PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. TIRSO D. C.

VELASCO and HONORATO GALVEZ

Facts

Three (3) criminal Information - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were
originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez,
Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of
the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed
against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez
was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside
his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.

After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new
docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively),
and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the
proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to respondent Judge Tirso
D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.

On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial
court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same
charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying
of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government
before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused
Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez,
the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be
rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of
the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that
this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a
verdict of guilt.

Issue

Whether or not a review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional
interdict against double jeopardy is permissible

Ruling
The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the
Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the prosecution representing the
sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.The Court in People v. Bocar
rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to
a second jeopardy."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact
extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency,
will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence
determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s
awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention
of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,"(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause
is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal
process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the
court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower
court decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions
setting forth the scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the
right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that courts
view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other
adequate remedy available,  and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that
the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal. Thus, if
a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of
the accused on the merits by the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it
by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an order as one sustaining a
demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a
verdict of guilty.

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause
such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the
extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of
discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the
accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of
the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent
judge considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies
relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and
nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While
the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon.
This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of
jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable
by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction.

The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.