261. People vs.

City Court of Silay

[G.R. No. L-43790. December 9, 1976.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY,

ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y
DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y MAGALONA, Respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General

Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for Petitioner.

Hilado, Hagad & Hilado as private prosecutors.

Benjamin Z. Yelo, Sr. for private respondent Romeo Millan.

Ciceron Severino and Emeterio Molato for other private respondents.

DECISION

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Facts: 
That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo
Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars
No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the
sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be
heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the
respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that
the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged
earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not
tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the
consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the
other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution
which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from
prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to
double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: 
Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the
case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the
prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar
the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of
double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such
complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and
that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without
express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed
a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which
was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the
accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against
the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore
dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two
instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the
dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when
the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case
at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the
approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the
accused which the law despises. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the
complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused.
The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double
jeopardy cannot be invoked.

262. Esmeña vs. Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981]

G.R. No. L-54110 February 20, 1981

GENEROSO ESMEÑA and ALBERTO ALBA, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY, City Court of Cebu City, Branch III, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and RICARDO B. TABANAO, as Special Counsel, Office of the City
Fiscal, Cebu City, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Facts: 
Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them
because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. No
trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date. Sometime later
Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received
a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial.
Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the
priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the
complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal
filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that
the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, They pointed out that they did not consent to the
provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed
them in jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. accused Esme ña and Alba filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s
failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: 
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present,
that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent
jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion,
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present
then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the
case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of
the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the
dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will
be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

263. People vs. Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-44205. February 16, 1993.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Branch

XXI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and CONSOLACION NAVAL, Respondents.

The Solicitor General for Petitioner.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap & Associates for Private Respondent.

MELO, J.
Facts:
When Consolacion Naval, the respondent, was separately accused of having committed the
crime of estafa and of falsification, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the
information for falsification, premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in
danger of being condemned for an identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty
to the charge levelled against her for falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo
denied her motion to quash but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch
21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a
necessary means of committing, along with the denial of the motion for re-evaluation therefrom.
which the People impugns via the special civil action for certiorari before the supreme court

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent was in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal
act

Held:
No. the courl ruled that “The mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in
by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused." This would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the two
informations charging identical offenses, but when the situation where the accused has already
entered a plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the same
offense, the majority ripostes that "in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the
accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the
previous case without his express consent thereafter." In fine, what the majority posits is that
the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was a previous conviction, acquittal,
or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the accused and he is now charged again
with the same offense.

264. People vs. Tampal [G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995]

G.R. No. 102485 May 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LUIS TAMPAL, DOMINGO PADUMON, ARSENIO PADUMON, SAMUEL PADUMON, and
HON. WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
XI, Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondents.

PABLITO SUCO, DARIO SUCO, and GAVINO CADLING, (At Large).

PUNO, J.:

Facts: 
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and
Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only
private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were
arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero
moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without
any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but
the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of
the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.

Held: 
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What
are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust
delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case.

The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights
of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled
and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

265. Melo vs. People [G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950]

[G.R. No. L-3580. March 22, 1950.]

CONRADO MELO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, Respondents-Appellees.

Jose A. Fojas for Petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo
for Respondents.

MORAN, C.J. :

Facts:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted
upon victim with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the
body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from
performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o’clock in the
morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same
day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on
January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging
the accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information
alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the information charged against the accused constitute Double Jeopardy.

Held:
No, It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that “if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed
to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when
the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other. This so called “same-evidence test” which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two
offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be
said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the
information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. In
other words, on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. “As the Government cannot be with the
highest, and then go down step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included
therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result.”

266. People vs. Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977]

[G.R. No. L-41863. April 22, 1977.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV’L. FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR.,

Petitioners, v. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., Respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino, for Petitioners.

Fama & Jimenea for Private Respondent.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.

FACTS:
On April 12, 1975, Margarito Fama, Jr.., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use
personal violence uponMiguel Viajar by throwing a piece of stone upon his right cheek, inflicting
physical injuries which would require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring
complication as per medical certificate of the physician. A criminal complaint for slight physical injuries
was filed against Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975, docketed as Case No. 3335. Meanwhile, Viajar filed another
complaint on July 28, 1975, docketed as Case No. 5241, for the same instance of throwing a stone but this
time for serious physical injuries because it left permanent scar and deformation on his right face. The
first case proceeded and Fama Jr. pleaded not guilty during arraignment. After several postponements by
the prosecution, Fama Jr.successfully sought dismissal of the first criminal case invoking the
constitutional right to speedy trial. Fama Jr. now moves for the dismissal of the second case on the ground
of double jeopardy.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a
supervening element which should take this case out of the rule of identity resulting in double jeopardy.

HELD: 
YES. This rule of identity does not apply… when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the
same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. [Here], when the complaint was filed on April 15,
1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and
there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party.
Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of
Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. In other words, in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold.