TABLE OF CONTENTS

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 Chapters Page
Number

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 4

INTRODUCTION 5

HISTORY 6

VIOLENCE IN WEST BENGAL 7

CAUSES OF NAXALITE MOVEMENT 8

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF HUMAN 10

DEVELOPMENT DEFICITS

REASONS FOR FAILURE(1967-1975) 16

MOVEMENTS AFTER 2004 18

CONCLUSION 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY 20

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would sincerely like to put forward my heartfelt thanks to our

respected Sociology Professor Mr. Rahul Kosambi for giving me a
golden opportunity to take up this project on - Naxalite Movement.

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 I have tried my best to collect information about the project in various
possible ways to depict a clear picture about the Naxalite Movement.

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 Posters, leaflets, graffiti — Naxalbari, a nondescript village in north Bengal, is gearing up
to celebrate 50 years of a movement, a peasants’ uprising, that inspired other resistance
movements in the country.

INTRODUCTION
Naxal, Naxalite or Naksalvadi militant Communist groups operating in different parts
of India under different organizational envelopes. In the eastern states of the mainland India
(Jharkhand, West Bengal and Orissa), they are usually known as, or refer to themselves
as Maoists while in southern states like Andhra Pradesh they are known under other titles. They
have been declared as a terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of
India (1967). Leaders of the movement have been found to have hideouts located in China 1. The
term 'Naxal' derives from the name of the village Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal, India,
where the movement had its origin. The Naxals are considered far-left radical communists,
supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split in
1967 of the Communist, leading to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–
Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West. In later years, it spread into less
developed areas of rural central and eastern India, such as Chhattisgarh and Orissa  through the
activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist)2. For the past 10
years, it has grown mostly from displaced tribals and natives who are fighting against
exploitation from major Indian corporations and local officials whom they believe to be corrupt.
In 2006 India's intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing estimated that 20,000
armed cadre. Naxalites were operating in addition to 50,000 regular cadres and their growing

1
The Times of India. 2011-10-08. Retrieved 2011-12-31. Times of India describe new findings of China ISI links to
Naxal movement.
2
Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh (2005-09-21). "The Naxalite Challenge". Frontline Magazine (The Hindu). Retrieved
2007-03-15.

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influence prompted Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare them to be the most
serious internal threat to India's national security3. In February 2009, the Indian Central
government announced a new nationwide initiative, to be called the "Integrated Action Plan"
(IAP) for broad, co-ordinate operations aimed at dealing with the Naxalite problem in all
affected states, namely (Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal). Importantly, this plan included
funding for grass-roots economic development projects in Naxalite affected areas, as well as
increased special police funding for better containment and reduction of Naxalite influence in
these areas. In 2009, Naxalites were active across approximately 180 districts in ten states of
India. In August 2010, after the first full year of implementation of the national IAP
program, Karnataka was removed from the list of naxal affected states. In July 2011, the number
of Naxal affected areas was reduced to (figure includes proposed addition of 20 districts) 83
districts across nine states. In December 2011, the national government reported that the number
of Naxalite related deaths and injuries nationwide had gone down by nearly 50% from 2010
levels.

What Happened? – History

The term Naxalites comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Ram Prabhav
Singh and Jangal Santhal, J P Inspector initiated a violent uprising in 1967. On May 18, 1967, the Siliguri
Kishan Sabha, of which Jangal was the president, declared their readiness to adopt armed struggle to
redistribute land to the landless. The following week, a share cropper near Naxalbari village was attacked
by the landlord's men over a land dispute. On May 24, when a police team arrived to arrest the peasant
leaders, it was ambushed by a group of tribals led by Jangal Santhal, and a police inspector was killed in a
hail of arrows. This event encouraged many Santhal tribal’s and other poor people to join the movement
and to start attacking local landlords 4. These conflicts go back to the failure of implementing the 5th &
9th Schedules of the Constitution of India. See Outlook India comment by E.N. Rammohan 'Unleash the
3

4
Diwanji, A. K. (2003-10-02).

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Good Force' - edition July 16, 2012. In theory these Schedules provide for a limited form of tribal
autonomy with regard to exploiting natural resources on their lands, e.g. pharmaceutical & mining), and
'land ceiling laws', limiting the land to be possessed by landlords and distribution of excess land to
landless farmers & laborers. The caste system is another important social aspect of these conflicts.
Mao Zedong provided ideological leadership for the Naxalbari movement, advocating that Indian
peasants and lower class tribal’s overthrow the government and upper classes by force. A large number of
urban elites were also attracted to the ideology 5, which spread through Majumdar's writings, particularly
the 'Historic Eight Documents' which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology. In 1967, Naxalites organized
the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), and later broke away
from CPM. Violent uprisings were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969, the AICCCR gave
birth to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)).
Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate offshoot from the beginning
was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh group. The MCC later fused
with the People's War Group to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A third offshoot was that of
the Andhra revolutionary communists, mainly represented by the UCCRI (ML), following the mass
line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy, which broke with the AICCCR at an early stage.
During the 1970s, the movement was fragmented into disputing factions. By 1980, it was estimated that
around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of 30,000 6.

VIOLENCE IN WEST BENGAL

 In 1970 the Naxalites gained a strong presence among the radical sections of the student movement
in Calcutta. Students left school to join the Naxalites. Majumdar, to entice more students into his

5
Hindustan Times
6
Times of India

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 organisation, declared that revolutionary warfare was to take place not only in the rural areas as
before, but everywhere and spontaneously. Thus Majumdar declared an "annihilation line", a dictum
that Naxalites should assassinate individual "class enemies" (such as landlords, businessmen,
university teachers, police officers, politicians of the right and left) and others. Throughout Calcutta,
schools were shut down. Naxalites took over Jadavpur University and used the machine shop
facilities to make pipe guns to attack the police. Their headquarters became Presidency College,
Kolkata. The Naxalites found supporters among some of the educated elite, and Delhi's prestigious St.
Stephen's College, alma mater of many contemporary Indian leaders and thinkers, became a hotbed of
Naxalite activities.

 The chief minister, Siddhartha Shankar Ray of the Congress Party, instituted strong counter-measures
against the Naxalites. The West Bengal police fought back to stop the Naxalites. The house of Somen
Mitra, the Congress MLA of Sealdah, was allegedly turned into a torture chamber where Naxal
students from Presidency College and CU were incarcerated illegally by police and the Congress
cadres. CPI-M cadres were also involved in the "state terror". After suffering losses and facing the
public rejection of Majumdar's "annihilation line", the Naxalites alleged human rights violations by
the West Bengal police, who responded that the state was effectively fighting a civil war and that
democratic pleasantries had no place in a war, especially when the opponent did not fight within the
norms of democracy and civility7. Large sections of the Naxal movement began to question
Majumdar's leadership. In 1971 the CPI(ML) was split, as the Satyanarayan Singh revolted against
Majumdar's leadership. In 1972 Majumdar was arrested by the police and died in  Alipore Jail. His
death accelerated the fragmentation of the movement.

CAUSES OF NAXALITE MOVEMENT

 Naxalism is the most significant political movement since independence. It has been the most long-
lasting though it has had its ups and downs. Despite its fragmented nature a continuing thread with
some variations can be seen in the ideological thrust, strategy and tactics of mobilization of different
groups within its fold. It is the only movement which having started in one police station of a single
district in West Bengal in 1967 has expanded its activities covering over 460 police stations in 160
7
Diwanji, A. K. (2003-10-02)

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 districts across 14 states despite the police force and infrastructure having grown manifold during
this period. The movement’s capacity to challenge the state has also enormously increased
considering the incidents of violence and casualties resulting from them. The movement is viewed
with greater anxiety in the government because it is most intense precisely in areas which are rich in
natural resources and, therefore, targeted for fast-track industrial development. These are also the
areas which have a history of mass protests by the peasantry against colonial policies. The movement
is also unique in that it tends to mobilize the most subdued and socially marginalized sections and
lays bare, as probably no other movement has done, the sharp fissures in the society, politics and
economy. Unlike the political mass movements with violent underpinnings featuring in the border
areas, naxalites do not seek to secede from the Indian union to establish a sovereign independent state
of their own but only to capture political power through armed struggle to restructure society.

 A movement with such clarity of goals and sharply carved out strategies is usually spearheaded by a
well knit organization. Though the naxlite movement continues to be fragmented in separate small
groups, after 1977 three organized political formations – CPI (ML)- Liberation, CPI (Maoist) and CPI
(ML) have emerged with their distinct programmes, policies and strategies of revolution. Although
all of them share the broad ideological goal of overthrowing the government and capture of state as a
prelude to revolutionary restructuring of society, their strategies of achieving it in respect of
mobilization of people, role of armed underground cadre, participation of people in their actions,
solving people’s grievances differ. Basically it is the approach to parliamentary politics and the
pursuit of armed struggle that differentiates the three formations (Mohanty, 2006). The groups which
are not banned participate in the elections and also have representatives in the elective bodies. Their
mass mobilization activities are, however, severely constrained by formal and informal prohibitions
imposed by the local administration. After the merger of CPI (ML) (People’s War) with Maoists
Community Centre (MCC) in September, 2004, CPI (Maoists) have emerged as the dominant naxalite
group and the most visible face of the movement. Its mode of struggle has emerged as the defining
feature of naxalism and determines the nature of state’s response to the movement and civil society’s
attitude in the matter8.

 Social and political movements do not arise in vacuum. They are rooted in the objective conditions of
life and respond to the deep-seated frustrations of the people with the existing social, economic and
political order, its institutions and practices and the notions of development, participation and
governance which they challenge and seek to change. The state becomes central to this
enterprise since it carries the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, functions as an
arbiter for allocation of socially valued goods and upholder of existing institutions and
practices, and shapes relationships between citizens, organized interests, institutions and
political system. It makes binding decisions, claiming to represent and aggregate various social
interests and enforces adherence to them (Jerkins and Klandermans,1995) 9.

 Although naxalite movement is spread over 12 states, the most acutely affected ones happen to be
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Orissa and West Bengal. But the
number of incidents and the casualties resulting from them are concentrated in Chhatisgarh,
Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra in that order. These states feature dense
forests with predominance of the tribal population followed by dalits and other backward
communities. The tribals and dalits are among the poorest of the poor and the most socially
marginalized sections of the society. They are also the most peace loving communities who are not

8
The Times Of India,2008
9
The Naxalite Movement, New Delhi

8
 easily persuaded to challenge even a locally dominant authority let alone resist the state power. But
they are also the groups for whom the movement has great appeal and who form its large support
base. Of them, those who are conceptually wedded to the ideology of the movement and engage in
executing the directives of the party are only a few thousands. The rest of the population only lends
tacit support. Some among them may be doing so out of fear rather than genuine attraction to its
programme. There must, therefore, be something compelling in the social situation which drives these
people to lend this support. Three committees constituted by the Government of India one in 1960s,
the second in mid 1980s, and the third in late 1980s have looked into the causes of disaffection in the
population in these areas. There are, in addition, academic studies and reports of the civil society
groups. All these reports with varying emphasis have brought out the factors contributing to the
growth of radial left movements. Yet, no attempt has been made to address the issues involved
holistically. It is, therefore, in the social conditions of these groups and their existential experience
that we shall have to explore why their level of tolerance has reached a breaking point. This
exploration would refer to the status of these groups in the country as a whole since disaggregated
information is not readily available in respect of the states affected by the movement. However, there
are no reasons to believe that the problems of these groups in the affected states would be any better
than what the overall national picture in respect of them presents.

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEFICITS

1. POVERTY-
The structural violence contributes to and is also reinforced by human development deficits in respect of
all accepted indicators which are lower in the case of these communities when compared to the other
social groups. These pronounced disparities have a debilitating effect on the psyche of the affected
population and a cause of their seething resentment. Of these indicators, poverty tops the list. It
constitutes the greatest source of misery and degradation in life. The dalits and the tribes are among the
poorest sections of the society. At the national as well as the state level in the naxalite belt, they are at the
bottom of the ladder. In fact, Bihar, Orissa, MP, Chhatisgarh, West Bengal, UP are states which account
for 58% of the dalit  population but 70% poor among them and 49% of tribal population but
63% of the poor among them. The percentage of dalits below poverty line was 36.8 (rural) and
40 (urban) and of tribals 47.3 (rural) and 33.3 (urban) compared to 28 (rural) and 25.77 (urban) for the
nation (GOI, 2008). The incidence of poverty is higher than 50% among the tribals in Orissa (73%),
Jharkhand (including Bihar 59%), MP (including Chhatisgarh 57%) and between 35-50% in West Bengal,
Maharashtra, Assam and UP (including Uttaranchal). Similarly, the incidence of poverty is the highest in
Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, UP and Assam. The states of UP, MP (including
Chhatisgarh), Bihar (including Jharkhand) and West Bengal have concentration of poor dalits. The rate of
decline of rural poverty between 1994-2000 was also lower (2.5%) among the tribals and (4.86%) among
the dalits compared to 6.03% in the case of the other communities. It is evident that neither the state
intervention nor market liberalization policies have registered the desired impact on alleviation of poverty
(Radhakrishna and Ray, 2005). The poverty and its slower amelioration have a great deal of linkage with
the lack of productive assets which enables households to generate income and engage in dignified and
sustained employment. This is corroborated by the incidence of landlessness which is higher among the
dalits and tribals than other communities. On a comparative scale, 10% of the dalits (at the ground level,

The term dalits is used here for the SCs and tribals is used for the STs

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the percentage is much higher) are landless and 77% are near landless while for those excluding the dalits
and tribals, the percentages are 4.8 and 63 respectively. The largest numbers of them are agricultural
labourers (45.6%) there being low incidence of diversified occupation among them. The level of
urbanization among dalits is half (11%) of the level for the other communities (22%). The non-farm
workers among them are 24% while the percentage is 36 for others. In urban areas too, dalits are largely
engaged in traditional or low status occupation - sweepers, cobblers, washer men etc. As for the tribals,
the head-count ratio of poverty is much higher not only in comparison to the other groups but even the
dalits and the rate of decline slower and the percentage decline the lowest. Though the tribals had a much
better landholding than the dalits at the time of independence, the incidence of landlessness has grown
faster in their case because of large scale displacement and alienation of their land by the non-tribal
immigrants to their area. But even in respect of those who own land, not all are able to cultivate it
because a large portion of tribal land is unfit for cultivation. In respect of the rest, lack of resources does
not permit its cultivation (Radhakrishna and Ray, 2005). This also explains why 38.13% of them are
agricultural labourers. The incidence of regular employment in the urban areas in their case is also the
lowest (4.10%) even in comparison to the dalits (7.4%) while it is far higher for others (17.89%). The
concentration of tribals in agriculture (more than 70% are dependent on agriculture) makes them
extremely vulnerable because the tribal land is poor in soil fertility and almost entirely rain-fed. Only
26% of the land owned by the tribals is irrigated compared to 53% in respect of the other communities.
The region is mono-cropped and productivity very low. The agricultural activity is also extremely
vulnerable to climate fluctuations (most frequently visited by drought) and the produce by market
fluctuation and, therefore, yields low income.

2. FOOD INSECURITY-
Both the dalits and tribals suffer from acute food deficiency but the tribals face it far more than the dalits.
As per official data, nearly 1% of the tribal households do not have sufficient food in any month of the
year while nearly 3% of the households face food shortage for some months in a year which is an
underestimate. The food insufficiency affects 6% of the tribal households while the level is 4-5% in the
case of dalits. In either case, it is far higher when compared to the other groups. Nearly 71.6% of tribal
households are food deficit for 2-3 months and 5% for six months and above (Radhakrishna and Ray,
2005). The incidence of starvation deaths, characteristic of extreme impoverishment, is the highest in the
tribal areas where families are forced to sell their children for survival. Hunger is also the greatest cause
of indebtedness among the tribes as they borrow money for consumption at very high rates of interest
during the lean agricultural season when there is no employment.10

3. LOWER PER-CAPITA CONSUMTION -

These depressing indicators in respect of productive assets, employment and food insecurity lead to low
per-capita consumption expenditure – an indication of low purchasing power. In the case of tribals,
approximately 50% of rural households are concentrated in the consumption class of less than Rs.340
while the corresponding percentage in the case of dalits is 40% and for others 17%. In the urban areas,
52% of the tribal households are in the consumption class of Rs.577 as against 29% of the other groups.
The inequality and the ratio of poverty between the tribals and others have increased over the years
(Radhakrishna and Ray, 2005). As per the Report of National Commission for Enterprises in the Un-
organized Sector, 392 million people live with an average per capita consumption of Rs.20/- a day

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NHRC Report

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(NCEUS, 2006). There is little doubt that the dalits and tribals constitute the largest segment in this
category particularly in the states which are affected by Naxalite activities .

4. HEALTH-
The situation in respect of health status is even worse. The infant mortality rates, indicative of the reach
of primary health care is as high as 84.2 per thousand in the case of tribals and 83 per thousand in the case
of dalits compared to 61.8 in the case of others. Their limited access to health care is evident from the
fact that barely 42% of the pregnant dalit women could get ante-natal care from a doctor compared to
64% of the other communities and 28% only could consult an ANM. In the case of the tribes, only 18%
could have their deliveries in a health facility compared to 51% among the other communities and 33% in
the case of dalits (GOI, 2008). The position in respect of the under 5 mortality is 119.3 in respect of the
dalits and 126.6 in the case of tribes compared to 82.6 for others (MTA, 2005). The disparity is also
reflected in the high morbidity, low level of immunization, high level of malnutrition among women in
these communities. The nutritional levels in these groups are truly disturbing. The percentage of children
with anemia is 78% in the case of dalits and 79% in the case of tribes. The incidence of anemia among
women is the highest (64.9%) in the case of tribes while it is 40-50% in the case of other social groups..
These parameters influence outcomes of pregnancies and state of children that are born with long term
health consequences. The child malnutrition affects 61% of tribal children under five years of age while
53% of tribal adults suffer from chronic energy deficiency. The crude death rate is also higher among
the tribals. The most chronic malnutrition areas in the country are in the tribal belt of Maharashtra,
Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The under 5 mortality per 1000 is 119.3 in the case of dalits and 126.6 in the
case of tribals as against 82.6 for others. Here too, the overall percentages for these communities
conceal a more depressing picture in respect of the states where the naxalite movement is strong.
The data from NHFS III (2005-06) brings out the caste differentials in relation to the health
status. It records low level of contraceptive use among the dalits and the tribes compared to the
forward castes and reduced access to ante-natal care, institutional deliveries and complete vaccination
coverage. The incidence of stunting, wasting, underweight in children is also higher among these
groups. Similar differentials were documented in the NHFS II (1998-99).

5. SOCIAL EXCLUSION-
These disparities in human development attainments are not caused by bias in policies or paucity of
resources but are rooted in the social structure which excludes these groups from the benefits of
development and access to social services. The social status of the dalits is determined by birth,
reinforced by degrading social practices and vocations imposed on them and sustained by social sanctions
and physical force. The dalits and tribes in every walk of life and all stages suffer from numerous
discriminatory and exclusionary practices which deny entitlements and equal access to opportunities by
the higher caste groups in the case of the dalits and by the non-tribal groups in the case of tribes. This
can be observed in the prevalence of untouchability experienced by the dalits not withstanding its
abolition. The untouchability practices include exclusion in drawing water from a public well, access to a
temple and participation in religious procession, entry into a village shop, restrictions in wearing clothes
of choice and movement within the village, house entry, access to village level institutions, prohibitions
on marriage processions through village road and discrimination in treatment while receiving services of
the barber, postman, washer-man, potter, priest and the grocery shop keeper as also in village festivals,
cultural events, sitting arrangement of students in the village schools, separate earmarking of seats in
village panchayats and serving of tea and snacks in separate cups and plates. The extent of prevalence of

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these practices is not uniform and varies across states (Throat, 2002). On the economic front,
discrimination is practiced in the labour market, input market, access to social services and participation
in some category of jobs. This bias can be observed in refusing to hire dalit or tribal candidates in the case
of employment despite fulfillment of formal qualifications and favouring less qualified candidates of the
other castes, wage rate, share of rent, rate of interest charged, fees for services, working conditions,
opportunities for upward mobility (Thorat, 2007) and in the sale of items from shops owned by the dalits.
The restrictions are also imposed on the change of traditional occupation by them. The dalits also face
differential treatment and restrictions in access to land, labour, capital, credit education and other inputs
and services required for participation in commercial activities (Thorat, 2007). This translates into denial
of jobs, denial of access to capital market through denial of sale, purchase or leasing of land, sale and
purchase factor inputs and commodities and consumer goods. The social barriers also exist in the formal
urban labour market even for the highly qualified dalits and tribals. Despite public policy to support
entrepreneurship among these groups, they account for only 10% and 4.6% of the private enterprises in
the country compared to 40% and 45% in respect of the OBCs and higher castes respectively in the rural
areas and even less in the urban areas. The bulk of even these are household enterprises (Thorat and
Sadane, 2009). The patterns of exclusion and caste discrimination pervade the public sphere as well
including a number of state institutions and interactions that occur within them (Shah et al, 2006). It also
afflicts government services, as brought out, for example, in a survey conducted in 531 villages of five
states which exposed such practices in Mid Day Meal Scheme and Public Distribution System. The
dominant caste communities bar dalit children from the Mid Day Meal Scheme, oppose engagement of
dalit cook, segregate seating arrangement, serve separate meals, give dalit children inferior or
insufficient food. The dalit’s access to PDS is compromised by differential treatment in the quantity of
grains supplied, price of grain charged, favouritism in favour of the higher castes, untouchability in the
mode of distribution and ownership of PDS shops (Throat and Lee, 2005). While the discrimination listed
above also takes place, though less so, in the case of tribes, they are far greater victims of fraud by the
non-tribals in every walk of life – in the transactions of the market, access to services, social intercourse,
economic activities etc. This exclusion and discrimination is directly linked to lower income and higher
poverty.

The social inequality driven by the hierarchical social structure and cultural differentiation and the
inferiority it generates overwhelms economic inequality and is reinforced by it. This hurts the victims
more than poverty and deprivation and explains why restoration of dignity is on the top of the agenda of
the naxalites which the existing system has been unable to accomplish. 11

6. GOVERNANCE-
The analysis made above makes it evident that the policy architecture represented by three streams of
intervention – protection, development and participation has failed to achieve their intended objectives
and have, therefore, made no contribution to reduce let alone eliminate the structural violence inflicted on
the dalits and tribals.

The gaps in policy architecture and ground realities emerging from its implementation makes it
abundantly clear that the interface of dalits and tribals with the governance structures holds the key to
the understanding of naxalite movement and appreciation of its violent manifestations. But the
movement is also significantly related to the relationship which these communities have with the larger
society around them. The state-people interface is multifaceted and covers all organs of the government
as well as the economy and political formations outside it. The interface with the larger society is
reflected in its institutions and practices as also the thinking and behavior of its members. Governance

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NHRC Report

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was expected to influence relationships of these marginalized groups with the state as well as society so
as to create a feeling of inclusion among them. The first was to be achieved by formulating laws,
policies and programmes to remove constraints and disabilities in enjoyment of freedom and equality.
The second was to be realized by vigorously promoting social change. That this has not been achieved is
a testimony of the failure of governance. The result is lack of confidence and trust in the established
authority and deep alienation of people from the government. Far worse, it has generated in them a
feeling of helplessness and despair.

7. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION-
Another dimension of this model of ‘development’ is the degradation of environment which also causes
social injustice. The tribal heartland, the centre of naxalite movement, is the worst affected in this regard
due to concentration of mining and industrial projects. The mining projects have turned agricultural land
in the vicinity of projects barren, polluted water sources, denuded forests, defiled the air and degraded
the quality of life of the people who live and work in the area. The change in land use deprives people of
their traditional source of livelihood and life supporting benefits from the forest. The immense air
pollution has devastating health effects – T.B, silicosis, cancer and even the lassemia which have
increased mortality rates and lowered life expectancy. The commercial exploitation of bio-
diversity through mass tourism generates severe competition for limited forest resources and causes
social and cultural disruption in the tribal communities. The laws and regulatory arrangements to check
environmental degradation are weak in fixing responsibility of the polluter and liability for payment of
compensation, and ineffective in implementation. The regulatory authorities tilt in favour of the industry
which has financial and political clout. Even social protests bring no relief to the affected persons as
they are powerless. This environmental degradation threatens not merely the current level of existence of
the people in the area but the future generations as well. The pattern of economic growth ignores huge
social and human cost which the people in this region have to pay.

8. JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATION-

The third dimension of governance relates to the administration of justice i.e., punishment for violation
of laws and institutional arrangements for conflict resolution and grievance redressal. The greatest
frustration is caused to the people when crimes and injustices are not punished and disputes and conflicts
are not settled by the state apparatus fairly and in time (Singh, 1994). It is then that they look for
alternative modes of getting justice and settling disputes. There are stories from Naxalite areas about
persons who took up arms when faced with such acute injustices like dispossession from land, rape of
their women, deprivation of fruits of labour, incarceration in false cases and violence of the law
enforcing agencies with no action against the guilty persons by the concerned agencies. The existing
justice administration system has failed the people belonging to these groups. The authorities which
deal with investigation and prosecution are insensitive and tilted in favour of those who violate laws
and commit crimes. The judicial system is too formal, remote, slow, expensive and technical besides
being user-unfriendly to be of any help to the weak and the poor. Both are ridden with corruption and
their process are vulnerable to manipulation by the persons from the dominant social groups. The dalits
and tribals feel that the system is not meant for them but only for the rich and the powerful. They get
entrapped in it as accused rather than as complainants. They have no faith in it (Daghamvar, 2006). It is
not surprising that the naxalite system of dispensing instant justice, however abhorrent to the liberal mind,
attracts them. The discourse on Alternative Dispute Resolution as an answer to the ills of the existing
system is also irrelevant to the needs of these groups as also the other poor. The genesis of ADR lies in

13
the needs of the business class and government who want quick resolution to save resources and time.
The poor require a simple, inexpensive, user-friendly system of justice administration at the
village/panchayat level. There is no thinking in the government to design such a system. What is being
attempted is a new law to set up judicial courts at the block level called the Gram Nyayalyas to reduce
the distance people have to travel as well as their expenses. But these courts would continue to operate
with the existing rules of evidence and processes of adjudication and would, therefore, be riddled with
the same problems witnessed at a higher level. The Nyaya Panchayats are also being contemplated to
take the administration of justice lower down and make it user-friendly. But given the existing unequal
power structure in the village, there is little hope that the marginalized groups would get justice against
their powerful adversaries even in this foray. Besides, Nyaya Panchayats would only deal with minor
offences.

The mechanism for redressal of grievances in the domain of civil administration is even more
important for these groups. This is because a larger number of complaints such as those relating to
land, wages, and deprivation of entitlements and harassment of lower level officials fall in its jurisdiction
and its processes of disposal are less formal and time consuming. Here too, the complainants fare no
better. The officials are not easily approachable. The complaints are not entertained and when
registered under pressure, enquiries remain pending for a long time. Still worse, enquiries into the
complaints are eventually carried out by the same persons against whom allegations of omissions and
commissions have been made. The higher level formations routinely accept reports received from the
subordinate formations which falsify the complaints and defend their action. In this manner, delivery of
justice is frustrated. There is lack of transparency in disposal of complaints and reluctance even to
inform the complainant about the outcome of his complaint let alone give him/her a chance to contest the
findings in the reports. The complainant is totally frustrated because he/she is unable to get grievances
redressed and at times, even a personal hearing. Still worse, this mechanism is influenced by political
intervention and manipulated by powerful persons. The grievance redressal system is most unresponsive
when the complaints relate to the excesses of the local officials particularly the police and security
officials. Here, even the statutory agencies like the national and state commissions have proved totally
ineffective. In these circumstances, the system of governance far from providing comfort to the victims
who suffer structural violence operates in a manner that accentuates the crisis of confidence in the
system.

9. DEMOCRACY-
Democracy is considered to be the greatest antidote to the social discontent and its potential spillover to
violence as it provides a safety valve through which the discontent of the people gets an outlet and can,
therefore, be addressed timely and in an orderly manner. The institutional democracy and its processes
have, however, significantly failed in this endeavor. Their non-performance lies in the indifference
towards the widespread structural violence which members of these communities face in their daily lives
and their failure to get justice from the system. It is also reflected in the lack of determination and
corresponding efforts to break the feudal agrarian power structure, humanize corporate attitude to labour
and eliminate caste ridden social order to promote social equality. It has also failed to enforce equity in
governance and accountability of the bureaucracy. No interest is shown in proactively working for
participation of the under privileged groups in a manner that can empower them to influence decision
making in their favour against the dominant and powerful groups. The structures of national political
parties reflect the same class-caste divide which is so representative of the governance structures. The
existing representation of the dalits and tribals in the organization of political parties is tokenistic rather
than empowering even though these groups constitute a sizeable vote bank. The leaders of political
parties since independence have shared the same disinclination to act tough against the rural power

14
structure which has subverted the implementation of progressive (pro-poor) laws and defeated the
objectives of programmes introduced to benefit the weaker sections. None of them have demonstrated
the resolute will to break the class and caste biases and conveyed a clear message to this effect to the
bureaucracy and society at large. At a political level, the leaders of all political parties have failed to use
democratic space to engineer social change so as to eliminate hostility of the dominant groups to equity
promoting measures empowering the dalits and tribals. In the context of the naxalite movement, the
fragility of democracy gets particularly exposed when one observes the virtual withdrawal of political
parties from the affected areas and cessation of political activities therein, leaving a disquieting vacuum
for the radical left groups to demonstrate their relevance. There is no sign of a concerted political
response to the radical violence of the Maoists by way of a peaceful alternative to restore their faith in
democracy. The greatest resentment of persons from the marginalized groups in the naxalite area
against democracy lies in the unwillingness of its institutions and leaders to challenge the dominant view
which gives primacy to the maintenance of public order as the main strategy to curb the movement rather
than addressing their social concerns arising out of structural violence and collapse of institutions to
render social justice. The silence of democracy towards violence inflicted on the people by the state
supported non-state actors under the cover of a spontaneous people’s resistance to the naxalites is even
more hurting. The institutional democracy, therefore, fails to generate trust in its ability to rescue the
people from the onslaught of structural violence as well as spiral of violence resulting from the strategy of
state to deal with the naxalite movement. It ends up by providing support to it.

REASONS FOR FAILURE(1967-1975)

In a methodical study, Sailen Debnath has surmised the consequences and reasons of failures of the
Naxalite movement organised by Kanu Sanyal and Charu Majumdar. He writes "The Naxalite movement,
though continued intensively from 1967 to the middle of the 1970s and resurfaced after some years, could
not go a long way achieving anything commendable because of the following reasons 12:"

1. The Naxalites wanted to surround the towns and cities by the villages, i.e., they wanted to
encircle the urban centres with organized peasant forces of the villages. If the peasant militia
could have occupied the cities, according to Majumdar, the so-called bourgeois government
would fall making the passage to the coming of a socialist government; but the Naxalites could
not and did not come up to a stage capable of organizing the peasants and thereby encircling the
towns.

2. Majumdar gave sole importance to secret organization, and justified the policy of continuing the
Movement without the need to build any popular mass base, forgetting or ignoring the fact,
popular mass base is the basic criteria of any Communist-Leftist Revolutionary movement.
KanuSanyal the original founder of the Movement vehemently did oppose this wrong action
plan, while being interred in the 'Parvatipuram Conspiracy Case'.Armed training for the purpose
of eliminating 'Class Enemies' was preached, but the educating the cadres on the Marxist-
12
SailenDebnath, West Bengal in Doldrums

15
 Leninist thought process was never taken up, resulting in a lions majority of the cadres coming
out of an urban-frustrated-middle class background without any Revolutionary teaching and zeal,
and who were desperate for senseless actions. As the Naxalites did not have mass level
organization, they lacked mass support. With only a few armed elements, and those not properly
educated in the party line, little could be accomplished.

3. Khatam" (the action of eliminating the so-called class enemies in villages) was a wrongheaded
attempt at political mobilization based on the individual murders of a select few people whose
political class and character was never adjudged by their socio-economic conditions or the
properties they possessed but very often only by their political affiliation or by the name and
colour of the party or parties they directly or indirectly belonged to. For example,
in Jalpaiguri and Alipurduar they killed some petty jotdars who otherwise could have been
comrades in action against the capitalists or could be friends in a revolution for radical change.
And which blatantly shows the 'Myopic'lack of vision of the so called leadership and the party
workers.

4. Recruitment in the Naxalite party took place in the absence of proper judgment and scrutiny of
the political characters and behaviours of the recruits. It was not uncommon for recruits into the
Naxalite party to vent their personal animosities by identifying their personal enemies as class
enemies, to be killed with the help of the Naxalite organization. Even murders and Homicides
were carried out by anti-social and hoodlum elements directly under the patronage and protection
of the ruling Congress(I) and the main opposition the CPI(M) party, to discredit the Movement.

5. The ruling Congress party inserted spies inside the unguarded Naxalite organization to gather
information about its secret bases and arrest its supporters. Government intelligence personnel
and police disguised as Naxalite sympathizers/supporters could easily infiltrate the party’s inner
organization and arrested many of its leaders, including Charu Majumdar. Thus police had
information about the movements of Majumdar after he had gone underground in 1970, and he
was arrested in Calcutta in July 1972. He died in jail days after his arrest, probably in the night of
27 or 28 July. It is not known how he died, although the government reported that he died of
a heart attack. After the arrest and detention of the original founders of the movement-Kanu
Sanyal and Jangal Santhal who were based amongst the peasant-farmers and the tribal labourers
of the tea gardens of rural North Bengal, when the leadership passed into the hands of people,
majority of whom belonged to the urban-educated-opportunist-middle class, as an 'agrarian-rural-
peasant-laborer-Communist revolutionary' movement, Naxalbari Movement had lost its genuine
character and nature, thus coming to an 'incomplete' end.

MOVEMENTS AFTER 2004

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In a 2004 Indian Home Ministry estimate numbers were placed at that time at "9,300 hardcore
underground cadre holding around 6,500 regular weapons beside a large number of unlicensed country-
made arms13. In 2006, according to Judith Vidal-Hall, "Figures (in that year) put the strength of the
movement at 15,000, and claim the guerrillas control an estimated one fifth of India's forests, as well as
being active in 160 of the country's 604 administrative districts14.".India's Research and Analysis Wing,
believed in 2006 that 20,000 Naxals were involved in the growing insurgency. .
Today, some Naxalite groups have become legal organisations participating in parliamentary elections,
such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation.  Others, such as the Communist
Party of India (Maoist) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti.
On 6 April 2010 Naxalites launched the most deadly assault in the history of the Naxalite movement by
killing 76 security personnel. The attack was launched by up to 1,000 Naxalites . in a well-planned attack,
killing an estimated 76 CRPF policemen in two separate ambushes and wounding 50 others, in the remote
jungles of Chattisgarh's Dantewada district in Eastern/ Central India. On 17 May, Naxals blew up a bus
on Dantewda-sukhma road in Chhattisgarh, killing 15 policemen and 20 civilians. In third Major attack
by Naxals on 29 June, at least 26 personnel of Indian Centre Reserve Forces (CRPF) were killed in
Narayanpur district of Chhattisgarh.
Despite the 2010 Chhattisgarh ambushes, the most recent central government campaign to contain and
reduce the militant Naxalite presence appears to be having some success. [15] States such as Madhya
Pradesh have reported significant reduction in Naxalite activities as a result of their use of IAP funds for
rural development within their states..
In late 2011, the death of Kishenji, the military leader of Communist Party of India (Maoist) was killed in
an encounter with the joint operation forces, which was a huge blow to the Naxalite movement in Eastern
India.
In March 2012 Maoist rebels kidnapped two Italians in the eastern Indian state of Orissa 15, the first time
Westerners were abducted there 16. 12 CRPF personnel were killed on 27 March 2012 in a landmine blast
triggered by suspected Naxalites in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra.

Conclusion
The Naxalite Movement has thus greatly disrupted the smooth progressing of the
country and has causes loss of thousands of innocent lives across India. The
13

14

15
The Hindu (Chennai, India). 2012-03-27.
16

17
Government should effectively come into the picture and should deal with their
various problems like of social exclusion, environmental degradation, grant of
rights and should ensure means of proper governance to deal with them in a
comprehensive manner and then only this problem can be solved in a better way. to
deal with them in a comprehensive manner and then only this problem can be
solved in a better way.

Only with consolidate efforts on part of the legal and political framework socio-
economic reforms can be implemented, and the problem of Naxalism tackled.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 1. ARTICLES-

Hindustan Times

The Times of India

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/naxalbari-movement-maoism-charu-mazumdar-kanu-sanyal-jangal-
santhal/1/962788.html

The Times of India. 2011-10-08. Retrieved 2011-12-31. Times of India describe new findings of China
ISI links to Naxal movement.

Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh (2005-09-21). "The Naxalite Challenge". Frontline Magazine (The Hindu).

Retrieved 2007-03-15.

Philip Bowring Published: TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2006 (2006-04-18). "Maoists who menace India".
International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 2009-03-17.

"South Asia | Senior Maoist 'arrested' in India". BBC News. 2007-12-19. Retrieved 2009-03-17.

The Times of India. 2011-12-08. Retrieved 2012-01-02. Times of India describe some details of ongoing
nationwide Naxalite containment program, its "Integrated Action Plan".

Diwanji, A. K. (2003-10-02).

{Sunil Kumar Sen.} ({1982}). {Peasant movements in India: mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries}.
{K.P. Bagchi}.

Hindustan Times

Singh, Prakash. The Naxalite Movement in India. New Delhi: Rupa& Co., 1999. p. 101.

NHRC Report

The Hindu (Chennai, India). 2012-03-27.

"India Maoists kidnap Italian tourists in Orissa". BBC News. 2012-03-18.

2. NET SOURCES-

www.google.co.in

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www.worldlivevents.com

www.idsa.in

www.hindustantimes.com

www.indiafutureofchange.com

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