comments, 1989 Rev. Edition, p. 492; Savit vs. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310 [1941]).
Another mistaken notion entertained by petitioner concerns the impropriety of issuing the writ of attachment on August 11, 1989 when he "was not yet a
defendant in this case." This erroneous perception seems to suggest that jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as defendant below, must initially
attach before the provisional remedy involved herein can be requested by a plaintiff. A contrario, Chief Justice Narvasa obliterated this unfounded
assertion in Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (204 SCRA [1991]) whose dissertation on the subject as related and applied to the
present inquiry is quite enlightening:
It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the
court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be
dependent on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or
nature of the action, or the res or object thereof.
An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter or nature of the action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity, and it thus that the court acquires over said subject matter or nature of the
action. And it is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other appropriate pleading) — by which he signifies his
submission to the court's power and authority — that jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is obtained, as above stated, by the service of summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary submission to the
authority of the court.
The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues to the defendant,
the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff, and finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant in any of the ways authorized by the
Rules of Court. There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons of
the defendant. During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are of unquestionable validity and propriety. Among
these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the
amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court, authorization by the Court of service of summons by publication,
the dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.
This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or replevin. They may be validly
and properly applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or heard from.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party
may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict
construction of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter," The phrase, "at the commencement of the
action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the commencement of the
action; and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite
clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the
plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at
any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for
the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross-
claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.
(at pp. 347-350.)
Petitioner seeks to capitalize on the legal repercussion that ipso facto took place when the complaint against him was amended. He proffers the idea that
the extinction of a complaint via a superseding one carries with it the cessation of the ancilliary writ of preliminary attachment. We could have agreed
with petitioner along this line had he expounded the adverse aftermath of an amended complaint in his omnibus motion. But the four corners of his
motion in this respect filed on September 5, 1990 are circumscribed by other salient points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the assailed writ
itself. This being so, petitioner's eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial factor for exculpation must be rendered ineffective and barred by the omnibus
motion rule.
Lastly, petitioner is one of the belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a family home within the purview of the Family Code and therefore
should not have been subjected to the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that respondent court properly applied the discussion conveyed by
Justice Gancayco in this regard when he spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo vs. Breva (185 SCRA 766 [1990]) that:
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code.
It became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-
taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment
arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).
Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22,
Rollo). This fact alone will militate heavily against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2, Article 155 of the
Family Code cited in Modequillo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide and Romero, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY
SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a
family home constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et
al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said udgment
on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with
a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the
office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an
area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at
Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land
although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for
lack of merit on September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying
petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated August
26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his
family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues
that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in
this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those
instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the
trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that
the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity
of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and
their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head
of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-
taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment
arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the
petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already
fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance
rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999
Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the
CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-
appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto. 4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No.
16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to
counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for
the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who
died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then
65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15
years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth
certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a)
The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family
name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did
not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's
last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that
after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void,
invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE
recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing
thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as
the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to
Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was
later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant]
Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's
Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code. 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled
that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time,
and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age
of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that
the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the
child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the
child did not belong to either the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal. 6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031
subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-
serving oral testimony of respondent. 7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 8 of the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only
by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 9 The interest
of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. 10 The case concerned the
properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which
the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's
filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles
provide:
xxx xxx xxx
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the
child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless
then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel.
Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of
the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the
Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because
it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case
at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding
the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to
attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it
were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.1âwphi1.nêt
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that
the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the said document to show
that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the former was
not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's
parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
G.R. No. 159785             April 27, 2007
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO
POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment 3 dated January 4, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September
23, 1987 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner
Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in
1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town
planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers
that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions
were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room
where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went
on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same
day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he
led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and
would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again
she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in
February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility – you and I shall take care of it and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she
identified petitioner’s penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented
the pictures6 petitioner gave her of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her
parents that she would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another P2,000 for
her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23,
1987,7 she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissa’s mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissa’s story. She said they learned of their daughter’s pregnancy through her husband’s cousin. She added
that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed by her daughter’s pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23,
1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he was proved to be the natural father of the
above-named minor as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents];
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with modification by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANT’S PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE COLLATERAL TO
THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente
lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not respondents are
entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established or proved in the
proceedings; that the award for damages and attorney’s fees has no basis; and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral
action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the
birth certificate as father without his consent. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere
expressions of concern and advice.12 As to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because she was in
pari delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them. 13 In support of his argument that the issue on filiation should have
been resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action. 15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain that the Court of Appeals committed no error in its decision. They reiterate that
Clarissa’s clear narration of the circumstances on "how she was deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the
corroborating testimony of Clarissa’s mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are preponderant evidence of paternity. They
cited the case of De Jesus v. Syquia 16 where we held that a conceived child can be acknowledged because this is an act favorable to the child. 17 They also
argue that damages should be awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his sexual advances. 18
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find petitioner’s stance unmeritorious. The caption is not
determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning
to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. 19 In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption,
but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. 20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa’s averments
therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her
demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 21
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although
petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph
as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as
found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money
during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of
the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and
irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the
rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 23
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 24of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in
cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who
begets a love child to damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to
them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorney’s fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2) 25 and (11)26 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181258               March 18, 2010

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, vs.ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint 1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his
signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial
support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his
child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she
reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.2
By Order of July 4, 2001, 3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten note which it treated as "contractual support" since
the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencel’s prayer for support pendente lite in the
amount of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, 4 whereupon the case
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear
petitioner’s signature; that petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his
child; and that there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution
of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, 5 reversed the trial court’s decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days
of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioner’s payment of Araceli’s hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to
provide monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencel’s father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in
omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for
Arhbencel’s subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, 6 petitioner comes before this Court through the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari.7
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of
Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative parent; that the supposed
payment made by him of Araceli’s hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel’s claim of paternity
and filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact which the appellate court had already addressed, along with the issues raised in
the present petition.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code9 that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.1awph!1
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the
preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set
forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites,
we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage
contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures
are sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each
month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the
necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And
Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of
filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, 11 has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish
her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however,
just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the
Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142877           October 2, 2001
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in
order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A.
de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for
reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the
illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the
establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question
of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for
being improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition
as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require
a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no
attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be
seasonably brought up in direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.4 The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. 5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 6 Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgement.7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. 9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170,10 and in proper cases Article 171, 11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable, 12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, 14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private
document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's
illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they
could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent
cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of
the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 171713             December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and (2) the Resolution 2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her
mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky
prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises. 4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed
into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac
City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses
and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the
child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his
daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting
the trial court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelio’s Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was
received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999
rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in
a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life. 7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be
considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendant’s motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced
shall remain in record, subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendant’s answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to defendant’s counterclaim within
the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiff’s application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff
immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every
month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the pendency of this case. 9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is
a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may
have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article
provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
following the birth of the child because of –
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he
comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever
arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had
sexual relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a
certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an
evidence of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to
go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was
even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should
support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The
Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz
shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001. 12 From the denial of
his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for
decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002. 13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February
2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, 14 which
motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an order
directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon
consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he
and plaintiff’s mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not
consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological father of the plaintiff
even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiff’s mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would
be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant
during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of
such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose
illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support. 17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG. 18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting
aside the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory
recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo. 19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the
appellate court’s decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. 20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband. 24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in
the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same
person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity. 25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate
a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of
an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four
bases appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific
paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in
the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling,
tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five
(5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was
used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats);
and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of
by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match
two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a
criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the " known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called
"allele," one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce
a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the
DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. 26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of biological
samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA
profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of
support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1),
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and written,
by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8
March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father
and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People
v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because
"doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators?
