ST Trends 2020-2040

Science & Technology Trends
2020-2040
Exploring the S&T Edge
NATO Science & Technology Organization

DISCLAIMER
The research and analysis underlying this report and its conclusions were conducted by the NATO S&T
Organization (STO) drawing upon the support of the Alliance’s defence S&T community, NATO Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA).
This report does not represent the official opinion or position of NATO or individual governments, but
provides considered advice to NATO and Nations’ leadership on significant S&T issues.
D.F. Reding
J. Eaton
NATO Science & Technology Organization

Office of the Chief Scientist
NATO Headquarters
B-1110 Brussels
Belgium
http:\www.sto.nato.int
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Copyright © NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020

First published, March 2020
Foreword
As the world Science & Tech-

changes, so does nology Trends:
our Alliance. 2020-2040 pro-
NATO adapts. vides an assess-
We continue to ment of the im-
work together as pact of S&T ad-
a community of vances over the
like-minded na- next 20 years
tions, seeking to on the Alliance.
develop military capabilities fit for the geostrategic This assessment is based on a review of selected na-
challenges of today and the future. As such, NATO tional and international S&T foresight and futures
nations must remain at the forefront of innovation, studies; multi-national workshops; and, technol-
S&T based or otherwise while facing challenges ogy watch activities conducted by the Science &
from all strategic directions and across all opera- Technology Organization. I gratefully acknowledge,
tional domains. To do so requires an appreciation the collaboration and support provided by Alliance
of the potential future security environment, espe- and Partner defence R&D communities, the NATO
cially the military and security challenges presented international staff, Allied Command Transforma-
by emerging or disruptive S&T. Drawing upon tion (ACT), and the NATO Communication and
the intellectual strength and knowledge advantage Information Agency (NCIA).
of the Alliance, Science & Technology Trends:
2020-2040 provides just such an assessment. The
informed insights and information provided will
help guide NATO at all levels and the Alliance as
we prepare to evolve and adapt to the future security
environment and the challenges ahead.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach Dr. Bryan Wells

Chairman of the Military Committee NATO Chief Scientist
ToC
Table of Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Context 1
1.2 Purpose 2
1.3 Approach 3
1.4 Overview 4
2 Science & Technology Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.1 S&T Development 6
2.2 Assessment 10
2.3 Disruptive Technologies 13
2.4 Emergent Technologies 19
2.5 Convergence, Inter-Dependencies and Synergies 23
2.6 Countering EDT Threats 25
2.7 Summary 25
3 Contextual Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Introduction 27
3.2 Innovation and Investment 27
3.3 Strategic Drivers 30
3.4 Defence and Security 37
v
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B Artificial Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
C Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
D Quantum Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
E Space Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
F Hypersonics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
G Biotechnology & Human Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
H Novel Materials and Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
I Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
I.1 Description 112
I.2 NATO Reports and Studies 112
I.3 NATO STO Technology Watch 114
I.4 Workshops 117
I.5 Alliance and Partner Research Programs 117
I.6 Attention Analysis 118
I.7 Studies and Meta-Analyses 121
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Symbols, Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

EX
Executive Summary
Science & Technology Trends: 2020-2040 provides an assessment of emerging or disruptive Science
& Technologies (S&T) and their potential impact on NATO military operations, defence capabilities,
and political decision space. This assessment draws upon the collective insights of the NATO Science
& Technology Organization (STO), its collaborative network of over 6000 active scientists, analysts,
researchers, and engineers, and associated research facilities. These insights have been combined with an
extensive review of the open-source S&T futures literature and selected national research programs.
The report aims to assist current and future military and civilian decision-makers in understanding
emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). In particular, it focuses on:
• Why EDTs are important to future Alliance activities;
• How they are expected to develop over time; and,
• What this will mean to the Alliance from an operational, organisational or enterprise perspective?
Ultimately, this assessment is intended to provide focus to Alliance S&T efforts and will: (1) at senior
level provides an overview of the threats and opportunities presented by EDTs; (2) at a staff level, assist
in guiding the design of future military concepts and capabilities; and, (3) overall, aid policymakers in
preparing Alliance forces and the NATO enterprise for mission success in the future security environment.
Over the next 20 years, four overarching characteristics can be expected to define many key advanced
military technologies:
• Intelligent: Exploit integrated AI, knowledge-focused analytic capabilities, and symbiotic AI-
human intelligence to provide disruptive applications across the technological spectrum;
• Interconnected: Exploit the network of virtual and physical domains, including networks of
sensors, organisations, individuals and autonomous agents, linked via new encryption methods and
distributed ledger technologies;
• Distributed: Employ decentralised and ubiquitous large-scale sensing, storage, and computation to
achieve new disruptive military effects; and,
• Digital: Digitally blend human, physical and information domains to support novel disruptive
effects.
Technologies with these characteristics are bound to increase the Alliance’s operational and organi-
sational effectiveness through: the development of a knowledge and decision advantage; leveraging of
vii
emergent trusted data sources; increased effectiveness of mesh capabilities across all operational domains
and instruments of power; and, adapting to a future security environment replete with cheap, distributed
and globally available technologies.
Eight highly interrelated S&T areas were considered to be major strategic disruptors over the next 20-years.
The first seven EDTs were approved by Defence Ministers in October 2019, while an eighth (Materials)
was added as an area for future consideration and development by the STO. These S&T areas are either
currently in nascent stages of development or are undergoing rapid revolutionary development. The EDTs
are:
Data Artificial Intelligence (AI) Autonomy Space Hypersonics
Quantum Biotechnology Materials
Technological development in Data, AI, Autonomy, Space and Hypersonics are seen to be predom-
inately disruptive in nature, as developments in these areas build upon long histories of supporting
technological development. As such, significant or revolutionary disruption of military capabilities is
either already on-going or will have a significant impact over the next 5-10 years. New developments in
Quantum, Biotechnology and Materials are assessed as being emergent, requiring significantly more time
(10 - 20 years) before their disruptive natures are fully felt on military capabilities.
Disruptive effects will most likely occur through combinations of EDTs and the complex interactions
between them. The following synergies and inter-dependencies are projected to be highly influential for
the development of future military capabilities:
• Data-AI-Autonomy: The synergistic combination of Autonomy, Big Data and AI using intelligent,
widely distributed, and cheap sensors alongside autonomous entities (physical or virtual) will
leverage new technologies and methods to yield a potential military strategic and operational
decision advantage.
• Data-AI-Biotechnology: AI, in-concert with Big Data, will contribute to the design of new drugs,
purposeful genetic modifications, direct manipulation of biochemical reactions, and living sensors.
• Data-AI-Materials: AI, in-concert with Big Data, will contribute to the design of new materials
with unique physical properties. In particular, this will support further developments in the use of
2-D materials and novel designs.
• Data-Quantum: Over a 15 - 20-year horizon, quantum technologies will increase C4ISR data col-
lection, processing and exploitation capabilities, through significantly increased sensor capabilities,
secure communications, and computing.
• Space-Quantum: Space-based quantum sensors, facilitated by Quantum Key Distribution com-

munication, will lead to an entirely different class of sensors suitable for deployment on satellites.
Increasingly commercial, smaller, lower power, more sensitive and more distributed space-based
sensor networks enabled by quantum sensors will be an essential aspect of the future military ISR
architecture in 20 years.
• Space-Hypersonics-Materials: Development of exotic materials, novel designs, miniaturisation,

energy storage, manufacturing methods and propulsion will be necessary to fully exploit space
and hypersonic environments by reducing costs, increasing reliability, improving performance and
facilitating the production of inexpensive task-tailored on-demand systems.
Alliance forces and a NATO enterprise enabled by EDTs will expand the Alliance’s ability to operate
in rapidly evolving operational environments, such as space, cyber (including the information sphere) and
urban areas. However, NATO will be challenged to ensure legal, policy, economic and organisational
constraints are properly considered early on in the development of these technologies.
1
1. Introduction
Prediction
“Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future.” - Nils Bohr [1]
1.1 Context
NATO, as an alliance of like-minded countries, strives for peace, security, and stability across the Euro-
Atlantic area. It continues to provide the essential framework for defence and security collaboration across
the operational spectrum, be it collective defence, crisis management or cooperative security. But today’s
NATO faces a dangerous, unpredictable, and fluid security environment, with existential challenges and
threats from all strategic directions including state and non-state actors; near-peer military forces; cyber
threats; space; terrorism; hybrid warfare; and, information operations.
NATO is the most successful alliance in history, preserving peace and stability around the world for
an unprecedented seven decades. This success is built upon the military and political framework that
NATO provides for consultation, collaboration, coordination, interoperability, effective deterrence and,
ultimately, united action. A key enabler of this accomplishment has been the NATO S&T community
(the original NATO innovation engine), which has provided NATO with the intellectual and technological
edge needed to ensure Alliance success across the operational and diplomatic spectrum.
Building an alliance capable of reacting to current and future needs over a broad range of potential
operations requires a delicate balance between the needs of today and those of decades to come. Getting it
right begins with a clear understanding of the S&T landscape, especially the enabling and destabilising
role of emerging or disruptive technology (EDT). If NATO is to maintain the intellectual, technological,
scientific and innovation edge [2] that it has enjoyed over the preceding 70 years, it will need to fully
understand these developments, their potential use and the operational and strategic implications. Further,
it will need to creatively engage the entire alliance to adapt to the associated threats and opportunities,
leveraging the unmatched financial and intellectual capital available.
The Science and Technology Office (STO), plays a decisive role in supporting innovation; providing
deep insights into alliance challenges; ensuring the integration of Alliance capabilities; and making
available an interconnected network of science and knowledge workers capable of providing evidence-
based advice to NATO, as well as alliance members and partners (Figure 1.1). At its core, the role of
NATO’s S&T community is to [3]:
“... maintain NATO’s scientific and technological advantage by generating, sharing and util-
ising advanced scientific knowledge, technological developments and innovation to support
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
the alliance’s core tasks.”
The impact S&T has had on the defence ca-

pabilities of the alliance and nations as a whole
has been profound [4, 5]. Over the past 70 years,
NATO has effectively employed a strategy of tech-
nology [6, 7], leveraging a decision and S&T ad-
vantage to significant intellectual, political, eco-
nomic and military effect. However, in recent
years, this intellectual and technological edge has
been degraded due to many strategic, economic, so-
cial and technical challenges. The concerns about
losing this technological edge are very real [4, 8].
As noted by NATO Secretary General, Jens
Stoltenberg [9]:
“NATO’s technological edge has al-

ways been an essential enabler of its
ability to deter and defend against
potential adversaries. Our future Figure 1.1: Five Objectives of the NATO Science &
security will depend on our ability Technology Organization (STO).
to understand, adopt and implement
technologies such as Artificial Intelli-
gence, autonomy, and hypersonic systems. In October 2019, Defence Ministers approved an
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) roadmap to help structure NATO’s work across
key technology areas, and enable Allies to consider these technologies’ implications for
deterrence and defence, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control
aspects.”
1.2 Purpose
Science & Technology Trends (2020-2040) provides context for the work that will underpin the develop-
ment of the EDT roadmap. The core objective is to increase the level of understanding within the Alliance
of the potential for S&T developments to enhance or threaten Alliance military operations. As such, the
report is an aide to decision-makers in considering:
• Why emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) will be important to future Alliance activities;
• How these EDTs may develop over time; and,
• What developments and potential consequences are expected for the alliance in the short, medium
and long term.
Anticipating the future security environment better than potential adversaries is one way in which the
alliance has maintained a competitive advantage. S&T foresight is a critical aspect of this preparation. It
does not attempt to predict the future in detail (a difficult task at best, and impossible at worst), instead it
seeks to provide a context for anticipating the potential development and impact of technology on future
Alliance operations.
Analyses of technology trends and the associated process of technology watch are critical steps to
identify new militarily important technologies and communicate the potential impact of these technologies
on NATO and national leadership. Those technologies so identified hold the promise to enable the
development of disruptive military capabilities for both Alliance (BLUE) and potential adversarial (RED)
forces. To explore the implications of these changes the report provides an assessment of S&T trends
(emerging and/or disruptive technologies) projected to impact NATO operations, capability development
1.3 Approach 3
and core functions over the next 20 years. These S&T areas are broad, have significant overlaps and are
expected to:
• Mature over a 20 year period;
• Be transformative or revolutionary in nature; and,
• Be emergent or create generational shifts in S&T development.
The NATO Science and Technology Office (STO) has the responsibility to provide these assessments
for NATO. As stated in the STO charter (2012) [3]:
“To fulfil its mission, the STO will ... provide advice to NATO and Nations’ leadership
on significant S&T issues, including the identification of emerging technologies, and the
assessment of their impact on defence and security.”
1.3 Approach
This report aims to reach a wide audience, both inside and outside of NATO and its partners. We do so to
stimulate a frank and open discussion as to potential opportunities and risks presented by technological
developments over the next 20 years. As such, the report is based strictly on:
• Technology trends discussed in the open literature;
• A global perspective on technological progress;
• Logical reasoning informed by S&T expertise; and,
Candidate S&T trends, as well as disruptive and emerging technologies, were identified using the
following considerations:
• Are likely to be realised in a non-cost prohibitive manner within the next 20 years;
• Will present a significant challenge to Alliance forces (e.g. survivability, defence, C4ISR, etc.); and,
• Will significantly impact Alliance capability or planning decisions (i.e. decision making, counter-
measures, etc.)
Science & Technology Trends: 2020-2040 supersedes the STO Technology Trends (2017) report [10],
but draws upon its foundations, insights and lessons learned. Further, the report exploits a broad range of
open-source reports, internal assessments and futures studies to develop a comprehensive understanding
of the future technology landscape. These sources include:
• Existing NATO S&T trend and future security environment studies, discussions and assessments;
• Technology watch activities conducted by the S&T Organisation, including existing Technology
Watch Cards (TWC) (current as of Feb 2019) and Von Karmon Horizon Scans (vKHS);
• Meta-analyses and reviews of open source technology watch and futures research articles/reports,
from defence, security and industry sources;
• NATO-sponsored EDT workshops and innovation system engagements; and,
• Alliance and partner EDT studies and research programs.

4 Chapter 1. Introduction
Taken together, and in consultation with NATO staffs, a picture of the future technological landscape
was developed and a sub-set of S&T areas selected. This subset highlighted the S&T areas most
likely to disrupt NATO and Alliance nations and was later consolidated with an EDT taxonomy and
roadmap approved by Defence Ministers in October 2019. An additional EDT (Novel Materials and
Agile Manufacturing) was added for this report. Each EDT is further broken down into capability and
technology focus areas, highlighting specific areas that will require development and research. Appendix
I discusses this decomposition in further detail.
In reading this report, several caveats should be kept in mind:
1. The prediction of S&T trends is a difficult task, although there is some evidence that such studies
have been successful at anticipating S&T development within broad time horizons [11];
2. Technologies rarely evolve in a simple linear fashion, and complex synergies between EDTs are
often as crucial as the EDTs themselves;
3. The list of EDTs provides a grouping of related technologies capable of technological disruption.
The development of sub-technologies may be very different than the aggregate. Further, such a
grouping is not unique, and one finds many such taxonomies in the literature. All such clusters,
or taxonomies, are simplifications; however, this particular clustering of technologies has proven
useful for our purposes; and,
4. Technology has historically driven the changing nature of human conflict, but not conflict itself
[12]. In this context “technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral” (Krazberg’s First Law
of Technology [13]). New technologies will inevitably be used in conflict, and it is necessary to
understand how that might occur. This understanding provides a necessary first step to support
technology-policy decisions, potential capability development and prepare defensive countermea-
sures. As such, discussion of the impact of S&T on future NATO operations or vignettes (e.g. the
Conjecture Cards presented in the appendices) should not be taken as an indication of current or
future NATO S&T research efforts.
1.4 Overview
Within the following chapters, an analysis is presented of identified, and militarily relevant S&T trends
which may impact NATO capability development and operational challenges over the upcoming 20
years (2020-2040). The approach and key data sources used to conduct this assessment are described in
Appendix I.
The assessment is presented in three parts:
1. An overview is provided of the general nature of S&T development. This synopsis includes a primer
on S&T attention and readiness. Specific EDT areas are identified that are expected to significantly
impact NATO over the period 2020-2040 (Chapter 2). These EDTs are presented separately, broadly
considering the state and rate of development as well as the military implications. This overview
is followed by consideration of critical potential synergies between EDTs, as it is in the overlap
between these developments that significant disruptions will occur;
2. The broad strategic context and drivers are outlined that will impact defence S&T development
(Chapter 3); and,
3. Separate appendices provide a more detailed exploration of each EDT, drawing heavily upon
STO research and technology watch activities. This section also includes Conjecture Cards, short
vignettes that describe the potential future application of these technologies. Earlier versions of
these cards were used during workshops [14] conducted to support this analysis, and they are added
to help contextualise the potential impact of these technologies.
1.4 Overview 5
An extensive list of useful references is provided in the bibliography at the end of this document.
These are also used throughout the body of the text where appropriate. When using the Adobe PDF
version of the report, clicking on a numbered reference will take the reader to the relevant entry in the
bibliography. If desired and available, clicking on the provided URL (i.e. web-link) will provide an option
for the reader to open the source reference directly for further study and exploration of the topic.
2
2. Science & Technology Trends
Anticipation
“I skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been.” - Wayne Gretzky [15]
2.1 S&T Development

How can NATO explore, develop and exploit the best, cutting-edge technology able to deliver disruptive
military effects for the Alliance? What do we mean by emerging or disruptive S&T. What are these
emerging or disruptive technologies or scientific insights? What do they mean for an agile and innovative
Alliance? To answer these questions, this chapter provides a summary of the modern technology landscape.
For purposes of this report, we narrowly define technologies as:
• Emerging: Those technologies or scientific discoveries that are expected to reach maturity in
the period 2020-2040; and, are not widely in use currently or whose effects on Alliance defence,
security and enterprise functions are not entirely clear.
• Disruptive: Those technologies or scientific discoveries that are expected to have a major, or
perhaps revolutionary, effect on NATO defence, security or enterprise functions in the period
2020-2040.
• Convergent: A combination of technologies that are combined in a novel manner to create a

disruptive effect.
Not all technologies or scientific discoveries are emergent or disruptive, nor is disruption driven solely
by technology [4]. Further, not all emerging technologies will be disruptive; not all disruptive technologies
are emergent; and, not all convergent technologies are driven by emerging ones. For this report, we focus
on those technologies assessed as most likely to be disruptive over a twenty-year time-frame, including
those that have moved beyond the initial exploration phase but have not yet become widely exploited.
Understanding the natural pattern of EDT development is a necessary prerequisite in understanding and
assessing their potential effects on NATO and the Alliance.
2.1.1 S&T Context

The seventh generation military revolution [16] is being driven (once again) by rapid changes in the
technological landscape. Human organised conflict (war in its most extreme case) is, in a Clausewitzian
sense, a fundamental clash of wills between large social groups (e.g. states, pseudo-states, communities,
societies, etc.). During such conflict, whether with peer competitors or asymmetric threats, technology is
an edge [17] to be exploited. As democratised technology becomes even more central to human existence,
so too will it gain an outsized role in shaping conflict. As noted by General Sir Richard Barrons [18],
former commander of Joint Forces Command (UK):
“The same wide span of Fourth Industrial Revolution technology (data, processing, con-
nectivity, AI, robotics, bio-sciences, autonomy and so forth) that is changing how we live,
work and play will now transform the way war is waged - in a process spanning at least a
generation ... Military transformation will largely be about the rapid adoption and adaptation
of civil-sector-derived technology and methods in disruptive military applications ... The
future of military success will now be owned by those who conceive, design, build and operate
combinations of information-based technologies to deliver new combat power.”
Within a broad strategic and geopolitical context (see Chapter 3) the nature of conflict is seen to
be changing, with general agreement that the transforming technological environment is a significant
factor [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. This changing nature of conflict manifests itself in hybrid war [26, 27],
hyper-war [28], memetic warfare [29] or next-generation conflict [30]. In each, disruptive technologies
are merged with existing technologies and military capabilities to create new ways and means of engaging
in conflict.
The common factors that link these Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies are that they are all
in some way shape or form intelligent, interconnected, distributed and digital (I2D2) in nature. More
specifically, and building on [31, 32, 33], we note that the future S&T landscape will be characterised
(and at the same time driven) by the following:
• Intelligent: Integrated and integral artificial intelligence, analytics and decision capabilities across
the technological spectrum.
– Autonomy: Artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems capable of some level of

autonomous decision making. Such autonomous systems may be robotic, platform based or
(digital) agent-based.
– Humanistic Intelligence: The seamless integration of psycho-social-techno systems support-
ing enhanced human-machine teaming and synergistic behaviours.
– Knowledge Analytics: Advanced analytical methods (including AI) exploring large data sets
and advanced mathematics to provide insights, knowledge and advice hitherto impractical.
• Interconnected: Exploitation of the network (or mesh) of overlapping real and virtual domains,
including sensors, organisations, institutions, individuals, autonomous agents and processes.
– Trusted Communications: The use of technologies such as distributed ledger technologies

(e.g. blockchain), quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography and AI
cyber-agents to ensure trusted interactions and information exchange.
– Synergistic Systems: The development of mixed (physical or virtual) complex systems-of-
systems allowing for the creation of novel ecosystems (e.g. smart cities).
• Distributed: Decentralised and ubiquitous large scale sensing, storage, computation, decision
making, research and development.
– Edge Computing: Embedding of storage, computation and analytics/AI into agents and
objects close to information sources.
– Ubiquitous Sensing: Embedding of low (or lower cost) sensors to create large sensor net-
works across the human-physical-information domains.
8 Chapter 2. Science & Technology Trends
INTELLIGENT
Autonomous
Autonomy Precision
Systems &
Humanistic Intelligence Warfare
Agents
Knowledge Analytics
DISTRIBUTED DIGITAL
Edge Computing Digital Twin
Ubiquitous Sensing Synthetic Realties
Decentralized Production
Democratized S&T
Expanding INTERCONNECTED Battle

Domains Networks
Trusted Communications
Synergistic Systems
Figure 2.1: Intelligent-Interconnected-Distributed-Digital (I2D2) with associated military trends.
– Decentralised Production: Exploitation of AI-assisted design, novel materials, and (mixed

material) 3D/4D printing technologies, to support just-in-time local digital manufacturing and
production.
– Democratised S&T: Reducing costs of design and production, increasing computational
capabilities and the broad availability of S&T information will increase innovation and the
generation of novel science.
• Digital: Blending of the human, physical and information domains to create new physiological,
psychological, social and cultural realities.
– Digital Twin: A digital simulacrum of physical, biological or information entities digitally

linked (often in near real-time) to the original, supporting predictive analytics, experimentation
and assessment.
– Synthetic Realities: The creation of new perceived cognitive or physical realities based on
the integration of psycho-socio-technical systems. Such realities may be augmented, virtual,
social or cultural in nature.
New EDTs do not arrive fully formed, nor are they divorced from the military operational environment
in which their use is contemplated. Effort, experimentation and innovation are needed to turn these EDTs
into actionable military capabilities, and these, in turn, will force changes to Alliance forces and force
structure. Each of the four identified technology characteristics combine to drive a specific military trend
(Figure 2.1) [34]:
• Intelligent + Distributed ⇒ Autonomous Systems and Agents: Intelligent and, increasingly

autonomous systems, are already supplanting and exceeding the capabilities of human forces.
Autonomous systems to date have been quite limited, employing fixed rule-sets and various levels
of direct human-control. The increased use of AI will enable autonomous systems capable of signifi-
cantly more sophisticated decision making, self-directed activity and, at the same time, increasingly
complex human-machine teaming. Such increased used of intelligent agents will dramatically
expand into our synthetic realities, including cyber, battle networks [34, 35, 36] and digital so-
cial networks. Autonomous agents will provide rapid analysis, advice and courses-of-action for
strategic-operational-tactical planning, allowing for increased OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act)
loop effectiveness and bringing an entirely different perspective on old problems unconstrained by
old strategies. Such intelligent battle networks have the potential to increase decision speeds to
levels that will require new methods of human-machine interaction and visualisation. The resulting
competition between battle networks will generate increased evolutionary pressures on algorithms,
each seeking an edge or combination of effects that will lead to a decisive victory. Similarly, au-
tonomous vehicles so enabled will increase their effectiveness across the conflict spectrum, creating
large sensor and strike mesh networks.
• Interconnected + Digital ⇒ Battle Networks : Evolving agile and adaptive mesh C4ISR networks
will create deep operational dependencies underlying military action. Such evolving battle networks
will increasingly become targets in and of themselves and subject to effects based conflict. This
increased reliance on seamless and ubiquitous connectivity will increase the value in targeting
such networks (military or civilian) in disinformation, cyber or physical manner. Such attacks may
be implemented long before the conflict itself is initiated, and could strike indirectly at logistic,
personnel, information, financial or other supporting elements of modern operational and strategic
networks.
• Interconnected + Distributed ⇒ Expanding Domains: As the operational environment expands

to include space, cyber and the broader information sphere, the need to think, plan and operate
in a widely dispersed, interconnected and multi-domain manner will become even more critical.
The growing numbers and wide distribution of multi-domain sensors, multi-domain missions, and
the rising processing capabilities increasingly embedded at the edges of the networks, will present
new demands for dominance, counter-domain capabilities, protection, counter-measures, counter-
counter-measures and other secondary functions. The increase exploitation of new domains will
inevitably lead to the search for domain superiority, with attendant costs and capability demands.
• Intelligent + Digital ⇒ Precision Warfare: Increased digitisation across C4ISR capabilities, along
with miniaturisation, edge processing and falling costs, have been the underpinning technological
developments enabling increasingly intelligent, interconnect and distributed systems. In aggregate,
this has dramatically increased the development of precision strike and effects orient capabilities.
Swarming and the use of lower-cost cheap precision weaponry has and will continue to put large
high-value capabilities at risk, while increased digitalisation opens up new and hitherto unanticipated
vulnerabilities. New sensors (e.g. quantum technology-enabled), increased reliance on synthetic
realities (virtual, social, mixed, twinned, etc.) will present risks and opportunities. The use of more
and more sophisticated analytical tools, leveraging the increased volumes of digital data, will lead to
the development of new operational capabilities (e.g. novel hypersonic weapon designs developed
using increasingly higher-fidelity computational fluid dynamics models and embedded sensors).
AI will change the landscape of warfare, while the availability of digital data will allow distributed
and interconnected (autonomous) systems to analyse, adapt and respond. These changes will, in turn,
potentially support better decision-making through predictive analytics [37]. All of this will take place in
a context of synergistic and symbiotic systems-of-systems, including sensors, societies, and organisations.
In this way, EDTs will continue to change the ways and means of conflict for at least a generation, but at
the same time will need to integrate and operate alongside existing systems.
2.1.2 Synergy
To maintain a military-technological edge and to prevail in future operations, NATO forces must con-
tinually evolve, adapt, and innovate in order to be credible, networked, aware, agile, and resilient [24].
Such adaptation is most rapid and disruptive where EDTs work to enable one another or where the human,
information or physical domains overlap [38]. Several such critical synergistic connections are identified
later in this report.
In addition to interconnections between EDTs, it should be noted that many of the issues driving and
limiting the effective development of new capabilities are non-technical. Murray [39, 40] notes that:
“What matters in the technological adaptation as well as technological innovation is how

well new and improved technologies are incorporated into effective and intelligent concepts
of fighting: it is not the technological sophistication that matters, rather it is the larger
framework.”
For active development of EDTs into Alliance capabilities, the implications of culture, concepts, risk-
tolerance, organisational structure, policies, treaties, human capital and ethics must be fully appreciated.
These factors will need to evolve as much as the technology if EDTs are to be fully developed into new
operational capabilities.
2.2 Assessment
To understand the state and rate of EDT development, it is necessary to consider several perspectives
on each EDT: (1) the potential military impact; (2) the level of attention or hype around a particular
technology or scientific area; (3) the current technology readiness level; (4) the time horizon in which the
science or technology is expected to be fully mature; (5) the relevance to NATO operational capabilities;
and, (6) the S&T domains relevant for enabling research.
Such an assessment is problematic as each EDT encompasses many different core aspects, each
potentially at a different stage of development. As a result, for this report, each EDT is broken into several
areas identified for focused development, or (emerging and disruptive) technology focus areas.
2.2.1 Impact
Assessing the potential impact of emerging or disruptive technologies is not a straightforward process. To
do so successfully requires consideration of the threat environment (current and future), legal & policy
constraints, political factors, investment decisions, as well as estimating the potential for organizational
uptake (i.e. entrepreneurial drive and risk tolerance) [41]. These estimates are further compounded if the
road to disruption involves complex combinations of such technologies (i.e. synergies) or requires new
concepts to be developed.
For purposes of this report we follow [41], defining Impact in a somewhat subjective and imprecise
manner as (Table 2.1):
Table 2.1: EDT Impact.
Scale Performance: speed, range, accuracy, lethality, survivability, affordability,

availability, dependability or other defining capability characteristic
Moderate 10 - 50 %
High 50 - 100 %
Revolutionary Greater than 100%, or conducting activities or tasks hitherto deemed impractical
or impossible
2.2 Assessment 11
Assessments are based on a variety of sources, including a review of previous trends assessments
[20, 24, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45], workshop results [14] as well as STO technology watch activities and
reports (e.g. [46]).
2.2.2 Attention
Technological development is distinctly cyclic on
many levels. The most well-known of these cycles
is the Gartner Hype Cycle [31] (Figure 2.2), itself
based on Howard Fosdick’s work on the sociology
of technology adoption [47, 48].
Technologies do not always progress from be-
ginning to the end of such a cycle; indeed most
technologies fail. Many avenues of science or
technological discovery never breakthrough to ig-
nite innovation, or they disappear from public con-
sciousness after initial enthusiasm as unproductive
avenues of development, or they may appear later
on as new convergent developments reinvigorating Figure 2.2: The Gartner Hype Cycle.
an old idea. Finally, even successful technologies
may reappear as novel ideas create innovation triggers and old technologies becomes so integrated into
production systems that the original connection is lost on all but the most technically minded. Such an
evolutionary process built on heroic failures [49] or creative errors is essential to scientific and technologi-
cal progress, as lessons and ideas that arise will often lead to entirely new areas for exploration, innovation
and development.
During a hype cycle, a successful trending technology will (arguably) ultimately go through five key
phases: [50, 51]:
• Innovation Trigger: After a long period of supporting research, a potential new technology break-
through starts to show promise. This initial innovation trigger builds upon early experimentation,
results in proof-of-concept stories and media interest is triggered. This spark yields growing public-
ity and internet search activity. At this stage, no viable product exists, and commercial viability
remains unproven.
• Peak of Inflated Expectations: Early publicity produces many success stories — often accompa-
nied by scores of failures. Interest (e.g. as measured by web searches) is at an all-time peak. Some
innovative companies take action; many do not.
• Trough of Disillusionment: The limitations of the technology become clear, and some implemen-
tation efforts fail to produce useful results. As a result, general interest falls, and negative stories
become more frequent, although these may be overly pessimistic. Eventually, some developers
and producers move onto other areas or fail outright. A bifurcation occurs at this point, where
investment and continued developments occur only if continued progress can be shown through
the refinement of the underlying technology, development of a better understanding of where this
technology is most applicable or a convergence of other technologies or demand. If this does
not happen, the technology will eventually be deemed unproductive and disappear entirely from
consideration, or return to the start gate to await further developments, technological convergence
or changing circumstances.
• Slope of Enlightenment: With a better understanding of what is practical and where it can be best
applied, the potential begin to crystallise and become more widely understood and appreciated.
Next-generation products occur, and positive attention begins to increase with more and more
successful trials and pilot products. Some companies remain cautious.
• Plateau of Productivity: Mainstream adoption occurs. With a better understanding of value,

applicability and limitations, the technology has found its market. Issues and new ideas may still
arise, potentially kicking off a new cycle. Otherwise, the technology becomes so well integrated
into the technological landscape that its use becomes common-place until it is supplanted by a new
technological advance.
Balancing out the highs of inflated expectations and the lows of the trough of disillusionment is a
critical task in making investment and long term capability decisions. The Gartner Hype Cycle is useful
for this purpose. Nevertheless, while the approach is well known, there are noted flaws in its use as an
assessment and decision tool [47, 52, 53]. In particular, the exact placement of technology on such a curve
is problematic, as is the focus on hype rather than a measurable quantity such as attention. Therefore,
generalising from [48], we will simplify the assessment and describe the state of technological attention
and understanding in broad categories only. These categories are: Trigger: New technology or scientific
discovery; Expectation: Increasing publicity and discussion; Disillusionment: Exploring limitations;
Enlightenment: Understanding utility; and, Productivity: Mature Application.
This report assesses technological attention through a review of Gartner technology assessments [31],
other technology futures analyses already mentioned, STO technology watch activities, and an analysis of
web search activity drawn from Google Trends [54] (see Appendix I.6).
2.2.3 Technological Maturity

In general successful S&T proceeds along a developmental path captured in the use of a technology
readiness levels (TRL), originally developed by NASA [55, 56], with each step being a potential off-ramp
or pause for that particular technology (see Table 2.2). These levels provide a useful shorthand for
interpreting technology maturity level and, as such, are widely used within industry and government.
Table 2.2: Technology Readiness Levels.
TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful mission operations.

