EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-39999. May 31, 1984.]

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and

JOSE FARLEY BEDEÑA , petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,
respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY

OF CIVIL LIABILITY IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH CRIMINAL ACTION; EXCEPTION. —
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution
when the offended party, expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately (Morte, Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL; GROUND FOR EXTINGUISHMENT OF
CIVIL LIABILITY. — The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal
case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words,
the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION THAT THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE CIVIL
MIGHT ARISE DID NOT EXIST, INDISPENSABLE. — The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093;
see Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1933 ed., p. 623).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES IN SAME JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
JUSTIFIED; REASONS. — There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate
civil action to still be led considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted.
Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the
criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant
efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness
by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
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 consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication
of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 29, NEW CIVIL CODE, NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. — Article
29 of the New Civil Code clearly and expressly provides a remedy for the plaintiff in
case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of
only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be led but there is no
statement that such separate ling is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the
rendition of a judgment of acquittal awarding damages in the same criminal action. The
two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability must arise
did not exist.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR. , J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which

reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the
crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants
as actual damages. Cdpr

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

"The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDEÑA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO
ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO
CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN
(14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
"That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning,
in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedeña, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard
Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means
of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close
their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein
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 by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his
family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and
moral damages and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

"That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their

public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation."

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court nds the accused Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedeña guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them
to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a ne of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.

"The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermudo,

Christopher Villaoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales,
Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged."

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals.

They contended that the trial court's nding of grave coercion was not supported by
the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was
a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in nding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of ve
months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged
the order to pay nes of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
cdphil

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals

states:
"WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense
that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt, but they are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as
actual damages."

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of
the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
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 ". . . 'appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt — whether the
crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was
committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic)
complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that
complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is
correct."

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS
OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED

DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS, 'TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER
HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR
WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND
THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456-CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO
PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal
case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They
cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the
amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in
a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil.
748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo
Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Mañago, 69 Phil.
496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepaño, 116 Phil. 457). cdrep

In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
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 commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the
carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts
were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such
as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
"For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence
must be employed against the person, not against property as what happened in
the case at bar. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other
than coercion?

From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats
or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of
conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted
for these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not
allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the
information mentions that the act was 'by means of threats', it does not allege the
particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature
of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid
information.

"We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.

"While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they nevertheless are civilly

liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the
demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties, The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a nal judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51
OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which
the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties
contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is
no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute
a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition
that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied
institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil
liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime. cdll

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 As early as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in
Barredo v. Garcia et al. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime
and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused. However, the offended
party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil
Code provides:
"Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant"

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a nal judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing
and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People
v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332,
Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based
upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p.
623). cdphil

Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

"When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to le a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect,
it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground."
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 More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case
would not constitute an obstacle to the ling of a civil case based on the same acts
which led to the criminal prosecution:
". . . The nding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in
the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal
bene t is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is
based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil
liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section I, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a
declaration would not bar a civil action led against an accused who had
been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on
factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense
charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at
bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least
to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes
which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by
applicable rules and regulations." (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203).
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be
led considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process
has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged.
The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part
of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of
the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of
the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. Cdpr

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
"(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the
Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in
question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered
the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking
inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had
it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store,
ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial
of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the
materials of the demolished stall have not been made known."

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

"On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to
that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police
Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using
ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having rst inventoried the goods and merchandise
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 found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping.
Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
"The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equip-
ment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment
taken 8,000.00
————
P9,600.00
"It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the
complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did
so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable. This
nds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the
premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore,
far-fetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily
abated.

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the
destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They
state:
"On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to
vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the
premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of
Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor's directives, demolished the store of the
Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these
goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, . . ."

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier
cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this
provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modi ed by
a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the
dictates of logic and common sense. cdphil

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

". . . if the Court nds the evidence su cient to sustain the civil action but
inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable
nonetheless? An a rmative answer to this question would be consistent with the
doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and will (a) dispense with
the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other
independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence; (b) save the injured
party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to
take advantage of the free services of the scal; and (c) otherwise resolve the
unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action
whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

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 ". . . But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested,
Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly
provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be
instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in
the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the
accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjusti ably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any signi cance,
and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
"In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much
sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the
same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on
reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate
character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the
vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil
action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to
grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The
Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate
civil action. A separate civil case may be led but there is no statement that such
separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. cdll

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a

judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action.
The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement,
a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the
victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he
seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the
intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more
di cult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil
action mandatory and exclusive:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious aws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate
and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
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 demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other, One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation
of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. . . . It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or ne upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be

established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as e cacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided
for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course,
choose to le a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover
the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be
unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to
be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ ., concur.
Aquino, J ., concurs in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J ., is on leave.
De Castro, J ., took no part.

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