FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141962. January 25, 2006.]

DANILO DUMO and SUPREMA DUMO , petitioners, vs . ERLINDA

ESPINAS, JHEAN PACIO, PHOL PACIO, MANNY JUBINAL, CARLITO
CAMPOS, and SEVERA ESPINAS , respondents.

Jaime S. Linsangan and Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for petitioners.

Agustin F. Paneda for respondents.
Benedicto L. Nanca for M. Jubinal & E. Espinas.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES; MERE FILING OF AN

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST A JUDGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFYING
HIM FROM HEARING A CASE; RATIONALE. — To reiterate, the mere ling of an
administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing
the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to
either stop the proceedings in order to await the nal decision on the desired
disquali cation, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of
his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there
would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. This Court
has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.
Moreover, while judges are given wide latitude of discretion in determining if it is indeed
proper for them to hear or sit in a particular case, it should be emphasized that this
choice is not absolute and must be based on a just and valid cause and on a rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.
The option given to a judge to choose whether or not to handle a particular case should
be counter-balanced by the judge's sworn duty to administer justice without fear of
repression.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; DUE PROCESS; ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS, EXPLAINED. —
In any case, petitioners' contention that they have been deprived of due process is
denied by the fact that they were able to appeal the questioned RTC Decision to the CA
via petition for review and, subsequently, le a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. What the law
proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As long as party is given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain,
for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.
3. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; APPELLATE COURT IS CLOTHED WITH AMPLE
AUTHORITY TO REVIEW RULINGS EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT ASSIGNED AS ERRORS;
RATIONALE. — We have held that an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to
review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors. This is especially so if the court
nds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case
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 before it. We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which a determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error. Petitioners admit in the present
petition that herein respondents, in their appeal with the RTC, raised the question of
whether or not the prevailing party may be awarded damages. Since this issue had been
seasonably raised, it became open to further evaluation. It was only logical and natural
for the RTC to deal with the question of whether petitioners are indeed entitled to the
damages awarded by the MTC.
4. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; THE ONLY DAMAGE THAT CAN BE RECOVERED IN
EJECTMENT CASES IS THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE OR THE REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR THE USE AND OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY; EXEMPLIFIED.
— We agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual,
moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the
only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only
issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. Although the MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their
alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could have
been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the
property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any
evidence to sustain the same. Thus, we nd no error in the ruling of the RTC that the
award for lost earnings has no evidentiary or factual basis; and in the decision of the CA
affirming the same.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 14, 1999 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 50239, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union, Branch 33, and reinstated with modi cation the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of the same town and province; and its Resolution 2 of February 18,
2000, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present case arose from a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction led by
spouses Danilo and Suprema Dumo (petitioners) against Erlinda Espinas, Jhean Pacio,
Phol Pacio, Manny Jubinal, Carlito Campos and Severa Espinas (respondents) with the
MTC of Bauang, La Union. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 881. In their
complaint, petitioners alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That plaintiffs are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land
with all the improvements standing thereon, located in Paringao, Bauang, La
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 Union, with an area of 1,514 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No.
22839, a photocopy of the said tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. That on November 17, 1995, defendant Severa J. Espinas led a
civil complaint before this same court, docketed as civil case no. 857, entitled
"Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and
Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same real property
mentioned in paragraph 2 above, for which plaintiffs seeks (sic) that the
Honorable Court takes judicial notice of the same;

4. That although a decision has been rendered against the defendants

in civil case no. 857, the same was not enforced as per Sheriff's return dated
November 4, 1996, attached to the records of civil case no. 857;

5. That on October 30, 1996, at about 1:45 P.M., all defendants acting
for the interest of Severa Espinas, apparently disgruntled with the refusal of the
sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open
de ance with the o cial action taken by the sheriff, took it upon themselves,
employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the said question (sic) real
property, and despite protestations made by plaintiffs, who were there then
present and visibly outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed
with sticks, bolos, hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out
plaintiffs, and took over the premises; that arrogantly, the defendants were
boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the "judge" to do just that — to
forcibly enter and take over the premises; that defendants while inside the
premises, demolished and totally tore down all the improvements standing
thereon, consisting of, but not limited to shed structures intended for rent to the
public; HaIATC

6. That defendants are still in the premises to date, and have even started
putting and continuously putting up structures thereon;
7. That the plaintiff being the rightful owner of the disputed property and not
being a party in civil case no. 857, can never be bound by the proceedings
thereon; that the acts of defendants in forcibly entering the property of
plaintiff, and taking over the same without no lawful basis is patently a
violation of her proprietary rights, the commission and the continuance of
the unlawful acts aforementioned of defendants verily works injustice to
plaintiffs; 3
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners prayed for the payment of actual damages in the amount of P75,000.00,
lost earnings of P5,000.00 per day, moral damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees
in the amount of P50,000.00. 4
On November 12, 1996, the MTC issued a temporary restraining order directing
the defendants to cease and desist from destroying or demolishing the improvements
found on the subject land and from putting up structures thereon. 5 In its Order of
January 15, 1997, the MTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. 6
In their Answer, respondents contended as part of their Special and A rmative
Defenses:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That Sps. Marcelino and Severa Espinas purchased the questioned
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 parcel of land from Carlos Calica in 1943;
2. That said parcel of land has been declared for taxation purposes
under their name and the real estate taxes have [been] religiously paid;
3. That said parcel of land has been surveyed, which Plan Psu-202273
is duly approved by the Director of Land, with an area of 1,065 sq. m. more or
less;

4. That to remove and clear all doubts and cloud over the ownership of
said parcel of land, Civil Case No. 857 was led and after hearing, decision was
rendered declaring herein defendants the lawful owners of said parcel of land;

5. That under and by virtue of said Decision, defendants entered,

occupied and possessed said land, and in the exercise of their right of ownership,
cleaned the same of illegally constructed structures which were done without the
knowledge and consent of herein defendants; 7

xxx xxx xxx

After trial, the MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to
prove their right of possession over the subject property. The dispositive portion of the
MTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs spouses Danilo and Suprema Dumo and against all the
defendants and therefore, the Court declares the plaintiffs the priority of
possession or physical possession de-facto of the land subject matter of the suit.
The preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued by this Court is hereby
made permanent and if the defendants and their agents or any person acting in
their behalf are still in the premises are ordered to vacate said property. The
defendants are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages plus P500.00 a day as lost earning of
the premises from October 30, 1996 up to the time defendants vacate the
premises; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P30,000.00 as attorney's fee and to pay double cost.

SO ORDERED. 8

Aggrieved by the decision of the MTC, respondents appealed the case to the RTC
of Bauang, La Union. 9 It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1099-BG.
In a letter led with this Court dated July 24, 1998, RTC Judge Rose Mary R.
Molina-Alim who handles Civil Case No. 1099-BG, requested that she be allowed to
inhibit herself from further sitting in said case on the ground that the petitioners have
led an administrative complaint against her for partiality, and by reason of such
complaint she honestly feels that she can no longer continue deciding Civil Case No.
1099-BG without bias and unnecessary pressure. 1 0 However, in this Court’s Resolution
of September 15, 1998, Judge Molina-Alim's request was denied on the ground that the
mere ling of an administrative complaint does not preclude a judge from deciding a
case submitted to him/her for resolution. 1 1 Hence, Judge Molina-Alim proceeded in
deciding the case.
In its Decision dated December 18, 1998, the RTC reversed and set aside the
Decision of the MTC and dismissed the case filed by the petitioners. 1 2 The RTC ruled:
Prescinding from the above factual antecedents, as between defendant
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 Severa Espinas who acquired the property on October 18, 1943 through purchase
(Exhibit "1") and plaintiffs who allegedly possessed it on May 23, 1987 by virtue
of the deed of partition with absolute sale (Exhibit "A" ), the former had a
possession antedating that of the latter. Even if the possession of plaintiffs'
predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Pedro and Bernardo Trinidad since 1951, were to be
considered, still, defendant Severa Espinas enjoys the priority of possession long
before the ling of the instant case on October 30, 1996. Under these
circumstances, priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of
possession.

What is more, defendant Severa Espinas was never divested of her

possession except in 1987 when the plaintiffs put up the retaining seawall on the
western portion and cyclone wire on the southern portion of the property without
her (Severa) consent. Despite the latter's protestations, plaintiffs continued to
introduce these improvements and challenged her to le a suit in Court. (Minutes
of the ocular inspection, April 23, 1997). And lately, in Civil Case No. 857 (Exhibit
"3"), when defendants Saldy and Fresnida Saldaña tried to encroach on the
property claiming ownership thereof. What is more, the possession of defendant
Severa Espinas since 1943 was bolstered by the decision rendered in the land
registration case (Exhibit "U"), as well as in the civil case (Exhibit "E"), wherein she
was declared the owner of the property in question.
Hence, the MTC erred in nding plaintiffs to have priority of possession.
On the contrary, defendants (sic) evidence is very clear that defendant Severa
Espinas and her husband had been in actual, open, continuous, adverse in the
concept of owner, possession of the land since 1943. In addition, the evidence of
possession presented in the land registration and quieting of title cases (Exhibits
"U" and "E") surely dispels any iota of doubt that may exist in regard to the
possession of defendant Severa Espinas over the subject property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

As regards the issue on the award of damages:

The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases,
the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of
the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which
have no direct relation to his loss of material possession (Araos vs. Court
of Appeals, 232 SCRA 770).

Then too, under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the monetary award is limited to . . . the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. In this case, the MTC erred
in awarding P30,000.00 as actual damages plus P500.00 a day as loss earnings,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. These
damages are not the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. Rather, these are damages which may have been suffered by plaintiffs
which have no direct relation to the use of material possession, hence, should not
have been awarded (Araos vs. C.A., supra).
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 Besides, the award of P30,000.00 as actual damages plus P500.00 a day
as loss earnings has no factual and legal basis, hence, should have been
disallowed.
True, the aforecited rule now allows attorney's fees to be awarded, but the
grant of the same must be in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code, thus:
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees . . . cannot
be recovered except . . .
1) In any other cases (sic) where the court deems it just and equitable .
..
In all cases . . . must be reasonable. ISaCTE

The award of attorney's fees by the MTC lacks basis. The body of the
appealed decision indeed does not show justi cation for the award. Hence, there
is no basis for such award, which, consequently, should have been removed. The
power of the Court to award attorney's fees under the above cited article,
demands factual, legal and equitable justi cation. Its basis cannot be left to
speculation and gesture (Morales vs. C.A. G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997). 1 3
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners then led a petition for review with the CA. On October 14, 1999, the
CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision setting aside the judgment of the RTC
and reinstating with modi cation the decision of the MTC, by deleting the awards for
actual, moral and exemplary damages. 1 4 The CA held that the MTC correctly found that
the petitioners were in possession of the subject land prior to the time when
respondents allegedly forcibly entered the property; that it is error for the RTC to reach
all the way back to 1943 to determine priority in possession considering that "prior
possession" means possession immediately prior to the act of disturbance; that Civil
Case No. 857, which was an action to quiet title led by respondent Severa Espinas
against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, is not binding on petitioners; and, that
the alleged difference in the identities of the lands of petitioners and respondents was
not raised as a defense in the Answer of respondents. As regards the award of
damages, the CA agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property concerned;
nonetheless, it sustained the award of attorney's fees by the MTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the same was denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated February 18, 2000. 1 5
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNDER THE INSTANT DECISION
AND RESOLUTION, ANNEXES 'A' AND 'B' HEREOF, COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT DECLARING THE DECISION OF RTC JUDGE ROSE MARY MOLINA
ALIM AS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN VIEW OF HER ADMITTED BIAS IN
DECIDING THE CASE.

