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Simon Caney “Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities”

Section I – definition and argument for global equality of opportunity

1. Two conceptions of equality of opportunity in a domestic level:

1) Those distributing positions should give them to the best qualified, independent of his race, gender,
class. (ignores socioeconomic contexts in which people gain qualifications)
2) Resources should be distributed to ensure that people’s opportunities are not worsened by their
race or class. (Caney favors this conception)

Caney’s ideal: second conception of EO applied globally so that people’s positions in life are not
influenced by their nationality/race/class/gender, etc.

Features of this ideal:

1) EO does not require equality of outcome
2) GEO – entitlement. Complete theory of justice should also talk of duties, but it is not the aim of
Caney here. (theory of justice should determine: entitlements -> institutions which bring them about
-> people’s duties: bring about and support institutions required by the global principles of justice)

2. Reasoning for GEO:

1) We think it’s unfair for person to have worse chances in life because of ethnicity, social status, or
gender
2) This should also be extended to nationality or civic identity: people should not be penalized
because of the community they were born into. People are entitled to the same opportunities as
others.

3. Supplementary considerations in favor of GEO:

1) Ensuring basic right of subsistence would not be enough, it still allows for “liberal and humane
apartheid” or “global apartheid”. It holds domestically and globally.
2) Cosmopolitan theories are criticized for impossibility to realize their implications. But these
objections have “little force against GEO since its demands are relatively light. Statistics show that
costs of global justice are relatively low when compared with existing expenditure on luxuries.
3) Equalizing opportunities would contribute favorably to the alleviation of global poverty: Fair start
in life -> using opportunities -> earning a reasonable standard of living.

4. GEO may be supplemented by other principles, for example basic rights.

5. Possible critical responses to the ideal of GEO:

1) Complete repudiation – there are NO global principles of DJ

2) Partial repudiation – there are global principles of DJ but GEO is not among them

The argument which critic should make to reject Caney’s conclusion is disanalogy argument: If he
accepts the principle of domestic EO (Caney assumes he does), he has to show that global context
is disanalogous from the domestic in some morally relevant respect. He has to identify some
property P which is relevant for EO and which exists in domestic context but does not exist in a
global one (for example, political, psychological, economic, cultural factors).
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Section II – “Calibration” challenge

Boxill rejects ideal of GEO on the basis of the great cultural variety which exists in the world and which
determines that different cultures have different standards of success.

Boxill’s property P – cultural consensus – does not exist in international realm.

1. Considerations of Boxill’s argument:

1) Pinnacle is conceived differently in different cultures – for some it is to be a businessman, for
some – a soldier. “For which one of these standards are opportunities to be equalized?” 1
2) There are conceptual problems of devising criteria for the equality of prospects that are for
radically different ends (ends being highly valued social positions in each culture). Also, if these can
be overcome, and educational basis would be established for each valuable position in each
society, ethos of each society would ensure that inequalities remained.

2. 1) Caney says, that first consideration argues against this definition of GEO:
GEO requires that persons (of equal ability and motivation) have equal opportunities to
attain the positions valued in one preferred society

2) Caney says that second consideration argues against this definition of GEO:
GEO requires that persons (of equal ability and motivation) have equal opportunities to
attain
the positions valued in every society.
Boxill’s point here is that it is easier for persons to attain valued positions in their society than
for persons who are outsiders to this society.

3) Caney proposes a different definition of GEO:

GEO requires that persons (of equal ability and motivation) have equal opportunities to
attain
an equal number of positions of a commensurate standard of living.

3. Boxill’s arguments don’t undermine 3 rd definition of GEO.

Boxill mistakenly assumes that GEO requires that each person have equal opportunity to exactly
the same individual tokens.
3rd def. of GEO makes clear that not opportunity to identical tokens, but opportunity to positions of
the same type should be equalized.

Someone might object: how can we asses standard of living in multicultural world?

Caney cites Sen: standard of living = people’s capacity to enjoy certain functionings. Nussbaum

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I think, this one doesn’t hold because why do we have to equalize FOR something? GEO means more or less equal
starting point in life, from which you can choose out of ALL the opportunities which are opened to you when this equal
starting point is ensured. It doesn’t mean that equal opportunity is designed to make a position of businessman
available for all. It is designed to make ANY, or, more realistically, considerably greater number of positions available
for all. And then let people choose for themselves, However, it is true that specific education is needed for every
position, and it might not be available is some countries, and creating opportunities for specific training would be very
hard. It seems that equality of opportunity could be better realized not only by equalizing economic starting positions,
but also by allowing free movement of people, so children from each society could attain education required for
achieving their gals in life.
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provides a list of goods valued by all cultures. Thus, positions ‘of an equal standard of living’ can be
measured and compared in terms of their contribution to well-being.

However, a critic might ask, why accept the notion of GEO which argues for equalizing
opportunities to commensurate standard of living? This splits into 2 questions:
1) Why make reference to the standard of living?
We value a position because of its nature and benefits. Thus we SHOULD value opportunities of
such nature which protects human interests.
2) Why state that there should be EO to commensurate standard of living?
The opportunities from which, say, two persons can choose have to be of the same value. (given
the talents and drives of the persons)

4. Objection: standard of living as defined by Sen and Nussbaum cannot be measured since the
factors they list are unquantifiable. Thus, this definition of the standard of living cannot be used as
a principle of DJ.

Caney thinks this version of Calibration argument is unpersuasive because

1) If it’s hard to measure people’s opportunities to certain goods, it doesn’t mean they’re not
morally significant. People entitled to x should not be rejected x just because it’s hard to measure
it.
2) There are many sophisticated indices to measure standard of living. Vaguely right > precisely
wrong
3) Rough picture of what opportunities do people enjoy can be gained by examining the choices of
well-informed people.

Section III – argument that GEO is inappropriate

Relationist arguments – some or all ideals of DJ are applicable only within a certain arrangement which is
absent on a global scale

The argument refuting GEO should take this form:

1) Plausible account of ‘collaborative arrangement’
2) Establishing that principles of EO apply only within this arrangement
3) Showing that there’s no such global arrangement

If favoring partial repudiation:

4) explaining why certain principles of DJ apply outside the system but not GEO.

Caney says that domestic but not GEO equals special rights to citizens of a certain country and looks at
justifications of special rights to find (and refute) arguments for domestic EO but not for GEO.

1. Mutual restrictions - Hart

People work to create benefits and thus have a special right t benefits generated.

Yet Caney doesn’t think that this reasoning can be used to defend the specialty of the right to EO.
“Putative bearers of the right to EO are persons who have not yet participated in the economic
system”. The “mutuality of restrictions” apply to people who participate in the economy to create
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mutual benefit which then will be redistributed. But the special right stemming form sharing the
burden does not apply to those who did not yet share the burden. 2

2. Special relations (Part a) - Hart

Hart says that there are cases in which special right arises from the special relationship of the
parties. Occupying a certain social role – parent, diplomat (and, likewise, citizen of certain country)
– brings with it certain special rights, including welfare rights.

This argument is used by David Harris against GEO like this:

In virtue of belonging to a polit community people have special rights qua citizens and not qua
human beings. The social role of citizen brings with it an entitlement to EO within political
community.

Caney’s objections to Harris’s argument:

1) This argument rests on egalitarian conception of citizenship, but there are non-egalitarian
conceptions of citizenship. Claiming that EO is part of what means to be a citizen is not enough.
2) If membership in a political community is a good, then EO is essential for political community so
every citizen is included in it to the same level. But if community is good, it does not necessarily
take a form of political community.
3) Even if Harris argument plausibly defends domestic EO, it does not show why we should reject
GEO.

3. Special relationships (part b) – justification of domestic EO

Being a citizen brings with it certain civil and political rights and there, in turn, require material
resources for their fulfillment

Caney’s evaluation:
1) It may be true that fulfillment of civic rights require material resources on the side of citizens,
but it doesn’t follow that this fact entails equalization of starting positions for citizens
2) Even if it does justify domestic EO, it does not speak against GEO because it does not show that
non-citizenship-based defenses of GEO are unpersuasive.

“No of the three arguments considered has established that EO is best construed as civic right that applies
within the context of sovereign unit.”

Section IV

Objection based on Rawls’s The Law of Peoples in which he argues for restricted set of 8 principles of
international justice which are endorsed by liberal and decent nonliberal societies, and constitute
reasonable and fair international order.
The relevant principles are 6. “peoples are to honor human rights” which include the right to subsistence
and 8. “Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their
having a just or decent political and social regime”.

Differences between Rawls’s and Caney’s account:

1) content: Rawls is minimal, Caney is egalitarian

2
I think that state assumes that these people WILL share the burden and thus grants special rights in advance.
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2) methodological difference: global egalitarian principles are intolerant since they rest on liberal
egalitarian ideals that some reject. (“toleration” argument)

Disanalogy argument. Property P – commitment to liberal egalitarian values

Conciliatory points by Caney, that attempt to make some attempts to equalize opportunities at a
transnational level compatible with Rawls’s structures.
1) Toleration argument allows for transnational EO for individual members of liberal states
2) Difference between:
> Structural principles – principles of justice which should be entrenched in the global order
> Agent principles – principles which agents (like individuals or social movements) are permitted, or
obliged, to observe
Structural principles should be legitimately accepted. But they do not invalidate those who adopt GEO as an
agent principle – something according to which individuals ought to behave. It is possible that the state, in
honoring Rawlsian international order, engages in policies designed to equalize opportunities: e.g., allows
immigration or distributes resources and technology. GEO is compatible with Rawlsian international order.

Caney’s objections to Rawls:

1. Rawls’s toleration argument does not undermine the reasoning behind GEO (section I), just ads to it
another important value, and Caney says, we have to accept both: GEO and the value of not imposing on
peoples values that they reject.

2. It also matters who rejects the ideal of GEO. Certain forms of rejection are not as morally significant as
others. GEO could be rejected by

1) Those who would be advantaged by it. This rejection doesn’t matter because we could have GEO
and if someone chooses not to avail herself of them because she disagrees with them, then she is
free not to do so.
2) Those who are disadvantaged by it. We cannot reject the ideal because the privileged of the
current order want it.

3. Rawls’s conclusion of toleration argument is too strung: he rejects not only forcing of liberal values on
nonliberal peoples, but also employing “incentives” to encourage people to embrace basic liberal values.

The world in which people are not denied their entitlements, should be an ideal. A path to that could lead
to incentives which encourage societies to respect entitlements of their members and nonmembers.
Incentives is a peaceful method which respects peoples autonomy.

Rawls’s argument for basic moral criteria that societies must meet:
1. All societies should meet basic human right even if they themselves do not recognize them
2. The human rights are legitimate because “decent” liberal and illiberal societies accept them

Caney: (2) is unconvincing because these societies are defined by their recognition of these rights
Also, then why should we only accept the basic minimum that Rawls proposes? “If Rawls allows (as he
does) the imposition of certain values on all societies even if some dissent from them, on what grounds can
he reject GEO?”
Rawls rejects ideas of human dignity and thus his argument for a basic minimum lacks fundamental
reasoning, and thus is weak.
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Beitz “International Distributive Justice”

For utilitarian principled of justice or charity are all the same – we simply need to maximize utility.
For contractarian questions of global distributive justice might pose a problem: “contractarian principles
usually rest on the relations in which people stand in a national community united by a common
acceptance of a conception of justice”. Contractarian principles might not favor redistribution across
borders of these communities.

Beitz makes and argument from contractarian grounds for global distributive obligations, founded on
justice and not merely on mutual aid.

Beitz argument rests on the observation that international relations more and more resemble domestic
society in several respects relevant to the justification of principles of (domestic) social justice.

The argument of Beitz is extension and reinterpretation of Rawls in contemporary world. The argument
stands only if one holds Rawls’s theory to be plausible.

1. Social Cooperation Boundaries, and the Basis of Justice

Rawls’s theory:
 Justice – first virtue of social institutions
 Primary subject of justice is the way in which social institutions distribute fundamental rights,
duties, and advantages from social cooperation
 Principles of justice (PoJ) – tell how social institutions can fairly distribute benefits and burdens
of social life.
 Reasoning behind PoJ: Original position and veil of ignorance
 Society – cooperative venture for mutual advantage. If there were no such cooperation, there
would be no justice, since there would be no joint product with respect to which conflicting
claims might be pressed, nor would there be any common institutions to which principles could
apply. Of course, not necessarily all members of such community have to cooperate. (polis and
slaves). Beitz says that in fact, there may be a society in which all members are disadvantaged
compared to what they’d have been were there no society. But even this society can be judged
by PoJ, thus Rawls’s definition is too narrow.

Beitz’s alternative:
“the requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices (whether or not they are
genuinely cooperative) in which social activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens
that would not exist if the social activity did not take place”

 In any way, Rawl’s PoJ is not about relations between states, and for him are only applicable to a
scheme of social cooperation, i.e., institutions of a state.
This view rests on the assumption that states are self-sufficient and do not economically
cooperate with other states; however are not entirely self-contained, as Rawls also
acknowledges the existence of principles of international justice.

Principles of international justice are also agreed upon in international original position.
Basic principle of equality and all classical principles (non-intervention, self-determination, pacta
sunt servada, etc,)
Beitz poses an objection that principle of non-intervention prevents states from fighting unjust
regimes which violate human rights. But the objection doesn’t hold because The Law of Nations
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applies to the world of just states.

Rawls’s is an ideal theory and it doesn’t self-evidently follow that these rules ought to hold in
the nonideal world. At least it would require limiting their scope to cases in which their
observance would promote the development of just institutions in presently unjust societies;
observing basic protection of human rights.

International people in Rawls’s original position are aimed at providing conditions in which just
domestic social orders would flourish.

The real life problems of regulation of common areas (seas and outer space) are of a different
sort and require substantial cooperation among peoples.

2. Entitlements to Natural Resources

Accepting the assumption of national self-sufficiency Rawls’s principles seem plausible but not
exhaustive. Even among self-sufficient states the question of natural resources would invoke moral
conflict.

Material advancement of societies consists of:

1. Human cooperative activity
2. Natural resources – morally relevant even in the absence of international social cooperation.

Uneven distribution of natural resources among nations is analogous to uneven distribution of

talents among persons.

Rawls says (about talents) that natural positions are neither just nor unjust, (un)just is the way in
which institutions deal with these contingencies. Factors beyond person’s control are morally
arbitrary and should not influence his life prospects.

Beitz thinks that “parties would think that resources (or the benefits derived from them) should be
subject to redistribution under a resource redistribution principle)”

If analogy with talents holds, then objections against interference with the development and use of
talents would also hold against redistribution of natural resources. Objections:
1. Possessing a talent need not be justified, it is a natural fact, the natural possession means than
person has a right to use them
2. Talents are very much linked to the personality, to interfere with talents is to interfere with a
self.

Beitz says that these objections don’t hold against implications of moral arbitrariness of distribution
of natural resources:
Resources are morally arbitrary like talents in a sense that they are not deserved.
1. But unlike talents resources are not naturally attached to persons. They must be appropriated to
be used, while talents are naturally given.
In the situation of scarcity appropriation leaves others considerably disadvantaged.
2. While justification of possession of talent stems from personal liberty, this justification does not
apply to possession of natural resources.
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3. Resources do not stand in the same relation to personal identity as talents – they are not parts of
the self.

Thus, Beitz concludes: “the natural distribution of resources is a purer case of something “arbitrary
from a moral point of view”

Bietz says that nations do not gain a right to a wealth from natural resources simply because
they’re self-sufficient.
On the other hand, if all obligations emerge only within certain cooperation, i.e. social contract, no
justification for appropriation of resources is necessary in a global state of nature.
This justification seems plausible in theories with distributive justice who are concerned to
distribute burdens and benefits of social cooperation. In a world of self-sufficient states, there is
nothing to redistribute beyond the state borders.

Beitz says, that there is nothing in this reasoning that says that we can only have moral ties to those
with whom we share membership in a cooperative scheme.

Beitz argues that parties in international original position would agree on a resource redistribution
principle, taking into account arbitrariness of natural distribution and scarcity of resources. Each
person has prima facie claim to a share of a total available resources and deviations from this initial
standard need to be justified. Resource redistribution principle internationally = difference principle
domestically. Otherwise resource-poor countries might resort to war.
Also, in original position parties probably would agree on some principle of conservation.

3. Interdependence and Global Distributive Justice

Resource redistribution principle – strongest distributive principle applicable to the world of self-
sufficient states.

However, now the states are not self-sufficient as they participate in complex international
economic, political, and cultural relationships that suggest the existence of a global scheme of
social cooperation.
If one grounds necessity of DJ in existence of social cooperation, he must agree that in current
world order we need GDJ.

Main features of current world relevant to GDJ:

capital flows across state borders
Decline in tariffs and barriers to trade
World marker – demand for finished goods insensitive to their place of manufacture.
The main organization in response to these trends – multinational corporation.

It is clear that economic interdependence produces substantial aggregate economic benefits. It in

not so clear how these benefits are distributed.

Interdependence widens the income gap between rich and poor countries (even if it produces
absolute gains for most of them):
1. In the absence of continued transfers to those least advantaged by international trade (having
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less factor endowments and less access to technology), international inequalities are exacerbated.
2. Multinational corporations are able to extract monopoly by fixing prices in excess of competitive
levels.
3. Political power and ability to move profits to another country allows corporations to avoid paying
corporate taxes to domestic governments.

- Of course, these things depend on power of domestic governments to control businesses

Participation on the world economy produces political inequality:

If breaking a cooperative relationship imposes higher costs on one party, the other uses break of
relationship as a threat. That’s why economic policies were dictated by industrial countries to
developing countries. The most vulnerable to these relationships are developing non-oil exporting
countries (and those exporting few products to a few countries).

