CHAPTER 11 HazOp Study

HazOp Study
A hazard and operability study is a procedure for the systematic, critical, examination of the
operability of a process. When applied to a process design over an operating plant, it indicates
potential hazards that may arise from deviation from the intended design conditions

The technique was developed by petrochemical division of material chemical industry, see
Lawley(1974) and is now in general use in the chemical and process industry. The term
operability study more properly is used for this type of study, though it is usually referred to as
hazard and operability study or Hazop study. The formal operability study is the systematic study
of the design, vessel and line by line, using guide words to help generate throughout about the
way deviations from the intended operating conditions can cause hazardous situations.

11.1 General Description

11.1.1 Background:
A HazOp study identifies hazards and operability problems. The concept
involves investigating how the plant might deviate from the design intent. If, in the process of
identifying problems during a HazOp study, a solution becomes apparent, it is recorded as part of
the HazOp result; however, care must be taken to avoid trying to find solutions which are not so
apparent, because the prime objective for the HazOp is problem identification. Although the
HazOp study was developed to supplement experience-based practices when a new design or
technology is involved, its use has expanded to almost all phases of a plant's life. HazOp is based
on the principle that several experts with different backgrounds can interact and identify more
problems when working together than when working separately and combining their results.

The "Guide-Word" HazOp is the most well-known of the HazOps; however, several
specializations of this basic method have been developed. These specializations will be discussed
as modifications of the Guide-Word approach, but they are not to be regarded as less useful than
the Guide-Word approach. Indeed, in many situations these variations may be more effective
than the Guide-Word approach.

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11.1.2 Concept:
The HazOp concept is to review the plant in a series of meetings, during
which a multidisciplinary team methodically "brainstorms" the plant design, following the
structure provided by the guide words and the team leader's experience.

The primary advantage of this brainstorming is that it stimulates creativity and generates ideas.
This creativity results from the interaction of the team and their diverse backgrounds.
Consequently the process requires that all team members participate (quantity breeds quality in
this case), and team members must refrain from criticizing each other to the point that members
hesitate to suggest Ideas.

The team focuses on specific points of the design (called "study nodes"), one at a time. At each
of these study nodes, deviations In the process parameters are examined using the guide words.
The guide words are used to ensure that the design is explored In every conceivable way. Thus
the team must identify a fairly large number of deviations, each of which must then be
considered so that their potential causes and consequences can be identified.

The best time to conduct a HazOp is when the design is fairly firm. At this point, the design is
well enough defined to allow meaningful answers to the questions raised in the HazOp process.
Also, at this point it is still possible to change the design without a major cost. However, HazOps
can be done at any stage after the design is nearly firm. For example, many older plants are
upgrading their control and Instrumentation systems. There is a natural relationship between the
HazOp deviation approach and the usual control system design philosophy of driving deviations
to zero; thus It Is very effective to examine a plant as soon as the control system redesign is firm.

The success or failure of the HazOp depends on several factors:

 The completeness and accuracy of drawings and other data used as a basis for the
study
 The technical skills and insights of the team
 The ability of the team to use the approach as an aid to their Imagination in
visualizing deviations, causes, and consequences

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 The ability of the team to concentrate on the more serious hazards which are
identified.
The process is systematic and It Is helpful to define the terms that are used:

A. STUDY NODES - The locations (on piping and Instrumentation drawings and
procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated for deviations.

B. INTENTION - The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of
deviations at the study nodes. This can take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or
diagrammatic; e.g., flow sheets, line diagrams, P&IDs.

C. DEVIATIONS - These are departures from the intention which are discovered by
systematically applying the guide words (e.g., "more pressure").

D. CAUSES - These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been
shown to have a credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be
hardware failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state (e.g., change of composition),
external disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.

E. CONSEQUENCES - These are the results of the deviations should they occur (e.g.,
release of toxic materials). Trivial consequences, relative to the study objective, are dropped.

F. GUIDE WORDS - These are simple words which are used to qualify or quantify the
intention in order to guide and stimulate the brainstorming process and so discover deviations.
The guide words shown in Table 4-3 are the ones most often used in a HazOp; some
organizations have made this list specific to their operations, to guide the team more quickly to
the areas where they have previously found problems. Each guide word is applied to the process
variables at the point in the plant (study node) which is being examined. For example:

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Guide Words Parameter Deviation

NO FLOW NO FLOW

MORE PRESSURE HIGH PRESSURE

AS WELL AS ONE PHASE TWO PHASE

OTHER THAN OPERATION MAINTENANCE

These guide words are applicable to both the more general parameters (e.g., react, transfer) and
the more specific parameters (e.g., pressure, temperature).