How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape
with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing
the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of
DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence 28 allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. 29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case,
petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in
our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is
material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice,
motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the
matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1
March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 143256            August 28, 2001
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ,
ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the decision 2
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: 3
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by
TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed
that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo
Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang
for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken
care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of the
following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925),
situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and
on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four (194) square meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G. I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters and 126 square meters of the
first and second floor, respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22- 592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters including the building and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the
southwestern portion of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925),
situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on
the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) — Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8", Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez,
being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to
declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and
other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the
total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with
each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly on the same date,
caused the execution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described in the deed of extra-
judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus
prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez
whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez
which are now in question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties thereto and for value." (Records, pp. 20-21,
Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"), the TCT No.
54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was
negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to
present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such as Ambassador Armando
Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child; a
pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree, 5 (4) the certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office
that there was no available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for
backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that
Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available records of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8,
1936, while Rodolfo's baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-
judicial partition and the deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the
documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed decision dated
December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with the deceased spouses. It
found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for
recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary
weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they were evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein
with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez
with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code referred to the written
admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public
document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000. 6
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY
TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE THE
SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB
INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED
AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF
SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL
BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow
of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez.
Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo
Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally attacked in the
present action but in a separate and independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial
partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo's right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we
are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in the
instant case considering that respondents' claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do
not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,7
which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
"A careful reading of the above articles 8 will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the
child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy
of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of
the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining
what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of
the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief 9 filed before the trial court,
hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a
factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight 10 when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings
of the trial court. 11 We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the evidence presented, thus: 12
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a
certification worded as follows:
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence,
there is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive proof of
the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants' Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed to
admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family
Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this
case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as evidence — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness
of the statements made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the parish
priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of the sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the certificate; but it does
not constitute proof of the statements made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing
Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect
evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and certified to or the date
written by him are not shown to be false; but they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5,
1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration and statement contained in the said application that concern the relationship
of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the
contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died
(Rollo, p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and
privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as
legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The
Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a
child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John
Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on November
15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits for the Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements
or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one
of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was
doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16,
1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G"). Neither the family portrait
offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) ( supra). In fine, the
evidence presented by appellant did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989
executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus
the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar
as Rodolfo is concerned13 pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of ½ pro indiviso of the conjugal property and the
other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces
of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the ½ share of the decedent's estate while the ¾ share of the conjugal property will still belong to Generosa as the
widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's order reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to the
admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the ½ of the inheritance and the
respondents to the other ½. In effect, ¾ pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., ½ as her share of the conjugal property estate
and ½ of the remaining ½ as share as heir from her husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the extra-
judicial partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive right to the conjugal property, as
erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations
than those established by law,14 which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment of
contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. 15
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract prejudices
the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. 16 As we have discussed above,
respondents are entitled to the ¼ of the entire conjugal property, i.e., lot and building; however considering that widow Generosa, during her lifetime,
sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to
the interest of respondents as regards their ¼ share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of said deed of
sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie
Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial court's findings that the deed was prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was
controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract worker
in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a contract has
sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. 17 Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is
presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs
amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence 18 and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same;19 a burden respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the
evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.20
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her ¾ undivided share in the
building but also the ¼ share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null and
void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the ¾ share of the building
together with the respondents who owned the ¼ share therein. 21
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A party is
entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proven. 22 Such damages, to be recoverable, must
not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. 23 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 24 The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he suffered around P100,000 actual
damages was not supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent court should not
have awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification.
Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's fees, which is in violation of the proscription against the
imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼ share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant
thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new
title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal
building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 132305      December 4, 2001

IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4, 1997, 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed
and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein petitioner
to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. 1âwphi1.nêt
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had
fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the
property.3 On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property
covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said
property.4
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein
petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which
came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who
died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 5 was
executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
1723346) in petitioner's name alone.7
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that,
having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed
that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare." 8
Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject
property because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was
quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. 9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know
any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained
that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her,
and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his
lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that
respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was decided in her
and the other defendants' favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her
name alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay
realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession each of one-
third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal Avenue
Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the
remaining one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to
herein defendant as owner and entitled to possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon
finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the
defendant as owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the
parties herein.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a
valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the
following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that
petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that respondents knew of petitioner's
existence and her being the daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents
were not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their
credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal
shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of
Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was
born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any
child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her
his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had, before the filing of the instant case, previously
"considered"11 her as the daughter of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts that her identification as
Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the "strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals12 in which we held that
"(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law."13 Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention. 14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. 15 They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the
present case since this is not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and possession of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title
and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession,
sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the
husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. 16
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present
case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not
a child of Jose at all. 17 Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive
periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged
by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate
status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson
couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that
it was too late to question the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be
made collaterally but in a direct proceeding. 18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth
certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) 19 plainly states that... Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document
states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate. Therefore,
this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida
Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it would have been the easiest thing to do
considering that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the
certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee's parents were Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized
person. This document can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the
priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing more. 20 (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida
Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.21
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. 22
However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the
Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. 23
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. 24 More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows
that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. 25
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to
do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find
petitioner's silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such
evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However, use
of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. 26 The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida
Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made
conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit
from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or
donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The
intrinsic defects are extractable from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what was the big
idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose Santiago
who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c)
Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his signature (citation omitted) [affix]
his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to her when she
would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was
earlier married to Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]he was then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of said
properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession
was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?27
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged
to his sisters.28 Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. 29 Consent of the contracting parties is among the
essential requisites of a contract, 30 including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any
centavo for the property,31 which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being
a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the "donation" for Ida. 32
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146737            December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta),
the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR.,
petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry
Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry
General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the September 13, 2000
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of
Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of
the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. 1 died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan
E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No.
4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined savings, current
and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly published, 2 thereby
giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming
to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the
deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or
the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier
oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin),
likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate
estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") 3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records
in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was
the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She
produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") 4 showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", 5 indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by
his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that
while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit
"D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's
birth. This scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified
that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are
forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this
Court.
"SO ORDERED."6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal7 does not apply when there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked,
or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 8 Here, the trial court failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
"Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select." (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show,
so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. 9 Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees. 10 In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration,
respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as
next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."12 (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a
photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita
Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged natural
child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of
the deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the standard signatures presented by oppositors
were not in public document and may also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin,
Sr. was the original or primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by
oppositors was found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and
requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually paste the pages of the bound
volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the
suspicious circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are
officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several
decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record
from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason
to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more
convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago.
The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry
General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's
explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in
1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the
former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." 13
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been
used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956.
We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form
to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn.
Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because
the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D"
does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of
the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date
and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a
bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the leaves were
taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to paste them."14(Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the
suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given
more faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to
the Civil Registrar General, thus:
"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. — Local civil registrars shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry; (b) compile the
same monthly and prepare and send any information required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of any document
registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of all certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to
the Civil Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to
facilitate search and identification in case any information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes" 15 (Emphasis
ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in
substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit
"D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as
respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar16 that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out
of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals17 where this Court said that "a birth certificate not
signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. 18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic
copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between
the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is
authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, 19 lest we
recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before
a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious.
Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155733             January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO
and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA;
and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor, 2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in
SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its
resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of
her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her
full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa
Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado), 15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father. 16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein.
Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to
petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record
of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage
transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife
until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends
to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the
United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim
No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia
Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one
Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia,
named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of their ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." 23
The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and
by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda. 24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates
of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr.,
and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married
but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was
concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8,
1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the
entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [i s] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to
the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is
likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of
the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice. 32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance
of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs
of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay
or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV
Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals
amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate
of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee
Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee
of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn
over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty
(60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. 37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was
such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They
make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who
had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in
society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio
must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on
the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon
Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). 50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood
siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit
that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were
all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972
of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: 57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole
heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office
of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only
upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only
after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo
Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64
Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. 65
On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo
Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as
an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes
an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of preference
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, 72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and
nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24,
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and
half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also
surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is
hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such
amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.