Case Digest Part 1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS | Atty.
Soleng
1. BONIFACIO v. RTC OF MAKATI

[G.R. No. 184800. May 5, 2010.]
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint
before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public
hatred and contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said
company. This is after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under
the policies they obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable
cause to indict the petitioners, filed separate information against them.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds
that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information
are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC.
Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended
parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first
published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
offended party accessed the internet-published article.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner's’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.
RULING:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to
only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In
other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication. This is wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
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was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pep coalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
This goes against the purpose as to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel
suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts

2. TIJAM v. SIBONGHANOY
[G.R. No. L-21450. April 15, 1968.]
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c.] and
86[b.], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had

jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiff's' motion for execution against
the surety x x x

3. ANTIPORDA VS GARCHITORENA
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999.]
FACTS:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping,
the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the
prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the new
information contained the place where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the
Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to
hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied.
Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit themselves
to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(2) WON reinvestigation must be made anew.
RULING:
(1) No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the
offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that
the said crime is work connected.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of
estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.
(2) No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be
impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the

Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to
the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated
where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof,
and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no
cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

4. MIRANDA ET AL. V. TULIAO

[G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006.]
FACTS
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the
RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted
the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted
the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
RULING:
No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of
the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.
5. REODICA V. CA

[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.]

FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the
Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the
victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
RULING:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in
cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months,
as in the instant case, “the prosecution commenced by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.
Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case
of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised
Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of
the offenses charged in the information in this case.

6. FRANCISCO V. CA
122 SCRA 538 (1983)
FACTS:
On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong
Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December
26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI of Rizal of the crime of grave oral
defamation. Later, upon order of the court, the information was amended by adding
statements allegedly uttered by the two accused constituting the crime of slander.
On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave
oral defamation and sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and was made to
pay the complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision
was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. Bernardino passed away while this
petition was instituted in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the CA had
found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90
of the RPC, prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed the case.
Further, Francisco claims that the CA should have acquitted him on the ground that the
said crime had already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged defamatory remarks
were committed on December 26, 1965, while the information charged against him was filed
more than four months later.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the purpose of determining the
proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in
the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as
said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since the prescription for
grave oral defamation is six months, the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information
was filed. Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's
office interrupts the period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the time the offense
was allegedly committed to the day of the filing of the complaint.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offense
committed by the petitioners has prescribed.
(2) Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the
prescription of an offense.
RULING:
(1) Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the
crime charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has
already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a

circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the

defendant of the graver offense.
(2) Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without
jurisdiction, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation. Thus, the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period
of prescription.

7. DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000.]
FACTS:
Domingo was accused of violating RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. A filed a motion
to quash on the ground that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. His motion was denied by
the CA and (3) his right to a speedy trial was violated
ISSUE:
Whether the information should be quashed
RULING:
No. A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations do not constitute the offense
charged should be resolved on the basis of the allegations alone whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. In this case, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation
of RA 3019 so the motion to quash must fail.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said
public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or
in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer
has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Clearly,
the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail.
If the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is not known
at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Lastly, Domingo cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering
that one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to
submit his counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved.

8. DOMONDON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000.]
FACTS:
4 separate informations were filed against petitioner and other PNP officials
Another information (5th case) was filed:
● For the irregular issuance of advices of sub-allotment
● Ghost purchases / deliveries
● Forged payrolls
● False issuance of the combat, clothing and individual equipment to the uniformed
personnel of PNP valued at 83.6M
Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation before the Sandiganbayan with the 5 cases
Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders:
1.) Ordered prosecutor officer lll Querubin to demonstrate the probable complicity of the
accused herein in the transaction described in the information resulting in violation of the Anti-
Graft Law (Section 3 (e), RA 3019), considering the uncertainty as to the probable cause against
herein petitioner/accused
2.) deferring action the motion for consolidation, considering the uncertainty of the court to
even proceed with this case as this time & considering further that the motion for consolidation
is filed only by 1 out of 15 accused & considering finally that prosecutor officer lll Querubin said
that this case can stand independently of the proceeding in the other cases
Sandiganbayan cancelled the scheduled arraignment until further advice from the prosecution
Prosecutor Querubin report:
● Exclude 6 accused, not including herein petitioner, and to continue the prosecution of
the remaining accused
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against the latest order of prosecutor officer lll
Querubin with prayer for consolidation
Special prosecutor officer l of the office of the special prosecutor/ombudsman Joselito Ferrer
order:
● Recommended to modify Queribin’s order, exclude herein petitioner and deny prayer
for consolidation
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto disapproved Ferrer’s order
● Basis – Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa’s memorandum
● Proposed the setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference of the 5th case
Sandiganbayan filed for motion to admit information

● To exclude some of the accuse, not including herein petitioner

● Recommended that herein petitioner is for further prosecution by the ombudsman
thus, the petition at bar
The petitioner contended that Respondent Villa and Desierto acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration because there is no probable cause against
petitioner and that he disregarded evidence presented by the petitioner and that respondents
Villa and Desierto acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for consolidation.
According to the petitioner, since all of the case has been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to
the office of the special prosecutor under the office of the ombudsman for reinvestigation
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the respondents Villa and Desierto denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration
2. Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the respondents Villa, Desierto, and Tamayo denied the petitioner’s motion
for consolidation
3. Whether or not the respondent FIrst Division, Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from
proceeding with the hearing and other incidents of the 5th case of the petitioner during the
pendency of the petition
RULING:
Petition is dismissed.
Petitioners contentions are untenable In Ocampo vs Ombudsman o criminal prosecutions may
not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition,
except in the following instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners
The courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the
specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged
Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed,
But SC is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of
discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
In the case at bar, there was no arbitrariness or despotism showed by respondents Desierto
and Villa in their determination to proceed with petitioners prosecution
On the basis of their reinvestigation, respondents found sufficient probable cause to include
petitioner in the indictment "complicity in the commission of the crime is clearly revealed by
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case."
This is an exercise of the Ombudsman's powers based upon constitutional mandate and the
courts should not interfere in such exercise
MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION - While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been
filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full
control of the case
Control over: Informations to be dismissed Which case may not be consolidated
The exclusion of petitioner from the information as one of the accused in the 5th case would
not affect the outcome of this petition
SC cannot determine with certainty WON the alleged complicity and participation of petitioner
is the same as the first 4 cases filed.

9. ONG V. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000.]
FACTS:
Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine from the Solid Cement Corporation but
no machine could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier
mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein
petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a
criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
Information for estafa and other deceit was filed with MeTC. Evidence presented consisted of
private documents. Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, attaching
thereto their demurrer and stressed that all the above-mentioned documents being uncertified
photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence.
MeTC DECISION: demurrer denied. The petitioners here then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC.
RTC DECISION: reversed decision and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
CA DECISION: reversed RTC’s decision. Order dismissing case was set aside and the accused
were given the option to either present their evidence before the trial court below
(Metropolitan Trial Court)or to submit the case for decision based solely on the prosecutor's
evidence. Held that petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence,
should not have filed a petition for
certiorari with the regional trial court.
Petitioner’s Contention: the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that appeal and not certiorari
was the remedy that should have been availed of by petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in not accepting the demurrer to evidence of petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. The denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.

10. SAMSON V. GUINGONA

[G.R. No. 123504. December 14, 2000.]
FACTS:
On July 13, 1995, at about 8:05 p.m., at Scout Reyes Street, Barangay Paligsahan, Quezon City,
patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of Scout Reyes
Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu Gemie Sinsuat as passenger.
Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts of the body, inflicting upon him
multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death
The Court finds that at the time of the filing of the information for murder based on the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and Resolution dated September 29,
1995, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against accused
Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before the
Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on February 6, 1996, petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further proceeding
with the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a reinvestigation
of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for determination of probable
cause
RULING:
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or
final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when
the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme
cases, we have laid the following exceptions:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.

As a rule, the Court does not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender.

11. JADEWELL V. LIDUA

[G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized
to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000.
It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle
immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint
that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia
and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was
then illegally parked and [left] unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City,
herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed
the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey
Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee.
Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-
1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan,

and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The
Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23,
2003.
A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935 respondent Benedicto Balajadia
denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an
illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the
vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of

Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February
10, 2004 Order to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of
prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While
it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003,
the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within
the prescribed period
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the
ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on
grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs.
Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION
FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE
WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN"
Petitioner contended further that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases
had prescribed.
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses
charged have not prescribed.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through
Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held

that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an
Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the
respondent judge's Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
ISSUE:
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations
on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription;
failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges
on respondents with more than one offense.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the
offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
RULING:
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period
for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any
other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may
not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the

accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information
shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err
when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents.

12. CITY OF MANILA V. RIZAL

[G.R. No. 7946. March 9, 1914.]
FACTS:
The defendant in this case was convicted in the municipality court of the city of Manila
of a violation of a municipal ordinance against gambling, and appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila. In that court a demurrer to the information was sustained on the ground
that the action was brought in the name of the city of Manila, and not in the name of the
United States as required by the provisions of section 2 of General Orders, No. 58.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecutions charging violations of the municipal ordinances of the city
of Manila, for which punishment by fine or imprisonment is prescribed, may be brought in the
name of the city of Manila.
RULING:
No, Section 2 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that in this jurisdiction "all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the same of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses." Violations of municipal ordinances for which punishment by fine or
imprisonment is lawfully prescribed are, in our opinion, public offenses as that term is used in
the above-cited section of the order, and prosecutions for such violations of municipal
ordinances must therefore be instituted in the name of the United States.
It is sufficient at this time to point out that there is no express authority granted the city
of Manila in its charter to institute criminal actions in its own name, and that in this jurisdiction
actions instituted to enforce penalties of fine or imprisonment prescribed for the violation of
municipal ordinances are purely criminal actions and are in no sense civil in their nature.

13. NGO YAO TIT V. SHERIFF OF MANILA (1914)

[G.R. Nos. L-9619 and L-9620. March 28, 1914.]
FACTS:
Herein petitioners are detained under a commitment issued upon a final judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting them on a new trial, following an appeal from
the municipal court of said city, of a violation of section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, and sentencing
each one of them to pay P100 fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment.
Said accused were arrested in a house, allegedly a Chinese club, where certain utensils
used in smoking opium, namely, a pipe, a lamp and three small packages, two of them empty
and one containing a quantity of opium were found. Sergeant Worrel and Patrolman Penalosa,
as witnesses before said court, testified that a strong odor of opium fumes and an opium pipe
found upon the bed was still warm upon entry.
The trial court declared the accused guilty of violating said ordinance. And so,
petitioners elevated the case to the SC with applications for writs of habeas corpus.
PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:
- That before a conviction can be had under section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, it should be
proved that the house they visited was one generally used for smoking opium. As there was no
affirmative statement coming from the court that said club was not destined or generally used
for the smoking of opium, and there being no finding that the accused were unlawfully there,
the judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain it and is, therefore, absolutely void.
A writ of habeas corpus will therefore lie and imprisonment under a judgment
absolutely void is an illegal imprisonment;
- Not only should the court have jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
court must have jurisdiction to render the particular judgment. Stating further that habeas
corpus will lie for the discharged of one imprisoned for an act which does not constitute any
offense known to the law;
- A finding with nothing to sustain it is arbitrary and useless and is a nullity;
- Action should have been in the name of the United States, being wrongly entitled, the
court had no jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the action rendering the judgment
of conviction as absolutely void. Therefore, habeas corpus will lie as the imprisonment is illegal.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to be availed of by
the petitioners
RULING:

NO. The trial court had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and the subject
matter. Therefore, if the acts of the petitioners constituted the crime defined in that ordinance,
they were properly convicted. As demonstrated by the evidence, the petitioners were found in
the club house in question and that opium was being smoked therein, it then became the duty
of the court to determine, by the exercise of its judicial functions, whether such acts
constituted the crime defined by the ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly
within the jurisdiction and authority of the court to make. The exercise of that jurisdiction
would not result in a void judgment, provided the court kept within the limits thereof. It is clear
that the court kept fully within the limits of its jurisdiction in this case and, a right exercise
within that jurisdiction, determined the question whether the acts developed by the evidence
fell within the prohibition of the ordinance. This same question is one which is passed upon by a
court every time it tries a criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications. If it is to be
held that a wrong determination of that question deprives the court of jurisdiction, then the
correctness of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case will nearly always be determinable by
a writ of habeas corpus. (Ex parte Coy, 127 U. S., 731.) This, of course, is not the function of that
writ, and makers of legislation and constitutions which preserve the writ never intended that it
should be used in that manner and for that purpose.
- Admittedly according to the SC, there was a failure to support the contention. However,
said decision is not wholly founded on nothing contrary to petitioners’ claims. Here, there were
evidence supporting the findings, although not sufficiently.
While the judgment attacked in these proceedings was erroneous and the conviction
unwarranted by the evidence as it stands before us, it was not void. While it may be a case of
improper conviction, the court had jurisdiction to convict and its determination, therefore, is
not a nullity. It necessarily follows that the petitioners are restrained of their liberty by reasons
of being " in custody of an officer under process issued . . . by virtue of a judgment . . . of court
of record, and that the court . . . had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment or
make the order. . . .." (Code Civ. Proc., 528.)
- The bringing of the action in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States is
an error merely and not a jurisdictional defect. It is not similar to the case where, as claimed by
petitioners, an information is filed by a person who is not authorized in law to file it. Petitioners
were in no sense injured or prejudiced by it.
The defect is one which could have been cured at any stage of the trial by an
amendment on the motion of the court itself or upon the motion of any person interested in
the prosecution. Defects of that character which are not taken advantage of in the court below
in the manner prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here, and especially in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus was not intended and cannot be used to correct mere errors
or defects in proceedings, and accordingly does not lie in the present applications.
14. PEOPLE V. MENDEZ

[G.R. No. 132546. July 5, 2000.]

15. TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR

[G.R. No. 122452. January 29, 2001.]
FACTS:
Sometime before November 1992, Vic Ang Siong issued a check to Concord-World
Properties, Inc. The check amounted to P83.5 million. The check however bounced. In
November 1992, Tam Wing Tak filed an affidavit-complaint for violation of the Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law against Ang Siong. The fiscal did not file a criminal information against Ang Siong
because apparently Concord-World and Ang Siong are settling out of court (in fact Ang Siong
already paid P19 million); and that Tam Wing Tak was not authorized by the Board of Directors
of Concord-World to sue Ang Siong. Tam Wing Tak then filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the fiscal to file the information. Judge Ramon Makasiar dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD:
No. The petition for mandamus shall not lie. There was no grave abuse of discretion
when the fiscal refused to file the information. Concord-World is the named payee in the check
that bounced. As payee, Concord-World is the injured party hence only Concord-World can file
the criminal case against Ang Siong but it did not do so because it chose to amicably settle the
issue with Ang Siong. Where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its
board of directors or trustees. This can be delegated but Tam Wing Tak never proved that he
was authorized by the Board of Concord-World.
But may the suit be considered a derivative suit where the Board’s authorization may
not be had?
No. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for
and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative
cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who
may wish to join him in the suit. In this case, this was not complied with. Hence, Tam Wing Tak
cannot sue Ang Siong.

16. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU

[G.R. Nos. 111771-77. November 9, 1993.]
FACTS
In 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Sarmenta
and the killing of Gomez.
Acting on this request, a preliminary investigation was conducted. Petitioner Sanchez was not
present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
PNP Commander Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear in their
Camp for investigation. It was served on Sanchez and he was immediately taken to the said
camp.
Sanchez was positively identified by Centeno and SPO Malabanan as a principal in the rape-slay
charge. Because of this positive identification, petitioner was placed on "arrest status" and
taken to the DOJ.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez and he was taken to Camp Crame,
where he remains confined.
Then, the respondent prosecutors filed with the RTC 7 informations charging Antonio L.
Sanchez, et al. with the rape and killing of Sarmenta. Anent to this, the judge issued a warrant
for the arrest.
Later, the 7 informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating
circumstance.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations which was denied.
Thus, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/writ of injunction was filed.
Petitioner’s contention:
The 7 informations filed against him should be quashed because:
1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation;
2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation;
3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction
over him;
4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons;

5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and
6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES
Whether or not the grounds raised by the petitioner herein are meritorious
RULING
1. No. He was not denied the right to present evidence in the Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right
to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation, the petitioner's counsel manifested that his client was
waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit,
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors told the counsel that he could still file a
counter-affidavit. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
2. No. It is not only Ombudsman that has the competence to coduct the investigation.
However, the Trial Court has jursidiction in this case.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held
only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
3. Yes, the warrantless arrest illegal. However, it was cured when the Regional Trial Court
subsequently issued warrant of arrest in connection to the rape-slay and killing cases.
The Court agrees that the arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the offenses. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner
was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno
and Malabanan. Moreover, as the offenses were committed forty-six days before the date of
the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the
petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of
the warrant of arrest it later issued in connection with the rape-slay cases.
The Court opined that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of
arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect.
3. No. There was no duplicity of the offense in the information.
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
SECTION 13. Duplicity of offense. — A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code.
The allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven
accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust
satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes
is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan
Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
4. No. There was no discrimination as the prosecutor has the discretion to determine who
appears to be guilty.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who, in his opinion, appear
to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person
against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. The appreciation of the
evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the
case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in
special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a
rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
5. No. The case is not triable in the Sandiganbayan, but in the Regular Courts.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, provides:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not
fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by
paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even
alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected
with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception.
The Court finds no allegation in the information that the crime of rape with homicide imputed
to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said
crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
No, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the
respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his
co-accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.

17. PEOPLE V. OSO

[G.R. No. L-42571. October 10, 1935.]

18. VISBAL V. JUDGE RAMOS

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306. March 20, 2001.]
FACTS:
Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal delegated his prosecutory authority in a certain criminal case to
the Station Commander or duly authorized representative citing the Rules of Court. He
contended that there was no regular prosecutor available in the respondent Judge’s sala in
Jaro, Leyte since Visbal is officially and regularly assigned in the RTC Branch VIII of Tacloban City
(travel time from Tacloban to Jaro is more or less 1 hour para ma gets nato kung unsa siya ka
layo so mej layo siya but sakto lang) forcing him to delegate the prosecution of the case to the
police investigator. However, on February 18, 1998 Judge Ramos issued an order directing him
to appear for the prosecution despite the fact that he has already delegated it to the authorized
representative.
Visbal argued that respondent Judge was motivated by malice and bad faith when he issued the
order because Visbal filed and action against Judge Ramos back in 1994. He also alleges that
Ramos deliberately failed to rule on the prosecution’s offer of evidence which was submitted as
early as March 10, 1997.
Judge Ramos denied said liabilities and admits that he ruled on the Offer of Evidence only on
November 24, 1997 (after seven months) but he insists that it was not done deliberately since
he wanted the accused to have a no other chance to make a comment on the said offer.
OCA: Recommended that respondent judge be sanctioned for his unjustified delay on the
resolution of the prosecution’s offer of evidence but he did not abuse his authority when he
issued the assailed order to Visbal pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 110.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the Order directing Visbal to continue on his appearance as
prosecution in the said criminal case constitutes gross ignorance of the law given that he has
already delegated it
RULING:
No. The said order does not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It is in accord with Sec 5 Rule
110 (Revised). It is a general rule that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control
and direction of the prosecutor. An exception would be the assigned prosecutor is not
available, in cases before the MTC and MCTC it may be prosecuted by the offended party, any
peace officer or any public officer. However, such authority ceases upon the actual intervention
of the prosecutor or upon elevation to the RTC. The said exception must be applied strictly
citing the case of People v. Ramos that it is necessary that the prosecution be handled by
persons skilled in the said function. Instead of being entrusted to private persons or public
officers with little or no preparation for this responsibility. In the case at bar, a prosecutor has
already intervened in the case Prosecutor Ricardo P. Candido but since he was hospitalized, he

transferred it to Prosecutor Visbal. Hence, a prosecutor was available. There was no reason for
the delegation of the prosecutor authority to the police chief of the municipality. Gross
ignorance of the law is a serious accusation so complainant should be more circumspect in
hurling this charge.

19. PEOPLE V. BERIALES

[G.R. No. L-39962. April 7, 1976.]
FACTS:
Three men (Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio, and Pablito Custodio ) who were charged for
the murder of Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. Before trial, the accused moved for reinvestigation
which was granted. Before its completion, however, the trial court relying on the constitutional
right of the accused for speedy trial, finally set the case for hearing, notwithstanding vigorous
objections thereto on the part of the accused, on the ground that the City Fiscal had not yet
completed the reinvestigation. The City Fiscal through Special Counsel, then manifested that
the private prosecutor be authorized to conduct the trial in behalf of the prosecution. When
the case was called, counsel for the accused reiterated his objection to the trial and requested
the court to wait for the Fiscal who might be able to submit his report on the reinvestigation
but the same was turned down. Subsequently, the court ordered for the arraignment of the
accused. The latter refused to plead, whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for them
and ordered the private prosecutor to commence the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. However, counsel for accused refused to cross-examine the witnesses which
refusal was considered as waiver. Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case, which was
then, declared submitted for decision. On the date set for the promulgation of the judgment,
the accused manifested their disagreement to the promulgation of the sentence on the ground
that the trial was irregular. The court nevertheless proceeded with said promulgation and
convicted the accused of the crime of murder. Appellants appealed invoking that the Trial court
committed irregularity.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance of Leyte committed irregularity when it ordered the
arraignment and trial of the case before the completion of the reinvestigation by the fiscal.
RULING:
We sustain the appellants/accused. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and
trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of
such reinvestigation.
The Supreme Court held that since the reinvestigation had not yet been completed there was a
possibility for the City Fiscal to change his conclusion. The trial court thus committed a serious
procedural irregularity when it ordered the arraignment and trial of the case before the
completion of the reinvestigation by the fiscal.

20. BRAVO V. CA
[G.R. No. 48772. May 8, 1992.]

21. CHUA-BURCE V. CA
[G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000.]
FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, requested through his Assistant to conduct physical bundle count of the cash
inside of the vault, and is expected to be 4,000,000. After the physical bundle count there was
shortage of 150,000. To determine if there was really shortage a verification of the records was
conducted, and it was verified that there was really shortage. A investigation was conducted
and it was discovered that Chua-Burce, cash custodian, was responsible.
To recover the amount a civil case was filed against Chua-burce, which was also followed by the
filing of the criminal case for estafa.
Accused then filed for suspension of criminal case on ground of a prejudicial question, which
was granted but CA later on ruled that there was no prejudicial question.
While criminal case was suspended, the civil case continued. By the time of arraignment, the
civil case was submitted for decision. The partied then, agreed to adopt the respective evidence
in the civil case for the criminal case. Such was agreement was in written form, which was with
the conforme of the public prosecutor
After which RTC convicted accused, who appealed it to CA which also affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) Was there a valid trial of criminal case?
(2) whether the elements of the crime of estafa under 315 was proved beyond
reasonable doubt?
RULING:
(1) There was a valid criminal case. The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement
was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5
of Rule 110 requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecutions by private persons." The records show that the public
prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its
inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their
respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2
(e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference,
the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious

trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, reduced to writing such
agreement.
(2) The Court, however, ruled that petitioner cannot be convicted of estafa
through misappropriation because petitioner is a mere cash custodian who had
no juridical possession over the missing funds. In the absence of the element of
juridical possession, petitioner cannot be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner was acquitted.

22. PEOPLE V. TANADA

[G.R. No. L-32215. October 17, 1988.]

23. PEOPLE V. BUGTONG

[G.R. No. 75853. January 31, 1989.]
FACTS:
Sometime in July, 1984, Luisa Cutiam noticed that the stomach of her daughter Irene Cutiam,
who was 15 years old, was growing bigger and bigger. Dr. Salome Pilit, a government physician
who conducted a medical examination confirmed that Irene was pregnant. Irene, at first, would
not reveal the identity of the man responsible for her condition, but when she felt something
moving inside her belly, she confessed to her mother Luisa that Andres Bugtong, their
neighbour, raped her and that her refusal to talk earlier was due to the fear that accused would
make good his threats to kill her should she squeal. With this information, Luisa, together with
Irene, went to the Acop Tublay Police Station to report the crime which resulted in Irene's
pregnancy. Irene gave birth to a baby boy later on. Andres Bugtong was thereafter charged
before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet with the crime of Rape in which the
accused plead not guilty.
On motion of the fiscal, Irene was made to undergo psychological testing which revealed that
she had an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of only 47, equivalent to the mental age of a person
between the ages of 5 and 8 years and her mental retardation was classified as moderate.
Irene Cutiam testified that one day in January 1984, she was sent by her mother Luisa Cutiam to
the house of Andres Bugtong, the herein accused to pay her account to the latter in the amount
of TEN PESOS (P10.00). This fact of indebtedness and payment of the same was previously
testified on by Luisa Cutiam. She claimed that when she handed the money to Andres Bugtong,
the latter grabbed her other hand and placed her on the bed, and when she tried to shout, the
accused covered her mouth with his hand and allegedly threatened her by saying. 'If you will
report the matter, I will kill you, anyway our house are near each other.”
Andres Bugtong gave a different version. According to him, one day in January 1984, Irene
came to their house after lunch. Andres Bugtong was then alone. Without any word, she just
entered the one-room house, sat on the bed and kept on smiling without any word sat beside
the complainant, who in turn leaned on the former with her breast on his left shoulder. At this
stage when accused was already sexually aroused, he laid down the complainant on the bed
and after closing the door, he removed his clothes, sat between the legs of the former, lifted
her skirt and when he noticed that complainant had no panty, he proceeded with the sexual
intercourse with both hands holding her shoulders while the latter took hold of his waist. This
was the first sexual intercourse which was repeated four or five times during the succeeding
months of 1984.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Andres Bugtong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape as defined in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Appellant contends that as rape is a personal offense which, under Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, must be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended party,
the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis of the
Information signed by the fiscal alone.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis
of the Information signed by the fiscal alone since rape as a personal offense be prosecuted
upon a complaint filed by the offended party?
Whether or not the trial court erred on finding that he is guilty of the crime of rape as defined
in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
In the case at bar, it is evident that the prosecution for rape was initiated by the offended party
herself with the assistance of her mother. The Information filed by the Fiscal said so, thus:
"The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal, upon a sworn originally filed by the offended
party accuses Andres Bugtong of the crime of Rape . . ."
The appellant's insinuation that the Information should have been signed and sworn to by the
complainant is incorrect for it is not necessary for the complainant to sign and verify the
Information for rape filed by the Fiscal.
There is merit in this contention. Herein appellant was tried on an information charging him
with rape committed thru force and intimidation (355 par. 1), his conviction for rape committed
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious (355 par. 2) would be
violative of his constitutional right as an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
This is not to say however, that the conviction of accused-appellant should be set aside
altogether. Only his conviction under par. (2) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is
nullified as his guilt of the crime of rape committed thru force and intimidation, as charged in
the Information, has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, except for the modifications that (1) the conviction of accused-appellant under
paragraph (2) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is set aside and (2) the civil indemnity to
be paid to the victim is increased to P30,000.00, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respect.

24. PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them, and such connubial disharmony eventuated
inn private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany while
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation. The Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon, and as a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings, however, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment. A motion to
quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
denied by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge has acquired jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crime of
adultery?
RULING:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such
exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. As cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery. When said respondent initiated the divorce

proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would henceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other. To put it in simpler terms, he can no longer have standing to initiate the
complaint of adultery which can only be filed by the aggrieved husband, since at the time he
filed the complaint, he is no longer considered the husband of petitioner via the divorce decree
of the Federal Republic of Germany, such requirement is jurisdictional which insufficiency
thereof results in the court being bereft of jurisdiction . Therefore this motion is granted.

25. PEOPLE V. SCHNECKENBURGER

[G.R. No.L-48143. November 10, 1941.]
FACTS:
Roberto married Elena Ramirez Cartagena on March 16, 1926 but after 7 years they agreed to
live separately. They then executed a document which states that they agree to live apart from
each other for the rest of their lives and will not intervene, under any circumstances, in each
other’s public or private life. On June 15, 1935, Roberto secures a decree of divorce from the
civil court in Chihuahua, Mexico without ever leaving the Philippines. On May 11, 1936:
Roberto marries Julia Medel in Malabon. Then, 2 actions were filed against Roberto:
a. Bigamy (Court of First Instance in Rizal) – convicted, penalty: 2 months and one day of
arresto mayor
b. Concubinage (Court of First Instance in Manila) – Accused posed a plea of double
jeopardy and the case was dismissed.
The Fiscal appealed and the Court held the dismissal to be premature.
The case was then remanded to the trial court. He was finally convicted and sentenced to two
months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of the court of first instance in Manila was valid, and that the
respondent is guilty of concubinage
RULING:
No, Roberto should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage.
The document executed by the accused and his first wife, in which they agreed to “complete
liberty of action”, while illegal for the purpose it was executed, constitutes a VALID CONSENT to
the act of concubinage.
Under Art 344 of the RPC: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders. Pardon refers to offense AFTER its commission, while
consent must have been intended to refer to the offense PRIOR to its commission.
Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting
the offense. Judgment is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

26. FERNANDEZ V. LANTIN

[G.R. No. L-44759. December 17, 1976.]
FACTS:
● Libel case was filed against petitioner accusing him of writing and publishing a letter
wherein he maliciously imputed a crime, vice, or defect, to one Iluminada Tandiama.
● The letter stated that: Iluminada, an employee of the Bureau and married to Celedonio,
was allegedly discovered having an “illicit relationship” with Hector Valdeleon, who was
a Prison Guard. When the Acting Director learned of it, he dismissed the prison guard
while Iluminada, being the niece of the Acting Director, was spared.
● Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that according to Article 360 RPC, the
criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Assistant City Fiscal
opposed saying that the “illicit relation” does not necessarily connote to adultery.
● Respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion saying that the imputation of the
“illicit relation” could be a vice or defect hence not covered by Article 360 RPC which
only covers crimes such as adultery, concubinage, etc. Hence this petition to for
certiorari questioning the validity of the order of respondent judge.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the terms “illicit relation” and “paramour” stated in the letter connote the
commission of the crime of adultery.
2. If yes, whether the criminal action cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
RULING:
1. YES. When the term "illicit relationship" is used to describe the relationship between a
married woman and a man other than her husband and at the same time the former is
labelled as the “paramour” of the latter, there can be no other purpose than to imply
that the two are having carnal intercourse with each other. Thus, the phrase "illicit
relationship" when used in a complaint for abduction had been construed to mean
clearly the existence of an unlawful sexual intercourse. Similarly, the word "paramour",
according to Webster, is "one who loves or is loved illicitly; one taking the place without
the legal rights of a husband or wife; mistress — called also lover." To state that
Iluminada is having carnal intercourse with Hector is to accuse her of committing
adultery. For adultery means the carnal relation between a married woman and a man
who is not her husband.
2. YES. Article 360 (4) RPC requires that if the defamation consists in the imputation of a
crime against chastity, such as adultery, concubinage, etc., a complaint by the offended
party is required.
However, the SC ruled that this error could be corrected without sustaining the motion to
quash and dismissing the case. Pursuant to Sec. 1 (a) of PD 77, under which the Assistant City
Fiscal conducted the preliminary investigation, the statement of the complainant was sworn to

before the aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said sworn statement
contain all those required of a complaint under the rules, a copy of said verified statement of
the complainant should be filed with respondent Court in order to comply with the
requirements of Article 360; otherwise, the Fiscal should file with said court a verified
complaint of the offended party. Petition denied but ordered the Fiscal to file with respondent
court, within 10 days from notice, either the aforestated sworn statement of the offended
party, or her verified complaint.

27. PEREZ VS HAGONOY RURAL BANK

[G.R. No.126210, March 9, 2000.]
PARTIES INVOLVED:
· Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. - owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed
petitioners in this case.
· Cristina O. Perez - Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller.
· Alberto S. Fabian - Bookkeeper.
· Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin - Solicitors/Field Managers.
· Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas – outsider included in the complaint
· Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company (LMSC)- independent management,
consultancy and accounting firm/ auditing firm.
· Judge Masadao – one who granted the motion praying for the dismissal of
the case.
FACTS:
· LMSC conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop (for the
period of August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993).
Findings: [Anomalous withdrawals amounting to P879,727.08]
(1) Anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of
withdrawals recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the
passbooks of depositors;
(2) said withdrawals were supported by withdrawal slips, however the signatures
appearing thereon were noticeably different from the sample signatures in their
specimen signature cards;
(3) fake deposits were recorded in the money shops subsidiary ledgers
· Respondent Hagonoy filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against its employees of
the money shop (Perez, Fabian, Median and Martina) and two outsiders, Susan
Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.
· Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang issued a resolution finding prima
facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommended filing of
information against them with RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against
outsiders were, however, dismissed.

· Petitioner Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) praying
for the dismissal of the charges against her.
· Respondent Hagonoy moved for a reconsideration and filed another information
against petitioners stated in previous Information but now excluding Mangahas and
Perez.
· Secretary of Justice (Franklin M. Drilon) issued Resolution No. 696 ordering the
prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against Petitioner Perez on the
ground of insufficient evidence.
· Respondent Hagonoy filed a motion for reconsideration (MOR) of the order of SOJ,
however, was denied with finality by SOJ.
· Prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against
Perez and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner Perez as
one of the accused pursuant to directive of SOJ.
· Presiding Judge Masadao granted the motion filed by the Prosecutor.
· Respondent Hagonoy filed MOR assailing the dismissal of the case. However, after
finding that Respondent Hagonoy had no legal personality to question the dismissal
of the criminal charges against the petitioner, MOR was denied.
· Respondent Hagonoy filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
with CA, alleging Judge Masadao had issued an order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
· CA annulled and set aside the assailed Order and directed Judge Masadao to resolve
with dispatch the respondents MOR.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Judge Masadao committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to dismiss
the criminal case against petitioner filed by the prosecutor.
(2) WON Respondent Hagonoy has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial
judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor.
RULING:
[Petition Denied]
(1) Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Judge Masadaos reliance on the recommendation on the dismissal

of the case against the petitioner was an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court's pronouncement in Crespo v.
Mogul as reiterated in the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
"…The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it
not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely
to accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency…”
(2) Respondent Hagonoy had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Cited in the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, which says:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he
may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to
bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the
courts of law.
Also, the very nature of the offense charged in this case is estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which connotes damages for which the accused may be held civilly
liable in case of conviction. It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may
file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to
move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against
the petitioner.

28. PEOPLE V. BAYYA

[G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000.]

29. SERRA V. MORTIGA

204 U.S. 470 (1907)
FACTS:
Adriano Mortiga filed a complaint of adultery against her wife, Maria Oblena committed with
Vicente Serra. The defendants were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by
the trial court, stating in their written opinion that by analyzing the testimony and pointing out
that all the essential ingredients of the crime of adultery, as defined by the articles of the penal
code already referred to, were shown to have been committed. The accused were sentenced to
pay one-half of the costs and to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day. The
record does not disclose that any objection was taken to the sufficiency of the complaint before
the trial. Indeed, it does not appear that by objection in any form, directly or indirectly, was any
question raised in the trial court concerning the sufficiency of the complaint. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not objections to the sufficiency of the complaint of statements constituting an
offense be considered on appeal.
RULING:
No. "The objections to the complaint, based upon an insufficient statement of the facts
constituting the offense, cannot be considered here, because they were not presented in the
court below.
Under the RPC, it will be seen that an essential ingredient of the crime of adultery, as therein
defined, is knowledge on the part of the man charged of the fact that the woman with whom
the adultery was committed was a married woman. Although there were deficiencies in the
complaint because it did not specify the place where the crime was committed, nor does it
expressly state that Serra knew that Maria Obleno was at the time a married woman,
objections of that nature must be taken at the trial, and but when no such challenge was made
in the trial court before judgment, no denial of the guarantees of the statutory bill of rights
arose from the action of the appellate court in refusing to entertain an objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint because no such ground was urged in the trial court.
While the powers of the Supreme Court hears a case on appeal as a trial de novo. As pointed
out in the Kepner case, whilst that court on appeal has power to re-examine the law and facts,
it does so on the record and does not retry in the fullest sense.

30. PEOPLE V. NARVAES

[G.R. No. L-39799, March 20, 1934.]
FACTS:
On August 28, 1932, Pedro Narvaes (farmer-tenant) inflicted 3 wounds using a penknife on
Benito de Silva (foreman) which caused his untimely death. Narvaes attacked Benito as the
latter embarrassed him in front of the rest of the farmer-tenants. Defense tried to prove that
when the Narvaes was already plowing, Benito continued to insult him. It was also alleged that
Benito caught him by the neck, choked him and threw him to the ground where Benito
mounted on top of Narvaes and placed his knee on Narvaes’ abdomen without loosening his
grip on his neck; and that it was under these circumstances when the Narvaes remembered his
penknife. With this, Narvaes pleads justification of his acts, insisting that he justly acted in self-
defense.
Narvaes was charged and convicted for homicide in 1933 sentencing him to fourteen years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties to
indemnify the heirs of his victim, Benito de Silva, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs of
the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in not declaring that the defendant's true name is Primo
Narvaes instead of Pedro Narvaes.
RULING:
No. The weight of the evidence shows that the appellant's true name is Pedro Narvaes, not
Primo Narvaes. The baptismal certificates of Primo and Pedro and which were duly admitted
without any objection on the part of the defense, show that the said two persons are brothers
by the same father and mother and are furthermore grandsons of the same paternal and
maternal grandparents. There is a little discrepancy on the father’s name, however, it is of no
consequence because Leoncio and Lucio sound practically the same, and the error in their
spelling must have been due to carelessness on the part of the clerk who prepared and wrote in
the baptismal record.
The witnesses claimed that appellant is the same Pedro Narvaes, elder son of the spouses
Leoncio or Lucio Narvaes and Teodora Castillo, not Primo Narvaes, who is the second son of the
said spouses, and who does not live with them during the school year because he is studying in
another municipality different from Cabuyao, Laguna. Also, when the appellant was arraigned
under the name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely
entered his plea of "not guilty" under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should
have for the first time raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the
court's lack of jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Pedro
Narvaes, not Primo Narvaes. Not having filed the said demurrer, it must necessarily be

understood that he renounced it and therefore he is now estopped from raising, or insisting to
raise, the same question, not only in this appeal but even in the trial.
Sentence is affirmed in toto. However, in view of Act No. 4103, which provides for an
indeterminate sentence, and taking into consideration the youth of the appellant, who is only
19 years old when he committed the crime, the minimum of the said penalty imposed upon him
is fixed at six years and one day of prision mayor, so that the same shall be understood to be
from six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal. So ordered.

31. PEOPLE V. RAMOS

[G.R. No. L-2171. March 4, 1950.]

32. PEOPLE V. PERRERAS

[G.R. No. 139622. July 31, 2001.]

33. PEOPLE V. LABADO

[G.R. No. L-38548. July 24, 1980.]

34. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARVIN TORRES Y HERNANDEZ AND ROSENDO SALAS aka
BOYET AKHRO
[G.R. No. 76711. September 26, 1988.]
FACTS:
On Nov 1983 at around 7:00 p.m., Herminio Nocum, a bicycle mechanic, went to
Ventanilla Street on his bike to practice caroling with friends lasting until 11:00 p.m.
On his way home, Nocum met Erwin Alcantara who was on his way to buy pandesal.
Alcantara then asked Nocum to accompany him and rode the bicycle in tandem to the bakery
but found it closed.
On their way home, they met Torres and Salas who waved at them. They approached
them and Alcantara went off the bike and talked to them. After a few seconds Nocum heard
Torres challenging Alcantara to a fist fight stating, "Pare, gaano ka ba kalaki; magsukatan o
magsuntukan na laang tayo." Torres pulled out his knife and pointed it to Alcantara at the
same time telling Salas "bunutan mo na iyan."
Salas followed the bidding of Torres and stabbed the left shoulder of Nocum while
Alcantara was also being stabbed by Torres. While Salas tried to stab again Nocum, Torres
grabbed his wrist watch. Nocum and Alcantara was able to ran away.
Nocum and Alcantara tried to go to Pasay City General Hospital but was referred to
Ospital ng Maynila which did not admit them as well for lack of x-ray. They were rushed
instead to the Philippine General Hospital where Nocum was confined for 5 days but with
Alcantara dead from multiple stab wounds (2 on the chest and 1 at the back).
Nocum gave his statement to Police Officer Ilas of Pasay City Police Station. Torres,
picked up for another robbery case, was pointed at by Nocum as the one who grabbed his
watch.
An amended information for violation of P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Highway Robbery) was
filed before the RTC of Pasay. The trial court convicted the accused, Marvin Torres, for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Erwin Alcantara in the sum of 63, 000.00Php.
An appeal was filed by herein accused before the SC with the following assigned
errors:
1. The Trial Court erred in giving faith and credence to the incredible and unbelievable
testimony of Herminio Nocum.
2. The Trial Court erred in giving weight and consideration to the unverified statement of
Aurora Torres.

3. The Trial Court erred in not giving weight and consideration to the defense raised by
accused Marvin Torres.
4. That conspiracy was not proven as a fact.
5. That granting that accused Torres committed the acts complained of, the Trial Court
erred in finding him guilty of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide instead of the
separate offense of Homicide and Theft.
6. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the said crime in the absence of
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the trial court in convicting the accused of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide was proper
HELD:
It is clear that accused-appellant and Salas acted in concert in assaulting, stabbing and
robbing Nocum and Alcantara of their wrist watches. They admitted that they had borrowed
the weapon the night before the incident and were together again the following night with
the said weapon. They were loitering in the vicinity at the unholy hour ready to challenge
anyone to fight and divest them of their belongings. Each of them stabbed the victims and
succeeded in grabbing their watches. There can be no question about the existence of
conspiracy.
Accused-appellant cannot be held guilty of the separate offenses of homicide and
theft. With conspiracy having been proven, the act of one is the act of all. The plan to commit
robbery and its eventual commission by the accused-appellant and Salas is unquestionable,
homicide and frustrated homicide were committed on the occasion of the robbery.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It was not
necessary for witness and victim Nocum to have seen the actual act of stabbing by accused-
appellant of the deceased Alcantara. The combined circumstances that Nocum saw accused-
appellant with the knife, the weapon that the latter admittedly borrowed the night before;
that accused-appellant told Salas "bunutan mo na yan" after which Salas, using his own
weapon, pre-occupied himself with stabbing Nocum; that when Nocum heard a moan, he
looked back and saw Alcantara holding his face and his wound at the back; and that only
Alcantara and accused-appellant were at Nocum's back at the precise moment that Alcantara
was being stabbed — all point to no other conclusion but that it was accused-appellant who
had stabbed Alcantara, while Salas was stabbing Nocum.

35. PEOPLE V. COSARE

[G.R. No. L-6544. August 25, 1954.]

36. PEOPLE V. NUNEZ

[G.R. No. 128875. July 8, 1999.]

37. PEOPLE V. NAVA

[G.R. No. 130509-12. June 19, 2000.]
FACTS
Accused-appellant Marcelo Nava, Jr. was charged with 4 counts of Rape under 4 separate
informations for raping her daughter Maribeth A. Nava.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant enters a plea of not guilty to each one of these
informations and interposed the defenses of alibi and denial.
During the trial, Maribeth claimed that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.
The first incident of rape took place in the morning of Thursday in January 1996, while her
mother and eldest sibling were in Manila. While the rest of the siblings were playing outside
their house, accused-appellant forced himself on Maribeth. Accused-appellant, armed with a
knife, forced her to undress and to part her legs and sexually assaulted her. He threatened to
kill her if she revealed the incident to anyone.
In the evening of that same day, Maribeth was again raped by accused-appellant.
The third incident of rape took place in the evening of Monday in the same month of January
1996.
The fourth incident happened in the evening of August 9, 1996, at the house of her paternal
grandmother. Maribeth acceded to her father's bestial advances for fear of being harmed.
The Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape in all the four cases and sentenced him in each case to suffer the penalty of death and to
indemnify the private complainant and pay moral and exemplary damages. Hence, this
automatic review.
Accused-appellant attacked the credibility of private complainant by pointing out
inconsistencies in her testimony.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Court erred in according weight and credence to the testimony of private
complainant despite its lack of credibility
2. Whether or not the Court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty to death
RULING
1. No, the Court did not err in giving credence to Maribeth’s testimony
Errorless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to remember
and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling outrage she went
through, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to recall the same, as they are too

painful to remember. Indeed, an accurate account of the harrowing experience such as rape
has never been required from a victim. Moreover, no young woman would accuse her own
father or anybody else for that matter, of so grave a crime as rape unless she truly has been
aggrieved.
As per the Court:
“In this light, we are convinced of Maribeth's credence. Besides, the precise time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element in the crime of rape. In fact, it is settled
that even a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that
established by the evidence during trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to
warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.”
Considering that Maribeth had been molested by accused-appellant since she was in Grade III,
and considering also that the episode referred to was only the first of three in January 1996, we
cannot expect her to narrow down to a particular incident and mechanically remember the
triviality of the same.
We must keep in mind that after the first incident mentioned above, three more followed. Save
for the last, which may still be vivid in her memory, Maribeth could not possibly give an
exacting detail for each of the previous incidents since, for Maribeth, these may just be but
mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare. A calvary she might even be
struggling to forget.
Thus, "Errorless testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to
remember and recount every ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling outrage she
went through, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to recall the same, as they are
too painful to remember. Indeed, an accurate account of a harrowing experience such as rape
has never been required from a victim.”
2. Yes, the Court erred in imposing death penalty in the case at bar.
The Court did not agree with the imposition of the death penalty by the court a quo. The special
circumstances of rape introduced by Republic Act 7659 should be properly pleaded with
information in order to be appreciated as having qualified the crime. In the present case, the
concurrence of minority of the private complainant and her relationship to the accused-
appellant should have been specifically alleged in the information in order to afford the latter of
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Although the
complaint sufficiently established the age as well as the relationship between the private
complainant and accused-appellant, the indictment on which he was arraigned failed to
reiterate the same. Hence, accused-appellant can only be held liable for simple rape and the
penalty in each case was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
38. ROALLOS V. PEOPLE

[G.R. No. . December 11, 2013.]

39. US v. Chan Toco

[G.R. No. 3851. December 17, 1908.]
FACTS:
Chan Toco was charged with an infraction of section 4 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippines
Commission when he smoked opium in the store of Liangco in Santo Niño, Samar on October
23, 1906 without securing a certificate.
His counsel’s contention was that it was not alleged in the information that the use of opium
had not been prescribed as a medicine by a physician. They further contended that where the
enacting clause in a statute described an offense with certain exceptions, the exceptions should
be negative in the indictment, complaint, or information.
ISSUE:
Whether exceptions should be negated in the complaint or information.
RULING:
Section 4 of Act No. 1461 is as follows:
"(a) Except when prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician, it shall be
unlawful for any person to smoke, chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise consume or use opium in
any of its forms unless such person has been duly registered as provided in section two hereof
and has secured the certificate therein prescribed. Except when prescribed as a medicine by a
duly licensed and practicing physician, no registered confirmed user of opium shall smoke,
chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise use or consume opium except in his own residence.
b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."
The evident intent and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and penalize the smoking of opium.
The legislators however decided that the operation of said statutes should not apply to a
limited number of smokers such as those who smoke opium under the advice and prescription
and licensed physician What the accused should have done is to set up the defense that he
smoked opium under the advice of the physician and not impose the burden upon the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that each person using opium does so
without the advice of a physician for that would result to absurdity and impracticability. The
doctrine laid down in the case of US vs. Nelson stating that "as a rule, an exception in a statute
by which certain particulars are withdrawn from or excepted out of the enacting clause thereof
defining a crime concerning a class or species, constitutes no part of the definition of such
crime, whether placed close to or remote from such enacting clause” should be followed.
Decision of the trial court is affirmed.

40. PEOPLE vs GIANAN

[G.R. No. 135288-93. September 15, 2000]
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged, tried and convicted of multiple rape by the Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, for raping his daughter Myrna Gianan, then twelve (12) years old, and
sentenced him to "triple death" and ordered to pay complainant compensatory damages. The
trial court found credible the testimony of the complainant that her father committed acts of
lasciviousness against her once in December 1992, raped her twice in December 1992, twice in
1993, specifically in the months of March and April, and once in November 1995. She positively
established in detail the antecedents and surrounding circumstances of the sexual assaults
committed by her father against her.
In his appeal, accused-appellant contended, among others, that the information against him
was void because it did not allege with certainty the dates of commission of the rapes, as a
result of which he was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.
ISSUE:
Whether failure of stating the exact time of the commission of the offense would make the
information or complaint defective.
RULING:
This Court has held that the allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October
15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, § 11. In any event,
even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes,
the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during the trial and any objection based
on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused-appellant's failure to object
before arraignment. Accused-appellant's remedy was to move either for a bill of particulars or
for the quashal of the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form. In this case, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial. He cross-
examined the prosecution's witnesses and afterwards presented evidence for the defense. It is
now late in the day for him to claim on appeal that the information against him was defective.
Accused-appellant's reliance on United States v. Dichao is unavailing because in that case, the
accused made a timely motion to quash the information.
With regard to the contention that the information against him is defective because it charges
more than one offense, the pertinent provisions of Rule 117 state . . . as a result of accused-
appellant's failure to move for the quashal of the information on the ground that more than
one offense was charged, he is deemed to have waived his objection based on such ground.


41. People v. Magbanua

[G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001]

42. PEOPLE V. LADRILLO

[G.R. No. 124342. December 8, 1999]
FACTS:
Jane Vasquez, the offended party accused Edwin ladrillo of rape. The offended could not state
the month and year however the precise time she was rape. But she recalled that one
afternoon she was raped by the accused herein.
In 1994, It was discovered by her mother that such event happened. They then proceeded to a
hospital to have Jane physically examined. And it was discovered that jane had a non-intact
hymen, which may indicate a male organ has penetrated the private female organ.
January 3, 1995 a case was then filed against the accused
Accused however deny such charges from the offended party. That he didn’t even knew Jane
nor her mother at that time or by year 1992, in which the alleged crime has been committed. As
stated in the information, the crime was committed “on or about the year 1992”.
ISSUE:
Was the information valid?
RULING:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the
Rules of Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as
near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs
afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to
time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been
committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992
but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g.,1991 and 1993, for which accused-
appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to
allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to
prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information,
deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly
refute the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of
residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly
committed the rape.

43. CRESPO V. MOGUL

[G.R. No. L-53373. June 30, 1987]

44. DIMATULAC V. VILLON

[G.R. No. 127107. October 12, 1998.]
FACTS:
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga against private respondents
Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti
David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz,
Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain
"Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." After conducting a preliminary examination in the
form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate David of
the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-
affidavits. Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were
arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. Judge David in a
Resolution 4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof and
circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy based on the following
information:
That on or about November 3 1995 all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago
"Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding,
went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding,
stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused
descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by
the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he
died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor
"Docsay" as the one responsible. That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay"
Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio
Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
Warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut,
Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz,
Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended. However, only accused Francisco
"Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the same. The
court then found the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared] to the others,
which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty.

On January 29, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and
the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one
another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. The command of
Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose
the means or method of attack. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant
at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and
consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably
believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to
murder.
On 23 February 23, 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein
petitioners, appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). However, on 28 February 1996, an Information for Homicide, signed by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before
Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and
John Doe alias "Danny Manalili. Furthermore, on 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura,
presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of
P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest.
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure
Order Against All Accuseds 14; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings. The private
prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need for a hold-
departure order against the accused and contended that the accused's invocation of the right
to a speedy trial was, inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the
preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder to this Opposition. 1996, Judge Roura
deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he
found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23
February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was
given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the
accused on 12 April 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura from hearing Criminal Case
No. 96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the
former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having
remarked in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify
the case into Murder. Subsequently, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the
case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge
Sesinando Villon.
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May
1996. On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. Alarmed by the conduct
of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment.

Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary
Guingona ruled that treachery was present "and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to
murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The YABUTs
opposed petitioners' Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already
been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public
prosecutor — not the private prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case. The
Secretary of Justice then set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder
considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the
accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty.
In his Order of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment,
citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1
July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration
ISSUES:
Whether the office of the provincial prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1)
giving due course to the motion for reinvestigation by private respondents against whom
warrants of arrest were Issued but who had not yet been brought into the custody of the law;
and (2) filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the appeal from said
prosecutor's resolution to the office of the secretary of justice.
Whether public respondent judge acted in excess of Jurisdiction in proceeding with the
arraignment and in denying petitioners' motions to set aside arraignment and reconsideration
thereof despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and the submission of vital
evidence to prove that murder and not homicide was committed by the accused.
Whether public respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
reconsidering his Order finding that the crime committed was murder and directing the
provincial prosecutor to amend the Information from homicide to murder
RULING:
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail
recommended for their temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in
the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never
brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu
proprio or upon motion of the YABUTS, conducted reinvestigation since accused were at large,
Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so. Furthermore, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to
submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the
standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make
a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be
charged with the lesser offense of homicide.

In addition, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for
homicide on 28 February 1996. While the information was dated 29 January 1996 , it was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996 . This simply means that the
Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. It is undebatable
that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The
last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March 1996 he
deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the
reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given
due course by the Secretary of Justice." Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as
the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they
wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order
could obviously defeat the purpose of said order.
Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on
the assailed information for homicide. Again, the state and the offended parties were deprived
of due process.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to
determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ
as early as 23 February 1996.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case is void, hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise
declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED
to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing
with the trial court the amended information for murder.

45. DUNGOG V. CA
[G.R. No. 77850-51. March 25, 1988.]

46. GABIONZA V. CA
[G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001]
FACTS:
Dennis Gabionza was a defendant in a civil case entitled "Achievers Sales Corporation v. Pasvil
Liner, Inc., et al." filed before the RTC, Branch 155, of Pasig. Contending that there was no basis
for impleading him as a party-defendant in that case, Gabionza filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint as against himself. The motion was denied by the trial court.
In the present Petition for Review, Gabionza admits that the docket number of the case before
the trial court whose order was sought to be set aside, had not been set forth in the caption of
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. Gabionza, however, maintains that his
Petition should nevertheless not have been dismissed by the CA, but rather should have been
deemed in substantial compliance with Circular
No. 28-91, for the reason that the docket number of the case pending before the trial court was
in fact set out in the body of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gabionza is guilty of forum-shopping
RULING:
No. Petition given due course.
Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper
conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described
as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.
Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two (2) different forums, for such practice works havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure. 4 That rule was formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by the Supreme Court on 11 January 1983 in connection with the implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Section 17 read as follows:
17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc. — No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if another
similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may a petition be
filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the Intermediate
Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of

court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate actions against the counsel or party concerned.
Circular No. 28-91, in its original form, established two (2) requirements which are to be
complied with by every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The first
requirement related to the caption of a petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals; 5 the second requirement related to the certification which must
accompany that petition or complaint.
The first requirement was set out in the following terms:
The attention of this court has been called to the filing of multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency with the result that said tribunals or agency have to
resolve the same issues.
To avoid the foregoing, every petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency shall comply with the
following requirements, aside from pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing
circulars:
The first requirement had two (2) components: first, the docket number of the case
before the lower court whose order is sought to be reviewed, should be in the petition; and
second, that docket number should be in the caption of the petition. In the instant case, there is
no dispute that the docket number of the case before the trial court had not been set out in the
caption of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. However,
that docket number, as well as the title of the case, before the trial court had in fact been set
out in the second page of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
There is also no dispute that petitioner Gabionza had complied with the second
requirement of Circular No. 28-91, i.e., that the required sworn certification (to the effect that
"there is no similar petition [with] the same subject matter previously filed, pending, withdrawn
or dismissed in the Supreme Court, in this Honorable Court [Court of Appeals] or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency") 6 was attached to the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. There has been no allegation that the sworn
certification filed by petitioner was false or untrue in a material respect or that petitioner
Gabionza had sought to deceive the Court of Appeals.
We, therefore, believe and so hold that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by Gabionza with the Court of Appeals was in substantial compliance with the original
requirements of Circular No. 28-91 and that the objectives of that Circular were not being
subverted by Gabionza's.
47. PARULAN V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

[G.R. No. L-28519. February 17, 1968]

48. PEOPLE V. GROSPE

[G.R. No. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988]
FACTS:
Respondent Manuel Parulan, an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan, was charged with violations of BP 22 and Estafa for allegedly
issuing checks having insufficient funds in favor of SMC. After proceeding with the trial against
Parulan, respondent judge dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. The Republic filed a
petition for certiorari challenging the dismissal of the two criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case?
RULING:
No. The questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon
respondent judge’s erroneous conclusion that his court had no “territorial jurisdiction” over the
cases. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said
to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore no second proceeding which would
subject the accused to double jeopardy.
Decision of respondent judge is set aside and he is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over the
criminal cases and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal.

49. Diel V. Martinez

[G.R. No. L-247. March 14, 1946]

50. Liong v. Lee

[G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013]
FACTS:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a
company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate
disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a
majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI filed for a verified petition for the Issuance of an
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 which covers a property owned by CHI. Petitioner
submitted Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his
files and discovered such loss in May 1999, and despite diligent efforts, such TCT has not been
found and is already beyond recovery. Such petition was granted by RTC and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by his brother, filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the order of RTC be
set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that she was in possession of the said Owner’s
Duplicate Copy, being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI.
Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he
planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Thus, RTC recalled and set
aside its previous order.
On May 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint-affidavit stating that petitioner made a wilful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly
knew that she was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of the said TCT. Respondent
executed a Supplemental Affidavit stating that she was accusing petitioner of Perjury. The
Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. Upon Review Resolution, the
recommendation to dismiss was set aside. Thus an information for Perjury wa filed.
At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with
the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a
private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. MeTC denied said motion,
and its MR. CA upheld such decision by the MeTC holding that the presence of the private
prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the
criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated
that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private complainant therein,
hence, an aggrieved party.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against
public interest.
2. Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action.
RULING
1. YES. When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which
he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually
or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious
to respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the
duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court ordered issuance of a new owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent's timely discovery of the case filed
by petitioner in the RTC.
2. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for
the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter
of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is
always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

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What are the two venues where libel cases can be filed?

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS | Atty.

1. BONIFACIO v. RTC OF MAKATI

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4. MIRANDA ET AL. V. TULIAO

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[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.]

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circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the

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● To exclude some of the accuse, not including herein petitioner

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10. SAMSON V. GUINGONA

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11. JADEWELL V. LIDUA

Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan,

A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.

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Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:

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Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall

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12. CITY OF MANILA V. RIZAL

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13. NGO YAO TIT V. SHERIFF OF MANILA (1914)

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[G.R. No. 132546. July 5, 2000.]

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15. TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR

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16. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU

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17. PEOPLE V. OSO

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18. VISBAL V. JUDGE RAMOS

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19. PEOPLE V. BERIALES

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