2. MOREOVER, THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNDER THE SAID DECISION

AND RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B HEREOF, COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DELETING THE AWARDS OF ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
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 DAMAGES MADE BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAID AWARDS ARE ALREADY RES JUDICATA BECAUSE:
(a) THAT, AS AFORESAID, THE DECISION OF JUDGE ALIM
WHICH INCLUDED THE DELETION OF THE SAID DAMAGES IS NULL AND
VOID, AND DID NOT AFFECT THE MTC DECISION, AND,
(b) THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS DID
NOT QUESTION THE AMOUNTS OF SAID AWARD IN THEIR APPEAL FROM
THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT TO THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THEREBY RENDERING SAID AWARDS, FINAL AND RES
JUDICATA. 1 6

In their rst assignment of error, petitioners contend that the Decision rendered
by the RTC dated December 18, 1998 is null and void because it violates petitioners'
constitutional right to due process considering that Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim
who sat during the trial and penned the questioned RTC decision had previously
admitted her bias against petitioners.
We do not agree.
In Gochan vs. Gochan, 1 7 we have su ciently discussed the matter of a judge's
inhibition from hearing a case vis-à-vis the right of a party to due process, to wit:
A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is
impartial and disinterested. Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." All the other elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision were to
come from a biased judge. Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial o cer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or a nity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.
The instances mentioned in the rst paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively
presume that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in a case. The second
paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the
judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with
only their conscience as guide.
To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of such
suspicions a suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with
prejudice for or against a litigant, they should conduct a careful self-examination.
Under the second paragraph of the cited Section of the Rules of Court, parties
have the right to seek the inhibition or the disquali cation of judges who do not
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 appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a
case. Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own
"sound discretion." That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed
primarily to their sense of fairness and justice.

However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way

that the people's faith in the courts of justice would not be impaired. A
salutary norm for them to observe is to re ect on the possibility that
the losing parties might nurture at the back of their minds the thought
that the former have unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against
them. Of course, the judges' right must be weighed against their duty to
decide cases without fear of repression .
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not
give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to
be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality .

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to
be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not
su ce. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of
o ce of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably —
both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-
connected.
Equally important is the established doctrine that bias and
prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits
on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned
from participating in the case . As long as opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct
observed by the magistrate, such opinion — even if later found to be erroneous —
will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable
error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is
required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. At bottom, to
disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence. 1 8 (Emphasis ours)

What makes the present case different from the usual cases passed upon by this
Court is the fact that, as stated earlier, Judge Molina-Alim herself manifested in her
letter-request for inhibition that in view of the administrative case led by herein
petitioners charging her with partiality, she honestly feels that she "can no longer
continue deciding the appealed case free from bias and unnecessary pressure." 1 9
Petitioners contend that Judge Molina-Alim's manifestation is an admission of bias.
Hence, by reason of such admission, there is no longer any need for them to prove the
same. However, it must be emphasized that the Court denied Judge Molina-Alim's
request for inhibition holding that the mere ling of an administrative complaint does
not preclude a judge from deciding a case submitted to him/her for resolution for there
are judicial remedies available to the parties should there be an adverse decision. 2 0 It
is clear from the Resolution that the Court was not persuaded by the reason put forth
by Judge Molina-Alim in her request for inhibition. It should be clearly understood from
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 the above-cited Resolution that the Court found no su cient basis to allow Judge
Molina-Alim to inhibit herself from hearing Civil Case No. 1099-BG. The Court ruled that
the mere fact that an administrative case for alleged partiality was led against her by
herein petitioners does not justify her recusal. Indeed, a careful reading of the letter-
request of Judge Molina-Alim shows that her request for inhibition stems solely from
the fact that herein petitioners had led an administrative case against her for partiality.
There is no other statement in said letter-request, categorical or implied, which would
show that her purported bias resulted from any other source. Notwithstanding Judge
Molina-Alim's statements in her request for inhibition, we nd that petitioners'
allegations of bias and partiality remain unsubstantiated. Indeed, bare allegations of
partiality and prejudgment will not su ce in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. 2 1 There
should be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be showing that
the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case. 2 2
To reiterate, the mere ling of an administrative case against a judge is not a
ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party
apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await
the nal decision on the desired disquali cation, or demand the immediate inhibition of
the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept
pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending
in all the courts. 2 3 This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of
being biased or partial. 2 4 Moreover, while judges are given wide latitude of discretion
in determining if it is indeed proper for them to hear or sit in a particular case, it should
be emphasized that this choice is not absolute and must be based on a just and valid
cause and on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the
case brought before him. 2 5 The option given to a judge to choose whether or not to
handle a particular case should be counter-balanced by the judge's sworn duty to
administer justice without fear of repression. CacHES

In any case, petitioners' contention that they have been deprived of due process
is denied by the fact that they were able to appeal the questioned RTC Decision to the
CA via a petition for review and, subsequently, le a motion for reconsideration of the
CA Decision. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 2 6 What the
law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. 2 7 As long as a party is given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain,
for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. 2 8
In their second assignment of error, petitioners point out that in their petition for
review led with the CA, they did not raise as an issue the award of damages made by
the MTC. Similarly, respondents did not speci cally assign as error the award of
damages by the MTC when they appealed the case to the RTC; neither did they le an
appeal with the CA questioning the award of damages by the MTC. On this basis,
petitioners conclude that the award for damages not having been appealed, the same
had become nal and executory. Hence, the RTC had no authority to reverse the
judgment of the MTC respecting the award of damages. In the same way, petitioners
contend that the CA did not have jurisdiction to rule on the matter of damages because
this issue was not raised in the appeal filed before it.
We are not persuaded.
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 We have held that an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review
rulings even if they are not assigned as errors. 2 9 This is especially so if the court nds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before it.
3 0 We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which a determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error. 3 1 Petitioners admit in the present
petition that herein respondents, in their appeal with the RTC, raised the question of
whether or not the prevailing party may be awarded damages. Since this issue had been
seasonably raised, it became open to further evaluation. It was only logical and natural
for the RTC to deal with the question of whether petitioners are indeed entitled to the
damages awarded by the MTC.
Moreover, even if the issue on damages was not raised by herein respondents in
their appeal with the RTC, it is not erroneous on the part of the RTC to delete the award
of damages in the MTC decision considering that the RTC judgment reversed the
decision of the MTC. It would be the height of inconsistency if the RTC sustained the
award of damages in favor of herein petitioners when, in the same decision, it reversed
the MTC judgment and dismissed the complaint of petitioners.
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to
award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment
cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. 3 2 Considering that the only
issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession. 3 3 Although the MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners
of their alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could
have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the
property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any
evidence to sustain the same. Thus, we nd no error in the ruling of the RTC that the
award for lost earnings has no evidentiary or factual basis; and in the decision of the CA
affirming the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1999 and February 18, 2000,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., no part, former partner of a party's counsel.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña (now retired) and concurred in by
Justices Omar U. Amin (now retired) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
3. Original Records, pp. 1-2.
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 4. Id., p. 3.
5. Id., p. 27.
6. Id., p. 33.
7. Original Records, p. 21.
8. Id., pp. 199-200.
9. Id., p. 202.
10. CA rollo, p. 62.
11. Id., p. 77.
12. Original Records, p. 384.
13. Original Records, pp. 390-394.

14. CA Rollo, pp. 102-114.

15. Id., p. 132.
16. Rollo, p. 15.
17. 446 Phil. 433, (2003).
18. Id., pp. 446-448.
19. CA rollo, p. 62.
20. Id., p. 77.
21. Chin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144618, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 206, 214.
22. Id.
23. Cruz vs. Joven, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1270, January 23, 2001, 350 SCRA 70, 73 citing
People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171.
24. Pagoda Philippines, Inc. vs. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005.
25. Chin vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 213.
26. Estares vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cuaton vs. Salud, G.R. No. 158382, January 27, 2004, 421 SCRA 278, 283.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. C & S Fishfarm Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 442 Phil. 279 (2002).
33. Ibid.

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