TRL 8 Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration.
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment.
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment.
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment.
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment.
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept.
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated.
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported.
Technologies, or the underlying sciences, may be unsuccessful in generating new operational capabili-
ties or pause at any point along the path to TRL 9+ due to several factors, including interconnectedness
or dependencies on other technologies, costs, ethics, policies or fundamental physical, information or
human limits. However, unsuccessful developments are critical within S&T to inform and ultimately give
rise to new approaches and technologies that may themselves be more successful in moving from basic
principles to operational capabilities.
We assess the current TRL levels primarily through assessments made within the STO Technology
watch activities, related futures assessments and reference to several available TRL calculators [57]. It
should be noted that emerging technologies are usually in the range of TRL 1 through 5 [58].
2.2.4 Capability
For NATO, EDTs are primarily of interest through their influence on current and future Alliance defence
capabilities. To better connect EDTs to their military impact, each EDT is evaluated for its potential effect
on NATO operational capabilities. NATO’s operational capability taxonomy ([59] provides a structured
list of capabilities and sub-capabilities. An assessment is presented for the first level of the operational
taxonomy only: Prepare, Project, Engage, C3, Sustain, Protect, and Inform. This assessment is presented
later in this chapter for each EDT, and in Appendices A - H. The evaluation employs a 3-point scale
describing low, medium or high impact on the performance of the associated operational capability (Table
2.3). Such a subjective assessment provides a preliminary appraisal of potential disruptive effects.
Table 2.3: EDT Impact on NATO Capabilities.
Relevance: The impact of this EDT on current and future operational capability is expected to be ...
Low Limited and secondary in nature.
Medium Moderate overall, or of significant relevance to a limited subset only.
High Significant or revolutionary impact.
2.2.5 S&T Domains

Defence Science is broadly broken into three large domains, encompassing research in the human (includ-
ing biological), information and physical S&T domains [60, 61]. Linking EDTs to these three major areas
of scientific inquiry helps to ensure a holistic approach to research, development and operationalisation
of an EDT. This assessment is provided later in this chapter and in Appendices A - H. The evaluation
employs a 3-point scale describing low, medium or high alignment or relevance (Table 2.4) of this research
area to NATO in the development of the EDT.
Table 2.4: EDT Connection to S&T Domains.
Relevance: The relevance of EDT research in this S&T domain to NATO ...
Low Limited and secondary in nature.
Medium Moderate overall, or of significant relevance to a limited subset only.
High Significant relevance.
2.3 Disruptive Technologies

2.3.1 Data: Big Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA)
(Big) Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA)
Big Data describes data that presents significant volume, velocity, variety, veracity and visualisation
challenges. Increased digitalisation, a proliferation of new sensors, new communication modes, the
internet-of-things and virtualisation of socio-cognitive spaces (e.g. social media) have contributed
significantly to the development of Big Data. Advanced (Data) Analytics describes advanced analytical
methods for making sense of and visualising large volumes of information. These techniques span
a wide range of methods drawn from research areas across the data and decision sciences, including
artificial intelligence, optimisation, modelling & simulation (M&S), human factors engineering and
operational research.
Since the beginning of the 1960s, our world

has become increasingly digital and virtual. For
the next 20 years, this trend is expected to accel-
erate and to have a fundamentally disruptive effect
on Alliance operations and capabilities. Data sets
of a magnitude that are difficult to handle logisti-
cally (a definition that it must be noted changes
yearly) due to increasing volume, velocity, vari-
ety, veracity and visualisation issues will present
significant technical, organisational and interoper-
ability challenges. Distributed sensors, autonomy, Figure 2.3: Big Data and Advanced Analytics.
new communication technologies (e.g. 5G), in-
creased use of space, virtual socio-cognitive spaces, digital twins and the development of new and
expanded analytical methods will increase our ability to understand the human, physical and information
spaces around us. BDAA is the enabling technology for all EDTs and will be central to their exploitation
for enhanced military capabilities. AI, in particular, requires high-quality training data to develop new
algorithms and applications.
For NATO BDAA will enable increased operational efficiency, reduced costs, improved logistics,
real-time monitoring of assets and predictive assessments of campaign plans. At the same time, it will
generate significantly greater situational awareness at strategic, operational, tactical and enterprise levels.
These applications will lead to a deeper and broader application of predictive analytics to support enhanced
decision making at all levels. It has the potential to create a knowledge and decision advantage, which
will be a significant strategic disruptor across NATO’s spectrum of capabilities. There is the potential
to significantly impact NATO’s kinetic and non-kinetic targeting effectiveness through the use of cheap
widely distributed sensors (as part of the internet-of-things (IoT)), linked by new communication protocols
(such as 5G), building on analyses and dissemination of critical information in real-time. Potential peer
or near-peer adversaries will seek a similar technical edge, while asymmetric threat actors will exploit
increasingly open and available sources of data for targeted effect or disruption.
Industry is investing heavily in BDAA and will continue to lead in the overall development and
application. The effectiveness of this investment underlies the current knowledge economy. Nevertheless,
the unique needs of NATO military forces will require the development of methods and standards for inter-
operability, sharing, collection, modelling & simulation, analysis, classification, curation, communication
and data management. Finally, it is not a given that more data and advanced algorithms will ultimately
produce better decisions. Understanding the complex socio-cognitive-technical context around decision
making and the proper role and integration of BDAA in this context will be essential to developing a
NATO decision advantage.
Appendix A provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
assessed potential impact, state and rate of development, as well as identified areas for focused research.
Table 2.5: Big Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA) 2020-2040.
EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon

Data Advanced Analytics Revolutionary Expectation 4 2025
. Communications High Enlightenment 6 2030
Advanced Decision Making Revolutionary Disillusionment 6 2025
Sensors High Expectation 4 2030
Relevance: Low Medium High

Capability Hierarchy PREPARE PROJECT ENGAGE C3 SUSTAIN PROTECT INFORM
S&T Domain HUMAN INFORMATION PHYSICAL
2.3.2 Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human
intelligence – for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making
predictions, or taking action – whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical
systems [62].
The availability of big data has driven both the development of and the need for AI. Starting in the
mid-1950s, AI has moved through three primary development cycles. As a result, AI (e.g. expert systems
and machine learning) algorithms are already deeply embedded in modern technology. However, in 2012
there was a significant leap forward in their application to practical problems, driven by improvements in
underlying algorithms (deep learning) and the wide availability of sizeable publicly available training sets.
In concert with BDAA, AI has the potential for revolutionary impact on NATO operations and
capabilities. AI is the fulcrum around which big data will be turned into actionable knowledge and,
ultimately, a NATO decision advantage. Integration of AI into combat models & simulation, enterprise
systems, decision support systems, cyber defence systems and autonomous vehicles will allow for rapid
and more effective human-machine decision making. Use of AI on sensors to pre-process information
and provide adaptive use of frequencies (e.g. cognitive radar) and bandwidth will paradoxically lead to a
decrease in communication traffic. AI will also have a significant effect on the conduct of NATO S&T
efforts as meta-analyses of existing research will expose new discoveries, identify promising research
areas and provide improved S&T tools to support further research.
In the commercial world, AI is a priority R&D
area, with many nations making significant invest-
ments. Business is the primary driving force be-
hind AI, although research is often based on widely
available open-source tools and publicly available
data [63, 64]. The brittle nature of most existing
applications and the need for explainable AI are
just two serious technical challenges that remain to
be overcome. Complex problems associated with
human-AI teaming and psycho-socio-technical is-
Figure 2.4: Artificial Intelligence. sues will also need to be considered, but hold the
promise of revolutionary applications. Notwith-
standing these limitations, by 2030, it is estimated that the contribution of AI to the global economy will
be $15.7 trillion (USD) [65].
The development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI, i.e. human-level generalised intelligent
behaviour), presents a significant (and potentially impossible) technical challenge, in-spite of over 60
years of AI research. It is considered unlikely that AI systems will meet this level of cognitive ability
within the next 20 years.
Policy, legal, and interoperability challenges
will be serious challenges for NATO. Ensuring AI
advice is trusted, ethical and consistent with na-
tional rules-of-engagement (ROE) will require AI
approaches with a strong emphasis on explainabil-
ity, trust and human-AI collaboration. Further,
it will be necessary, especially in the context of
Alliance operations, to define processes and stan-
dards for verification, validation and accreditation
(VV&A) of such AI systems.
Figure 2.5: Artificial Intelligence in the Real World
Appendix B provides a more comprehensive
(CREDIT: DARPA).
review of this EDT. The following table presents
the assessed potential impact, state and rate of development, as well as identified areas for focused
research.
Table 2.6: Artificial Intelligence: 2020-2040.

Artificial Intelligence Advanced algorithms Revolutionary Expectations 4 2030
Applied AI Revolutionary Expectation 6 2030
Human-Machine Symbiosis High Trigger 4 2035

2.3.3 Autonomy
Autonomy
Autonomy is the ability of a system to respond to uncertain situations by independently composing
and selecting among different courses of action in order to accomplish goals based on knowledge
and a contextual understanding of the world, itself, and the situation. Autonomy is characterised by
degrees of self-directed behaviour (levels of autonomy) ranging from fully manual to fully autonomous
[66, 67, 68]. Robotics is the study of designing and building autonomous systems spanning all levels
of autonomy (including full human control). Unmanned Vehicles may be remotely controlled by a
person or may act autonomously depending on the mission. Applications include access to unreachable
areas, persistent surveillance, long-endurance, robots in support of soldiers, cheaper capabilities, and
automated logistics deliveries.
The history of autonomous systems in defence

is a long one going back to at least 1898 with
Nikola Tesla’s demonstration of a wireless re-
motely operated unmanned boat [69]. However,
there has been a significant push over the last 20
years to use system autonomy across a wide va-
riety of physical and virtual environments. The
success of these efforts is seen in the increased use
of platform autonomy (UxVs), with ISTAR (intelli-
gence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance)
and precision strike platforms being increasingly Figure 2.6: Autonomous Systems (CREDIT: CMRE).
common in operations. The ultimate objective has
always been to unite the human and autonomous system (at whatever level of independent operation) into
a formidable team, allowing the automated system to take on dull, dirty, dangerous and dear tasks (the
four D’s of robotization) [70]. The underlying motivation is to decrease costs, reduce manning, improve
operational effectiveness and reduce casualties.
Approaches to autonomy may range from fully-autonomous to semi-autonomous or even unmanned
systems. Specific levels of autonomy are a function of sensors, mission type, communication links,
on-board processing and legal/policy constraints. The drive for more and more semi-autonomous and fully
autonomous systems in operations will dramatically expand future NATO capabilities into an environment
where every soldier acts as a company, every ship as a task group and every aircraft as a squadron.
Autonomous systems development is primarily driven by operational needs such as high-altitude-long-
endurance (HALE), increasing levels of integrated AI, and human-machine factors (i.e. how to make
the overall human-machine team/system more effective while retaining necessary human oversight and
decision making). In particular, legal, policy and interoperability considerations will challenge the use
of autonomous systems across the kill-chain. Nevertheless, given the operational advantages to both
NATO and potential adversaries, there is little doubt that the use of autonomous systems will significantly
enhance, threaten and enable operational capabilities over the next 20 years.
Appendix C provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
Table 2.7: Autonomy 2020-2040.

Autonomy Autonomous Systems Revolutionary Expectation 6 2025
Human-Machine Teaming Revolutionary Trigger 4 2030
Autonomous Behaviour High Expectation 4 2030
Countermeasures High Disillusionment 5 2025

2.3.4 Space Technologies (ST)
Space Technologies
Space is generally considered to begin 90 - 100 km (the Karman line [71]) above sea-level. Space
Technologies exploit or must contend with the unique operational environment of space, which includes:
freedom of action, global field of view, speed, freedom of access; a near-vacuum; micro-gravity;
isolation; and, extreme environments (temperature, vibration, sound and pressure).
Humankind has been making effective use of

space for over 60 years. However, two interre-
lated and interacting trends have emerged that are
driving an explosion in the exploitation of space
and space-based assets. First, the global commer-
cial space industry has taken a leading role not
just in the development of satellites, but increas-
ingly in sensors, communications and launch. This
trend has led to dramatic decreases in launch costs,
new options for the deployment of space-based
Figure 2.7: The Alliance from Space. assets, and the near real-time commercial avail-
ability of high-quality space-derived information
(EO/IR, SAR and ELINT). Second, new technologies and manufacturing methods have changed the nature,
availability and costs of using space [e.g. 3-D printing [72]]. Such technologies included new propulsion
options such as advanced electric propulsion systems, on-board AI, advanced robotics, on-orbit remote
servicing of satellites, system miniaturisation (enabling smaller and cheaper satellites), improved and novel
sensors, 3D-printing, improved power storage and efficiency, and next generation encryption technologies.
As a result, space is becoming increasingly commercial, congested, contested and competitive [73, 74].
Use of space for C4ISR, navigation and defence is central to many of NATO’s existing capabilities,
and ultimately it is the foundation upon which NATO has built a technological edge. This use of space and
space-derived data will only increase over the next 20 years, enabling increasingly capable and ubiquitous
C4ISR capabilities. Combined with BDAA and AI, this has the potential to significantly improve
situational awareness at all levels, support near real-time assessments of operational effectiveness and
increase targeting success. However, as more and more Alliance capabilities come to rely on these assets,
the risks from ASAT (anti-satellite) or robotic parasitic systems will become more acute. Increasingly
congested orbits, increased use of large constellations of smallsats and increasing levels of space debris
will impact the effectiveness and reliability of space-based systems [75].
Many nations have significantly increased their presence in and access to space. Nevertheless,
commercial developments and the increased use of space derived data are expected to dominate events
over the next 20 years. Increasingly powerful smallsats and large scale constellations/swarming will
facilitate increased used of space while posing significant policy and legal issues. These legal and policy
challenges include conflicts between commercial, academic and military use; governance of the global
(space) commons; and, the potential for the increased militarization of space.
Appendix E provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
Table 2.8: Space (Systems) 2020-2040.

Space Platforms Moderate Expectation 6 2025
Operations Moderate Expectation 5 2030
Sensors High Trigger 3 2035

2.3.5 Hypersonic (Weapon Systems) (HWS)
Hypersonics (HWS)
(Advanced) Hypersonic Weapons Systems (missiles, vehicles, etc.) operate at speeds greater than Mach
5 (6125 kph). In such a regime, dissociation of air becomes significant, and rising heat loads pose
an extreme threat to the vehicle. Hypersonic flight phases occur during re-entry from space into the
atmosphere or during propelled/sustained atmospheric flight by rocket, scramjet or combined cycle
propulsion. This class of weapon system includes air-launched strike missiles (HCM), manoeuvring
re-entry glide vehicles (HGV), ground-sea ship killers, and post-stealth strike aircraft. Systems of this
nature may rely primarily on kinetic effects alone or may include supplemental warheads (nuclear
or non-nuclear). Countermeasures against individual, salvoed or swarms of hypersonic systems are
particularly challenging due to their speed and manoeuvrability. [45].
Research on hypersonic systems goes back 70 years to the start of the space age. Still, recent devel-
opments and testing have increased the likelihood of operational hypersonic weapons being developed
and deployed within the next ten years. There are four types of hypersonic systems typically discussed:
(manoeuvring) hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV); air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM); Hyper-
sonic rail guns [76]; and, hypersonic crewed aircraft. The primary focus of this EDT will be on missile
systems (HGV and HCM).
New materials and propulsion methods have
enabled recent developments in hypersonic re-
search and have greatly increased the likelihood
of their wide operational use [77]. China, Rus-
sia, US, UK, France, India, Japan and Australia
all have openly acknowledged research and test-
ing of hypersonic systems [78]. These systems
are particularly strategically disruptive given the
reduced reaction times available for ITWAA (Inte-
grated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment), the
difficulty in developing countermeasures, and the Figure 2.8: Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) De-
threat they pose too high valued targets individu- fence (CREDIT:Northrup-Grumman).
ally or en masse [45].
For NATO hypersonic capabilities would provide increased effectiveness (lethality and response)
against priority ground and naval targets. Due to the high speeds involved, they may also dispense with
warheads, relying entirely on mass and kinetic energy, thus simplifying weapon design. Such speeds will
increase the odds of a successful strike and reduce the risks of interception. U.S. systems are expected
to fielded by 2025, with hypersonic drones following by 2035 [79, 80]. Both China and Russia have
demonstrated advanced supersonic programs [81, 82] and limited fielding of hypersonic weapons.
More worryingly, these advantages are available for a peer or near-peer adversary with hypersonic
weapons. Given the high costs associated with developing hypersonic systems, it is unlikely that they will
be available in this period to asymmetric antagonists.
Hypersonic weapons present considerable challenges to strategies and technologies for defensive
countermeasures. This challenge is particularly acute due to the speeds involved and the possibility of
large swarms. Countermeasures, employing soft kill approaches (e.g. jamming, deception, etc.) may
be useful to some extent. Nevertheless, directed energy weapons (high energy lasers or particle beam)
or space-based interceptors provide the best overall hope of a hard kill. These systems will need to be
refined and be made operational, within the appropriate policy and legal constraints, if effective defensive
countermeasures are to be deployed over the next ten years.
Appendix F provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
Table 2.9: Hypersonic (Systems) 2020-2040.

Hypersonics Platforms and Propulsion High Trigger 5 2025
Countermeasures High Trigger 3 2030

2.4 Emergent Technologies

2.4.1 Quantum (Technologies) (QT)
Quantum Technologies (QT)

Next-generation quantum technologies exploit quantum physics and associated phenomena at the atomic
and sub-atomic scale; in particular quantum entanglement and superposition. These effects support
significant technological advancements primarily in cryptography; computation; precision navigation
and timing; sensing and imaging; communications; and, materials.
Quantum mechanics counts its origins from the beginning of the last century and is generally used to
describe the behaviour of matter at the atomic scale (less than 10nm). Quantum phenomena underlie much
of modern technology including the transistor, nuclear energy, electron microscopes, superconductivity,
photoelectric detectors, medical imaging (functional magnetic resonance and positron emission imaging),
lasers and solid-state devices. Over the last ten years, quantum phenomena, in particular, superposition
and entanglement, have been used to develop novel emergent technologies. These next-generation
developments include: ultra-sensitive sensors; incredibly accurate clocks; unbreakable encryption and
communications; and, quantum computing [46, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88].
Although new quantum technologies have the potential for revolutionary impact on NATO operations,
most (but not all) are in early stages of development, and significant technical challenges lie ahead before
operational systems will be developed. The use of ultra-sensitive gravimetric, magnetic or acoustic sensors
will significantly increase the effectiveness of underwater warfare capabilities, potentially rendering
the oceans transparent [90]. Quantum radar [91, 92, 92] has the potential to make stealth technologies
obsolete, provide more accurate target identification, and allow covert detection and surveillance. Accurate
clocks will enable the development of (precision) positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems
for use in GPS denied or inaccessible areas (e.g. under-ice). Unbreakable quantum key encryption
will support substantially more robust and secure communication. Quantum computing, potentially the
most disruptive quantum technology of all, has the potential to render previously untenable classical
computational tasks in areas such as optimisation, BDAA, AI, and modelling & simulation viable. This
computational edge has the potential to increase the decision making and operational effectiveness of
NATO forces significantly, as well as render current encryption techniques and encrypted data crack-able
for the first time.
Quantum Annealer Analog Quantum Universal Quantum
First generation quantum computer. Will be able to simulate complex The grand challenge. The most
Least powerful and most restrictive quantum interactions, which are powerful, general and hardest to
form. Simplest to build but designed currently intractable for existing build quantum computer, with
for only one function (optimisation). conventional computers or significant technical challenges.
Limited or arguably no-advantages architectures. Estimated to require Estimated to require > 10,000 qubits.
over classical computing. 50 to 100 qubits. Has already (2019) Has the potential to be exponentially
Computational capabilities are on arguably demonstrated a speed faster than traditional computers for
par with classical computers. advantage over classical systems specific classes of applications of
(quantum supremacy). State of the interest in science and business.
art as of 2020: 53 (IBM) & 73
(Google) qubits.
Application: Optimization problems Application: Quantum chemistry; Application: Secure computing,

material science; optimization machine learning, cryptography,
problems; sampling; quantum quantum chemistry, material science,
dynamics. optimization, sampling, quantum
dynamics, searching
Generality Generality Generality

Computation Computation Computation
Level of Difficulty Level of Difficulty Level of Difficulty
Figure 2.9: 3-Types of Quantum Computers (CREDIT:Adapted from [89]).
Interoperability considerations will be critical for the successful implementation of some quantum
enabled capabilities. Standardisation around quantum encryption and communications protocols will be a
more immediate concern. PNT, sensors and computing will present fewer interoperability challenges as
these will be tightly integrated into operational capabilities, but this may also lead to significant disparities
in operational performance between alliance members.
Of all the EDTs Quantum technologies are perhaps the most nascent and variable in development, with
substantial national and commercial investments being made. In particular, the operational viability of
new sensors that have been demonstrated at the laboratory level is a significant area of continued research
[93]. This development is generally agreed to be at a very much lower level of technical readiness [94, 95]
than other quantum technologies. PNT and QKD are much closer to being fielded operationally.
Quantum computing (or quantum information science) (Figure 2.9) has enjoyed considerable visibility
in the media and has undergone significant commercial development. Nevertheless, the development
of widely available general quantum computing (i.e. capable of significantly exceeding the theoretical
limits of classical computing (i.e. quantum supremacy)) is at least 15-20 years away. However, business
application outside of a research environment is envisaged as 5 - 10 years away [96, 97]. To achieve this
goal requires surmounting some significant theoretical and engineering challenges (particularly around
error correction), which may ultimately render such systems impractical over this period [98]. However,
for NATO, research into non-classical quantum optimised algorithms (e.g. quantum neural networks for
AI) suitable for Alliance defence and security problems is a cost-effective development strategy in the
short term [99, 100].
Appendix D provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
Table 2.10: Quantum 2020-2040.

Quantum Communication High Trigger 5 2030
Information Science Revolutionary Trigger 4 2035
Precision Navigation High Disillusionment 6 2025
Sensors Moderate Trigger 3 2040

2.4.2 Bio-(& Human Enhancement) Technologies (BHET)
Bio & Human Enhancement Technologies (BHET)

Biotechnologies use organisms, tissues, cells or molecular components derived from living things, to
act on living things; or, act by intervening in the workings of cells or the molecular components of
cells, including their genetic material [101]. Human Enhancement Technologies (HET) are biomedical
interventions that improve human form or functioning in excess of what is necessary to restore or sustain
health.
Manipulation of our biological environment

and human enhancement goes back to the earli-
est days of humankind when our ancestors em-
ployed skins, stones and agriculture to create an
evolutionary advantage. However, bio- and human-
enhancement technologies (BHET) are expected
to be available over the next 20 years that change
our very definition of what it means to be a soldier,
sailor or aviator. These technologies span the spec-
trum of biological sciences: Genetic manipulation
Figure 2.10: Biotechnology.
(e.g. CRISPR) to develop novel pathogens or med-
ical countermeasures; Manufacturing methods exploiting biological processes; Human enhancement
via integrated robotics (e.g. exoskeletons or replacement parts); Neural interfaces; Enhanced vision;
Socio-technical symbiosis with AI and autonomous systems; Pharmacological approaches to cognitive and
physical enhancement; Increased virtualisation of the socio-cognitive environment supporting the develop-
ment of new social, information and organisational structures; and, New bio-sensors and bio-informatics,
which will increase our understanding of socio-cognitive, physiological, economic and neurological
behaviours to improve operational performance and resilience, as well as increase the effectiveness of
non-kinetic targeting.
Disruptive BHET research areas of potential interest to NATO are: Bioinformatics and Biosensors:
The collection, classification, storage, retrieval and analysis of biological and biochemical data. Human
Augmentation: The use of genetic modifications, pharmacological agents, electro-mechanical devices, or
neurological interfaces to increase human physiological and neurological performance beyond normal
limits. Medical Countermeasures and Technologies: The development of new diagnostics, therapeutics
and vaccines (employing bioinformatics, genetic engineering and biosensors) to support predictive
diagnostics, CBRN threat identification and treatments. Synthetic Biology: The deliberate design,
engineering and creation of novel synthetic or modified biological components or systems.
These changes will and already are presenting significant societal, legal and policy issues.
Appendix G provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
Table 2.11: Biotechnologies and Human Enhancement 2020-2040.

Biotechnologies Bioinformatics Moderate Expectation 6 2025
Human Augmentation High Expectation 5 2030
Medical Countermeasures High Trigger 4 2030
Synthetic Biology High Trigger 6 2025

2.4.3 (Novel) Materials and Manufacturing (NMM)
Novel Materials and Manufacturing (NMM)

Advanced (novel) materials are artificial materials with unique and novel properties. Advanced materials
may be manufactured using techniques drawn from nanotechnology or synthetic biology. Development
may include coatings with extreme heat resistance, high strength body or platform armour, stealth
coatings, energy harvesting & storage, superconductivity, advanced sensors & decontamination, bulk
production of food, fuel and building materials. Research into graphene, other novel 2-D materials, and
topological materials are an area of high potential and growing interest. Additive Manufacturing, which
is often used as a synonym for 3-D printing [102], is the process of creating an almost arbitrary 3D
solid object from a digital model through layered addition of materials. Additive Manufacturing can be
used for: rapid prototyping; in situ production & repair of deployed military equipment; and production
of precision, custom or unique parts.
Developments in novel materials and manufacturing will demonstrate both disruptive and emergent
aspects over the next 20 years. While aspects of this EDT, such as agile manufacturing (e.g. 3D/4D
printing), are assessed to be highly disruptive in areas of capability development, acquisition and logistics,
the underlying technologies are already well in place and continue to be developed, expanded and used at
a brisk pace by industry. However, at the cutting edge of research are the development and exploitation of
new materials (e.g. graphene first discovered in 2004 and other 2-D materials); new material properties
[103]; production of hitherto impossible designs; new manufacturing methods (e.g. biotechnology-based
[104]); nano-scale manipulation of materials; mixed materials printing; and, the use of AI and BDAA
to find new materials. These research areas are driven by a desire to discover or exploit new and unique
physical properties (e.g. superconductivity), as well as cheaper, stronger, lighter, more durable, or higher
capability materials (e.g. energy).
(a) Topological Materials [103]. (b) 2-D Materials
Figure 2.11: Novel Materials.

Appendix H provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the
2.5 Convergence, Inter-Dependencies and Synergies 23
Table 2.12: (Novel) Materials 2020-2040.

Materials Novel Materials High Trigger 2 2040
Additive Manufacturing Moderate Enlightenment 7 2025
Energy Storage Moderate Trigger 5 2030

2.5 Convergence, Inter-Dependencies and Synergies

EDTs rarely create an impact in isolation. Instead, they are most disruptive at the boundaries of the
physical, information or human domains or where these EDTs overlap or converge. These synergies,
along with serendipity and explicit inter-dependencies between the following EDT groups are projected to
be especially important in the development of future capabilities. It is impossible to fully characterise all
combinations of these EDTs, but six are deemed to be potentially the most disruptive.
2.5.1 Data-AI-Autonomy
The synergistic combination of autonomy, BDAA
and AI is expected to have the largest disruptive
effect on the Alliance and its military capabilities
over the next ten years. Increased use of intelli-
gent, widely distributed, ubiquitous, cheap, inter-
connected sensors and autonomous entities (physi-
cal or virtual) will lead to volumes of data that are
virtually impossible to analyse by current method-
ologies and approaches. Interrelated technologies
and methods will underlay solutions to these prob-
lems. Such technologies include 5G (and similar Figure 2.12: Sense Making.
communication technologies), cognitive EM man-
agement, the-internet-of-things (IoT), the AI-of-things (AIoT) [105], better battery technologies and even
3-D printing. Such changes, coupled with supporting space, bio- and quantum technological developments,
have the potential to create a NATO strategic and operational decision advantage, leading to the need for
new cyber and memetic warfare concepts and capabilities [29, 106].
2.5.2 Data-Quantum
Over a 15 - 20 year horizon, quantum technolo-
gies will greatly increase C4ISR data collection,
processing and exploitation capabilities, through
greatly increased sensor capabilities, secure com-
munications, and computing. In particular, quan-
tum computing may greatly increase modelling
& simulation speed and fidelity for predictive an-
alytics, and enable a quantum approach to deep
learning neural networks for greatly enhanced AI
and data analytics. This increased computational
Figure 2.13: Deeper Insights. and simulation capability will also significantly
impact the conduct of Alliance S&T through a
meta-analysis of existing science and the simulation of quantum dominated systems. This capability will,
in turn, lead to the discovery of new fundamental and applied science, novel designs, purpose-built genes
or organisms, as well as identification of novel material, chemical and biological properties. All of these
have the potential to generate disruptive effects beyond 2040.
2.5.3 Space-Hypersonics-Materials
Space and hypersonics present challenging oper-
ational domains. The development of exotic ma-
terials, novel designs, miniaturisation, energy stor-
age, manufacturing methods and propulsion will
be necessary if space and hypersonic systems are
to exploit the inherent advantages and opportuni-
ties of these domains fully. Space and hypersonic
systems share many of the same environmental
challenges. The development of new cheap, strong
and exceptionally heat resistant materials will be
essential to develop practical and affordable sys- Figure 2.14: Near Real Time Global Reach.
tems. The increased use of 3D/4D printing will
also be critical as the printing of essential parts (e.g. engines) will help to reduce costs and increase
reliability.
2.5.4 Space-Quantum
Space-based quantum sensors, facilitated by QKD
communication, will lead to entirely different
classes of sensors suitable for deployment on satel-
lites. Currently, power limitations and sensor sen-
sitivity significantly impact satellite design and
operation. Smaller, lower power, more sensitive
and more distributed space-based sensor networks
enabled by next-generation quantum technologies
will be an essential aspect of NATO’s future ISR
architecture in 20 years.
The development of large-scale satellite-
Figure 2.15: Trusted Global Communications.
relayed QKD quantum communication (QC) net-
works [107], will be essential if the Alliance is to maintain a fully secured global communication network.
Satellite-to-Earth QC has already been demonstrated for ranges over 5000km. China, in particular, is
developing a number of very ambitious demonstration projects. Technological developments over the
next 5 - 10 years are expected to greatly expand these early experiments and provide the technological
framework for robust commercial capabilities.
2.5.5 Data-AI-Biotechnologies
AI and biotechnology are developing at an expo-
nential rate, driven by greatly reduced costs, in-
creased speeds and rising commercial interest [65].
For example, the original human genome project
took ten months and cost $3 billion USD (in 2001).
Today, it takes less than one hour and costs about
$1000 (USD) to decipher a human genome [65].
AI, in-concert with BDAA and biotechnology,
will have an outsized impact on the world’s econ-
omy and health. Such a combination of EDTs will
greatly contribute to the design and discovery of Figure 2.16: Bio-Engineering.
new drugs, purposeful genetic modifications, di-
2.6 Countering EDT Threats 25
rect manipulation of biochemical reactions, development of optimised biological agents, living sensors,
development of new CBRN counter-measures and identification (through meta-analysis) of new research
areas. The use of AI to optimise the design of new biological agents molecule-by-molecule or cell-by-cell
will greatly expand our ability to tailor-make new pharmaceuticals (e.g. [108]) as well as create new
means of manufacturing for sensing. Such disruption will not be confined to the bio-sciences but will be
mirrored across all areas of S&T development.
2.5.6 Data-AI-Materials
AI, in-concert with BDAA, will contribute to
the design of new materials, the identification
and design of unique physical properties (e.g.
[109, 110]), direct manipulation of chemical reac-
tions, creation of novel designs and identification
(through meta-analysis) of new research areas. In
particular, this will support further developments
in the development of 2-D materials. This dis-
ruption will be mirrored across all areas of S&T
development.
Figure 2.17: New Materials and Products. AI and BDAA, in combination with 3D/4D
printing or bio-manufacturing, will push produc-
tion towards the edge (i.e. the user) and greatly facilitate the development of reliable, tailored, mixed
material manufactured products.
2.6 Countering EDT Threats

RED forces are themselves complex and adaptive. It is misleading to consider RED force development of
EDTs as being a simple mirror of BLUE force development. Potential asymmetric and peer/near-peer
competitors will take differing exploitation paths and may potentially target novel applications in the
physical, human or information domains.
Nevertheless, for every military capability, there are eventually counter-measures and counter-
countermeasures. As such, even where there are strict national, legal and ethical limits to the deployment
of such capabilities, Alliance nations must conduct appropriate S&T in these areas to develop such
countermeasures. As an example, this has been and will continue to be the case for CBRN threats, where
(medical) countermeasures have been developed and in some cases have yielded significant benefits in the
fight against virulent diseases such as Ebola [111, 112, 113].
Development of countermeasures for each advantage an EDT may provide will also need to be
considered within the NATO capability development process. As technology is increasingly globalised
and democratised the life-span of a technological advantage may become increasingly short. Therefore,
operational success will come to those best able to effectively integrate EDTs within enterprise and
operational functions, as well as those who continue to push the technological edge.
2.7 Summary
It is essential for the Alliance and the nations to understand the potential impact, current level of hype,
readiness, operational applicability and synergies associated with each EDT. As noted by Possony and
Pournelle [6] there is little choice but to adapt to this environment as:
“The primary fact about technology in the twentieth century is that it has a momentum of
its own. Although the technological stream can, to some extent, be directed, it is impossible
to dam it; the stream flows on endlessly. This leaves only three choices. You may swim
with the stream, exploiting every aspect of technology to its fullest; you may attempt to
crawl out on the bank and watch the rest of the world go past, or you can attempt to swim
against the stream and "put the genie back in the bottle"... The research itself does not create
technology but is merely one of technology’s major prerequisites, and technology by itself
cannot guarantee national survival.”
EDTs are poised to have a significant effect (positive and negative) on the Alliance over the next 20
years. However, productive employment of these new technologies will pose severe challenges and raise
fundamental questions of ethics and legality. Expanded use of AI, BDAA and autonomy will provide
greater access to critical operationally relevant data and knowledge, but at the risk of the fog of more.
Information itself will increasingly become a warfighting domain and a commodity. In parallel, the use of
automated and potentially autonomous systems in operations in which humans are not directly involved in
the decision cycle, will become more widespread and increase the pace of strategic competition.
Despite these potential leaps in innovation, the evolving battlespace will continue to feature a mix
of old legacy systems and new weapon systems. This mix may challenge the Alliance’s ability to fight
together. Technological gaps will pose connectivity, communications, doctrinal, legal and interoperability
challenges. Capability and capacity mismatches, as well as capacity shortfalls, are to be expected as
nations come to terms with the implications of these new technologies.
Technological advances coupled with demographic changes will place a premium on the development
of the right human capital capable of leading and operating across all domains, including strategic,
operational and tactical levels, and across multiple terrains.
While it is likely that the Alliance will maintain a degree of technological advantage in some EDT
areas, EDTs (in particular AI, Big Data, biotechnology, hypersonic) will likely become cheaper and
more accessible to hostile actors. The Alliance’s dependence on advanced technology could increasingly
become a liability if care is not taken on how they are integrated and in the development of counter-
measures. Allies must be prepared to operate in a practical (credible, aware, networked, agile and resilient)
manner. EDTs will need to be aligned with NATO military functions (prepare, project, protect, engage,
sustain, C3 and inform) and development must be focused on achieving desired military effects (assure,
contain, deter, defeat, defend, deny, stabilise and transform). It is essential that we understand the nature
of these new technologies, analyse their implications for defence and security, explore the opportunities
they offer, push the boundaries of what is possible, and ensure that we are ready to mitigate their risks.
NATO is by its international and collaborative nature well placed to consider these issues.
The development of an EDT is rarely, if ever, constant in speed or unerring in its path towards
practical application, either in the military or civilian spheres. How the underlying science and resulting
technologies will develop, what complex interactions they will have with one another, and ultimately what
military capabilities they will enable or engender is fundamentally uncertain either in result or timeline.
Nevertheless, much as the former US President and NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) Dwight D. Eisenhower said “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything” [114], the
process of forecasting S&T trends prepares NATO for the associated opportunities and risks presented by
these technologies.
3
3. Contextual Trends
Initial Conditions
“Le présent accouche, dit-on, de l’avenir.” - Voltaire [115]
3.1 Introduction
S&T developments do not take place in a vacuum, as they are driven by technological, individual,
economic, societal and organisational needs and trends. In turn, these S&T developments drive events
that fundamentally change societies/individuals and force the evolution of organisations and governments.
Understanding the forces that generate these developments is an essential first step in assessing future
technological and scientific disruption.
This section presents a brief contextual overview for of key global and strategic forces that are driving
technological progress. It draws on a number of future studies including [20, 24, 33, 44, 116, 117, 118,
119, 120, 121, 122].
3.2 Innovation and Investment

Driven by these global trends, specific technolog-
ical advances, breakthroughs, applications and ul-
timately, military capabilities may be generated
through multiple innovation paths (Figure 3.1).
Such paths may include the novel use of old tech-
nologies; application of new technologies to old
problems; the application of modern science to de-
velop novel techniques and technical tools engen-
dering new science and ultimately new technolo-
gies; and, the creative convergence and integration
of old and new technologies.
For NATO, the path from S&T idea to mili-
tary capability is tied to a continuous process of
assessment, concept development and experimen-
tation. This process is an essential framework for Figure 3.1: Innovation.
evaluating the potential military value of EDTs
28 Chapter 3. Contextual Trends
and ensuring appropriate operational concepts exist for uptake into operational capabilities. Alliance
collaboration facilitates these activities through coordinated investment and assessment. Differing national
S&T funding levels, acquisition programs, operational priorities and time horizons are challenges to this
collaboration. Nonetheless, bringing to bear the intellectual and financial resources available across the
Alliance provides a robust framework for assessing and developing new EDT based capabilities. Despite
existing monopolies, new technologies which offer a cost-effective alternative to current approaches tend
to be eventually adopted widely and quickly. With this investment comes the increased availability of
technology for military capabilities.
High levels of investment generally drive rapid technological development and reflect their success
(real or potential) in the marketplace or on the battlefield. Innovative countries leverage this investment
through intense R&D efforts, development of high-value and value-added industries, and the nurturing of
a highly skilled, productive and educated workforce. Figure 3.2 presents a ranking of the top 60 innovative
countries for 2020 [123]. As expected, Alliance countries consistently rank highly for innovation. What is
perhaps more surprising is to note that in 2020 the U.S. has fallen from first place in 2013 to ninth place,
while China has risen to fifteenth place from twenty-first place in 2017.
Figure 3.2: Bloomberg Innovation Index - Top 60 Countries (2020) - Scale 0 (Poor) - 100 (Excellent)
(SOURCE: [124]).
Investment in defence S&T remains substantial (see Figure 3.3) as it is often seen as a key mechanism
for shaping the national innovation agenda [125]. However, over the last 20 years, the drivers for S&T
development have resided more and more outside the Defence and Security community, with commercial
and societal needs providing the impetus for new capabilities (e.g. [126]). Technology uptake within a
society impacts the development of EDTs, as well as creating potential vulnerabilities in both military and
civilian spheres.
Underlying science (TRL 1-3) for such commercial successes still overwhelmingly comes from
government funding and research activities, which are better placed to absorb the risks associated with
such developments [41]. The level of such investments and those from industry are a vital factor in
determining the long term rate of technological and capability development.
3.2 Innovation and Investment 29
France, 2.1%
Germany, 2.2%
Japan, 1.8%
South Korea, 4.9%

United States, 81.2%
Turkey, 2.0%
United Kingdom,
3.5%
All Others,
2.3%
(a) Share of Total OECD Government Defence R&D Funding, by Country, 2017 (in purchasing power parity terms).
0.30%
0.25%
0.20%
0.15%
0.10%
0.05%
0.00%
(b) OECD Countries with the Highest Levels of Government Defence R&D Funding as a Share of GDP, 2017.
Figure 3.3: Government Defense R&D Funding (SOURCE: OECD, RDS Database) [127].
As noted by [32] and [128] there are growing investments in AI, quantum computing and information,
commercial space, synthetic biology, cloud computing, cybersecurity and (big data) analytics. These
investments are key drivers of new military capabilities [18, 23]. For example, global investment in AI
research is set to exceed $1 trillion by 2030, driven in no small measure by Chinese investment and a stated
goal to become the world’s leader in AI by 2030 [129]. The US and the EU have also pledged billions of
dollars & euros to support AI research with more than $2 billion dollars set aside for defence-related AI
research.
Global investment in S&T has changed substantially over the last few decades [130]. For example, in
the 1960s, the USA share of global research and development was 69%. By 2016 this share had fallen to
28% with Chinese investment rising substantially as a function of purchasing power and as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (see Figure 3.4).
On a less positive note, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [132]
observes that:
“The share of government in total funding of R&D decreased by four percentage points
(from 31% to 27%) in the OECD area between 2009 and 2016 ... But current trends in
public research and development (R&D) spending may not be commensurate with the similar
ambition and challenges delineated in mission-oriented policies. Since 2010, government
R&D expenditures in the OECD as a whole and almost all Group of Seven countries have
stagnated or decreased, not only in absolute amounts and relative to gross domestic product
but also as a share of total government expenditure.”
At the same time that government funding has been decreasing some research suggests that techno-
logical innovation is slowing down [133, 134, 134, 135]. Others, such as Microsoft’s Bill Gates disagree
strongly [136]. Both perspectives may be correct given the ambiguity in defining innovation and the long
lead times between national investments, scientific discovery and practical application.
Innovation (i.e. novelty for a purpose) should not necessarily be conflated with emerging nor is
disruption necessarily game-changing technology [137]. Other aspects of the innovation ecosystem are
equally important, such as access, design, motivation, costs, intent, culture and societal expectations.
Further, advances in mathematics, engineering and human factors are not necessarily technological but
may be highly disruptive and innovative. Serendipity and synergy often play a critical role in bringing
together ideas, people and technology to create disruption. Low cost, widely available technologies
used in creative ways, employing creative designs, or addressing problems in a manner that facilitates
easy adoption can be highly disruptive (e.g. the Apple iPhone [138]). In seeking military innovation,
it is essential to distinguish between innovation and disruption and to appreciate the critical nature of
these additional factors, which range across all aspects of DOTMLPFI [Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability].
3.3 Strategic Drivers

The following key strategic drivers will likely affect technology trends over the next 20 years. This section
offers some thoughts and assumptions regarding these drivers.
3.3.1 The Operational Environment (Space & Info-sphere, Arctic, Urban)

The range of potential NATO operations is expanding and evolving as the geopolitical, military, economic,
social, climatic and technological landscapes change [139]. Space, the info-sphere, the arctic and urban
domains are particular areas of rapid evolution.
The Space Domain
Space has been a human domain for over 60 years, and essential militarily for at least that long. However,
commercialisation, new propulsion options, novel materials, miniaturisation of sensors and electronics,
and agile manufacturing have issued in a new era of rapid development. These have significantly reduced
the cost of space access and increase the availability of space derived information. As a result, space
GDP
Gross domestic spending on R&D

(Million-Million US Dollars (2010 Base Year))
$0.60
$0.50
$0.40
$0.30
$0.20
$0.10
$0.00
1996
1999
2006
2009
2012
2016
1995
1997
1998
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2010
2011
2013
2014
2015
2017
CAN CHN EU28 GBR TUR USA
(a) Gross domestic spending on R&D (2010 USD).
Gross domestic spending on R&D

(% of GDP)
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
1995
1996
1997
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2016
2017
1998
2015
CAN CHN EU28 GBR TUR USA
(b) Gross domestic spending on R&D (% of GDP), 2017.
Figure 3.4: Total R&D Funding By Select Countries (Canada, China, European Union, Great Britian,
Turkey, USA) (SOURCE: OECD, RDS Database [131]).
is increasingly contested, congested, competitive and commercial. With growing Alliance and global
reliance on space-based technologies, the control of space could become a significant flash-point [118].
The risk of militarisation is not insignificant. This risk includes the use of anti-satellite (ASAT) (hard
or soft kill) weapons [140, 141, 142], which have the potential to pollute the near-earth environment,
significantly increasing the risk of collision with space debris.
Given these concerns, NATO has recently de-
clared space as an operational domain, implicitly
recognising that with the increased peaceful use of
space and space-based technologies (e.g. commu-
nication and sensing) comes an increased risk of
malicious actions in space. As noted by the NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg [143]:
“Satellites can be jammed, hacked or

weaponised. Anti-satellite weapons
Figure 3.5: Satellite Based Automatic Identification could cripple communications and
System (S-AIS) for Maritime Situational Awareness other services our societies rely on,
(CREDIT: MarineTraffic.com). such as air travel, weather forecast
or banking. Space is also essential to
the Alliance’s deterrence and defence.
Including the ability to navigate, to gather intelligence, and to detect missile launches.
Around 2,000 satellites currently orbit the Earth. And around half of them are owned by
NATO countries. NATO has no intention to put weapons in space. We are a defensive Alliance.
And our approach will remain fully in line with international law. But making space an
operational domain will help us ensure that all aspects are taken into account to ensure the
success of our missions.”
Given the Alliance’s reliance on space-based systems, NATO will need to increase its vigilance and
resilience in this domain.
The Infosphere (Cyber, Electronic Warfare (EW), and the Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum)
The information domain (including cyber, EW (Figure 3.6) and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum man-
agement) or info-sphere, is a unique operational environment. This domain is driven by the digitisation
and virtualisation of individuals, organisations and societies [44]. Global access to social media and
mobile communications have created new virtual communities and empowered individuals working within
complex social networks unbound by geographic boundaries but increasingly defined by emergent virtual
ones and associated echo chambers. Social and individual empowerment so engendered have become in
many ways as important to the modern world as food, water or shelter. This empowerment is true across
the globe and at all levels of economic development, driven by the deep-seated human need for social
contact. Blended and virtual reality systems have blurred the distinction between physical and artificial
realities. 5G and the internet-of-things (IoT) will also increasingly enable the use of the info-sphere.
Such empowerment is being challenged by nations, through national firewalls and social metrics to
control, shape and constrain social discourse and individual expressions of discontent. At the same time,
fringe communities and near peer-competitors have found a voice in the info-sphere with trolling, mob
behaviour, and disinformation campaigns becoming increasingly sophisticated. The use of AI in this
context to create competing narratives and alternate facts (e.g. deep fakes, chatbots, etc.) is not a question
for the future but a reality today.
The information space is an evolving operational domain and one where others are increasingly active
[145, 146, 147]. NATO operations in the info-sphere will require increasingly sophisticated approaches to
cyber, EW and EM management. The info-sphere is the critical operational domain for hybrid warfare.
Success in hybrid warfare will require winning the war in the info-sphere. This success will require the
development of a competing Alliance narrative, trolling the increasingly deep and murky data ocean
Figure 3.6: Electronic Warfare in Today’s Military Environment [144].
that such virtualisation and digitisation creates, and developing a decision advantage in terms of speed,
accuracy and effect. The impact of EDTs in this area will be profound.
The Arctic
The Arctic has reemerged as an area of strategic importance to Alliance nations [148, 149, 150, 151],
partners [152], and others with interests in polar climate change and resource development [153, 154]. Of
more concern has been the resurgence of Russian military activity [155, 156, 157], as well as growing
interest by non-arctic nations [153, 154, 158].
(a) RCAF Twin Otter (440 Sqn): Ellesmere Island. (b) HDMS Knud Rasmussen.
Figure 3.7: Austere Arctic Operations (CREDIT: DF Reding).

Increased military and commercial activity in the Arctic, driven by the allure of resources, new shipping
routes, tourism and changing climatic conditions suggests that NATO will need to expand its limited
ability to operate across the Arctic. While many Alliance nations have considerable Arctic operational
experience (e.g. Figure 3.7), this will present a challenge for the vast majority of NATO capabilities that
were designed for more benign operational conditions. Operations over vast distances, where few satellites
regularly pass, will make GPS and communication coverage sparse. Weather conditions (both atmospheric
and space) will degrade sensor, communication and vehicle performance. The freezing winters, swarming
insects, permafrost, short summers, muskeg and highly variable weather conditions pose a further risk to
human health and equipment not prepared to withstand such conditions. Technologies, including many of
those considered in this report, will be challenged to operate successfully in the Arctic.
The Urban Theatre
Figure 3.8: NATO Joint Military Operations in an Urban Environment: A Capstone Concept [159].
Urban areas are expected to be a stage upon which NATO operations are increasingly conducted [44].
Estimates by the United Nations are that by 2050 68% of the world’s population will live in urban areas
[160]. As this develops, the number of mega-cities (i.e. those with populations greater than 10 million)
will increase from 28 to 50 [161]. This increased urbanisation, driven by economic and climatic changes,
will stress civil societies and present a challenge to military operations at any scale [162].
The engagement space of the future urban operational environment will be highly multi-dimensional
and hybrid in nature, with strategic success depending on successful information, social, EM and cyber
engagements. There will be an increased need to operate with minimal or no collateral damage in
environments where the difference between combatants and non-combatants may be difficult to discern or
change minute-to-minute. New technologies will be essential to ensure adequate situational awareness
and (kinetic or non-kinetic) precision in these scenarios, with the internet-of-things providing millions
of possible sensors and urban transportation systems increasing the complexity of operations [118].
But, buildings and underground systems inhibit sensor systems, and radio-frequency interference can
severely degrade sensor and communications performance. Furthermore, military forces will need to work
comprehensively alongside local governments, NGOs, OGDs and security forces. However, they may not
be completely interoperable with multinational deployed military forces or even seek the same strategic
objectives.
3.3.2 Culture, Ethics & Law

Culture, ethics and laws shape the integration of technology into society and ultimately define its effect
and value. As a result, Alliance nations have differing constraints around the operational use of EDTs
and the capabilities they engender. These constraints ultimately impact development, interoperability and
employment of EDTs as part of Alliance military capabilities. As noted by A. Kaspersen, the former Head
Geopolitics and International Security at the World Economic forum [163]:
“Such is the speed, complexity and ubiquity of innovation today, we need a regulation
process that looks ahead to how emerging technologies could conceivably be weaponised,
without holding back the development of those technologies for beneficial ends. “Hard
governance” of laws and regulations remain necessary, but we will also need to make more
use of faster-moving “soft governance” mechanisms such as laboratory standards, testing
and certification regimes, insurance policies and mechanisms like those set up by academics
to make potentially dangerous research subject to approval and oversight. This will need to
proactively anticipate and adapt to not only technological changes, but also macro-cultural
ones, which are a lot harder to predict.”
NATO itself is well-positioned to ensure that such fundamental issues are addressed so that EDT derived
military capabilities will be interoperable, used in a legally defined manner, and seamlessly integrated into
Alliance operations.
As technology advances at an increasingly
rapid pace, legal frameworks, social norms and
regulations are lagging. Despite the global reach
and implications of many technologies, there are
few international regulatory agreements. As the
centre of mass for technology development moves
to the commercial realm, there are associated risks
and opportunities, e.g. the increased use of lawfare
[45] whereby strategic legal actions maybe taken
to limit the use and exploitation of contested tech-
nologies. Contracts with industry may increase
operational risks e.g. through the loss of the right
to repair, with additional restrictions placed on sys-
tem performance and maintenance documentation
due to IP restrictions [165, 166, 167]. Alterna-
tively, the development of publicly available data
and open source tools, such as those employing the
GNU General Public License, have been credited
as a driver of innovation in artificial intelligence
research [63, 64].
Ethical and regulatory issues have surrounded
the development of EDTs and have had a direct
impact on the development of defence-related ca-
pabilities, in particular in the areas of autonomy,
AI and big data (e.g. [68, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, Figure 3.9: Towards Rule of Law in the Digital Envi-
172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177]). On the other hand, ronment [164].
the democratisation of technology (i.e. reduced
costs and increased access), raises the concern as to how much regulation is needed to safeguard society
from high-tech rogue actors whose capabilities are only limited by their imagination. Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear technologies (CBRN) in particular have traditionally been highly regulated
to prevent proliferation, but these regulations may be inadequate if anyone can set up a bio-engineering
laboratory in a backyard or basement.
From a broad societal perspective, there is cultural resistance to integrating civilian capabilities into
the military arsenal. For example, while non-lethal weapons may reduce casualties or collateral damage,
even in high-intensity war-fighting scenarios, and increase operational effectiveness, they are seen by
many as not a military weapon thereby slowing down their adoption and integration into the operational
toolkit. Similarly, the military use of current information and cyber capabilities has been slower than
expected, likely due to cultural resistance in both civil and military societies.
The challenges of maintaining privacy in a digital and virtual world are profound. When it comes to
ethics and confidentiality, there is no single global social norm regarding how personal data is used. In the
West, populations are generally resistant to the use of their data by governments. Nevertheless, even in
Alliance countries, privacy concerns may be overridden in the name of security [178]. Some societies
or governments see value in using such data to reinforce social norms (e.g. [179]). Having uninhibited
access to an entire population’s worth of data gives a clear advantage for training AI and conducting
advanced social analytics.
3.3.3 The Environment

Protecting and sustaining the environment is a critical concern when it comes to defence and security. As
noted, environmental disruption can quickly lead to disruption of a society, or the use of toxic materials
in weapons can render large areas unusable or hazardous. Long term stewardship of the environment
(urban, space, maritime, land and air), including consideration of flora and fauna, is an important factor in
weapon system design as well as training.
Figure 3.10: The Changing Arctic Environment (CREDIT: NOAA [180]).

Climate change will be a major disruptive force in the upcoming decades (e.g. Figure 3.10), with
a number of future studies (e.g. [24, 41, 44, 116, 117, 118, 120, 128, 181] to name a few) highlighting
the potential for climate change to drive future conflict. Increased shortages and control of food, lack
of fresh water, reduced biodiversity, mineral and energy competition will all challenge global cohesion
and power balances. Climate change and rising sea levels will threaten individuals and cities, leading to
mass migrations and whole societies struggling to adapt. It is projected that by 2050 [182] more than 150
million people around the world currently living on land will be below the high-tide mark. The projected
loss of entire islands, coastal areas and cities will challenge national boundaries and economies leading to
further social, economic and military disruption.
3.3.4 Miscellaneous
Following [20, 24, 39, 44, 120, 121, 122, 183, 184, 184], we also note that several other strategic trends
have the potential to impact future NATO capabilities or operations. These include:
• The Changing Nature of Work: Increased reliance on AI and Autonomy will redefine work;
• Education: Use of virtual realities, AI, big data etc. will enable personalised training;
3.4 Defence and Security 37
• Automated Logistics: AI and Autonomy increasingly enable automated transportation and logis-
tics;
• Food and Water Technologies: Application of novel materials and techniques, along with bio-
engineering and biotechnologies may increase water and food supplies;
• Human Capital: An ageing global population, economic migration patterns and uneven develop-
ments within nations will challenge societies and recruitment efforts by military forces. Further, the
ability of a society to exploit and absorb new technologies is limited by the availability of talented
and skilled individuals able and willing to take on the challenge. Demographic shifts, job losses due
to AI and autonomy, globalisation of talent and a growing skills mismatch may ultimately challenge
the Alliance’s ability to manage and absorb the disruption and exploit the opportunities presented
by EDTs.
• Changing Global Economic Framework: Increased pressure on and decoupling of the interna-
tional economic framework into protected technological silos (bifurcation) will hamper technologi-
cal and economic development [185, 186]; and,
• Infectious Diseases and Pandemics: New diseases, reduced vaccination rates and growing resis-
tance to countermeasures (e.g. antibiotics) will challenge global health & development and Alliance
operations.
3.4 Defence and Security

The defence and security environment itself is changing [24] driven by the evolving nature of conflict and
geopolitical factors. Chaos, complexity and competition [187] are said to be the defining characteristics of
this future.
Two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the potential for great power competition [188, 189] is
greater than ever. As stated in the 2019 NATO London Summit Declaration:
“We, as an Alliance, are facing distinct threats and challenges emanating from all strategic
directions. Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism
in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all. State and non-state
actors challenge the rules-based international order. Instability beyond our borders is also
contributing to irregular migration. We face cyber and hybrid threats. . . To stay secure, we
must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies
to maintain our technological edge while preserving our values and norms. . . We have
declared space an operational domain for NATO, recognising its importance in keeping us
safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law. We are increasing
our tools to respond to cyber-attacks, and strengthening our ability to prepare for, deter,
and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies. We are
stepping up NATO’s role in human security. We recognise that China’s growing influence
and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address
together as an Alliance.”
The NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg

has also stated [190]:
“China’s role and influence is an-

other sign of increasing global power
competition ... Its economic rise and
technological prowess are powering
global growth. This brings many op-
portunities, financially and politically.
But China’s rise also has implications
for the global rules-based order and
our security. We see this in the South
China Sea, in cyberspace, and Chi-
nese investments in critical infrastruc-
ture. So we need to understand bet-
ter the challenges and opportunities
China presents.”
Such geopolitical challenges are expected to

grow over the next 20 years. These develop-
ments will present significant operational chal-
lenges to the Alliance, compounded by the in-
creased democratisation of technology, as well
as new technological threats from peer & near- Figure 3.11: The NATO Secretary-General Jens
peer competitors, terrorists, criminals and irregular Stoltenberg at the NATO Summit - London 2019.
forces.
4
4. Conclusion
Understanding Trends
“We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the
long run.” - Amara’s law [191].
Conflict is enduring, but the nature of that conflict continues to change, driven in no small measure by
advances in technology, tools and scientific understanding. This evolution will be a vital feature of the
future battlespace or zones of conflict, whether physical or virtual. These evolving multi-domain complex
operational spaces will have significant implications for the development and future employment of the
Alliance’s instruments of power. If NATO is to develop a new strategy of technology it must do so in the
context of evolving geographic, geopolitical and military domains, which in themselves are driven in no
small part by technologies that are increasingly intelligent, interconnected, distributed and digital.
This report has considered how EDTs will disrupt, degrade and enable NATO military capabilities in
the 2020-2040 timeframe. Such characteristics of modern technologies are drivers of the current evolution
and revolution in data, AI, autonomy, space, quantum, hypersonics, biotechnologies and materials. Alone
or in combination, they define the technological edge necessary for NATO’s operational and organisational
effectiveness. How quickly, in what order, and ultimately how successful these technologies will be,
or what threats they will present, is yet to be determined. However, long term forecasts of military
technologies provide a useful exercise while offering a guide to prioritising capability and technology
investments. The techno-policy, legal and ethical challenges that they present NATO can not be overstated.
Understanding why they present a problem or opportunity, how they are expected to manifest, and what
this will mean to the Alliance is an excellent first step and will ensure NATO remains technologically
prepared and operationally relevant.
Appendices
A
A. Data
Big Data - Impact

“So you should expect big data to have a big impact. And you can bet that it will help machines interact
more usefully with our unstructured, changing, and sometimes downright confusing human ways. But
if you’re counting on it to make people much more predictable, you’re expecting too much.” - Gregory
Piatetsky-Shapiro [192]
Definition
(Big) Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA)
Big Data describes data that presents significant volume, velocity, variety, veracity and visualisation
challenges. Increased digitalisation, a proliferation of new sensors, new communication modes, the
internet-of-things and virtualisation of socio-cognitive spaces (e.g. social media) have contributed
significantly to the development of Big Data. Advanced (Data) Analytics describes advanced analytical
methods for making sense of and visualising large volumes of information. These techniques span
a wide range of methods drawn from research areas across the data and decision sciences, including
artificial intelligence, optimisation, modelling & simulation (M&S), human factors engineering and
operational research.
Keywords
Big Data · Optimisation · Analytics · 5G · Operations Research ·Decision Science · Data Science ·
AI·Human Factors · Predictive Analytics · Business Analytics · Business Intelligence
Overview
BDAA (Big Data and Advanced Analytics) is a direct outgrowth of our increasingly digital and virtual
world, and the subsequent need to make sense of the resulting information deluge. In particular, analytics
is the process of generating understanding (e.g. through mathematical analysis and visualisation) and
providing insights into current system states (descriptive) or future system states (predictive). The analyst
is often faced with data having significant volume, velocity, variety, veracity or visualisation challenges.
Vast amounts of data available throughout the future physical, human or information battle-spaces will
42 Chapter A. Data
enable analytics to deliver insights and predictions, provide real-time decision support, and highlight
early indicators of success and warnings of crises. Increased use of predictive analytics and M&S will
enable decision-makers to exceed their cognitive limits while improving consideration, interdependencies,
intransparencies and temporal dynamics [193, 194]. In the end this will allow decision-makers to better
understand the potential impact of their decisions, and adjust plans accordingly (Figure A.1). Many
aspects of BDAA are well developed and, while it is and will continue to be highly disruptive in nature,
some have questioned whether it is truly an emergent technology at this time [195].
BDAA is understood to encompass four essential components: (1) collection (sensors); (2) com-
munication; (3) analysis; and, (4) decision making. The 5V’s (volume, velocity, variety, veracity and
visualisation) describe the essential challenge of BDAA: how to make sense of large amounts of non-
homogeneous data coming too fast, and of potentially dubious authenticity and accuracy. BDAA covers
the human (social media, bioinformatics, etc.), physical (sensors) and information (cyber, analysis, etc.)
domains.
BDAA is a foundational technology and, as
such, understanding its projected development is
a critical step in understanding other EDTs. From
Decisions a technology watch perspective, BDAA will be
(faster, better)
enabled by S&T developments in a variety of ar-
Big Data
and
eas, which include: exploitation of human sig-
Advanced natures; modelling and simulation for social me-
Analytics dia; modular multisensor fusion engines; provi-
(BDAA)
sion and discovery of M&S tools and services in
More Efficient
use of New the cloud; visual analytics; decision support and
Resources Capabilities planning support with M&S in the battlefield; vir-
tual mission areas; distributed ledger technologies
(e.g. blockchain); cognitive sensing; compressive
Figure A.1: BDAA Goals. sensing; computational imaging; deep learning;
electric-and magnetic-field sensing; photonic inte-
grated circuits; sensing sources data fusion; swarm centric systems; and, wideband telecommunications.
Sensors are a critical enabler of BDAA. Sensors provide the data in the physical domain, and
increasingly in the human domain. Ubiquitous sensing or sensors everywhere will be significantly enabled
by the growth of 5G communication and the internet-of-things (IoT). The concept of sensors everywhere
refers to the ability to detect and track any object or phenomenon from a distance by processing data
acquired from high tech, low tech, active and passive sensors. Effectively everything will be a sensor, and
every sensor will be networked. Military applications will be wide-ranging, including the development of
a multi-domain common operating picture, large scale underwater sensor mesh networks, exploitation and
weaponising of social media, automated logistics planning, autonomous systems, and integrated soldier
systems. While sensor technologies are expected to evolve to support greater precision and accuracy,
the most disruptive development will be the combination of further miniaturisation, reduced costs, novel
(3D/4D) manufacturing and the sheer volume and wide distribution of sensors in the military sphere.
Advances in materials technology also promise future sensors at the molecular, nano or quantum scale.
Technological development of new sensor technologies will be rapid over the next 20 years. Such
developments include:
• Smart textiles [196] imbued with molecular/nanoscale sensors providing real-time health and
environment monitoring are expected to be widely available by 2030.
• Next-generation Over-the-horizon (OTH) [197, 198, 199, 200] and passive radar systems will
provide wide-area air space surveillance, employing sophisticated data processing and multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) technologies. Passive OTH radar is likely to be in a mature prototype
state within 5-10 years, with fully fielded systems in place in the 10-15 year time-frame. Air target
detection ranges could increase from 350km to 1500km.
43
Figure A.2: Hypothetical OTH Northern Radar Coverage.
• Quantum sensing which, in the long term, will generate a revolution in sensing technology, enabling
very high sensitivity sensors capable of long-range detection of aircraft, submarines or subterranean
activities. This capability allows the development of smaller higher performance sensors to monitor
weapon system health and performance.
• The use of digital twins (highly detailed virtual models of a specific weapon system [201]) will
become increasingly commonplace over the next ten years, relying on extensive embedded sensor
networks, including those tied to the human and information aspects of such systems.
• Computational imaging (CI) which holds great promise to revolutionise such EO/IR sensors, as
well as providing significantly increased sensitivity. CI refers to image formation techniques
that use digital computation to recover an image of the scene. Compressive sensing (CS), a CI
subset, involves capturing a smaller number of specially designed measurements from the scene
to recover the image or task-specific scene information computationally. CS has the potential to
acquire an image with similar information content to a large format array while using smaller,
cheaper, and lower bandwidth components. More significantly, data acquisition can be designed
to capture task-specific and mission-relevant information guided by the scene content with more
flexibility. CI has the potential to reduce system size, weight, power, and cost while enabling
simultaneous target acquisition and situational awareness (multiplexed imager), perception range
extension (Non-Line-of-Sight Imager, multispectral imaging), and multipurpose imagers.
• Microwave photonics, which is on the verge of delivering higher performance, lower power, more
robust sensing and wireless communication on the battlefield.
The EM spectrum and associate communication modalities are at the centre of big data, enabling
both sensors and communication. Control of the EM spectrum is a necessary prerequisite to information
dominance. Electromagnetic Dominance is the ability to use more of the spectrum, to share the spectrum
more efficiently, to protect one’s own forces’ use of the spectrum and to deny enemy use. The future
will bring, among other things, faster, more reliable wireless/radio communications, electronic warfare
resilience, secure streaming video and smaller deployed footprint. As a result, the EM spectrum is and
will continue to be increasingly congested as military and commercial systems via for bandwidth. The
use of AI to support cognitive sensors (e.g. cognitive radars) and communications, which adjust in
an agile fashion to maximise collection and through-put, will become essential to avoid conflict in the
congested (and perhaps contested) EM spectrum. This will be especially essential for operations in urban
environments.
44 Chapter A. Data
By 2025, decoys will have the capability to obscure visual and thermal and radar wavebands and
be an integrated part of defensive aids suites. It should be technically possible to have fleets of robotic
decoys for deception operations, but simple decoys aimed at mimicking the electromagnetic signature
of headquarters of manoeuvre units are more likely to be developed in the short term. Electromagnetic
field-based stealth systems and broadcast electronic decoys hold promise for the defensive capabilities of
future electrically powered systems.
Changing from the physical to the human do-
main, the increased virtualisation of social and in-
dividual interactions has contributed dramatically
to the availability of social and personal data. One
aspect of this virtualisation, Social Media, refers to
the full range of internet-based and mobile commu-
nications where users participate in online shared
exchanges and contribute user-related content or
participate in online communities of mutual inter-
est. Its applications in defence and security include
population surveillance, sentiment analysis, knowl- Figure A.3: The Social Brain.
edge and information sharing, low-cost means to
stay in touch with families and strategic communications. Social media content continuously grows with
ever-increasing rate but struggles to deal with issues of veracity and value. DARPA [202], in particular,
continues to explore the implications of social media in such areas as linguistic cues; patterns of infor-
mation flow; topic trend analysis; narrative structure analysis; sentiment detection and opinion mining;
meme-tracking across communities; graph analytics/probabilistic reasoning; pattern detection; cultural
narratives; inducing identities; modelling emergent communities; trust analytics; network dynamics
modelling; automated content generation; bots in social media; and, crowd-sourcing. As social media
reaches more corners of society, it increasingly enables significant and subtle influences on the expression
of collective political and social power. The technology has already demonstrated the potential to alter the
nature of political and social discourse leading to new, rapid and decisive mobilisation of populations at
the right place and the right time to achieve political and social objectives. Similarly, data collection in the
social sphere allows an unprecedented understanding of human social behaviour and group dynamics.
BDAA is being enabled in no small measure by ubiquitous computing, that is computing anywhere,
anytime and on any device. Integrated with military mobile networks and mission cloud computing,
ubiquitous computing has the potential to provide real-time decision support to the individual soldier at
all times and all places. Such mesh networks of connected devices will allow BLUE forces to leverage
and exploit distributed data structures and cloud computing services. It also encompasses software-driven
functionality, with the ability to process incoming data at the sensor before transmission, and exploits
advances in encryption that will enable assured information transfer across a network.
Secure communication and data storage is es-
sential in military operations. Databases are the
traditional means to store and maintain structured
and related data. More recently, distributed ledger
technologies (e.g. blockchain) have emerged and
been used as the distributed, transparent, and per-
manent data management technology underlying
the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. The increased use of
blockchain technologies (along with AI-enabled
defensive cyber-bots/agents, quantum key distri-
Figure A.4: Global Data. bution (QKD) and post-quantum encryption) will
significantly increase the Alliance’s ability to en-
sure trusted communications and data storage.
Analytics and advanced computational techniques for data processing and fusion, will improve
45
sensor ranges and provide richer contextual information than is currently possible. Artificial Intelligence,
specifically machine learning, is a promising computational technique capable of processing large volumes
of seemly disparate, disorganised, and ostensibly unrelated information. These predictive, correlative
models are valuable tools for detecting intent and predicting possible future actions and events. The utility
of these models and deep learning techniques will increase as methods for data-driven learning mature
and as the underlying data grows almost without bounds.
Over the next 20-years, data volume will con-
tinue to grow, as the number of handheld and
internet-connected devices grows exponentially,
and the IoT becomes a reality. By 2021 global
spending on IoT is expected to reach 1.4 trillion
USD [203], and by 2030 500 billion items are ex-
pected to be interconnected [204]. The sheer vol-
ume of data that this will create is difficult to com-
prehend. The associated legal, policy and privacy
considerations are decidedly non-trivial. To deal
with this deluge, better tools for analysis (without Figure A.5: Advanced Decision-making.
the analyst) will need to emerge. Companies will
grow increasingly data-driven and willing to apply analytics-derived insights to critical business operations.
Intuitive decision-making will diminish somewhat as companies integrate analytics across the board.
Organisations will struggle with data privacy, security and governance issues.
Visualisation techniques are critical enablers in assessing social media data supporting decision
making. The civilian market is making extensive use of visual analytics methods for marketing purposes.
This technology may be partly transferable to the defence and security domains.
A continuing trend away from centralised-only data silos is also noted. Smart devices will collaborate,
while processing will increasingly be at the edge where the data was born and exists. Machine-learning
algorithms will be able to adjudicate peer-to-peer communications and decisions in real-time.
Decision-makers will have access to sophisticated simulation models to support time-sensitive decision
making. Access to models will also be available during training to improve realism. Low power flexible
displays for soldiers will enhance information flow between the tactical and command levels and enhance
situational awareness. Quantum encryption will allow encrypted communications between parties,
instantly revealing eavesdropping.
Developments in BDAA S&T are driven by massive commercial investments, as well as the availability
of publicly available training data sets and tools for algorithm development and testing [63, 64]. Many
alliance nations have made significant BDAA investments in both civilian and military environments.
NATO will, therefore, be able to leverage these investments, while extending, adapting and integrating them
into NATO processes and operations. Continued investment in enabling capabilities, R&D collaboration
and common standards and policies for data collection, curation and management will be necessary to
ensure the successful integration of BDAA into the Alliance enterprise and operations. Potential legal,
commercial and IP issues may provide additional challenges to the successful use of BDAA in a NATO
context. Such challenges include introducing unanticipated vulnerabilities, limited configuration control
and a lack of explainability.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
BLUE
Excelling at BDAA has the potential to create a NATO decision and knowledge advantage, grounded
in the innovative collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination and fusion of immense and wide-
ranging data sources and information products. Success in this area would support a more refined and
comprehensive understanding of tactical, operational and strategic environments and courses of action.
Areas most likely to be affected include:
46 Chapter A. Data
1. ISR: The proliferation of advanced sensors and the increased use of autonomous systems will
dramatically increase NATO’s ability to detect, classify, recognise, identify and engage threats across
physical and virtual operational domains. Adaptive solid-state power amplifiers and optimised
waveforms will support simultaneous search and track capability for the interdiction of airborne
targets, resulting in faster and more accurate ISR and exploitation of multiple intelligence source
analysis. Passive radar reduces the vulnerability of systems to electronic countermeasures and
increases the detection capabilities of stealth targets. Advanced processing at the sensor itself,
will result in lower bandwidth requirements, faster sensor-to-shooter times and more reliable data
transfer. Capabilities inherent in devices utilised to enable social media, such as video, audio, text,
GPS, proximity detection, and others will transform traditional ISR capabilities. The addition of
social network sensing to traditional sensor data fusion will enable: multimodal content filtering
and summarization; data fusion for event detection; event tracking; analysis of social dynamics;
and, anomaly determination.
2. Situational Awareness: Improved mapping of mission areas for planning & preparation and
rehearsal environments will support operational planning and increased situational awareness (SA).
This increased SA includes improved patterns of life, human terrain and anomaly detection. This
awareness will be further enabled by enhanced low power display capabilities for soldier systems,
embedded analytics (e.g. AI) and increased information flow between the tactical and command
levels. Geo-tagged soldier system and social media data will also be used to generate increasingly
accurate environmental information. Deep learning used in the deciphering of internet content
has the potential to identify security-relevant information through social behaviour on the internet
merged with content extraction from multiple text documents (even if specific intent is not explicitly
referenced). Fusing social media data with more traditional sensor data provides a more vibrant and
accurate human-terrain mapping and common operational picture [205, 206].
3. Training and Readiness: Virtual environments and bioinformatics will support improve training
for operations. Physiological and psychological state monitoring will maximise overall human
performance and readiness through increased health and safety monitoring and injury protection.
Algorithmic optimisation of individual and team performance & readiness will also be possible.
4. Enterprise Management: NATO’s basic business processes, policy development and strategic
planning will all benefit from an increasingly sophisticated and evidence-based approach, including
real-time monitoring of the impact of decisions and predictive assessments of options through
advanced M&S.
5. Logistics: The increased integration of weapon system health monitoring sensors, real-time in-
ventory monitoring and the use of digital twins will significantly increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the logistic system while reducing life-cycle costs. A greater understanding of
the current status of munitions and their ability to achieve mission objectives will also be possible
through Integrated Munition Health Management models enhancing relative safety, reliability and
performance risks.
6. Support to Operations: Vast quantities of sensor data (ISR, logistics, bioinformatics, human
terrain, etc.) will support a more comprehensive understanding and approach to the operational
environment. Combined with AI, this will enable a more holistic approach to operational planning,
courses of actions analysis and (kinetic and non-kinetic) targeting. Improved understanding and
modelling of adversarial group behaviours will help enable the ability to generate courses of action
that are disruptive to their goals and activities.
7. S&T: BDAA will have a significant impact on (defence) S&T through meta-analyses of existing
scientific and technical knowledge. This meta-analysis, in turn, will lead to the creation of novel
materials, development of new and better sensors, the discovery of new underlying science etc.
which will directly impact the development of new NATO capabilities.
47
8. Information Management: Contextual programming will enable search engines to move beyond
simple keyword searches by discerning the intent behind the search and offer more targeted
information. This approach may be used to predict security risks from a deep analysis of personal
contacts, social network behaviour, and location information.
RED
RED BDAA is expected to develop along the lines of those outlined for BLUE, where RED forces will
seek to develop their decision advantage and get inside of the NATO OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act)
loop. Further:
• BDAA will increase the effectiveness and expansion of RED operations into non-traditional domains,
enabling sophisticated targeting of individuals and social groups via and across the instruments of
national power (DIME: diplomatic, information, military and economic).
• Increased NATO use of BDAA will introduce vulnerabilities in command decision making that may
be exploited by sophisticated and non-sophisticated RED opponents. The focus of targeted cyber or
information attacks will become more covert and explicitly designed to undermine BLUE decision
making and destroy trust. Over-reliance on BDAA in decision making will increase the risk to and
damage from cyber/information attacks.
• Increased globalisation and commodification of information and sensors means that potential
adversaries will have access to much of the same data, commercial tools and encryption methods as
BLUE.
• Proliferation of access to mobile computing solutions by adversaries is to be expected as these will

be increasingly commercial in nature.
• Hybrid or memetic warfare employing social media deception, diplomatic warfare and influence
operations undermine, delay or frustrate BLUE forces, nations and populations.
• The potential to locate camouflaged, stealthy, protected or submerged targets through the processing
of large volumes of data from persistent active and passive sensors will have a significant tactical
and operational impact on future Alliance operations. For example, the US nuclear triad could be
highly destabilised [45].
Interoperability
Interoperability challenges are expected in the following areas:
• Technical Obsolescence: Rapid RED and BLUE BDAA technological evolution will require
constant investment to maintain a technological edge and ensure operational resilience. This will
challenge Alliance nations to maintain common technological and interoperable force, especially as
the NATO enterprise, and operational commanders, come to rely on BDAA engendered near-real-
time feedback, increased situational awareness and improved operational effectiveness.
• Network Allocation: The EM Spectrum is becoming more commercial, congested, contested and
competitive globally from the commercial use of advanced radio-frequency technology. Alliance
agreement on spectrum allocation and conflict will need to be undertaken.
• Data: Distributed data and verification structures will need to be developed to allow nations to
maintain ownership and control of data while sharing within a coalition. Big data raises significant
concerns about security, privacy and governance that will need to be addressed at an Alliance level.
Development of policies on data collection, retention, exchange, curation, classification, bandwidth,
taxonomies and privacy will be necessary.
48 Chapter A. Data
• Unique Standards: NATO operational and enterprise environments have unique characteristics
not shared by commercial and civil environments, including reduced risk tolerance and policy
constraints. Legal issues may also become a concern as commercial interests seek to protect
underlying intellectual property (IP) (e.g. explainable AI), thereby limiting explainability of
recommended courses of action or assessments.
• Standards: National adoption of critical BDAA technologies (e.g. 5G) may create a significant
digital divide due to differing threat perceptions and adoption of underlying technologies. A lack of
standards and the development of incompatible or untrustworthy systems may limit NATO’s ability
to share C4ISR and other sensitive data.
S&T Development
BDAA research is highly interdisciplinary, with strong commercial and open-source underpinnings. Key
areas of research and development are:
1. Engineering Defence: Counter-social-engineered and cyber agents (i.e. bots) to auto-identify,

disrupt and investigate bot-mediate social and cyberattacks [202].
2. Optimised Communications: Novel technologies to optimise network resources, data through-

put and (cognitive) spectrum management (including operations in a contested and congested
environment with limited knowledge of other appliance, vehicles or sensors on the network) for
distributed applications or sensing. The research will include exploration of new communication
modes (e.g. 5G), mesh networks, post-quantum encryption methods and the increased used of
cognitive (AI) methods.
3. Analytics: Novel mathematical, computational and human-factors approaches to the analysis of

complex and complicated military socio-technical systems-of-systems (e.g. operational command),
including fusion of noisy and uncertain data and operational decision making. This includes
modelling and simulation of complex multi-scale physical, information and engineering systems.
Development of data-driven discovery models [202] will be an essential aspect of this research
as human engagement in the development of predictive models is a significant limiting factor.
New distributed computational architectures (edge computing), as well as search and assessment
technologies, will be necessary to discover, organise and present multi-domain content [202].
4. Sensors: New, distributed, low power and sensitive sensors capable of large scale mesh be-
haviour and self-organisation (ubiquitous sensing). This includes developments in analysis, fu-
sion and assessment of signals from passive sources (e.g. bio-engineered), bio-social sensors,
multisensor/multi-domain sources, and edge-computing.
5. Trust: Distributed ledger technologies, cyber-agents, improved visualisation and predictive analyt-
ics to support trusted information exchange and enhanced support to human decision making. This
includes tools for identification and attribution of malicious social or cyber actors, as well as the
development of RED-team cyber agents to assist cybersecurity operators in the determination of
cyber-physical-human vulnerabilities.
The following table presents the assessed potential impact, state and rate of development, as well as
identified areas for focused research.
References
[32, 41, 44, 50, 192, 202, 207, 208, 209, 210]
49
Table A.1: Big Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA) 2020-2040.

Data Advanced Analytics Revolutionary Expectation 4 2025
. Communications High Enlightenment 6 2030
Advanced Decision Making Revolutionary Disillusionment 6 2025
Sensors High Expectation 4 2030

Conjecture Card: Data

A.1 Real-Time Video Feeds A.2 Information Integrity A.3 Commercial Networks
Access reliable real-time unhack- Assure the source and integrity in- Utilise state-of-the-art global
able streaming video feeds from formation, networks and data to pre- always-on commercial networks
hand-held wireless devices. vent insertion of distracting or false for secure encrypted communica-
information by hackers. tion and data transfer.
A.4 Situational Awareness A.5 Trusted Systems A.6 Assured Connectivity
Know the location and history of ev- Trusted information exchange in Store and retrieve strongly en-
ery single individual or item in a or- zero trust environments, for exam- crypted data/information across the
ganisation or operation at any time, ple to exchange money or control network so it is always accessible
using digital twins and the IoT. check points. and recoverable.
A.7 Courses of Action A.8 Global Intelligence A.9 Algorithmic Advantage
Simulate in near real-time billions Conduct continuous global ISR and Optimise enterprise functions, as
of potential courses of action, iden- target acquisition in all operational well as providing predictive assess-
tify optimal solutions, while adapt- domains, while fusing data into ments in-real time to support enter-
ing recommendations to real-time a single coherent rich intelligence prise decision making and capabil-
sensor information. system. ity development.
B
B. Artificial Intelligence
“By far the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude too early that they understand
it.” - Eliezer Yudkowsky [211]
Definition
Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human
intelligence – for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making
predictions, or taking action – whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical
systems [62].
Keywords
Artificial Intelligence · Machine Intelligence · Deep Learning · Neural Networks · Machine Learning
· Expert Systems · Semantic Analysis · Supervised Learning · Unsupervised Learning · Reinforcement
Learning · Clustering · Deep Fakes · Machine Vision · Chat-bot · Decision Trees · Data Science · Genetic
Algorithm · Autonomy
Overview
Artificial Intelligence (AI) emulates aspects of human cognition such as perception, reasoning, planning,
and learning. AI is able to autonomously perform tasks such as planning, understanding language,
recognising objects and sounds, learning, and problem-solving. AI has been identified as the biggest
technological challenge facing Alliance nations [45, 212], with some calling it the most important
technology ever invented [213]. Over the next 20 years, AI is expected to play a significant disruptive
force through its effects on:
• Exploitation of increased digitalisation and the resulting availability of (very) large data sets,
including publically available data for system training and development;
51
• Widespread deployment and use in cyber-physical systems;

• Novel areas of application, driven by greater investment in and wider adoption of AI techniques;
• Decision making and optimal control (e.g. power systems, investment, etc.);
• Computation, such as advances in everywhere/edge computing, ubiquitous sensors, database design,
developmental tools, cloud computing, new algorithmic approaches and using AI to bootstrap the
development of AI; and,
• Development of advanced large data analysis tools and computer vision.
Since its beginnings in the mid-1950s, AI has moved through three development cycles (Figure B.1).
The initial period focused on rules-based approaches (decision trees, Boolean and fuzzy logic), e.g. expert
systems [214]. The second cycle focused on the development and application of statistical methods (i.e.
supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning). Such machine learning methods have been highly
successful and underlie everything from e-mail spam filtering to internet web searches. The third cycle of
development focuses on the use of bio-inspired learning methods (neural networks, deep learning), with
considerable success in the areas of sensing and perception [215].
FIRST WAVE SECOND WAVE THIRD WAVE
Expert knowledge or criteria Machine / Statistical Contextual Adaption

& logical reasoning Learning
The first wave of AI is represented The second wave of AI is based on Third wave AI technology
by expert knowledge or other machine learning (ML), or statistical combines the strengths of first-
authoritative sources and encoded learning, and includes voice and second-wave AI, and is also
into a computer program in the recognition, natural language capable of contextual
form of an expert system. processing, computer vision etc. sophistication, abstraction and
explanation.
Examples: Resource Allocation, Examples: Face Recognition, Spam Examples: Autonomous Vehicles, Cyber
Maintenance, Inventory Control filters, Medical Diagnosis, Semantic Agents.
Analysis
Relative Level of Capability

Perceiving Perceiving Perceiving
Learning Learning Learning
Abstracting Abstracting Abstracting
Reasoning Reasoning Reasoning
Figure B.1: 3 Cycles of AI (CREDIT: Adapted from [216]).

While major strides are continuing to be made in deep-learning methods [118], new research areas
are being developed, including neuromorphic computing, which attempts to more accurately emulate
the neural structure and operation of the human brain [215], and adversarial machine learning which
seeks to understand how to confuse AI systems [217, 218]. Another promising area is that of probabilistic
computing, designed to deal with uncertainty, ambiguity, and contradiction in the natural world. [215].
Research in these areas includes new machine and deep learning methods focusing on the use of smaller
training sets and explainability. Another major area of R&D will be the development of new machine
and deep learning algorithms based on quantum information science and quantum computers. Continued
R&D into new and more general-purpose algorithms will be critical in maintaining the current momentum
behind AI research and moving AI beyond its current practical limitations.
52 Chapter B. Artificial Intelligence
R&D opportunities exist to substantially ex-

pand the analysis of large data sets, including those
DATA SCIENCE associated with sensor data processing, fusion and
MACHINE
LEARNING (ML) analysis. Indeed, the expected continued rapid ex-
Natural Language Predictive Data Management
Processing (NLP) Analytics
plosion in digitised data will make the use of AI
Speech
Descriptive Analytics
(and its derivatives) even more useful and a practi-
Data Based
Vision Classification cal necessity for BDAA. To put this in context, in
ARTIFICIAL Models
2020 the world is expected to produce 44 trillion
INTELLIGENCE Rule Engines Visualization
Non-ML gigabytes of digital data, with an annual growth
Based NLP
Symbolic Logic rate expected to be on the order of 60% [45], with
over 500. Without AI, individuals and organisa-
tions will be challenged to turn this data glut into
Figure B.2: The Relationship Between AI, Machine actionable knowledge.
Learning and Data Science (CREDIT: Adapted from This reliance on large quantities of data is both
[219]). a strength and a weakness of AI. Data quality, in
particular, is a critical issue, both for assessment
and training. Reliance on large curated and filtered (training) datasets is an essential element of many AI
algorithms and a significant contributor to the fragile nature of many AI application. Research is being
conducted on the development of more adaptable and efficient machine learning algorithms that will
require less labelled data and are capable of making inferences with sparse or contradictory data while
making them easier to train, more resilient to unpredictable real-world conditions and generalizable to
new environments [202]. In a similar vein, research is being conducted into the use of deceptive data and
adversarial attack, whereby the injection of malicious data could be used to manipulate or provide an
assessment of an AI system [202]. As AI systems become ubiquitous and underpin decision making in
complex systems-of-systems, the need to develop appropriate countermeasures and algorithmic resilience
will be essential.
Development of symbiotic AI (i.e. human-
centric), whereby humans and cognitive machines
work together as trusted partners in a complex-
hybrid system, is a significant research challenge
[202]. Fundamental R&D is necessary to improve
the understanding of human speech, extraction of
semantic information inherent in a wide variety
of media and responding to non-verbal aspects of
communication. Such capabilities will also allow
a more natural interaction and partnership, but will
also necessitate the integration of analogues to Figure B.3: Symbiotic AI.
human perception in the physical (e.g. vision)
and human domains (e.g. emotions), along with the development of machine common-sense (i.e. the
embedding of a priori knowledge [202]. This will also necessitate the development of systems capable of
asking questions, speculating, proposing multiple options, enhanced learning and explaining clearly the
decision or deliberative process. As noted by DARPA [202]:
“Enabling computing systems with such human-like intelligence is now of critical importance
because the tempo of military operations in emerging domains exceeds that at which unaided
humans can orient, understand, and act.”
Such human-machine symbiosis provides a more robust and potentially more effective construct leveraging
the strengths of both human and machine.
The application of AI is considered a priority S&T investment area across the globe [31, 45]. Signifi-
cant developments in the application of AI are primarily driven by industry. Still, advancement in the
application and development of AI has been significantly enabled by the development and availability
53
of open-source tools and publically available data (e.g. Enron data set [220]). This does not mean that
Alliance nations themselves are not also investing in AI. As noted in [221]:
“The Pentagon is figuring ways to harness artificial intelligence (AI) for advantages as far-
flung as battlespace autonomy, intelligence analysis, record tracking, predictive maintenance
and military medicine. AI is a key growth investment area for DoD, with nearly $1 billion
allocated in the 2020 budget. The Defense Department’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
(JAIC) will see it’s budget double to over $208 million, with significant increases likely in
2021 and beyond ... The military is currently seeking to integrate AI into weapon systems
development, augment human operators with AI-driven robotic manoeuvre on the battlefield
and enhance the precision of military fires.”
National capacity and proclivity to use AI are as important as research and development of AI methods
(see Figures B.4 and B.5). As such, other nations are staking a claim in the AI gold rush. For example,
Figures B.4 and B.5 highlights the range of preparedness by national governments to exploit AI and the
current level of application or experimentation of AI within national industries. China, following the
release in 2017, of its AI development plan [129] has also obviously moved quickly to expand the science
of AI and explore its use. As noted by [45]:
“The growth in AI development is not limited to the United States. China has identified AI as
a strategic priority. Last summer, China’s State Council issued an ambitious policy blueprint
calling for the nation to become “the world’s primary AI innovation center” by 2030, by
which time, it forecast, the country’s AI industry could be worth $150 billion ... In the words
of one analyst, “the digital revolution is going to be the biggest geopolitical revolution in
human history [. . . ] Every other twenty-first-century geopolitical trend will look piddling by
comparison.”
Figure B.4: Overall Ranking for Government AI Readiness (2018/2019) (SCALE: 0 [Poor] - 10 [Excel-
lent]) (SOURCE: [222])
Nevertheless, the current state of AI is complicated. While there is considerable investor interest
driving an explosion of practical AI applications, there are early indications that AI research is reaching a
% of Companies Actively Engaged in AI

90
80
70 32
60
50
%
40 22 20 20 15
13
11
30
53
20
29 29 29 31 29 28
10
0
CHINA USA FRANCE GERMANY SWITZERLAND AUSTRIA JAPAN
AI Piloting AI Adoption
Figure B.5: Percentage of Companies Actively Engaged in Piloting or Adoption of AI, by Selected
Countries (SOURCE: [223])
plateau. Concerns that AI is approaching another AI winter of slow growth and disappointment have been
raised by several authors [224, 225]. The need for new algorithmic approaches and a better understanding
of human-machine teaming has probably never been stronger [202, 226, 227]. In particular, the develop-
ment of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) (i.e. human-level generalised intelligent behaviour), is a
significant technical challenge and remains a very difficult or perhaps even chimeric goal, in-spite of over
60 years of AI research. It is considered unlikely that AI systems will meet this level of cognitive ability
within the next 20 years [228].
Finally, one area of fundamental AI disruption will be its use to augment science and increase the
rate of innovation [213, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235]. The fusion of human-AI reasoning will be a
powerful combination in exploring new and exciting areas of research and innovation. Sir Issac Newton
(1642-1727), the great English physicist, once said:
“I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a
boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble
or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before
me.”
AI & BDAA, as applied to science, has the potential to become humankind’s digital best friend greatly
expanding our ability to explore the scientific seashore and find even more interesting pebbles and shells.
Schrodinger may have his cat, but Newton will have a dog.
Military Implications
BLUE
AI will significantly impact alliance military capabilities and forces. This impact will occur predominately
through the use of embedded AI in other associated technologies such as virtual/augmented reality;
quantum computing; autonomy, modelling & simulation, space; materials research; manufacturing &
55
logistics; and, big data analytics [236]. AI will have transformative effects on nuclear, aerospace, cyber,
materials and bio-technologies. It has been stated that these effects will have a strategic impact on the
same order as the introduction of nuclear weapons [237]. Further, over-reliance on AI systems will also
introduce significant new vulnerabilities and usher in an adversarial AI arms-race.
Some areas of potential areas of impact over the next 20-years are expected in the following areas:
• C4ISR: War-fighting units will employ trusted AI-enabled autonomous systems capable of per-
forming tasks that move beyond those that are deemed dull, dirty, dangerous or dear. Some of the
areas for potential application are expected to be in the increased use of virtual assistants (analogous
to Google Home, Apple Siri, or Amazon Alexa), AI-enabled decision support to war-games and AI
recommended courses of action (COA). AI holds considerable promise for enhanced data fusion, as
well as categorisation and effects based assessments (or targeting). For example, Intelligence ana-
lysts will be able to leverage trusted systems capable of tasking, collecting, processing, exploiting,
disseminating (TCPED), and retrieving information across the entire spectrum of available sensors
and relevant archival data. Additional areas of AI integration will include enhanced indications &
warning, information and knowledge management tools, as well as decision aides enabling more
rigorous and robust intelligence analyses. This will include establishing patterns of life, human
terrain mapping, social network analysis, as well as decision support for targeting. Very high speed,
very low power neuromorphic electronic components offer the possibility of autonomous systems
and computer architectures that may rival human perception at very low power, enabling embedded
sensor processing for scene recognition, target discrimination, and identification.
• Weapons and Effects: AI is seen to be of potential use in cross-cueing, trajectory planning, colli-
sion avoidance, swarming, weapon selection, battle damage assessment and effects coordination.
• UxV: Areas of potential AI impact in trajectory planning, collision avoidance/swarming, operator as-
sistance (e.g. one operator controlling multiple-UxVs). Dynamic mission planning for autonomous
systems (e.g. navigation, data collection, environmental characterisation and adaptive sensing).
The integration of deep learning systems into mobile platforms will enhance robotic capabilities
for navigation within dull, dangerous, dirty or dear situations. AI could enable fully autonomous
explosive ordnance disposal in urban areas. Intelligent autonomy will enable capabilities such as
long duration unmanned underwater vehicles.
• Capability Planning: AI will support the development of analytical solutions to assist in long term
planning within NATO, including supporting complex decision-making that cuts across traditional
internal boundaries; assisting assessments of complex factors and effects chains for decision-makers.
• CBRN: NATO requires a suite of enabling and integrated technologies that provides rapid detection,
identification, and monitoring (DIM) of CBRN threats/hazards during any mission, in all operational
environments, which informs on the course of action necessary to mitigate the threat/hazard. AI
may support improve autonomy to perform detection, sensor integration and data fusion. AI
is seen as a means of alleviating the burden of human involvement in determining the position
of sensors and initiating data fusion and data interpretation. Use of AI will enhance command
situational awareness and support through new abilities to self-organise and assume the optimal
posture needed to achieve desired end-states. Ultimately, this will increase the knowledge of current
and potential controlled agents incorporated in software suite in Stand-off platforms, increasing
hazard management capability.
• Medical: Modern military forces require clinically relevant and empirically validated medical
interventions and associated procedures. AI has the potential to assist in developing evidence-based
clinical knowledge, evidence-based diagnostics and treatment best practices to reduce morbidity and
mortality and maintain/recover essential functions in the face of hazards from across the mission
spectrum. Further, AI will provide automated decision support and diagnostic support tools to assist
medics in the field who are dealing with novel trauma situations.
• Enterprise Management: NATO requires more efficient and effective processes for enterprise
resource management (investment and business planning, program performance and risk manage-
ment, strategic transformation, and improvement initiatives, strategic readiness management, and
strategic management practice) based on advanced analytics and evidence-based decision making.
With respect to finance, AI can assist in cost analysis, assessment of economic impacts and drivers,
and the provision of timely evidence-based decision support.
• Logistics: AI systems (especially when paired with digital twins) have the potential to minimise
equipment downtime, minimise system failures, improve inventory and repairs management etc.
Problems of these sorts are similar to those encountered in the commercial world and are therefore
primed for early adoption by NATO.
• Cyber & Info-space: Intelligent (i.e. AI-enabled) autonomy extends beyond mobile platforms. For
resilient autonomous networks and cyber-warfare, the system must detect, evaluate and respond
well before humans would be capable of understanding the situation. Desktop applications will
assess and interpret vast amounts of sensor and intelligence data. These systems and virtual agents
will have the capacity to make independent decisions and act upon these decisions rapidly, while at
the same time, work as part of a human-AI team. One would expect that networks and information
systems will be configured, maintained, and protected by AI-enabled autonomous agents.
• Training: AI systems (especially when paired with virtual/augmented reality systems) have the
potential to improve individual and customised training through real-time adaption to human
behaviour and the generation of customised training environments or scenarios.
RED
The advantages outlined for NATO forces are equally applicable for near-peer or asymmetric RED forces.
However, the reliance on AI will also increase the potential impact of cyber and information attacks.
Further, with fewer ethical and legal bounds, RED may enable AI functions from beginning to end of the
kill chain, in order to achieve a tactical decision advantage or as a response to a loss of communications.
Additional RED aspects of future AI developments are:
• Cyber: AI systems are particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks, whereby small, deliberate changes
may lead to erroneous recommendations or sub-optimal actions.
• Information: Advances in speech processing and synthesis technology are likely to allow the
realistic simulation of friendly and enemy personnel over communications links and broadcast
media (i.e. deep fakes). Combined with twitter-bots and other social media hacks, ever more
effective AI (e.g. generative adversarial networks (GANs)) will greatly increase the scale and
effectiveness of hybrid attacks, whether by near-peer or asymmetric threats [238].
• Aberrant Behaviour: Unanticipated behaviour in AI systems is simultaneously a strength (e.g.

creating entirely new strategies [239] and at the same time a significant potential liability. Lim-
itations imposed through legal, ethical and policy considerations may be more relaxed for peer
or near-peer opponents. A RED weapon system unrestricted by the physical limitations of the
human body, whose behaviour is often unpredictable and inexplicable, would potentially constitute
a formidable adversary.
• IEDs: Increasingly intelligent, learning systems will enable new generations of improvised explo-
sive devices, less susceptible to traditional countermeasures.
Interoperabilty
AI interoperability will be a serious challenge. As AI-enabled systems become increasingly common, the
need to define interoperability, data and specialised communication standards will become acute. One
57
critical aspect is the need to define and conduct verification, validation and accreditation (VV&A) of AI
enabled operational decision support AI systems for use in Alliance military operations. The Alliance
will be challenged to do so by differing standards on verification, validation and accreditation (VV&A);
differing rules on data management, taxonomies, and training sets; explainability concerns; man-machine
teaming & symbiosis concepts; and differing levels of system and organisational trust. It will be necessary
to build processes and policies that fundamentally recognise, as with any human part of the system, their
potential fallibility.
As has been noted, AI explainability is an active and vital research area [202]. However, it must also
be noted that commercial interests may push back on such a requirement given the possibility of exposing
intellectual property and underlying algorithms [240]. Standardising this across the Alliance will present
significant challenges.
S&T Development
AI faces a number of critical challenges or areas of research. Advances are necessary in the following
areas:
• Advanced Algorithms: Improvements in the effectiveness and generalisation of AI. Continued

research will be necessary in the areas of machine & deep learning, adversarial AI, as well as
neuromorphic & probabilistic computing.
• Human-Machine Symbiosis: Advances in interfaces, human-centric AI, visualisation, explainabil-

ity, and socio-technical implications (e.g. team dynamics);
• AI Application: AI is an underpinned technology supporting predictive, prescriptive and even

cognitive data analytics. There is a need for processes to transform both structured data (e.g.
machine learning techniques with varying levels of complexity, from regression to neural networks)
and unstructured data (e.g. using deep learning and natural language processing) into insights and
foresight for decision-makers. These tools may then be applied to critical defence and security
challenges such as:
– Psycho-Socio-Technical: The use of AI to enable human, social or complex system agents

within M&S, supporting more realistic analysis and personalised training.
– Adaptation: Adaptive techniques will out-mode current intelligence cycles in areas such as
electronic warfare. The development of a new intelligence paradigm may be required.
– Cyber: Development of AI agents for defensive cyber (e.g. bio-inspired equivalents of
immune systems T-cells) and offensive cyber operations (e.g. penetrative and vulnerability
seeking agents).
– Infospace: Weaponising information through AI (e.g. deep fakes) and development of
hybrid-warfare countermeasures (e.g. sustain trust and counter vulnerabilities).
Table B.1: Artificial Intelligence: 2020-2040.

Artificial Intelligence Advanced algorithms Revolutionary Expectations 4 2030
Applied AI Revolutionary Expectation 6 2030
Human-Machine Symbiosis High Trigger 4 2035

References
[45, 105, 173, 212, 216, 219, 221, 224, 234, 235, 236, 241, 242, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252]
Conjecture Card: Artificial Intelligence

B.1 Detect/Generate Fake Media B.2 Virtual Command Advisor B.3 Automated Communication
Automatically detect or create fake Support and advise operational Equip individual soldiers to auto-
media reports, video, audio and commanders in real-time with matically, instantly identify and ac-
social media posts responsive to human-like reasoning and advice curately translate languages, body
live situations or to communicate based on previous operations, lever- language and human emotions any-
in real-time with targeted individu- aging comprehensive operational time and anywhere.
als or groups. awareness.
B.4 Spoof AI Systems B.5 Deep Fakes B.6 Optimise Vehicle Use
Covertly get in-side the OODA Modify and mimic adversarial com- Optimally allocate and route vehi-
loop of adversary’s AI systems munications, including those in cles (e.g. transport, medevac, ISR,
to insert misleading data or infor- real-time (video, audio, etc.) to de- tanks, APC, etc.) using real-time
mation to impact their decision- stroy trust. situational awareness of the operat-
making processes. ing environment.
B.7 Disruptive Behaviour B.8 Precision Engagement B.9 Automated Targeting
Accurately predict the behaviour of Acquire and engage targets in a Provide precision targeting advice,
humans or groups from background crowded, cluttered or dynamic en- across the military, economic, in-
data (e.g. social media, surveil- vironment with highly localised- formation, and diplomatic spec-
lance, biometric devices). effects (kinetic or energy-based) trum to achieve a desired opera-
and selective lethality. tional/strategic effect.
C
C. Autonomy
Autonomy
“Autonomous Systems raise challenging operational, strategic, and policy issues, the full scope of which
cannot yet be seen. The nations and militaries that see the furthest into a dim and uncertain future to
anticipate these challenges and prepare for them now will be best poised to succeed in the warfighting
regime to come.” - Paul D. Scharre [176]
Definition
Autonomy
Autonomy is the ability of a system to respond to uncertain situations by independently composing
and selecting among different courses of action in order to accomplish goals based on knowledge
and a contextual understanding of the world, itself, and the situation. Autonomy is characterised by
degrees of self-directed behaviour (levels of autonomy) ranging from fully manual to fully autonomous
[66, 67, 68]. Robotics is the study of designing and building autonomous systems spanning all levels
of autonomy (including full human control). Unmanned Vehicles may be remotely controlled by a
person or may act autonomously depending on the mission. Applications include allowing for access to
unreachable areas, persistent surveillance, endurance, robots in support of soldiers, cheaper, automated
logistics deliveries.
Keywords
Autonomous Vehicles · Automated · U(A/U/CA/x)AV · Man-Machine Interface · Autonomy · Human-
(in/out/on)-the-loop · RAS (Robotics and Autonomous Systems) · Human-Machine Teaming
Overview
Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) are a key enabler and beneficiary of developments in other
EDT areas. From a technology watch perspective, developments of interest to NATO will be predom-
inantly in the areas of: (1) Autonomous Systems (platforms, devices & agents): e.g. new platforms;
propulsion; software agents; low power sensors; IoT devices; and, applications. Areas of particular
60 Chapter C. Autonomy
note are: autonomous hypersonic vehicles; bio-inspired micro and mini aerial vehicles; miniaturisa-
tion, small satellites (smallsats); hybrid-electric aero-propulsion systems; light-weight high-resolution
hyper-spectral imaging technology for semi-persistent surveillance missions; RF sensor miniaturisa-
tion; plasmonics for decreasing IR detector size; rapid 3D environment modelling; and use of robotic
decoys; (2) Human-machine teaming: human performance enhancements, human-machine collabora-
tion and communication; (3) Counter-measures: high power radio frequency (HPRF) weapons; and,
(4) Autonomous Behaviour: control, swarm centric systems and intelligent autonomy (i.e. increasingly
advanced embedded AI).
Platform autonomy is one of the more important examples of militarily relevant robotics and au-
tonomous systems (RAS) [176, 253]. Such UxVs are uncrewed vehicles for air (UAV, UCAV if combat
capable), sea (underwater (UUV) and surface (USV)) and land/ground use (UGV). Since the launch of the
first experimental, fully autonomous spacecraft (Deep Space 1) in 1998 [254], AI-enabled autonomous
systems (especially smallsats) have catalysed novel technological developments in and use of space
[255, 256]. UxVs may be remotely piloted or may act at varying levels of autonomy throughout a mission
[66]. Research into UxVs cover a wide spectrum of enabling technologies including: stealth (signatures:
infrared, acoustic); qualification & certification; structures & materials; propulsion; performance; stability
& control; and, design.
While UxVs have become increasingly com-
mon and essential capabilities for military opera-
tions [257, 258], the use of virtual software agents
or bots are also being investigated for offensive and
defensive action in information and cyberspace.
Analogous to the immune system, the development
of safe, secure and reliable autonomous software
agents as part of a cyber-physical immune system
[259] will provide a means to counter and char-
acterise bot-nets & large scale malware attacks,
Figure C.1: Underwater Autonomous Vehicle. along with other cyber events. Such counter cyber-
adversary systems will also observe and monitor
attacks in a covert fashion while minimising the impact on alliance network systems and infrastructure
[202]. Adversarial agents support cyber operations at both the enterprise and internet-scale.
Of critical importance are resilient autonomous networks and cyber-warfare agents, where the system
must detect, evaluate and respond well before an operator could understand and react. A good deal of
important decision software must utilise autonomy to reduce the operator s cognitive load. These systems
will assess and interpret vast amounts of sensor and intelligence data to produce actionable information
and recommendations for the warfighter. They will have the capacity to make independent decisions and
act upon these decisions rapidly, while at the same time, have the ability to work as part of a team which
includes people. This level of intelligent autonomy will result in systems that work seamlessly with the
warfighter, can enhance warfighter trust in the systems, and lead to an almost unlimited force multiplier
and substantially increase the pace of operation.
Autonomous systems, whether unmanned platforms or agent-based, may execute defined missions
with or without human interaction or supervision. The degree of autonomy of the unmanned system
(UMS) depends on the agent’s or vehicle’s own abilities for sensing, analysing, communicating, planning,
deciding and acting. These, in turn, are influenced by the complexity and constraints (e.g. legal, policy,
etc.) of the mission. While unmanned systems are increasingly being used in military operations, for
the near term full autonomy of unmanned systems will be practical only for more straightforward tasks.
An example would be a remotely piloted or autonomous helicopter that is capable of fully independent
operation for a portion of its flight in order to deliver supplies and ammunition to troops in the field or
medivac casualties [260].
While fully autonomous systems may be a long term goal, in the short and medium-term, semi-
autonomous systems will have more impact on operations. These systems will collaborate with the
61
warfighter who will retain control and ultimately, final decision-making authority while enhancing
situational awareness, effective reach, and reducing the risk to personnel participating in the operation.
The major challenge for such autonomy is the limitation of risk during operation. Mission complexity is a
major driver for risk, and the resulting feasibility of risk limitation or mitigation may limit use.
Research into UxV stealth technologies rele-
vant for smaller and low power systems, is also
essential, originating from the need to limit or
avoid the detection of BLUE systems by RED
forces. Developments in this area aim to reduce
vulnerability to detection methods (radar, infrared,
sonar). Such signature requirements may also in-
fluence and drive novel platform designs. At the
same time, new miniaturised, low power sensors
are required to support embedded AI, situational
awareness and generally increase ISR capabilities. Figure C.2: Global Hawk.
Research in this area is also driven by commercial
needs for autonomous vehicles, leading to increasingly more powerful and cheaper EO/IR, LIDAR and
RADAR sensors.
The application of RAS is the commercial world and for military operations is developing rapidly
[253]. In a defence context ISR, logistics, cyber defence and targeting are all areas that have or are expected
to be heavily impacted by the wide-spread use of autonomous systems (e.g. [261]). The growth and
wide-spread adoption of low-cost persistent sensing (including multi-statics) combined with large scale
autonomous collection & systems, will create the-domain-of-things in airspace/space [45], oceans [262],
or in urban areas [202]. This includes distributed networks of heterogeneous or possibly multifunctional
sensors and specialised sensor suites on multiple autonomously operating mobile platforms. The potential
impact on situational awareness and operational effectiveness will be substantial.
To fully realise the benefits of autonomous ve-
hicles, unstructured geospatial data and metadata
will need to be of high quality, easily accessible,
and readily available [208]. As such, increased use
of autonomous systems to characterise virtual or
physical environments helps to bootstrap increased
effectiveness. There will be associated challenges
on the fusion and categorisation of this informa-
tion. The research will need to draw upon ad-
vanced statistics, combinatorial optimisation, sta-
Figure C.3: Small Drone. tistical decision theory, and mathematical game
theory. Robust, systematically evolving, and adap-
tive fusion engines for military multiple purpose applications will need to be modular, controllable, and
embedded via interoperable interfaces.
For Alliance activities in the air and space domains, the use of autonomous systems will be an essential
element of future operational success [66, 241]. This success will, however, be built on a continuing
exploration of converging technologies as noted by [241]:
“Swarms of low-cost, autonomous air and space systems can provide adaptability, rapid
upgradability, and the capacity to absorb losses that crewed systems cannot. By leverag-
ing advances in artificial intelligence, low-cost sensors, and networked communications,
low-end systems can restore the agility to attack adversary weaknesses in unexpected ways
by exploiting numbers and complexity. ... Multidisciplinary efforts are needed to combine
research across low-cost platforms, agile digital and additive manufacturing, modular compo-
nent and material technologies, autonomous system algorithms, and risk-based certification.
Methods are needed to control large numbers of autonomous systems coordinated with tradi-
tional manned assets. Artificial intelligence advances are needed to achieve high levels of
intelligence in small, embedded systems and execute complex missions with trust.”
Mini, micro and nano UxVs are an emerging solution for a broad range of modern military missions,
including urban and unconventional warfare, battle damage assessment, tactical (ISR) (e.g. [263, 264,
265]). Research in this areas aims to exploit bio-mimetic materials (e.g. artificial mussels), as well as
propulsion and behaviour (e.g. [266, 267, 268]). The development of cheap swarms of micro-UxVs
will be an essential element of future IoT ISR networks but arming such systems present significant
operational, policy and ethical challenges [269].
In the land domain, the impact will be dramatic [176]:
“The increased use of RAS capabilities will fundamentally change the way the Army fights by
increasing situational awareness, reducing the soldier’s physical and cognitive workloads,
improving sustainment, facilitating movement and manoeuvre, increasing reach and range
and force protection. In turn, this will afford Joint Force commander’s new opportunities
and, potentially, replace soldiers in some of the most dangerous tasks in the battlespace. RAS
technology will also provide a significant opportunity in the training and education of Army
to improve learning and provide cost-effective and realistic training.”
The US Army, in particular, has identified five land force RAS capability objectives [270]: to increase
situational awareness; lighten soldiers’ workloads; sustain the force; facilitate movement and manoeuvre;
and, and protect the force. In addition to UGVs, development of new autonomous subterranean vehicles
will be a requirement for land forces, especially those operating in an urban setting. Such vehicles will
need to navigate networks of tunnels, sewers, caves and other urban subterranean environments [202].
For maritime operations, multiple capabili-
ties are seen to be especially amenable to the use
of autonomous systems: Mine Counter Measures
(MCM), denied-area ISR, Anti-Submarine War-
fare (ASW), environmental characterisation, the-
ocean-of-things, SIGNIT/ELINT collection and
operational deception [202, 271, 272, 273]. Ocean
environments are particularly challenging, facing
pressure, temperature, navigation and corrosion
limitations, as well as long operational deploy-
ments. Long range underwater gliders are partic- Figure C.4: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Con-
ularly well suited for this role. tinuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (CREDIT:
The impact of autonomous systems will be felt DARPA).
not just on the battlefield but also within opera-
tional support. For example, logistics operations are an area where warehouse robotics are widely used in
commercial applications, with obvious benefits for military operations [257]. The broader applications
of robotics (e.g. exoskeletons) and autonomous systems within the logistics chain (e.g.aerial refuelling
[274] or squad support vehicles [275, 276]) have the potential to increase operational availability, weapon
system effectiveness (e.g. loitering munitions [277, 278]), improve effectiveness and efficiency of the
logistics system and reduce casualties [279].
With the broad availability across physical and virtual domains comes significant human-machine
teaming challenges. This challenge will occur across the spectrum of autonomous operations. Most
of today’s deployed military uncrewed systems are remotely operated by an operator who augments
the system s guidance, situational assessment, and decision-making. These systems have demonstrated
unquestioned value, playing vital roles such as Improvised Explosive Device (IED) interrogation, aerial
surveillance, checkpoint inspection, and land or sea mine clearance. Although these systems help keep
warfighters safe and improve ISR capabilities, current unmanned system technologies result in increased
manpower needs and place an increased cognitive load on the warfighter [280, 281]. While some levels of
autonomy have been introduced in recent unmanned systems, autonomous systems lack the intelligence
63
to actually reduce manning requirements, reduce warfighter cognitive load, or increase the pace of
operations. Intelligent autonomy will enable capabilities that are not currently possible, such as long-
duration unmanned underwater vehicles, where the vehicle must be able to work for months without
human intervention or communication.
Collaborative autonomy is a feature of widely
autonomous systems acting as a social-technical
team (eventually with distributed tasks) under the
command of a warfighter. Systems of this nature
will assess and interpret vast amounts of sensor and
intelligence data to produce actionable information
and recommendations for the warfighter. They will
have the capacity to make independent decisions
and act upon these decisions rapidly, while at the
same time, work as part of a human team (with
Figure C.5: Human-Machine Teaming. attendant social, collaboration and communication
issues). This level of intelligent autonomy will
result in systems that work seamlessly with the warfighter, are able to build warfighter trust, and act
ultimately as a significant force multiplier. Research continues on the development of procedures to
evaluate vehicle/operator/team system performance as a function of platform autonomy.
New modalities for human-machine communication are being developed [173] to fully exploit human-
machine teaming, including non-invasive neurological & neuro-motor interfaces, virtual environments,
biosensors, new visualisation approaches and controls. The technical limitations of human control must
also be considered and mitigated as RAS systems are subject to well-known problems of automation
bias, lack of situational awareness and moral buffering [169]. Finally, as we move towards the seamless
integration of RAS the socio-technical implications, especially around team behaviour and collaboration,
will need to be explored and better understood (e.g. [282]).
In the context of military sensor systems, a single large multisensor platform can be conceptually
broken down into a sensor team comprising a limited number of platforms, where each platform possesses
fewer or cheaper sensors than the single large platform. This concept can then be extended to a swarm
whereby each platform is even smaller and possesses limited performance sensors; however, the loss in
sensor performance at each platform can be compensated for by large numbers of cheap platforms in the
swarm.
A swarming system is potentially low-cost and
robust against the failure or destruction of the
nodes in the swarm but comes with an increase
in organisational complexity. Solving the self-
synchronisation problem for moving platforms
will pave the way to multisensor and networked
drone swarming. Swarms can also display adapt-
ability and intelligent autonomous behaviours
through relatively simple local interactions and
coordination. A swarm is dependent on a variety
of technologies, such as sensor signal processing, Figure C.6: Drone Swarm (CREDIT: DARPA).
data fusion, cognitive and intelligent control and
learning. Swarms can be deployed for a range of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
applications. The use of C-130 (Hercules) flying aircraft carriers [283] and arsenal vehicles (ships or
aircraft [284]) to carry and deploy large numbers of UxVs into theatre is already being explored as a
means of rapid swarm deployment. The use of large scale swarms of autonomous vehicles in urban areas,
in particular, is seen to be a significant potential force multiplier [285].
Small satellites are fast becoming viable platforms for effecting specific military missions, with cheap
smallsats ideally suited for wide deployment. They can carry common or specialised payloads and can
operate individually, together in constellations, or autonomously in swarms for higher complexity missions.
As such, swarms of smallsats provide a cost and potentially highly effective ISR and communication
missions.
As learning-enabled RAS becomes more
widely deployed on the battlefield and in other
uncertain environments, it will be necessary to de-
velop innovative system designs, as well as new
analysis, testing, and verification and validation
(V&A) methods [202]. Success in this area will
allow more rapid deployment of learning-enabled
systems, as well as reducing operational risks.
As RAS (both physical and virtual) becomes
more and more essential on the battlefield, the need
Figure C.7: Machine Learning and Testing. to protect one’s own forces becomes acute. Use
of intercepting counter swarms [286], electronic
countermeasures, lasers and other directed energy systems (e.g. high power radio frequency weapons)
offer some options. Nevertheless, the broad range of autonomous systems, from large high altitude long-
endurance (HALE) systems to nano-UAVs for surveillance or attack, presents many technical challenges
for the development of effective countermeasures. With hundreds of millions of dollars being spent
around the world on counter-UxV technologies, it should also be no surprise that counter-counter UxV
technologies are also being developed [287].
RAS development is a high priority for many Alliance and partner nations [66, 176, 288, 289, 290].
Commercial interests are expected to create a proliferation of readily available and deployable systems
(e.g. automated logistics & transportation). To put these developments into perspective, the global
autonomous vehicle market is expected to reach $172.3B USD by 2024 [291]. Military investment in such
technologies is growing as well with [290] noting that for 2020 the US defence budget adds $3.7 billion
of new funding for unmanned/autonomous systems technologies and $927 million of related funding for
AI. This will present both an opportunity and an interoperability risk for Alliance military application.
Still, the successful development of fully autonomous systems is expected to be slower than anticipated,
overlapping with technological developments in low-power sensors, propulsion and artificial intelligence.
This may lead to a growing sense of disillusionment in their effectiveness. Nevertheless, successful
integration of autonomous systems at lower levels (<4) of autonomy will provide a major driver of alliance
capability development and future operational success.
BLUE
UAVs of different size and degrees of autonomy are already used for ISR and strike missions, taking
advantage of long loitered times and flexible positioning near potential targets. The long-endurance type
of UAVs is particularly important for surveillance when operations are conducted over a period of days.
However, the increased use of small swarms of UxVs offers considerable advantages for ISR, as well as
offensive and defensive operations.
Autonomous systems are expected to lead changes in:
1. Force Structure: UxV and autonomous software agents will replace humans in operational/tactical
jobs environments that are deemed dull, dirty, dangerous or dear (e.g. CBRN, EOD, reconnaissance,
etc.). Increased use of autonomous systems will, therefore, challenge the development of appropriate
military skills, organisational/force structures and training.
2. Effectiveness: Employing a warfighter as a system concept will see next generation networks
and advanced AI seamlessly integrating disparate techno-human systems into unified and focused
capability (e.g. [292]), allowing every soldier to act as a squad, every ship as a task group and
65
every aircraft as a squadron. Agile manufacturing (e.g. 3D/4D mix-materials printing) will provide
task tailored systems in theatre on demand.
3. Counter-Measures: The wider use of UxVs and swarming on the battlefield will require additional
force protection assets with explicit counter-UxV capabilities. These will span the spectrum of
hard and soft kill options, such as electronic countermeasures, cyber, kinetic kills, directed energy
weapons, interceptor swarms, and deception. It will be necessary to defend critical assets from
swarms, where each node in the swarm is highly manoeuvrable, adaptable and hard to detect.
Counter-swarm techniques will need to engage each node very quickly and cost-effectively to defeat
the swarm.
4. Swarming: UxV swarms will enable new sensing and attack paradigms for friendly forces (e.g.
[293]). One approach is to use a swarm as an expendable asset, for example, to penetrate into
defended areas through the saturation of defences or to protect BLUE critical assets through large
numbers of sacrificial sentinels. Ultimately, it will cost more time, energy and money for RED to
defend against a swarm than to overcome it.
5. Logistics: UxVs will transport passengers and cargo onto the battlefield, especially in the relatively
small quantities that would apply in tactical situations. Current levels of technology may be
sufficient to create remotely piloted or autonomous UxVs that are capable of delivering supplies
and ammunition to troops in the field, under well-defined circumstances. Wider application within
the logistics and transport system will reduce waste, increase operational availability and support
warehousing operations.
6. Situational awareness: Improved ISR through widely dispersed, persistent, low-observable ve-
hicles/sentinels employing a broad range of low-power sensors (EO/IR, radar, magnetics, etc.).
Increased use is expected in evolving operational areas such as space, cyber and urban environments.
Hand-carried micro-UAVs deployable by soldiers in urban environments will be available and
widely used. UAVs of different size and degrees of autonomy are already used for ISR, taking
advantage of the fact that UAVs can have long loiter times and can be positioned flexibly near
potential targets. Long endurance UxVs are particularly important for surveillance when operations
are conducted over days to years. Cyber agents will also increasingly be used to maintain situational
awareness within virtual spaces (social or otherwise), and to aide in the identification of threats or
vulnerabilities.
7. Lethality: Large numbers of low-cost systems and improved human-machine teaming, will greatly
improve force projection. This will lead to the capability to gather constant and reliable information
over vast geographical areas at a much greater level of detail than ever before. An armed UAV
would provide air combat capability without exposing a pilot to risk. Ordnance could be carried
by the UAV, or the UAV itself could be integrated into the aircraft in a manner similar to an air-
launched cruise missile. UAVs can be used to attack high-value, sea or ground targets in military
operations. Through a loyal wingman concept current air, land (e.g. [292]) or naval assets could act
as a shepherd for several assigned UxVs, especially in an area denial or Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2AD) role.
8. Manoeuvrability: Increased tactical and operational agility, through increased presence, numbers
(swarms) and reduced logistics needs. Automated systems will be able to rapidly exploit tactical
opportunities consistent with operational direction.
9. Survivability: Reduction in combat casualties (due to smaller forces), more rapid medical care, and
greater operational effectiveness. It is conceivable as well that UAVs will conduct future combat
search and rescue missions, further increasing survivability.
10. Sustainability: A combination of agile manufacturing and autonomous systems may enable
automated logistics support in dangerous or isolated operational environments. Reduced manning
may also substantially diminish costs, with commensurate changes required in training and military
occupations.
11. Urban Operations: Micro-UAVs will increase situational awareness in complex urban areas. These
vehicles are also applicable for regular or special operations in unconventional and/or asymmetric
threat environments, providing ISR and target acquisition capabilities in complex and complicated
operations. Such vehicles could provide real-time data, directly support command decision-making
processes and would reduce the risk for the warfighter.
12. Cyber: Autonomous software agents will increasingly undertake cyber (offensive and defensive)
operations.
RED
Peer or near competitors will leverage the same advantages, potentially cancelling out the organisational
and operational value of Alliance autonomous forces. Their use in covert hybrid war operations could
provide plausible deniability while achieving tactical, operational or strategic objectives. As costs to
produce autonomous systems decrease, their use and employment by non-state actors will increase both
in number and effectiveness. Current countermeasures do not scale or adapt well to the broad operational
use of large numbers (swarms), small or cheap widely dispersed autonomous systems. Various approaches
exist for countering Alliance autonomous systems, such as cyber-attacks (platforms or C2); electronic
warfare; counter-swarms; or directed energy weapons. RED may also employ small-UAVs in targeted
attacks against individuals [294] or as a means of increasing the effective disbursement of CBRNE
materials [293]. Technologies supporting (limited) swarming are becoming widely available and are no
longer beyond the technical capabilities of non-state actors (e.g. the 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities by
the Yemen-based Houthi movement [295, 296]).
Interoperabilty
Increased integration of autonomous systems within Alliance and partner nations are expected to be
incremental, but by 2025 and beyond such system are expected to be omnipresent in Alliance operations.
Communication, control and operational inte-
gration issues will need to be addressed. These
include alignment of ROEs, sharing of large vol-
umes of data and standardising operating protocols
(e.g. deconfliction, collaboration, mission plan-
ning, data fusion and swarming) across a wide
range of physical and virtual operational environ-
ments. While such issues (especially effective con-
trol of large swarm) present considerable techni-
cal challenges [293] even for advanced nations,
solutions are becoming more widely available to Figure C.8: Interoperability Challenges.
regular and irregular forces.
Drawing upon the current operational experience with UxVs, significant ethical and legal factors will
need to considered as nations move towards increased levels of autonomy [174]. International collaboration
addressing all aspects of DOTMLPF-I will be critical in avoiding the creation of a complicated, ineffective
and chaotic future operational environment.
S&T Development
Research areas of note span the range of challenges in system designs, sensing, interfaces, countermeasures,
human control and application. These include:
1. Systems: Next-generation low observable vehicles and systems; novel propulsion; space & hyper-
sonic systems; low powered, less expensive and highly sensitive sensors; mesh optimised distributed
67
ISR collection; decoys; increased miniaturisation; new cyber-physical immune systems; offensive
and defensive cyber; social bots; and, application in complex dynamic environments across the
physical (air, sea, land, space), human (social) and information (cyber) domains.
2. Human-Machine Teaming: Improved human-machine teaming; optimised socio-technical inte-

gration; and, new interface and control designs (including microelectronics).
3. Counter-Measures: Directed energy weapons (DEW); EM countermeasures; decoys; cyber;

intercept swarms; and, kinetic weapon defence for counter-UAV and counter-swarm engagement.
4. Autonomous Behaviour: Large scale swarming; increased embedded AI; precision navigation;
and digital controls.
Table C.1: Autonomy 2020-2040.

Autonomy Autonomous Systems Revolutionary Expectation 6 2025
Human-Machine Teaming Revolutionary Trigger 4 2030
Autonomous Behaviour High Expectation 4 2030
Countermeasures High Disillusionment 5 2025

References
[44, 66, 67, 68, 68, 169, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 255, 257, 257, 271, 288, 289, 297]
Conjecture Card: Autonomy

C.1 Access Inaccessible Areas C.2 Repurpose Commercial Sys- .C.3 Replace the Soldiers
tems
Access contaminated, high threat or Take control of or piggyback off Complement human forces with
inaccessible environments to iden- commercial unmanned systems for human-like robots that have beyond
tify risks and MEDEVAC casualties own purposes. human strength and information
without, necessarily, requiring hu- processing ability.
man supervision.
C.4 Cyber Immune System C.5 Sustainment C.6 Autonomous Lethal
Weapons
Employ cyber agents capable of im- Summon unmanned refuelling or Automatically attack specific indi-
mune system like independent iden- strategic logistics on demand, de- viduals, vehicles, objects or facil-
tification, monitoring and response ployable in air, maritime or land en- ities with fly-sized or smaller sys-
to cyber-physical network attacks. vironments. tems.
C.7 Deploy a Swarm C.8 Active Defense System C.9 Driverless Transportation
Infiltrate or disrupt adversary ac- Automatically defend unarmoured Travel anywhere including urban
tions or conduct surveillance using or lightly armoured vehicles or in- areas (sea, air, littoral, near-space
massive swarms (e.g. millions of dividuals from a variety of incom- and ground) in unmanned vehicles
nano-UAVs) at sea, on land or in ing threats via automatic counter- ranging in size from personal trans-
the air. measures systems. porters to strategic lift.
D
D. Quantum Technologies
Quantum Computing
“In less than ten years quantum computers will begin to outperform everyday computers, leading to
breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, the discovery of new pharmaceuticals and beyond ... The very
fast computing power given by quantum computers has the potential to disrupt traditional businesses
and challenge our cyber-security. Businesses need to be ready for a quantum future because it’s coming.”
- Jeremy O’Brien, University of Bristol [298]
“A lot of promises are made, and it’s not always stressed that it’s still in a kind of research phase ...
Sometimes people think: Okay, it went fast with mobile phones, it went fast with this and that, so
maybe in a few years I will have my own quantum computer on a mobile phone. I think this is simply
not realistic. If we even have working quantum computers in the first stage, they will be in a computer
centre like this one” - Kristel Michielsen, Jűlich Supercomputing Center [299]
Definition
Quantum Technologies (QT)
Next-generation quantum technologies exploit quantum physics and associated phenomena at the atomic
and sub-atomic scale; in particular quantum entanglement and superposition. These effects support
significant technological advancements primarily in cryptography; computation; precision navigation
and timing; sensing and imaging; communications; and, materials.
Keywords
Quantum · Superposition · PNT · Entanglement · Photonics · Cryptography · Sensors · Radar · Imaging ·
Novel Materials · Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) · Quantum simulation
Overview
Modern military systems are predicated upon the exploitation of classical, statistical, quantum and
relativistic physics. In particular, the first quantum revolution laid the groundwork for transistors, computer
chips, lasers, magnetic resonance imaging and modern communications technologies. However, while the
70 Chapter D. Quantum Technologies
practical application of such physics has transformed the nature of contemporary society and the battlefield,
over the last ten years advanced tools and a deeper understanding of such phenomena have provided
technological opportunities hitherto undreamed. Thus, the second generation of quantum technologies
are now emerging (Figure D.1), with the ability to produce and exploit more esoteric and subtle aspects
of quantum phenomenology. The impact of this new technology, sometimes referred to as the second
quantum revolution [300, 301], is expected to be profound and wide-ranging [83]. While the practical
application of these second-generation quantum effects is currently being investigated, and in many
cases actively employed, there is an increased acceptance that this is part of a more massive revolution
potentially leading to a fourth industrial age created through the complex interplay of autonomy, advanced
manufacturing, material science, energy storage and next-generation quantum effects [302].
CLOCKS SENSORS GLOBAL COMMS SIMULATOR INTERNET UNIVERSAL COMPUTER
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

A B C
B
D E
A
B C D E F
D E
A B C C F
D E F
1. Communications 2. Simulators 3. Sensors 4. Computers

0 – 5 Years 0 – 5 Years 0 – 5 Years 0 – 5 Years
A: Core technology of quantum A: Simulation of motion of A: Quantum sensors for niche A: Operation of a logical qubit
repeaters electrons in materials applications (incl. gravity and protected by error correction or
B: Secure point-to-point quantum B: New algorithms for quantum magnetic sensors for health topologically
links simulators and networks care, geosurvey and security) B: New algorithms for quantum
5 – 10 Years 5 – 10 Years B: More precise atomic clocks for
synchronization of future smart
computers
C: Small quantum processor
C. Quantum networks between C. Development and design of networks, inc. energy grid. executing technologically
5 – 10 Years
distant cities new complex materials relevant algorithms
5 – 10 Years
D. Quantum credit cards D. Versatile simulator of quantum
C. Quantum networks sensors
> 10 Years magnetism and electricity
for larger volume applications
E. Quantum repeaters with > 10 Years including automotive and
D. Solving chemistry and
materials science problems
cryptography and E. Simulators of quantum construction with special purpose quantum
eavesdropping detection dynamics and chemical D. Handheld quantum navigation computer > 100 physical qubit
> 10 Years
F. Secure World-wide internet reaction mechanisms to devices
> 10 Years
merging quantum and classical support drug design
communication E. Integration of quantum circuit
E. Gravity imaging devices and cryogenic classical control
based on gravity sensors hardware
F. Integrate quantum sensors F. General purpose quantum
with consumer applications computers exceed
including mobile devices computational power of
classical computers
Figure D.1: Quantum Technologies Timeline (CREDIT:Adapted from [83]).

Next-generation quantum technologies (QT) are developing at a phenomenal rate, but defence and
security applications are not progressing evenly amongst the four key lines of activity: (1) Communication;
(2) Computing; (3) (Precision) Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT); and, (4) Sensing. Developments
for quantum computing are primarily driven by commercial interests, while those in quantum sensing,
communications and PNT are motivated by defence and security interests. National levels of investment
are substantial and increasing [303], but the focus remains predominantly on commercial applications.
Collaboration across nations will be instrumental in advancing the basic science, and in particular defence
applications. As per [46], in the longer-term for QT, typically over 20 years from now, a step-change in
quantum capabilities is expected when quantum devices can reliably exploit entanglement despite noise
across a variety of time and distance scales and when the number of entangled logical qubits per device
71
increases.
Unprecedented Alliance capabilities using quantum technologies
Space based quantum sensors for Quantum cloud for secure information
improved detection and identification sharing and computing
GPS denied
environment
Inertial Sensors for 100x reduction in

GPS-free navigation error
Ultra-sensitive Magnetic field sensor for ASW

acoustic sensors and underwater mines
Secure comms between Space, Special
Forces, Air, Navy & Land assets
Enhanced resolution, covert and

ultra-wideband with fused multi- Inertial sensors for
band radar network precision fire
Fibre link to fixed fibre network
for secure comms and improved Enhanced decision making through quantum Mass (gravimetric) sensor for enhanced
clock stability information science (predictive analytics and AI) bunker/tunnel detection and mapping
Figure D.2: Alliance Quantum Capabilities (Adapted from US ARMY [304]).
BLUE
NATO military capabilities enabled by next-generation quantum technologies are anticipated to offer
unprecedented improvements in the following areas (Figure D.2):
1. Computing: Quantum computers are expected to provide orders of magnitude better computational
capabilities, beyond the theoretical limit of classically designed computers for specific classes of
analytical problems (e.g. optimisation and simulation). This computational leap will enable highly
sophisticated approaches to encryption and decryption of codes, rendering current cryptographic
methods obsolete. Sophisticated and rapid M&S will enable complex operational and organisa-
tional decision making, as well as new ways of developing hitherto undiscovered materials and
biotechnologies, as well as next-generation AI (e.g. quantum neural networks for target and image
identification problems).
2. Sensing: Quantum sensors will be many times more sensitive than current systems. This will sup-
port the development of counter-stealth and covert radars [92, 305]; magnetic, acoustic and gravity
sensors with greatly increased ASW capabilities [90]; and, support the development of hitherto im-
practical low power high sensitivity airborne and spaced based sensors. Some example applications
are for all-weather, day-night tactical (battlefield etc.) sensing (short-range, active/passive, covert,
using EO/IR/THz/RF frequencies) for ISTAR, as well as strategic (long-range maritime, airspace,
space) surveillance (active, RF). Quantum sensors are potentially more resistant to jamming.
3. PNT: Quantum effects support the development of very sensitive precision instruments for PNT.
Such PNT technologies will enable operations in a GPS denied or difficult operational environment
(e.g. long-duration submerged under-ice autonomous operations). In the short to medium term,
rack-mounted units suitable for exploitation on larger mobile military systems (e.g. ships) will be
available.
4. Communication & Cryptography: The development of unbreakable cryptography and the abil-
ity to decrypt encoded messages using current cryptographic methods will provide significant
challenges for current C4ISR systems.
RED
Within the 2020-2040 time-frame, the primary threat is from near-peer competitors, especially given
the high level of mathematical sophistication and R&D investment required. The potential security
implications due to the loss of useful encryption methods, the possible loss of air and underwater stealth,
and a possible RED analytic/decision advantage enabled by quantum computing will challenge Alliance
operations.
Interoperability
The use of next-generation quantum technologies will present significant interoperability challenges,
primarily driven by differing rates of investment and, given the potentially dramatic improvements in
sensing and communication capabilities, national security considerations.
S&T Development
Defence research areas of note are [46, 87]:
• Sensing: TRL for quantum sensing is still quite low; however, several of the enabling technologies
are advancing quite rapidly and may be available in the mid-term to address NATO ISR challenges.
Improved sensors may be used to build georeferenced maps of gravitational and magnetic anomalies
around the world. Near-term targeted investments in QT gravity, magnetic and EW sensors
could demonstrate new military capabilities for tunnel surveys, magnetic anomaly detection and
electromagnetic sensing. In the mid-term better QT sensors will enable these capabilities to be
deployed in more challenging military environments such as space. In the long-term, the use of
entanglement distribution networks may make distributed sensors thousands of times more precise
than is currently available.
• Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT): There are two fundamentally different approaches to
PNT: one involving the transmission and receipt of external signals, such as GPS, and the other
relying on the self-contained sensing of motion, such as provided by inertial systems. Since the
future security environment anticipates a highly contested electromagnetic environment (jamming
and spoofing), NATO will need to be prepared to operate in a GPS denied environment. Investment
in QT will enhance resilience to these emerging vulnerabilities. Quantum technologies are expected
to support the combination of ultra-precise time measurements with ultra-precise acceleration and
angular rotation measurements (each of which uses a different quantum technology), to provide
ultra-precise inertial navigation (and timing), which will be needed as GPS, and other signal-
dependent means become unavailable due to countermeasures (or inside structures). There are
several competing concepts (solid-state nitrogen-vacancy, atom trapping in free space, cold atomic
interferometry, etc.). Developing cold-atom QT will enable resilience to Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) denial through smaller QT clocks, and both gravity and magnetic sensing could
be used to georeference using survey maps. It is expected that PNT will be first fielded through
rack-mounted units (e.g. desktop computer size), suitable for exploitation on larger mobile military
systems, e.g. ships. With continuous investments in the mid and long term, the systems are expected
to reduce in size, weight, power and cost and ultimately provide navigation better than current
GNSS performance, with greatly reduced reliance on external references.
• Quantum Remote Sensing: Quantum remote sensing, such as quantum radar [91, 92, 92] has the
potential to make stealth technologies obsolete, provide more accurate target identification, and
allow covert detection and surveillance. There are two known approaches to Quantum-enhanced
remote sensing: either by using quantum interferometry or by using quantum illumination. Both
rely on using entangled photons and retaining one half of an entangled photon pair while sending the
73
other out (in a known direction) to interact with the environment. These sensors will enable much
more accurate and sensitive measurement and the use of much lower power, for applications such
as the detection and tracking of small, stealthy targets. Developments will rely on several quantum
engineering capabilities, such as the controlled generation of individual entangled photon pairs, the
ability to retain one of each pair in isolation and to detect the returning photon for comparison with
the idler.
• Magnetic and Gravity Sensing: Precise measurement of the magnetic field are used by maritime
patrol aircraft for the localisation of submarines, using MAD (magnetic anomaly detection) sensors.
Current sensors are not suitable for use on small UAVs, due to size-weight-power constraints,
but emerging quantum technologies may provide a solution. There are also special applications
of gravity sensing that could be enabled by quantum technology, for specialised surveillance
applications such as underground structure detection (tunnels, bunkers) from an airborne platform.
• Quantum Computing: Quantum computing research is being driven predominately by commercial
interests. While special-purpose quantum computing devices may be available in the mid-term, the
development of a true general-purpose universal quantum computer, applicable to NATO problems,
is likely a long way from being available. As per [46], experts estimated that such a quantum
computer might be built within the next 15 to 50 years. In the medium term, the development of
new quantum optimised algorithms and M&S for defence problems may be applied to special and
limited BDAA problems.
• Quantum Communications: Quantum communication capability (for ultra-secure channels) is an
important research area, but it is being driven in many cases by strong commercial and intelligence
interests. Use of near-term QT may enable the detection of an eavesdropper on a communication
channel. Further development of quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum post-quantum
encryption options will provide the Alliance with superior encryption capabilities. In the mid-term
investment should focus on QT optical communications for anti-eavesdropping capabilities and as a
defence against jamming to enable the Alliance to understand vulnerabilities and opportunities. In
the long term, a global-reach quantum entanglement distribution system should be developed to
support secure communications and other advanced QT applications.
• Materials: Quantum simulations, which accurately model quantum many-body systems, offer
the promise of predicting material behaviours. This capability will allow the explicit design and
creation of new materials with specific desirable physical properties such as ultra-hard armour,
superconductivity, high-temperature tolerance, etc.
Table D.1: Quantum 2020-2040.

