Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

5 LRTA V Navidad

You are on page 1of 2

LRTA v Navidad (Torts)

LRTA v Navidad G.R. No. 145804 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.

FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced
to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously.
The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:


1. RTC-Pasig: ordered defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin to pay actual,
compensatory, and moral damages including attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
2. CA: exonerated Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor
Navidad. While the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage
theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were
supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting
Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to
the death of Navidad 

ARGUMENTS

LRTA
: Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate
court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and
LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
not of the LRTA.

Respondent Navidad and PRudent


: contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT
station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation 

ISSUE:
Whether LRTA is liable

RULING: Yes.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and
for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of
or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code.
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of
the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing,
one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can
well apply.
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply. 

You might also like