Neorealisms Advancement On Traditional R PDF
Neorealisms Advancement On Traditional R PDF
Neorealisms Advancement On Traditional R PDF
Omar Zahid
The Second World War shattered the self-belief of the idealistic, utopian
views of international politics that prevailed during the inter-war period. This
gave rise to the political theory of Realism that has since dominated the
fields of International Relations and academia right up until the end of the
Cold War. Realism claims legitimacy from its long intellectual philosophical
tradition spanning from the ancient Greeks, through to Machiavelli, and more
recently to realist writers such as Morgenthau and Waltz to name but a few.
As with most theories of social science, traditional realism has undergone
changes, whereby ideas have been discarded or refined into what is known
today as neorealism.
Introduction
It is extremely difficult to define realism as it is not a single coherent theory,
but for the purpose of the paper two major branches of realism will be
examined. The analysis will begin by looking at traditional realism and the
modern neo-realist school of thought and evaluate the similarities and
differences between them even though they share the same central tenets1.
This analysis will be followed by outlining Kenneth Waltz’s theory of
neorealism and assess what kind of advance it makes on traditional realism.
It will evaluate the concept of anarchy and whether the structure of the
system determines state behaviour or other factors come into play according
do different versions of neorealism. Finally, the paper will examine what
direction neorealism is heading towards and if it is shifting away from its
central assumptions.
Traditional Realism
Realism developed and gained prominence during the inter-war period as a
reaction to liberal internationalist thought that strongly upheld the view wars
would cease to exist as mankind had learnt their lessons from the horrific
experiences of the First World War. Liberal idealists hoped for a better world
brought about by cooperation and collective security through the
establishment of institutions such as the League of Nations. Realists like E.
H. Carr on the other hand criticised the ‘utopian’ dreams of statesmen who
thought a world could be built on that which transcended the need for the
realpolitik of the day. For Carr, liberal internationalists were wrong in arguing
that:
1
Jack Donnelly (2000), Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 1.
2 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
2
Steve Burchill (1996), ‘Realism and Neorealism’ in Steve Burchill & Andrew Linklater
(eds.), Theories of International Relations, London: Macmillan Press, p. 67.
3
Edward H. Carr (1939), The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, London: Macmillan Press,
pp. 13-14.
4
Edward H. Carr (2001), The Twenty Years Crisis, edited by Michael Cox, Basingstoke:
Palgrave, pp. 62-83.
5
Ibid, p. 87.
6
Ibid.
7
Steve Burchill (Note 2), p. 68.
8
Edward H. Carr (Note 3), pp. 11-12.
9
Hans J. Morgenthau (1946), Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 192-194.
10
Cited in Jack Donnelly (Note 1), p. 9.
11
Hans J. Morgenthau (1955), Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred A Knopf, pp. 3-13.
3 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
12
Kenneth Waltz (1959), Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press,
pp. 16-42.
13
For views on how neorealist rely on human nature, see:
Markus Fischer (1992), ‘Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual
Practices,’ International Organisation, Vol. 46, p. 465.
14
Hans J. Morgenthau (Note 9), pp. 195-200.
15
Ibid, p. 211.
4 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
16
John Mearsheimer (1994-95), ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’
International Security, Vol. 19, p. 10.
17
There is a difference in systemic and structural approaches. The former is viewed as
being interchangeable and analyses international influences but not domestic political
variables, while structural analyses focuses on the role of polarity.
5 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
Third, the primacy of state security is above all other goals. Once
security has been established other things of value can be pursued.
Because neo-realists assume all states within the international system
pursue the same goal of security maximisation, they possess the same
characteristics and therefore do not take into account factors such as the
personalities of individual leaders or domestic political institutions that
govern state behaviour.
Finally, this assumption explicitly reveals that in a realist world, states
are always interested in maximising their power and influence over other
states if they can do so. All realists agree that military security is the state’s
prime responsibility and the third and fourth assumptions have solved the
security dilemma that caused inconvenience to early realist theories by
halting the pursuit of power maximisation by taking a more cautious
undertone.
18
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 6,
(Autumn 1996), pp. 54-55.
19
The title is borrowed from; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The
Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Spring
1992).
20
Kenneth Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, p. 91.
21
Ibid, p. 118.
6 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
latter in cases where the two come into conflict. The reason is
22
straightforward: the international political system is anarchic .
22
John Mearsheimer (1992), Disorder Restored. In Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond
the Cold War to New World Order, edited by Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton, New
York: W. W. Norton, p. 222.
23
Kenneth Waltz (Note 12), p. 206.
24
Ibid, p. 221.
25
David Baldwin (1995), ‘Security Studies and the end of the Cold War,’ World Politics, Vol.
48, pp. 117-41.
26
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), pp. 79-80.
27
Robert Gilpin (1984), ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,’ International
Organisation, Vol. 38, p. 290.
28
Bruce Russett (1993), Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
29
Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin (1995), ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,’
International Organisation, Vol. 20, pp. 39-51.
7 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
Case Studies
Neorealism’s hypothesis that balancing behaviour constantly recurs is an
argument that claims international incentives compel states to balance each
other out30. This would mean in the current environment the economic
powerhouses of Germany and Japan are likely to rise to great power status
in order to balance the US as claimed by neo-realists. In other words
according to neorealism, Germany and Japan will adopt the worst-case
scenario and both countries will strengthen their militaries. However, a
credible military deterrent would be costly to Germany and Japan. As Gilpin
suggests it would make more sense for these countries to pursue economic
capacity while avoiding large-scale military expenditure. Germany has
reduced its defence expenditures since the year 199031 as well as Japan
who have made defence spending cuts in late November 199532. Realist
writers claim they are amending and revising the Waltzian neo-realist
approach, rather than critiquing it33. However, neo-realists need to look
beyond the worst-case scenario assumption and consider that the probability
of conflict varies systematically according to factors other than the
distribution of capabilities.
The second hypothesis argues the possibility of conflict will be
conducted by force where rational states mimic each other. Neorealism
claims the mimic by states is likely to cause significant nuclear proliferation
in the post-Cold War era34. The most prominent case in point is
Mearsheimer’s 1993 argument in which he claims the Ukraine would retain
its inherited nuclear weapons following the break-up of the Soviet Union35.
Mearsheimer unequivocally forwarded his claim based on two reasons: first,
Ukraine had nuclear weapons; and second, Ukraine faced a substantial
security threat from Russia a country which it has had a history of tense
relations.
For Ukraine to maintain its nuclear weapons would have been very
costly and Steven Miller rebuts Mearsheimer by stating, ‘despite the myth
that nuclear weapons are cheap, they are in fact quite expensive for most
states’36. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians came to find out that nuclear
weapons were a costly deterrent that was far too expensive to maintain. In
the end, Ukraine decided to take up the offer of financial aid from the US
(pledged $900 million) and the financial incentives from Russia to forgo
30
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), pp. 118-21, 128.
31
Spiri (1995), Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 390.
32
New York Times, (29 November 1995), A9.
33
For example see:
Charles Glaser (1994-95), ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,’ International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 50-90.
Stephen Walt (1987), The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
34
John Mearsheimer (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,’
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.
35
Ibid, pp. 58, 66.
36
Steven Miller (1993), ‘The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,’ Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 77.
8 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism
proliferation that included writing off a multibillion-dollar oil and gas debt37.
Although security tensions would dictate that Ukraine maintain a nuclear
deterrent, Ukraine opted to advance its economic capacity where in 1996 it
ceased to be a nuclear power. This case represented an anomaly to the
neo-realist perspective.
Cooperation, according to neo-realists is something states are
reluctant to engage in as Waltz argues, ‘States do not willingly place
themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system,
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest’38.
This does not mean Waltz does not believe cooperation as impossible, but
something that is greatly constrained. On the other hand, neo-realists
suggest developing countries are less likely to cooperate, as security issues
will be more salient in those regions39. Yet, recent cooperative efforts taking
place in the developing world such as ASEAN, CACM (Central American
Common Market) are examples of cooperation despite the security issues
existing within these organisations, which significantly contradicts the neo-
realist assumptions.
The brief empirical review has demonstrated how two branches of
neorealism, the Waltzian school and that supported by Gilpin have come into
direct debate against each other. Although these cases do not support
neorealism per se, they emphasise that empirical irregularities suggest the
theory’s central assumptions may not reflect the real world as neorealists
have claimed.
Conclusion
The analysis of this paper has revealed the wide-ranging neo-realist
criticisms of traditional realism. In particular, Waltz’s criticism of
Morgenthau’s ideas regarding human nature seems on the surface to tear
apart one of traditional realisms central tenets, but Waltz actually only
disregards the egoist and selfish aspects of human nature and replaces it
with fear, as he assumes conflict is based on possibility.
Neo-realists view the international system as a relentless competition
for military security and only investigate the structure of the system, which
they conclude as being anarchical. Neorealism itself reveals inherent latent
disputes within the theory regarding a series of assumptions concerning
state behaviour. Waltz’s idea of anarchy is not only a criticism, but also an
evolution from the traditional realist position. However, Gilpin who asserts
state behaviour is based on probability of conflict challenges Waltz’s
assumption of state behaviour. If conflict in the anarchic system is based on
worst-case/possibilistic assumption, then the parameters of this assumption
may simply be inflexible and restrictive. Although neorealism’s views on
state behaviour may not be completely wrong, the impression given is that
the theory does not have a unified set of assumptions concerning state
behaviour.
37
Mitchell Reiss (1995), Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Capabilities, Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 117, 129.
38
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), p. 107.
39
Robert Powell (1991), ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,’
American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 303-320.
9 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism