Thea Faye B.

Cahuya JD-1A

Sec. of DND et al v. Raymund Manalo, et al

G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to
the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and
omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish
the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.
The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking
to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not statements from the victims is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke the right to security of
a person
Ruling:
1. YES. Much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places
where they were detained.
2. YES. Covered by the privilege of the writ, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people.” Moreover, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of one’s rights by the government. As the government is the chief guarantor of order
and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.
 Robert Reyes v. Sec. Raul Gonzales
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were
charged of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued Hold Departure
Order in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against
the petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused
civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to
them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police
authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the
dismissal of the crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is
included in the Hold Departure List. This happens every time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s
constitutional right to travel.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with
violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ
of amparo.

Ruling:
NO. The writ is a remedy for any person whose right to life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private person or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or
threats thereof.
Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities he has been endowed by his Creator.
Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the court’s sound discretion."
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
AMOUNTED to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security for which there exists
no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
 RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
Facts:
Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members
an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car
where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol). The men
started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of the
New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Rodriguez was then subjected to
beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to
admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations.
Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also
coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied
by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They went home to Manila. Callagan
and 2 military members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite
Rodriguez’s effort to stop them. On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that
several suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT. Rodriguez
then filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009. Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the
petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine
Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo
and habeas data cases.
Ruling:
YES. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order
to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Proceedings under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but this should
not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the
respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other
hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No.
191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and
habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and
property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
 Dr. Joy Lee v. Neri Ilagan
G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014

Facts:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy,
her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s
condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered
from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the
return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed
Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against
him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the
Napolcom, utilizing the said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and
privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of
the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital
camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days
from receipt. In her return, Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and
reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s
petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in
the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of
data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of
the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant
petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan.
Ruling:
NO. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the
right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order
to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily,
the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this
relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege
that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.
 Marynette Gamboa v. Marlou C. Chan et al
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa
Commission which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country
in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its
investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President.
Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the
Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her
aides and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of
media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated,
Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the
unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports
against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to
privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that
Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.

Issue:
Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy

Ruling:
NO. It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded
to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.
This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in
the report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
 TELEBAP v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

Facts:
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during the period of election.

Issue:
Whether or not the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation
of media of communication or information during the period of election is in excess.

Ruling:
NO. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC
Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise
their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time
for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government
would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides
that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,”
while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free
speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have
access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the
autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media
can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render
in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
 ABS-CBN Brodcasting v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000

Facts:
COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups from
conducting exit survey during the elections for national officials particularly for President and
Vice President. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-
CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Issue:
Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of
Speech and of the Press.

Ruling:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media
constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the COMELEC
cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in
eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the COMELEC so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of
suffrage. The Court cannot support any ruling or order “the effect of which would be to nullify
so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When faced with borderline situations in which the
freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked
against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of
freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate
should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain
them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
 Felipe Navarro v. Court of Appels
G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the
police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the
City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused
policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The
victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist
blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded
on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Issue:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wiretapping.
Ruling:
The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law;
or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.. . . .
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications.Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2)
that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those
of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;[32]
and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals
248 SCRA 590

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees
and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610, 000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and
penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The RTC granted the Motion. From
the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and
void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the
party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Ruling:
YES, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it
shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
 Zulueta v. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 699

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta, petitioner, entered the clinic of her husband, Alfredo Martin, private
respondent, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinets and took a total of 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between the private respondent and and hi alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, respondent’s passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were to be used in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from practice of medicine filed by the petitioner against the private respondent.
Respondent then filed an action for the recovery of the documents and damages against
the petitioner which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The decision of the RTC
was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) hence this petition for certiorary.

Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence

Ruling:
NO.  Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."  Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
  The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
  The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.  But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
  The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  
 Waterous Drugs Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997

Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico
sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price
is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check
payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to
her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a
check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC:
Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible,
by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
YES. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision,
we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement
would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to
Catolico.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month’s salary for every year
of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half
months’ salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such,
we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision
and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to
its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set
aside.
 Marquez v. Desierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

Facts:
Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order from
Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera. The
Ombudsman wanted to conduct such in camera inspection on the accounts based on a trail of
manager’s checks by a certain Trivinio who purchased 51 managers checks for a total amount of
P272M. Marquez agreed to the inspection. Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the
accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The
Ombudsman replied that the Bank should have preserved records despite the accounts being
dormant.
Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents due to the
unjustified delay by the Bank since the in camera inspection had already been extended twice.
Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the bank
secrecy law

Issue:
 Whether or not the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to the bank
secrecy law.

Ruling:
NO. The in camera inspection is not allowed. There being no pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction. An exception to the bank secrecy law is when the money deposited is
the subject matter of a litigation.
Therefore, it may be allowed on the ground of a pending case when:
o     The case is pending in court of competent jurisdiction
o     The account must be clearly identified
o     Inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case
o     The Bank personnel and account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
o     Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what
the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally
charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in
court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
 Ople v. Torres
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
Facts:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.

Ruling:
YES. The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308
is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the
said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.