TABLE: HAZOP GUIDE WORDS AND MEANINGS

Guide Words Meaning

No Negation of the Design Intent

Less Quantitative Decrease

More Quantitative Increase

Part Of Qualitative Decrease

As Well As Qualitative Increase

Reverse Logical Opposite of the Intent

Other Than Complete Substitution

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With the general parameters, meaningful deviations are usually generated for each guide word.
Moreover, it is not unusual to have more than one deviation from the application of one guide
word. For example, "more reaction" could mean either than a reaction takes place at a faster rate,
or that a greater quantity of product results. With the specific parameters, some modification of
the guide words may be necessary. In addition, it is not unusual to find that some potential
deviations are eliminated by physical limitation. For example, if the design intention of a
pressure or temperature is being considered, the guide words "more" or "less" may be the only
possibilities.

There are other useful modifications to guide words such as:

 SOONER or LATER for OTHER THAN when considering time

 WHERE ELSE for OTHER THAN when considering position, sources, or destination
 HIGHER and LOWER for MORE and LESS when considering elevations, temperatures, or
pressures.

Finally, when dealing with a design Intention involving a complex set of interrelated plant
parameters (e.g., temperatures, reaction rates, composition, or pressure), it may be better to apply
the whole sequence of guide words to each parameter individually than to apply each guide word
across all of the parameters as a group. Also, when applying the guide words to a sentence it may
be more useful to apply the sequence of guide words to each word or phrase separately, starting
with the key part which describes the activity (usually the verbs or adverbs). These parts of the
sentence usually are related to some impact on the process parameters. For example, in the
sentence "The operator starts flow A when pressure B is reached", the guide words would be
applied to:

Flow A (no, more, less, etc.)

When pressure B is reached (sooner, later, etc.)

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11.2 HAZOP Analysis of HSD Plant

Keeping in view our limitations regarding the HAZOP analysis, what we are describing
in the subsequent text is a very brief overview of potential hazards and operability problems of
our process, their consequences along with additional implications of these consequences. Then
in the end the HAZOP studies for three equipment’s is tabulated in table 11.1.

Now, starting from the feed pump which is required to maintain a constant pressure head
of 1110 psia at a constant discharge flow rate, any abnormality in normal operating conditions of
flow, pressure or temperature can cause damage to the impeller of the pump, which would then
result in disturbed head and discharge flow rate. This will directly affect the reactor operation
where there is a process requirement of maintaining the specified pressure in order to ensure
required degree of hydrodesulphurization. Also the low discharge rates would result in drop of
liquid levels in the downstream vessels. If the discharge valve of pump falls close, the pressure
will increase in the pump discharge line and this would result in damaging the impeller and other
pump internals initially but prevailing this situation for some time would result in explosion and
complete pump failure. If the valve at the inlet of the pump fails close then this will result in the
cavitation of pump. These consequences along with other consequences are given in table 11.1 at
the end of this article.

Compressor is required to maintain the pressure of treat gas inside the reactor. The
positioning of discharge valve is very critical in case of compressor. If the instrument air of
discharge valve fails and the valve shuts down, this would result in hammering inside the
compressor and since the pressure developed is very high, it would result in compressor failure
which might result in an explosion as well. Also, if the flow rate of coolant in inter-stage cooler
cuts off, the heat generated in single stage of compressor will not be removed, as a consequence
of this the volume of gas entering the next stage will increase and hence, the compression will
decrease. So, not only the discharge pressure will decrease but also the seals and impellers will
be worn out due to excessive heating. This disturbed pressure will also disturb overall plant
operation, due to which the final product composition will also change. If the inlet valve of the
compressor is closed by any means or the flow rate of make-up gas decreases this will result in
low hydrogen partial pressure inside the reactor, ultimately this can result in destruction of
catalyst beds inside the reactor.

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The direct fired heater or furnace is the major source of energy in our process. Any
abnormal operation of this unit may have some serious implications to our process. If the flow
rate of fuel increases due to sudden opening of valve, the flame temperature may drastically
increase which could cause an excessive heating and would result in higher process stream
temperature. Higher feed temperature would not only damage our catalyst in the reactor, which is
quite valuable to us, but also disturb product specifications. If the fuel line ruptures, this will
cause leakage of gas which would pose a serious threat of external fire and less heating of
process fluid would disturb reactor conditions. Also, the excessive heating of furnace tubes may
result in excessively high tube skin temperatures and rising of temperature above a particular
value would result in rupturing of tubes. This is a very serious threat because our process fluid is
highly combustible and any possible internal leakages could result in huge explosion.

Reactor is heart of any process. Since, reactor in our process is a trickle bed reactor; a
uniform flow distribution is required to ensure specified hydrotreating. If the discharge line of
reactor ruptures, this would adversely affect the operation of subsequent separators because
required level of liquid cannot then be maintained. This would result in poor separation in
separators. Any negative change in the flow rate of quench gas will result in temperature increase
in inter-bed spaces, which will result in sintering of catalyst beds.

