SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C.

SALITICO, Petitioners 
vs.
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION* 

Facts: he instant case stemmed from a Complaint4 for Specific Performance with

Damages (Complaint) filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps. Salitico
against the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez. he Estate of Amanda H.
Burgos

Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land in Bambang,

Bulacan. By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos
(Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda,
Resurreccion, as a devisee. 

Resurreccion executed a documentBilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa which transferred

ownership over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken
before the RTC, Branch 22 (Probate Court). Respondent Recaredo was appointed as
the executor of the Huling Habilin.  Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring
them to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it to the
respondents heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners
Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009, which
was however denied registration 

In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery
and return in their favor of the owner's duplicate copy and the execution of the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng
Lupa. RTC rendered its Decision11 dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of
action.

Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the subject property which she inherited from
Amanda to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Nevertheless, the RTC held that the action
filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown
that the Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda

CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate proceedings before the
Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that no
will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court. 

ISSUE: WON the sale is valid.

HELD: Yes. Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the
rights of the inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death meaning
that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and,
therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of
heirs, or partition, or distribution."19 Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of
his/her hereditary share immediately after such death.20 The Court, early on in Teves
de Jakosalem v. Rafols, et al., 21explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir
of his share in an inheritance does not interfere with the administration of the estate.

As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the
absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that
upon settlement of Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or
excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion from entering into
a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former's share
or interest over the subject property.
NICANOR NACAR vs. CLAUDIO A. NISTAL
G.R. No. L-33006; December 8, 1982

Facts: Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to annul an order of Judge Nistal of the municipal court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect
the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the questioned order, and to stop the
respondent judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 65.
Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it "Claim
Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On the
basis of this complaint, including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to
remove and dispose the above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent to
defraud plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitana had given security
according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the
provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner
Nicanor Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late
Isabelo Nacar.
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and
absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in
the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by
Nicanor Nacar

The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the MTD is proper.

HELD: No. Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause
of action against petitioner Nacar. Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a
legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no
correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the
complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of
the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the
petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or
damage to the latter as would create a cause of action against the former.

It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against
petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to
Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner
to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is
only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in
the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late
lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner
Nacar has nothing to do.
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, vs. IDONAH SLADE PERKINS

Facts: Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of
the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties left
by the deceased.
a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last
will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28,
1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of
P5,000,000. 
Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator 
Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the
probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. 
the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or
give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal
effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances,
etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid
their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their
disposition.
Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the
opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal
properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal
of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.
TC approved the sale.

Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them.

ISSUE: WON the sale is proper.

HELD: No. It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed Sec.
2 Rule 81 of ROC. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to
preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81,
also empowers such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered sold;" .

Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of
the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership
property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the
ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal
partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to
which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to
preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the
items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical
appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and preserved with
proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential houses (in
Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme
urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection
of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of
the personal estate in question.
VDA. DE REYES VS CA

Facts: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of
approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig,
Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens
System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title
having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo
Reyes, who was the administrator of his property. In 1941, or about twenty (20) years
after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property — OCT
No. 255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo
Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of
this fact.

Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more
or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee,
this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The
deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee
immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes
therein.

hen the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
(Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was
intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated
to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in
representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.

As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued
in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the
name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title
were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. 
Danilo vs Suarez
Gr No. 94918; September 2, 1992

Facts: Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then
his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot
been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages
The jfive (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, were levied and sold to
respondents. Before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action against private respondents. Teofista Suarez joined by herein
petitioners claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further
informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale.
RTC ruled the persons claiming right to vacate the property. On appeal, the CA
annulled the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels
of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased
father.

HELD: No, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the
institution of the case."The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent."

Article 888 further provides "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.The latter
may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides "If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants."

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime
of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father.

Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul
the auction sale to protect their own interest.
Lim v. Chinco, G.R. No. 33592, [March 31, 1931

Facts: This is a contest over the probable of a paper writing purporting to be the will
of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz.
The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document produced as her
will purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or
less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname
of Lim. This instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the
instrument as executrix. Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the
deceased.  
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the trial court sustained the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that the
testatrix did not have testamentary capacity   |||

The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto
Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to the chief
beneficiaries named in the will. . After informing himself of the condition of the
testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by the patient and, taking a
sheet from an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question.   |||

Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del Castillo that he would be pleased to have
Doctor Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he
considered the old lady to be lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person present
was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the deceased and attorney Gabriel asked him also
whether or not he was willing to sign as one of the witnesses. |||

In the end three persons served as witnesses, and two relatives of his wife. The
intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was
signed for her by the attorney.

Issue: whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper
referred to was signed. |||

Held: No. The alleged testatrix, a woman of about 80 years of age, was stricken with
apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was kept prostrate in bed, in a state of
coma, for three days, at the end of which she was removed to a hospital where she
died four days later. Just before her removal to the hospital a will was made for her by
an attorney, who also signed her name thereto, purportedly at her request. At the time
the will was made the proof showed that the testatrix was in a comatose condition and
devoid of the power of articulate speech. Held, that testamentary capacity was lacking
and that the purported will was not valid.|||
Barrera v. Tampoco, G.R. No. L-5263, [February 17, 1954]

Facts: Oliva Villapaña died in Tarlac. A petition was filed by Agustin Parrera in the
CFI of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by Oliva Villapaña and for the
appointment of the petitioner as executor.
Tampoco and Villapana alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, filed
an opposition, claiming that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with
law, that the testratrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence
and pressure in its execution, that the signature of Oliva Villapaña was obtained by
fraud and trickery, and that the testamentary provisions are illegal.  
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The court found that Oliva Villapaña had testamentary capacity  but the will was|||

disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of the deceased and
it was not based on the finding that Oliva Villapaña did not furnish the names of the
persons instituted as heirs and that the will was not read to her before she signed it. On
appeal, the trial court erred in denying probate of the will.

Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the probate of the will proper.

Held: No. Two attesting witnesses testified that the will was signed by the testatrix
and by the three attesting witnesses in the presence of each other, while the other
attesting witness testified to the contrary. The court gave weight to the testimony of
the first two one of whom is an attorney and justice of the peace who drafted the will,
the court also considering the fact that the witness who testified against the due
execution of the will, signed the attestation clause stating that the will was signed by
the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.  The fact that the
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witnesses to the execution of the will are related to some of the beneficiaries
thereunder, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses. It is not necessary that the
will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses. The court did not
attempt to discover the motives of the testatrix in leaving her properties to the person
named in the will and admitting therefrom the oppositors. As the will was found to
have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with the
testatrix having testamentary capacity, the court was compelled to give expression
thereto.  
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THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON vs. COURT
OF APPEALS

Facts: