Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 81077 June 6, 1990

LUIS DE OCAMPO, JR., JOSE RODRIGO, EUGENIO ESQUEJO, VICTORINO TABERNERO, RIZALO
DALIVA, FRANCISCO ACOSTA and 87 others listed in Annex 'A' hereof, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MAKATI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Alfra Beta A. Serquina for petitioners.

Maximo P. Amurao, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petition seeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent NLRC dated June 8, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as hereinabove indicated.

Consequently, the application for clearance to dismiss the union officers is granted; the
employment status of the individual complainants who were project employees is also considered
severed, not on account of illegality of the strike but due to the expiration of their employment
contracts; and the respondent is ordered to reinstate, without back wages, the individual
complainants who were regular employees except those who were officers of the union among
them or paid separation pay at their option, equivalent to one month's pay or one-half month's
pay for every year of service, whichever is greater.

It appears that on September 30, 1980, the services of 65 employees of private respondent Makati Development
Corporation were terminated on the ground of the expiration of their contracts; that the said employees filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against the MDC on October 1, 1980; * that on October 8, 1980, as a result of the aforementioned
termination, the Philippine Transport and General Workers Association, of which the complainants were members, filed a notice of strike on the grounds of
union-busting, subcontracting of projects which could have been assigned to the dismissed employees, and unfair labor practice; that on October 14, 1980,
the PTGWA declared a strike and established picket lines in the perimeter of the MDC premises; that on November 4, 1980, the MDC filed with the Bureau of
Labor Relations a motion to declare the strike illegal and restrain the workers from continuing the strike; that on that same day and several days thereafter the
MDC filed applications for clearance to terminate the employment of 90 of the striking workers, whom it had meanwhile preventively suspended; that of the
said workers, 74 were project employees under contract with the MDC with fixed terms of employment; and that on August 31, 1982, Labor Arbiter Apolinar L.
Sevilla rendered a decision 1 denying the applications for clearance filed by the MDC and directing it to reinstate the individual complainants with two months
back wages each.

This is the decision modified by the NLRC   which is now faulted by the petitioners for grave abuse of discretion.
2

The contention is that the public respondent acted arbitrarily and erroneously in ruling that: a) the motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; b) the strike was illegal; and c) the separation of the project employees was
justified.

Having considered the issues and the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, including the
petitioners' ex parte motion for early resolution of this case, the Court makes the findings that follow.

On the first issue, we note that the rule on motions for reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC is now found
in Rule X of the Revised Rules of the NLRC, providing thus:

Section 9. Motions for reconsideration — Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or
decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent
errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (I 0) calendar days from receipt
of the order, resolution or decision, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been
 furnished, within the aforesaid reglementary period, the adverse party and provided further, that
only one such motion shall be entertained.

Subject to the provisions of Section 3, Rule IX of these Rules, motions for reconsideration of an
order, resolution or decision of a Division shall be resolved by the Division of origin.

However, this section was promulgated only on November 5, 1986, and became effective only on November 29,
1986, after the required publication.   It was therefore not yet in force when the required resolution in the present
3

case was rendered in 1984.

Apparently agreeing that the reglementary period then was fifteen days, the Solicitor General argues that the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was nevertheless filed late on June 26, 1984, the decision of the NLRC
having been rendered on June 7, 1984, or 19 days earlier.   This is not exactly accurate. The fact is Annex "C" of
4

the petition shows that a copy of the decision was received by the petitioner only on June 13, 1984, and it was
from that date that the reglementary period commenced to run. This means that the motion for reconsideration
was filed on time, only 13 days having elapsed before the deadline.

But this notwithstanding, we must hold that under the law then in force, to wit, PD No. 823 as amended by PD
No. 849, the strike was indeed illegal. In the first place, it was based not on the ground of unresolved economic
issues, which was the only ground allowed at that time, when the policy was indeed to limit and discourage
strikes. Secondly, the strike was declared only after 6 days from the notice of strike and before the lapse of the
30-day period prescribed in the said law for a cooling-off of the differences between the workers and
management and a possible avoidance of the intended strike. That law clearly provided:

Sec. 1. It is the policy of the state to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining
within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore all forms of strikes,
picketing and lockout are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries such as in public utilities,
including transportation and communication, companies engaged in the manufacturer processing
as well as in the distribution of fuel gas, gasoline and fuel or lubricating oil, in companies
engaged in the production or processing of essential commodities or products for export, and in
companies engaged in banking of any kind, as well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges.

However, any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may lockout in establishments
not covered by General Order No. 5 only on grounds of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining, in which case the union or the employer shall file a notice with the Bureau of Labor
Relations at least 30 days before the intended strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied)

It is our ruling that the leaders of the illegal strike were correctly punished with dismissal, but their followers
(other than the contract workers) were properly ordered reinstated, considering their lesser degree of
responsibility. The penalty imposed upon the leaders was only proper because it was they who instigated the
strike even if they knew, or should have known, that it was illegal. It was also fair to rule that the reinstated
strikers were not entitled to backpay as they certainly should not be compensated for services not rendered
during the illegal strike. In our view, this is a reasonable compromise between the demands of the workers and
the rights of the employer.

Coming now to the last question, we stress the rule in Cartagenas v. Romago Electric Co.,   that contract
5

workers are not considered regular employees, their services being needed only when there are projects to be
undertaken. 'The rationale of this rule is that if a project has already been completed, it would be unjust to
require the employer to maintain them in the payroll while they are doing absolutely nothing except waiting until
another project is begun, if at all. In effect, these stand-by workers would be enjoying the status of privileged
retainers, collecting payment for work not done, to be disbursed by the employer from profits not earned. This is
not fair by any standard and can only lead to a coddling of labor at the expense of management.

We believe, however, that this rule is not applicable in the case at bar, and for - good reason. The record shows
that although the contracts of the project workers had indeed expired, the project itself was still on-going and so
continued to require the workers' services for its completion.   There is no showing that such services were
6

unsatisfactory to justify their termination. This is not even alleged by the private respondent. One can therefore
only wonder why, in view of these circumstances, the contract workers were not retained to finish the project
they had begun and were still working on. This had been done in past projects. This arrangement had
consistently been followed before, which accounts for the long years of service many of the workers had with the
MDC.

It is obvious that the real reason for the termination of their services-which, to repeat, were still needed-was the
complaint the project workers had filed and their participation in the strike against the private respondent. These
were the acts that rendered them persona non grata to the management. Their services were discontinued by
the MDC not because of the expiration of their contracts, which had not prevented their retention or rehiring
before as long as the project they were working on had not yet been completed. The real purpose of the MDC
was to retaliate against the workers, to punish them for their defiance by replacing them with more tractable
employees.

Also noteworthy in this connection is Policy Instruction No. 20 of the Department of Labor, providing that "project
employees are not entitled to separation pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or
any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the projects in which they had been employed by a
particular construction company."   Affirmatively put, and interpreting it in the most liberal way to favor the
7

working class, the rule would entitle project employees to separation pay if the projects they are working on have
not yet been completed when their services are terminated. And this should be true even if their contracts have
expired, on the theory that such contracts would have been renewed anyway because their services were still
needed.

Applying this rule, we hold that the project workers in the case at bar, who were separated even before the
completion of the project at the New Alabang Village and not really for the reason that their contracts had
expired, are entitled to separation pay. We make this disposition instead of ordering their reinstatement as it may
be assumed that the said project has been completed by this time. Considering the workers to have been
separated without valid cause, we shall compute their separation pay at the rate of one month for every year of
service of each dismissed employee, up to the time of the completion of the project.   We feel this is the most
8

equitable way to treat their claim in light of their cavalier dismissal by the private respondent despite their long
period of satisfactory service with it.

It is the policy of the Constitution to afford protection to labor in recognition of its role in the improvement of our
welfare and the strengthening of our democracy. An exploited working class is a discontented working class. It is
a treadmill to progress and a threat to freedom. Knowing this, we must exert all effort to dignify the lot of the
employee, elevating him to the same plane as his employer, that they may better work together as equal
partners in the quest for a better life. This is a symbiotic relationship we must maintain if such a quest is to
succeed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED but with the modification that the contract
workers are hereby declared to have been illegally separated before the expiration of the project they were
working on and so are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.

Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her
husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan,
March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA
but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on
the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising
are essentially questions of law.   Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's
1

direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her
prejudice.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated
on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It
replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section
4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment.  2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the
Employees Compensation Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of
the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as
"employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international
waters, covered by a valid contract.   A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked
3

overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen"   or "any person working overseas or
4

who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under
a valid employment contract and shall include seamen."   These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is
5

not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's
vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country.  6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of
the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping
articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over
overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797.   The second is its payment   of the contributions
7 8

mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No.
1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature,
described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco."   While this receipt is
9

certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and
the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines
who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the
petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers.
Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be
considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA
pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen
Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court.   The petitioner claims that it had never
10

entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it
should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of
any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract
effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date."
In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed
written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State.  11

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading
as follows:
 ... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself
prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate
Apellate Court   which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
12

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.'
(Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and
by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,  viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it.   Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
13

map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.  14

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v.
Rosenthal   "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR   "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v.
15 16

Williams   and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General,   to mention only a few
17 18

cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission,   and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 
19 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since
March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition,
as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is
specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular
No. 2, Series of 1984, that—

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct
from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine
laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay
the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial
expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen
Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines
(Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever
benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under
the employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social
Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the
social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the
promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due
process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is
an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers,
the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau
of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the
Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the
Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources
and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted
as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the
cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations   are observed.
21

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the
private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in
life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his
cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is
not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order
dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26341      November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.

Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.

Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the
decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the
widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed
Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's
fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the
IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main
IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to
say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself
killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo
Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home.
From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of
the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere
stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of
employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in
holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively
simple and litigiously prolific", 1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in
the course of employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course
of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; 3 however, it should not
be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the
word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the
two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. 4 The words "arising out of"
refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of"
refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. 5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it
takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while
he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 6

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in
the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is
excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts." 7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized
exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2)
where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or
customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his
place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with
his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of
transportation to and from the place of employment. 8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries
sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs.
Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the
rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the
next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of
and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus:

The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do
not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to
or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the
Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment
covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the
morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the
spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate
to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R.
No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation
Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a
laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and
commonly used by the latter's laborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a
centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the
following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2-½ meters from it
between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the
highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In
holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," "
this Court reasoned thus:

The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends
upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the
fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude
coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that
the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can
usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law,
in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the
Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative
connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In
 order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very
special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of
access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the
premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the
employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to
avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch
was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should
have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no  particular causative
connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although,
as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken
measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that
the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place
was particularly unsafe.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference
to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an
affluence of Federal and State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we
glean the following observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work. Injuries
going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the
employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee was walking or
driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the
course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the
employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is
flatly raised.

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of
the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's
premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the employment
premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but
also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the
employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even
on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its
streets are protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time
prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the
employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any
state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks
adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by
an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the
employment is discernible, no federal question arises.
 The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment
threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and
narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or
supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2)
if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for
the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment
he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even
though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of
business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own
peculiar circumstances.

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally
considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his work,  when, though
off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an
appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and
recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent
property with the express or implied consent of the employer.

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or
death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L.
804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work on public
streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether
an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of
each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work,
but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable.

Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen
out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk
immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just
before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general
rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point
not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public
highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that
there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable
time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned
that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the
sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business
was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited
degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.

In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held to have
arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he
was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short
distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of  a street maintained by the
employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one,
it led nowhere except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to
and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are
such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with
such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the
sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no
option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then
in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
 environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury
falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Law.

99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special
circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or
injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or
accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and
as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to
exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope of "course
of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:

We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries which
occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and highways. The extension of the
course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an
employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the
exercise of any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that
while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a
trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the
application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or
otherwise.

A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the premises of
the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment.
These risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no
justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at
most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or
private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or
reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that,
when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the
conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury,
it may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the
meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that
"the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally
responsible."12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava,
supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied
by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the
bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the
stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was
adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving collided with a
cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it
a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash
his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of
compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who had been
suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked
him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee
stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was
caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in
the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by
the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an
unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the
assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the employee-driver
was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during
which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death
and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were intimations that
the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision 17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1)
Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law"
(sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to
compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on
the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault
on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted worker
arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the
injury and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to
do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which
subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which
expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-
matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs
comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the
public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a
street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3)
jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the
subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or
where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence
was due to labor disputes.20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the employment
because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the
Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the
corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
 In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor of coverage
has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally
unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that
the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been
given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to
injure or kill himself or another.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the New York
act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to
testify.

The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the mere making of
a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred.
The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be
necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can
attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your
employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would
devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the
environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the presumption a
foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury
occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but
has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's
Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing that accidental
injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that
mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of
the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be
some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the
course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where
some connection appears between the accident and the employment.

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment," was opened
with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate headings for convenience,
some interplay between the two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed.

A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-
tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is
almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum
quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising"
quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising"
quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.

But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in
which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an
employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment,
such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a
blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since
the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the
causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the
"course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing
with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the
analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is
sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment
— as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the
mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the case over the line to
success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled
with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the
time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an
award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is
at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee,
although living on the premises is not on call.

A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-employment
activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the
method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct
performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising" element; one
may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other
"neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the
employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very
weak, since the source of the injury — whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or
death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as
such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this
employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since
the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how
generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when
a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal connection, one
can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made
in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element
was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v.
Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted
by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was
prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook
dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was
made in New York.

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may
reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation
was denied to an employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck
her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we
have a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal
appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing
alone — lunch period, care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards in
which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and
could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent
lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resume:
 1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the
course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is
strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is
whether the accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury
and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to
have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes
place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling
his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not
of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close
proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending
the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between
the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of
a dispute leading to the assault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no
cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case
must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn
beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting
compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was
called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to
question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose
of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so
that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within
the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for
the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for
its employees by employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred
that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial
of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO.
All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking
along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review,"
the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20)
meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of
the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took
place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that
shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that
the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have
fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the
principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road
must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a
legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security
control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such
duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches,
but should also have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo
was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw
therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further
facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the
employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course
thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it
was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to
be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a
way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is
entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably,
as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the
employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to
include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or
implied consent of the employer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main
IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the
IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty
meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's
death was in the course of employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the
time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period
when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a
continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only
to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a
dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work
at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises
and one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those premises,
and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In
that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO
premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its
employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he
can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29

The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee while using
the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of employment is not
compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a
consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk
and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In these cases
a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or
egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his
employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal
authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.

The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is controlling of
this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In
that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and
owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's
facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated
on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various
buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public
desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work
at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of
resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance
company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business
of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities
from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the
conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act.
The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises
that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises . The Court pointed out that the
lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber
company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing the "access"
doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer
when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means
of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers incident
to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of
service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in
the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only
as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which
the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute,
which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.

xxx      xxx      xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed
the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad
track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney
said:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and
convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to
discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon
the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured,
 in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that,
the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in
furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had
occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221,
72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:

An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time
and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done . If
the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity
and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising
out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space
before the place where the work is to be done is reached.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in
very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate
a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public
or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the
road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a
means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under
obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might
encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security
measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in
his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be
brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must
first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the
injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and
not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be
compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be
barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general
public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v.
MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App.
826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our conclusion
that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the
IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the
presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a
causal relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space,
twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of the  course factor. But it
may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty
meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision
in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical
question put forth by the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before
us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is
the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain
constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be
suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided
in the light of then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it
must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act
comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.