People v. Hayag

G.R. No.
L-38635 November 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANIEL HAYAG, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Daniel Hayag appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Tagum
Branch VIII, convicting him of rape, sentencing him to "imprisonment for the rest of his natural life" and
ordering him to pay to Esperanza Ranga ten thousand pesos as moral damages
The prosecution labored under the handicap that it could prove the alleged rape only through the sign
language of the victim, Esperanza. The victim's sister, Virginia, who has communicated with her since childhood
by means of sign language, was the sole available witness who could make known to her the questions on
direct and cross-examination and could articulate her alleged answers for the record.
Because there was no means of checking the correctness and veracity of Virginia's interpretation and because
she herself believed that Esperanza was raped by Hayag, it is not surprising that the defense counsel
vehemently objected to Virginia's role as interpreter. The defense regarded her as biased and as lacking the
cold neutrality of a third person acting as interpreter.
As Esperanza did not study in the school for deaf-mutes and as there was no instructor in that school available
as an interpreter the trial court had no choice but to use Virginia as the medium for communicating with
Esperanza.
ISSUE: whether Virginia Ranga, a public school teacher, a college graduate and the victim's sister, correctly and
credibly interpreted and verbalized the sign language of Esperanza as meaning that Hayag raped Esperanza.
RULING:
No.
Rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute. - At the outset, it is relevant to state the jurisprudential rules
for verbalizing the perceptions of a deaf-mute.
'Although in ancient times the rule was otherwise, deaf-mutes are now generally accepted as competent
witnesses. In any given case a showing must be made that the witness has a system of communication, and if
he has and he is otherwise competent, his testimony will be received" (81 Am. Jur. 2nd 116).
The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb persons are not incompetent as witnesses merely because
they are deaf and dumb if they are able to communicate the facts by a method which their infirmity leaves
available to them, and are of sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters as to which they will testify and
to appreciate the obligation of an oath; but where the person is not so educated as it is possible to make him
understand the questions which are put to him he is not competent (97 C.J.S. 454).
The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of a deaf-mute should be that which is best suited to
attain the desired end, the particular method of examination resting largely in the discretion of the trial court.
Thus, a deaf and dumb witness may be examined by means of written questions to which he gives written
answers, or he may be examined through the medium of an interpreter who communicates with the witness by
means of signs. The qualifications of a particular person to act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute rests largely in
the discretion of the trial court (98 C.J.S. 25).
It has been said that a court has the inherent power to elicit testimony from a competent deaf-mute by
whatsoever means necessary to the end to be obtained, and that the manner in which the examination of a
deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion.
However, it has also been said that the best method should be adopted. And there is authority to the effect
that the method adopted will not be reviewed by an appellate court in the absence of a showing that the
complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted.
In fact it has been said that, in the absence of a showing as to what constituted the best method of taking a
deaf-mute's testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court adopted the best method.
As is stated in the authorities approved in Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480, the general rule is
that deaf-mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by signs, or through an interpreter, or in
writing.
And the general rule is that the evidence of a deaf-mute who can be communicated with by signs may be taken
through an interpreter who understands such signs and can interpret them to the court.
And it has been held that it is permissible to take the testimony of a deaf-mute through an interpreter by signs
notwithstanding the evidence could have been written. At least where there is no showing that the
interpretation by signs is not the better method.
And especially where it appears that the witness is capable of relating the facts "correctly" by signs, but, while
able to read and write, can only communicate Ideas imperfectly' by writing. And it is not necessary that the
witness be able to read and write. However, it has been said that it would seem to be better in the case of a
deaf and dumb witness who can read and write to conduct his examination in writing.
With respect to the conducting of the examination of a deaf-mute itself, it has been held that the allowing of
leading questions is in the discretion of the court. This discretion was said to arise out of the fact that 'there is
always more or less difficulty in eliciting testimony' where the witness is a deaf-mute (Annotation, 9 ALR 482-
484).
Our conclusion is that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
culpability of Hayag cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her
sister and mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free from suspicion.
From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her sister, it is at once evident that Esperanza did not offer much
resistance to the alleged sexual assault made by Hayag. She did not suffer any physical injuries. Her dress was
not torn. She did not attempt to free herself from the clutches of Hayag.
This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped by a strong and robust adult. This is a case of a thirty-two-year-
old farm girl who was allegedly forced to have carnal intercourse by a fifty-year-old man. Her story does not
contain details as to how she repelled Hayag's attempts to ravish her. And that story was not recounted by her
directly in her own words but was made known by means of sign language which was interpreted by her sister.
The trustworthiness of that interpretation is doubtful.

People v. Hayag

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

People v. Hayag

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

People v. Hayag

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

L-38635 November 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANIEL HAYAG, Accused-Appellant.

You might also like