EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163980. August 3, 2006.]

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and

NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his personal capacity and as
President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN,
in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
(PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE
SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of
the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J : p

The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization
Act of 2003."
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal
capacity and on behalf of the association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government
Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant
petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman
of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty.
Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA),
Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor
(PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary
Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
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 Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances
authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC). AIcECS

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.

1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a
little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. 1
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. 2
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993,
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the
government's socialized housing program. 3
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy . — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands
located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.

Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center

Site to Bona Fide Residents. — Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is
hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares
on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth
Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide
residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide
residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey
conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on
the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That
all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or
implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby adopted.

Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center

Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic,
Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. — Certain portions of land
within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are
hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
th o s e institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition
program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further,
That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of
thes e institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis
therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot
allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land
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 area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually
used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) cAISTC

In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, 4 the Committee formulated the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004.
Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1)
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC)
HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED
NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO
IMPLEMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1)
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC)
HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED
NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL.
5

First, the procedural matters.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association
cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1)
since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2)
provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-
beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price
escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell
within the prescribed period. 6 Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner
association is not the duly recognized people's organization in the NGC and since
petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of
disposition of lots in the NGC. 7
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged . . . The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 8
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition,
whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC.
There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are
residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited
or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection
process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus,
petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to
be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG's allegation
that the failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as
beneficiaries effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR,
such circumstance precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to
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 assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury
arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and
eliminated from the selection process. While it is true that petitioners claim
rights over the NGC West Side only and thus cannot be affected by the
implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest
of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2
(c.1), govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the
NGC. HDAaIS

We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The
petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant
petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper
remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function. 9 Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207,
the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function,
which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed
outright, the OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City 10
and respondent NHA 11 contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the
Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a

consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. 12
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power. 13
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on
the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the
ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to
implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. 14
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the
judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
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 courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 15
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance
of the issues raised, so warrant. 16 A direct invocation of the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 17
I n Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 18 the Court said that it will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 19
A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or
important reasons to warrant the Court's taking cognizance of the petition in the
first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower
courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, 20 the Court's power to
evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate
in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition
should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. aSECAD

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or
in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 21 Prohibition lies against judicial
or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels. 22 Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise
of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can
be obtained. 23 Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
In a number of petitions, 24 the Court adequately resolved them on other
grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no
compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition
may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will
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 not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the
speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to
except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it
cannot be questioned. 25
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however,
is just as dismal for petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide
residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxx xxx xxx

(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the

Code of Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified
to acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of
54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of lots.
xxx xxx xxx
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and
evaluated based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and
maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxx xxx xxx
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
(a) Westside

(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS)

within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail
of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) for both eastside and westside

(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the

deadline set in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of
eastside six (6) months after approval of the subdivision plan shall
be subjected to lot price escalation.CTEacH

The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National

Housing Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria. The
new rate shall be approved by the NGC-Administration Committee
(NGC-AC).

Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are

constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the
object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.

First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded

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 to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in
harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot
allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or
occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The argument is
utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups,
namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and
certain government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A.
No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for
disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be
distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand,
governs the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is true that
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall
be based on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the law's
effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the
local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious
institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide
residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident
of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.
Petitioners' interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and
the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The government's policy to set
aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local
government and various government institutions devoted to socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious purposes. 26 Thus, although Proclamation
No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third
of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the
condition that those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public
purposes would be excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The
same policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No.
248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the
rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional
property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the
vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by
Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would not
adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the
NGC. CaEIST

In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional

beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the
portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be
allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended
for institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the
bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a
limitation on the area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a
necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate
of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They
add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell
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 within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a
price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus,
they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should
be nullified. The argument deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in
the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the
statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. 27 All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law. 28
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer,
formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas
covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statute's objective of urban
poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which
the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad
power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications
of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing
the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the
law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their
determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter
possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters. IaHCAD

The Committee's authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to
the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for
the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 29 In this
regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is
unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary
who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within
the Committee's authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement
R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and
conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are
reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period
within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can
ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from
a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by
several representatives of people's organizations contrary to the express
mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized
peoples' organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed
IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized
people's organization.
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had
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 the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed
complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum
requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a
ground to invalidate the same. aDSIHc

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and
Velasco Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., in the result.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 6.
2. Id. at 7.

3. Id.
4. SEC. 5. National Government Center Administration Committee. — There is hereby
created a National Government Center Administration Committee to administer,
formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the land disposition of the
areas covered by this Act. . . .
5. Rollo, p. 12.
6. Id. at 80.

7. Id. at 82.
8. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA
656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA
81.

9. Rollo, p. 81.
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 66.
12. Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission , 456 Phil.
145, 155 (2003).
13. Id. at 157.
14. Id. at 158.

15. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA
460, 470.

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 16. Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480 (1998).
17. Id. at 481.
18. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra.
19. Id. at 471.
20. CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 states: The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decrees, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. . . .
21. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2.
22. David v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 90,
100.
23. Id.
24. Development Bank of the Phils. v. Commission on Audit , 424 Phil. 411 (2002);
Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 375 Phil. 615 (1999); Spouses
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 761 (2001).
25. Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29,
2005.
26. Republic Act No. 9207 (2003), Sec. 2, provides: Declaration of Policy . — It is
hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban
poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for
housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.
27. Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals , 329 Phil. 987, 1006-1007
(1996), citing Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department
of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63.
28. Sigre v. Court of Appeals , 435 Phil. 711, 719 (2002).
29. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818,
December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 218, 225-226.

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