Lee V KBC Bank PDF

TOPIC Rule 112; Sections 3 and 4, Procedure;
CASE NO. G.R. No. 164673; January 15, 2010

CASE NAME Samuel Lee Maybelle Lee Lim v KBC Bank NV
MEMBER Nica Pine
DOCTRINE
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Preliminary investigation is
for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the court — it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Trial judges are thus required to make their own
assessment.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
This is case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This case started when MDEC obtained two loaned
from KBC with promissory notes and deed of assignments over confirmed purchase order (CPOs) by Otto
Versand for each loan. However, MDEC defaulted on the paying both loans which led KBC bank asking
Otto Versand to verify the validity of both CPOs. However, Versand told KBC through a fax that they will
not pay since it didn’t issue the CPOs. Hence, Pajarillo, manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank,
charged Lee and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor
Subia) found the existence of probable cause and recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against
Lee and Lim. In the Petition for Review filed by Lee and Lim, they claimed that the prosecutor’s resolution
merely relied on hearsay evidence (fax message) which cannot be the basis for a finding of probable cause.
W/N admissibility of the fax should be properly ventilated during the full blown trial and not during the
preliminary investigation – YES, Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the exhaustive
display of presentation of evidence.
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Preliminary investigation is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
W/N Judge Dumayas merely relied on the DOJ Secretary’s recommendation instead of making his own
evaluation – YES
J. Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation in granting the motion to withdraw the information
J. dumayas, in his 26 march 2003 order, did not (1) positively state that the evidence against Lee and Lim
is insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the case, (3) assess whether Secretary Perez's
conclusion is supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of secretary perez's recommendation, (5) embody
his assessment in the order, and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the information.
It’s the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such
motion.
1
FACTS
• MDEC obtained two loans from KBC Bank
o A $1.4M loan for which Lee, assistant treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a
promissory note (PN1) in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of
MDEC's rights over a Confirmed Purchase Order (CPO1) issued by Otto Versand
(company based in Germany), covering a shipment of girls’ basic denim jeans amounting
to around $1.86M; and
o A $65K loan for which Lim, assistant treasurer and director of MDEC then, executed
another promissory note (PN2) and another deed of assignment transferring all of
MDEC's rights over another Confirmed Purchase Order (CPO2) issued by Otto Versand
covering a shipment of boys’ Bermuda jeans amounting to $841,500.
• Later, Lim renewed PN1 and issued a notice of renewal and drawdown certificate to KBC Bank.
She also executed an amended deed of assignment for CP1. However, MDEC defaulted in paying
both loans. KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of both CPOs.
• Otto Versand told KBC Bank through a facsimile message (fax) that it did not issue the
purchase orders or order or receive the items covered by them, and that it would not pay.
o Pajarillo, manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank, charged Lee and Lim of estafa.
• State Prosecutor Subia found the existence of probable cause and recommended that 2 counts of
estafa be filed against Lee and Lim since they clearly helped one another fraudulently represent to
KBC Bank that the purchase orders existed and that MDEC had rights and interests thereto, and
entice the Bank to loan them $1.4M and $65k under the short-term trade facility.
• Two Information were charged with the RTC against Lee and Lim.
o After finding probable cause, RTC's Judge Dumayas issued warrants of arrest against Lee
and Lim. The two filed a petition for review with the DOJ challenging the state prosecutor's
Resolution and later Order denying their motion for reconsideration.
• The DOJ Secretary directed the withdrawal of the information against Lee and Lim, stating that the
fax constitute hearsay evidence. Pajarillo did not have personal knowledge of the fact that the CPOs
were fake, so her testimony could not have been the basis for finding probable cause against Lee
and Lim.
• Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao prayed for the withdrawal of the information filed against Lee
and Lim. J. Dumayas of the RTC granted.
• KBC petitioned to the SC, which referred it to the CA.
• DOJ Secretary denied the MR.
• But the CA set aside Judge Dumayas's Order, stating that "...the filing of a complaint or information
in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is
the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information,
a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.”
o The CA also stated a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well- grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. The issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of
evidence is a matter of defense that is best ventilated in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N admissibility of the fax should be properly ventilated during the full blown trial and not during
the preliminary investigation – YES
1. W/N Judge Dumayas merely relied on the DOJ Secretary’s recommendation instead of making
his own evaluation – YES
2
RATIO
1. On the issue of CA reviewing the findings of Sec Perez
• CA reviewer J. Dumayas’ March 2003 order, not Sec. Perez’s.
• CA ruled that Dumayas erred when he failed to make his own evaluation and merely relied
on Sec. Perez’s reco that there was no probable cause.
2. On the issue of admissibility of the fax should be properly ventilated during the full blown trial and
not during the preliminary investigation
• The presence/absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial.
• The validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
3. On the issue of Judge Dumayas merely relied on the DOJ Secretary’s recommendation instead of
making his own evaluation
• J. Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation in granting the motion to withdraw the
information
• J. dumayas, in his 26 march 2003 order, did not (1) positively state that the evidence against
Lee and Lim is insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the case, (3) assess
whether Secretary Perez's conclusion is supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of
secretary perez's recommendation, (5) embody his assessment in the order, and (6) state
his reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the information.
• J. Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates kbc
bank's right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge dumayas' 26
march 2003 order granting the motion to withdraw the informations is void.
• In Co v Lim: trial judge did not positively state that the evidence presented against the
respondents was insufficient for a prima facie case, nor did the aforequoted order include
a discussion of the merits of the case based on an evaluation or assessment of the evidence
on record. In other words, the dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other
than the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the
respondents. Thus, the trial judge improperly relinquished the discretion.
• In Ark Travel v Presiding Judge of Makati: bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over
the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing
the motion
• In Ledesma v CA: Trial judges are thus required to make their own assessment of whether
the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the
appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution's or the secretary's evaluation
*this 3rd issue came up because Lee and Lim claimed that the CA erred when it reviewed the findings of
the DOJ Secretary, since the only ruling before the CA was the ruling of the RTC. But the SC said that the
CA did review only the RTC Order, not the DOJ Secretary's resolution. What the CA decided was that RTC
J Dumayas erred when he only relied on the DOJ Sec’s resolution and so failed to make his own evaluation
on the existence of probably cause
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS the 10 february 2004 Decision and 27 July
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78004. the case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 58, Makati City for evaluation on whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.
3
4
TOPIC Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
CASE NO. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909. April 6, 2005.

CASE NAME C!COMMUNITY RURAL BANK OF GUIMBA (N. E.), INC., Represented by
OLGA M. SAMSON, complainant, vs. Judge TOMAS B. TALAVERA, Regional
Trial Court (Branch 28), Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, respondent.
MEMBER Marie Kayla Galit
!
DOCTRINE
1. In granting the Motion to Dismiss, Talavera relied solely on the Resolution of the prosecutor who had
conducted the reinvestigation and recommended the dismissal of the case for alleged insufficiency of
evidence. Thus does not demonstrate his independent evaluation. It was unduly haste given that the
granting of motion was ONLY A DAY AFTER the reinvestigation’s conclusion.
2. Conclusion can be arrived at only after a thorough assessment of the prosecution evidence. For a valid
and proper exercise of judicial discretion, accepting the prosecution's word that the evidence is
insufficient is not enough; strictly required of the order disposing of the motion is the trial judge's own
evaluation of such evidence.
3. Talavera granted the Motions without notice to the bank and despite the lack of hearing. Sections 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least three days before
the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time and place of hearing of
the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof.
a. Purpose: to enable the adverse party to appear for its own protection and to contest the
motion. In criminal proceedings, the word "party" is held to mean not only the government
and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the orders issued and/or
judgment rendered.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Community Bank filed a complaint against the accused for Estafa. After preliminary investigation, Fiscal
recommended the filing of information. Accused appealed to the DOJ to which the latter denied with finality.
Three months later, the accused yet again filed a Motion for Reinvistigation without notice to the bank or its
counsel and no hearing. Then, reinvestigation was conducted by Asst. Provincial Prosec. Caballero (no notice
again to the bank) who reversed the decision of the previous investigating Fiscal. A motion to dismiss was
granted without notice to the bank or its counsel.
The issue in this case is: W/N Judge Talavera acted grossly negligent when he granted the (1) Motion for
Reinvestigation and (2) Motion to Dismiss without notice to the bank? YES. He granted the Motion for
Reinvestigation despite the finality of judgment of DOJ, he hastily granted Caballero’s resolution reversing the
findings of previous reinvestigating fiscal, and all these WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE BANK OR ITS
COUNSEL and with NO HEARING CONDUCTED.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least three days
before the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time and place of hearing of
the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof. Purpose: to enable the adverse party to appear for its own
protection and to contest the motion. In criminal proceedings, the word "party" is held to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the orders issued and/or
judgment rendered.
! 1!
FACTS
• In a Complaint-Affidavit, Community Rural Bank of Guimba (N. E.), Inc. charged Judge Tomas B.
Talavera of RTC Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, with
a. Serious misconduct and/or gross inefficiency; and
b. Violation of Rules 1.01, 2 3.01 3 and 3 .0 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• In September 1997, the Bank lodged a complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of Cabanatuan
charging several persons (the accused) with Estafa in relation to P.D. Nos. 818 and 1689.
• After a preliminary investigation, the Investigating Fiscal recommended the filing — of 6
Informations for Estafa against the accused.
o Respondent was the presiding judge of one of the branch to whom two criminal cases were
raffled.
• The accused appealed the findings of the Investigating Fiscal to the DOJ. DOJ denied the petition of
the accused. Then, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the DOJ
through a resolution.
o Hence, respondent issued a Warrant of Arrest fixing no bail against the accused.
• Three months after, the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest.
o Neither the Bank nor its counsel was furnished a copy of said Motion. There was also no
hearing on the said motion to afford the Bank an opportunity to oppose.
• Talavera granted the motion without any hearing.
o A reinvestigation proceeding was conducted by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Virgilio
Caballero. Again, the Bank was not notified of said proceedings.
• Caballero reversed the earlier findings of the previous Investigating Fiscal.
o On the same day, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by Caballero. No notification again was
sent to the Bank or its counsel.
• Talavera granted the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the release of the accused.
• The Bank filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but Talavera denied the same.
Contentions:
o Talavera transgressed Sections 2, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, when he
granted the Motion for Reinvestigation of the accused and Assistant Caballero's Motion to
Dismiss without notice and hearing in favor of the Bank or its counsel.
o Talavera’s granting of the Motion to Dismiss based solely on the Resolution issued by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Caballero, without making his own independent findings of
the merits of the case, is repugnant to Crespo vs. Mogul ruling, which held that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any disposition or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Evaluation of OCA:
• By dismissing the criminal case without giving complainant the opportunity to object to the
Motion for Reinvestigation and Motion to Dismiss, Talavera showed gross ignorance of the law.
The presence of the bank was required in the hearing of a motion to dismiss as much as in the
arraignment. The dismissal of the criminal cases covered the litigation's civil aspect (recovery of
damages by the offended party), which was deemed included in the Information.
o OCA recommended that Talavera be fined in the amount of P21,000.
ISSUE/S and HELD

W/N Judge Talavera acted grossly negligent when he granted the (1) Motion for Reinvestigation and (2)
Motion to Dismiss without notice to the bank? YES.
RATIO
- First, Talavera should not have entertained the Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the accused.
Talavera was fully aware that theaccused had appealed the unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor to the DOJ.
! 2!
o Talavera must have in fact taken that appeal into consideration when he issued a warrant of
arrest against all the accused after Justice Secretary Cuevas had denied their Petition for
Review and affirmed the presence of prima facie evidence against them.
! What the prosecutor reviewed and overruled in the reinvestigation was not the
actuation and resolution of his predecessor, but of the secretary of justice no less.
- In Ledesma v. CA, the Court held:
o Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Revised Admin Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of
the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution.
! In administrative law:
• Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinates perform their duties. If the subordinate fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action as prescribed by law to make
them perform such duties.
• Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.'
- Thus, the actions of prosecutors are limited; subject to review by the secretary of justice who may
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions or opinions. Consequently the secretary may direct
them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or an information against the accused
o The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to
review or overrule the decision of the secretary.
- Consistent with this administrative superior-subordinate relationship between them, Section 7 of
Department Order No. 223 stipulates that a motion for reinvestigation on the ground of newly
discovered evidence must be filed before the justice secretary rules on an appeal from a resolution in a
preliminary investigation.
o In this case, the accused filed their Motion for Reinvestigation about three months after the
August 15, 2000 Resolution of the secretary denying with finality. It was grossly
erroneous for respondent judge to order the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor.
o Talavera granted the Motion only on the basis of an alleged newly discovered evidence — a
one-page Affidavit executed by Ms. Sacramento, one of the co-accused.
- Second, in granting the Motion to Dismiss, Talavera relied solely on the Resolution of the prosecutor
who had conducted the reinvestigation and recommended the dismissal of the case for alleged
insufficiency of evidence.
o Thus does not demonstrate his independent evaluation. It was undly hate given that the
granting of motion was ONLY A DAY AFTER the reinvestigation’s conclusion.
! Conclusion can be arrived at only after a thorough assessment of the prosecution
evidence. For a valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion, accepting the
prosecution's word that the evidence is insufficient is not enough; strictly required of
the order disposing of the motion is the trial judge's own evaluation of such evidence.
- IMPORTANT: Third, Talavera granted the Motions without notice to the bank and despite the lack
of hearing. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent
at least three days before the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time
and place of hearing of the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof.
o Purpose: to enable the adverse party to appear for its own protection and to contest the
motion.
! In criminal proceedings, the word "party" is held to mean not only the government
and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the orders issued
and/or judgment rendered.
- A told, respondent showed his lack of understanding, not only of the basic and established superior-
subordinate relationship between the secretary of justice and the provincial prosecutors, but also of the
functions and duties of the trial court in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system.
! 3!
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, Judge Tomas B. Talavera is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED
21,000 pesos. He is hereby sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
OTHER NOTES
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court (Not provided for in the case)
Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. (4a)
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. (5a)
Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof. (6a)
! 4!
TOPIC CrimPro – Rule 112 – Prelim. Investigation
CASE NO. G.R. No. 191567 - March 20, 2013
CASE NAME Callo-Claridad v Esteban
MEMBER Mitchell
DOCTRINE
- The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended
party. A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes the
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent because
the determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.
- Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering
in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the Department of Justice
the ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.
- Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the SoJ’s findings and conclusions on the matter
of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Petitioner is the mother of the late "Chase" Callo-Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body was discovered
one evening between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house in Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Esteban according to Chase's sister and
their two household helpers less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body. The OCP of Quezon
City dismissed the complaint. It observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial
evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder and that the circumstantial evidence
could not link Philip to the crime. On petition for review, the Sec. of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. The petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of
Court. CA dismissed the petition for review.
Issue: W/N CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding
that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase (No)
SC: CA has no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice. The Court said that a petition for
review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards
by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies. The SoJ performed an essentially executive function in
reviewing the findings of the OCP on the matter of probable cause. The determination of the existence of
probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary
investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. A public prosecutor alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence establishing the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent because the determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of
the public prosecutor. Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the Dep’t of Justice the
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. The only exception wherein judicial review is
permitted is where the respondent in the preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
1
FACTS
- Under review is the decision promulgated where CA upheld the resolution issued by the Secretary
of Justice dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint for murder filed against Philip
Esteban and Teodora Esteban
- Petitioner is the mother of the late "Chase" Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body was
discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a
residential house located at No. 10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
- Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with Philip Esteban less than an hour before the discovery
of his lifeless body
- The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. It observed
that:
o there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge Philip
with homicide, much less murder;
o the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the crime;
o several possibilities would discount Philip's presence at the time of the crime, including the
possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase;
o Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested
that the two had no ill-feelings towards each other;
o no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could have been the female
person engaged in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was
unreliable being mere hearsay.
- Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal, but the OCP denied the motion
o On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
o The SoJ stated that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient
circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the
witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime
alleged.
o The SoJ held that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the
allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock of the evening in question, Chase had
boarded the white Honda Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses' positive
identification of Philip as the driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that
Philip did not alight from the car, the windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of
the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did not indicate that Philip had been with
Chase at the time of the commission of the crime.
o After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the SoJ, the petitioner elevated the
matter to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court.
o the CA promulgated its assailed decision, dismissing the petition for review.
- The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion for its lack of merit.
o Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
o Petitioner prays that Philip and Teodora be charged with murder on the strength of the
several pieces of circumstantial evidence; that the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery be appreciated in the slaying of her son, given the
time, manner, and weapon used in the commission of the crime and the location and degree
of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
2
ISSUE/S and HELD
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding
that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase—NO
RATIO
The SC denied the petition for review and sustained the CA decision.
- The CA has no appellate jurisdiction vis-a-vis the Secretary of Justice. A petition for review
under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards
by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of
Rule 43.
- In this case, the SoJ was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the
findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice
performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents
were guilty.
- On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice's determination of
probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the
Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was
still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of
powers
MAIN SYLLABUS TOPIC: Second, even an examination of the CA's decision indicates that the CA
correctly concluded that the SoJ did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the finding of
probable cause by the OCP
- A preliminary investigation (Section 1, Rule 112) is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."
- The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well-founded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The
role and object of preliminary investigation were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious,
and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from
the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.”
- In Arula vs. Espino, the Court rendered the 3 PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION:
1. to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of the accused with
it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime charged against
him, and, if there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the State may take the
necessary steps to bring him to trial;
2. to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and
3. to determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable. The officer conducting the
examination investigates or inquires into facts concerning the commission of a crime with
the end in view of determining whether an information may be prepared against the
accused.
3
- The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended
party.
- A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes the probable
cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent because the
determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.
- Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering
in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the Department of Justice
the ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.
- Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the SoJ’s findings and conclusions on the matter
of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
o By way of exception, however, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in the
preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion
o The trial court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.
- The CA's determination that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the
respondents' involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness
of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed,
how many persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing.
There was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either
homicide or murder
o It is clear from the foregoing disquisitions of the CA that the Secretary of Justice reasonably
reached the conclusion that the dismissal by the OCP of Quezon City of the complaint for
murder had been based on the lack of competent evidence to support a finding of probable
cause against the respondents.
o Accordingly, such finding of probable cause by the Exec. Department, through the SoJ,
could not be undone by the CA, in the absence of a clear showing that the SoJ had gravely
abused his discretion. That showing was not made here.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals
4
TOPIC Preliminary Investigation (PI) (Rule 112)
-Sections 3 and 4, Procedure; NPS Rule on Appeal, supra
CASE NO. G.R. No. 213910 (2016)
CASE NAME VINSON * D. YOUNG a.k.a. BENZON ONG and BENNY YOUNG a.k.a.
BENNY ONG, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
respondent.
MEMBER Miguel Calilung
DOCTRINE
Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.
Executive determination of probable cause pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during
preliminary investigation for the purpose of ling an information in court. At this juncture, the
investigating prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this stage, the judge makes a preliminary
examination of the evidence submitted, and on the strength thereof, and independent from the ndings of
the public prosecutor, determines the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Moreover… a judge's determination of probable cause is generally conned to the limited purpose
of issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. … only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable
cause —that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City. They learned that (a)
petitioners were the owners of Jaguar; (b) a certain "Tico" acted as overall manager; and (c) a certain
"Ann" welcomed customers and offered them GROs. In the course of an entrapment operation the
RAHTTF raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the
marked money from Jocelyn Balili, and the rescue of 146 women and minor children. 6 of these women
(AAA Group) — executed Affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners. Hence,
criminal complaint for violation of "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003." was filed against them,
before the OCP. OCP found probable cause and ordered the indictment of petitioners. Petitioners led an
omnibus motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, praying that the issuance of the
corresponding warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against
them to be dismissed for lack of probable cause. RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed the case
for lack of probable cause. OSG, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA found that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion and remanded the case to the RTC. Petitioners filed an MR. Denied.
Hence the present petition.
W/N the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.
The court held that determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.
1
Moreover… a judge's determination of probable cause is generally conned to the limited purpose
of issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. … only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable
cause —that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
FACTS
Include relevant facts only.
• Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City
• In the course of their surveillance, they learned that: (a) petitioners were the owners of Jaguar; (b) a
certain "Tico" acted as overall manager; and (c) a certain "Ann" welcomed customers and offered
them GROs
• In the course of an entrapment operation, members of RAHTTF, acting as customers, handed P15,000
worth of marked money to the "mamasang "/manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. At the
pre-arranged signal, the rest of the RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests,
seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from Jocelyn Balili, and the rescue of
146 women and minor children.
• 6 of these women (AAA Group) — executed Affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as
Jaguar's owners. Hence, criminal complaint for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to
Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003." was filed against them,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City (OCP).
• Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights and interests therein to one
Charles Theodore Rivera pursuant to a Deed of Assignment therefore, he had no control and
supervision over the AAA Group. Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the owner nor
manager of Jaguar and was not even present during the raid.
• During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, or on May 31, 2011, the AAA Group submitted
affidavits stating that their previous affidavits were vitiated and not of their own free will and
voluntary deed, effectively recanting the same.
OCP Ruling
• OCP found probable cause and ordered the indictment of petitioners, Tico, and Ann for violation of
Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. OCP concluded that the receipt
and subsequent recovery of the marked money from Balili constituted prima facie evidence that there
was a transaction to engage in sexual service for a fee. It also held that the documentary evidence
pertaining to Jaguar's business operations, as well as the positive identification made by the AAA
Group, sufficiently established petitioners as its owners. Petitioners led an omnibus motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause, praying that the issuance of the corresponding warrants of
arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be dismissed
for lack of probable cause.
RTC Ruling
• RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. People, through
the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
2
CA Ruling
• CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Petitioners filed an MR. Denied. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable
cause. YES.
RATIO
Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.
Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dio v. CA that while a judge's determination of
probable cause is generally conned to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless
authorized under Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Thus:
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be
stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record
shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and
thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate
course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 10, 2013 and the Resolution
dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 07147 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3
TOPIC Sections 3 and 4, Procedure; NPS Rule on Appeal
CASE NO. G.R. No. 195542
CASE NAME SEC vs. Santos
MEMBER Janine Verocel
DOCTRINE
Generally, at the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor and ultimately the Secretary of the DOJ is afforded
wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. The
determination of probable cause is an executive function where the prosecutor determined merely that a crime has been
committed and that the accused has committed the same. However, the authority of the prosecutor and DOJ is not absolute,
it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. While it is the Court’s policy not to interfere, it has in more than once
occasion, admitted some exceptions.
[Note: I’m actually not sure what topic Sir wants to relate this to because what he put in the syllabus doesn’t really relate
exactly huhu sorry.]
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Sometime in 2007, yet another investment scam was exposed with the disappearance of its primary perpetrator Liew, a
self–styled financial guru and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Performance Investment Products Corporation (PIPC–
BVI), a foreign corporation registered in the British Virgin Islands.To do business in the Philippines, PIPC–BVI incorporated
herein as Philippine International Planning Center Corporation (PIPC Corporation).
Because the head of PIPC Corporation had gone missing and with it the monies and investment of a significant number of
investors, the SEC was flooded with complaints from 31 individuals against PIPC Corporation, its directors, officers,
employees, agents and brokers for alleged violation of certain provisions of the SRC, including Section 28 thereof. Santos
was charged in the complaints in her capacity as investment consultant of PIPC Corporation, who supposedly induced
private complainants Lorenzo and Sy, to invest their monies in PIPC Corporation. On her defense, Santos alleged that she
was merely an employee of PIPC thus should not be personally liable.
The Court held that Santos acted as an agent or salesman of PIPC Corporation making her liable under Sec. 28 of SRC.
There is no question that Santos was in the employ of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI, a corporation which sold or
offered for sale unregistered securities in the Philippines. To escape probable culpability, Santos claims that she was a
mere clerical employee of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI and was never an agent or salesman who actually solicited
the sale of or sold unregistered securities issued by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI.
FACTS
• Sometime in 2007, an investment scam was exposed with the disappearance of its primary perpetrator Michael
H.K. Liew, a self-styled financial guru and Chairman of the BOD of Performance Investment Products Corporation
(PIPC-BVI), a foreign corporation registered in British Virgin Islands.
• PIPC-BVI incorporated in PH as PIPC Corporation. SEC was flooded with complaints from 31 individuals against
PIPC and its officers for alleged violations of certain provisions in SRC (Securities Regulation Code). On the whole,
Private complainants Lorenzo and SY charged Santos in her capacity as investment consultant of PIPC Corporation
who actively engaged in the solicitation and recruitment of investors. She acted as PIPC’s agent and made
representations regarding its investment products facilitating Lorenzo and Sy’s investment. And so, SEC filed a
complaint affidavit for violation of Secs. 8, 26, and 28 or SRC before the DOJ that charged the following:
o This case stems from the act of fraud and chicanery masterfully orchestrated and executed by the officers
and agents of PIPC Corp. against their unsuspecting investors. The deception is founded on the basic fact
that neither PIPC Corp. nor its officers, employees and agents are registered brokers/dealers, making their
numerous transactions of buying and selling securities to the public a blatant violation of the provisions of
the SRC, specifically Sections 8 and 28 thereof. As per their AOI, PIPC was only authorized to act as a
research arm of their foreign clients.
• Santos’ defense consisted in:
1) denying participation in the conspiracy and fraud perpetrated against the investor-complainants of PIPC;
2) claiming that she was initially and merely an employee, and subsequently, an independent information
provider for PIPCl
3) PIPC being a separate entity from PIPC-BVI of which Santos has never been a part of in any capacity;
4) she did not receive money from Sy and Lorenz because they directly invested with PIPC-BVI
1
5) PIPC-BVI as the other party in the contract, was the only corporation liable to Sy and Lorenzo and other
complainants.
• The DOJ panel found probable cause on the collective acts of the majority of the respondents including respondent
Santos, which consisted in their acting as employees-agent and/or investor-agents of PIPC Corporation or PIPC-
BVI. Specifically alluding to Santos as Investment consultant of PIPC Corporation, DOJ found probable cause to
indict her for violation of Sec 28 of SEC for engaging in the business of selling or offering for sale securities without
the necessary registration from SEC. Santos filed a petition for review before the Sec of DOJ claiming that she was
a mere employee who did not solicit investors. Accordingly, the Sec of DOJ excluded Santos from prosecution of
violation of Sec 28 of SRC.
• Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Santos should be excluded from the information for violation of Section 28 of the SRC.
RATIO:
• Generally, at the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor and ultimately the Secretary of the DOJ is
afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine probable cause to warrant criminal
prosecution. The determination of probable cause is an executive function where the prosecutor determined merely
that a crime has been committed and that the accused has committed the same. However, the authority of the
prosecutor and DOJ is not absolute, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. While it is the Court’s policy
not to interfere, it has in more than once occasion, admitted some exceptions.
• In excluding Santos from the prosecution, the Secretary of DOJ debunked the finding of the DOJ panel and ruled
that there was no evidence showing Santo’s actual participation in the final sale of unregistered securities since
Santos never signed nor was ever mentioned in the investment documents. Such conclusions are a myopic view
of the investment solicitations made by Santos on behald of PIPC while she was not a licenses broker or dealer.
Hence, the Court sustains the DOJ Panel’s findings that PIPC was an issuer of securities without the
necessary registration of license with SEC and engaged in the business of buying and selling securities.
• Under Sec 3 of SRC:
o Broker – a person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for the account of others
o Dealer – means any person who buys and sells securities for his or her own account in the ordinary course of
business
o Associated person of a broker or dealer – an employee whom directly exercises control of supervisory authority
but does not include a salesman or an agent or a person whose functions are solely clerical
o Salesman – a natural person, employed as such as an agent by a dealer, issuer or broker to buy and sell
securities.
• To determine whether the DOJ Secretary’s resolution was tainted with GAD we pass upon the lements for violation
of Sec 28 of SRC:
a) Engaging in the business of buying or selling securities in the PH as broker or dealer or
b) Acting as a salesmen or
c) Acting as an associated person of any broker or dealer, unless registered as such with the SEC.
• Santos, by the very nature of her function as what she now unaffectedly calls an information provider, brought about
the sale of securities made by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI to certain individuals, specifically private
complainants Sy and Lorenzo by providing information on the investment products of PIPC Corporation and/or
PIPC-BVI with the end in view of PIPC Corporation closing a sale.
• While Santos was not a signatory to the contracts on Sy's or Lorenzo's investments, Santos procured the sale of
these unregistered securities to the two complainants by providing information on the investment products being
offered for sale by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI and convincing them to invest therein.
• No matter Santos' strenuous objections, it is apparent that she connected the probable investors, Sy and Lorenzo,
to PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI, acting as an ostensible agent of the latter on the viability of PIPC Corporation
as an investment company. At each point of Sy's and Lorenzo's investment, Santos' participation thereon, even if
not shown strictly on paper, was prima facie established. The very information provided by Santos locked the deal
on unregistered securities with Sy and Lorenzo.
• Sy and Lorenzo did not go directly to Liew or any of PIPC Corporation's and/or PIPC-BVI's principal of cers before
making their investment or renewing their prior investment. However, undeniably, Santos actively recruited and
referred possible investors to PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI and acted as the go-between on behalf of PIPC
Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI.
• When the investor is relatively uninformed and turns over his money to others, essentially depending upon their
representations and their honesty and skill in managing it, the transaction generally is considered to be an
investment contract. The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.
2
• At bottom, the exculpation of Santos cannot be preliminarily established simply by asserting that she did not sign
the investment contracts, as the facts alleged in this case constitute fraud perpetrated on the public. Specially so
because the absence of Santos' signature in the contract is, likewise, indicative of a scheme to circumvent and
evade liability should the pyramid fall apart.
• PETITION GRANTED.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 112781 and the
Resolutions of the Department of Justice dated 1 October 2009 and 23 November 2009 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution of the Department of Justice dated 18 April 2008 and 2 September 2008 are REINSTATED. The Department
of Justice is directed to include respondent Oudine Santos in the Information for violation of Section 28 of the Securities
and Regulation Code.
3
TOPIC Who Must Prosecute (Section 5)
CASE NAME Quisay v. People
MEMBER Miguel Redor
DOCTRINE
1. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the

prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy.
2. The Information was defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior WRITTEN authority from
any of those authorized officers.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which affirmed the denial of
Quisay’s motion to quash before the RTC of Makati. In this case, a Resolution was issued finding probable
cause against Quisay for violation of RA 7610. Consequently, an Information was filed before the RTC.
Quisay moved to quash the said Information because nothing in it would show that Assistant City
Prosecutor De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and/or Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Hirang (SACP Hirang)
had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor before they filed the Information. The
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (OCP-Makati) countered by stating that the Information was filed
with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself. The
RTC denied Quisay’s motion to quash. The CA affirmed this ruling. Hence, this petition. The issue in this
case is whether the RTC and the CA gravely abused their discretion in dismissing Quisay’s motion to quash
the Information; to which, the answer is yes.
First, the Court held that the resolution was valid pursuant to an OCP-Makati Order which gave
SACP Hirang the authority to, among others, approve resolutions. Since the Resolution bore the approval
of SACP Hirang, it was valid. The same cannot be said for the Information. Section 4, Rule 112 states that
the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. Thus, as a general rule, complaints
or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing
authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to The Information was defective as
it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so OR failed to show
that they obtained prior WRITTEN authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section
4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, the Information must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against Quisay.
FACTS
• The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Resolution (called Pasiya
in this case) finding probable cause against Quisay for violation of RA 7610, otherwise known as
“Special Protection of Children Against Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”
Consequently, an Information (Pabatid Sakal) was filed before the RTC charging Quisay of said
crime.
• Quisay moved to quash the Information on the ground that both the Resolution and the Information
were tainted with a jurisdictional defect. He stated that the Resolution, which was penned by
Assistant City Prosecutor De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City
1
Prosecutor Hirang (SACP Hirang), and the Information, which was penned by ACP De La Cruz,
did not show that ACP De La Cruz and SACP Hirang had prior written authority from the City
Prosecutor.
• The OCP-Makati countered by saying that SACP Hirang was authorized to approve the Resolution
pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, and that the Information was filed with the prior
approval of the City Prosecutor.
• The RTC denied Quisay’s motion to quash for lack of merit. Quisay moved to reconsider but was
still denied. Quisay appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N RTC AND CA gravely abused their discretion in dismissing Quisay’s motion to quash the
Information. YES.
RATIO
3. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein
before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. No complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
4. Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules.
5. In this relation, People v. Garfin, firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer
without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot
be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings.
6. The Court held the Resolution to be valid. By virtue of OCP-Makati Order No. 32, the City
Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang as review prosecutors of the OCP-Makati. In this light,
the Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made
as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang,
as evidenced by his signature therein.
7. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Information filed before the RTC, as there was no
showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati’s
division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz
which stated, among others, that “DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain
ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-
Usig”– which translates to “and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and
approval of the City Prosecutor.”
8. Despite such certifications, the Information was defective as it was shown that the officers filing
the same in court either lacked the authority to do so OR failed to show that they obtained prior
WRITTEN authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, the Information must be quashed, resulting
in the dismissal of the criminal case against Quisay.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated
January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal
case against her is DISMISSED.
2
TOPIC Control of Prosecution
CASE NO. G.R. No. L-53373
CASE NAME Crespo v. Mogul
MEMBER Miguel Calilung
DOCTRINE
“The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court… A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.”
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Assistant Fiscal Gala filed an information for estafa against Crespo. Crespo filed a
motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with
the Secretary of Justice, of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the
information. Judge Mogul denied the motion. Crespo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction with the CA. CA granted and perpetually
restrained Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until the DOJ shall have
finally resolved the petition. Undersecretary of Justice, Macaraig, Jr., resolved the petition and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information. A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal. Judge Mogul again denied the
motion. Crespo again elevated the case to the CA. Denied. MR denied. Hence the present
petition.
W/N the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
The court held that rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
FACTS
• Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo. Crespo filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice, of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of
the information.
• Mogul, denied the motion. Crespo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a preliminary writ of injunction with the CA. CA granted and perpetually restrained
Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
• Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition and directed
the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A
1
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal. Judge
Mogul denied the motion and set the arraignment stating:
▪ “…The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence
of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the
requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence
and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore
hereby DENIED.”
• Crespo filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA.
Denied. MR denied. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE/S and HELD

W/N the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.
RATIO
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by
the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing
of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets
in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court,
the only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
2
Note: This is just additional info, Sir might ask what happens then? What should the
fiscal/prosecutor do?
“However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal
upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A
state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice
who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to
handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of
Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the
hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that
the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.”
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
3
TOPIC Section 5, When Warrant of Arrest May Issue/Who May Issue
Warrant/Determination of Probable Cause/Reinvestigation and Other Reliefs/No PI
CASE NAME Roberts, Jr. V. Court of Appeals
MEMBER Ian Butaslac
DOCTRINE
1. There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal,
by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of
the investigation prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court." More specifically, it stated: In order therefore to
avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal,
when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
2. Two types of warrants of arrest, second type personal examination of judge not required: As to
the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses, but “he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.”
Xxx “otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.” It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the
fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate the report and the supporting documents. XXX in
People vs. Inting “the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the
Judge to make his determination of probable cause.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Pepsi had a promotion wherein purchasers of their products could win a prize of a certain amount
redeemable if they could buy bottles that have the number “349” on their crowns in connection with their
Number Fever Promotion. Pepsi did not not give the winners who had the number “349” on their bottle
crowns. Pepsi’s defense was that the rules were clear from the beginning as per approved by the DTI and
explaind to the public, that for one to be entitled to the cash prize his crown must bear both the winning
number and the correct security code as they appear in the DTI list. The investigating prosecutor released
a Joint Resolution for the recommendation of filing an information against the petitioners. The petitioners
then field a petitioner for review with the DOJ. Respondent Judge Asuncion challenged the petition for
review with the DOJ stating that his court would be guided by the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul and not by the resolution of the Department of Justice on the
petition for review undertaken by the accused. Public respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground that it has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal by the DOJ of the
petitioner’s petition to review the Joint Resolution.
Petitioners contended that Judge Asuncion had acted with GAD in issuing his order since he failed to
examine the record of preliminary investigation before ordering the arrest of petitioners; there is no
1
probable cause to hold petitioners liable; and that the proceedings should have been suspended awaiting
the SoJ’s resolution of petitioner’s appeal.
The court decided that indeed the court has control over the entire case with consideration of Section 4 of
Rule 112 which recognizes the authority of the SOJ to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. However, the SOJ is only enjoined to
refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the SOJ reverses an appeal resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court.
The court also rules that the Judge did not personally examine in order to find probable cause. This is
taken with the facts in the case and even the leniency of Soliven vs. Makasiar regarding the second type
of warrant of arrest.
Lastly, the Supreme Court generally does not have powers to conduct and find probable cause in cases
except upon the listed exceptions. This case is under the second exception which is “when necessary for
the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions”, but the court still
did not take action upon it as they reasoned that the respondent judge did not find that probable cause
existed and if he did he did not have the basis therefor, plus the records of the preliminary investigation
are not with this Court.
FACTS
Several thousand holders of “349” Pepsi crowns in connection with Pepsi’s Number Fever
Promotion filed with the OCP of QC complaints against the petitioners in their respective
capacities as officials of Pepsi for (a) estafa; (b) violation of RA 7394 aka Consumer Act of the
Philippines; (c) violation of EO 913; (d) and violation of Act No. 2333 aka An Act Relative to
Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements, as amended by Act. No. 3740
Thereafter, investigating prosecutor, Ramon Gerona, released a Joint Resolution for the
recommendation of filing an information against petitioners for the violation of Art. 318 of the
RPC (other deceits) and dismissing the others. Later on, added info for estafa attached to the Joint
Resolution that was approved
Act complained: Pepsi wouldn’t give the winners for those who got the “349” code on the Pepsi
bottle caps (as advertised in their promotion) their due prize. If it were not for this promotion, the
complainants said that they would not have bought (that much) Pepsi. The promotions were
“false, fraudulent, and deceitful posters”
Pepsi’s contention: it had always been clearly explaind to the public that for one to be entitled to
the cash prize his crown must bear both the winning number and the correct security code as they
appear in the DTI list.
Procedural stuff:
o Petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review
o Petitioners filed Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrests on the ground that they filed the aforesaid Petition for Review
o Acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor de Guia issued a 1st
Indorsement directing the City Prosecutor of QC to inform the DOJ whether the
petitioners have already been araigned, and if not, to move in court for the deferment of
further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the case,
for the case is being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Department Circular
No. 7
o Case was raffled to branch 104 of the RTC of QC
2
Private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion to hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and to Suspend Proceedings. He stressed that the DOJ has taken cognizance of the Petition for
Review by directing the City Prosecutor to elevate the records and its related cases and asserted
that the petition for review was an essential part of the petitioner’s right to a preliminary
investigation
Respond Judge Asuncion issued an order advising the parties that his court would “be guided by
the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, and not by the
resolution of the DOJ on the Petition for Review undertaken by the accused
o “In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.”
Public respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it has become moot
and academic in view of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petitioner’s petition to review the Joint
Resolution.
CA dismissed the petition because it had been “mooted with the release by the DOJ of its
decision … dismissing petitioner’s petition to review by inerrantly upholding the criminal court’s
exclusive and unsupplatable authority to control the entire course of the case brought against
petitioners, reiterating with approval the dictum laid down in the “Crespo case”
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N public respondent Judge Asuncion commited grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the
basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ
shall have been resolved. NO
2. W/N public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
inverstigation (main issue). YES
3. W/N this Court may determine in this proceedings the existence of probable cause either for the
issuance of warrants against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa. NO
RATIO
1. On the first issue on the reliance of the Crespo case that the DOJ shall not entertain a petition for
review which should be left to the court:
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of
a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to “as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court”
However, in Marcelo vs. CA it stated: Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The SOJ is only enjoined
to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
3
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the SOJ reverses an appeal resolution, is subject to the
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing the last paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which recognizes the authority of the SoJ to reverse the
resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on appeals from
resolutions in preliminary investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their petition for the review of
the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25
January 1990. Section 2 thereof provided that only resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint may be
appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Its Section 4, 55 however, provided an exception, thus allowing,
upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable
cause, provided that the accused has not been arraigned.
2. On the second issue on the judge’s grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest
without examination of preliminary investigation records:
Warrant of Arrest: 2 types, personal examination of judge not required in the second, but:
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued
(1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except those in NCR, Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their
exclusive original jurisdiction; in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the
accused fails to appear when required; and in cases filed with them which are cognizable by
the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); and
(2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in NCR(MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed
with them after appropriate preliminary investigations conducted by officers authorized to do
so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs.
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses, but “he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.”
Xxx “otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts.” It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report
or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate the report and the supporting
documents. XXX in People vs. Inting “the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause.
Why the Judge Evaluate the Report/Certification of the Fiscal
4
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal
or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him
to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor
presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Soliven vs. Makasiar: Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses xxx. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting
the Fiscal’s bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
Allado vs. Diokno: before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof
Webb vs. De Leon: before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of the guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do
not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if
it is supported by substantial evidence.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that
the investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution which is made the
basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
No Documentary bases for finding probable cause (invalid warrants of arrests)

Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing
on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. As found by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 July 1993,
a copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993.
And as revealed by the certification of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation,
or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of Criminal Case No.
Q-93-43198 as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17
May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information,
amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or
evidence supporting the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest “after June
21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then
compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to
presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
3. On the last issue on the Supreme Court’s power to determine in a petition for certiorari the
existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrests against the petitioners for
their prosecution for estafa.
Determination of probable cause not lodged within the Supreme Court
5
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a judicial
prerogative. XXX preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation
for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind is executive in
nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate
case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
In exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause
by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
Exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile as follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (this case falls under this exception, but the court still decided to not make a
finding)
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-43198 and several thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly situated as the
former for being holders of “349” Pepsi crowns, any affirmative holding of probable cause in the said
case may cause or provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners, the filing of several thousand cases in
various courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the petitioners would be exposed to the harassments
of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to huge expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for
travels from one court to another throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago for their
arraignments and trials in such cases. Worse, the filing of these staggering number of cases would
necessarily affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of their attention, time, and
energy, which they could devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a frightful scenario
would seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of
actions - a situation already long conceded by this Court to be an exception to the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction.
We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43298. For, as earlier stated, the respondent
Judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis
therefor as mandated by Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and even Webb. Moreover, the records of the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 are not with this Court. They were
6
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter’s
1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted and the following are hereby SET ASIDE:
(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February 1994 of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 31226;
(b) The Resolution of the "349" Committee of the Department of Justice of 23 July 1993 dismissing the
petitioners' petition for review and of 3 February 1994 denying the motion to reconsider the dismissal;
and
(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17 May 1993 in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.
The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits, within sixty (60) days from notice of
this decision, the petitioners' petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor
Ramon Gerona and thereafter to Ele the appropriate motion or pleading in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198,
which respondent Judge Asuncion shall then resolve in light of Crespo vs. Mogul, Soliven vs. Makasiar,
People vs. Inting, Lim vs. Felix, Allado vs. Diokno, and Webb vs. De Leon.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to cease and desist from further proceeding
with Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
7
TOPIC When Warrant of Arrest May Issue/Who May Issue Warrant/Determination of
Probable Cause
CASE NO. N/A
CASE NAME Whiteley vs. Warden of Wyoming
MEMBER Jeremy Jess R. Arizabal
DOCTRINE
1. The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements before a
warrant for either arrest or search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant
be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause
exists for the warrant.
2. The standards applicable to the factual basis for an arresting officer's probable cause assessment
are no less strict than those applicable to the magistrate's assessment. Here, the arresting officer had
no information to corroborate the report that the suspects had committed the crime and the fact that
the warrantless arrest was based on a police radio bulletin cannot supply the element of probable
cause that the officer who issued the bulletin lacked.
3. Where the initial impetus for an arrest is an informer's tip, information gathered by the arresting
officers can be used to sustain a finding of probable cause for an arrest that could not adequately
be supported by the tip alone. Additional information acquired by the arresting officers must in
some sense be corroborative of the informer's tip that the arrestees committed the felony or, as
in Draper itself, were in the process of committing the felony.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
A sheriff, acting on a tip, made a complaint before a magistrate charging that petitioner and another
individual on the date and at the place named "did then and there unlawfully break and enter into [the
described] locked . . . building," and a warrant was issued. A police radio bulletin named and described
the two persons, the type of car they were probably driving, and the amount and type of money taken.
Relying on the bulletin, an officer in another county made a warrantless arrest of the suspects. The car
was then searched and various incriminating items removed, which were later used at petitioner's trial,
which resulted in his conviction. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition reiterating the challenge he had
made at his arraignment and trial to the constitutionality of the use of evidence seized during a search
incident to the assertedly illegal arrest. The District Court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. SC held that the complaint on which the warrant issued here clearly could not support a finding
of probable cause by the issuing magistrate. The arresting officer was not himself possessed of any factual
data tending to corroborate the informer's tip that Daley and Whiteley committed the crime. Therefore,
petitioner's arrest violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; the
evidence secured as an incident thereto should have been excluded from his trial.
FACTS
• On November 23, 1964, a break-in ensued in several business establishments in Saratoga,
including the Rustic Bar and Shively's Hardware. Based on a tip, Sheriff Ogburn commenced
investigation.
• After the investigation, the sheriff put out a state item on the radio to pick up two suspects
(Harold Whiteley and Jack Daley).
• Sheriff Ogburn then filed a complaint, WITHOUT STATING THAT HE ACTED ON A TIP,
which provided the basis for the arrest warrant issued by the justice of the peace. The same was
posted in the state bulletin (radio).
• The complaint filed by Ogburn is as follows:
1
o "I, C. W. Ogburn, do solemnly swear that, on or about the 23 day of November, A.D. 1964,
in the County of Carbon and State of Wyoming, the said Harold Whiteley and Jack Daley,
defendants, did then and there unlawfully break and enter a locked and sealed building
[describing the location and ownership of the building]."
• The state bulletin named and described the two persons, the type of car they were probably
driving, and the amount and type of money taken.
• The radio bulletin reached Laramie Police and on Nov. 24, acting on said tip, a Laramie
Patrolman arrested the Whitely and his companion.
• The patrolman together with a deputy sheriff, who had come up in the meantime, searched the car
and removed a number of items introduced in evidence, including tools and old coins, identified
at the trial as taken from Shively's Hardware. . . ."
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N probable cause was established to justify the arrest. – NO
RATIO
• The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements before a
warrant for either arrest or search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant
be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause
exists for the warrant.
• The sole support for the arrest warrant issued at Sheriff Ogburn's request was his own complaint
• Nothing more than the complainant's conclusion that the individuals named therein perpetrated
the offense described in the complaint. The actual basis for Sheriff Ogburn's conclusion was an
informer's tip, but that fact, as well as every other operative fact, is omitted from the complaint.
• The information possessed by the Laramie patrolman at the time of arrest and search consisted of:
o (1) the data contained in the state bulletin
o (2) the knowledge, obtained by personal observation, that two men were driving a car
matching the car described in the radio bulletin;
o (3) the knowledge, possessed by one of the arresting officers, that one of the people in the
car was Jack Daley
o (4) the knowledge, acquired by personal observation, that the other individual in the car
fitted the description of Whiteley contained in state bulletin 881; and
o (5) the knowledge, acquired by the officer after stopping Whiteley, that he had given a
false name.
• This Court has held that, where the initial impetus for an arrest is an informer's tip, information
gathered by the arresting officers can be used to sustain a finding of probable cause for an arrest
that could not adequately be supported by the tip alone.
• Additional information acquired by the arresting officers must in some sense be corroborative of
the informer's tip that the arrestees committed the felony or, as in Draper itself, were in the
process of committing the felony.
• However, this court finds that the complaint on which the warrant issued here clearly could not
support a finding of probable cause by the issuing magistrate. The arresting officer was not
himself possessed of any factual data tending to corroborate the informer's tip that Daley and
Whiteley committed the crime.
• Therefore, petitioner's arrest violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should have been excluded from his
trial.
2
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
Pursuant to our authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to make such disposition of the case "as may be just
under the circumstances," we reverse the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remand with directions that
the writ is to issue unless the State makes appropriate arrangements to retry petitioner. It is so ordered.
3
TOPIC when a warrant may issue; who may issue a warrant; determination of probable cause;
reinvestigation and other reliefs; no preliminary investigation
CASE NO. AM No. MTJ-05-1581
CASE Sesbreño v. Aglugub
MEMBER Chezka Tomas
DOCTRINE
● Where the judge has discretion to issue a warrant of arrest — If the complaint/information is filed
directly with the MTC, the procedure found in Sec. 3(a) of the Rules will apply. If the judge finds no
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial, he can dismiss the complaint/information. Otherwise, the
judge shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested, and
hold the trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a warrant of
arrest if he doesn’t find it necessary to place the accused under custody. It is thus not obligatory but
merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even
after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for
the determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge's sound judgment.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
FACTS: Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub,
charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.
In the criminal case, the three accused were Enrique Marcellino, Susan Nuez and Edna Tabazon, all employees of
Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna. They were charged of Falsification, Grave Threats and
Usurpation of Authority under the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge. But upon arraignment, only the
Usurpation of Authority pushed through and the other two charges were dismissed. All accused, except Enrique
Marcelino, were arraigned. A warrant of arrest was issued against Marcelino.
Following the arraignment, the complainant filed a Private Complainants Urgent Manifestation alleging violation
of RA 10(4) and prayed that all three be issued with warrants of arrest. The respondent judge issued an order
statement that the violation of RA was indeed alleged in the complaint of Usurpation of Authority but was
not resolved due to oversight. However, finding no probable cause, respondent dismissed the prayer for
warrants and ordered to forward the records of the case back to the Provincial Prosecutor for review.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative complaint.
ISSUE: W/N the judge erred in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial
RULING: NO. If the complaint/information is filed directly with the MTC, the procedure found in Sec. 3(a) of
the Rules will apply. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial, he can dismiss the
complaint/information. Otherwise, the judge shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested, and hold the trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons
instead of a warrant of arrest if he doesn’t find it necessary to place the accused under custody. It is thus not
obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused
1
even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for
the determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge's sound judgment. Hon. Aglugub simply followed the
foregoing procedure. Also, she did not need to issue a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during
trial because that is upon the discretion of the judge. Such is not required by the RPC. More so in this case, the
private prosecutor did not move for issuance of such warrant.
FACTS
● Peter Sesbreño filed a complaint against Hon. Gloria Aglugub, charging her with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service (relative to a criminal
case People v. Marcelino)
○ Sesbreño filed 3 separate complaints against Marcelino, Nuñez, Tabazon, and Carunungan for
Falsification, Grave Threats, and Usurpation of Authority. They were assigned to Hon. Aglugub.
○ Hon. Aglugub, after preliminary examination, issued a Consolidated Resolution dismissing the
cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and set for arraignment the
case for Usurpation of Authority.
■ All the accused were arraigned, except for Marcelino; so Hon. Aglugub issued a warrant
for Marcelino’s arrest.
○ Sesbreño filed a Private Complainants’ Urgent Manifestation alleging that the accused were
also charged with violation of R.A. 10 and prayed the warrants of arrest should be issued
against all of the accused.
○ Hon. Aglugub issued an Order stating that the charge for violation of R.A. 10 was in the
complaint of Sesbreño, it wasn’t resolved due to oversight. But, since the statute only applies to
members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities and since the complaint
failed to allege this element, Hon. Aglugub found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for
violation of R.A. 10.
○ Further, citing Sec. 5(b), Rule 1121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules),
Hon. Aglugub denied complainant's prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for
review.
○ The PPO affirmed respondent's order and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings
on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
● Sesbreño contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 5(b), Rule 1122 of the Rules when she refused
to issue warrants of arrest against the accused. He also faults Hon. Aglugub for allegedly motu proprio
reconsidering her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the
Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
● Hon. Aglugub counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge.
Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found it unnecessary to issue the
warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar
1
Originally “Sec. 6(b) Rule 112” not Sec. 5(b) Rule 112 — I changed it to Sec. 5(b), Rule 112 because that is what makes
more sense looking at the laws. It might have been a typo in the case, but if Sir asks, it originally said Sec. 6(b) Rule 112.
2
Same^
2
cases for review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in accordance with law when she forwarded the
records of the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.
ISSUE/S & HELD

W/N respondent judge erred:
1. in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial — NO
2. in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority — NO
3. in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10 — NO
4. in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman — YES
RATIO
1. in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial — NO
● A preliminary investigation is required before filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 yrs., 2 mos. & 1 day. A preliminary investigation
is not required for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the RPC which is punishable by prision
correccional in its min. and med. periods (6 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. and 2 mos.)
● Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable
○ Sec. 9. Cases not requiring preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure —
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. 'If the complaint or information is filed with the
Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the
procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the
evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may,
however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite
the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said
period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the
judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
● If the complaint/information is filed directly with the MTC, the procedure found in Sec. 3(a)
of the Rules will apply. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial,
he can dismiss the complaint/information. Otherwise, the judge shall issue a warrant of
arrest or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested, and hold the trial.
However, the judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a warrant of
arrest if he doesn’t find it necessary to place the accused under custody. It is thus not
obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions for the determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is
necessary to place the accused in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the
judge's sound judgment.
3
● Hon. Aglugub simply followed the foregoing procedure. Also, she did not need to issue a
warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial because that is upon the
discretion of the judge. Such is not required by the RPC. More so in this case, the private
prosecutor did not move for issuance of such warrant.
2. in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority — NO
in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10 — NO
in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman — YES
● Hon. Aglugub admitted that she overlooked the charge (of violation of RA 10) when she
conducted the preliminary examination of the complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case,
she ordered a preliminary investigation, and later, found no probable cause and ordered the
dismissal of the case. When she dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did
so to correct an oversight.
● Hon. Aglugub contends that the resolution shall be reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She
explained that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of R.A. No. 10. However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No.
6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the
Ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is
not applicable to the issue at hand. Therefore, Hon. Aglugub erred when she forwarded the case
for review to the Provincial Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, Sesbreño failed to show that
respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, Hon.
Aglugub is guilty of judicial error for which she could not be held administratively accountable
absent any proof of fraud/evil motive.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge
Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.
Other Notes:
This might be needed but this isn’t in the case:
Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
a. By the Regional Trial Court. —
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint
or information.
b. By the Municipal Trial Court. —
When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases
falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section.
c. When warrant of arrest not necessary. —
A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the
municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint or information was filed
4
pursuant to section 6 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction.
5
TOPIC Sec. 5, Rule 112 – Warrant of Arrest
CASE NO. GR No. 183345
CASE NAME Hao v. People
MEMBER Apa Mendoza
DOCTRINE
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced
that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person sought to be
arrested. This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the
proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint against Spouses Hao and Ngo for syndicated estafa. Dy alleges that Ngo, the branch
manager of Asiatrust Bank, advised him to make investments in State Resources Dev’t Corp which was incorporated by Spouses
Hao.
Dy made investments amounting to P100 million. In turn, Spouses Hao issued checks representing Dy’s earnings. However,
these checks bounced upon deposit by Dy. Dy sought the assistance of Ngo but he was nowhere to be found and had already quit
his job.
Upon the filing of the complaint for syndicated estafa, warrants of arrest were issued against Spouses Hao and their co-accused.
The Haos filed a motion to defer arraignment and lift the warrants of arrest. They invoke the absence of probable cause against
them and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ.
As to the issue of the validity of the warrant of arrest, the Court ruled that the Judge did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. As stated by the said Judge, the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation of the factual
circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a
criminal offense.
As to the issue of the deferment of the arraignment, the Court ruled that the right of an accused to have his arraignment
suspended is not an unqualified right. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. After the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
FACTS
• Manuel Dy (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against Spouses Hao and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated
estafa penalized under Art. 315(2a) of the RPC as amended.
• Dy alleged that he was a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch, where Ngo was the manager,
and because of their good business relationship, he took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment
that will give a higher rate of return.
• Ngo introduced Dy to Gracia Hao (Gracia) who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies
and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation where Dy invested.
o Dy’s initial investment was P10M. He received the promised interest from his investment. As such,
he invested more totaling to almost P100M. In turn, Gracia Hao issued several checks to Dy
representing Dy’s earnings. These checks were subsequently dishonored.
• Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the dishonored checks. After a few months, Dy discovered
that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Instead, Dy confronted Gracia
and discovered that his money was invested by Gracia in the construction and realty business of her husband,
Danny Hao (Danny).
• Dy filed a complaint for syndicated estafa against petitioners and co-accused. Warrant of arrest were
subsequently issued against the Hao’s and other accused.
1
o Hao filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. They invoked lack of
probable cause and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ.
o RTC denied the petitioner’s twin motion. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with regard to the twin
motion. However, the CA opined that the information shows only probable cause for simple estafa
only. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. WON a valid warrant of arrest was issued. (YES)
2. WON the arraignment should be deferred because of the pendency of the petition for review with the DOJ.
(NO)
RATIO
Warrant of Arrest was Validly Issued
The Hao’s argue warrants of arrest were not validly issued because there was no probable cause.
To be valid, the warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that probable cause be
personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not
the certainty, of guilt of the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a hearing; he only needs to personally review
the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Provisions under Constitution and Criminal Procedure regarding the judge’s duty to personally examine the existence
of probable cause is to refrain mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct own examination of
the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Trial court has three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or information. The Judge may:
1. dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
2. issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or
3. order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause
The Court ruled that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated
by the said Judge, the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him
to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Arraignment should not be deferred.

The Hao’s argue that because they filed a petition for review with the DOJ which has yet to be resolved, then
arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
The Court ruled that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. While the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After the
expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
Since the suspension of the petitioners’ arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the
petitioners’ motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged
for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge.
The warrants of arrest issued stand.
2
TOPIC Section 5, When Warrant of Arrest May Issue/Who May Issue
Warrant/Determination of Probable Cause/Reinvestigation and Other
Reliefs/No PI in:re to Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence
CASE NO. G.R. No. 212593-94
CASE NAME Reyes v. Ombudsman
MEMBER Raymond Conchu
DOCTRINE (I recommend to read all of the ratio since there are numerous doctrines relating to CRIMPRO)
1. Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be led. Nonetheless,
this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave
abuse of discretion action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion
2. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof..
3. Technical rules of evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind
that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's
accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented.
4. Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay.
5. Executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to
support an Information being led. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Reyes, Napoles and siblings and De asis are all currently being charged with plunder as well as graft and
corruption in relation to the PDAF scandal. Wherein numerous NGO projects were being funded with the
approval of Senator Enrile as senate president for his specific allocation of PDAF funds. This NGO projects
however later turned out to be ghost projects. However, the important facts in this case relies on the pieces of
evidence presented in the determination of probable cause of the ombudsman and Sandiganbayan. Where in
the ombudsman relied on the testimonial evidence of the whistleblowers, Sula, Sunas and Tuason and in
consideration with some documentary evidence such as, business ledgers of Enrile for his kickback,
irregularity in commission of audits report for the implementation and independent field verification which lead
to the determination of probable cause against the petitioners.
Petitioners however contend that there was a grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan in finding probable cause against them. NO
Ombudsman
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it.
Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." Technical rules of evidence should not be applied"
in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on
the validity or merits be established with hearsay evidence, of a party's accusation or defense or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. Probable cause can as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay. With all the witness testimonies and documentary evidence there was no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the ombudsman in finding probable cause.
1
Sanidganbayan
Executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being led. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there
is necessity for placing that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of its official duties. This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either
Reyes or the Napoles siblings through clear and convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail.
FACTS
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistle blowers Benhur Luy (Luy),
Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from
the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile)
Among those charged were:

• Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile, for fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's
illegal PDAF disbursements
• Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF
• Napoles siblings, as high ranking officers of the JLN Corporation, for continuously diverting the sums
sourced from Senator Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control
• De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger, for assisting in the fraudulent releases
of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs and eventually remitting the funds to Janet Napoles's
control
Senator Enrile himself or through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, or Ruby Tuason (Tuason) with the former rendering
an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the
PDAF . Upon their agreement on the conditions of the "PDAF acquisition," including the "project" for which the
PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding IA tasked to "implement" the same, and the legislator's "kickback"
ranging from 40-60% of either the "project" cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of
his PDAF, who in turn will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of SARO.
Janet Napoles would direct her staff including the aforementioned whistleblowers to prepare PDAF documents
which contained the preferred JLN NGO for its project implementations. These documents will also be
delivered by her staff De Asis and Ronald John Lim. DBM would release the Cash allocation to the
Implementing agencies concerned where the head of which would expedite the transaction in exchange for
10% project cost.
Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Janet Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the
disbursements, Janet Napoles and her staff, i.e. the Napoles siblings and De Asis, would manufacture fictitious
lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that
would make it appear that the PDAF-related project was implemented. 61 Under this modus operandi Senator
Enrile, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around.
While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the Ombudsman, Tuason surfaced as an
additional witness and offered her affidavit implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam.
Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution finding probable cause against, Reyes, Janet
Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the
Napoles siblings for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
2
Reyes filed for a motion requesting for copies of the sworn statement of Tuason however the same was denied
by the Ombudsman stating that the affidavit does not form part of the records of the preliminary investigation
and neither was it mentioned in the joint resolution
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all
the accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the
supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255, finding the existence of
probable cause against them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions
ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them. NO
2. W/N Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions
RATIO
1. W/N the Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions
Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be led. Nonetheless, this
Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is

reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it.
Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction."
probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof.. Probable cause does not require an inquiry .. whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
Only facts sufficient to support a only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are
required, not absolute certainty.
Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements of the crime of
plunder need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent.
This is because probable cause — the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation — implies mere
probability of guilt thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction would suffice.
3
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence,
and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. , "the validity and merits of a party's
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
Technical rules of evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that
"the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation
or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented.
Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay.
Application of Evidence to determine probably cause.

First, records reveal that there is substantial basis to believe that Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile,
dealt with the parties involved; signed documents necessary for the immediate and timely implementation of
the Senator's PDAF-funded projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost projects";
As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, such participation on the part of Reyes was outlined by
whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas. Which was Corroborated in all respected by Tuason’s verified statement.
These pieces of evidence are already sufcient to engender a wellfounded belief that the crimes charged were
committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof.
Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Suñas, and Tuason and support in
the following documentary evidence:
1.) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through
Tuason and Reyes, as his "commission" from the so-called PDAF scam;
2.) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken
on PDAF disbursements — that there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-
funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and
3.) the reports on the independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the filed
investigation office of the Ombudsman which secured sworn statements of local government officials and
purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent.
Tuason admitted to having acted merely as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the Ofce of Senator Enrile. It
is in this capacity that she made "direct arrangements" with Janet Napoles concerning the PDAF
"commissions," and "directly received" money from Janet Napoles for distribution to the participants of the
scam. In the same manner, Luy and Suñas, being mere employees of Janet Napoles, only acted upon the
latter's orders.
2. W/N Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions
Petitioners allege that the Sandiganbayan concluded without any additional evidence presented by the OSP
and were hastily issued and decided. They also alleged that the evidence relied upon were all bare allegations
of witnesses that did not relate to the crime charged.
The Supreme Court responded by saying that Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines
probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of
probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of
the accused. Two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive determination
of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
4
issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being led. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
Verily, when a criminal Information is led before the trial court, the judge is entitled to make his own
assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal
case.
This is in line with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is led in court, any disposition
of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption of regularity in the performance of its official duties.
This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles siblings through clear and
convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Resolutions and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED
LEONEN CONCURRING
Nothing substantial added but there are some doctrines to be noted:
Bill of Rights Sec. 2

The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence other than the prosecutor’s
bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own finding on the existence of probably cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the law.
Both the prosecutor and the trial court may rely on the same records and evidence, their findings are arrived at
independently
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is also not a venue for an exhaustive display of petitioners'
evidence. It is merely preparatory to a criminal action. (Drilon v. CA)
This court pointed out that any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation does not render the
information void or affect the trial court's jurisdiction (People v. Narca)
A trial court's finding of probable cause does not rely on the prosecutor's finding of probable cause
We dismissed a Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable
cause against the accused. Once probable cause has been judicially determined, any question on the
executive determination of probable cause is already moot (De Lima v. Reyes)
Other notes
Rules of Admissibility 5. Testimonial Knowledge
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30a)
5
Plunder,
Section 2 153 of RA 7080 following elements:
( a ) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
( b ) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) 154 thereof; and
( c ) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Section 3 (e) 156 of RA 3019 Elements:
( a ) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a
private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
( b ) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
( c ) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
6
TOPIC Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112), Section 5: On Perceived Irregularity
CASE NAME People v Lugnasin
MEMBER Pierre Macalino
DOCTRINE
1. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or
to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground BEFORE
ARRAIGNMENT.
2. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made BEFORE he enters his PLEA; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived.
3. Even if the out-of-court identification was improper, it will have no bearing in the conviction of
the accused. It is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court
identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw
that may have attended it
RECIT-READY DIGEST
Vicente and Devincio, among other accused who remain at large, were accused of kidnapping for ransom
for kidnapping Nicassius Cordero. Cordero was abducted while he was opening the garage door of his
residence. Cordero was able to identify Devincio because he had a revolver with him and the latter pushed
him. He was taken to a car, and later to a jeepney where he met the ‘Commander’ which he later finds out
to be Vicente. He was kept in a small house for four days but was eventually released without ransom
money paid. In the RTC, the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. On appeal, the
accused raised the illegality of the arrest. The CA ruled that the accused is deemed to have waived his right
to question the arrest due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling of the CA. First, it ruled that the lone testimony of Corderio is believable by adopting
the findings of the lower court, which should not be disturbed. Second, it ruled that the out-of-court
identification is a valid way of identifying accused. And even if it wasn’t, the subsequent in-court-
identification by Cordero of the accused cured any defect to that effect. Lastly, the SC upheld the ruling of
the CA that the accused is deemed to have waived their right to challenge the legality of the arrest. A motion
to quash the information based on the ground of illegality of the arrest must be raised before arraignment.
If it is not, then it will be deemed waived.
FACTS
• Vicente and Devincio were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom by the RTC. They were with other accused, but they remain at large.
• Antecedent facts of the crime:
o Nicassius Cordero was abducted while opening the garage door of his residence in
Mindanao Avenue by three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with
the 38 cal. Revolver who came from his left side and pushed him in the car.
o He was later transferred to a jeepney where he met the ‘Commander’, Vicente Lugnasin.
o He was made to walk barefooted towards a small house where he was kept for four days
while the accused negotiated with his sister-in-law for ransom money. He was eventually
released without ransom money paid.
• Vicente’s side:
o Denied the accusation, saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of
Justice and that the latter could not even identify him.
o Claimed that while preparing for a fiesta, policemen came to his residence and arrested him
and his brother and cousin for an alleged involvement in a robbery case. After posting bail,
1
he was arrested for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with a bank robber
and a Mercury Bank robbery.
(this is important because Vicente will later claim that Cordero was only able to identify them
because they were the accused in the robbery cases)
• Devincio’s side:
o Denies the accusation, saying he only saw Codero for the first time in the courtroom.
o Claimed that near Holy Week, five uniformed policemen arrested him without a warrant
in Lucena City where he used to buy smoked fish.
• RTC Ruling: found both accused to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It resolved the LONE
ISSUE of whether or not Cordero’s identification of Vicente Lugnasi and Devincio Guerrero as
among his kidnappers is reliable.
• CA Ruling: upheld the ruling of the RTC.
o In the CA, accused raised the argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it did
not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure (? I think this should be Rule
112, pero it says 109 in the case)
o Held: Accused right to question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation
is deemed waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.
ISSUE/S and HELD

1. W/N the lone testimony of Cordero is reliable? – YES
2. W/N the out-of-court identification was suggestive? – NO
3. W/N the warrantless was illegal and violated his rights under RA 7438? – NO
RATIO
1. When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court.
Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be
disturbed.
2. The out-of-court identification made by Cordero satisfied the Totality of Circumstances Test. Out-
of-court identification is done in show-ups (suspect is brought face to face with witness for
identification), mug shots, police-lineups.
• Totality of Circumstances Test
1. The witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. The witness' degree of attention at that time;
3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
• Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to the light
emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men approached him,
the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the men acted where they passed, where he was taken,
and even the sounds he heard.
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons
to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which
the crime is committed, xxx. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create a lasting
impression on the victim's mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his memory.
• Contention: The Out-of-Court identification was marked with suggestiveness because Cordero had
knowledge that they were being investigated for a robbery case when he was showed their
mugshots.
2
o Held: To avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the
photograph that would focus attention on a single person. The photographs shown to
Cordero contained nothing to suggest whom he should pick and identify as his abductors.
o EVEN IF the out-of-court identification was improper, it will have no bearing in the
conviction of the accused. It is settled that an out-of-court identification does not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that,
even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it.
o Cordero's in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both accused-
appellants in court when he was asked to identify them from among the people inside the
courtroom
3. Accused failed to raise their objections on time. Accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente failed
to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited
their defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are
deemed to have waived their right to question their arrests.
• In Miclat v People, it was ruled that:
o At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
o An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground BEFORE
ARRAIGNMENT.
o Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made BEFORE he enters his PLEA;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
• With respect to appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while
he was under custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence
to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not
executed an extrajudicial confession or admission
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and
Devincio Guerrero are ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following
3
TOPIC Preliminary Investigation v. Preliminary Examination
CASE NO. G.R. No. 197293. April 21, 2014
CASE NAME ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO
CARS, INC., respondents
MEMBER Bianca Ledesma
DOCTRINE
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor,
the trial court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
The court differentiates two kinds of determination of probable cause

1. executive determination of probable cause 2. judicial determination of probable cause
- concerns itself with whether there is - determines whether a warrant of arrest
enough evidence to support an should be issued
Information being filed.
- made during preliminary investigation - made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused
- It is a function that properly pertains to the - The judge must satisfy himself that based on
public prosecutor who is given a broad the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
discretion to determine whether probable placing the accused under custody in order
cause exists and to charge those whom he not to frustrate the ends of justice
believes to have committed the crime as -
defined by law and thus should be held for
trial
Whether or not that function has been correctly - If the judge finds no probable cause, the
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the warrant.
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
Preliminary Investigation v. Preliminary Inquiry

preliminary investigation preliminary inquiry
- determines whether or not there is reasonable - determines probable cause for the issuance
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of a warrant of arrest
of the offense charged and, therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense,rigors, and embarrassment of trial
-
- Function of the prosecutor - function of the judge
1
FACTS
Juno Cars conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released
by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.
The audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments of
P886,000.00. While there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Alfredo also failed
to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI.
Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing
of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause before
the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for
resolution.
Trial Court issued an order dismissing the complaint: “After conducting an independent assessment of the
evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence
adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x xx”
Juno Cars filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and argued: “the determination of probable
cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.”
Appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction “in supplanting the public
prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable
cause.”
Alfredo argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the
evidence on record. He argued that “judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive
determination of probable cause” and that “[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is
exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x.”
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment that the appellate
court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was
no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of prosecutor, the trial court should respect his determination
of probable cause.
Alfredo reiterated that “judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a
broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable cause.” He argued
that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s, which merely
reviewed the findings of the trial court.
ISSUE/S and HELD: whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis
of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause? YES.
2
RATIO
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph,
no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary
investigation must first be conducted “to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty 654thereof, and should be held for
trial,” in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of
probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.
• If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she
shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence” to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this
stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is
only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause;
rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an “oppressive” exercise of government prosecutorial
powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also
acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of
nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain
from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
- if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of probable
cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or
suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved
Ø In this case, when the prosecutor found that it was sufficient to warrant the indictment of petitioner,
there was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him
by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by the prosecutor was valid, the judge still had the discretion to make her own finding
of the existence of probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold
the accused for arraignment and trial.
Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. Therefore, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to
establish probable cause.”
It is also settled that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to
its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.”
Ø In this case, the judge made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that
“the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft
and estafa.
o the complainant failed to prove by competent evidence
3
o the complaint [did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their
valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused, which the
judge found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed
the case against Alfredo.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against
Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
Note:
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory

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TOPIC Rule 112; Sections 3 and 4, Procedure;

CASE NO. G.R. No. 164673; January 15, 2010

ISSUE/S and HELD

CASE NO. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909. April 6, 2005.

ISSUE/S and HELD

ISSUE/S and HELD

1. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the

ISSUE/S and HELD

ISSUE/S and HELD

ISSUE/S and HELD

Why the Judge Evaluate the Report/Certification of the Fiscal

No Documentary bases for finding probable cause (invalid warrants of arrests)

Determination of probable cause not lodged within the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S and HELD

CASE NO. AM No. MTJ-05-1581

CASE Sesbreño v. Aglugub

MEMBER Chezka Tomas

ISSUE/S & HELD

ISSUE/S and HELD

Arraignment should not be deferred.

Among those charged were:

ISSUE/S and HELD

Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is

Application of Evidence to determine probably cause.

Bill of Rights Sec. 2

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

ISSUE/S and HELD

MEMBER Bianca Ledesma

The court differentiates two kinds of determination of probable cause

Preliminary Investigation v. Preliminary Inquiry

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