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    Defendant Appealed, Arguing Principally That The Moratorium Laws Did Not Have The Effect of

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    Jude Chicano
    1) Plaintiff Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in 1954 to recover payment on a 1941 chattel mortgage from Defendant Manuel Flores. 2) Defendant argued the case was barred by prescription from 1941-1954. However, the lower court found the moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period. 3) Defendant appealed, arguing the moratorium laws were unconstitutional and could not suspend prescription. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the moratorium laws could still be applied in this case despite being found unconstitutional, as legal effects prior to a declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.

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    Defendant Appealed, Arguing Principally That The Moratorium Laws Did Not Have The Effect of

    Uploaded by

    Jude Chicano
    25 views2 pages
    1) Plaintiff Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in 1954 to recover payment on a 1941 chattel mortgage from Defendant Manuel Flores. 2) Defendant argued the case was barred by prescription from 1941-1954. However, the lower court found the moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period. 3) Defendant appealed, arguing the moratorium laws were unconstitutional and could not suspend prescription. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the moratorium laws could still be applied in this case despite being found unconstitutional, as legal effects prior to a declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.

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    MMCvFlores

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    1) Plaintiff Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in 1954 to recover payment on a 1941 chattel mortgage from Defendant Manuel Flores. 2) Defendant argued the case was barred by prescription from 1941-1954. However, the lower court found the moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period. 3) Defendant appealed, arguing the moratorium laws were unconstitutional and could not suspend prescription. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the moratorium laws could still be applied in this case despite being found unconstitutional, as legal effects prior to a declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    25 views2 pages

    Defendant Appealed, Arguing Principally That The Moratorium Laws Did Not Have The Effect of

    Uploaded by

    Jude Chicano
    1) Plaintiff Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in 1954 to recover payment on a 1941 chattel mortgage from Defendant Manuel Flores. 2) Defendant argued the case was barred by prescription from 1941-1954. However, the lower court found the moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period. 3) Defendant appealed, arguing the moratorium laws were unconstitutional and could not suspend prescription. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the moratorium laws could still be applied in this case despite being found unconstitutional, as legal effects prior to a declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 2

    Plaintiff-Appellee: Manila Motor Company

    Defendant-Appellant: Manuel Flores


    Ponente: En Banc
    Doctrine: Effects of Unconstitutional Statutes

    Facts:

    • In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to
    recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage instalments
    which fell due in September 1941.
    • Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the
    Court of First Instance, sustained Plaintiff’s contention that the moratorium laws had
    interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the time during which
    said laws were in operation — three years and eight months 1 — the ten-year term had not
    yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said court ordered
    the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.
    • Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of
    suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this
    court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites jurisprudence holding that when a
    statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no
    rights can be built upon it.

    Issue: Can the moratorium law be applied in the case at bar despite it being
    unconstitutional?

    Held: Yes, There are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation
    (cf. notes in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or
    qualified its effects ‘since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an
    operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored’ (Chicot County vs.
    Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs.
    Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).” (refer to ratio)

    Doctrine:
    Note:
    The Effects of Unconstitutional Statutes
    Orthodox view
    An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
    affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
    as though it had never been passed.

    Modern view
    Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
    annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
    refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
    had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
    unconstitutionality may be recognized.

    Ratio:
    Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the lower court was appealable in
    nature; but we agreed not to discuss the point, inasmuch as the question submitted by Appellant
    could speedily be disposed of. In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial we held that the moratorium
    laws suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision.
    It should be stated however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla decision came down
    after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is
    quoted from a resolution of this Court.
    “2.  Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision
    the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing
    circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute —
    ’confers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under
    it.’ (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)

    NOTE: (Ruling of the court, after “Yes” that is the paragraph that is subsequent above par.)

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