A.

Territory
Magallona vs Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 187167 Augu st 16, 2011
Facts:

 Petitioner: Prof. Merlin M. Magallona

 Respondent: Hon. Eduardo Ermita (Executive Secretary)
 1961: Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State
 Followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying the sovereign right of States parties over
their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined
 RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly 5 decades
 1968: legislation passed Republic Act No. 5446 correcting typographical errors
and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo
 March 2009: Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522
 The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5
which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984
 RA 9522: shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands"
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
 Petitioners attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included — its failure to
reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's
framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue:

 Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit - YES

 Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 – YES
 Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional – NO

Held:

 The petition was dismissed

 The petitioners’ locus standi as citizens was recognized with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly
raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution.
 When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, we have, by
tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles
to test the constitutionality of statutes.
 RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country's Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
 UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.
 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United
Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States'
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.
 The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime
zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
Arigo vs Swift
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
Facts:

 Petitioner: Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa

 Respondent: Scott H. Swift (Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet)
 A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-
6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to
the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
 August 11, 1988: Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
 1993: Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site
 April 6, 2010: Congress passed Republic Act No. 10067 known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection
and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations."
 December 2012: US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance
for USS Guardian "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty."
 January 17, 2013: at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 January 20, 2013: U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement
 Arigo et al claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
 Arigo et al cite the following violations committed by US respondents
o R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19);
o non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21);
 o obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
o damages to the reef (Section 20);
o destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26)
 Arigo et al assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which
they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
Issue:

 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing - YES

 Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian - YES
 Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case -
NO

Held:

 Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged,
and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
 Oposa v. Factoran, Jr: we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced
and healthful ecology which is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.”
 The Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for
the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations.
 The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. 
 The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law
is to be filed separately.
The South China Sea Arbitration
July 12, 2016
B. Government
1. Functions

PVTA vs CIR
G.R. No. L-32052. July 25, 1975
Facts:

 Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

 Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations et al
 December 20, 1966: private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged
their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular 8
hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime
compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444
 Commonwealth Act No. 444: Section 1: The legal working day for any person
employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.
 Court rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay private respondents' claim,
minus what had already been paid.
 Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. 
 Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and
is exempt from CA No. 444 - YES
Held:  

 The petition and motion for reconsideration are both dismissed

 It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its
people and promote their general welfare.
 This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated
by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
 The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant
functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the
needs of the present time.
 He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete."
 The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now
considered obsolete. 
Romualdez-Yap vs CSC
G.R. No. 104226
Facts:

 Petitioner: Conchita Romualdez-Yap

 Respondent: Civil Service Commission, Philippine National Bank
 September 20, 1972: Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the
Philippine National Bank as Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of
the PNB President.
 1983: She was appointed Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department
 April 1, 1986 – February 20, 1987: She filed leave of absences due to medical
reasons which were duly approved
 December 3, 1986: While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80 was
approved which authorized the restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of
PNB.
 The Fund Transfer Department was abolished
 January 30, 1987: She was notified of her separation from the service
 August 4, 1989: Her first appeal to the Civil Service Commission
 March 5, 1990: She filed a motion for reconsideration where she argued that her
separation was illegal and was done in bad faith considering that her termination
on February 16, 1986 was made effective prior to the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986. Her motion was denied.
 CSC noted that the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the
service was a typographical error. PNB submitted documents supporting its
stand that the separation actually took effect on 16 February 1987
Issue: Whether the reorganization of PNB a government-owned or controlled
corporation performing ministrant functions is valid - YES
Held:

 Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general

interests of society and are merely optional.
 Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private
sector endeavor, an optional function of the government.
 There are functions of the government which it may exercise to promote merely
the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people.
 Thus, reorganization of such corporations like PNB is valid so long as they are
done in good faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison doctrine.
  Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is found to be done in good faith by the
Court.
2. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

Govt. of P.I. vs Monte De Piedad

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
Facts:

 Plaintiff-Appellee: The Government of the Philippine Islands

 Defendant-Appellant: El Monte Piedad Y Caja De Ahorros De Manila
 June 3, 1863: a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place.
 The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National
Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake.
 The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and
was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as
jewelries, equivalent to the same amount. 
 June 1983: Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the
$80,000 deposited from before.
 The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is
not the affected party.
 Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the
$80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs.
 Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of

the money of the people deposited in respondent bank - YES
Held:

 The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a

complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine
of Parens Patriae.
 The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an
inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest.
 The government has the right to "take back" the money intended for people.  
  The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of
its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other
person is entrusted with it.  
 The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs
with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.
Cabanas vs Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
Facts:

 Plaintiff-Appellee: Melchora Cabanas

 Defendant-Appellant: Francisco Pilapil
 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman,
the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas.
 She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964.
 The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased.
 The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his
brother to act as trustee during her minority.
 Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him.
 Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the
delivery of such sum.
 She filed the bond required by the Civil Code.
 Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by
invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary - YES
Held:

 Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code provides: The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or
may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the
child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is
under parental authority and whose company he lives.
 With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle,
without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand
the test of the strictest scrutiny.
 It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to
the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in
the case of an uncle
Vasco vs CA
G.R. No. L-46763 February 28, 1978
Facts:

 Petitioner: Antonio Vasco

 Respondent: Court of Appeals et al
 The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in a decision
dated October 5, 1976 found that Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita are illegitimate
children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes.
 It ordered Antonio to pay them the sum of P200 as monthly allowance for
support, beginning October 1976 plus P500 as attorney's fees
 Antonio Vasco appealed to the Court of Appeals from that decision.
 April 21, 1977: the lower court approved Vasco's record on appeal and ordered
the elevation of the record to the Court of Appeals.
 June 22, 1977: Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco filed a motion for the execution
of the said judgment pending appeal.
 Antonio Vasco opposed that motion on the ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to grant execution. He invoked section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
 August 26, 1977: Antonio Vasco filed this Court the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Held:
People vs Casipit
G.R. No. 88229 May 31, 1994
Facts:

 Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

 Accused-Appellant: Guillermo Casipit y Radam
 The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a sixth grader, while
appellant was 22.
 They were neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
 On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical check-up, Myra's
father entrusted her to Guillermo’s parents.
 Guillermo invited Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice and
bananas but when they reached poblacion, he told her that they should buy in
Dagupan instead because the prices were cheaper.
 Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited Myra to watch a movie until six
o'clock in the evening, after which, they took a ride for Alaminos arriving there at
eight o'clock.
 On their way home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open
field of Barangay Talbang where Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid down.
 After a few minutes, he told her to lie down with him and rest. Then he went near
her. He removed her panties, poked a knife at her neck and warned her not to
shout. She resisted, kicked him twice, but was helpless to subdue him as he tied
her hands behind her nape. He mounted an assault on her chastity until he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She could not stop him as he
was big and strong.
 When she reached home, she was noticed to be walking abnormally by her
cousin-in-law Rogelio Casipit so her aunt Nenita Rabadon asked her what
happened and she told the story.
 26 September 1986: Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a
criminal complaint against Guillermo
 July 1987: Guillermo was arrested
 After trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found appellant guilty of
raping Myra by means of force and intimidation
Issue:

 Guillermo assails the trial court that the victim's story contained many flawS:
o firstly, even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked
him twice, the doctor who examined her found no external physical injuries
on her body;
o secondly, the fact that the victim agreed to have a movie date with him
shows that she liked him and was attracted to him; and,
o thirdly, the victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning,
which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped
Held:

 The petition was dismissed

 The argument that the absence of external injuries on the body of the victim
belies her claim that she struggled with appellant to prevent him from raping her
is devoid of merit.
 The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the
commission of rape.
 The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no indication that she
already agreed to have sex with him. Her actuation is understandable as she is a
close relative of appellant, according to his grandfather
 The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were sweethearts cannot be
given weight. For, if that was true, she would not have immediately disclosed to
her family and to the authorities the sexual assault done to her. ||| 
 Worth noting is the marked receptivity of our courts to lend credence to the
testimonies of victims who are of tender years regarding their versions of what
transpired since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully
protect themselves. ||| 
3. Act of State

Harvey vs. Commissioner

G.R. No. 82544 June 28 , 1988
Facts:

 Petitioner:
 Respondent:

Issue:
Held:

4. De Jure vs. De Facto Government

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Lawyers’ League vs. Aquino

G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
C. SOVEREIGNTY
1. Effect of Belligerent Occupation on Political Laws

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946
Facts:

 Petitioner: Ramon Ruffy

 Respondent: The Chief of Staff, Philippine Army
 Petition for prohibition, praying that respondents be commanded to desist from
further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court
 December 8, 1941: Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M.
Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine
Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro|
 February 27, 1942: the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro
 Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy,
disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerilla outfit known as Bolo
Combat Team or Bolo Area.
 Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian
joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of 1942, while
Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its
members some time in 1943
 Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine
Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military
District
 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer
of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of military
character||| 
 A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on
June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding
Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place||| 
 October 19, 1944: Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense
was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy - YES
Held:

 The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation.
 The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance
of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial.
 Moreover, they were operating officers, which make them even more eligible for
the military court's jurisdiction. 
 In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be
dismissed.
 Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED
Laurel vs. Misa
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
Facts:

 Petitioner: Anastacio Laurel

 Respondent: Eriberto Misa
 A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel
 He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
 On the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of the Filipino citizen
thereto were then suspended
 And that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic
Issue:

 Whether the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the government becomes

suspended during enemy occupation - NO
 Whether the petitioner is subject to article 114 of the revised penal code - YES

Held:

 The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied

by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
(repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier
 It remains vested in the legitimate government
 Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that “Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them”
 What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant
 The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation
 The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign
people (Art.114)
2. Effect of Cession on Political Laws

People vs. Perfecto

G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
Facts:

 Petitioner: People
 Respondent: Gregorio Perfecto
 The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
 Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion –
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the
Philippine Senate.
 Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown.
Issue:

 Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and
can be applied in the case at bar? - NO
Held:

 The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC
was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
 However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect.
 Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically
abrogated.
 The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is
about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized
that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ 
 Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be
applied to the present case.
 Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Macariola vs. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
Facts:

 Complainant: Bernardita R. Macariola

 Respondent: Honorable Elias B. Asuncion (Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte
 June 8, 1963: a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil
Case 3010 which became final for lack of an appeal.
 One of the parties in that case was Macariola.
 October 16, 1963: a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which
he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November
11, 1963.
 Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots involved in the partition, was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
 March 6, 1965: Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of the said lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.
 August 6, 1968: Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."||| 
 August 9, 1968: Bernardita R. Macariola filed the instant complaint dated August
6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit:
o [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E
which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010
decided by him;
o [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte;
o [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in
disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain
Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in
the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and
 o [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge
Issue:

 Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said provision - NO

Held:

 The Court finds that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita
R. Macariola.
 The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of
the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
 For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
 When the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-
E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was
already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation.
 Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated
October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving
the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. 
 Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon. 
 Therefore, the respondent Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. 
3. Effect of Belligerent Occupation on Municipal Laws

Peralta vs. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945
Facts:

 Petitioner: William F. Peralta

 Respondent: The Director of Prisons

 Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila

charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of goods and other necessaries was prosecuted for  the  crime of
robbery
 He  was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced
to serve on August 21, 1944, by the  Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction
 The petition for habeas corpus  is based on  the ground that the Court of Special
and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
instrumentality of the military forces  of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims
and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims  and political  purposes of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as  well  as those of the  United  States of
America,  and therefore,  null  and void that the  petitioner  herein is being
punished by a law created to serve the  political purpose of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the  Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much
(more)  severe than the penalties  provided for in the Revised Penal  Code."
 The City Fiscal of Manila submits that the petition for  habeas corpus  be denied 
on  the  following grounds:
o That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction  and the
Acts, Ordinances  and  Executive Orders, creating  it are not of a political
complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and  offenses
placed under its  jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an
urgent necessity
 According to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a
criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure
established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III,
section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of 
section 1  (1)  of the same Article that no  person  shall be deprived of  life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
Issue:
  Whether or not the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court is
valid - YES
 Whether or not the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life
imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation is valid - YES
 If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of
the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
Held:

 As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the
authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. 
 It is well established in International Law that the criminal jurisdiction established
by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as
denned in the usages of nations. 
 The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals,
whose authority and procedure are defined in the military code of the conquering
state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district.
 A belligerent "occupant  may where necessary, set  up  military courts instead of
the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of
justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless so  far as  is necessary for
military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily
alter the laws, especially the Criminal  Law, on the basis of which justice is
administered as well as the laws regarding... procedure."  (Oppenheim'si
International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)
 It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted
power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law
penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.
 In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby
granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without
pronouncement as to costs.  So ordered.

Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-6, November 29, 1945
Facts:

 Petitioner: Aniceto Alcantara

 Respondent: The Director of Prisons
 Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries.
 The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from
arresto mayor to prison correccional.
 Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said
the court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus from petitioner.
Issue:

 Whether or not the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid? - YES

Held:

 Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the
sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion.
 A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a new
act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a
crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and
penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is
necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army
of the occupier.
 Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

4. Effect of Cession on Municipal Laws

Vilas vs. City of Manila
229 US 345 (1911)
Facts:

 Petitioner: Vilas
 Respondent: City of Manila
 Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City.
 After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money
owed to him by the city.
 The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the
cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now
is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished.
Issue:

 Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of
the City of Manila to its creditor? - NO
Held:

 The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign.
 The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the
new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor
corporation including its liabilities.
 The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with
the present sovereignty are suspended.
 Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the
old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila. 

People vs. Lol-lo

G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922
Facts:

 Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippine Islands

 Defendants-appellants: Lol-lo and Saraw
 June 30, 1920: 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. 
 In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat 11 men,
women, and children, subjects of Holland. 
 The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies.
 There, the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed.
 The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all
of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women.
 All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again
placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. 
 The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.
 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw.
 At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
 Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands.
 There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy
 All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
 Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
 Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may
be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried.
 The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
 As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
Issue:

 Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy
are still in force – YES
Held:
 In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-
lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung
until dead.
 Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be
still in force in the Philippines.
 The crime of piracy was accompanied by
o (1) an offense against chastity and
o (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves.
 It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
 At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for
its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means
were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also
be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.