LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

GALO, RENGIE C. ATTY.
GERALD YU, CPA

TRANSPORATION LAW – SA 8:00-10:00AM
LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o'clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with
her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin
was negligent in his assigned task.
In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security
agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist
blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman.
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings
of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the
presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would
insist that Escartin's assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an
act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the
appellate court's conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
Ruling:
The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven." This finding of the appellate court is not
without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual
tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter, thus, Roman
can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
Principles:
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide
safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier
on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to
show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that
negligence must be proved.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort
is that which breaches the contract.
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

GALO, RENGIE C. ATTY.

GERALD YU, CPA

LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

You might also like