Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff.

The Supreme
Court provides some test that may find the contributory negligence of a
G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918
person. Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff
FACTS: at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions
Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by
train to the company’s office in the city of Manila where he worked, he Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering
company’s trains free of charge. injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by
no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
the exit while the train is still on travel. When the train has proceeded a ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no
little farther Jose Cangco step down into the cement platform but appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
unfortunately step in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under
the platform and was drawn under the moving car which resulting to his Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
arm to be crashed and lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and sued in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
the company and the employee who put the sack of watermelon in the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of that persons, of the
platform. time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that
time of the year that may we considered as season to harvest watermelon In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of
explaining why there are sacks of watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff the company to inform their employees to not put any hindrance in the
contends that it is the negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to transport
let their employees put a hindrance in the platform that may cause serious plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
of the plaintiff alone on why he did not wait for the train to stop before 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
alighting the train. performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is liable for
ISSUE: damages against Cangco.
Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence Del Prado v. Meralco
on behalf of the plaintiff.
Facts:
RULING:
Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was driving the company’s
street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the
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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 1
street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing
complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in
when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint obligation.
for culpa contractual.
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the
Issues: moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and
proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in
(1) Whether the motorman was negligent
putting on the power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one
(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent
act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered
(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be
Held: analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as
the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the
(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it
a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the
was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature
acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty. RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
of a contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due
care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa
contractual). Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to FACTS:
its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
alighting therefrom. defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor
to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there
breach of positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled
himself by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side
arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual). In the case pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the
before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced
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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 2
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the
about the knee.
liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not
ISSUE: necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the
Whether the company is liable employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil
action may proceed to judgment.
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what
extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two 2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility
particulars is he charged with carelessness: of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the 3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it. known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American
Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA (1966) / Sanchez
rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they
not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the FACTS:
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 3
 ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts could give ground for an action for damages.
with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket due consideration.
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
Singson v. BPI
upon the availability of first class seats.
Facts:
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages? Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI
Manila. Judgment was rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants
Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to
RULING:
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
became final and executory as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected
issued to BPI against the Villa-Abrille’s account.
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s name and,
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, without reading the full text, wrote a letter for the signature of the bank
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is President, informing Singson of the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self- dishonoured, and so petitioner’s account with the latter was closed.
interest or will or for ulterior purpose." Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his account is not included
in the writ of garnishment. Having confirmed so, the bank President
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
Santiago Friexas apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled that damages for quasi-

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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 4
delict cannot be sustained because the relationship between the parties is The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person
contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case. reading the same would logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus
RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The
Issue:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was
Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of
the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed
Held: among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication;
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent Issue:
recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be
a tort. Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the
civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, Ruling:
respondents
Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986
20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of contract
Facts: thru the negligence of its own employees. By adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent, there is a
Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio clear breach of contract; for upon payment of the fixed rate, the company
Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent undertakes to transmit the message accurately.
through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:
In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule. As a
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the
FER LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK- acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts
PER 115 PMSA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN- of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective
him wounded his feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and affected and adequate remedy.
adversely his business because other people have come to know of said In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may
defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
a private joke between the sending and receiving operators, that they were cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances
of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. surrounding the injury.

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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 5
The judgment of the CA is affirmed. Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Ponente: Vitug
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Facts:
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig
case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed)
branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to
of the common carrier.
private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and
submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Held:
Luis' credit card was not honored. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-
delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the
the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-
humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's
existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine,
apologies to Luis
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an
1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-
of Pasig against FEBTC. delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated
thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact
rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage
P20,000.00 attorney's fees. claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
decision of the trial court. stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and Francisco
FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review. Salva
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
There is merit in this appeal.
332 SCRA 356
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach FACTS:
of the contract. The Civil Code provides: Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with
passengers so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a

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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 6
wooden stool at the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end of in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, a in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other
the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
truck. 2. Yes. The liability of petitioner arises from his negligence in the
performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of carriage.
RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva as third-
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed
party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death or injuries
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
to passengers, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is now the
jeepney.
duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s cause of care of his passengers. However, in this case, petitioner failed to prove that
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It was
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil found that the jeepney was not properly parked and he took more
Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and passengers than the allowed seating capacity.
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
3. No. The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied assumption of
ISSUES: risk on the part of the passenger. A caso fortuito is an event which could
1. Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
quasi-delict. independent of the obligor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
2. Whether or not respondent carrier is responsible for the injury caused to unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor
its passenger when the accident was caused by another vehicle. to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the obligor did not take
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen
was a caso fortuito. the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.
4. Whether or not respondent passenger is entitled to moral damages.
4. No. Petitioner did not act in bad faith in the performance of the contract
RULING: of carriage. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
1. No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
pending case was never a party in a previous one. And besides, the issues
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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 7
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occured.
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in case of
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who had no opportunity to avoid
NOTES: the collision due to his own making is not relieved of liability, such as
when his negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
(Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])
because it s the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the LRTA vs NATIVIDAD
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier failed to transport his
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (transportation)
passenger safely to his destination.
Laws Cited: Art. 1755,Art. 1756,Art. 1759,Art. 1763
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
FACTS:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered
delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”.
Presumption of Negligence
While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once Junelito Escartin approached him.
arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a
Bad faith
moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to
December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a
assist the injured passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org.
construed as an admission of bad faith.
Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband.
The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remain
LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim
basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although
against Escartin and Prudent
noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as
also forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in
Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996]) the selection and surpervision of its security guards
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
common sense, policy and precedent, is that cause which, in natural and

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KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 8
Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
the act or omission.
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or
of carriage negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon
the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is majeure
DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is
absolved. Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty
off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related
provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise
Civil Code: even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far breaches the contract)
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee,
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they selection and supervision of its employees.
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision
1733 and 1755 of the employee
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet.
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and Nicanor and Roman
supervision of their employees
Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. ANZEN DY
KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 9