[G.R. NO.

144159 : September 29, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ ​Petitioner​, ​v.​ ​SANDIGANBAYAN and MANUEL S.

ALBA,​ ​Respondents.​

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., ​J.​:

This is a petition for ​certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
nullification of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 23, 2000,
quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 25653 and acquitting the respondent of
the crime charged therein.

The Antecedents

On February 17, 1999, ​an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Luis G. Pabalan in the Office
of the Ombudsman against the respondent, then City Administrator Manuel S. Alba of
Quezon City, and the Chairman of Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas
(IEMELIF), ​Jeremias T. Cruz. The case was docketed as OMB-0-99-0346 and was
assigned to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) which, in turn,
assigned Graft Investigator Romeo M. Pamute to conduct an evaluation and a
preliminary investigation.

Based on the records, the Graft Investigator found that the case stemmed from the
following facts:

Respondent MANUEL S. ALBA is a high ranking government official being the City
Administrator of Quezon City with a salary grade of 27 while respondent JEREMIAS T.
CRUZ is a private person. The latter is the Chairman of the Evangelist Methodist Church
in the Philippines Novaliches Congregation, Novaliches, Quezon City.

In his sworn complaint, complainant, ​LUIS PABALAN, stated that he is the owner of a
lot ​located at Susano Road, Novaliches, Quezon City, ​where the Congregation of
Evangelist Church of the Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by respondent Architect
JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when improvements on their structure were made
sometime in February 1997. The construction was done without the necessary building
permit. The Quezon City building official was, accordingly, informed and consequently
after hearing, ​the Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of the structure. The
Order becomes final and executory upon failure of the religious congregation (IEMELIF)
to appeal on time to the DPWH.

On November 4, 1998, ​however​, IEMELIF, through ​respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ,

wrote respondent City Administrator, Mr. MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said
order be not enforced pending appeal to the DPWH stating, among others, that the
Order of the Assistant Building Official is illegal and the implementation of the same will
cause irreparable damage and injury to the church (IEMELIF).

The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the
respondent MANUEL ALBA but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition
order was dated November 4, 1998 or a day before the receipt of said letter.

The complainant objected and in a letter requested respondent ALBA to revoke the
Order recalling the demolition, but respondent City Administrator refused and failed to
respond and, ​as a result, the Building Official was not able to effect the demolition.

Complainant presented his title to the lot, the Resolution of the Building Official
ordering the demolition of the structure; the Order granting the Motion for Execution;
the letter of Appeal by respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ to the Mayor of Quezon City thru
respondent MANUEL ALBA stamped received by the City Administrator's Office on
November 5, 1998; the Memorandum of respondent MANUEL S. ALBA to Engr.
Romualdo Santos showing that the date is November 4, 1998; and the letter of
objection and request that the recall order on the demolition be corrected was, likewise,
presented by the complainant.​1

In his Counter-Affidavit, ​the respondent alleged, ​inter alia, that he acted on the appeal
of respondent Cruz and recalled the demolition order which was issued by the building
official. He did so on the basis of the authority delegated to him under the January 12,
1994 Memorandum issued by the Mayor, as well as the guidelines implementing the
said memorandum, where it was stated that no demolition shall be allowed pending an
appeal to higher authorities.

The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic (Rep.) Act No. 3019 and recommended the filing of the
Information against him. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

On September 9, 1999, an Information was filed with the SB, charging the respondent
with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about November 5, 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the City
Administrator of Quezon City while in the performance of his official function
and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue a Memorandum recalling the Order
of Demolition issued by the Acting Building Official knowing fully well that he
has no authority to do so, thus, giving unwarranted preference to Jeremias
T. Cruz in the discharged (sic) of his official functions.

CONTRARY TO LAW.​2
Appended to the Information were the following: (a) the memorandum of the Legal
Counsel, Office of the Ombudsman duly approved by the Ombudsman, which
recommended the approval of the resolution of the EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
finding probable cause against the respondent, as well as the prosecution of the crime
charged; (b) the affidavit-complaint; (c) the counter-affidavit of the respondent; and
(d) the Resolution of the EPIB. As ordered by the SB, the special prosecutor submitted
Annexes "A" to "F" of the affidavit-complaint and Annexes "1" to "4" of the respondent's
counter-affidavit on September 24, 1999.

On October 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the SB a Motion for Leave to Order
Reinvestigation and/or Quash Information on the following grounds:

THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION FILED
AGAINST THE ACCUSED, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE.

II

THE FACTS RECITED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT IN

SUBSTANCE TO INDICT THE ACCUSED CRIMINALLY, BECAUSE THEY WERE
BASED ON ERRONEOUS PREMISES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.​3

During the hearing of the motion, the respondent, through counsel, agreed to convert
his motion into a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause against him. Since no objection was made by the special prosecutor to
the motion for a reinvestigation, the SB issued an Order on October 8, 1998, granting
the motion and ordering the special prosecutor to take appropriate action on the
respondent's motion for reconsideration. It, likewise, directed the Special Prosecutor to
inform the SB of its findings and recommendation, as well as the order of the
Ombudsman, within sixty (60) days from the said date.​4 On December 8, 1999, the
respondent filed a Memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration.

On January 25, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion,​5
informing the SB that, after a review of the case, the Office of the Ombudsman was
affirming its finding of probable cause against the respondent and prayed for his
arraignment. Appended to the motion was the memorandum duly approved by the
Ombudsman, recommending that the resolution of the EPIB be affirmed.​6 Accordingly,
the SB set the arraignment of the respondent at 8:30 a.m. of February 18, 2000. On
February 2, 2000, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve the Opposition to the
Manifestation and Motion of the Special Prosecutor dated January 21, 2000, with a
motion to reset his arraignment. He later filed a motion for postponement/deferment of
his arraignment and the pre-trial to enable him to file the appropriate motion with the
SB. The arraignment of the respondent was reset to 8:30 a.m. of March 27, 2000.

In its Comment on the Opposition of the respondent to the Manifestation and Motion​7
dated January 28, 2000, the prosecution averred that the said opposition and motion
had been mooted by the re-setting of the respondent's arraignment on March 27, 2000.
On even date, the SB issued an Order​8 holding in abeyance the arraignment of the
respondent until after it shall have resolved the motion for leave to order
reinvestigation and/or quash information filed by him.

Nevertheless, on April 10, 2000, the respondent, assisted by counsel, was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. On the same day, the SB issued an Order​9 granting his motion
for leave to travel abroad without prejudice to the resolution of his motion to quash
information. On April 14, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed her Comment/Opposition​10
to the respondent's motion to quash.

On June 23, 2000, ​the SB issued a Resolution granting the motion to quash the
information of the accused and acquitting the respondent of the charge.​1​1 The SB held
that based on the records, there was no probable cause to charge the respondent of the
crime. ​It based its findings on the Memorandum of then Mayor Ismael A. Mathay to the
respondent dated January 12, 1994, and a portion of the Resolution of Graft
Investigator Romeo Pamute dated July 23, 1999 which was duly approved by the
Ombudsman. The SB lifted the Hold Departure Order it earlier issued on June 26,
2000.​12

The Present Petition

On August 15, 2000, the People of the Philippines, through the Special Prosecutor's
Office (SPO), filed a petition for ​certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, for the nullification of the June 23, 2000 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(SB). It anchors its petition on the following arguments:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ACQUITTED
MANUEL ALBA OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2565
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRAIGNED OR THE
PROSECUTION ALLOWED TO PROVE ITS CASE.

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED
MANUEL ALBA'S MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM
ISSUED BY THE QUEZON CITY MAYOR, WHICH MEMORANDUM HAS
ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED.
 3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
PETITIONER ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.​13

On the first issue, ​the petitioner avers that the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information.

We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the SB quashed the information
with the ruling that the respondent acted on the basis of the January 12, 1994
Memorandum to him of then Mayor Ismael Mathay, quoted infra:

MEMORANDUM

TO : DR. MANUEL ALBA

City Administrator

In view of the multifarious duties attendant to my dual position as

Chairman, Metro Manila Authority and Mayor of Quezon City, the authority
to issue orders for the demolition of illegal structures is hereby delegated to
you. You may sign as follows:

BY AUTHORITY OF THE CITY MAYOR

MANUEL S. ALBA

City Administrator

It is understood that the aforementioned authority shall be exercised

pursuant to the attached copy of guidelines issued by the undersigned.
Periodic reports of demolition undertaken under this authority should be
submitted to this Office.

This Memorandum takes effect immediately.

(Sgd.) ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR.

City Mayor​14

The SB concluded that, having acted on the basis of the memorandum of the Mayor,
the respondent could not be considered as having usurped the authority of the building
official or of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, or that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The SB also relied on the
resolution of the Graft Investigator, Romeo Pamute, dated July 23, 1999, duly approved
by the Ombudsman, which reads:

It is our view that the relief granted by respondent City Administrator in his
Memorandum is only temporary in nature and will last only for a meantime
 that the legality or otherwise of the contested demolition order is being
determined by the DPWH. We agree that greater injury could have been
caused had the questioned demolition order was carried out but later on if it
will be found that the property claimed by the complainant as his belongs
not to him but to the religious congregation represented by the private
respondent. We see nothing wrong if the complainant could wait a little
while in the interest of justice and fair play. It has to be realized that the
ownership issue should share equal attention as that of the demolition issue
raised by the complainant. It is a reality in our system of government that
resolving an issue via a judicial or administrative remedy, is a long and
tedious process if we have to be meticulous in the just dispensation of
justice. The government has not yet invented a system, a sure-fire formula
wherein justice could be dispensed with in just a click of a finger. To hurry
demolishing a structure where an appeal has been made and taken
cognizance of by higher appellate agency of the government is recklessness
and may result to grave injustice. We agree with the rationale in the
assailed Memorandum issued by the respondent City Administrator to the
Acting Building Official. '​15

The SB ruled that, based on the facts and the evidence on record, there was no
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the respondent; hence,
the information should be quashed and the respondent be acquitted of the crime
charged.

However, as pointed out by the petitioner, the January 12, 1994 Memorandum of the
Mayor had already been amended by a subsequent issuance, Memorandum No. 4,
which states, inter alia, that the authority to act on violations of the Building Code no
longer rested on the respondent as City Administrator, but on the City Engineer or his
assistant, viz:

a. For violation of Building Code City Engineer/Asst. City Bldg.

Official

b. Illegal Structures under RA 7279 City Administrator​16

(Squatting)

We also agree with the petitioner's contention that the January 12, 1994 Memorandum
of Mayor Mathay is even contrary to Section 307 of Presidential Decree No. 1096,
otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines,​" which reads:

"Section 307. Appeal. Within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of
advice of the non-issuance, suspension or revocation of permits, the
applicant-permittee may file an appeal with the Secretary who shall render
his decision within fifteen days from date of receipt of notice of appeal. The
 decision of the Secretary shall be final subject only to review by the Office of
the President.​17

To rectify his erroneous January 12, 1994 Memorandum, Mayor Mathay had to issue
Memorandum No. 4 to the respondent.

Moreover, ​in Opinion No. 36, Series of 1996, the Secretary of Justice succinctly ruled
that only the city engineer, as the building official, has the exclusive authority to act on
matters relating to the issuance of demolition permits or the revocation or suspension
thereof.

The law is clear that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways has
jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of building officials involving the
non-issuance, suspension or revocation of building permits. His decision is final subject
only to review by the Office of the President.

In line with existing jurisprudence, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. (Bacalso
v. Ramolete, 21 SCRA 519; Garcia v. De Jesus, 206 SCRA 779) ​Section 307 of P.D. No.
1096 is the law that confers jurisdiction upon the DPWH Secretary to adjudicate appeals
from the orders or decisions of the building officials.

Section 477 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is cited to support the view that the
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of building officials has been devolved to the
city/municipal mayor​. But Section 477 which reads:

"Section 477 - Qualifications, Powers and Duties '

xxx

The appointment of an engineer shall be mandatory for the

provincial, city and municipal governments. The city and
municipal engineer shall also act as the local building official"

should be read in conjunction with Section 205 of the National Building Code
which provides:

"Section 205. Building Officials.

xxx

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may

designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City
Engineers and Municipal Engineers to act as Building Officials of
their respective areas of jurisdiction.

["Section 201] - Due to the exigencies of the service, the incumbent city
and municipal engineers have been designated to act as building officials in
their respective areas of jurisdiction. (Section 205) x x x When acting as
 building officials the city and municipal engineers, who are local officials,
should be deemed national officials subject to the supervision of the Minister
of Public Works (Opinion No. 144, Series of 1979)." (​Underscoring
supplied​)​
cralawlibrary

It does not appear from the Local Government Code that vesting of power in the local
chief executive to appoint engineer who, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall
likewise act as local building official, also carries with it the power to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions in matters involving non-issuance, suspension,
revocation of building permits.

Absent any clear and explicit provision in the said code to this effect, we cannot
conclude that the appellate jurisdiction vested in the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways under Section 307 of the National Building Code has been transferred to the
city or municipal mayor.​18

What is worrisome is that, to justify its illegal quashal of the information, the SB quoted
only a portion of the resolution of Special Prosecutor Pamute, and omitted, either
deliberately or inadvertently, the

ratio decidendi thereof:

We agree with the rationale in the assailed Memorandum issued by the

respondent City Administrator to the Acting Building Official. ​It is alright if
only the same is issued by the officials authorized to do so - by the DPWH
officials where appeal of that nature is vested by law. But it appears that
respondent Manuel S. Alba is bereft of power to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the action of local building official relative to building
permits​. We find merit in complainant's submission in his reply that nowhere
in the National Building Code or in the DILG law could we find a provision
"which empower the local chief executive to exercise appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions of the local building officials relative to the non-issuance,
suspension or revocation of building permits. x x x Absent any clear
provision of law we cannot conclude that the appellate jurisdiction vested in
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section 307 of the
National Building Code has been transferred to the city or municipal mayor.
Moreover, the action made by respondent City Administrator is flawed by
the fact that the date of the assailed Memorandum is earlier than the date of
receipt of the letter that has to be acted upon. We viewed this as irregular.​"
(​Underscoring supplied)​ 19
​

We note that during the hearing of October 8, 1999, the respondent agreed that his
motion for leave to order reinvestigation and/or quash the information be converted to
a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding
probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. This can be gleaned
from the following Order of the SB:

When the "Motion for Leave to Order Reinvestigation and/or Quash

Information" dated October 4, 1999 filed by the accused, through counsel,
was called for hearing, Pros. Jacqueline Ongpauco-Cortel manifested in open
court that the prosecution has no objection if the said motion is converted
by movant-accused into a "Motion for Reconsideration" under Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act) inasmuch as the five-day period
provided therein was not observed. The accused, assisted by counsel, Atty.
Danny B. Gille, agreed to convert the said motion into a "Motion for
Reconsideration" under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.​20

With the conversion of the Omnibus Motion of the respondent into a motion for
reconsideration, he, in effect, withdrew his motion to quash the information.
Accordingly, the required reinvestigation was conducted to ascertain, once again, if
there was probable cause for the filing of the information. There was, thus, no motion
to quash the information pending resolution by the SB.

Moreover, on January 12, 2000, the SPO filed a Manifestation and Motion​21 with the SB
stating, among others, that the Ombudsman had affirmed his finding of a probable
cause against the respondent and prayed for the arraignment of the accused. ​The
respondent was accordingly arraigned, on April 10, 2000, and pleaded not guilty. He
even posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty, which was duly approved by the SB.
The court, thus, had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
without the need for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for his apprehension and
incarceration. The SB should have set the pre-trial of the case instead of quashing the
Information and even acquitting the respondent. The arraignment of the respondent
and his posting a bail bond for his provisional liberty proscribed the SB from dismissing
the case for lack of probable cause.

Under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to quash an
Information may be filed only for the following grounds:

SEC. 3. Grounds.' The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
 (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a

legal excuse or justification; and​
cralawlibrary

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted

of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.​22

To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow.​23 ​The absence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is
a ground for the dismissal of the case.

It bears stressing that, even before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Regional Trial Court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused only
upon a finding of probable cause based on the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, the affidavits and other evidences appended to the Information, whatever
evidence the Prosecutor may adduce upon order of the court. If the court finds that
there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the
case. The dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the refiling thereof unless barred
by prescription. Indeed, the procedure is now encoded in Section 6, Rule 112, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court is mandated to immediately dismiss
the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest, and
after having evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.' (a) By the Regional Trial Court.'
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. ​He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause​. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
The absence or presence of probable cause is to be determined from the material
averments of the information and the appendages thereof, as enumerated in Rule 112,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:

SEC. 8. Records.' (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An

information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits
and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution of the case.

By quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable cause

instead of merely dismissing the case, the SB acted in violation of case law
and, thus, acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.

On the second issue, we find and so rule that in acquitting the respondent of
the crime charged before trial, and without the latter having prayed for such
relief, the SB acted without jurisdiction, thereby depriving the petitioner of
its right to due process. The records show that the only prayer of the
respondent in his Omnibus Motion was as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the

Motion for Reinvestigation and/or Motion to Quash be granted and in the
interim, an order for suspension of proceedings be issued during the
pendency thereof.

Other reliefs and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.​24

And yet, the SB acquitted the respondent. It is basic that the dismissal of a case is
different from the acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal of the case
based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case will not result in the
acquittal of the said accused. As fully explained by the Court in People v. Salico:​25

This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal

concepts of dismissal and acquittal. ​Acquittal is always based on the merits,
that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only
case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used,
instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has
presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the
court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show
 beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the
dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits.
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental
that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.​26

By its precipitate and patently illegal acts, the SB deprived the petitioner of its right to
due process, an aberration that should not be countenanced. ​The assailed Resolutions
of the SB are, thus, null and void. We reiterate our pronouncement in Paulin v.
Gimenez:​27

Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not
ready for trial and adjudication, the order is null and void (People v.
Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98 [1969]).

In People v. Bocar (138 SCRA 166 [1985]), this Court found that the
prosecution was denied due process as it never had the chance to offer its
evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court in view of the trial
court's order of dismissal. The trial court was thereby ousted from its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by
aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence and,
therefore, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. Hence, the remand of
the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first
jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this
Court reiterated its previous ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the case
and as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to
prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due
process. With such violation, its orders are, therefore null and void and
cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.​28

The respondent cannot even invoke double jeopardy, conformably to our ruling in
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,​29​ where we had the occasion to state:

The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured
beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the ​certiorari
proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal
by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent
Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute
 to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise
the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application,
the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject - matter jurisdiction. In this
case, the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment.

A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or
create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete
cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court's
jurisdiction.​30

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is ​GRANTED​. The assailed

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are ​NULLIFIED​. The records are remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

----------------------

-----------------

CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Luis G. Pabalan in the Office of the Ombudsman

against the respondent, then City Administrator Manuel S. Alba and Jeremias T. Cruz.

Based on the records, the Graft Investigator found that the case stemmed from the
following facts:

LUIS PABALAN, stated that he is the owner of a lot where the Congregation of
Evangelist Church of the Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by respondent Architect
JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when improvements on their structure were made.
The Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of the structure. The Order
becomes final and executory upon failure of the religious congregation (IEMELIF) to
appeal on time to the DPWH.
However, respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ, wrote respondent City Administrator, Mr.
MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said order be not enforced pending appeal to
the DPWH stating, among others, that the Order of the Assistant Building Official is
illegal and the implementation of the same will cause irreparable damage and injury to
the church (IEMELIF).

The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the
respondent MANUEL ALBA but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition
order was dated November 4, 1998 or a day before the receipt of said letter. as a result,
the Building Official was not able to effect the demolition.

the respondent alleged, inter alia, that he acted on the appeal of respondent Cruz and
recalled the demolition order which was issued by the building official. He did so on the
basis of the authority delegated to him under the January 12, 1994 Memorandum
issued by the Mayor.

The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic (Rep.) Act No. 3019 and recommended the filing of the
Information against him. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

the SB issued a Resolution granting the motion to quash the information of the accused
and acquitting the respondent of the charge.​11 The SB held that based on the records,
there was no probable cause to charge the respondent of the crime.

ISSUE:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ACQUITTED
MANUEL ALBA OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2565 DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HE HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRAIGNED OR THE PROSECUTION
ALLOWED TO PROVE ITS CASE.

HELD:

Yes.
With the conversion of the Omnibus Motion of the respondent into a motion for
reconsideration, he, in effect, withdrew his motion to quash the information.

The respondent was accordingly arraigned, on April 10, 2000, and pleaded not guilty.
He even posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty, which was duly approved by the
SB. The court, thus, had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
without the need for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for his apprehension and
incarceration. The SB should have set the pre-trial of the case instead of quashing the
Information and even acquitting the respondent. The arraignment of the respondent and
his posting a bail bond for his provisional liberty proscribed the SB from dismissing the
case for lack of probable cause.

The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground
for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case.

By its precipitate and patently illegal acts, the SB deprived the petitioner of its right to
due process, an aberration that should not be countenanced.