Quantum Communication High Trigger 5 2030
Information Science Revolutionary Trigger 4 2035
Precision Navigation High Disillusionment 6 2025
Sensors Moderate Trigger 3 2040

References
[46, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310]
Conjecture Card: Quantum Technologies

D.1 Transparent Ocean D.2 Quantum Cryptography D.3 Quantum Radar
Obtain the position of any subma- Crack certain types of encryption in Use air and space-based covert
rine, at any depth, everywhere on microseconds. Overcome cyber de- ultra-sensitive very low power radar
Earth, through ultra-sensitive mag- fences to disrupt or destroy others’ systems to track and identify air
netic, gravity or acoustic sensors. computer systems. targets at the extreme line-of-sight
ranges.
D.4 Computational Dominance D.5 GPS Denied Environment D6. Precision Navigation
Utilise novel quantum algorithms Operate for weeks at a time in Conduct under-ice precision navi-
(optimisation, neural networks, a GPS denied environment with gation with unmanned underwater
etc.) to provide a decision edge sup- complete geospatial and temporal vehicles for months, without GPS
porting military and enterprise op- awareness, equivalent to that of to- updates, in the deep ocean and lit-
erations and functions. day’s GPS systems at sea, in the air toral areas.
or on land.
D.7 Quantum Illumination D.8 Quantum Communications D.9 Chemistry & Materials
Short-range very low power non- Communicate instantaneously at Simulate the quantum structure and
invasive imaging for security or long range without being prone to behaviour of new chemicals and
biomedical applications. eavesdropping. materials to create new biochem-
icals and materials important for
CBRN countermeasures.
E
E. Space Technologies
Space Technologies
“Space is extremely important for all civilian and military activities, for communications, for navigation,
for the transmission of data, so of course, space and satellites are of great importance for all NATO
Allies ... We will not weaponise space, we will not deploy weapons in space, but we make sure that
the assets there are available in peace, crisis and conflict.” - NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
(2019) [311].
Definition
Space Technologies
Space is generally considered to begin 90 - 100 km (the Karman line [71]) above sea-level. Space
Technologies exploit or must contend with the unique operational environment of space, which includes:
freedom of action, global field of view, speed, freedom of access; a near-vacuum; micro-gravity;
isolation; and, extreme environments (temperature, vibration, sound and pressure).
Keywords
Space · Satellites · Micro-sat · Smallsat · Picosat · Nanosat · Propulsion · Launch vehicle · ITWAA · EO/IR
Sensors · SAR Sensors · Geosynchronous - Geostationary - Polar - Sun-synchronous - LEO (low-earth ) -
MEO (medium-earth) - HEO (high-earth) - Molniya orbit · Thruster · Solar Sail · ISR · Imagery · National
Technical Means · Missile Defence · ASAT (Anti-Satellite Weapon) · Kinetic kill · AIS · Earth Observation
Overview
Space is the ultimate high-ground (Figure E.1) and NATO is fundamentally dependent upon space
capabilities to conduct missions responsively and efficiently. To do so requires national or commercial
access to launch vehicles, platforms (satellites), sensors, C2 and constellations that are resilient to
environmental or human-made threats. NATO has identified 5 core space capabilities [312] outlined in
Table E.1.
S&T has a strong interest in space technologies and the use of space, but many aspects are beyond
the scope of this report, as they fall outside of NATO’s defined areas of concern. These include uses or
76 Chapter E. Space Technologies
Table E.1: NATO Space Capabilities and Usage.
Space Capability NATO Use and Effects

Precision Strike
Force Navigation
Position, Navigation, Time (PNT) & Velocity
Support to Personnel Recovery (PR)/Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR)
Network Timing
Force Protection
Integrated Tactical Warning and Threat Assessment Attribution
Missile Warning
Mission Planning
Environmental Monitoring Munitions Selection
Weather Forecasting
Command and Control
Communications Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Ops
Beyond-the-Horizon communications
Coverage of Operation Execution (in the oper-
ations centre)
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
Intelligence
Targeting
technologies more align with the civilian sector or of uniquely national interest, including (heavy) launch,
astronomy, planetary exploration, surveillance of space, and human performance. For this appendix space
technology is understood to encompass three essential components:
1. Platforms: Including satellites, power, station keeping, propulsion, photonics, materials, and
active/passive countermeasures;
2. Sensors: High-performance sensing; and,
3. Operations: Including space control, space situational awareness, space weather, autonomy,
communications.
Specific tech watch activities related to space
have been conducted by the STO around: sen-
sors (compressive sensing, computational imag-
ing, persistent infrared surveillance); materials
(energy storage, 3D printing) and operations (sys-
tem health management, 3D environmental mod-
elling, ultra-short lasers, wide-band communica-
tions, robotics, and autonomy).
Operating predominately in low-Earth (LEO)
and medium-Earth (MEO) orbits (Figure E.2),
Figure E.1: The Earth at Night. small satellites (smallsats) are delivering afford-
able science and services to academia, commerce
and government and offer significant benefits to the warfighter. Active individual satellites and entire
constellations can be deployed at greatly reduced costs in capability areas such as communications, ex-
tended ISR and geographical positioning. Smallsats are spacecraft which are less than 500 kg in mass and
encompass several subcategories including [313]: (1) minisatellites (100 - 180 kg); (2) microsatellites (10 -
100 kg); (3) nanosatellites (1 - 10 kg); (4) picosatellites (0.01 - 1 kg); and, (5) femtosatellites (0.001 - 0.01
kg). A special category of modular smallsats (cubesats) have a standard size of 10cm × 10cm × 10cm per
77
constituent cube. These satellites are significantly cheaper than larger platforms, allow greater risk-taking
and can be launched quickly at a lower cost. Moreover, smallsats enable the deployment of constellations
or formations of space assets that can perform tasks with increased resolution, repeat cycle and higher
performance across the constellation of satellites. Consequently, smallsats may enable military capabilities
on-demand, tailored to specific operational needs. In the context of NATO, smallsats could support three
of NATO’s strategic capabilities: (1) strategic information dominance; (2) reliable, secure communication;
and, (3) enhancement of situational awareness.
As a technological solution, smallsats have
advanced significantly over the last decade from
educational and experimental platforms to fully HEO
mission capable space assets. The miniaturisation
of payloads and the entry of dedicated small satel-
lite launch services to the market (e.g. Rocket GEO
Lab [72]) facilitated this development. In some in- MEO
LEO
stances, small satellites augment the capabilities of
conventional larger spacecraft, such as off-loading ● LEO: Low Earth Orbit (160 – 2000 km)
● MEO: Medium Earth Orbit (2000 – 36,000 km)
less demanding tasks or supporting communica- ● GEO: Geostationary (36,000 km)
● HEO: Highly Elliptical Orbit (e.g. 40,000 km apogee)
tion relays. Small satellites are also fast becoming
viable platforms for effecting specific military mis-
sions. They can carry conventional or specialised Figure E.2: Orbit Types.
payloads and can operate individually, together in
constellations, or autonomously in swarms for higher complexity missions.
Smallsat concepts and technology developments have focused on moving beyond the traditional space
mission paradigm. These developments have had and will continue to require scientific, technological
and engineering efforts in such areas as large (mesh) constellations; functional separation and control;
increased robustness and resiliency through reduced complexity; mission studies to reduce revisit times at
an affordable cost; rapid assembly, integration and verification studies to reduce time and cost to launch;
rapid technology insertion through dedicated platforms to reduce risk of emerging technologies; innovative
propulsion options; integration into space operations (figure E.3); and, responsive launch. Technologies to
temporarily increase or remedy capacity loss are also of interest.
Satellites are fully or semi-autonomous vehi-
Space Segment
cles and as such benefit from continued research
and development in autonomy related technolo-
gies such as stealth (signatures: infrared, visible,
Ground Station radar); qualification & certification; structures &
Launch Facility materials; performance; stability & control; and de-
Control Center sign tools. In particular, increased responsiveness,
Remote
improved power management and reduced com-
Customer Terminals
Terminals
Tracking Station
munication bandwidth are being enabled through
Ground Segment User Segment
the development of more effective on-board pro-
Figure E.3: 3 Segments of Space Operations cessing, automated collection, multi-sensor data
(CREDIT: Adapted From [312]). fusion and on-board target recognition. Increased
use of robotics in space is also facilitating the re-
furbishment, refuelling and repair of satellites on-orbit [314]. While still nascent this technology will over
the next ten years greatly reduce life-cycle costs and increase longevity. As noted in [315]
“The vision for on-orbit servicing and assembly is to create a robust and resilient space
ecosystem that drives humanity toward a new era of space exploration, ultimately lowering
the cost of access to space, and helping to build a better world.”
Communications and observation (i.e. C4ISR) have always been important motivators for the use of
space. The development of specialised EO/IR sensors (electro-optic/infrared) notably to support missile
defence, SAR (synthetic aperture radar), ELINT (e.g. Automated Identification System (AIS)) continues.
New sensor modalities are being explored, driven by improved sensor sensitivity, miniaturisation, the
developing quantum sensor and communication revolution, and increased commercial satellite density.
For example, radars operating at frequencies above 100GHz, (sub-Terahertz) can have very good range
and angular resolution. Radars at these wavelengths are also sensitive to surface texture in a way which
is closer to electro-optical systems than to conventional radars. The small wavelength also makes them
very compact. Such sensors offer great potential for space-based imaging as space-borne systems are
unaffected by atmospheric attenuation. Similarly, MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) radars and
Passive Coherent Radars (PCL), currently on its third development cycle [316], are well suited for
space-based sensing and exploiting transmissions from commercial systems.
As part of the democratisation of S&T and commercialisation of space, access to these sensors
and space derived data will increasingly be widely available as will sophisticated analysis tools [317].
This access will not be limited to lower quality imagery, but increasingly exploited data based on fused
high-quality electronic intelligence (ELINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), radar
(synthetic aperture radar), and state of the art hyper-spectral & EO/IR imagery.
A wide variety of other space-related technologies will have a direct impact on future NATO space
operations. Among the most critical, is an increased reliance on developing BDAA and AI technologies
to mitigate the projected increase in space derived data. These technologies include the increased use
of digital reality (virtual, mixed, etc.) to support space operations and training; high-data-rate space-to-
ground/space-to-space optical communications [318]; improved cyber hardening to prevent unauthorised
use or re-purposing of satellites or constellations; and, increased M&S support and analysis increasing
resilience (e.g. debris, space weather) and space situational awareness.
Others
Australia
France
South Korea
Spain
Luxembourg
Germany
Canada
India
United Kingdom
Multinational
Japan
Russia
China
USA
0 200 400 600 800 1000

Operational Satellites
Figure E.4: Operational Satellites by Country (as of 30 Sept 2019) (SOURCE: [319]).
The world’s economies, militaries and societies rely heavily on space-based systems (see (Figures E.4
- E.8)), and that reliance is increasing. The continued explosion of commercial interest in space is the
biggest space development foreseen over the next 5-10 years. This growth in commercial space includes
new launch capabilities (e.g. SpaceX and RocketLab); the increasing use of low-cost smallsats for com-
munication or earth observation; on-orbit repair or salvage; large-scale constellations of communication
79
Mixed Use
13%
GEO Civil
25% 7%
MEO Commercial
6% 46%
Military
Elliptical 15%
LEO 3%
66%
Government
19%
(a) Orbits of Operational Satellites (b) Operational Satellites by User
Figure E.5: Operational Satellites (as of 30 Sept 2019) (SOURCE: [319]).
OTHER
Space Observation
Navigation/Regional Positioning
Earth Science
Space Science
Navigation/Global Positioning
Technology Development
Earth Observation
Communications
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Figure E.6: Purpose of Operational Satellites (as of 30 Sept 2019) (SOURCE: [319]).
Communications Earth Observation Navigation

Technology Development Space Science Multipurpose/Other
1200
Actual and Projected Launches per year
1000
800
600
400
200
Figure E.7: Actual and Forecast Satellite Launches per Year (SOURCE:[320]).
45
40
Launch Costs (Thousand USD (2018)) per kg
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Launch Year
Figure E.8: Launch Costs by Year (Thousands USD Per kg) (SOURCE: [321]).
81
(internet, media, etc.) satellites; and space tourism. Over a 20-year horizon, new commercial activities
in resource extraction (e.g. moon, asteroids, etc.) and human exploration will expand many times over.
Figure E.7 provides some context around this growth. As of the publication of this report more than 2000
satellites are in orbit, a number driven in no small measure by the exponential decay in per kg launch costs.
The number of satellites is expected to quintuple by 2030, with 1,100 expected to be launched per year in
2025 alone (almost four times the number launched in 2018) [320]. SpaceX alone is planning on placing
12,000 small satellites in orbit by 2027 to support its Starlink communication constellation. With all this
activity, by 2040, the global space industry is forecast to grow from $350M (US) to $1 - 2.7 trillion [322].
Along with the use of space, the threats to
space assets are developing as well [323, 324, 325].
While a number of countries have experimented
with counter satellites weapons (e.g Figure E.9),
recent actions by Russian space apparatus inspec-
tors [326], as well as Chinese [327] and Indian
[141, 328] anti-satellite (ASAT) activities are of
significant concern. These physical threats are in
addition to the spectre of cyber-attacks [329] (in-
cluding ransomware) on space infrastructure (e.g.
[330, 331, 332]) or the hijacking of existing satel-
lites [333, 334], the use of direct energy weapons
to blind satellite systems [335, 336] or more tra-
ditional jamming of satellite communication and
control. On-orbit robotic servicing technologies
will probably open the door to the development
of new ASAT weapons such as parasitic micro-
satellites, designed to hijack, jam, re-purpose, ex-
ploit, destroy or covertly monitor satellite activ-
ity. As such, there will be a growing need by
Alliance nations to design resilient satellites that
are capable of defending themselves (passively
or actively) from such threats. As noted by Gen Figure E.9: ASM-135A Launched From a Highly
Andre Lanata (Supreme Allied Commander Trans- Modified F-15A, Sept. 13, 1985 (CREDIT: USAF
formation (SACT)) [337]: “Until now, space was (Paul Reynolds)).
considered by everybody as a safe haven ... It’s
not the case anymore.”
BLUE
Space is an underpinning technology for NATO operations and Alliance activities. The following
developments will impact a broad range of NATO space capabilities and uses (PNT, indications and
warning, environmental monitoring, and C4ISR):
1. Smallsats: Smallsats support many different military capabilities as they can perform military
missions that once were reserved for large spacecraft. Today, smallsats of different size and degrees
of autonomy are already used for ISR collection activities, taking advantage of very short revisit
times, rapid launch and flexible positioning. Increased use of smallsats with new low powered
passive and active sensors will increase situational awareness around the planet, and increase space
situational awareness. In the future swarms, increased autonomy and large constellations will
further improve C4ISR capabilities.
2. Microwave Photonics: Microwave photonics can strongly impact space based functionalities and
performance for high-frequency of radars and EW systems. Photonics integration can help in
reducing size and weight, and in increasing the robustness in terms of electromagnetic interference
insensitivity. The integrated photonic technology has already been demonstrated to be space
qualified for military applications.
3. PCL: The increase in detection ranges for ground base PCL radars, augmented by space-based
receivers, will allow a real-time RAP (Recognised Air Picture) over a much wider area over RED
or neutral territory. It will enable a deep view onto activity over a wide area and provide detection,
precise tracking and identification of targets using adversary or neutral nation transmitters of
opportunity. An advantage of such an approach will be the possibility of more complete TBM and
hypersonic launch detection and tracking.
4. Quantum: One of the main benefits of quantum technologies will be realised in the medium
term through improved sensing applications; in particular, the ability to detect submerged or
concealed objects. Improved imaging through various techniques may enable more rapid and
accurate identification of threats. QKD potentially offers a significant improvement in secure
communications, but there are several challenges to be overcome concerning distance and network
size. Nevertheless, rapid identification of intrusion could be a substantial aid to cyber intelligence.
5. Terahertz Sensors: Terahertz sensors will support exo-atmospheric high-resolution sensing. In-
terception and countermeasures capabilities into this region of the spectrum would prevent other
actors from being able to exploit such capabilities against NATO.
6. Situational Awareness: With Space as an operational domain, space situational awareness will
become even more critical. Dealing with debris, hunter-killer satellites [325, 338], congested orbits,
commercial space-derived intelligence, mega-constellations, space weather and increased human
activity in space will all require increase space situational awareness.
RED
Peer or near competitors will leverage the same advantages as BLUE. However, the use by asymmetric
forces is expected to grow predominately through the leveraging of commercial space imagery and
communication systems. Cyber attacks against BLUE (commercial or military) space control centres open
up additional areas of vulnerability and the possibility of ransomware, covert monitoring or hijacking of
commercial space assets [339]. More specifically:
• Smallsats: Since smallsats can be developed in short times and with affordable budgets, they may
also be used as a threat to NATO space assets. However, the major limitation will be placing
smallsats in relevant orbits requiring launch vehicle capability, which is today only owned by a
small number of space fairing nations. However, launch capacity may be obtained from Russia,
China or growing commercial sources. The rapidly falling price of space launches and increased
miniaturisation will greatly increase access to space, including access to criminal or asymmetric
threats.
• Microwave Photonics: The applications of microwave photonics in communications wireless

systems and distributed sensor networks will make this technology available worldwide. This
availability will allow RED to develop increasingly smaller and more functional satellites and
constellations.
• PCL: Peer or near-peer forces will obtain the capability for covert detection and tracking of BLUE
forces activities at long distances.
• Terahertz Sensors: Of particular concern is the possibility that RED could detect stealthy objects
more readily using space-based terahertz sensors.
83
• ASAT: The risks from ASAT (anti-satellite) (hard or soft kill) weapons or robotic parasitic systems
will become more acute. Increasingly congested orbits, increased use of large constellations of
smallsats and increasing levels of space debris polluting the near-earth environment will impact the
effectiveness and reliability of space-based systems [75, 140, 141, 142, 340].
Interoperability
To date, NATO does not own satellites directly
but leverages those owned by Alliance nations, ex-
ploits space derived information and uses satellite-
based communication networks. As such, interop-
erability issues will arise around access to highly
classified space derived information, operational
use of commercial communication networks, shar-
ing of exploitation results, policies on the use of
data collected by commercial sensors, and pro-
cedures for the Alliance to request collection on
targets by national means. Interoperability solu- Figure E.10: The International Space Station.
tions will require that NATO continues to provide
a forum to share information and supports missions and operations with space-based systems. Common
interests and a willingness to work together are characteristic of international activities in space (e.g.
Figure E.10), including those involving NATO, and such coordination and collaboration will be essential
to ensure interoperability and the long term utility of space to NATO’s success.
S&T DEVELOPMENT
1. Microwave Photonics: Maturing with subsystems currently at TRL 5, and many components at
TRL 6. Continued research will improve system performance and support further miniturisation.
2. Small-sats: A variety of small-sats are already used within military operations in all domains.
However, these systems are limited in their usage and missions capability. To fully cover the
military needs, S&T efforts are still required to increase the TRL for key technologies. With
increasing required levels of autonomy, the current TRL level is decreasing. Therefore the current
TRL level ranges from 3 – 9 depending on the observed technology. Additional research will need
to be undertaken on low power propulsion, autonomy and satellite control, in order to enable next
generation smallsat swarming or mission specific orbital adjustment.
3. Autonomy: Space has always pushed the boundaries of autonomy. Continued research needs to be
conducted to expand on-orbit autonomous capabilities. These developments include expanding on-
board AI and processing capabilities, better energy storage, more efficient thruster and propulsion
technologies, and enhanced robotics. These technologies vary widely from TRL 3 – 9 depending
on the observed technology.
4. Passive Coherent Location (PCL) Radars: The TRL level can be estimated between 2 and 3. The
studies are at the present moment at the level of theoretical considerations and basic phenomena
modelling. Selected field tests show the capability of passive radars to track fast objects like missiles
both in lunch and ballistic phases. It is estimated that this technology will reach TRL level 4-6 in
the next five years, and reach level 9 over the 20-year time-frame.
5. Spaced Based Quantum: The TRLs vary across the different technologies outlined above, but
none are currently above TRL5. Gravitometers are up to TRL5; while mostly imagers are up
to TRL4, and some RF sensors have reached TRL5. QKD is at TRL7, and has already been
demonstrated in space but with substantial challenges associated with expansion to larger networks.
Within 5 to 15 years, precision navigation systems, QKD, imagers, and gravity sensors could reach
TRL9.
6. Terahertz Sensors: In 10 - 20 years, components developed originally for automotive/ communi-

cation systems will be available for space-borne ISAR systems. This availability will allow space
objects with a radar cross-section* of about 0.1m2 to be imaged with a resolution of better than a
centimetre at a range of 50km.
7. Resilience: Resilient space assets and networks will need to be developed and maintained. Research
into new methods of rapid low cost tactical launch, improved space situational awareness (including
space weather), satellite hardening (new materials, impact survivability & cyber) and active/passive
ASAT countermeasures should be explored.
The following table presents the assessed integrated potential impact, state and rate of development,
as well as identified areas for focused research.
Table E.2: Space (Systems) 2020-2040.

Space Platforms Moderate Expectation 6 2025
Operations Moderate Expectation 5 2030
Sensors High Trigger 3 2035

References
[73, 74, 75, 99, 99, 141, 142, 255, 322, 327, 333, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348]
85
Conjecture Card: Space

E.1 Star Wars Satellites E.2 Satellite E.3 Solar Space Power
Surgically deliver a kinetic or di- Conduct on orbit construction, re- Deliver very large quantities of en-
rected energy weapon (DEW) effect pair, deconstruction or covert/overt ergy everywhere on Earth provided
from space to targets larger than modifications of C4ISR satellite you have the necessary equipment
10cm in diameter. systems and constellations. to receive it.
E.4 Commercial Space ISR E.5 Instant launch E.6 Global radar
Use and fuse commercial space de- Launch single-purpose limited life Target from space using GPS or
rived data providing global situa- satellites & swarms into low other EM echoes.
tional awareness of air, space and Earth orbit (LEO) from forward-
maritime surface traffic, including operating bases.
identification of dark targets in real-
time.
E.7 Orbiting Base E.8 Weaponized Space Debris E.9 Deep insertion
Employ persistent counterattack or Plausibly deny destruction of an ad- Strategic resupply and force projec-
observation bases for Earth-orbiting versarial satellite or ground strike. tion anywhere on Earth in hours.
objects, defeating earth-oriented
countermeasures.
F
F. Hypersonics
Hypersonics
“I’m sorry for everybody out there who champions some other high priority ... But there has to be a
first, and hypersonics is my first ... When the Chinese can deploy [a] tactical or regional hypersonic
system, they hold at risk our carrier battle groups. They hold our entire surface fleet at risk. They hold at
risk our forward-deployed forces and land-based forces.” - Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defence
Research and Engineering (USA) [349]
Definition
Hypersonics (HWS)
(Advanced) Hypersonic Weapons Systems (missiles, vehicles, etc.) operate at speeds greater than Mach
5 (6125 kph). In such a regime, dissociation of air becomes significant, and rising heat loads pose
an extreme threat to the vehicle. Hypersonic flight phases occur during re-entry from space into the
atmosphere or during propelled/sustained atmospheric flight by rocket, scramjet or combined cycle
propulsion. This class of weapon system includes air-launched strike missiles (HCM), manoeuvring
re-entry glide vehicles (HGV), ground-sea ship killers, and post-stealth strike aircraft. Systems of this
nature may rely primarily on kinetic effects alone or may include supplemental warheads (nuclear
or non-nuclear). Countermeasures against individual, salvoed or swarms of hypersonic systems are
particularly challenging due to their speed and manoeuvrability. [45].
Keywords
Hypersonic · Propulsion · Glide Vehicles · Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)
Overview
Advanced hypersonic weapons systems (missiles, vehicles, etc.) operate within the atmosphere at speeds
higher than Mach 5 (6125 kph) [350]. At such speeds dissociation of air (i.e. the breakdown of air
molecules into atoms, ions or radicals) becomes significant, and the resulting heat poses a threat to the ve-
hicle. Hypersonic flight occurs during re-entry in the atmosphere from space or during propelled/sustained
atmospheric flight by rocket, scramjet or combined cycle propulsion. A hypersonic vehicle may be an
87
Ballistic Trajectory
Altitude
❑ Easier to predict flight path and intercept
Vehicle Release
❑ Rocket Booster
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles:

Difficult to detect and track
unless near impact or launch
❑ Too high for surface-to-air missiles
❑ Too low for exo-atmospheric engagement
❑ Mach 5 – 25
Impact Point ❑ Erratic flight path
Figure F.2: Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) (CREDIT: Adapted from [352]).
aeroplane, missile or spacecraft. Potential applications include fast, long-range strike of high value or
high threat targets, ballistic missile defence, ISR and reusable space transport vehicles.
Hypersonic weapons [350, 351] are ultra-fast and manoeuvrable weapon systems which typically
come in three types:
(1) Boost Glide: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) employ ballistic launch by rocket, but glide and
manoeuvre un-powered at hypersonic speeds within the atmosphere. These wave-rider HGVs generally
fly at altitudes between 40 to 100 km [352] reaching speeds as high as Mach 25;
(2) Cruise Missiles: Hypersonic Cruise Missles (HCM) are typically air-launched and powered by
scramjets (supersonic combusting ramjets) to maintain hypersonic speeds. Scramjets use thrust produced
by compressed air moving at hypersonic speeds, mixed with fuel, and then ignited. As a result, they
require rockets for assisted take-off or launch in order to accelerate the HCM to Mach 3 or 4, where the
scramjet begins to operate. HCMs generally fly at altitudes of 20 - 30 km [352]; and,
(3) Hypersonic Aircraft: Human-crewed aircraft or unmanned drones, that are typically used for
strike or reconnaissance purposes (e.g. an aircraft similar to the Mach 3+ SR-71).
Ballistic missiles reach similar speeds, but gen-
erally follow a prescribed (i.e. ballistic) flight path
after exhausting their fuel supplies. As a result,
they are excluded from this assessment. Likewise,
EM rail guns [353], which fire hyper-velocity pro-
jectiles, are also excluded as they generally use
non-manoeuvrable projectiles and an electromag-
netic impulsive launch. The use of rail guns, rather
than rockets, for the initial acceleration of scram-
jets has been an area of investigation[354, 355].
Figure F.1: Hypersonics Glide Vehicle. Given the enormous kinetic energies involved,
hypersonic missile systems may rely primarily on
kinetic effects or may include supplemental warheads (nuclear or non-nuclear). Countermeasures against
individual, salvos or swarms of hypersonic systems are particularly challenging due to their speed and
manoeuvrability [45].
The latest developments in hypersonic systems build upon a number of development cycles spread out
over the last 60 years. However, the latest R&D cycle has brought with it the possibility of operational
88 Chapter F. Hypersonics
use, as noted in [351]:
“Hypersonic weapons use electronic capacity, sensor quality, and miniaturisation to create a
new threat ... They’re fast and manoeuvrable. That combination creates a threat ... There are
flight tests from Russian, China, and other countries that show accelerated progress.”.
Jet engines come in three primary varieties:

turbojet, ramjets and scramjets (see Figure F.3 for
a comparison). In particular, scramjets, while em-
ploying relatively few moving parts, are incred-
ibly complex systems due to various problems
with aerothermodynamics, supersonic combustion,
fuels, insulation/cooling and structural material
and design. Achieving a positive thrust-drag ra-
tio is a significant engineering and technical chal-
lenge. These specialised areas include hypersonic
flow physics, turbulent transport phenomena, heat
transfer, the transition from laminar to turbulent
flow, hypersonic inlets, supersonic combustion, ad-
vanced functional materials, thermal protection,
thermal management stability and control includ-
ing control effectors. Research continues to be
necessary in the mid-term in order to develop
affordable air-launched air-breathing hypersonic
weapons capable of sustained high-temperature
cruise airspeeds [202].
Sustained hypersonic flight may be achieved
by supersonic combustion ramjets (scramjet), but Figure F.3: Three Types of Jet Engines: (a) Turbo;
requires acceleration by rocket or other sub-to- (b) Ramjet; and, (c) Scramjet. [356]
supersonic propulsion systems to reach the scramjet’s operational regime. Sustained hypersonic flight
has been achieved only for a minimal duration (∼ 2.5 min X-51A [357], Figure F.4). Research focused
on new engine designs, and operating modes will be critical to the broader development of hypersonic
capabilities. In particular, development of dual-mode engines, which transition from fuel-efficient turbine
operation to ramjet mode, will support transformational changes in long-range strike (both HCM and
aircraft), ISR, and would enable two-state-to-orbit (TSTO) operations significantly reducing the cost of
space launch [202, 358].
(a) X-43A Computational Fluid Dynamics (Mach 7) (2001- (b) X-51A Waverider on a B-52 (2010-2013 [359])
2004) (CREDIT: NASA Photo ID: ED97-43968-1).
Figure F.4: US Hypersonic Research Testbeds.

Significant milestones in hypersonic flight research have been the crewed X-15 experimental rocket
(1967), early human-crewed space re-entry capsules or modules (Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Vostok,
89
Soyuz), the Space Shuttle, and USAF programs such as the X-43a [360] and X-51A projects [357, 359]
(Figure F.4). Vehicles typically have a wave-rider configuration with a robust heat protected and cooled
structure.
Experimental work in hypersonic flight is possible only for nations with highly developed R&D
capabilities and very high financial resources [351], with the US alone spending $1 billion annually [361].
The USA, Russia and China are the current leaders in research and development for military hypersonic
vehicle applications [361, 362, 363, 364, 365]. China in particular is demonstrating considerable S&T
leadership in many aspects of hypersonic flight [366] (see Figure F.5 for one measure of such leadership).
More importantly, China and Russia have both announced successful tests and development [77, 81, 82,
367, 368], while the US has expressed concerns about losing its technology edge in this area [369]. In
recent years many other nations [370], such as the UK [371], France [372], Japan [373], and Australia
[374] have initiated new hypersonic research programs in combination with other partners. By the 2030s,
hypersonic missile technologies are expected to expand beyond delivering warheads at speeds faster than
sound also to include hypersonic intelligence and reconnaissance flights [375].
Number of Academic Publications Per Year
(HYPERSONICS)
2007 2012 2017
800
716
700
600
500
400
367
300
255
233
207
200
139
100 76
57
44 43
31 41 29 24 20 27 34
9
0
UK GERMANY INDIA RUSSIA US CHINA
Figure F.5: Number of Academic Publications (Selected Countries) [366].

As advanced hypersonic weapon systems become more and more widely deployed, the need to
develop countermeasures will become more and more acute. Use of interceptors (e.g. Glide Breaker
[202, 376]), electronic countermeasures, lasers and other directed energy systems (DEW) (e.g. high
power radio frequency weapons) offer some options for countering hypersonic threats. As noted in
[45, 77, 81, 368, 377, 378, 379], the current development of hypersonic systems may be considered
revolutionary, in no small measure due a lack of countermeasures and the concern that they lower the bar
for the use of military force. Others have noted that while hypersonic weapons are an emerging threat, they
are not quite the existential threat suggested by some [380, 381, 382, 383] given the significant technical
challenges presented in operating at such high-speeds.
Military application is possible both for propelled and un-propelled hypersonic flight vehicles. Powered
hypersonic vehicles can be used for reconnaissance purposes such as a successor to the SR-71 or for fast,
long-range strike with a hypersonic cruise missile. They may provide a considerably enhanced capability
for quick and precision response below the ICBM/nuclear level. The application will likely be more
strategic than tactical and for high value or high threat targets only because of the very high system cost.
Such high speeds allow for a rapid strike against time-critical targets from safe standoff distances, keeping
the launch platform well outside contested areas. Advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities have
pushed out the boundaries of contested areas. Hypersonic flight counters this trend and allows greater
standoff operations for the first strike. Also, the extreme speed of hypersonic penetrating systems makes
kinetic intercept very difficult.
Propelled hypersonic vehicles (e.g. HCM) will fly at very high altitude with speeds around Mach 6 – 8
and with limited manoeuvre capability. This presents significant countermeasure and intercept challenges.
Un-propelled hypersonic vehicles (e.g. HGV) may be used as warheads on a ballistic missile having
the advantage of manoeuvring capability for targeting precision and defence penetration. These vehicles
will reach higher hypersonic speed (> Mach 10) but for a shorter duration. Thermal problems can be
addressed by heat protection/insulation.
Long-range Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance is another potential application. While manned
systems are possible, long-range ISR by a hypersonic UAV would be more flexible than reconnaissance
satellites with a possible option for weapon delivery. Hypersonic missiles could also be used for defence
purposes as for intercept of high value/high threat time-critical targets and potentially hypersonic cruise
missiles. Hypersonic flight is also possible for reusable space transport vehicles, e.g. the state-of-the-art
US Air Force X-37 space-plane [384]
Significant concerns have been expressed (e.g. [45]) on the potential destabilising nature of strategic
use of hypersonic weapons for decapitation strikes. Even the threat of such a strike reduces the decision
space for Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW&AA).
BLUE
In particular:
1. Strike: The use of hypersonic systems will allow rapid, highly challenging to engage and precise
high energy (kinetic) strike. In swarm or salvo, this would enable increased kinetic kill probability
of high-value targets. HCMs, in particular, would provide a significant capability for penetrating
RED air defences due to their high speed of operation, manoeuvrability and operating altitudes
between the engagement space of traditional air and ballistic missile defence systems [352]. Such
capabilities are also valuable for engaging high-value time-sensitive targets or for rapid re-targeting
during flight.
2. Defensive Countermeasures: Hypersonic systems are challenging to defend against by their very
nature (speed and manoeuvrability). New defensive countermeasures will need to be available
to BLUE forces, capable of engaging such targets en-mass and in a sustained manner. Given the
speeds involved, these will most likely be electromagnetic (directed energy, hypersonic rail guns,
jamming, space-based missiles, etc.) in nature, although this is not without significant technical
challenges.
3. Aircraft: Hypersonic aircraft will sustain Alliance capabilities in a post-stealth operational environ-
ment, providing a technological edge in a post-stealth world [77]. Such systems may enable rapid
deployment of special forces or materials around the world in the matter of a few hours.
4. ISR: Propelled hypersonic vehicles will be used for high-altitude rapid ISR collection (e.g. as a
successor to the SR-71), as an alternative to collection by satellites or HALE UAVs.
91
RED
Over the 20 year horizon of this report, hypersonic weapon systems will remain the province of peer
or near-peer competitors due to significant technical challenges and high capability costs. Increased
strike capabilities, more effective defensive countermeasures [385] and hypersonic aircraft will challenge
Alliance operations. In particular, the possibility of a non-nuclear (kinetic) decapitation strike against
strategic and operational high-value targets (e.g. critical bases, capital ships [386] etc.) will significantly
compress strategic and operational decision times in a manner that is potentially profoundly destabilising
[45].
Both China and Russia have demonstrated ad-
vanced HGV and HCM programs [81, 82], al-
though their true operational status is subject to
debate (e.g. Chinese DF-ZF (WU-14) and Rus-
sia (Russian YU-74 Avangard)). At the end of
2019, the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu
announced that the Avangard HGV had entered
service, with President Putin further stating [387]:
“Not a single country possesses

hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-
Figure F.6: Kh-47M2 Kinzha (Dagger): 2018
range hypersonic weapons ... [other
Moscow Victory Day Parade (CREDIT: kremlin.ru).
nations are] playing catch-up with us
... The Avangard is invulnerable to
intercept by any existing and prospective missile defence means of the potential adversary”
Prior to this, on 1 March 2018, Russia successfully tested the air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic missile
and official reports indicate that they have entered limited service (Figure F.6) [388]. Later in March
Russian announced it had tested a new HCM (Zircon), a ship-launched anti-ship and land-attack missile
system [389]. Similar Chinese development of hypersonic glide vehicles has culminated in the operational
deployment (as of 2019) of the DF-17 and development of anti-ship missiles [382, 390, 391].
To date, research and development of hypersonic flight is possible only for nations with highly
developed R&D capabilities and significant financial resources.
Interoperability
Given the high cost associated with hypersonic R&D, interoperability issues are expected to be small, as
these systems will remain firmly under national control. Hypersonic defence systems may present some
interoperability challenges, but these are expected to be consistent with the deployment of conventional
systems. More critical will be the (offensive & defensive) capability disparity within the Alliance, along
with C2 issues associated with integrated tactical warning and threat assessment.
S&T Development
Hypersonic research has gone through several major cycles over the last 70 years. However, recent
advances in materials, propulsion, guidance, control have provided new approaches to dealing with
significant thermal, manoeuvrability, pressure and energy challenges. In particular, future research will
need to be focused on:
1. Platforms: Novel heat resilient materials; new modes of propulsion; miniaturisation, weight
reduction; modelling & simulation; new vehicle designs; scramjet propulsion; stealth materials and
design; autonomous behaviour (AI and swarms); and, advanced flight control. More specifically,
• Materials: Surface temperatures of HCM/HGV systems can reach over 1000 °C. The devel-
opment of new mechanically strong and heat-tolerant materials will be necessary [352].
• Propulsion: Propulsion systems will need to be expanded and further refined, including
increased reliability, efficiency [352, 358] and alternative launch (e.g. EM).
• Control: Flight dynamics at hypersonic speeds is complicated by unusual airflow character-
istics, necessitating improved modelling and simulation (i.e. computational fluid dynamics
(Figure F.4)). This, in turn, will help enable research on vehicle control and guidance, which
is especially important to improve accuracy, loss of control and autonomous behaviour.
2. Defensive Counter-Measures: Countering hypersonic threats will be necessary as the high speeds,
manoeuvrability and operating altitudes make this a challenging prospect [392, 393]. More specifi-
cally,
• Sensors & Tracking: Countering HCM & HGV will require improved terrestrial and space-
based sensors for detection, identification and tracking, as well as improved navigation and
control to ensure successful intercepts. Integrated data fusion and autonomous functions will
need to be improved to support the short decision times available.
• Hard Kill: Development of new anti-hypersonic missiles or hyper-velocity projectiles suitable
for the counter-hypersonic role will present a major technological challenge. Directed energy
weapons (DEW) may also provide a hard-kill capability, but the very nature of hypersonic
vehicles will make this a challenge.
• Soft Kill: The use of cyber, EW, DEW and decoys as a means of countering hypersonic
weapon systems.
Table F.1: Hypersonic (Systems) 2020-2040.

Hypersonics Platforms and Propulsion High Trigger 5 2025
Countermeasures High Trigger 3 2030

References
[45, 78, 79, 80, 350, 352, 361, 363, 364, 366, 367, 368, 370, 379, 385, 390, 393]
93
Conjecture Card: Hypersonics

F.1 Energy Beam Self Defense F.2 Hypersonic Missile F.3 Super Destructive Projectiles
Automatically defend air, maritime Launch a precision hypersonic at- Propel hypersonic projectiles over
and land assets from incoming hy- tack from ground, surface, air or or- great distances, without the need
personic missiles or enemy systems bit capable of absolute destruction for chemical propellant, delivering
using high powered energy beam of a large building, aircraft carrier, destructive power through kinetic
weapons (e.g. lasers). air terminal or complex. effect.
F.4 Underwater Launch F.5 Very Fast Air F.6 Hypersonic Swarms
Launch hypersonic weapons (glide Employ manned aircraft, UAVs and Precision control of swarms of hy-
or cruise) while submerged for missile systems supporting hyper- personic vehicles or missiles in-
strike or ISR missions. sonic cruise, increasing responsive- flight targeting air, land or naval
ness, situational awareness and sur- forces.
vivability.
F.7 Propulsion and Materials F.8 Defensive Shield F.9 EM Countermeasures
Exploit next generation materials, Simultaneously identify and de- Disable targeted electronic systems
propulsion and manufacturing to stroy multiple incoming ballistic or on hypersonic vehicles, even those
greatly reduced the cost and avail- hypersonic missiles inside or out- with electromagnetic shielding or
ability of hypersonic systems. side the atmosphere. countermeasures.
G
G. Biotechnology & Human Enhancement
Biotechnology and Human Enhancement

“Modern technologies that actively seek to combine bio, nano, info and neuro elements can give us
the ability to ‘enhance’ human beings in ways that we want. This ability — to make soldiers more
capable of defeating their enemies and surviving the perils of conflict — is of great interest to militaries
throughout the world.” - Adam Henschke [394].
Definition
Bio & Human Enhancement Technologies (BHET)
Biotechnologies use organisms, tissues, cells or molecular components derived from living things, to
act on living things; or, act by intervening in the workings of cells or the molecular components of
cells, including their genetic material [101]. Human Enhancement Technologies (HET) are biomedical
interventions that are used to improve human form or to function beyond what is necessary to restore or
sustain health. HET may enhance physiological, cognitive or social functions.
Keywords
Medicine · Supplements · Mixed Reality · Prophylaxis · CRISPR · Synthetic Biology · Human Enhancement
Technologies (HET) · Bio-Engineering · Genetics · Medical Countermeasures · Genetic Engineering ·
Micro-Fluidics · Neural Interface · Prosthetics · Exoskeleton · Molecular Engineering · Brain-Machine
Interface · Neural Prostheses · Neural Interface · Biosensors · Bioinformatics · Micro-Arrays · Bioelec-
tronics
Overview
Bio and Human Enhancement Technologies (BHET) are comprised of four major R&D areas (with
substantial overlap and synergies between them). These are listed below with example applications or
areas of research:
(1) Bioinformatics & Biosensors: In vitro / ex vitro sensors, medical imaging, quantum biology,
applied BDAA;
95
(2) Human Augmentation: Mixed reality, virtual reality, social networks, robotics, AI, prosthetics,
exo-skeletons, neuro-electronics, rehabilitation, neuroscience, robotics, teleoperations, autonomy,
cognitive performance, computational, artificial intelligence, trusted autonomy, perceptual enhance-
ments;
(3) Medical Countermeasures and Bio-medical technologies: Chemical-Biological-Radiological-
Nuclear (CBRN) counter-measures and detection, personalized medicine, biomarkers, bio-engineering,
supplements, nutrition, physiology, resilience, stress resistance; and,
(4) Synthetic Biology: Genetic engineering, DNA sequencing and exploitation, bio-manufacturing,
modified microbiome, living sensors.
Advances in materials, information systems and the human sciences are setting the stage to significantly
enhance human capabilities, pushing the physiological, cognitive and social human performance frontiers.
R&D in these areas is enabled by rapid parallel developments in RAS, AI, BDAA, miniaturisation and
innovative materials/manufacturing. As a result, BHET developments are moving at a breathtaking rate,
driven by research breakthroughs (e.g. the discovery of CRISPR/Cas9 for gene editing [395]), substantial
national investments and increasing commercial interest. The limits on development are around the
need for baseline research, as well as ethical, legal and policy concerns. In particular, there are serious
issues around the use of genetic engineering; the release of personal bio-data; use of pharmacological
enhancements; and, ethical testing of new therapeutics and countermeasures.
Bioinformatics, and the related field of com-
putational biology is concerned with the storage,
retrieval, organisation and analysis of biological
data, and in particular that associated with humans
or human activity. The processing of such large
volumes of data available for exploitation and as-
sessment (often in real-time) has enabled a much
greater understanding of biological, biochemical,
physiological, cognitive and social behaviours. In
turn, this has supported new technological devel-
Figure G.1: Bioinformatics. opments in medicine, genetics and biology. Es-
pecially over the last 15 years, bioinformatics has
transformed the biological sciences to the point where:
“It might be that a new, “theoretical biology” is emerging, where models and their predictions
can now be assessed by experimental biology, in analogy to the interplay between theoretical
and experimental physics. This moment might have come faster than expected. The merging of
computation into the fabric of biosciences and biomedicine by 2020 ...will possibly necessitate
a redefinition of computational biology as a distinct discipline in the not-so-distant future.”
[396].
Developments in biosensors (especially cheap and widely available ones) have significantly contributed
to this data explosion. Biosensors are devices that measure biological (immunological, pressure, thermal,
etc.) or biochemical processes and convert them into an electrical signal. These are widely used today and
come in many forms. They may be employed for many purposes, such as nano-sensors embedded in smart
clothing for detection of CBRN agents; treatment monitoring (e.g. diabetes); silicon photonic biosensors
(e.g. fibre Bragg gratings [397]); rapidly applied tattoos to monitor physiological or cognitive stress [398];
and in support of biomedical research [399]. Human physiological monitoring technologies are already
commercially available and more advanced sensor packages will mature in the midterm. Advances and
technological convergence in material, information and human sciences are allowing new cheaper, smaller
and more robust biosensors to be developed.
S&T development in bioinformatics and biosensors, as they related to NATO capabilities, will
be predominately around their novel use, application of new analytical methods (e.g. AI, quantum
96 Chapter G. Biotechnology & Human Enhancement
biology [400], new sensors (in vivo / ex vivo) and the identification of new biomarkers). This continued
development will support predictive combat casualty care and diagnostics; operational readiness (e.g.
over-training, nutritional deficiencies, immunocompetence, cardiac health and muscular-skeletal injury);
and assessment of CBRN exposure.
State-of-the-art sensors are typically designed
for optimal detection only. As an example, terror-
ism threats and military conflicts have motivated
research in novel sensors for detecting explosives
and chemical warfare agents (CWAs). The focus
of today’s research on (bio)sensors goes far be-
yond the optimisation of the sensing material; it
includes the ability to make decisions and act –
smart sensing. Research in this area includes the
application of [401]: sensor material designs em-
ploying carbon nanotubes, polymer nanowires, and
porous silicon; machine learning, and DNA-based
molecular computing for smart biosensor function;
and, bioelectronics and neuroelectronics, such as
nerve cell microelectrode arrays for creating novel
transducers and physiological biosensors.
Enhanced bioinformatics and biosensors will
improve monitoring and bio-situational awareness
through the application of advanced data collec-
tion and predictive analytics. Leveraging such
techniques will support improved military health,
operational readiness and training, through predic- Figure G.2: The Future Soldier (CREDIT: US-
tive and pre-emptive responses to environmental ARMY/DARPA).
or individual issues [202].
Human augmentation, human enhancement or soldier systems are broadly understood to mean
technologies used to improve human form or to function beyond what is necessary to restore or sustain
health. Concerning BHET relevant to NATO, we take these to cover the range of human domains -
physiological, cognitive & social, and the use of robotic exoskeletons, smart textiles, drugs, and seamless
man-machine interfaces.
The development of new human augmentation technologies (physical, pharmacological, neurological
or social) has the potential to change the capabilities of the individual soldier, sailor or aviator significantly
[402, 403, 404, 405, 406] and create integrated human-machine symbiotes of unparalleled capabilities.
Examples of such augmentation across a variety of sensory modalities are [402]:
• Ocular enhancements to imaging, sight, and situational awareness through implants, glasses or con-
tact lens. These visual enhancements will support team data sharing; enhanced target identification;
man-machine teaming; and, expansion of vision beyond the visible spectrum [407]:
• Restoration and programmed muscular control through an optogenetic bodysuit sensor web;
• Auditory enhancement for communication and protection; and,
• Direct neural enhancement of the human brain for two-way data transfer.
The first three of these technologies are expected to be widely available within the next 20 years.
The last, direct neural enhancement, is potentially the most disruptive but is also unlikely to be widely
available before 2050, putting it outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the development of direct
neural-silica connections supporting bi-directional data transfer and mesh networks are a real possibility.
Given recent advances in understanding the brain’s neurological components and cognitive architecture,
97
neuroelectronic components that can efficiently implement brain-like algorithms and interface directly
with biological wetware offer possibilities for new technological capabilities that could significantly
impact both the civilian and military domains. Very high speed, very low power neuromorphic electronic
components that feature non-von Neumann architectures and analogue-like processors offer the possibility
of autonomous systems and heterogeneous computer architectures that incorporate these devices. Such
systems would be able to perform tasks that the brain excels at but which currently thwart classical
computers, such as extensive heterogeneous data analysis and visual scene processing. Interfacing these
devices with biological systems will offer new treatment methods for neurological diseases and improved
interface mechanisms between the brain and electronic devices for better control of artificial limbs.
In the near term, significant changes in advancing heads-up displays over the past five years will be
refined to offer:
• Improvements in the power efficiency of micro-displays;
• Advancements in optical fabrication techniques for free-form optical surfaces; and
• Integration and proliferation of smartphones and wireless data links.
The broad deployment of exoskeletons in commercial sectors will probably remain quite limited for
the short term, due to their high cost (more than $25,000 per suit). Nevertheless, “it’s clear that the
era of the exoskeleton has begun” [408] in areas such as logistics (e.g. warehouses), construction and
manufacturing (e.g. cars and aviation) to ease worker burden, improve efficiency and reduce injuries. It
is predicted that by 2025 the exoskeleton market will be 1.8 billion USD, up from 68 million USD in
2014 [409]. The US Army and others are moving forward quickly with development and exploring the
operational effectiveness of exoskeletons in theatre [410, 411].
Other methods of human augmentation include
the development of new physiological and pharma-
cological cognitive (PCE) enhancements, with at-
tendant reproducibility, medical, ethical, legal and
policy considerations (e.g. [412, 413]). Direct pe-
ripheral nerve stimulation and other non-invasive
methods may also be used to increase synaptic
plasticity for improved cognitive performance and
learning [202], supporting rapid and practical train-
ing of military personnel in complex multi-faceted
tasks. Figure G.3: Future Gear.
Ethical, legal, and policy issues arise around
the entire spectrum of human enhancement technologies, but especially with pharmacological enhance-
ments. As noted by [414]:
“Militaries have long sought to enhance the physical and cognitive performance of warfight-
ers directly, and indeed some human performance enhancement drugs are widely used across
the US military today, such as caffeine. Existing technologies have demonstrated the ability
to improve individual physical and cognitive performance above baseline levels and in key
areas central to military competition: strength, focus, attention, learning, and resistance to
fatigue. Many of these technologies are already being used in civilian settings, in licit or
illicit contexts.”
Mixed reality, is another example of human augmentation, blending the real and virtual worlds to
create new digital or manufactured realities, where physical and digital objects co-exist and interact in
real-time. Applications include heads up or head-mounted displays for pilots and soldiers for real-time
situational awareness, digital cockpits/windows, realistic training environments or providing hands-free
job performance aids. Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality are subsets of Mixed Reality. Computer
simulation models are often used to deliver these experiences. Recent attempts at large-scale commercial
product releases for head-worn, see-through, virtual displays have reopened interest in the use of head or
body-worn virtual displays.
Reference [402] notes that these technologies
will rapidly mature over the next 20 year and be
primarily driven by the commercial market. This
bio-economy is already at the earliest stages of
development (e.g. Google glasses [415]), while
the pharmaceutical industry is one of the world’s
most significant contributing over 200M euro to
the EU economy alone.
The social domain is an essential element of
human existence, and technology has provided
Figure G.4: Visual Enhancement. social enhancement technologies in the form of
social networks and media. A social network is
a network of social interactions and personal relations. Social media is a set of mediums that can be
used for social networking. Social media and networks have helped reshape the social, economic and
political world over the last 15 years [416, 417], with over 3.5 billion daily users (45% of the world’s
population). Social media has been embraced widely and quickly, and it has gained tremendous power
to affect the perceptions and behaviours of individuals and societies. As such, it has become critical for
the defence, security and safety of the Alliance, and it is the prime human-terrain for operations in the
cyber/information domain. The amount and variety of social media (whether text, audio, photographic or
video in nature) is immense and growing at an astounding rate.
Although social media is a product of the Internet era and most notably the 21st Century, the research
on social networks predates the internet by a wide margin. One of the first major social networking studies
in the 20th Century resulted in the Six Degrees of Separation (SDS) Theory, first proposed by Frigyes
Karinthy in 1929. In 2008, well after the advent of the internet, Microsoft conducted a study demonstrating
that the average e-mail chain length was 6.6 hops. However, in 2016, researchers at Facebook reported
that social networking had reduced the chain length to three and a half degrees of separation. As such,
social media and social networks may be best understood as a means for human social augmentation, and
they have been highly successful at it.
The growth of the global information network
presents significant challenges in understanding
dynamic information flows within the network,
and the associated velocity, variety and verac-
ity challenges. Understanding the dynamics and
spread of information, whether, by individuals,
groups, societies or states, within social networks
is essential to our understanding of weaponised
information and the role this plays in hybrid war-
fare [418]. Understanding how this dynamic may
be exploited is of considerable commercial (e.g. Figure G.5: Social Augmentation and Enhancement.
Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc.) and military
interest [26, 202].
The development of new Medical countermeasures and more generally Biomedical Technologies
pulls together and applies parallel developments in bioinformatics, biosensors, human augmentation
and synthetic biology. For example, applied research in casualty care and neural interfaces will help to
support evidence-based medicine, operational readiness, increased immunocompetence, disease/biothreat
forecasting & detection, patient-centric medicine, rapid development of CBRN countermeasures, improve
rehabilitation through new neural interfaces & AI-enabled robotic prosthetic limb technology, and provide
new diagnostic and treatment options for mTBI (mild traumatic brain injury) and PSTD (post-traumatic
99
stress disorder) [202].

Combat casualty care may also be significantly
enhanced through the use of improved bioinformat-
ics and biosensors, remote monitoring, molecular
& cellular biology, AI for rapid diagnostics, bioin-
formatics, surgical techniques & tools, novel mate-
rials to improve rapid identification, and treatment
of tissue damage and infection. These technologies
have the potential to reduce significantly mortality
and morbidity resulting from injuries on the battle-
field, improve the efficacy of follow-on care and
Figure G.6: Casualty Care. enhance rehabilitation efforts.
Fundamental research is also ongoing in un-
derstanding the dynamics of complex biological systems, such as the human biome. Research is focused
on understanding complex dynamical biological systems-of-systems and developing mechanisms for
assessment and optimal control [202].
Synthetic biology involves the precise genetic manipulation and engineering of organisms for scientific
research and the development of unique characteristics and capabilities not seen in nature. Furthermore,
synthetic biological processes can yield new organic molecules, novel materials that cannot be manufac-
tured directly or even new bio-manufacturing paradigms. Synthetic biology builds upon a human tradition
of genetic manipulation (e.g. crop breeding, domestication, etc.). Still, it has begun to evolve very rapidly
due to the confluence of molecular biology, systems engineering, information science and other emergent
technical fields.
The complex convergence of several fundamental technical domains such as molecular biology,
systems engineering, etc. precludes a concise and comprehensive characterisation of all relevant and
enabling science and technology involved in the field of synthetic biology. Synthetic biology is not a single
technology but rather an integrated environment of synergistic technologies (e.g. CRISPR/Cas9 [419])
involved in the manipulation of DNA sequences and exploitation of the resulting complex molecules.
The latter involves specialised bio and chemical engineering for scaling biological processes to produce
meaningful quantities of new organisms and their products. The former includes the involvement of data
and information sciences to architect new molecules. The technologies involved in synthetic biology are
globally becoming more advanced and refined as both public and private sector investment are increasingly
applied to this field in pursuit of both economic and national security objectives.
Biological engineering is a developing area of
research that holds significant promise. The goal
of biological engineering is the design and con-
struction of multi-cellular biological systems or
systems-of-systems, including the use of AI and
genetic design. The goal is to create biological
materials with engineered properties. Develop-
ments in this area include AI optimised xenobots
(i.e specialised bio-robots) for nano-scale manu-
facturing [420, 421] and living bio-sensors (e.g.
persistent living aquatic or terrestrial sensors, or Figure G.7: DNA.
CBRN monitoring) [202].
The scope and magnitude of the future contributions that synthetic biology will make to civil and
national security sectors are currently quite speculative; however, there is little doubt that this technology
domain will have substantive impacts wherever it is applied or exploited. Examples of practical applica-
tions of synthetic biology are the development of new macro-phages [422], plants, insects [423], viruses
constructed batteries [104] and xeno-bots for nano-scale manufacturing [420, 421]. Nevertheless, there
remain many technical barriers to be overcome in order to realise its full hypothesised potential as well
as many ethical and institutional challenges to be mitigated. The broad global awareness and prolifer-
ation of the underlying enabling technologies for synthetic biology largely preclude its comprehensive
control; potential adversaries and economic competitors can be expected to have few, if any barriers, to its
exploitation for their national or organisational objectives.
Biotechnology, nanotechnology and genomics are advancing rapidly in the short to midterm. These
advances are mostly driven by the private sector but can easily be transferred to the military sector where
appropriate.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
BLUE
BHET are expected to create disruption in:
1. Readiness: Use of biomarkers (phenotypic and genetic) for predictive diagnostics will enable pre-
deployment identification of medical issues or weaknesses (e.g. muscular-skeletal, psychological,
immunological, physiological or nutritional). Improved diagnosis and novel countermeasures will
result in increased occupational readiness and effectiveness for forces in high-risk high-threat
environments. Human state monitoring in real-time to near real-time will allow individual and team
performance to be optimised.
2. Operations: Wearable biomedical systems that provide the ability to monitor soldier health con-
tinuously could provide knowledge of the inception and progress of injury over time. Knowledge
of the health status of soldiers on the battlefield could be of great benefit for BLUE forces in
providing essential information needed for force condition status assessment. Forces, leveraging
bioinformatics, sensors and enhancement technologies, should be able to operate in smaller groups,
which has implications on affordability (i.e. a smaller number of soldiers, sailors or aviators can
achieve similar results). Virtual reality and ultimately, neural interfaces will support significant
improvements in situational awareness and operations of autonomous systems. Heads up displays,
currently used in aviation and to a lesser extent in automobiles, could also find uses in dismounted
soldier systems. Heads-up, eyes-out targeting could be achieved by overlaying targeting symbols
on top of real-world targets. Mixed reality could be used to assist planners and mission rehearsal.
Immersive visualisation of rapidly generated accurate 3D representations of the physical environ-
ment (terrain + buildings + infrastructure) from open source and military data and observations
could provide staff with a realistic feel for the terrain before being exposed to it in real life. Mixed
Reality setups are already used to provide practical, cost-effective training environments. Advances
in computer networking, processing and analytics will see such setups used in the battlefield as well
as expensive labs. Neurological interfaces will increase response times, situational awareness and
the effectiveness of man-machine teaming.
3. Medical Countermeasures and Care: Use of biomarkers, biosensors (in vivo & in vitro) [424]
and microarrays (microfluidic devices integrating computing chips with living cells and tissue) will
allow rapid (pre-symptomatic) diagnosis and response to synthetic or natural pathogens, chemicals,
as well as real-time monitoring of treatment options. Use of biomarkers, novel pharmaceuticals,
gene therapy and bio-engineering (e.g. robotics, prosthesis, neural interfaces, etc.) will dramatically
increase the effectiveness of combat casualty care and rehabilitation, especially in such areas as
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), environmental exposure and mild-traumatic brain injury
(mTBI).
4. Performance: Rapid advances in material, computer and human sciences, as well as convergence
between these fields, is setting the stage to enhance human capabilities and push the human perfor-
mance frontiers significantly. Optimising the performance of each individual, be it in the cognitive,
physical or resilience domains, in addition to improving team cohesiveness and effectiveness, will
enable Alliance forces to make better decisions faster, and can produce actions better tuned to
101
the needs of the situation. Current and future advances in physiological and psychological state
monitoring will maximise overall human performance and readiness through specific user group
algorithm applications. Benefits include better leadership assessment of force status; increased
training program adaptation and effectiveness through real-time performance metrics; and increased
health and safety monitoring as well as injury protection. Bioinformatics and biosensors, along
with increased use of personalised and virtualised training, will improve training effectiveness.
Muscular-skeletal augmentation (e.g. exoskeletons) will increase load carrying capacity during
operations, reduce debilitating injuries and increase combat performance.
5. Social Networks: Social media supports military activities in six key ways [26]: intelligence
collection; (geo-) targeting; cyber operations; command and control; defense; and, psychological
warfare (inform and influence). Fusing social media (as part of OSINT (open-source intelligence))
with other data, and integrating social network operations into broader operational and strategic
actions will be a critical success factor in countering hybrid and memetic warfare operations.
RED
BHET threats will increase driven, in no small measure by, the democratisation of associated technologies.
Significant Alliance ethical, legal and policy are not shared by a peer or near-peer strategic threats.
However, more worrisome perhaps, will be their use by security threats (both criminal and otherwise)
or the use of non-sanctioned enhancements by individuals. With globalisation and the increased pace of
scientific discoveries, there is a high likelihood that an adversary force will have access to the knowledge
necessary to create similar capabilities. The implications on the battlefield are that RED would have a
significant performance advantage if such a force is not constrained by the same ethical considerations in
implementing these new technologies.
In particular:
1. Synthetic Biology: New pathogens, novel biological agents or chemical agents, with explicitly
engineered and targeted effects (e.g. increased virulence, physical, neurological or physiological
impact, genetic susceptibility, etc.), will potentially increase casualties, reduce combat effectiveness
and present a strategic challenge to Alliance societies as a whole. The impact of unknown biological
agents will challenge the capacity of medical and logistics systems to cope, while countermeasures
themselves may present significant health and safety challenges.
2. Designer Pharmaceuticals: Criminal and non-state actors will increasingly have the ability to
develop low cost targeted pharmacological agents. These may be used to explicitly to disrupt
Alliance operations or destabilise alliance societies through targeted psycho-social effects.
3. Super-Soldiers: BHET will enable pharmacologically, neurologically and physiologically en-

hanced opponents. In combination with more effective partnering with autonomous and semi-
autonomous systems, these will significantly challenge Alliance forces, force structure and effec-
tiveness.
Interoperability
Alliance interoperability will be challenged by differing legal, policy, training, operational effectiveness
and ethical standards amongst the nations driven by BHET. Development of standards for personal
biosensors, the handling of bio-data, the sharing of medical countermeasures, man-machine interfaces
(including neurological) and bio-mechanical systems will be critical enablers of effective alliance BHET
enabled operations and capabilities.
S&T Development
BHET research over the next 20 years (across the innovation system) is expected to include R&D in:
• Bioinformatics and Biosensors: The collection, classification, storage, retrieval and analysis of
biological and biochemical data leveraging new sensor materials, AI and BDAA. The research will
explore new biosensor (including bio-engineered) and bio-data collection methods for detection of
biomarkers, as well as the processing and exploitation of massive amounts of personalised, cohort,
ISR and environmental data. In addition to increased situational awareness, this will support the
development of increasingly sophisticated and predictive models and simulations supporting clinical
interventions, personalised medicine, individualised training, assessment of natural or artificial
biological threats. [202].
• Medical Countermeasures and Technologies: The development of new diagnostics, therapeutics

and vaccines (employing bioinformatics, genetic engineering and biosensors) to support predictive
diagnostics, CBR threat identification, modelling and treatments. Combat casualty care will apply
advances in molecular and cellular biology, AI, bioinformatics, and novel materials to improve
rapid identification and treatment of tissue damage and infection.
• Human Augmentation (Physiological & Cognitive): The use of genetic modifications, phar-
macological agents, electro-mechanical devices, and neurological interfaces to increase human
physiological, neurological performance beyond normal limits.
• Human Augmentation (Social): Increased computational and modelling capabilities to understand

information flow within complex social networks (social media). Development of novel quantitative
methods will be essential if a deeper understanding of information network dynamics is to be
advanced, and countermeasures developed in the context of hybrid-warfare.
• Synthetic Biology: The deliberate design, engineering and creation of novel synthetic or modified
biological components or systems. This includes the engineering of multi-cellular bio-sensor
systems for surveillance and manufacturing.
Table G.1: Biotechnologies and Human Enhancement 2020-2040.

Biotechnologies Bioinformatics Moderate Expectation 6 2025
Human Augmentation High Expectation 5 2030
Medical Countermeasures High Trigger 4 2030
Synthetic Biology High Trigger 6 2025

References
[101, 207, 394, 400, 402, 414, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430]
103
Conjecture Card: Biotechnology

G.1 Super Sensings G.2 Body Self-Repair G.3 Bio-Databases
Enhance human senses and cogni- Heal wounds, injury or illness us- Store or process massive amounts
tive abilities to super-human lev- ing DNA restructuring or synthetic of data in living organisms.
els to increase speed of learn- biology solutions (e.g. artificially
ing/comprehension and reduce re- grown body parts).
action times.
G.4 Human-Machine G.5 Chem or Bio Analysis G.6 Health Monitoring
Mechanically augment the human Instantly analyse and identify chem- Continuously monitor health and
body either with exoskeleton or in- ical or biological substances re- well-being of entire populations
ternal mechanical parts to gain su- motely or using hand-carried or un- at the individual level, activating
per strength, balance and speed. manned systems. drugs or hormones or genes on de-
mand.
G.7 Train in Reality G.8 Psychotic Effects G.9 Genetic Targeting
Deploy realistic virtual or aug- Remotely induce mass hysteria or Design and develop targeted
mented reality training environ- hallucinations in groups or individ- pathogens, antidotes or neutralising
ments to prepare soldiers in real- uals. agents for CBRN agents from
time for mission tasks. materials and knowledge available
at low cost and to everyone.
H
H. Novel Materials and Manufacturing
Novel Materials and Advanced Manufacturing

“Advances in materials and manufacturing will have a profound effect on Defence and national security
over the coming decades. The use of novel materials with additive and hybrid manufacturing will make
for more efficient, lower waste products, highly customised design and production, and embedded
electronics and sensors enabling the collaborative, rapid design and manufacture of spare parts for
weapons, combat vehicles, and other equipment.” - A. Zelinsky [431]
Definition
Novel Materials and Manufacturing (NMM)
Advanced (novel) materials are artificial materials with unique and novel properties. Advanced materials
may be manufactured using techniques drawn from nanotechnology or synthetic biology. Development
may include coatings with extreme heat resistance, high strength body or platform armour, stealth
coatings, energy harvesting & storage, superconductivity, advanced sensors & decontamination, bulk
production of food, fuel and building materials. Research into graphene, other novel 2-D materials, and
topological materials are an area of high potential and growing interest. Additive Manufacturing, which
is often used as a synonym for 3-D printing [102], is the process of creating an almost arbitrary 3D
solid object from a digital model through layered addition of materials. Additive Manufacturing can be
used for: rapid prototyping; in situ production & repair of deployed military equipment; and production
of precision, custom or unique parts.
Keywords
Novel Materials · Additive Manufacturing · Agile Manufacturing · Bio-materials · Graphene · 2D
Materials · Black Silicon · Flexible Displays · Nanotechnologies · Smart Coatings · Bio-fabrication ·
Bio-manufacturing
Overview
Novel materials and manufacturing (NMM) research underlies much of the success of the industrial
revolution, and that is expected to continue. Over the next 20 years, three main areas of R&D activity are
seen to be disruptive: (1) Novel Materials; (2) Additive Manufacturing; and, (3) Energy.
105
Research into novel materials and advanced manufacturing is a vast field of study [431, 432], touching
on the truly unique and surprising properties of 2-D materials, new 3-D fabrication methods, unique
designs, smart materials, quantum M&S, nanotechnologies, and bio-manufacturing. These, in turn, have a
wide range of applications, with perhaps the generation and storage of energy (e.g. batteries) being one of
the most disruptive.
A revolution in 2-D materials research [432, 433, 434, 435] has emerged since the isolation and
initial characterisation of graphene and more recently, the families of topological insulators and transition
metal dichalcogenides. These and other novel materials have generated considerable R&D excitement,
kick-started by the discovery of graphene in 2004, and the awarding of the 2010 Nobel prize in Physics
to its discoverers Geim and Novoselov [436]. Graphene is a new carbon-based material with a wide
range of extreme mechanical, physical, chemical and electrical properties not found in any other known
material. It is chemically stable, non-toxic, lightweight and relatively easy to produce from widely
available raw materials. Graphene’s individual properties exceed those of conventional materials, and
its combination of these properties is unique. It is widely expected to lead to significantly improved
materials for applications in aerospace (composite structures), high-frequency electronics (terahertz, radar,
cooling), functional coatings (anti-icing, corrosion protection), energy storage (batteries, ultra-capacitors),
camouflage (radar absorbers), weapon technologies (energetics, missiles), protection (armour, textiles),
sensors (photodetectors, pressure/strain, chemical) and portable devices (displays). Other novel 2-D
materials such as phosphorene [437], hexagonal boron nitride [438] and transition metal dichalcogenides
[436] have also demonstrated unique and surprising characteristics.
2-D materials R&D is taking place around the
world. China, in particular, has taken a leading
role in 2-D material research [439], and is making
significant progress towards commercialisation, as
is South Korea. In January 2013 graphene was
identified as one of the two European Union Future
and Emerging Technology Flagship projects with
a budget of 1BC over 10 years, forming Europe’s
most significant ever research initiative [440].
The fundamental properties of these 2D mate-
Figure H.1: 2-D Materials. rials may be critical enablers for a range of future
technologies. While challenges remain in terms of
manufacture and scalability, graphene and other 2-D materials will offer game-changing technological
improvements — eventually. However, military capability development and application over the next
10-15 years will most likely be evolutionary. Advances will almost certainly be found from combining
2D materials to form new classes of layered heterostructure materials, as well as with use of traditional
bulk materials. Early experiments around stacked two-layer, three-layer and twisted graphene sheets
[441] have also demonstrated remarkable electrical properties (i.e. superconductivity) [442] and yielded
promising biosensors [443].
In general, improved robustness, operational life and reduced weight/size can be expected. This
research will lead to novel enhanced devices and uses, such as: • Integration with conventional semi-
conductor devices to improve infra-red photo-detection for thermal imaging or to achieve faster optical
modulation for broadband communications • Biological and chemical warfare detectors • Barriers to
specific biochemical molecules • Conductive membranes for flexible or printed electronics [444] • High-
speed electronics to support the development of imaging and ranging (radar) as well as Terahertz (THz)
communication frequencies [444] • Cooling of electronics leveraging the superior thermal conductivity of
graphene [444]. • Development of graphene optoelectronics and photonics for solar cells, touch screens,
photodetectors and ultrafast lasers [445, 446].
Current 2D materials research is extremely broad, ranging from energy generation and storage, through
optoelectronics and bio-chemical sensing as well as flexible, lightweight yet mechanically strong fabrics
and conducting polymers. From a defence perspective, the focus might sensibly be directed toward those
106 Chapter H. Novel Materials and Manufacturing
technologies that can provide key advantages in the near to medium term; one of these key areas is likely
to be optoelectronics. Testing is being done in industry on the application of graphene to a variety of
technologies relevant to sectors such as electronics, medicine, aerospace, automotive, energy storage,
water desalination, composites, coatings and paints, solar technologies, oil and communications.
Other materials are also being explored for ap-
plication to defence problems. Silicon, although
well studied and widely applied, has additional
properties or states which are of interest. An exam-
ple is black silicon, micro-structured silicon, which
absorbs visible and infrared light strongly due to
surface micro-spike traps [447]. It has potential
applicability in the production of photo-detectors,
night-vision systems and solar cells. Another type
of material being explored are topological mate-
rials [103], a class of quantum materials whose Figure H.2: 3D Printing.
quantum states are unnaturally stable under envi-
ronmental changes. Topological insulators [448] are of particular interest due to an unusual combination
of insulating and conducting properties.
Additive manufacturing (AM) or 3D printing as it is also known creates three-dimensional solid
objects of virtually unlimited shape from digital models and a wide variety of metals, plastics and resins
[449]. AM is achieved using an additive material process, whereby successive layers of material are
laid down in different forms. AM is distinct from traditional material removal or machining techniques,
which rely on cutting, milling or drilling (subtractive processes). AM is already heavily influencing
commercial production and supply chains. Some caveats for AM application are limitations in component
size, precision and surface quality and the potential need for post-fabrication machining. The resulting
manufactured materials may have unique material properties and may be impractical or impossible to
produce using conventional manufacturing methods. AM technologies may be used for, among other
things, rapid prototyping, in-site production and repair of deployed military equipment, precision, custom
and unique parts production. Industry is leading the development of 3D printing, with the global 3D
printing market rising from 5.8 billion USD in 2016 to 55.8 billion USD by 2027 [450].
Over the last 20 years, AM techniques, equipment and technology have been developing at a rapid
pace [451, 452, 453], where they have become a key component of high-value manufacturing and agile
manufacturing. AM (or 3D printing) is a broad term encompassing 7 core technologies [102]: • VAT
photopolymerisation • Material jetting • Binder jetting • Material extrusion • Powder bed fusion • Sheet
lamination • Directed energy deposition.
Current AM techniques are mostly applica-
ble for limited production runs, specialised de-
signs or prototyping [4]. AM systems (limited as
they are) are growing in popular both in the home
and industrial market. As such they are becom-
ing widely available and have moved well beyond
printing simple 3-D plastic models (e.g. Figure
H.3). Roughly two-thirds of US manufacturers
have already adopted 3D printing with around 50
per cent already using it for prototyping and final
products. Nevertheless, AM systems are not yet
Figure H.3: SpaceX Super Draco Printed Thrust at a level of maturity necessary to replace tradi-
Chamber [454] (CREDIT: SpaceX) tional machining and manufacturing methods for
widespread, full-sized industrial production. This
is changing, and the availability of 3D printing capabilities is enabling agile manufacturing and edge
production in a variety of industries.
107
Potential 3D printing applications are seen to be: • Concept modelling and prototyping. • Low-volume
complex parts, such as rocket engines • Replacement (obsolescent) parts • Structures using lightweight,
high strength materials • Mixed-materials and embedding additively manufactured electronics directly
in/on parts • Repair parts on the battlefield, on-board ship or in space • Large structures directly in location
thus circumventing transport vehicle size limitations • Manufacture of novel designs or use of unique
materials • Large structures [455] such as buildings (using local materials) or weapon systems (such a
ship [456]) • Bio-materials such as replacement tissues, organs and body parts.
The related process of 4D printing [457] merges 3D printing with advanced materials sensitive to
environmental conditions. These materials are programmed to change their form or physical behaviour
when subject to an environmental trigger (e.g. heat, pressure, current, light, etc.).
A related technology, nanotechnologies, are those processes for the manipulation of materials at the
atomic scale, often leading to novel material characteristics. The Ministry of Defence in the UK predicts
that medical nanobots and nano-enhanced C4ISR devices (e.g. micro-radar for miniature UxVs) will
begin to be used from 2030 on-wards [458].
Current AM (3D/4D) and nano-technologies
have direct implications for defence and security
[460]. However, these technologies are also widely
available and dual-use in nature [4], thus provid-
ing near-peer and non-state actors with similar
advantages. This also supports a massive increase
in RED’s ability to leverage system designs ob-
tained through illicit means or provide embargoed
parts such as those needed for advanced aircraft or
missiles [461].
The development of increasingly sophisticated Figure H.4: 3D Micromaterials [459] (CREDIT:
techniques and tools to sequence, synthesise and DARPA)
manipulate genetic material has led to the rapidly
maturing discipline of synthetic biology. These developments, in turn, have opened up new approaches
to materials R&D, nano-scale manufacturing, bio-fabrication and bio-manufacturing. These approaches
utilise engineered biological agents (cells, proteins, fungi, etc.) to assemble or build a wide variety of
products, ranging from pharmaceuticals, organs, tissues, leather and even concrete [462]. Specialised
bio-robots or xenobots for nano-scale manufacturing are also at the early stage of development [420].
Energy, storage and generation, is a critical aspect of battlefield sustainment and the increasingly
multi-domain and nonlinear nature of modern conflict demands prodigious amounts [463]. Over the
last 10 years, in particular, electric storage and renewables have leapt ahead. These advances are based
on the development of novel materials, manufacturing methods, energy management (e.g. use of AI),
and approaches to energy collection. Lithium-ion batteries, in particular, are an enabling technology for
sensors, vehicles, edge computing, mobile devices etc. The importance of the science behind lithium-ion
batteries was recognised by the awarding of the 2019 Nobel Prize in Chemistry to John B. Goodenough,
M. Stanley Whittingham and Akira Yoshino.
Energy research spans a wide range of topics and approaches, with societal and military demands
increasing yearly. This demand cannot be addressed via existing technologies, and major breakthroughs
continue to be needed [464]. Research into new energy collection, generation, storage and management
continues at an accelerating pace. This includes research into • Renewable energy such as solar, wind,
geothermal and biofuels • Hydrogen • Fusion (inertial confinement fusion, magnetic containment) • Fission
(molten salt, thorium, mini-reactors, etc.) • Energy harvesting (wireless, bio-mechanical) • Grid storage
• AI enabled power management; • Batteries (graphene, carbon nano-tubes, solid state, metal-air etc.)
BLUE
There are many defence applications of advanced materials, nanotechnologies and 3D/4D manufacturing.
It can be assumed that future systems will be lighter weight, stronger and more power-efficient due to the
incorporation of advanced materials. In particular, graphene and other 2-D materials will enable:
• Reduced equipment burden (by the nature of being able to replace bulky components with
lightweight materials and devices), particularly important for long-range operations and critical for
aircraft systems;
• Integral lightweight, flexible electronics woven into fabrics for covert wearable devices;
• Faster electronics for communications (wider bandwidths) and improved computation;
• Improved detection of (weak) signals, (RF/microwave or optical) extending the physical range of
operating platforms (either for communications, range-finding or thermal imaging/heat-seeking).
• Membranes that protect against bio-chemical attack, or provide higher sensitivity to detection (as
well as selectivity) of explosive vapours;
• Lightweight high-impact resistant materials for new armour and soldier systems, substantially
lighter than current technologies. Graphene has been shown to improve the fracture toughness of
ceramics, and this is expected to translate into improved ballistic protection if applied to ceramics
used for armour. Graphene may improve the strength and elastic properties of ballistic fibres such
as ultrahigh molecular weight polyethene.
• Reduced radar reflections from all platforms (land, sea and air) by adding graphene to polymers for
radar-absorbing coatings.
• Energy storage in ultra-capacitors and batteries using graphene-based storage. Some products are
already certified for space applications.
• Wearable technologies. It is expected that graphene may be useful as a coating on textiles for
uniforms, to improve weather resistance and for condition, monitoring using smart/intelligent
textiles. Chemical protection of gloves, masks, etc. may also be improved.
• Increase vehicle survivability through the reduction of reflection and radiation of electromagnetic
waves by smart coatings.
Specific applications of AM supporting Alliance operations or capability development are:
• Improved product development, via shortened design cycles and increased cost/time effective
development. AM can also support design optimisation unlimited by conventional machining
constraints;
• Improved maintenance and logistics by reducing stocks of spare parts (at home, on ships or abroad),
increasing parts availability and reducing shipping expenses. Spare parts could be manufactured on
demand locally, replacing hardware storage by storage of printable designs. Such parts could be
produced on-site based on a 3D scan of the component, thereby significantly extending operational
life, reducing the logistic tail and minimising life-cycle costs.;
• Cost reduction and increased effectiveness of new designs and high-cost items, especially in the
aerospace or maritime environments. For example, single-crystal turbine blades coated with thermal
barrier coatings or ultra-quiet submarine propellers involve intricate designs and complex material
processing. They are, therefore, costly. The effective repair of such components using AM will
significantly reduce the cost of ownership and increase operational availability.
109
• Production of task-tailored autonomous weapon systems on-demand and on-site [465].
Synthetic biology and nanotechnology specific applications include:

• Production of commodity-like materials, with increased efficiencies enabling production economies
of scale, e.g. fuel, food, and building materials;
• Fielding unique capabilities for sensing of environmental and other phenomena not currently
detectable or at scales needed across the battlespace; and,
• Creating speciality materials having special chemical or physical properties, including drugs, nutri-
tional supplements, and other substances requiring nano-scale manufacturing assembly processes.
RED
The benefits for RED are similar to those available to BLUE. More specifically for AM:
• Since progress in AM is mainly driven by civil/commercial interests it is probable that these
technologies will be available to a wide range of countries, non-state actors and military forces. As
such, the novel use by asymmetric threats (firearms, IED’s, task tailored weapons, etc.) must be
anticipated and may pose a considerable threat to BLUE.
• There are serious concerns around the management of AM technologies for defence applications.
Digital designs are required for AM, and these are easily reproduced (e.g. via 3D scanning), shared,
hacked, modified, counterfeited and stolen.
• The broad availability of AM and associated novel designs will encourage the proliferation of
defence technology to non-state players; non-friendly states; and, counterfeiting of components.
Embargoed parts could also be readily produced (e.g. F-14 parts [466]) limiting the effectiveness of
sanctions.
Interoperability
No specific interoperability challenges are foreseen with the development or use of 2D materials. Never-
theless, this may lead to some technical disparities amongst NATO forces.
Development of AM as an integral NATO ca-
pability will require design, software, IP, cyber,
certification and manufacturing standards be de-
veloped if advanced 3D/4D printed parts are to
be used in advanced weapon systems. Safety re-
quirements alone suggest that if we are to exploit
AM parts routinely in high-stress areas such as
aerospace, then we must address their certifica-
tion and qualification as original or replacement
parts. This requirement will require an extensive
understanding of all factors that lead to variability Figure H.5: Standards for Push-Button Replication.
in properties, and methods to accurately inspect,
characterise and certify components. Use of digital designs, scanning and 3D printing of parts may violate
contractors IP or may increase the risk of legal action against Alliance forces, while limiting operational
agility and reducing operational availability.
S&T Development
Graphene and 2D materials research are at an early but promising stage of development. The range of
potential applications for graphene and related technologies makes it impossible to generalise at this
point. Some applications (ultra-capacitors), adhesives and elastomers (rubber tyres) are commercially
available, so the TRL for these applications is 9. Most applications, however, are at relatively low TRL.
The rate of development is fast in some areas, driven by broad public and private investment. In the
short term (0 - 7 years), evolution will occur in the application to ultra-capacitors, adhesives, elastomers,
non-demanding fibre composites (sports equipment), some coatings will achieve TRL 9. In the medium
term (8 - 20 years) thermal interface materials for electronic cooling will reach TRL 9 at the beginning
of the period. Some sensors and electronic applications will be reaching commercialisation, and many
coatings will be available for corrosion resistance. Significant progress (TRL 6) will have been achieved
in multi-functional (structural) camouflage coatings by the end of the period.
The application of bio-manufacturing at nano-
scales is now at the lowest technology readiness
levels. It is anticipated that many heretofore
unidentified synthetic biological materials and ap-
plications will develop over the next ten to fifteen
years, having by then reached TRL 6 or higher.
The current TRL of some of the enabling syn-
thetic biological technologies for applications in
the midterm time-frame are likely already mani-
fested in technology readiness levels one through
Figure H.6: Stem Cell Bio-Printing. three.
For 3D/4D AM the technology is already used
today within various industries for many different purposes, while at the same time rapidly evolving and
expanding. The specific TRLs and attention levels are very material, application and process specific
[467]. TRL for a military application can be rated between 4 - 6.
Table H.1: (Novel) Materials 2020-2040.

Materials Novel Materials High Trigger 2 2040
Additive Manufacturing Moderate Enlightenment 7 2025
Energy Storage Moderate Trigger 5 2030

References
[257, 429, 431, 444, 453, 464, 467, 468, 469, 470]
111
Conjecture Card: Materials

H.1 Synthetic Biology H.2 Smartlite Armor H.3 Reduce Energy Use
Use artificially grown or 3D printed Wear lightweight body amour or Harvest, store and optimise use
human body parts for use for trans- clothes that are extremely flexible, of energy reducing resupply needs
plants to heal injured people or to but resistant to bullets or directed without significant loss of capabil-
upgrade humans. energy fire. ity.
H.4 Self-Charging Batteries H.5 Graphene H.6 Temporary Shelters
Generate and store renewable en- Use diamond hard graphene com- Build large stable shelters from
ergy adequate for the daily needs of posite armour and corrosion resis- extremely resilient extremely
an individual soldier in ways that tant plating an order of magnitude lightweight material that remem-
are soldier portable. lighter than 20th century systems. bers how it was packed and
self-packs in minutes.
H.7 Platform Printing H.8 Textured Explosives H.9 Spider climbing
Rapidly develop and deploy task tai- 3D print embedded and hidden ener- Climb walls or windows with sticky
lored land vehicles, naval vessels, getic materials in structures and sys- material applied to hands and knees
aircraft, habitation and space craft. tems (available to state, non-state or feet.
actors, and individuals).
ME
I. Methodology
Forecasting:
“Mieux vaut prévoir sans certitude que de ne pas prévoir du tout.” - Henri Poincaré [471]
I.1 Description
The approach and key data sources used to conduct this assessment are described in the following sections.
I.2 NATO Reports and Studies

The following NATO publicly released documents were used in the preparation of this report:
I.2.1 The Science & Technology Office: Tech Trends Report 2017 - Empowering the Alliance’s
Technological Edge
This report, published in 2017 [10, 42], provides highlights of technology trends assessed by the NATO
STO. It was the first report on emerging trends in science and technology published by the NATO STO.
It drew upon insights generated by the STO Panels and Group captured in Technology Watch Cards,
highlighting potentially disruptive developments in science and technology.
The report identified twelve technology areas:
Additive Manufacturing Everywhere Computing Predictive Analytics

Social Media Unmanned Air Vehicles Advanced Materials
Mixed Reality Sensors are Everywhere Artificial Intelligence
Electromagnetic Dominance Hypersonic Vehicles Soldier Systems
I.2.2 Framework for Future Alliance Operations (2018)

To maintain a decision and capability advantage (credible, networked, aware, agile and resilient) in future
operations, NATO must continually evolve, adapt, and innovate. The Framework for Future Alliance
Operations 2018 (FFAO) [24] provides a possible futures perspective supporting such developments. It
informs the Alliance of opportunities to improve its defence and deterrence posture together with its
ability to project stability, ensuring it remains continuously proactive, ready and responsive. It describes
how NATO forces can keep the edge and retain the ability to defeat potential adversaries on the battlefields
of the future. Finally, it provides military advice identifying force characteristics and abilities needed by
I.2 NATO Reports and Studies 113
the Alliance to retain the military edge, address upcoming challenges, and seize the opportunities of the
future.
The FFAO identifies several instability situations, potential events of critical significance, that could
reach the threshold requiring the Alliance to use military forces. These instability situations provide a
useful framework for consideration of the impact of EDTs, both from a threat and opportunities perspective,
and are listed below:
Weapons of Mass Destruction Conventional War Threat Escalation

Hybrid War Irregular War Terrorism
Global Commons Disruption Critical Infrastructure Attack Information Warfare
Cyberattack Governance Challenges Endangerment of Civilian Populations
Mass Migration Pandemic Disease Natural or Man-made Disaster
The report identifies anticipated future operational challenges. These include the impact of techno-
logical advances; new concepts of operation (e.g. global strike, hybrid, and cyberspace operations); and,
shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Of interest to the assessment of EDTs, the report notes that future
armed conflict is expected to be characterised by any combination of:
• Adversaries (state and non-state) global in • The use of human enhancement and the rising
scope and employing indirect approaches; importance of the human-machine interface;
• A greater role of super-empowered individu- • The use of automated and potentially au-
als and non-state actors that produce hard to tonomous systems and operations in which
predict effects; humans are not directly involved in the deci-
sion cycle;
• A compression of strategic, operational and
tactical decision making, blurring decision- • New classes of weapons that can cause
making processes; widespread destruction;
• More inter-connectivity across air, land, sea, • Greater number of sensors and the prolifera-
cyber, space and information domains; tion of the internet of things;
• Small units fighting over greater distances;
• An expanded access to knowledge, including
• Operations in the cyberspace domain, global the ability to conduct large-scale advanced
commons, urban areas, and subterranean ar- data analytics to gain military advantage; and,
eas;
• Weaponized information activities intended
• Rapidly emerging and widely available tech- to influence populations alone or in support
nologies; of armed conflict.
I.2.3 Technology Trends Survey: Future Emerging Technology Trends (2015)

"Technology Trends Survey - A Food-for-Thought Paper to Support the NATO Defence Planning Process"
[472], published in 2015 by NATO ACT, considered the impact of advances in technology to support the
NATO Defence Planning Process. It identifies no notably radial or disruptive technologies; however, it
describes significant incremental changes across a broad range of technology areas. The report represents
a holistic approach to foresight. It can best be understood as a guide book to emerging technologies,
developed to position NATO to exploit such areas to its advantage. Though this document provides a
primer for overall knowledge development, its primary objective was to support the derivation of long
term requirements within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In particular, it identifies the
following technologies of note:
Biotechnology Robotics Information Technology

Nanotechnology and Materials Energy Space and Hypersonic Systems
114 Chapter I. Methodology
I.2.4 Emerging or Disruptive Technologies Roadmap

Following the July 2019 NATO Defence Minister’s meeting, the NATO IS/ESC (International Staff /
Emerging Security Challenges), NATO ACT and the STO engaged in a vigorous debate around the issue
of emerging or disruptive technologies. As noted in [9] the Defence Ministers approved an EDT Roadmap
in October 2019. Work underlying this report informed, and was in turn informed by, these developments.
The EDT taxonomy used in this report reflects an agreed-upon set of seven EDTs, with the addition of
Materials (Novel Materials and Agile Manufacturing) based on STO foresight activities. The inclusion of
an eighth EDT recognises that aspects of materials and manufacturing research are both well-developed
technologically yet are becoming increasingly disruptive (e.g. 3D/4D manufacturing) while at the same
time, some aspects are emergent (e.g. novel materials, bio-manufacturing and nanotechnologies).
I.3 NATO STO Technology Watch

I.3.1 Collaborative Research Program (CPoW) NATO S&T Priority Areas
A set of NATO research priorities guides S&T conducted under the auspices of the STO, as agreed to
by the Nations through the S&T Board. These priorities serve to influence medium to long-term S&T
planning across the NATO and inform S&T investment decisions within the Nations. Through engagement
with the over 6000 active scientists, engineers and analysts who participate in the collaborative research
program (CPoW), the STO’s maintains an understanding of current and future S&T, including broad
themes and EDTs.
The STO S&T priorities are organised into 10
S&T Areas, spanning the human, information and
physical sciences. Each area has specific defined
Targets of Emphasis (TOE). While there are many
different ways of organising S&T activities, the
10 S&T Areas provide a broad and useful refer-
ence frame for research activities, while the targets
of emphasis provide selective focus and orienta-
tion. The priorities are constructed independent
of physical domains, scientific disciplines, or spe-
cific applications, while the language is situated Figure I.1: Targets of Emphasis (ambigram) [473].
between the words used to express requirements
and S&T solutions. The employment of the priorities focuses on S&T efforts that support cutting-edge
capabilities for the Alliance’s forces, inform future military specifications, and provide strategic advice to
senior decision-makers. Table I.1 summarises these priorities and associated targets of emphasis.
I.3 NATO STO Technology Watch 115
Table I.1: NATO S&T Priorities.

Domain NATO S&T Priority Areas Targets of Emphasis
HUMAN Advanced Human Performance & Health Medical Solutions for Health Optimisation
Human Resiliency
Enhanced Cognitive Performance
Human & Machine Interfaces
Cultural, Social & Organisational Behaviours Social Influence
Political Influence
Cultural Communications
Group & Organisational Behaviour
INFORMATION Data Collection and Processing EM Sensors
Non-EM Sensors
Sensor Integration & Networks
Advanced Signal Processing
Information Analysis & Decision Support Big Data & Long Data Processing and Analysis
Big Data & Human Decision Making
Multi-Domain Situational Awareness
Planning and Managing Uncertainties
Advanced Systems Concepts Integrated Human - Machine Hybrid Force
Clusters & Swarms
Modular, Scalable Systems
High Assurance Engineering & Validation
Autonomy Artificial Intelligence
Mission Autonomous Systems
Human-Autonomous Machine Teaming
Communications & Networks Secure and Resilient Communications
Trusted Multi-Domain Information Sharing
Ad hoc and Heterogeneous Networks
PHYSICAL Precision Engagement Precision Control
Weapons - Techniques and Systems
Weapons - Effects
Active & Passive EM, Acoustic & Optical Countermeasures
Platforms & Materials Fast and Agile Platforms
Unmanned Platforms
Hypersonic Platforms
Advanced and Adaptive Materials
In-Theatre Fabrication & Production of Equipment
Power & Energy Power & Energy Storage
Alternative & Renewable Energy Sources
Propulsion
Enhanced Energy Efficiency & Management
Targets of emphasis do not naturally align with the more broadly identified EDTs nor do they provide
sufficient resolution of potential or current development areas found within the identified EDTs. For
purposes of this report Technical Focus Areas (Table I.2) (TFA) were defined. TFAs are essentially
sub-aspects of EDTs suitable for focused research. These were then mapped to existing NATO S&T
Targets of Emphasis (TOE) (many-to-many). These do not cover all potential mappings, but rather those
that are deemed to require research focus. Highlighted TOEs are those considered to be most closely
aligned with their respective EDT (i.e. primary drivers of development in this area).
Table I.2: EDT Technology Focus Areas (TFA).

EDT Technology Focus Area (TFA) NATO S&T Targets of Emphasis TOE
Data Advanced Analytics Big data & Long Data Processing and Analysis IA&DS-2
Communications Ad hoc and Heterogeneous Networks C&N-3
Advanced Signal Processing DC&P-4
Trusted Multi-Domain Information Sharing C&N-2
Secure and Resilient Communications C&N-1
Advanced Decision Making Human Decision Making IA&DS-1
Multi-Domain Situational Awareness IA&DS-3
Planning and Managing Uncertainties IA&DS-4
Sensors Sensor Integration & Networks DC&P-3
Artificial Intelligence Advanced Algorithms Artificial Intelligence A-1
Big Data & Long Data Processing and Analysis IA&DS-2
Advanced Signal Processing DC&P-4
Human-Machine Symbiosis Human & machine interfaces AHP&H-4
Integrated Human – Machine Hybrid Forces ASC-1
Human-Autonomous Machine Teaming A-3
Applied AI Multi-Domain Situational Awareness IA&DS-3
Planning and Managing Uncertainties IA&DS-4
Human Decision Making IA&DS-1
Autonomy Autonomous Systems Mission Autonomous Systems A-2
Unmanned Platforms P&M-2
Countermeasures Active & Passive EM, Acoustic and Optical Countermeasures PE-4
Human-Machine Teaming Human & machine Interfaces AHP&H-4
Human-Autonomous Machine Teaming A-3
Autonomous Behavior Clusters and Swarms ASC-2
Sensor Integration & Networks DC&P-3
Secure & Resilent Communications C&N-1
Rules of Engagement, Legal and Ethical Implications PE-5
Space Operation Clusters and Swarms ASC-2
Precision Control PE-1
Platforms High Assurance Engineering and Validation ASC-6
Modular, Scalable Systems ASC-3
Propulsion P&E-3
Fast & Agile Platforms P&M-1
Enhanced Energy Efficiency & Management P&E-4
Active & Passive EM, Acoustic and Optical Countermeasures PE-4
Weapons - Techniques and Systems PE-2
Sensors EM Sensors DC&P-1
Non-EM Sensors DC&P-2
Sensor Integration & Networks DC&P-3
Hypersonics Countermeasures Active & Passive EM, Acoustic and Optical Countermeasures PE-4
Weapons – Techniques and Systems PE-2
Weapons effects PE-3
Platforms and Propulsion Fast and Agile Platforms P&M-1
Hypersonic Platforms P&M-3
Enhanced Energy Efficiency & Management P&E-4
Propulsion P&E-3
Quantum Communication Secure and Resilient Communications C&N-1
Trusted Multi-Domain Information Sharing C&N-2
Information Science Big Data & Long Data Processing and Analysis IA&DS-2
Precision Navigation Precision Control PE-1
Sensors EM Sensors DC&P-1
Biotechnologies Bioinformatics Big data & Long Data Processing and Analysis IA&DS-2
Human Resiliency AHP&H-1
Cultural Communications CS&OB-3
Group and Organisational Behaviour CS&OB-4
Medical Solutions for Health Optimisation AHP&H-1
Political Influence CS&OB-2
Social Influence CS&B-1
EM Sensors DC&P-1
Synthetic Biology Human Resiliency AHP&H-1
Advanced and Adaptive Materials P&M-4
Human Augmentation Enhanced Cognitive Performance AHP&H-3
Human & Machine Interfaces AHP&H-4
Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources P&E-2
Medical Countermeasures Human Resiliency AHP&H-1
Materials Additive Manufacturing In-theatre Fabrication & Production of Equipment P&M-3
Energy Power and Energy Storage P&E-2
Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources P&E-2
Novel Materials Advanced and Adaptive Materials P&M-4
Hypersonic Platforms P&M-3
I.4 Workshops 117
I.3.2 Technology Watch Cards (TWC)

Recognising the pressing need to maintain the Alliance’s technological edge, the STO actively pursues
Technology Watch for the Alliance. The STO Panels and Group have embraced a culture of continually
identifying and documenting potentially disruptive science or technology in Technology Watch Cards.
These cards contain assessments of the maturity of the science or technology and offer commentary
on how science or technology may affect the capabilities of the Alliance and potential adversaries in
the future. The current S&T Trends report relies heavily on the almost 100 Technology Watch Cards
developed by the STO Panels and Group, to deliver a short synthesis of observed technology trends. TWC
assessments and text were especially helpful in drafting the more detailed appendices in this report.
I.3.3 Von Karman Horizon Scanning (vKHS)

To address emerging challenges, the von Karman Horizon Scan is an instrument to quickly perform a
technology scan on a particular S&T topic within a short time frame (typically two to 6 months). Drawing
upon internationally recognised S&T expertise and experienced senior military, the process assesses the
state of leading-edge research in a specific S&T area; the outlook for the next decade; its relevance for the
armed forces; and, potential avenues for investment. Von Karman Horizon Scans have been undertaken
on laser weapons, quantum technologies, as well as optronic 3D imaging systems.
I.4 Workshops
Two unclassified workshops were held by the STO, with strong support from both NATO ACT and
NCI Agency, in 2018. During these workshops, NATO and partner science workers, along with military
personnel, identified and assessed the disruptive impact of various current and emerging technologies.
The workshops were unclassified and focused on:
• Sharing of national and NATO perspectives on EDTs;
• Technology trends identified through open-source materials;
• Logical and historical inference of potential technological development and impact; and,
• Global technological progress;
The workshops identified ten EDTs:
New Weapons Autonomous Systems and Countermeasures Energy

Assured Connectivity Human Capability Enhancement Computing Superiority
Space Applications of Artificial Intelligence Sensors
Manufacturing
The workshops also identified three disruptive themes:
Ethics Culture The Environment.
I.5 Alliance and Partner Research Programs

The vast majority of STO sponsored S&T activity is undertaken through national collaborative research
activities. As such, the STO maintains cross-alliance visibility on national research activities and priorities.
These activities provided insights into emerging technology areas and activities, of importance to the
Alliance. In particular, the following research programs were of considerable value in understanding
national stretch objectives in defence and security S&T: [202, 241, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479].
I.6 Attention Analysis
An assessment of EDT public attention was conducted partially based on data pulled from Google Trends
[54] and a review of the Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2019 and 2018 [50]. Figure I.2
presents the Gartner consolidated assessment for all emerging technologies considered to be of interest to
a general business audience as assessed in 2019.
Figure I.2: Gartner Hype Cycle 2019 (CREDIT: Gartner[480]).

Figure I.3 presents the Gartner assessment for sub-areas associated with AI, considered to be of
interest to a general business audience as assessed in 2019.
Google Trend data are presented in Figures I.4, I.5, I.6 and I.7. Figure I.4 compares raw web search
data with a 12-month moving average. Use of a moving average smooths out noise due to random events
and better supports an assessment of topic attention development over time. It is important to note that the
general shape of the Google Trends data does not match that used in Gartner as it reflects attention (good
or bad), while the Gartner cycle reflects a more idealised subjective assessment of expectations. Both
perspectives were useful in understanding the current level of interest in a particular EDT.
The remaining graphs (Figures I.5, I.6) show 12-month moving averages of world-wide interest over
time or attention in a topic area. The vertical axis shows the relative interest based on google search
activity around a topic normalised by the maximum search volume over the period. In other words, 100
represents the maximum searches (as a percentage of the reporting period) recorded for this topic with all
other points representing a percentage of this normalised search volume.
I.6 Attention Analysis 119
Figure I.3: Gartner Hype Cycle - Artificial Intelligence 2019 (CREDIT: Gartner[481]).
100
Big data: (Worldwide) AI: (Worldwide)
Big data: 12 Month Moving Average AI: 12 Month Moving Average
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure I.4: Google Trends (World Wide 2004-2020): Raw data and 12 Month Moving Average (AI, Big
Data).
100
Big Data Artificial Intelligence Autonomous Vehicles
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure I.5: Google Trends (World Wide 2004-2020): 12 Month Moving Average (AI, Big Data, Au-
tonomous Vehicles).
Quantum Technology Advanced Hypersonic Weapons Space Technology

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure I.6: Google Trends (World Wide 2004-2020): 12 Month Moving Average (Quantum Technologies,
Space Technologies, Advanced Hypersonic Weapons).
I.7 Studies and Meta-Analyses 121
Biotechnology CRISPR Graphene Additive Manufacturing

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure I.7: Google Trends (World Wide 2004-2020): 12 Month Moving Average (Bio & Human Enhance-
ment Technologies, & Novel Materials and Manufacturing).
I.7 Studies and Meta-Analyses

A considerable body of relevant literature exists on S&T trends, much of it referenced as required within
the body of this report. These span the gamut of national defence and security studies, open literature and
news articles, meta-studies and innovation research. In particular, the following documents were found to
be of particular value in drafting this assessment:
• Technology Trends (Defence & Security): [37, 44, 45, 118, 122, 163, 181, 257, 482, 483, 484, 485,
486]
• Technology Trends (Civilian): [32, 33, 41, 43, 128, 132, 487, 488, 489, 490]
• Future Security Environment: [24, 116, 117, 119, 122, 181, 184, 491]
• Articles: [23, 492, 493, 494]
• Other: [2, 83, 495, 496, 497]

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Abr
Symbols, Abbreviations and Acronyms
~ h/(2π)
c Speed of Light in a Vacuum (2.99792458 × 10+8 m/s)
h Planck Constant (6.62607004 × 10−34 m2 kg/s)
2-D or 2D 2-Dimensional
5G Fifth Generation (Wireless Technologies)
5V Volume, Velocity, Variety, Veracity and Visualisation (Challenges of Big Data)
A2AD or A2/AD Anti-Access and Area Denial
ACT Allied Command Transformation
ADF Australian Defence Force
AFRL Air Force Research Lab (USA)
AGI Artificial General Intelligence
AI Artificial Intelligence
AI HLEG Artificial Intelligence High Level Experts Group
AIoT Artificial Intelligence of Things
AIS Automatic Identification System
AM Additive Manufacturing
AMRG Additive Manufacturing Research Group
ARL Army Research Lab (USA)
ASAT Anti-Satellite Weapons

148 SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BDAA Big Data and Advanced Analytics
BHET Bio and Human Enhancement Technologies
BLUE Friendly Forces
C2 Command & Control
C3 Consultation, Command and Control
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance

and Reconnaissance (ISR)
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive
CI Computational Imaging
CMRE Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation
COA Courses of Action
COP Common Operating Picture
CPoW Collaborative Program of Work
CRISPR Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats
CSBA Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CWA Chemical Warfare Agent
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (US)
DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DEW Directed Energy Weapon
DGA Direction Générale de L’armement
DGRIS Direction Générale des Relations Internationales et de la Stratégie
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIM Deception, Identification & Monitoring
DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DND Canadian Department of Defence
DOD US Department of Defence
DOTMLPF-I Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and

Interoperability
SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 149
DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada
DST Defence Science and Technology Group (AUS)
dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (UK)
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation (AUS)
EDA European Defence Agency
EDT Emerging And/Or Disruptive Technology
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EM Electromagnetic
EO Electro-Optical
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EW Electronic Warfare
FAS Federation of American Scientists
FLIA Foundation for Law & International Affairs
fm Femtometer (10−15 m)
FOI Foi Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut / Swedish Defence Research Agency
GAI Generalised Artificial Intelligence
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
GAO (US) General Accounting Office
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEO Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GoC Government of Canada
GPS Global Positioning System
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance
HCM Hypersonic Cruise Missile
HDMS His/Her Danish Majesty’s Ship
HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit
HET Human Enhancement Technologies
HGV Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
HT Hypersonic Technologies
I2D2 Intelligent, Interconnected, Distributed & Digital
IED Improvised Explosive Device

IoT Internet of Things
IP Intellectual Property
IR Infrared
IS/ESC NATO International Staff / Emerging Security Challenges
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
ITW&AA Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
JAIC (NATO) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
JALLC (NATO) Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
JAPCC (NATO) Joint Air Power Competence Centre
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging
M&S Modelling and Simulation
Mach 1 Speed of Sound (340.3 m/s; 1,235 km/s; 767 mph) In Dry Air at Mean Sea
Level and Standard Temperature of 15°C)
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MC Military Committee
MCM Mine Countermeasures
MEO Medium Earth Orbit
MIMO Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output,
MIoP Military Instruments of Power
ML Machine Learning
MOD (UK) Ministry of Defence
mTBI Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
NAC North Atlantic Council
NASC Naval Air Systems Command
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIA NATO Communication and Information Agency
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations
nm Nano-Metre (10−9 m)
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 151
NRC National Research Council (Canada)
OCS NATO Office of The Chief Scientist
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OGD Other Government Departments
ONR Office of Naval Research (USA)
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act
OR&A Operational (Operations) Research & Analysis
OTH Over-The-Horizon
PAL Phase Alternating Line
PCE Physiological and Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancements
PCL Passive Coherent Location (Radar)
pm Picometer (10−12 m)
PNT Positioning, Navigation and Timing
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
QC Quantum Communication
QIS Quantum Information Science
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
QO Quantum Optics
QT Quantum Technologies
R&D Research and Development
RAP Recognised Air Picture
RAS Robotics and Autonomous Systems
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force
RDDC Recherche et Développement Pour La Défense Canada
RDS Research and Development Statistics
RED Hostile Forces
RF Radio Frequency
ROE Rules of Engagement
RSGB Royal Society (Great Britian)
S-AIS Satellite - Automatic Identification System
S&T Science and Technology
SA Situational Awareness
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAR Synthetic-Aperture Radar
ST Space Technologies
STO Science & Technology Organization
TBM Theatre Ballistic Missile
TCPED Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
TFA Technology Focus Area
THz Terahertz (1012 Hertz)
TOE Targets of Emphasis
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRL Technology Readiness Levels
TSTO Two State to Orbit
TWC Technology Watch Card
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicles
UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle
UK United Kingdom
UMS Unmanned Maritime Systems
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US United States
USA United States of America
USD US Dollars
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
UV Ultraviolet
vKHS Von Kármán Horizon Scan
VV&A Verification, Validation, & Accreditation
WEF World Economic Forum
µm micrometer(10−6 m)

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Science & Technology Trends

NATO Science & Technology Organization

NATO Science & Technology Organization

Copyright © NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020

As the world Science & Tech-

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach Dr. Bryan Wells

2 Science & Technology Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

G Biotechnology & Human Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

H Novel Materials and Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Symbols, Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

• How they are expected to develop over time; and,

• Space-Quantum: Space-based quantum sensors, facilitated by Quantum Key Distribution com-

• Space-Hypersonics-Materials: Development of exotic materials, novel designs, miniaturisation,

the alliance’s core tasks.”

The impact S&T has had on the defence ca-

“NATO’s technological edge has al-

• How these EDTs may develop over time; and,

• Mature over a 20 year period;

• Be transformative or revolutionary in nature; and,

• Be emergent or create generational shifts in S&T development.

• Technology trends discussed in the open literature;

• A global perspective on technological progress;

• Logical reasoning informed by S&T expertise; and,

• NATO-sponsored EDT workshops and innovation system engagements; and,

• Alliance and partner EDT studies and research programs.

2. Science & Technology Trends

2.1 S&T Development

• Convergent: A combination of technologies that are combined in a novel manner to create a

2.1.1 S&T Context

– Autonomy: Artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems capable of some level of

– Trusted Communications: The use of technologies such as distributed ledger technologies

Expanding INTERCONNECTED Battle

Figure 2.1: Intelligent-Interconnected-Distributed-Digital (I2D2) with associated military trends.

– Decentralised Production: Exploitation of AI-assisted design, novel materials, and (mixed

– Digital Twin: A digital simulacrum of physical, biological or information entities digitally

• Intelligent + Distributed ⇒ Autonomous Systems and Agents: Intelligent and, increasingly

• Interconnected + Distributed ⇒ Expanding Domains: As the operational environment expands

“What matters in the technological adaptation as well as technological innovation is how

Scale Performance: speed, range, accuracy, lethality, survivability, affordability,

• Plateau of Productivity: Mainstream adoption occurs. With a better understanding of value,

2.2.3 Technological Maturity

TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful mission operations.

2.2.5 S&T Domains

2.3 Disruptive Technologies

Since the beginning of the 1960s, our world

EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon

Relevance: Low Medium High

2.3.2 Artificial Intelligence (AI)

EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon

Relevance: Low Medium High

The history of autonomous systems in defence

EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon

Relevance: Low Medium High

2.3.4 Space Technologies (ST)

Humankind has been making effective use of

Table 2.8: Space (Systems) 2020-2040.

EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon

Relevance: Low Medium High

2.3.5 Hypersonic (Weapon Systems) (HWS)

EDT Technology Focus Areas Impact Attention TRL Horizon