In hot high pressure separator, a certain level of liquid is required to ensure equilibrium
establishment and separation of gas from liquid. If the discharge line ruptures, the level of liquid
will fall rapidly and not only the separation will disturb because of difficulty in the establishment
of equilibrium but also the next separator will run dry. If the outlet valve in the liquid discharge
line closes, the level of liquid starts to rise inside the vessel and after some time whole volume
will be occupied by liquid leaving no space for vapors and hence ceases the flow throughout the
process. Similarly, if the vapor discharge valve shuts off, the pressure inside the vessel will
increase and would result in vessel rupturing. If the gas discharge valve fails open, this will result
in the drop of pressure inside the vessel will result in disturbance of equilibrium inside the
vessel.

Further separation of vapors from liquid is achieved in cold high pressure separator. Over
head vapors coming from HHPS are condensed and water is added into this stream before it
enters into CHPS. If water supply cuts off, the temperature of vapor liquid stream entering the
separator will increase which will disturb the conditions in CHPS. This would in turn affect the

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degree separation. Water is actually added to dissolve NH3 and some H2S present in the inlet
stream in the form of ammonium sulphide precipitates which could cause severe corrosion
problems. So, the decreased flowrate of water will increase the corrosion rate in the separator.
Here, if the discharge line ruptures or valve malfunctions, the required level of liquid which
should be maintained at certain level to ensure required separation will drop down posing serious
threats to normal operation.

If flow rate of DEA in absorber is disturbed, this will decrease the H2S removal and its
high concentration in the recycle gas will accelerate the rate of corrosion and will adversely
affect the catalyst inside reactor. Also the low DEA flow rate may cause the flooding condition
to prevail in the column. If the pressure of DEA decreases due to any failure of amine pump, the
H2S removal will be largely affected because absorption is favored at high pressure. If the
flowrate if DEA increases, this can result in weeping of column.

As already mentioned in the beginning of this article, this is just the bird’s eye view of
HAZOP. Since the complete analysis requires the complete Instrumentation and Control
diagrams, Cause & Effect Charts setting out how control and trip systems operate, Details of
vendor packages if available and Plant layout diagrams. So, all the information given above may
render errors. In the following table HAZOP analysis of feed pump P-110, make-up gas
compressor K-110 and separation vessel V-110 is given.

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Equipment Deviations What Event Consequences of Additional

Reference and from Could this Deviation on Implications of
Operating Operating Cause this Item of this
Conditions Conditions Deviation Equipment Consequence
Under
Consideration

Feed Pump P- Flow

110

Less Inlet valve Pump cavitates Damage to pump

closed

Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

Line plugs Pump cavitates Damage to pump

FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closing FV-1

Drain valve Diesel released

open

More FV-1 fails Upset in Diesel released

open downstream
process

FICA-1 fails Upset in Diesel released

opening FV- downstream
1 process

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Pressure

More Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closing FV-1

Inlet and Deadhead pump Overpressure in

outlet valve pump or line
closed

Less Inlet valve Pump cavitates Damage to pump

closed

Drain valve Diesel released

open

Temperature

More Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed

FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closing FV-1

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Make up gas Flow

compressor K-
110

Less Inlet valve Compressor Damage to

closed surges compressor

Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

Line plugs Compressor Damage to

surges compressor

FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closing FV-2 compressor compressor

Safety valve Make-up gas

open released

More FV-2 fails Upset in Diesel released

open downstream
process

FICA-2 fails Upset in Diesel released

opening FV- downstream
2 process

Pressure

More Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

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FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closing FV-2 compressor compressor

Inlet and Deadhead Overpressure in

outlet valve compressor pump or line
closed

Less Inlet valve Compressor Damage to

closed surges compressor

Safety valve Make-up gas

open released

Temperature

More Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closed compressor compressor

FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closing FV-2 compressor compressor

Separation Level
Vessel V-110

Less Liquid Disturbance in outlet vapor and

discharge equilibrium liquid
valve fails establishment compositions
open disturb
discharge
line
ruptures.

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discharge Disturbance in outlet vapor and

line equilibrium liquid
ruptures. establishment compositions
disturb

Inlet valve Disturbance in outlet vapor and

closes equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb

More Outlet valve Disturbance in outlet vapor and

closes equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb

Inlet flow Disturbance in outlet vapor and

increases equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb

Pressure

Less Vapor outlet Equilibrium is outlet vapor and

valve fail disturbed liquid
open. compositions
disturb

More Vapor outlet Equilibrium is outlet vapor and

valve fails disturbed liquid
close compositions
disturb

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Temperature

Less Temperature Possible vacuum. Thermal stress

of inlet is on tank.
colder than
normal.

More Temperature Excessive vapor Thermal stress

of inlet is stream on tank.
hotter than
normal

External fire Tank fails Reagent released

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