Adverse domestic consequences of interdependence:

1. Destabilization of domestic economies: difficulties for domestic governments to control their
own economies, since domestic economic behavior is influenced by economic developments
elsewhere
2. Contribution to internal inequalities: effect of participation in the world economy on domestic
income distribution in resource-poor developing countries:
 Gains from trade and retained profits from foreign-owned firms tend to be concentrated in
the upper income classes
 Political influence of foreign investors has supported governments committed to inegalitarian
domestic distributive policies

Global regulative structure – monetary institutions regulating money flows which emerged as a
result of interdependence.3 It is constitutional structure of world economy, its activities have
important distributive implications.

Political and legal institutions that influence global distribution of income and wealth:
1. International property rights – control of territory and natural resources by governments
2. Nonintervention – huge implications for welfare of people everywhere

Beitz conclusion: Social cooperation is not limited to state borders and produces benefits and
burdens which would not exist if national economies were autarkic.
Thus principles of justice should be extended to a global scale if there are countries which increase
their well being through cooperation with other states, while other states in these relations do not
fare so well. For this conclusion to hold economy doesn’t need to be completely integrated. Also,
everyone need not be advantaged by the cooperative scheme in order for requirements of justice
to apply.
It is enough that cooperation produces benefits and burdens.
The role of principle of DJ is then to specify what a fair distribution of those benefits and burdens
would be like.

What are principles of GDJ?: “Assuming that Rawls’s arguments for the two principles are
successful, there is no reason to think that the content of the principles would change as a result of
enlarging the scope of original position so that the principles would apply to a world as a whole.”

3
Set exchange rates, regulate the money supply, influence capital flows, enforce rules of international economic
conduct
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Beitz says that global difference principle should apply to globally least advantaged persons, not
states, because membership of a group of the least advantaged in the world does not coincide with
any particular state.
States should be subjects of international distributive responsibilities since they are in best
positions to carry out whatever policies are needed to implement global principles.

4. Contrasts between International and Domestic Society

Differences between international and domestic societies that might refute Beitz’s conclusions:
1. Absence of effective decision-making and decision-enforcing institutions on international level,
compared to domestic societies. One must admit that currently there’s no reliable way of enforcing
compliance with international redistributive principles.
2. Absence of international sense of community which is the basis of compliance with laws in
domestic society. Capacity for a sense of justice (Rawls). This fact can be used against the ideal of
GDJ in that morality cannot demand the impossible.

Beitz say that these objections misunderstand the relation of ideal theory to the real world. IT
provides a goal towards which world should develop.

Beitz’s answers to objection:

1. Both of these objections rests on empirical facts that can change over time: we can develop
both institutions and capacity for sense of GJ.
2. Maybe these to things are undesirable altogether: authoritative global institutions could be
oppressive and global sense of justice could kill people’s distinct identities.
To these considerations Beitz says that institutions and sentiments on which compliance with
global principles is based do not need to closely resemble their domestic analogues. Allegiance
to global sense of justice is compatible with loyalties to smaller groups necessary to feelings of
belonging and identity. Also, different kinds of institutions could be invented, not necessarily
resembling domestic ones.

Beitz concludes that “contrast” objections do not invalidate his conclusions on global application of
difference principle. They are relevant not to the ideal of GDJ, but to the problem of realizing this
ideal.

Fair (just) coercive institutions

They give assurance to those they coerce to make sacrifices that others in similar circumstances will
be coerced to make similar sacrifices.
The perceptions that such institutions can assure a fair distribution of the burdens of social
cooperation is an important source of motivation for compliance.
This coercion constitutes the difference between obligations of charity and obligations of justice.

In international relations this assurance is often absent and thus bringing about GDJ is similar to
escaping Hobbesian SON. But there are differences:
1. Persons in SON risk death, persons before GDJ risk only relative deprivation
2. The assurance problem is easier to solve in international relations, than in SON.
3. Int. relations already has a variety of institutions which could be adjusted to carry out just
distribution, while there’s no such institutions in SON.
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--- all in all, in international system it is possible to find intermediate solutions which could bring it
closer to the ideal of GDJ.

Objection about voluntariness of participation in global social cooperation, while terms of domestic
cooperation apply to its members regardless their consent.
Beitz answers that relationships can be considered to be nonvoluntary since in the case of worse-
off participants, the weaker party lacks the resources to bargain effectively for different terms of
exchange. Terms are set by more powerful partner.
Also, reasons for weak state’s vulnerability are often beyond its control (uneven distribution of
resources or historical injustices).
Thus we cannot ignore the moral arbitrariness of factors which cause some countries to be in
relatively worse-off position.