UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

/
BUREAU OF MINES

INFORMATION CIRCULAR

PROTECTION AGAINST LIGHTNING AT SURFACE A N D

UNDERGROUND MINING PLANTS

D. HARRINGTON,
D. J. PARKER,
A N D L. H. HARRISON
---------
I. C . 7447,
April 1948.

INFORMATION-- CIRCULAR
-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE I m R I O R - BUREAU OF MINES

By D. Harrington,g/ D. J. ~ a r k e r , l /and L . H. ~arrisonL/

. INTRODUCTION

The n e c e s s i t y f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e hazards of l i g h t n i n g manifests

i t s e l f from time t o time i n t h e mining i n d u s t r y by reason of l o s s of l i f e ,
damage t o e l e c t r i c a l equipment, f i r e s i n s u r f a c e s % r u c t u r e s a t mines, and
a c c i d e n t s i n t h e handling and use of 'explosives. This paper i s intended t o
assemble, c o r r e l a t e ; and p r e s e n t some of t h e s a l i e n t p o i n t s embodied i n t h e
a v a i l a b l e l i t e r a t u r e on t h e s u b j e c t and a t t h e same time give some f a c t u a l
d a t a concerning i n s t a n c e s of such l o s s of l i f e and damage t o property, with
s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e mining industryc

The annual l o s s of l i f e and d e s t r u c t i o n of property by l i g h t n i n g i s

considerable; t h e former may be prevented t o a l i m i t e d e x t e n t , though use of
common sense a s t o exposure i s required and not always followed; t h e l a t t e r
can be prevented t o a considerable degree. The manufacturers of e l e c t r i c a l
equipment, through improved types of l i g h t n i n g a r r e s t e r s , , have done much t o -
ward t h e p r o t e c t i o n of e l e c t r i c a l equipment, with consequent safeguarding of
l i f e and of property. Education based on unfortunate experiences has gone
f a r t o discourage t h e handling of explosives and b l a s t i n g a c c e s s o r i e s during
thunder storms, e s p e c i a l l y i n open p i t s and q u a r r i e s , and t o a much smaller
e x t e n t i n underground workings. The lowly l i g h t n i n g rod plays a n important
r o l e i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c e r t a i n types of b u i l d i n g s ( e s p e c i a l l y i s o l a t e d
b u i l d i n g s ) , s t a c k s , monuments, and o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s .

LIGHTNING PHENOMENA

I n 1751, F r a n k l i n proved t h a t l i g h t n i n g was simply a v i s i b l e d i s p l a y of

e l e c t r i c i t y - a n extended spark; and u n t i l a generation ago l i t t l e had been
added t o h i s exposition, t o d e f i n e t h e various phases of t h e phenomenon.
Matters p e r t a i n i n g t o l i g h t n i n g a r e discussed i n t h e following references:

-1/ The Bureau of Mines w i l l welcome r e p r i n t i n g of t h i s paper, provided t h e

following f o o t n o t e acknowledgment i s used: "Reprinted from Bureau of
Mines Information C i r c u l a r 7447. "
-2 / Chief, Health and S a f e t y Division, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D. C .
-3/ Former supervising engineer, D i s t r i c t D, Health and S a f e t y Division,
Bureau of Mines, Birmingham, Ala,
-41 M i n i n g - e l e c t r i c a l engineer, Bureau of Mines, Birmingham, Ala .
I.C. 7447
CIVIIIETT, J . A . Lightning Damage Prevented by Using Proper Apparatus. Coal
Age, v o l . 47, No. 11, November 1942, pp. 61-63.
G I L WORLD. F i r e Prevention, Protection, Development i n t h e C a l i f o r n i a O i l
Industry. SeptemSer 1939, pp. 3-7.
PETERS, 0 . S. P r o t e c t i o n of L i f e and Property Agsinst Lightning. Bureau of
Standards Tech. Paper 56, 1915, 127 pp.
RICmRT, F. W. How Lightning and-surges Can be Rendered Innocuous by Two
S e t s of A r r e s t e r s Working i n Tune. Coal Age, vol. 47, No. 5, May 1947,
PP- 51, 54-55
RCCKY MOUIVTAIN CCAL MINING INSTITUTE. Lightning and t h e Nature of Lightning.
Proc. 1939, pp. 55-61.
.
SIMPSON, SIR GEORGE, AND SCRASE, F J. Proc , , Royal Soc , s e r . A , No. 905,
v o l . 161, 1937.
.
STRONG, R . G. Possible E f f e c t of Lightning on Underground Gas-Transmission
Lines, Proc. Ann. Conv., Am. Gas Assoc., May 1939; Gas Age, v o l . 53,
May 25, 1939, pp. 35-36; Pipe Line News, June 1939, pp. 3-7.
UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES. I n s t a l l a t i o n Requirements f o r Master Labeled
Lightning p r o t e c t i o n Systems. N a t . Board of F i r e Underwriters, 1934.
WAGNER, C. F . , AND McCAlVT, G . D. Lightning Phenomena. Chap. 12, E l e c t r i c
Transmission and D i s t r i b u t f o n Reference Book, Westinghouse E l e c t r i c &
Manufacturing Co ., Pj-ttsburgh, Fa.
WILSCN, C . R . T. I n v e s t i g a t i o n of hosses from Lightnj ng .
Jour. Franklin
I n s t . , vol. 20B, 1929, pp. 288-290.

EXPLOSIONS I N MINES AfJD QUARRIES

The very n a t u r e of l i g h t n i n g discharges makes it inconceivable t h a t t h e

e l e c t r i c disturbance should be co.nfined t o t h e atmosphere; t h e disturbance
extends f o r some d i s t a n c e i n t o t h e e a r t h , probably i n a r a d i a l p a t t e r n f r o n
t h e s t r o k e c e n t e r o r discharge p o i n t .

Lightning discharges a r e i n i t i a t e d by i n v i s i b l e p i l o t streamers o r

l e a d e r s propagated from t h e cloud toward t h e f i n , forming a path f o r t h e
discharge. Regarding t h i s , Wagner and McCann, s t a t e : %"i
A s t h e l e a d e r s t r i k e s t h e ground an extremely b r i g h t streamer
propagates upward from t h e e a r t h t o t h e cloud following t h e same
path a s t h e main channel of t h e downward l e a d e r . The charge d i s -
t r i b u t e d along t h e l e a d e r s thus i s discharged progressively t o
ground, giving r i s e t o t h e very l a r g e c u r r e n t s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d
with l i g h t n i n g discharges - c u r r e n t s varying between 1,000 a n d '
200,000 amperes.

With c u r r e n t s of such magnitude, even though spread over a considerable

a r e a of t h e e a r t h ' s surface, voltage gradients a r e b u i l t up owing t o t h e r e -
s i s t i v i t y of t h e e a r t h , which can provide s u f f i c i e n t p o t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e t o
s e t o f f explosive charges primed with e l e c t r i c detonators and produce d e f i n i t e
shock hazard. Such v a l t a g e d i f f e r e n c e s are not confined t o t h e e a r t h ' s s u r -
f a c e b u t have caused premature explosions i n underground mines, and instances

-6/ Wagner, C. F . , and McCann, G . C., ~ i g h t n i n gPhenomena: Chap. 12, E l e c t r i c

Transmission and D i s t r i b u t i o n Reference Book, Westinghouqe E l e c t r i c &
Manufacturing Co .,
Pittsburgh.
 I.C. 7447

a r e on record i n which persons have received severe shocks a t remote l o c a t i o n s

underground during l i g h t n i n g storms.

Below a r e some a b s t r a c t s o f ' l e t t e r s and r e p o r t s g i v i n g d a t a on i n s t a n c e s

i n ~ h i c h ~ l i g h t n i ni gs known o r suspected t o have caused premature explosions
o r e l e c t r i c a l shock i n mines and q u a r r i e s .

I have i n mind a n occurrence a t t h e Wakefield P i t of t h e M. A .

Hanna Co. a t Wakefield, Mich., about 1922 when two w e l l - d r i l l e d
h o l e s were loaded t o be detonated with e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g caps; and
while t h e men were a t lunch a l i g h t n i n g storm came up and t h e s e
h o l e s were s e t off without damage t o anyone. There was always a
q u e s t i o n a s t o whether t h e wires were p r o p e r l y "shorted" when
left.
***
On May 22, 1908, a t Caimito Mulato, Canal Zone, during a
thunder, storm, l i g h t n i n g exploded 3 1 tons of dynamite i n a number
of d r i l l h o l e s . The charges were a l l pldced and t h e l e g s of t h e
e l e c t r i c d e t o n a t o r s were being connected t o t h e l e a d i n g wires.
Two f a t a l i t i e s and a number of i n j u r i e s r e s u l t e d .
* + *
On August 11, 1908, a t Macachin, Canal Zone, a number of
holes had been charged, and t h e l e g s of t h e e l e c t r i c detonators
had been connected up t o t h e leading wires when l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k
t h e c i r c u i t and exploded t h e whole charge. Four men were i n j u r e d .
***
On November 7, 1911, a t Miraflores Locks, Canal Zone, l i g h t -
ning s e t off 12 35-foot h o l e s , i n which were 1,100 pounds of 60-
percent s t r a i g h t n i t r o g l y c e r i n d--mite. E l e c t r i c d e t o n a t o r s were
i n place i n t h e holes b u t t h e l e g s had 'not been connected t o t h e
l e a d i n g w i r e . The evidence i s t h a t a l l of t h e holes exploded,
and it i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a number of t h e s e h o l e s were f i r e d by i n -
f l u e n c e from a d j a c e n t h o l e s . A number of men were i n j u r e d b u t no
f a t a l i t i e s resulted.
***
I n June 1913, i n a n open-pit i r o n mine i n t h e United S t a t e s ,
during a thunder s t o m , l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k a bench n e a r 34 charges,
14 of which exploded prematurely. T h i r t y - f o u r charges had been
placed i n chambers which were reached by "gopher" h o l e s . Two
e l e c t r i c d e t o n a t o r s had been placed i n each charge, and t h e m n
were p l a c i n g t h e stemming i n t h e gopher h o l e s , when a s e v e r e
e l e c t r i c a l storm occurred. A number of t h e men took s h e l t e r i n
a n u n f i l l e d "gopher" h o l e . A l i g h t n i n g f l a s h was seen t o s t r i k e
t h e bank near t h e charges, and a b l a s t occurred immediately.
Eighteen men were k i l l e d i n t h i s a c c i d e n t .
***
I n August 1918, i n a n open-pit mine i n t h e TJnited S t a t e s ,
l i g h t n i n g exploded prematurely two "springing" charges, which
contained f i v e s t i c k s of 40 percent dynamite. Each charge con-
t a i n e d a n e l e c t r i c d e t o n a t o r , and t h e l e a d i n g wires were l y i n g
on t h e s u r f a c e . No one was i n j u r e d .
**+
1.c. 7447
A premature explosion of dynamite occurred l a t e t h e afternoon
of Thursday, June 26, 1930, i n t h e S t . Lawrence River about 3 miles
above Brockville, Ontario, which demolished t h e d r i l l boat, John B.
King, and caused t h e death of a t l e a s t 3 1 of t h e 42 men aboard.
Evidence i s t h a t t h f s premature explosion was caused by l i g h t n i n g .

The boat was equipped with 12 d r i l l s s e t 1 0 feet a p a r t and

was capable of d r i l l i n g holes 1 0 inches i n diameter and 30 f e e t
deep. Four rows of holes had been d r i l l e d and charged. Presumably
t h e s e rows were about 1 0 f e e t a p a r t . It was estimated t h a t t h e 48
holes contained somewhat l e s s t h a n 12 t o n s of dynamite. The
charges were t o have been f i r e d w i t h e l e c t r i c detonators and t h e
primers were placed i n most, perhaps a l l of t h e h o l e s . The l e g s
of t h e e l e c t r i c detonators had been connected t o g e t h e r presumably
t h i s means connected i n s e r i e s - b u t t h e d r i l l b o a t had not been
-
moved t o a s a f e l o c a t i o n b u t was d i r e c t l y a t t h e edge of o r per-
haps over t h e b l a s t l o c a t i o n . For such subaqueous b l a s t i n g s p e c i a l
waterproof e l e c t r i c detonators w i t h enameled copper l e g s a r e com-
monly used and it i s t o be presumed t h a t t h i s was t h e t y p e that
was used here.

P r i o r t o t h e explosion r a i n accompanied by severe thunder and

l i g h t n i n g had been observed. Lightning was observed s t r i k i n g ' t h e
d r i l l b o a t , John B. King, by Capt. G. B. Lox, i n command of t h e
United S t a t e s C u t t e r CG. 211, and by o t h e r s . Coast Guard men from
t h i s c u t t e r rescued 1 0 of t h e 11 s u r v i v o r s .

This d i s a s t e r c a l l s a t t e m t i o n t o t h e hazards of l i g h t n i n g
where e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g i s employed and e s p e c i a l l y where t h e charge
i s placed i n p a r t o r whole sometime b e f o r e it i s f i r e d .

I n t h e case of t h e Brockville, Ontario, explosion, it i s not

known whether t h e l e g s of t h e e l e c t r i c detonators o r t h e s h o t -
f i r i n g c i r c u i t were e l e c t r i c a l l y s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d by t w i s t i n g t h e
wires o r otherwise, b u t i n t h e o t h e r cases mentioned, it i s r e a -
sonably c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s was not done i n any case. This would
be a wise p r e c a u t i o n t o t a k e i n any event, though t h e degree of
p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d by it cannot now be d e f i n i t e l y s t a t e d .

Notable f e a t u r e s of t h i s premature explosion a r e t h e f a c t

that it was t h e custon of t h i s d r i l l b o a t t o b r i n g t h e explosive
f o r charging i n t h e holes t o t h e d r i l l boat immediately b e f o r e
charging and i n t h i s case it appears t h a t but l i t t l e o r no ex-
p l o s i v e was on t h e d r i l l boat a t t h e time of t h e explosion. That
11 s u r v i v o r s were rescued was due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e United
S t a t e s C u t t e r CG. 211 w a s nearby; a f l a s h of l i g h t n i n g aras ob-
served from it, as was t h e explosion, whereupon it proceeded
promptly t o t h e s i t e and s t a r t e d t h e rescue operations w i t h i n
about 3 minutes.
* * .*
 I.C. 7447
The S l i v e r mine i n S t . Louis County, Minn. was f i r s t developed
a s a n underground p r o p e r t y i n 1908 b u t l a t e r a s an open-cut by r e -
moving 40 t o 60 f e e t of g l a c i a l d r i f t . The major o r e body extended
i n a n e a s t t o westernly d i r e c t i o n . The ma,jor p o r t i o n of t h e steam
shovel o p e r a t i o n s had been conducted i n t h e south p o r t i o n of t h e
open-cut l e a v i n g a bank of o r e on t h e n o r t h shore l i n e approximately
500 t o 600 f e e t long, 40 f e e t high, and 100 f e e t wide. Old s u b l e v e l
d r i f t s from t h e underground o p e r a t i o n s extended from e a s t t o west i n
t h e b3nk, and during 1918, it was decided t o d r i v e c r o s s c u t s t o t h e
shore l i n e i n an attempt t o mine t h e o r e and s t o c k p i l e it i n t h e p i t
f o r l a t e r loading by steam shovel, This attempt was unsuccessful and
it vas t h e n decided t o b l a s t t h e e n t i r e bank i n one o p e r a t i o n b y
d r i v i n g coyote holes and d r i f t , t h e n load t h e o r e by t h e steam
shovels.

Timbered coyote holes were d r i v e n 50 t o 60 f e e t i n t o t h e bank

a t 50-foot i n t e r v a l s about 5 t o 7 f e e t above t h e open-cut bottom.
D r i f t s were d r i v e n i n a n e a s t t o westernly d i r e c t i o n , connecting
up a l l t h e coyote c r o s s c u t s . A f t e r t h e d r i f t s were completed, a
h a l f c a r l o a d of g r a n u l a r b l a c k b l a s t i n g powder and 45 percent
dynamite were d i s t r i b u t e d throughout t h e d r i f t s . Primers c o n s i s t i n g
of e l e c t r i c d e t o n a t o r s and 45 percent dynamite were placed i n each
charge and t h e wires were extended t o t h e coyote hole openings.
Stemming c o n s i s t i n g of o r e m a t e r i a l s i n bags was p i l e d a s c l o s e t o
t h e explosives a s p o s s i b l e and t h e coyote holes were packed with
loose ore.

The work was almost completed on Thuro -day, June 27, 1918, and
it was decided t o f i r e t h e b l a s t on t h e following Sunday, when ad-
jacent rnfnes would be i d l e .

An e l e c t r i c a l storm passed over t h e mine about 10 a.m. on

June 27, 1918, and t h e heavy r a i n dccompanying it caused t h e open-
c u t o p e r a t i o n t o be stopped; however, 13 men engaged i n p l a c i n g
stemming i n t h e coyote holes continued working during t h e storm.
A shovel crew of s i x men sought s h e l t e r i n a n o l d timbered d r i f t
i n t h e e a s t end of t h e a r e a which was t o be b l a s t e d ; t h i s d r i f t
i n t e r s e c t e d t h e open-cut bottom and extended i n t o t h e bank f o r
60 t o 70 f e e t .

Eye witnesses a r e s a i d t o have t e s t i f i e d t h a t l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k

t h e mine, and a t e r r i f i c c r a s h was heard when suddenly t h e o r e bank
seemed t o open and s l i d e away from t h e n o r t h shore l i n e caving a l l
openings.

Rescue work was s t a r t e d immediately, b u t of t h e 19 men i n t h e

d r i f t and coyote h o l e s , only 1 was saved and t h e o t h e r 18 l o s t
t h e i r l i v e s . The company haa a complete map of a l l coyote holes
b u t it w a s of l i t t l e value due t o t h e s h i f t i n g and s l i d i n g of t h e
bank.
***
I.C. 7447

We experienced two premature expios i o n s i n our limestone mines

..
a t Mullins, Ky., which were a t t r i b u t e d to- l i g h t n i n g . * .

I n both i n s t a n c e s we were dropping t h e roof; g e t t i n g back upon

t h e rock p i l e and d r i l l i n g u n t i l we were unable, on account of t h e
closeness of t h e rock p i l e t o ' t h e r o o f , t o do s o .

'In the' f i r s t i n s t a n c e some s i x o r e i g h t h o l e s had.been-loaded

when Anderspn,. t h e foreman i n charge, was n o t i f i e d t h a t an elec--
t k i c a l .storm was t a k i n g place Anderson immedzately stcpped load-
in$ and; t o g e t h e r with h i s crew, came out of t h e mine. The w i r e s "
from s e v e r a l h o l e s had not been connected, but l e f t hanging out
l o o s e . ' S h o ~ t l ya f t e r 'Anderson and h i s crew got o u t s i d e , a keen
c l a p of thunder was heard, and l i g h t n i n g appeared t o s t r i k e n e a r
t h e t o p of t h e h i l l under which our mine i s l o c a t e d . Immediately
t h e r e a f t e -r ; ' an' exp1.0sion was heard i n t h e mine. A f t e r t h e stbrm
d

subsi'ded, i n v e s t i g a t i o n was made, and it was found t h a t s i x holes

had been discharged. Since it was damp a t the p o i n t t h e h o l e s
were d r i l l e d , some Surface water dripping through, I b e l i e v e the' ',
e l e c t r i c i t y whlch caused t h e detoriation of t h e caps was conducted '' ' .
by water.

I n t h e second case t h e circumstances were i d e n t i c a l with t h e '

f i r s t i n s t a n c e , except t h a t a t t h e t i n e Anderson vas advised of

a n e l e c t r i c a l storm t a k i n g p l a c e o u t s i d e , he had connected up h i s
holes and a t t a c h e d h i s l e a d l i n e . As Anderson and h i s crew came
out of t h e mine, he ( ~ n d e r s o n )urireeled t h e l e a d l i n e and l e f t
t h e unreeled p o r t i o n of t h e l e a d l i n e adjacent t o a 4-inch pipe,
i n f a c t a g a i n s t i t . This 4-inch pipe l i n e was a n a i r l i n e coming
from ourfcompressor and exposed t o t h e weather. S h o r t l y a f t e r
Anderson and h i s crew came out of t h e mine t h e r e was considerable
thunder accompanied by s h e e t l i g h t n i n g , and t h e loaded holes were
a l l discharged. The pipe l i n e , i n t h i s case, w a s unquestionably
t h e conductor, t h e r e being enough e l e c t r i c a l energy i n t h e a i r t o
detonate t h e E . B. caps. The J i g h t n i n g d i d not appear t o s t r i k e
i n t h i s case, b u t t h e whole atnlosphere was charged. ..
Y * *
~ h k"Explosives Engineer" of October 1933, page 294, gives a n . '

account c f a premature f i r i n g of 16 o u t of 36 holes i n a n underground

l i n e s t o n e mine of t h e Washington Building Lime Cc., Bakerstown,
J e f f e r s o n County, W. Va. The account s t a t e s t h a t t h e men had charged
36 holes and were some d i s t a n c e from t h e s u r f a c e , t h a t t h e f i r i n g
l i n e s were a l l ' d i s c o n n e c t e d , and t h e cause of t h e premature b l a s t i s
attributed t o lightning.
***
E a r l y i n t h e season, bush f i r e s threatened t o do much damage i n
northwestern Quebec, b u t l a r g e crsws;and a heavy r a i n checked t h e
b l a z e s i n time. The OrBrien rhine a t Cadfllac was shut down f o r a day
because of t h e nearness of fclre and i n Joadnes Township, near Rouyn,
200 f i r e f i g h t e r s succeeded i n q u e l l i n g t h e f i r s t "green bush" f i r e
of t h e year.
 I.C. 7447

The same storm t h a t helped t o put o u t t h e f i r e s was responsi-

b l e f o r t h e l o s s of t h r e e minersf l i v e s a t t h e bottom of Sladen
M a l a r t i c ' s s h a f t , t h e n a t a depth of 700 f e e t . It was t h e t h i r d
time a supercharged atmosphere had s e t o f f a n e l e c t r i c b l a s t p r e -
m t u r e l y i n northwestern Quebec, although it has never happened
i n nearby Q n t a r i o mines where no ot$er precautions a r e taken,
Holes f o r t h e "squere-up" round iri t h e s h a f t - s i n k i n g o p e r a t i o n had
been completed, and a l l b u t t h e b l a s t i n g crew of t h r e e had been
taken up. Loading was completed, and t h e e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g caps
had been connected, F i f t y f e e t above, on t h e s a f e t y bulkhead,
t h e c i r c u i t was broken. On t h e TOO-foot l e v e l , t h e c i r c u i t was
broken i n two p l a c e s , one of them a locked switch t o which o n l y
t h e c h i e f b l a s t e r had a key, The men were j ~ i s tready t o come up
i n t h e bucket when a f l a s h of l i g h t n i n g crossed overhead, a t l e a s t
50 f e e t from t h e headframe. The charge a t t h e s h a f t bottom went
Two d i e d i n s t a n t l y and t h e t h i r d man l i v e d 20
minutes .:!
***
Lightning Explodes Dynamite 4,000 Feet Below Ground

- Johannesburg, December 13. - Eight n a t i v e mine workers were

k i l l e d i n a Rand mine December 12, 1937, when l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k a
b e l l w i r e on t h e headgear of t h e C e n t r a l S h a f t and detonated 11
dynamite charges 4,000 f e e t underground. The men were i n a p a r t y
of 15, preparing dynamite charges under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n ' o f two
Europeans. Four o t h e r n a t i v e s were s e r i o u s l y i q i u r e d . One of t h e
Europeans, 1W. J . J. P. P r e t o r i o u s , was saved from s e r i o u s i n j u r y
and perhaps death, by t h e a c t i o n of a r e l a t i v e , who p ~ s h e dhim
a s i d e i n t h e f i r s t e x p l o s i o n , The mine i s owned by E a s t Rand
P r o p r i e t a r y Mines Ltd.5/
***
I n t h e summer of 1929 i n t h e Machusett-Coldbrook Tunnel i n
Massachusetts, a f t e r a round had been charged and t h e men had
l e f t , and while b o t h s a f e t y switches were open, l i g h t n i n g which
accompanied a thunder storm on t h e s u r f a c e , s t r u c k t h e s h o t - f i r i n g
l i n e , followed it down t h e 411-foot s h a f t and toward t h e f a c e of
t h e t u n n e l about 1 mile d i s t a n t , ,jumped a c r o s s both of t h e open
switches, and f i r e d t h e s h o t . Nobody was in,jured. Subsequent t o
t h i s occurrence e i g h t - f o o t gaps were introduced i n t o t h e s h o t -
f i r i n g l i n e a s a p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t premature explosion from
lightning.
***
A f i r e completely destroyed a f a n i n s t a l l a t i o n about 3:30 a.m.
on August 8, 1944, a t t h e Carbon No. 3 mine, Carbon F u e l Co j Carbon, .
W e Va. An e l e c t r i c a l r a i n storm was raging during t h e afore-mentioned
d a t e , and it i s t h e opinion of t h e rranagement t h a t t h e f i r e was

-7/ T h i s item was taken from t h e Canadian Mining J o u r n a l . July 1938, v o l e 59,
NO. 7, P * 407.
-8/ Mining J o u r n a l o on don) v o l . 199, No. 5339, Dec. 18, 1737, P. 1124.
I.C. 7447

caused by l i g h t n i n g s t r i k i n g c l c ~ s et o t h e f a n . The f i r e penetrated

i n t o t h e mine workings f o r a n a p p r o x i r a t e d i s t a n c e of 200 f e e t i n
t h e Nos. 1 and 2 e a s t e n t r i e s off t h e P a i n t Creek s i d e . There were
no men working underground a t t h e time of t h e f i r e .

The following item was taken from t h e C z l i f o r n i a S a f e t y News, vol. 23,

No. 1, 1939, page 11:

A storm caused t h r e e miners t o l o s e t h e i r l i v e s . The men were

loading holes a t t h e bottom of a s h a f t , using e l e c t r i c caps. The
caps had been connected t o t h e b l a s t i n g c i r c u i t , but t h e c i r c u i t was
not closed. I n f a c t , it was open i n t h r e e places, one of them n
locked s a f e t y switch. J u s t as t h e men werc ready t o come up, a
l i g h t n i n g f l a s h crossed overhead,'50 f e e t o r more from t h e head-
freme; b u t t h e e n t i r e charge i n t h e s h a f t was i n s t a n t l y s e t o f f .

Rule 21: of t h e Rules prepared by -the I n s t i t u t e of Makers of

Explosi~ressays: "Don't connect up c r Load boreholes f o r e l e c t r i c
f i r i n g during t h e appraach o r progress c f a thunder storm, and i f
charges e r e a l r e a d y loaded and connected, a l l persons should be
kept a t a s a f e distailce from them while t h e storm is i n p o g r e s s .
If necessary t o leave overnight, ends of t h e \.ires should be
t w i s t e d t o g e t h e r , c o i l e d and covered with d i r t . "

A chief mine i n s p e c t o r wrote ( i n pa.rt):

A t t h e B e a t t i e mine, a number of holes :<ere loaded and ready

t o f i r e i n t h e oFen p i t . They were f i r e d b y ' l i g h t n i n g , b u t no one
was i n j u r e d . I n t h i s case, d r i l l i n g i s done on d a y - s h i f t , t h e
holes a r e loaded with e l e c t r i c primers i n t h e evening, and t h e
b l a s t i n g i s c a r r i e d out a t daybreak t h e next morning. The b l a s t
was f i r e d by lightning i n t h e middle of t h e n i g h t , and no one xas
i n t h e v i c i n i t y . Necr North Bay, Ontario, i n t h e course of some
constructisn.work, rnen narrowly escaped s e r i o u s in-jury when l i g h t -
ning s e t o f f a row of primed h o l e s .

I b e l i e v e t h a t our o p e r a t o r s a r e very c a r e f u l t o avoid t h e

.connecting up of e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g wires in a stono, 3 u t i n two
f a t a l a c c i d e n t s which have occurred i n t h i s d i s t r i c t as a r e s u l t
of induced c u r r e n t s caused by l i g h t n i n g , no one had previous c o t i c e
t h a t a storm was i m ~ i n e n t . I n both c s s e s , t h e sky was cloudy, and
it had r a i n e d to some e x t e n t , b u t t h e sudden l i g h t n i n g discharges
cane without werning. This evidgnce was checked with t h e power
corr.pariyfs s u b s t a t i o n records, and a s you know, t h e i r instruments
record even minor surges.

There i s very strong evidence t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e induced

charges were l e d underground by t h e h o i s t i n g c a b l e s . A cable
s t r e t c h i n g from t h e drum of a h o i s t over t h e head sheave o f f e r s an
i d e a l c o l l e c t o r , i . e . , condenser, as it i s not grounded t o unlim;
i t e d capacity. Also, i n case of a nearby discharge, it would pick
up s t r a y c u r r e n t s by induction and t r a n s a i t o r c r e a t e secondary
 I.C. 7447
induced c u r r e n t s i n p a r a l l e l conductors. I n view of t h e many and
severe storms i n t h i s d i s t r i c t , I favour t h e following p r a c t i c e :

When t h e explosi.ves and e l e ~ t r i c ~ p r i m e have rs been d e l i v e r e d

t o t h e s h a f t bottom, t h e bucket s h a l l be rung up t o t h e b l a s t i n g
s e t . The men w i l l then load t h e h o l e s , and connect-up t h e wires
between h o l e s . When completed, t h e y w i l l ascend t o t h e b l a s t i n g
s e t v i a t h e l a d d e r , t h e l a s t man unreeling t h e l e a d wires.. , m e n
t h e y reach t h e b l a s t i n g s e t , t h e y w i l l t e s t t h e i r c i r c u i t , and
connect up t o ' t h e b l a s t i n g wires a s . i n ordinary p r a c t i c e . If a
chain l a d d e r i s used, it would be advisable t o hang t h i s l a a d e r ,
i n a p a r t of t h e s h a f t . a s f a r as p o s s i b l e from t h e h o i s t i G , CO*
' * .
partment and t h e blast'ing wires ; a wooden l a d d e r would b'e
preferable .
The suggestion contained. i n the a b m e paragraph wo,uJd, I be-
l i e v e e l i m i n a t e t h e danger from unexpected l i g h t n i n g discharges.
Cf course, handling b l a s t i n g caps during an e l e c t r i c a l storm i s .
c l e a r l y dangerous.
***
The d e t a i l s of t h i s Shenango incidRnt were a s follows: Four
"jump" holes had been d r i l l e d i n an o r e bank ahead of a shovel f o r
t h e purpose of b l a s t i n g t h e c r e . These holes were about 30 f e e t
'deep. The b l a s t e r s had placed one s t i c k of dynamite w i t h a n e l e c -
t r i c b l a s t i n g cap a t t a c h e d i n each hole, which was t h e customary
p r a c t i c e a t t h a t time i n "blowing out" t h e holes preliminary t o
placing t h e r e g u l a r charge of powder used i n b l a s t i n g t h e o r e .

These f o u r holes were not wired t o g e t h e r . The ends of t h e

b l a s t i n g wires were l y i n g upon t h e ground under a rock a t t h e
c o l l a r of each h o l e . The ends were not t w i s t e d t o € e t h e r , which
i s bur p r a c t i c e today i n o r d e r t o c l o s e t h e c i r c u i t 2nd guard
a g a i n s t s t r a y c u r r e n t s and premature explosions ,

While t h e holes were thus charged with one s t i c k of dynamite

each, a n e l e c t r i c a l storm came up during which t h e b l a s t e r s and
o t h e r s i n t h e p i t sought s h e l t e r from t h e r a i n . When t h e men r e -
turned t o t h e h o l e s t h e y discovered t h a t a l l f o u r s t i c k s of dyna-
mite had been discharged, presumably by l i g h t n i n g , although no
one heard any d e f i n i t e r e p o r t . No one noted t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r
f l a s h of l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k i n t h e or?:; n i t , b u t t h e r e was much
l i g h t n i n g accompanying t h e s t o m . )J.) one was i n j u r e d .

We a r e unable t o f i n d any otFe2 i ~ s t a n c eof premature b l a s t s

a t c u r p r o p e r t i e s due t o lightnimg. It i s t h e general r u l e today
c o t t o charge holes during a n e l e c t r i c a l storm.

With ~ o r d e a uf u s e t h i s danger of b l a s t s being s e t off by

l i g h t n i n g i s minimized s i n c e no e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g cap i s a t t a c h e d
t o t h e f u s e u n t i l immed5ately b e f o r e t h e b l a s t , a n d ' t h i s i s not
done if t h e weather i s stormy. In o r d i n a r y e l e c t r i c b l a s t i n g t h e
ends of copper l e a d wires a r e always kept t w i s t e d t o g e t h e r - u n t i l .
I.C. 7447
t h e b l a s t i s ready t o be set o f f , i n order t o guard a g a i n s t s t r a y
currents .
*+*
Replying t o your l e t t e r of August 10, wauld advise t h a t we
have had no accident, experZence with reference t o l i g h t n i n g s e t t i n g
off b l a s t s prematurely a t our operations a t C a l c i t e . We do, how-
ever, discontinue a l l loading and t h e handling of dynamite during
e l e c t r i c a l storms.

When I was i n Tennessee i p charge of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e

o r i g i n a l dsm on t h e Ocoee River, we d i d have two b l a s t s i n connec-
t i o n with our operations t h e r e which were s e t o f f by 15ghtning.
Fortunately, i n t h e f i r s t case, none vere in.jured, b u t i n t h e
second case two men were very serio!.~sLy i n j u r e d .

I n t h i s case t h e connecting wires had been d i s t r i b u t e d on

t h e ground and connected t o a few of t h e h o l e s . Tney accumulated
from t h 5 ground s u f f i c i e n t c u r r e n t tcr explode t h e dynamite.

. P.o:<cihly t h e s e expcrienccs have j u s t i f is6 the very d r e s t i c

rule's mhich we have i n use here t o prevent tne recurrence of t h e s e
ackidents.

The following reference regarding prem3ture b l a s t s whlcll wece

a t t r i b u t e d t o lightning may be of i n t e r e s t t o you:

The danger of charges primed with e l e c t r i c detonators being

f i r e d by l i g h t n i n g during a thunderstorm i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by
an accident (78) which occurred a t t h e Galloway Water Power Scheme,
Kirkcudbright. From tine evidence it would appear t h a t charges
amounting t o 90 l b s . of G e l i g n i t e had been prepared and >rimed
i n t h e f a c e of a tunnel 1,000 yards awsy from t'ne entrance, when,
w h i l s t t h e men were r e t u r n i n g t o t h e f i r i n g b a t t e r y , t h e charges
suddenly exploded. A t t h e time a severe thunderstorm raging,
and it i s b e l i e v e d t h a t l i g h t n i n g f i r e d the charges. A t t h e same
moment a man, vho 'was standing a t t h e entrance of t h e t u m e l with
spanner i n h i s hand, received s shock which wrenched t h e spanner
frcm h i s hand and caused i m t o f a l l . Eight men were i n j u r e d a s a
r e s u l t of t h i s accident

The chief coal-mine i n s p e c t o r of t h e Province of V i c t o r i a , Canada, wrote,

i n p a r t , on ~ u l g21, 1938:

On J u l y 5th, 1938, an explosion occurred i n "B" mine, Michel

C o l l i e r y , i n t h e solltheastern p a r t of t h i s Province, and caused
t h e death of t h r e e men.

This c o l l i e r y i s s i t u a t e d i n t h e Rocky Elountains, a t a n e l e -

v a t i o n of 4,000 f e e t , and i.s l o c a t e d i n a narrow v a l l e y above which
t h e surrounding mountains r i s e s e v e r a l thousand f e e t .

H i s Majesty's Inspec-cors of Explosiv6s: F i f t y - e i g h t h Rnnual Report, 1933,

p. 20.
 I.C. 7447

The measures a r e i n c l i n e d from lo0 t o 30' and o u t c r o p on t h e

mountain above t h e mine which have been developed by means of a
cross-measure a d l t d r i f t and a t p r e s e n t f o u r m i n e s r a r e i n opera-
t i o n , i n s e p a r a t e seams, and may be considered a s e n t i r e l y ' s e p a r a t e
mines except t h a t t h e i r r e t u r n s a l l j o i n one common main r e t u r n t o
t h e fan; I

I The i n t a k e of "B" mine i s a t t h e outcrop on t h e mountains.ide

a t a n e l e v a t i o n of 600 . f e e t above main a d i t d r i f t 'and a t ' a ' p o i n t
some 4,.000 f e e t , by course of sir, from t h e mamain r e t u r n .
. h

The "B" seam i s 5 f e e t t h i c k and i s a l l c l e a n c o a l ; t h e system

of minirig i s t o develop l a r g e p i l l a r s t o a p r e d e t e r m i n e d 4 i n e and ,
recover t h e ' p i l l a r s by a r e t r e a t i n g longwall method. A l l t h e c o d
i s machine-.cut and conveyed t o t h e c a r s on t h e main haulage'eoadk:
.
This seam i s q u i t e dusty, b u t a l l t h e workings a r e w e l l
t r e a t e d w i t h lime d u s t , and t h e r e t u r n a i r from t h i s "B" mine
shows, by a n a l y s e s , v a r i o u s l y from 1 percent t o 1.25 percent k~~
content and it i s very seldom t h a t CHq i s d e t e c t e d by flame s a f e t ?
l a n p t e s t s i n t h e working p a r t s of t h e mine.

On t h e day of t h e explosion o n l y some 17 men were underground,

a s it was a n " l d l e " day; t h e s e men were engaged i n r e p a i r s , moving
machinery, e t c . , and were d i s t r i b u t e d a s follows: 5 i n "B" mine,
6 i n No. 3 mine, 2 i n t h e main r e t u r n and 4 on t h e main a d i t t u n n e l .
'
~ p p r o x i m a t e l50
~ men a r e employed on d a y s h i f t i n "B!' mine,
which produces 500 t o n s p e r day, and it i s beyond doubt t h a t had
t h i s explosion occurred during a working day m n y , i f n o t a l l , of
t h e s e men would have been k i l l e d .

A t t h e time of t h e explosion (1:40 p.m. ) t h e r e was a n i n t e n s e

l i g h t n i n g storm, and some witnesses who were engaged on c o n s t r u c t i o n
work o u t s i d e t h e mine r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y had seen a l i g h t n i n g d i s -
charge s t r i k e t h e immediate v i c i n i t y of t h e i n t a k e p o r t a l of "B"
mine and r a i s e a cloud of smoke; o t h e r men who were working c l o s e t o
t h e p o r t a l of t h e maln tunnels were a f f e c t e d by l i g h t n i n g a t t h e
same i n s t a n t. *

There was no knowle'dge of a n explosion a t t h i s t h e , b u t t h e

above phenomena r a i s e d a n alarm and on i n v e s t i g a t i o n it was discov-
e r e d t h a t an explosion had occurred i n "B" mine.

A t t h e same time t h r e e men working a t d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n No.

3 mine r e p o r t e d t o t h e i r f i r e b o s s t h a t t h e y had seen f l a s h e s of
l i g h t running along t h e r a i l s and making a moise l i k e f i r e c r a c k e r s ;
one man on a n i n c l i n e s t a t e d t h a t he saw a l i g h t t r a v e l i n g up one
r a i l f o r a d i s t a n c e of 250 f e e t towards him and appeared t o d i e
o u t 15 f e e t p a s t him. None of t h e s e men experienced anything i n
t h e n a t u r e of a n e l e c t r i c shock, b u t a n o t h e r man who was working
on a +inch p i p e l i n e d i d s u f f e r a &hock. (I may s a y t h a t t h e r e '
 * 9

1.2. 7447

i s no e l e c t r i c a l equipment, with t h e exception of telephone and

s i g n a l bell's; underground i n t h e C o l l i e r y . )

Unquestionably, t h e experience o f t h e petroleum i n d u s t r y Gith l i g h t n i n g

has been more expensive t h a n t h a t of t h e o t b e r mineral i n d u s t r i e s . I n May
1939 a paper e n t i t l e d "Possible E f f e c t of Lightning on Underground Pipe Lines"
was presented a t t h e Annual Meeting of t h e American Gas Association and it
appeared in' t h e June 1939 i s s u e of Pipe Line News. The following paragraphs
were taken from t h e paper:

On August 20, 1938, our company experienced a major p i p e - l i n e

break. The c i r c m s t a n c e s under which t h e break occurred and t h e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e pipe rupture d i d not combine t o provide a n
acceptable s o l u t i o n of t h e exact cause o r causes which actuated
t h e break.

The weather condit-ions durixg t h e month of August w i l l be

b r i e f l y described, s h c e it i s e n t i r e l y reasonable t o assume t h a t
t h e y may have had some influence, perhaps a n important one, on
what a c t u a l l y occurred. .

The f i r s t f o u r days of August were c l e a r t o p a r t l y cloudy

with temperatures i n t h e middle n i n e t i e s . There was r a i n on t h e
next t h r e e days rangi-ng i n d a i l y amounts from 0.05 lnch t o 1.18
.inches. This period vas followed by 7 days of f a i r and warm sum-
mer weather. On t h e 15th; a r a i n f a l l of 1.58 inches was recorded
and on t h e following day a l i g h t shower. The next 3 days were
f a i r and warm. On August 20, t h e day of t h e break, t h e weather
bureau recorded a r a i ~ f a l of l 2.83 inches. It i s of s p e c i a l s i g -
n i f i c a n c e t o note, according t o a farmer who l i v e d nearby, t h a t a
severe s t r o k e of l i g h t n i n g occurred simultaneously with t h e pipe-
l i n e rupture. . .

The break occurred i n western Iowa, about 7 miles northwest .

of Bed Oak and 7.4 miles e a s t of our n e a r e s t compressor s t a t i o n .
The country i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e break i s g l a c i a l d r i f t known
as. upland - i n general, a g e n t l y undulating plan. The h i l l s
throughout t h e upland a r e smooth and rounded. The slopes a r e
gradual and uniform and t h e landscape has a r o l l i n g appearance.
The pipe rupture occurred on t h e t o p of one of t h e s e h i l l s . The
immediate f i e l d was under corn c u l t i v a t i o n .

Probably more important t h a n weather conditions surrounding

a - b r e a k su-cki a s t h a t with which we a r e concerned, a r e t h e d e t a i l e d
f a c t s of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n gf t h e l i n e , t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e rupture,
and o t h e r contingent c i r c u m t a n c e s .
.-
When t h e 24-inch l i n o w a s l a i d i n 1931, t h e composite type of
c o n s t r u c t i o n was used; t h a t i s , two o r t h r e e 33-foot j o i n t s of pipe
were welded t o g e t h e r t o form 8 solid.weldea s e c t i o n . These s e c t i o n s
 I.C. 7447
were joined by a . D p s s e r - t y p e coupling. The t r e n c h was excavated
t o a nominal width of 32 indhes and a minimum depth of 5 f e e t ,
which provided a minim-im cover of 3 f e e t .

The pipe was completely severed by t h e r u p t u r e . The r e a c t i o n

which immediately followed t h e i n i t i a l f o r c e contained s u f f i c i e n t
energy t o t u r n a 39-foot piece of t h e pipe s e c t i o n end f o r end.
This pipe came t o r e s t about 30 f e e t from i t s o r i g i n a l l o c a t i o n
i n t h e pipe l i n e . The remaining s e c t i o n of t h e pipe came t o r e s t
approximately 125 f e e t from i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h e l i n e . T h i s piece
of pipe contained t h e 8 O overbend.

I n a ~ m ~ ca hs a severe s t r o k e of l i g h t n i n g was r e p o r t e d t o have

occurred simultaneously with t h e p i p e - l i n e break, it was decided
t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s of l i g h t n i n g a s an i n f l u e n c i n g
factor. I) I

Our f i r s t e f f o r t s i n t h i s regard were d i r e c t e d toward a

s e a r c h on a r t i c l e s o r d i s c u s s i o n s on t h e s u b j e c t of l i g h t n i n g
and i t s c o n t r i b u t i n g influence on p i p e - l i n e f a i l u r e s . I n q u i r i e s
were d i r e c t e d t o t h o s e c r e t a r i e s of t h e American Gas Association
and t h e American Petroleurn I n s t i t u t e . The I n d u s t r i a l A r t s Index
was a l s o reviewed. We found t h r e e s p e c i f i , ~c i t a t i o n s with d i r e c t
b e a r i n g on t h e s u b j e c t . The following w i l l b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e each
incident.

M r . Fred M. Goodwin, v i c e - p r e s i d e n t of D i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e
Boston Consolidated Gas Co., has r e l a t e d an experience which oc-
curred i n Boston i n September 1903. This i n c i d e n t was r e p o r t e d
i n a l e t t e r dated September 27, 1938, t o t h e American Gas Associa-
t i o n . The c o n s t r u c t i o n of a 24-inch main had been completed b u t
had not been placed i n s e r v i c e . A 24-inch g a t e valve had been
i n s t a l l e d a t t h e p o i n t of connection with t h e e x i s t i n g system.
o r t h r e e days following t h e completion of t h e l i n e t h e r e was
a severe thunder storm, during which l i g h t n i n g s t r u c k a d r i p
stem; t h i s r e s u l t e d i n blowing f i v e ler.yths of 24-inch pipe out
of t h e t r e n c h . The s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e 24-inch g a t e valve
d i d not make a t i g h t s h u t - o f f , which permitted a leakage of gas
i n t o t h e newly completed s e c t i o n . A g a s - a i r mixture was thus
formed which was i g n i t e d by t h e l i g h t n i n g and r e s u l t e d i n t h e
explosion.

The i s s u e of t h e Gas-Age Record d a t e d August 30, 1324, con-

t a i n s a n a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Lightning Destroys a New 20-inch Gas
Main." The f a i l u r e occurred on t h e n i g h t of A u y s t 6, 1924, a t
Worcester, Mass., during a t e r r i f i c e l e c t r i c a l storm. It was
d e f i n i t e l y determined t h a t l i g h t n i n g had s t r u c k one o r more times
i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e newly completed 20-inch c a s t - i r o n main and
t h a t 60 f e e t of t h e 20-inch pipe were damaged. The c a s t - i r o n pipe
was completely s h a t t e r e d and gave t h e appearance of having been
s t r u c k by a l a r g e stone breaker o r steam hammer. The main had not
been placed i n s e r v i c e and was supposed t o c o n t a i n only a i r , with
 . .
I.C. 74k7

p o s s i b l y some water. The $ r t i c l e s t a t e s t h g t f o u r thedrYes were

advanced as t o what might have csused t h e pipe..to rupture. F i r s t ,
t h e l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e near t h e pi2e nay have caused a p a r t i a l , v a c -
u r n around t h e p i p e j causing i n t e r n a l a i r pressure t o ru2tui-e t h e
p i p e . Second, if t h e lLghtning s t r u c k d i r e c t l y o y e r t h e yipe and
passed through, it m y have caused t h e eir i n t h e pipe t o expand,
and t h e ex?anded' a i r may have caused t h e failure.' Third, t h e plpe
was l a i d on a slope, and moisture and water could have accumula'ied
i n t h e lower end of t h e pipe. A b o l t of l i g h t n i n g m y have con-
v e r t e d t h e ~ t e i rn t o steam and t h e r e s u l t i n g p,ressure may have
been s u f f i c i e n t t o rupture t h e pipe. The f o u r t h theory was t h a t
m e 'pipe could have contained an explosive rpixture which was i g -
nited'by the lightning.

An i s s u e of t h e Kansas C i t y Power & Light Co.'s house organ,

"Public Service," contains an ai",cle e n t i t l e d "Lightning Puts -
Transmission Line 011t. of Comnission," w r i t t e n by M r . D. P. Hartson,
operating -mnager, P i t t s b u r g h & West V i r g i c i a Gas Co. and Equitable
Gas C a . The a r t i c l e s t a t e s t h a t on Yfrch 13., 1933, i f g h t n i n g .
s t r u c k a &inch gas t r a n s m i s s i ~ nl i n e carrying a p e s s u r e p f ap-
proximately 140 younds p e r sq;l.are inch. The l i n e was i n s t a l l e d
ovel' an unusually high r i d g e of ground - t h e second highest dn
t h a t v i c i n i t y . The l i n e had a cover of 2-1/2 f e e t and had been
r e l a i d i n October 1932; t h e r e f o r e , t h e bitc'h mdoubtedly was 'com-
p a r a t i v e l y s o f t . A telephone l i n e p a r a l l e l e d t h e 3ige l i n e , and
a t t h e wj.nt where t h e pipe was ruptured t h e r e was a guy wire
which came within 2 f e e t of t i e pipe. A jagged holc approximately
10 inches 3y 18 inches, ~ t t so r n i n t h e pipe. The edges of t h e
hole'were d e f i n i t e l y turned i n , and t h e damaged pipe showed a , p e r -
c e p t i b l e d e f l e c t i o n . There were no evidences of f u s i o n o r of heat
on t h e pipe.

.
Representatives of t h c Duquesne Light Co , t h e ~ e s t i n g h o u s e
E l e c t r i c & M!m.facturing Co., and t h e Genersl E:Lectric CO.-were
zonslllted regarding t h e p a r t l i g h t n i n g m ~ have
~ g contributed toward
t h e pipe r u p t u r e .

M r . C. F. F o r t e s c ~ r e (ciecczsed), C o n s z l t i n , ~Engineer of t h e ,
Westinghouse E l e c t r i c & &nufscturing Co., t o g e t h e r with h i s a s s i s t -
a n t , made a v s r y c a r e f u l study of t h e pipe and o t h e r conditions s u r -
rounding t h e s t r i k e . The s t u d i e s which he made and t h e l conclusions
dram seen t o give ample confirmation of t h e theory t h a t t h ? f a i l u r e
was caused by t h e pressure c r e a t e d by a l i g h t n i n g discharge through
t h e e a r t h and p a r t l y confined by it, The above incfdent i s q u i t e
amlogo?ls t o our own break.

I n a f u r t h e r e f f o r t t o o b t a i n more information on t h e ~henom-

ena of l i g h t n i n g , we consulted a n u b & of t e c h n i c i a n s who were
w e l l q u a l i f i e d t o - d i s c u s s t h i s s u b j c c t . These men were representa-
t i v e s of General E l e c t r i c Co., Westinghouse E l e c t r i c & Manufacturing
Co., Western Railroad Supply, U. ,E. B u r e ~ uof Standards, U. S.
Weather bureau, Amour I n s t i t u t e of Technology, and Kansas City
 I.C. 7447

Power & Light Co. S e v e r a l t h e o r i e s and opinions were advanced a s

t o t h e i n f l u e n c e l i g h t n i n g would have i n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of pipe
t o which we have r e f e r r e d . Some of t h e engineers were of t h e
opinion t h a t it wa8 p o s s i b l e b u t n o t prcbable f o r l i g h t n i n g t o
have s u f f , i c i e n t f o r c e t o r u p t u r e such 9 s t e e l pipe. Others were
of t h e opinion t h a t t h e lightning s t r o k e could have had a c u r r e n t
magnitude of 200,000 t o 250,000 amperes, and s i n c e it would d i s -
s i p a t e i t s e L f i n microseconds of time, it would be s u f f i c i e n t t o
cause d e s t r u c t i v e d i s t i l l a t i o n of t h e c e l l s t r u c t u r e of t h e e a r t h
and t h e r e b y develop enough p r e s s u r e t o d e s t r o y t h e pipe i n a man-
n e r s i m i l a r i n some r e s p e c t i s t o g i e r c i n g t h e pipe with a pro-
jectile.

It may be w e l l t o review a few of t h e phenomena of l i g h t n i n g

and i t s d e s t r u c t i v e f o r c e s . It i s g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t when
l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e s a t r e e , t h e t r e e i s s p l i n t e r e d from t h e i n t e r n a l
p r e s s u r e developed by t h e formation of steam from t h e moisture i n
t h e t r e e . It i s f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e t h a t under t h e high c u r r e n t i n -
t e n s i t y and p o t e n t i a l g r a d i e n t of a l i g h t n i n g charge, some of t h e
m a t e r i a l i t s e l f i s decomposed o r d i s t i l l e d w i t h t h e formation of
gaseous products which develop a high p r e s s u r e .

It i s known t h a t when l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e s a n i n s u l a t e d copper

wire, t h e wire w i l l completely v o l a t i l i z e and disap2ear. There
w i l l be no i n d i c a t i o n of burned o r fused metal. The i n s u l a t i o n
w i l l remain i n t a c t with no appearance of having been heated.

The June 12, 1936, i s s u e of Science c o n t a i n s - a v e r y i n t e r e s t -

i n g r e p o r t of a l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e which occurred near Dodge, Neb.,
on June 24, 1935. The f a m i l i e s who l i v e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y r e p o r t e d
a l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e of e q l o s i v e i n t e n s i t y . A few days l a t e r a hole
was found i n t h e e a r t h i n a corn f i e l d . The h o l e was i n v e s t i g a t e d
and was found t o measure 8 inches i n diameter a t t h e s u r f a c e . The
h o l e extended downward 8 f e e t almost v e r t i c a l l y with a n average d i -
ameter of 8 inches and t h e n became s m a l l e r f o r t h e next 7 f e e t and
v a r i e d somewhat from t h e perpendicular. A t a de?th of 15 f e e t t h e
diameter had been reduced t o about f o u r Inches and t h e main h o l e
branched o u t i n t h r e e d i r e c t i o n s i n t o 2-inch h c l e s which followed
f o r 3 o r 4 f e e t h o r i z o n t a l l y i n t o t h e e a r t h . The c l a y showed s i g n s
of f u s i o n a t a number of p o i n t s , and t h e i n s i d e of t h e h o l e had a
c o r m g a t e d appearance a s though moist c l a y had been f o r c e d v i o l e n t l y
back by high p r e s s u r e . It i s known t h a t when l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e s sand
o r sandy s o i l , fused s e c t i o n s w i l l r e s u l t which a r e known a s l i g h t -
ning tubes o r f u l g n r i t e s . These statements r e p r e s e n t i n t e r e s t i n g
examples of t h e h e a t and a c t i o n of t h e l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e .

The O i l World of ~ e ~ b k m b e1939 r has an e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d F i r e

Prevention, P r o t e c t i o n Development i n t h e C a l i f o r n i a O i l I n d u s t r y (pp. 3-7),
and t h e following paragraphs t a k e n from it i n d i c a t e some of t h e problems of
t h e petroleum i n d u s t r y due t o l i g h t n i n g as w e l l a s o t h e r causes of f i r e :

It t a k e s a s e r i o u s l o s s t o c r e a t e a sense of f u t u r e c a u t i o n .
P r i o r t o 1920 no such l o s s had occurred i n t h e oi.1 ind;lstry on t h e
I.C. 7447

P a c i f i c Coast and because of it no g r e a t amount of thought had been

given e i t h e r t o s c i e n t i f i c f i r e p r o t e c t i o n o r t o any f a r - s i g h t e d
program of f i r e insul-ance. There had been some f i r e s , b u t +,hey had
been i s o l a t e d and had involved n e i t h e r l a r g e va1iz.e~nor g r e a t public
concern. Tiue enough, when chemical f i r e - f i g h t i n g equipment became
a merchantable commodity through t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i c o r i c e a s a
s t a b i l i z e r of chemical foam, t h e P a c i f i c Coast o i l comganies f o l -
lowed t h e l e a d of Standgrd of C a l i f o r n i a i n buying and i n s t a l l i n g
s o l u t i o n systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e i r r e f i n e r j e s and l a r g e t a n k
farms and metropolitan bulk marketing s t a t i o n s . Ddt t h i s w a s s t o p
l o s s defense r a t h e r t h a n f i r e prevention.

During t h e next jrsar, 1924, a group of w~oden-roofed s t e e l o i l

tanks on Monterey Bay was 5gni.ted by E g h t n i n g . This f i r e spread
t o o t h e r o i l p ~ o p e r t i e sand caused a l o s s cf more than a m i l l i o n
d o l l a r s . History repeated i t s e l f i n a s m c h as t h e company involved
became very f i r e conscious and i m ~ e d i a t e l yorganized a f i r e protec-
t i o n department.

There followed t h r e e o t h e r f i r e s , involving some seven l a r g e

s t e e l tanks, a l l with wooden roofs, and again t h e i g n i t i o n cause
was l i g h L n i n g , prob2bly. through induction, s i n c e d i r e c t h i t s were
not seen. It became nore and more evident t h a t wood-roofed s t o r a g e
of low-flash crude o i l s , e i t h e r i n s t e e l tanks o r e a r t h e n and con-
c r e t e - l i n e d r e s e r v o i r s , presented a f i r e hazard from l i g h t c i n g t h a t
d i f f e r e d r a d i c a l l y from t h e l i g h t n i n g hazard t o o t h e r types of
s t r u c t u r e s . Meanwhile, two o t h e r corr.panies became converted t o t h e
fire-protection idea.

I t ' w a s n a t u r d enough t h a t t h e engineers who had been assigned

by t h e s e s e v e r a l companies t o t h e newly organized f i r e s e r v i c e should
g e t t o g e t h e r . One of t h e f i r s t a c t i v i t i e s was t o study forms of
l i g h t n i n g p r o t e c t i o n , and it i s a f a c t t h a t i n la25 plans were well
under way f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of l i g h t n i n g towers and Faraday g r i d s
f o r o i l - r e s e r v o i r p r o t e c t i o n under t h e d i r e c t i o n cf Messrs. Frank
Peeke and E. R . Shaffer. The i n t e r e s t i n t h i s form of p r o t e c t i o n was
a c c e l e r a t e d b y two g ~ e a tl i g h t n i n g f i r e s i n t h e f a l l of t h a t year
each involving a crude o i l r e s e r v o i r .

Then on t h e morning of A p r i l 8, 1926, two 750,000-barrel r e s -

e r v o i r s blew o f f t h e i r roofs simultaneously a t San Luis Obispc,
C a l i f . , and an hour l a t e r another of t h e s i x r e s e r v o i r s followed
s u i t . I n t h e ensuing f i r e a l l s i x r e s e r y o i r s were destroyed along
with 15 s t e e l , wood-roofed tanks i n t h e same farm. C a l i f o r n i a ,
which i s p r a c t i c a l l y l i g h t n i n g - f r e e , had produced t h e g r e a t e s t o i l
f i r e of a l l times.

I wish that t h e s t o r y might end here, but unfortunately t h i s

was n o t bad enough, f o r on t h e morning a f t e r t h e i g n i t i o n a t San
Luis Obispo, t h e same f r e a k o r u n ~ s u a lstorm reached Brea, C a l i f . ,
250 miles t o ' t h e south, and t h e r e repeated on another tank farm of
t h e same company. Here t h r e e r e s e r v o i r s and a small r e f i n e r y were
 destroyed. There was one o t h e r reservoir-lightning- S i r e 3 weeks
l a t e r , s i n c e which time t h e record has been p e r f e c t on a l l pr.0-
t e cted r i s k s .

It is needless t o s a y t h a t t h e f i v e o i l companies involved i n

t h e f i r e s t h a t have been mentioned have never l o s t t h e i r i n t e r e s t
i n f i r e p r o t e c t i o n . Lightning p r o t e c t i o n has become s t a n d a r d
p r a c t i c e , It is however curious t o note t h a t t h e o t h e r companies
on t h e Coast have n o t followed t h e i r example i n s e t t i n g up f i r e
engineering departments. It i s t h e g o u p which went through t h e
g r e a t f i r e s of 1923 t o ' 2 6 t h a t are today carrying t h e f i r e pro-
t e c t i o n program.

It i s p l e a s a n t t o be a b l e t o s a y t h a t s o f a r a s t h e l a s t t e n
years a r e concerned, the P a c i f i c Coast and p a r a t i c u l a r l y t h e major
companies, have p o f i t e d by t h e experiences of t h e p a s t and t h a t
t h e whole s u b j e c t of f i r e p r o t e c t i o n has been glven reasofiable
backing by most companies. Lightning p r o t e c t i o n , eliminutiori of
wood r o o f s and b e t t e r housekeeping has helped. Losses have been
s m a l l and a s a r e s u l t t h e r e has been time t o consider t h e problems
of community s r o t c c t i o n .

PROTECTION AGAINST INJURY OR DEATH CUE TO PREMATUm EXPLOSION

I n mines and q u a r r i e s , precautions should b~ tdcen t o prevent a s f a r a s

p o s s i b l e any chance of premature explosion due t o l i g h t n i n g . S h o r t - c i r c u i t i n g
of t h e l e a d wires i s a primmy precaution. I n sorub open-pit mines, it is now
t h e g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e n o t t o charge h o l e s during the ~ p p r o a c hor 2rOgress of
an e l e c t r i c a l storm. I n underground mines, howevcr, t h i s would n o t be
2ractical.

In mines using e l e c t r i c a l equipment, f e e d e r cables from t h e s u r f a c e a r e

a n e c e s s i t y , Such f e e d e r s should be equipped with modem-type l i g h t n i n g ar-
r e s t e r s n c a r - h e p o i n t of e n t r y t o the.minc. These a r r e s t e r s should be ex-
amined znd tcstcfd f r e q u e n t l y , n o t only t o i n s u r e t h a t t h t a r r e s t e r is function-
i n g properly, b u t t o keep a chcck upon t h ~ exound y e s i s t a n c ~and t o maintain
i t a t a low valuc. Low t r d u c s of%groundr e s i s t a n c ~a r e im2crative, i f maximum
p r o t e c t i o n is t o be obtained.

The question is f r e q u e n t l y a s k ~ das t o what c o n s t i t u t e s a good

ground; t h c b e t t e r t h e ground, the b c t t e r t h c protection, hqnce, the
b c s t ground is nonc too good. Lightning discharges or surges run i n t o
thousands of amperes, and a high ground b o p c m put t h e arrestor a t
such a high discharge or ground voltagb t h a t i t l o s e s i t s cPfectiv6-
ncss. A 5,000-ampert surge through u 30-ohm p o u n d wodd produce a
150,000-volt drop i n t h e ground o n l y . g /

Cure should be taker1 t o see t h a t l c a d wires and s h o t - f i r i n g l i n c s do n o t .

cGmG i n c o n t a c t with rails, a i r o r water l i n e s , and a t no timu should. t h e
P e w c c , C. T., and Allen, R . E . , Lightning Dtmycrs t o Coal-Mine D i s t r i b u -
t i o n Systems Minimized by P r o t d c t i v ~Devices: C o d Age, vol. 42, No. 9 ,
S ~ p t e m b e r1937, i p a 59-60; NO. 10, Octokxr, pp. 55-58. . .
I.C. 7447
bare wires be allowed to contact the rib, roof, or floor after the holes have
been charged.

Lightning-arrester grounds should not under any circumstances be con-

nected to rails, tracks, or pipe lines entering the mine.

To the extent that it is possible to do so, the personnel in a mine

should avoid contact with rails, pipe lines, or electric switches and appa-
ratus when it is known that a lightning storm is in progress on the surface.

Electric equipment and transmission lines are particularly vulnerable to

damage from lightning. Disturbances in Dower systems due to lightning can,
in general be placed in two classes:

(1)Direct strake of lightning.

(2) Surges resulting from lightning dischafges in proximity to the line.

Direct strokes of lightning vary in intensity; the lesser ones are,

nevertheless, of great severity. Pearce and ~ l l e e /
describe it as follows:

Lightning has much the characteristics of a prize fighter's

punch. A direct hit is like a "sock to the ,jaw" and can be a
knock-out unless the recipient is built to take it. The shock,
however, goes' through the system. With arresters iqstalled, the
stroke is like a glancing blow - part of the effect is "drained
off" so that the peak is not so great, even though of the same
steepness. Complete protection for equipment such as rotating
machinery requires protective apparatus which will also slope the
wave front so that the blow becomes more of a push, even though
of the same magnitude, and against which the electrical equip-
ment can, so to speak, brace itself.

Electrical equipment requires the\ protective functions of both lightning

arresters and capacitor equipment to reduce the steepness of the wave front.
To quote again from Pearce and Allen: .
Any equipment with multi-turn circuits presents the known
fact that, when a surge is impressed upon it, the voltage will
not distribute evenly throughout the circuit but will depend on
the number and arrangements of the turns and the steepness of
the front of the surge.

In one case where a 300-kilowatt motor-generator set was damaged fre-

quently by lightning, three single-phase lightning arresters of the ceramic-
dirk type were installed in the pit beneath the motor-generato set. A 3-
phzse oil-filled capacitor unit was also installed in the pit and connected
across the terminals of the 2,300-volt motor. Thls combination effectively
eliminated further damage from lightning at this location.

-
11/ See footnote 10.
 I.C. 7447

For t h e p r o t e c t i o n of d i r e c t - c u r r e n t c i r c u i t s t h e capacitor-type a r -
r e s t e r , though more expensive, i s l i k e l y t o be s u p e r i o r t o t h e multigap a r -
r e s t e r . The capacitor-type not o n l y has a m ~ c hlower voltage r a t i o , b u t it
i s a p p l i c a b l e t o c i r c u i t s up t o approximately 4,000 v o l t s . For t h i s reason,
it i s p a r t i c u l a r l y adapted f o r use with d i r e c t - c u r r e n t machinery o r machines
with weakened i n s u l a t i o n .

WHAT TO DO

A resume of t h e foregoing would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e following procedure may

s reduce t h e danger of i n j u r y aad death f r o n l i g h t n i n g :

During t h e progress of a l i g h t n i n g storm,

(1)Get under s h e l t e r when t h e storm comes, Do not s t a y out i n

r a i n . The l a r g e r t h e house o r barr, t h e b e t t e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n .

( 2 ) Avoid s h e l t e r under i s o l a t e d t r e e s , The middle of a dense

f o r e s t i s f a i r l y s a f e . Avoid t h e f o o t of a pole, mast, o r
tower.

(3) Avoid a n open space, such as a beach, swimming pool, f i s h i n g

pond, b a s e b a l l f i e l d , golf l i n k s , o r p a s t u r e .

(4)Leave h i l l t o p o r r i d g e . Head f o r t h e v a l l e y o r t h e base of

a c l i f f . A c l i f f i s relatively effective shelter.

( 5 ) Leave a small camp c o t t a g e , small shed, o r small open barn

f o r a l a r g e r b u i l d i n g , I n a l a r g e b u i l d i n g s t a y downstairs.
Choose a place n e a r t h e c e n t e r of t h e room. Avoid windows.
Stand away from stoves o r pipes. Shun t h e f i r e p l a c e .

(6) If you a r e d r i v i n g a n automobile when t h e storm comes up,

remain i n t h e c a r with windows almost, closed.

Victims of l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e o f t e n can be r e s u s c i t a t e d i f proper treatment

i s given i n time, I n j u r y and death from l i g h t n i n g r e s u l t from e l e c t r i c shock,
v
and t h e i n d i c a t e d treatment i s a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n and treatment f o r phys-
i c a l shock.
I Lightning, l i k e e l e c t r i c i t y from a power system, causes shock by para-
l y z i n g t h e nerve c e n t e r s t h a t c o n t r o l b r e a t h i n g o r by stopping t h e r e g u l a r
b e a t of t h e h e a r t . I n severe cases, burning of t h e body t i s s u e s i s probable,
A r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n should be given immediately.

ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION^/
A r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n i s a method by which normal r e s p i r a t i o n i s i m i t a t e d
by manual movements t o r e s t o r e b r e a t h i n g . I n many conditions where b r e a t h i n g
has ceased o r a p p a r e n t l y ceased, t h e h e a r t a c t i o n continues f o r a l i m i t e d time.

-
121 Bureau of Mines, Manual of ~irst- id ~ n s t r u c t i o n : 1940, pp.-52!and 53.

2113 - 19 -
I.C. 7447
I f f r e s h a i r i s brough$ i n t o t h e lungs, s o t 5 a t t h e blood can o b t a i n t h e
needed oxygen from it, l i f e can be s u s t a i n e d . That can be accomplisheP i n
a g r e a t number of cases by a r t S f i c i a 1 r e s p i r a t i o n . Every moment of d e l a y
i s s e r i o u s . AS t h e b r e a t h i n g m y be s o f a i n t t h a t it w i l l n o t be d e t e c t e d
by t h e layman o r f i r s t - a i d man, it i s a d v i s a b l e t.hat a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n
be s t a r t e d Immediately, even i f t h e person seems dead. A r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a -
t i o n should b e continued without i n t e r r u p t i o n u n t i l n a t u r a l b r e a t h i n g i s r e -
s t o r e d , o r u n t i l a physician d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e p a t i e n t i s dead. Persons have
been r e s u s c i t a t e d a f t e r a s long a s 72 hours of a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n . I f
n a t u r a l b r e a t h i n g s t o p s a f t e r being r e s t o r e d , give a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n
again.

TREATMENT OF PHYSICAL SHOC@/

'

Shock i s a dangerous condit.ion t h a t should be given p ~ o m p ta t t e n t i o n ,

and medical a i d should be obtained a s soon as p o s s i b l e . Procedure f o r han-
d l i n g cases of shock i s given i n d e t a i l i n t h e Bureau of Mines Manual of F i r s t
Aid I n s t r u c t i o n .

It i s of m j o r importance i n t r e a t i n g shock t o attempt t o r e s t o r e t h e

body warmth b y adequate covering over and under it,. heated o b j e c t s . w i t h i n t h e
covering, and warm drinks, i f t h e p a t i e n t is conscious. Next t o r e e s t a b l i s h -
i n g norflxxl body teniperaturc? by warmth, t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p a t i e n t plays a n
important part i n c a r i n g f o r shock. If t h e p a t i e n t i s l y i n g down and t h e
head i s on a l e v e l with o r lower t h a n t h e f e e t , . t h e flow of blood t o and from
t h e overworked h e a r t i s g r e a t l y aided.

. A s long a s evidence of shock i s present, shock 'treatment should be con-

tinued. P a t i e n t s i n a s t a t e of shock tend t o r e l a p s e , even a f t e r t h e i r con-
d i t i o n has , g r e a t l y improved, Relapse should be watched f o r and combated b y
renewed shock treatment. A f t e r he has recovered from shock of even s h o r t
d u r a t i o n , t h e p a t i e n t should be kept l y i n g dokm and q u i e t s o t h a t a s l i t t l e
s t r a i n a s p o s s i b l e i s placed on t h e c i r c u l a t i o n and h e a r t a c t i o n .

AVOIDANCE OF PAMAGE BY LIGirmNING .

Preventive measures covering t h e avoidance of premature explosions and
damage t o equipment and b u i l d i n g s due t o l i g h t n i n g should include t h e
following:

( 1 ) S t r i c t adherence to,codes and r e g u l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r s a f e

b l a s t i n g p ~ o c e d u r eand t h e prevention of a c c i d e n t s .

(2) Careful s u p e r v i s i o n of b l a s t i n g methods and frequent dissemina-

t i o n of a v a i l a b l e knowledge on t h e s u b j e c t .

(3) I n s t a l l a t i o n and maintenance of l i g h t n i n g a r r e s t e r s and e l e c t r o -

s t a t i c . . c a p a c i t o r s a t s t r a t e g i c 1 o c a t i o n s . o n power systems, and
overhead ground wires on transmission l i n e s .

-
13/ See f o o t n o t e 12.
 ( 4 ) Frequent checking of i n s u l a t i o n values .on r o t a t l n g machinery
and transformers and , t h e maintenance of 'such i n s u l a t i o n a t
h i g h values.

(5) P r o v i s i o n and maintenance of l o w - r e s i s t a n c e grounding connec-

t i o n s f o r l i g h t n i n g a r r e s t e r s and f o r t h e frames of r o t a t i n g
equipment and t r a n s f o r m e r s .

(6) I n s t a l l a t i o n
and maintenance of l i g h t n i n g rods and overhesd
ground wires on i s o l a t e d b u i l d i n g s of nonmetallic c o n s t r u c t i o n .
L

A d r a f t of a r a d i o p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t " P r o t e c t i o n Against L i g h t -
ning by t h e Underwriterst L a b o r a t o r i e s , I n c . , had some i n t e r e s t i n g statements,
as i n d i c a t e d by t h e following a b s t r a c t e d dialogue:

DUDLEY: Are t h e r e any f i g u r e s t o prove t h e value of l i g h t n i n g p r o t e c t i o n ?

MANNING: The records a r e f u l l of proof. Eight years ago, 6,000 g r a i n

e l e v a t o r s i n t h e P r a i r i e Provinces of Canada were equipped with
approved l i g h t n i n g - p r o t e c t i o n systems. Each e l e v a t o r containing
50,000 bushels of g r a i n was insured f o r $25,000. Before t h e s e
e l e v a t o r s were p r o t e c t e d , t h e r e had been a n average y e a r l y
l i g h t n i n g l o s s of $160,00@. Two years a f t e r t h e - l i g h t n i n g rods
were i n s t a l l e d and inspected, not a d o l l a r ' s l i g h t n i n g l o s s had
been s u s t a i n e d . And today, 8 years l a t e r , w e have s t i l l n o t
had a r e p o r t of any l i g h t n i n g danige t o those e l e v a t o r s .

ALCOCK: The e n t i r e p r o j e c t was more t h a n p a i d f o r by t h e satrings e f -

f e c t e d i n a few years.

DUDLEY: T h a t ' s renarkable! And t o d a t e ( 1 ' v e been doing a l i t t l e

mental a r i t h m e t i c ) , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of those e l e v a t o r s r e p r e -
s e n t s a saving of n e a r l y a m i l l i o n and a q u a r t e r d o l l a r s .

WOOD: The record i n one midwest S t a t e shows t h a t over a 2 year

period, 503 b u i l d i n g s .without l i g h t n i n g p r o t e c t i o n were
s t r u c k , causing a l o s s of 81,060,000. I n t h e same period
only 28 p r o t e c t e d b u i l d i n g s were h i t , and t h e l o s s was about
$87,000.

3n t h e o t h e r hand, a n i n q u i r y a s t o l i g h t n i n g - r o d p r o t e c t i o n f o r s u r f a c e
explosives-magazines was addressed t o one of t h e best-informed e x p e r t s of one
of t h e maJor producers of explosives i n t h e United S t a t e s , and brought f o r t h
t h e following r e p l y :

We agree t h a t a l i g h t n i n g rod, p r o p e r l y i n s t a l l e d and prop-

e r l y maintained on a dynamite magazine, should o f f e r some p r o t e c t i o n .
On t h e o t h e r hand, a l i g h t n i n g rod, i f not p r o p e r l y i n s t a l l e d o r
cared f o r , makes t h e c o n d i t i o n worse t h a n i f no rod had been i n -
s t a l l e d a t a l l . I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t dynamite magazines a r e
ahnost i n v a r i a b l y i n i s o l a t e d l o c a t i o n s , t h e magazines themselves
I.C. 7447
..
do not r e c e i v e much a t t e n t i o n , and a e f e e l s u r e t h a t l i g h t n i n g rods
would not receive proper care. Furthermore, t o be c o r r e d t l y i n -
s t a l l e d , a l i g h t n i n g rod should be a t t a c h e d t o t h e b u i l d i n g r a t h e r .
t h a n a t a d'istance o f , say, 18 f e e t a s i s s p e c i f i e d .ip your inquiry'.
Cur company has never i n s t a l l e d a l i g h t n i n g r o d on 'any f i e l d maga- .
zine; and s o f a r a s our records and memories go'back i n t o t h e p a s t ,
we have never l o s t a f i e l d magazine due t o 1ightn;ing. Under t h e
circumstances, we recommend d e f i n i t e l y a g a i n s t , t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of
l i g h t n i n g rods.
1 .

An a r t i c l e containing' some d i s c ~ s ~ s i oon

n lightning protection i n the July d
1941 i s s u e of Coal Age, page 55, had t h e following statements:
Generally speaking, lightning-proof l i n e s a r e p o s s i b l e .
The degree of l i g h t n i n g p r o t e c t i o n i s l i m i t e d only by t h e money
which can be economically spent f o r it. Proper grounds f o r l i g h t -
ning a r r e s t e r s a r e very important. Line-type a r r e s t e r s , s t a t i o n - '
type a r r e s t e r s , c a p a c i t o r s and overhead ground wires can be added
i n any combination. An ample ground-connection of low r e s i s t a n c e
i s most important.. Mine r a i l s f o r l i g h t n i n g - a r r e s t e r grounds have
proved e x c e l l e n t e l e c t r i c a l l y , b u t t f i e i r complete s a f e t y i s s t i l l
debatable. When possible, t h e N a t i o n a l ' E l e c t r i c a l Code suggests
a s e p a r a t e ground from t h e r a i l s .

Since t h e average value of m i n e - r a i l r e s i s t a n c e t o ground

v a r i e s from 1 ohm t o about 20 ohms, t e s t s should be made i n , each
case. ~ i n e sshould have a t l e a s t on a l t e r n a t e ground connection
f o r each s u b s t a t i o n where r a i l r e s i s t a n c e i s high. Where bore-hole
casings o r water l i n e s a r c a v a i l a b l e , t h e problem is,sirnplff$ed;
where an a r t i f i c i a l ground must be construct'ed,'care must be used.

Larger wires - 4/0 i s not t o o b i g - f j r grounding and b e t t e r

t e r m i n a l connections should be used. Brazing t o t h e frame i f v i -
b r a t i o n i s present may be d e s i r a b l e t o o b t a i n good contact; Inspec-
t i o n of t h e groUnd connections a t frequent i n t e r v a l s i s recommended.
Tests should be made every year. TJse of d.c. c a p a c i t o r s o r s u i t a b l e
a r r e s t e r s a c r o s s t h e t e r m i n a l s of machines increases p r o t e c t i o n .
The c a p a c i t o r a l s o a i d s where f l a s h - o v e r s a r e t h e tendency.

Temporary ground connections f o r power c o ~ d u c t o r swhen men

work on t h e l i n e s should be standard p r a c t i c e . S t a t i c e l e c t r i c i t y
can be drained t o a good, c a r e f u l l y h d e , temporary ground. Care
should b e used i n grounding l i n e s s o t h a t men do not work i n p o s i -
t i o n s where a drop i n p o t e n t i a l occurs a c r o s s t h e i r bodies.

Avoid metal fences around high-voltage equipment u n l e s s

t h e r e i s an e x c e p t i o n a l l y good ground connection. Before using
t h e s t e e l frimework of any b u i l d i n g f o r grounding exposed metal
s u r f a c e s of e l e c t r i c a l equipment, it should be determined whether
t h e steelwork i s a t ' ground p o t e n t i a l ; i f not, it should b e grounded
t o prevent shock.

2113 - 22 -
 I.C. 7447
Since i n t h e d.c. mine c i r c u i t t h e negative i s grounded with
c u r r e n t r e t u r n i n t h e r a i l a s standard, p o s i t i v e wires should he
kept i n s u l a t e d , negative wires grounded, and r a i l s w e l l bonded.
Grounding of r a i l s f r e q u e n t l y i s not p e r f e c t , s i n c e t h e y r e s t on
rocky s o i l and mine t i e s . A s a n added s a f e t y precaution, a sup-
plementary gronnd connection, such a s a water system, borehole
casing o r a r t i f i c i a l ground, i s d e s i r a b l e i f t h e mine r a i l i s t o be
counted on a s an a b s o l ~ l t egrounding medium,

The l i g h t n i n g hazard has unquestioncbly been reduced a s compared with t h e

conditions i n e f f e c t one, two, o r more decades ago; however, l o s s e s o f l i f e
and of property due t o l i g h t n i n g continue t o occur.

This paper presents some information on t h e e f f e c t of l i g h t n i n g on t h e

mining industry, and it w i l l be noted t h a t both s u r f a c e and underground w ~ r k
i s a f f e c t e d and t h a t , while premature detonation of explosives i s one of t h e
main hazards i n t h e mining i n d u s t r y due t o l i g h t n i n g , it i s by no means t h e
only harm t o t h e i n d u s t r y from t h l s cause.