LACONICO, ARCIE S.

16 OCT 2020

RESEARCH ABOUT SEARCH

WARRANT AND DRUG CASES
WHERE FOREIGNERS ARE
INVOLVED

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE
Validity or invalidity of search 3
warrant
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 4
NO. 13

Article. III, Section 2 of the 7

Constitution

WHAT ARE THE LAWS 8

GOVERNING THE APPLICATION
FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH
WARRANT?
WHAT IS A SEARCH WARRANT 9

CASES RELATED TO SEARCH 13

AND SEIZURE
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE 13
G.R. No. 170180 23 NOV 2007
PEOPLE vs. PUNZALAN 23
G.R. No. 199087 11 NOV 2015
CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE 39
G.R. No. 216922 18 APR 2018
CONSTITUTION - ARE 71
FOREIGNERS ALSO PROTECTED
BY OUR CONSTITUTION WHEN
THEY ARE IN THE
PHILIPPINES?
TWO CASES RELATED TO DRUGS 72
ON WHICH THE FOREIGNERS
ARE INVOLVED
PEOPLE vs. LIU and CHUNG 73
G.R. No. 189272     21 JAN 2015
SY y TIBAGONG vs PEOPLE 93
G.R. No. 182178     15 AUG 2011

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VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT
- specify of things to be searched and the place.
- 3 cases each - latest if possible.
- the search warrant must be in relation to drug cases.

Does A Warrant Of Arrest Expire?

A warrant of arrest has to meet the requisites according to the law to be
considered valid. It should also be issued by a competent authority, who
will also direct the arrest of an individual. The person arrested will be
bound to answer for the offense committed. This rule can be found under
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

The arresting officer must execute a warrant of arrest within 10 days

from receipt. It should also be noted that the officer is required to make
a report to the judge who issued a warrant and state the reason why the
accused has not been arrested within 10 days after the expiration. 

When it comes to the validity of the warrant of arrest, it will be

considered valid unless recalled or served. 
Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the
filing of the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the second
paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases
falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court may be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the

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issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by
paragraph (a) of this section. (As amended by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.)

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13

SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS

TO: ALL EXECUTIVE JUDGES AND JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL

COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURE IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH

WARRANTS.

Under Administrative Order No. 6 of this Court, dated June 30, 1975, the
Executive Judge derives his powers and prerogatives through delegation
thereof by this Court — some of which are to improve judicial services, in
coordination with court related government agencies, and to further
provide leadership in the management of all courts within his area of
administrative supervision.

As a measure to better serve the public good and to facilitate the

administration of justice, the Court is prescribing hereunder the
guidelines in the issuance of search warrants:

All applications for search warrants, if filed with the Executive Judge,
shall be assigned, by raffle, to a judge within his administrative area,
under whose direction the search warrant shall be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property;

After the application has been raffled and distributed to a Branch, the
judge who is assigned to conduct the examination of the complainant and
witnesses should immediately act on the same, considering that time
element and possible leakage of information are primary considerations
in the issuance of search warrants and seizure;

Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in cases where an

application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge in
whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours,
or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the
applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance
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thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays;

If, in the implementation of the search warrant, properties are seized

thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be
distributed by raffle conformably with Circular No. 7, dated September
23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to
whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who is
issued the search warrant.

New applications. — In order to insure maximum legitimate effect and

give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantee on the
security of every person, his house and his effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the following procedure should be strictly
observed:

A warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property
— 1) subject of the offense; 2) stolen or embezzled or are the proceeds
or fruits of an offense; and, 3) used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense;

A warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in laid connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other
responsible officer authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized so that they could be properly
identified;

The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted;

If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which

the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by the Rules;

Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The

duplicate copy thereof must be given to the person against whom the
warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the warrant must indicate
the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be
served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, a direction may be
inserted in the warrants that it be served at any time of the day or night;
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In every court, there shall be a log under the custody of the Clerk of
Court wherein shall be entered within 24 hours after the issuance of the
search warrant, the following:

Date and number of the warrant;

Name of the issuing judge;

Name of the person against whom the warrant is issued;

Offense cited in the warrant; and

Name of the officer who applied for the warrant and his witnesses.

Each branch or branches of a court shall have a separate and distinct log
book from the log book kept by the other branches of the same court
stationed in another city or municipality;

The search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issuance,
and after which the issuing judge should ascertain if the return has been
made, and if there was none, should summon the person to whom the
warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made.
If the return has been made, the judge should ascertain from the officer
who seized the property under the warrant if a detailed receipt of the
property seized was left with the lawful occupants of the premises in
whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of
such occupants, whether he left a receipt in the place in which he found
the seized property in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality, and should require that
the property seized by virtue of the warrant shall be delivered to the
judge who issued the warrant. The judge should see to it that an
accurate and true inventory of the property seized duly verified under
oath is attached to the return and filed with the court; and

The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian
of the log book who shall also enter in the log book, the date of the
return, the result, and such other actions the judge may have taken
thereon.

This circular shall take effect immediately from receipt of notice.

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ARTICLE. III, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION

When a policeman knocks on your door and wants to search your house,
will you let him in? If you are standing in a street, can a policeman just
search through your belongings? The answer is no, unless he is armed
with a search warrant.

No less than Art. III, Section 2 of the Constitution holds inviolable our
rights to be secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Thus, subject to certain exceptions,
we cannot be subjected to search by police authorities in the absence of
a search warrant.  To know more about search warrants, read on.

 Search warrants are governed by Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution

which provides:

 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

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Q: WHAT ARE THE LAWS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION FOR
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT?

A: They are the following:

1. Rule 126 (Search and Seizure) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure

2. 2. Section 2 of Article 3 (Bill of Rights) of the constitution
3. 3. Supreme Court Resolution in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC
4. 4. The penumbras of the right of citizens guaranteed by the
Constitution, Civil Code, etc that uphold the right to privacy.
5. 5. Rules on Evidence

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WHAT IS A SEARCH WARRANT

1.  What is a search warrant?

A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People

of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. [Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance
of Tayabas, G.R. No. 45358, 29 January 1937]

2.  What are the requisites of a valid search warrant?

The requisites are:

a.  There must be probable cause;

b.  The probable cause must be determined personally by a judge;

c.  It must be issued after examination, under oath or affirmation, of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce;

d.  The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized

3.  What is probable cause?

Probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched.

4.  What are the properties which may be seized under a search
warrant?

The properties subject of seizure under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court are:

a.  Subject of the offense;

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b.  Stolen or embezzled property and other fruits or proceeds of the
offense; and

c.  Property used or intended to be used as a means for the commission

of an offense.

5.  When are checkpoints allowed?

In the case of Valmonte vs. De Villa,  the Supreme Court had the occasion
to rule that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Routine
inspection and a few questions do not constitute unreasonable searches.
If the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of becoming a
search, this can be done when there is deemed to be probable cause. In
the latter situation, it is justifiable as a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable search. [Valmonte v. General de
Villa,  G.R. No. 83988, 24 May 1990]

6.  Is it required that the property to be searched should be

owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed?

No. In Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP [133 SCRA 800], the Supreme
Court enunciated that it is sufficient that the property is under the control
or possession of the person sought to be searched.

7.  Should the address in the search warrant match the actual
place to be searched?

Yes, the address in the search warrant must match the actual place to be
searched. In People vs. Court of Appeals [ 291 SCRA 400], the Supreme
Court ruled that the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant,
cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge
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of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only
in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search.

8.  What are the instances when a search may be made without a
warrant?

The following instances allow a search without a warrant:

a.  When there is a valid waiver of the right

b.  Where the search is incidental to a valid arrest

c.  Where the prohibited articles are in plain view. An example of such
situation is when a policeman is chasing a criminal and during the said
chase, the policeman stumbled upon a drug den where drugs and
paraphernalia were scattered around.

d.  In Stop and frisk situations or pursuant to a Terry Search. In the US

case of Terry vs. Ohio, a Terry Search has been defined as the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him
for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to
conclude that criminal activity may be afoot.

e.  Search of moving vehicles

f.  Enforcement of immigration and customs law

g.  Search under exigent and emergency measures

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9.  If the security guard in a mall wants to open my bag and check
the inside thereof, isn’t there a violation of my right against
unreasonable search?

No, there is no violation of your right. Private search is not covered by

the constitutional guarantee.  In the case of People vs. Marti [193 SCRA
57], the Supreme Court ratiocinated that in the absence of governmental
interference, the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot invoked against the State. The protection against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

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CASES RELATED TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. VALDEZ vs PEOPLE GR 170180 23 NOV 2007

2. CASTILLO vs PEOPLE GR 216922 18 APRIL 2018

VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.

170180 November 23, 2007 Warrantless Arrest, Search
and Seizure, Fruit of a poisonous tree

OCTOBER 25, 2017

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure

without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times

be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

FACTS

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par.

2(2) of R.A. No. 9165.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented

three barangay tanods namely, Bautista, Aratas and
Ordoo, who arrested petitioner.
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Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17
March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along
the National Highway in the said barangay together with
Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a
bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that
petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be
looking for something. They thus approached him but the
latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased
him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to
the house of Barangay Captain Mercado, where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim
pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then
that petitioner was taken to the police station for further
investigation.

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on

most material points. However, Aratas admitted that he
himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag before
petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado.
Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was
petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag
upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified
that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.

The forensic chemist conducted the examination of the

marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. He
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had
knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from
petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking
was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the
marijuana leaves.

Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was

opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out
an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to
be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof.
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He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by
his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend
such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the
police station and charged with the instant offense.

The RTC rendered judgment against him.

The CA affirmed the challenged decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrest effected against him by the

barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless
search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to
law.

Whether or not the marijuana leaves purportedly seized

from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of
a poisonous tree.

RULING:

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in

evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not
the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant,
is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant, to wit:

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Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be
then committing an offense. The tanod did not have
probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless
arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this

Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act

indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.

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Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the
bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as
the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself
be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with
personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that
he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay
tanod when they approached him.

It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking

the street at night, after being closely observed and then
later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to
flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous
with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.

Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it

ruled in People v. Shabaz that flight alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because
flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself
just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a
nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, [t]he

phrase in his presence therein, connot[es] penal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of
the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any
deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and
fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception
to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the
cases specifically provided by law.

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming

that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient
to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate
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his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners
behavior.

However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v.

Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a
genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his

arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly
taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him as they were seized during a warrantless
search which was not lawful.

As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also

mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches
and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1)
search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop
and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.

The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure

pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while
as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and,
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.

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When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was
neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor
was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless
search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against

unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence,
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.

Relevant to this determination are the following

characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state
of the person consenting. It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution

albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioners
bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was
already under the coercive control of the public officials
who had custody of him when the search of his bag was
demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any
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specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
petitioner indicating his alleged “consent.” Even granting
that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at
all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all
within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.
As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized

marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search
is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to
convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioners bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs

Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the
transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence
of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime.

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the

prosecutions case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. There can be no crime
of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging
doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the
same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug. As we discussed in People v. Orteza,
where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of
appellant for illegal sale of shabu.

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First, there appears nothing in the record showing that
police officers complied with the proper procedure in the
custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e.,
any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs
and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be
any, and or his representative, who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the
requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for
laboratory examination and presented in court was actually
recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed by the police
officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark

the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the
deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where

the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the
seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and
to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that

the material inconsistencies with regard to when and
where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack
of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt
as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

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Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership
of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody
comes into play.

The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls

upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and
public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the
chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of
evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling,
storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the
time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in
evidence. Each person who takes possession of the
specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for,
safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to
prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used
against an accused goes to the very heart of his
fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the
courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence. This elementary principle
accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests
upon the prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two
or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption
of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that

22
 the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty
and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly

fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which
petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove
all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from
criminal liability.

Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable

doubt.

G.R. No. 199087, November 11, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY

PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Accused-appellants Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan seek the

reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28,
2011 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04557 which affirmed the Joint
Decision2 dated March 29, 2010 and the Order 3 dated June 21, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 116 in Crim. Case
No. R-PSY-09-01162-CR convicting them of violation of Section 11,
Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No.
9165).

Accused-appellants were charged under the Information 4 docketed as

Crim. Case No. R-Y-09-01162-CR for violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, which reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 03 rd day of November 2009, in Pasay City,

Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority
of law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
23
 have in their possession, custody and control 40.78 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, (shabu) a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
cralawlawlibrary

Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.

During the trial, the prosecution presented Intelligence Officer 1 Aldwin

Pagaragan (IO1 Pagaragan), Special Investigator 2 Juancho Esteban (SI2
Esteban), Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores and Barangay Kagawad
Larry Fabella as witnesses.

The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in

the morning, Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and
her team implemented a search warrant 5 issued on October 28, 2009 by
then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate
search of the premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia
Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and
Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay
175, Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an
undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, including the
proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court.

Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed
to be occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch 6 of the compound
describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the
search warrant.

The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team tasked to conduct

the search was composed of IA1 Sandaan as team leader, SI2 Esteban
and IO2 Jessica Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) as arresting officers and IO1
Pagaragan as seizing officer.7 IO1 Pagaragan made lateral coordination
with the Southern Police District, Tactical Operations Unit, as evidenced
by the Pre-Operation Report8 dated November 3, 2009 and Authority to
Operate9.

Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to
coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry
Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them
a media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the
operation. From the barangay hall, they walked toward the target place
using as a guide the sketch they prepared.

24
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan,
which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A
woman, later identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly
opened the door. When they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and
informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia
immediately tried to close the door but was not successful since the PDEA
agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when found inside
the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront of
accused-appellants.

Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top
of the table. 101 Pagaragan was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic
sachets, two (2) square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a
small round plastic container. All three (3) plastic containers contained
smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of
suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and
a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Alvarado
effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after
informing them of their constitutional rights. 101 Pagaragan immediately
marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP". After searching
and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team, together
with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing.
They went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered
items. 101 Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property
Seized10 and a Certification of Orderly Search 11 which were later signed
by the barangay officials.

After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were

brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1
Pagaragan presented the seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who
prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, 12 Request for Drug
Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They likewise caused the
preparation of their respective affidavits. Photographs were also taken
during the actual search and inventory. Laboratory examination of the
seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.13

Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section

11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous
drug.
25
In denying the charge, accused-appellant Jerry Punzalan testified that at
around 5:45 in the morning of November 3, 2009, he was at his store
located at 704, A-44 Apelo Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house and store
are two separate structures which are 70 meters apart. Patricia was
inside the store fixing the grains. Jerry was about to open the store when
he saw men running toward their main house, carrying a tank with hose
attached to it. Jerry followed them and saw the men applying acetylene
on their steel gate. Jerry shouted at them but the men poked their guns
at him and when he answered in the affirmative after being asked if he is
Jerry, they placed him in metal handcuffs, held him at the back of his
shirt and brought him to his garage, about 30 meters from their house.
He was later made to board a van, which is about five meters away from
the garage. Inside the van, his wife Patricia was already there with her
hands bound in plastic. They stayed there for more or less three hours.
Then, Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores arrived. They were brought by
the PDEA agents to their main house. Upon reaching the house, accused-
appellants noticed that their belongings were already scattered. Inside
their house, there were two kagawads, two female and two male PDEA
agents, whom they later identified as IO1 Pagaragan, IA1 Sandaan, SI2
Esteban and IO2 Alvarado, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin
Razon. Their pieces of jewelry, cash amounting to P985,000 or almost a
million pesos, 3,711 US dollars, 3,100 Holland, Euro, Malaysian Ringgit,
things belonging to their children like PSP, gameboy, video camera, 14
units of cellphone, licensed gun, and three kilos of gold were likewise
missing. Jerry testified that he kept a huge amount of cash in the house
because he is engaged in "5-6" money-lending business. He also sells rice
from Bulacan.

From the van, the PDEA agents made them go up to the 4 th floor. He
heard his children crying inside the room of his eldest child at the third
floor. Accused-appellants explained that they sleep in the store because
they close late at night and wake up very early. Their things were already
scattered but no search was conducted upstairs. They were led down,
brought out of the house and boarded the van. They were later brought
to the PDEA office in Quezon City.

The defense also presented as witness accused-appellants' daughter,

Jennifer Punzalan, to corroborate their claim. She testified that on
November 3, 2009, between 5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she
was inside her room, together with her younger siblings. Her parents
were at the store. The last time she saw her parents was on the night of
November 2, 2009. In the morning of the following day, there were
people searching their house. She was inside the room together with her
26
siblings when somebody entered and searched the room. They just
covered themselves with a blanket. She left the room at noontime when
the persons who entered the room and her parents were no longer inside
the house. They left the house only when Kagawad Edwin Razon fetched
them.

Another witness presented by the defense is Kagawad Edwin Razon who

testified that when he arrived at the house of accused-appellants, after
he was summoned by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores for the
purpose of conducting a search in the house of the Punzalans, the door
was open, there was a .45 pistol on top of the table, an agent of PDEA
was marking the exhibits which seem to be shabu, and the cabinets were
already opened. There were four PDEA agents when he reached the
house. He also noticed a reporter and a photographer. He sat for a while
and then accused-appellants were brought inside the house, who came
from the van. Later, he signed a document containing the list of evidence
spread on the table. He said that they did not conduct any search
because they just made a house tour up to the third floor.

Lastly, accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan testified that on November 3,

2009, between 5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she was inside the
store located at 704-A44 Apelo Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house is 50
meters away from the store. Then, she noticed that there were many
gun-carrying men, so her husband, Jerry, followed them. She went out to
check what is going on. Two armed men then approached her and asked
for her name. After she gave her name, Pat, they tied her hands with
plastic. Then a van passed by and she was asked to board the van. After
the van had run a few meters, it was parked for more or less three hours.
Thereafter, the driver alighted and then the door was opened. She saw
her husband who was already in handcuffs and was made to board the
van. They also saw Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores. They were made
to alight from the van and were brought inside the house. The door was
already open and some PDEA agents, Kagawad Edwin Razon, Kagawad
Larry Fabella and a reporter were there. One lady was sitting and another
woman was standing. The reporter was sitting. The male PDEA agent was
marking some plastic sachets, which they claimed to be shabu. They
stayed inside the house for more or less one hour during which
photographs were taken by the PDEA agents. She further said that while
she was in her store, her four children were inside their house. PDEA
agents brought them out and they were made to board the van.

In a Joint Decision14 dated March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted

accused-appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165
and sentenced them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
27
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the
premises of different persons named therein is valid as there is no
requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be searched
is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately described. A
sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached
to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably
accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully
conduct their operation in the premises described in the search warrant.

The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law. Despite accused-
appellants' assertion that they were arrested outside their house and
were made to board a van parked along the street beside the river and
were not allowed by the PDEA agents to witness the search conducted
inside the house, the trial court was convinced that accused-appellants
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and were
physically present during the conduct of the search.

The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's version and found no
reason to doubt the credibility of IO1 Pagaragan, whose testimony was
sufficiently corroborated by SI2 Esteban. The court found no showing of
any improper or ill motive on the part of both PDEA agents to testify
against the accused-appellants and neither was there evidence that the
two PDEA agents were not properly performing their official duties and
functions at that time. On the other hand, the defense merely offered
alibi and bare denials which cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity of performance of functions accorded to 101 Pagaragan's and
SI2 Esteban's detailed declarations under oath.

In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two
phases of the search done in the Punzalan house. The first or initial
search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after the
PDEA agents gained entry and was beyond doubt made in the presence
of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs were found,
confiscated and consequently marked. The trial court further stated that
it is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness
the said initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness the
first or initial search at the ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even
their total absence thereat, will not render the subject search invalid and
unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not required. The trial court held
28
that the prosecution successfully and sufficiently established that the two
accused were present during the initial search, thus, satisfying the
requirement of a lawful and valid search.

The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the
house after the markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated specimens
were completed by 101 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated
in by the barangay officials. Finally, after the search of the entire house
was concluded, it is not disputed that an inventory of all the items seized
was conducted by 101 Pagaragan in compliance with the provisions of
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, it was admitted by the
barangay officials that they were requested to wait for the DOJ
representative, to which they willingly acceded.

Accused-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in

the Order15 dated June 21, 2010. The trial court modified the Joint
Decision by increasing the penalty to life imprisonment and the fine to
P400,000.00.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA

held that there was a valid search and seizure conducted and the seized
items are admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The pertinent portion of the CA Decision

states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given the foregoing, We do not find any error committed by
the trial court in convicting accused-appellants for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. From the evidence adduced,
their guilt to the crime charged have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Since the seized shabu weighs 40.78 grams,
the modified penalty of life imprisonment and fine of
P400,000.00 is maintained pursuant to Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal

is DENIED. The assailed Joint Decision dated March 29, 2010
and the Order dated June 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City are here AFFIRMED.

29
 SO ORDERED.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants set forth the following errors

allegedly committed by the CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. That the SEARCH WARRANT NO. 09-14814 issued by

JUDGE ED[U]ARDO PERALTA, Jr., of Branch 17-RTC
Manila, was in fact illegally procured and unlawfully
implemented.
2. The Prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of
accused- appellants for alleged possession of illegal drugs
as the requirement demanded by Chain-in-Custody [chain
of custody] Rule were never met.
3. The Prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.17

cralawlawlibrary

In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim

that the PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply
with the requirements for the procurement of a search warrant
particularly the approval of the PDEA Director General. Accused-
appellants also contended that the court which issued the search warrant,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the search
warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted is
outside its territorial jurisdiction.

We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the

Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its
Resolution of January 27, 2004, as amended,
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases

by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. - The
Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall
have authority to act on applications filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
30
 Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and
included herein by the Supreme Court.

The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such

agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or
the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of
Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be
served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.

x x x x18cralawlawlibrary

In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellants

failed to show that the application for search warrant of the subject
premises was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or his
authorized representative. On the contrary, the search warrant issued by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the
requirements for the issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution,

Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En Bane
Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated January 27, 2004,
and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing to the
satisfaction of the undersigned after personally examining
under oath Agent Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween
Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Metro Manila
Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are good
and sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of
assorted dangerous drugs, particularly shabu, including the
proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to be used by the
respondents as a means of committing the offense, you are
hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time
in the day or night of the premises above described and
forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined
quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds 01
fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.19cralawlawlibrary

Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC of

31
Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant
since the place to be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As
aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly
authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice-Executive Judges of the
RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants to be served in
places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as
those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with.

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts

and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched. There is no exact test
for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in
the process of exercising their judicial function. When a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. 20

Accused-appellants insist that they were not inside their house and were
inside the closed van when their house was searched. They allege that
upon forcibly breaking into their house through the use of an acetylene
torch, the members of the raiding party handcuffed them, dragged them
outside and held them for three hours inside a van while conducting the'
search of the premises. They thus argue that the shabu seized by the
PDEA agents were inadmissible in evidence.

We affirm the conviction of accused-appellants.

It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with
respect, more so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts,
and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupportive conclusions can be gathered
from such findings.21 The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is
in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard
their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. This rule finds an even more stringent application where
the trial court's findings are sustained by the CA.22

After carefully reviewing the records of the case, we find no cogent

reason to overturn the findings of both the lower courts, which were
adequately supported by the evidence on record. It cannot be
32
overemphasized that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.23

In the instant case, like the trial and the appellate courts, we are not
persuaded by accused-appellants' claim that they were not inside their
house but were inside a closed van when their house was searched. In
weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis that of
the defense, we find that the former is more worthy of credit. Both IO1
Pagaragan and SI2 Esteban clearly narrated how the search on the house
of accused-appellants was conducted. As aptly noted by the trial court
and concurred in by the appellate court, there were actually two phases
of the search done in the house of accused-appellants. The first or initial
search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after the
PDEA agents gained entry. 101 Sandaan knocked on the house and a
woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan slightly opened the door and
when they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the
occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to
close the door but was prevented by the PDEA agents from closing it and
they were able to enter the premises. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read
the search warrant in front of the accused-appellants and the agents
searched the house and immediately found several heat-sealed
transparent sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu.
Immediately, the seized items were marked "ADP" in the presence of
accused-appellants and media practitioner Jimmy Mendoza. It has been
sufficiently shown by the prosecution that accused-appellants were
present when their house was searched. The pictures taken during the
marking and inventory and showing the accused-appellants in their house
are clear proof that they were present when their house was searched
and the illegal drugs found were seized. It was only after the marking of
the drugs and while the PDEA agents waited for the barangay officials to
arrive that accused-appellants were made to board the van. This explains
the testimony of Kagawad Edwin Razon that accused-appellants were not
inside their house when he arrived. After the barangay officials arrived,
accused-appellants were brought back to the house for the continuation
of the search of the upper floors but they found no additional
contrabands. They then went back to the ground floor to conduct
inventory of the seized items.

The testimonies of the police officers who caught accused-appellants

in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs during the conduct of a
valid search are usually credited with more weight and credence, in the
33
absence of evidence that they have been inspired by an improper or ill
motive. Here, there is no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the
part of the police officers to impute such a serious crime to accused-
appellants.

On the other hand, accused-appellants hammer on the supposed

inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses such as whether
barangay officials were present at the time of the conduct of the search.
The latter was sufficiently explained by the prosecution while the other
inconsistencies pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that
they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the
established fact of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

We have previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the

testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important
and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. In fact, such
minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen the witnesses'
credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed.24

Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in

presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house, room, or
any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.cralawlawlibrary

As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not
present during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-
appellants themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that
"two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality" must be present applies only in the absence of either the lawful
occupant of the premises or any member of his family.

To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.25 In the case at bench,
34
the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the guilt of the
accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of the prohibited
drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside
from assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny
ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid
defense in the offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

As to accused-appellants' assertion that the chain of custody rule has not

been complied with when no inventory or acknowledgment receipt signed
by Atty. Gaspe was submitted in evidence and that no evidence was
shown as to the condition of the specimen upon its presentation to Atty.
Gaspe, who was not presented in court to explain the discrepancy, we
are also not persuaded.

This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a
method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 26

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 on the

handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs provides as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
35
 (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]cralawlawlibrary

It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug

confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 27 In this case,
the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from
the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by 101
Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office
in Quezon City. 101 Pagaragan was also the one who personally delivered
and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were
kept in custody until they were presented as evidence before the trial
court and positively identified by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same
specimens he marked during the inventory.

The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by
Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the
illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not
render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible.28 What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.29

36
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the
integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is
therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the
testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the
accused-appellants at the time of the search was the same one tested,
introduced and testified to in court. In other words, there is no question
as to the integrity of the evidence against accused-appellants.

In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellants Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan of the crime
charged. We likewise find proper the modification by the trial court of the
penalty imposed to life imprisonment and a fine of P400,000.00

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

The Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 04557 is hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, * Peralta, and Reyes,

JJ., concur.chanrobleslaw

Endnotes:

*
 Designated additional Member in lieu of Associate
Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per Special Order No.
2273 dated November 9, 2015.

**
 While accused-appellants filed a motion for
extension of time to file petition for review on
certiorari, they did not file the intended petition.
What they filed is a brief for accused-appellants.

1
 Rollo, pp. 72-92. Penned by Associate Justice
Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices
Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan
concurring.

2
 Records, pp. 156-178. Penned by Judge 
37
Racquelen  Abary Vasquez. The Joint Decision was
promulgated on April 21, 2010, id. at 179.

3
 Id. at 220-223.

4
 Id. at 1.

5
 Id. at 91.

6
 Id. at 92.

7
Rollo, p. 75.

8
 Records, p. 100.

9
 Id. at 99.

10
 Id. at 93-96.

11
 Id. at 98.

12
 Id. at 22-23.

13
 Id. at 87-90.

14
 Supra note 2.

15
 Supra note 3.

16
Rollo, p. 91.

17
 Id. at 10.

18
 Cited in Request of P/Dir. Gen. Razon for Authority
to Delegate the Endorsement of Application for
Search Warrant, 609 Phil. 472, 480-481 (2009).

19
 Supra note 5.

20
Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. Nos.
161106 & 161266, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 18,
39-40.

21
People v. Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19,
38
 2014, 717 SCRA 147, 163.

22
 Id. at 163-164.

23
People v. Steve, G.R. No. 204911, August 6, 2014,
732 SCRA 385, 396.

24
People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 177224, April 11,
2012, 669 SCRA 307, 318-319.

25
 People v. Lagahit, G.R. No. 200877, November 12,
2014, p. 7.

26
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 207988, March 11,
2015, p. 9.

27
 Id.

28
 Id.

29
People v. Bulotano, G.R. No. 190177, June 11,
2014, 726 SCRA 276, 295.

G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018

JAYLORD DIMAL AND ALLAN

CASTILLO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated August 27, 2014 and Resolution 2 dated February 4, 2015
in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355. The CA dismissed the petition
39
for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the Order 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87, which denied the Omnibus
Motion (Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11, to Declare the
Seized Items as Inadmissible in Evidence) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-12-
175369 to Q-12-175371.

The Facts

At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua

and Gemma Eugenio were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner
Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to negotiate for the sale of palay.
At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's
compound, asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio,
Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they had left an hour
ago. Unable to locate his relatives, Edison went to the police station in
Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing, then proceeded to seek
assistance from the police station in Echague.

Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound,

where they allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the absence of
Dimal until September 7, 2010. On even date at around 5:30 a.m.,
Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant
Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the
disappearances.

On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the

Echague Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of
Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. On September 25, 2010, a certain
Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made by
Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal
shot the three victims, and ordered him, Castillo and one Michael Miranda
to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in a river.

On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On

September 27,2010, the Echague Police filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Hagan, Isabela, a criminal complaint for
Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo,
Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.

On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a

commissioned officer of the Philippine National Police assigned with the
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response in Camp Crame Quezon City,
filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant 4 before the RTC
Hagan, Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and
40
multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma.

In his application for search warrant, P/Insp. Malixi stated that "he was
informed, and verily believed that JAYLORD ARIZABAL DIMAL @ JAY, 28
years old, a resident of Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela
and CMJ Building Dubinan East, Santiago City, has in control of the
following items" in the said address, to wit:
a. Personal belongings such as:
1. Driver's License of Lucio Pua;
Alien Certificate of Registration Identification cards of Lucio Pua
2.
and Rosemarie Pua;
3. ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's accounts;
4. Deposit Slips in BDO accounts of Lucio Pua;
5. Receipts of the palay delivered;
6. Blood-stained clothes of the victims:
Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and
6.1
brownish pedal pants;
6.2 Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt;
Gemma Eugenio y Estrada's maong pants, faded pink long
6.3
sleeves jacket, black striped t-shirt and a shoulder bag;
Polo t-shirt and faded pink jacket seen beside the comfort
6.4
room inside the compound of the warehouse of Jayson Dimal.
Picture of Shaira Mae Eugenio's youngest sister (Queen Sean
7. Eugenio) seen inside the shoulder bag of the victim, Gemma
Eugenio.
1,600 sacks of palay inside a warehouse found in the Felix Gurnpal
b.
Compound, Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela;
c. Long bolo approximately 16 inches in length; and
d. Glock 9mm caliber pistol.5
P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained the
veracity of the information and found the same to be true and correct, as
narrated and sworn to by Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of
Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims Lucio and Rosemarie
Pua, and Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio.
P/Insp. Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal
knowledge and that of his witnesses, acquired after conducting
surveillance and investigation. P/Insp. Malixi attached to the application
as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" the Vicinity/Location and Floor Map.
41
After the hearing of the application on October 8, 2010, Judge Bonifacio
T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a Search
Warrant, which reads:
The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the
form of questions and answers in writing and [under oath], the
applicant Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the
witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and
Ernesto Villador, who all collaborated to the fact of death of
Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague,
Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of Jaylord
Dimal after the commission of the crime and was able to see
the blood-stained clothes of the victims:
1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and 2) [Rosemarie] Pua's
clothes;
On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her
mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink
long sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a
shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which probably are in the
house of Jaylord Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he
testified that he saw Jaylord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol
and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the
computer table or drawers. He likewise testify (sic) that there
were 1,600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to
the Felix Gumpal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang

Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that
there is probable cause to believe that in the house,
particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord
Dimallocated at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, said items, to
wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1,600 sacks of palay
inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm
cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this
Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality
purposes, considering that possibility of leakages of information
once the application for search warrant is filed with the court
within the area having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any

time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gumpal
Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and
42
 forthwith seize and take possession of the following properties:
blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma
Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to
photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring
the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of
Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia
legis, to be dealt with according to law.6
In the Return on the Search Warrant, P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay
Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of Police, Echague Police Station, Echague,
Isabela," manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-11 was served at
the premises ofDimal at Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on October 9,
2010 at about 9:00 a.m., and (2) the search was conducted in an orderly
manner and in the presence of owner/custodian Carlos
Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio Miguel, Barangay Kagawads Rodolfo
Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos.
P/Insp. Macadangdang enumerated the items recovered:
The following articles, subject of the warrant, were found by
the said Office during the search:

a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM

markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM

markings)

c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-

26 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood
stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM
markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM
markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM
markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with

JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)

43
The articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct
of search are the following:

a. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)

b. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)

c. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM

markings)

e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM
markings)

f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM

markings)

g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM

markings)

h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM

markings)

i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM

markings)

j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM

markings)

k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM

markings)

l. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM

markings)

m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM

markings)

n. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and

Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of
Lucio Pua (mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

44
 o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-18 with JAM
markings)

p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM

markings)

q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)

r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM

markings)

s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM

markings)

t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as

E-27 with JAM markings)

u. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (mark as E-29 with JAM

markings)

v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM

markings).7
On February 20, 2012, petitioners Dimal and Castillo, together with
Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion8 to quash Search Warrant No.
10-11 and to declare the seized items as inadmissible in evidence. They
argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued in
connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e.,
kidnapping and multiple murder. They also contended that except for
witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi and witnesses Edison
and Shaira Mae have no personal knowledge surrounding the two crimes
committed; hence, their statements did not provide basis for a finding of
probable cause, much less for the issuance of a search warrant. With
respect to Villador, petitioners assert that his sworn statement is
incredible because he is just an ordinary laborer, who is unfamiliar with
the English language, and there is no showing that the contents of his
statement were fully explained to him by the Judge who issued the
search warrant. Petitioners further posit that the search warrant was
invalidly implemented because the raiding team failed to comply with
Section 8, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two
witnesses during a search of premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on
the issuance of a receipt of seized properties. Finally, petitioners sought
that the items seized which are not covered by the search warrant,
should be declared inadmissible in evidence and be ordered returned to
the accused.
45
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2010, three (3) criminal Informations for
Kidnapping for Ransom, as defined and penalized under Article 267,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
were filed against petitioners before the RTC of Echague, Isabela, Branch
24, and later re-raffled to the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17. The
accusatory portion of the Informations similarly read, save for the names
of the 3 victims, as follows:

That on or about the 6 th day of September 2010, and for

sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Echague, Province
of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Jaylord Arizabal Dimas (sic) and
Allan Castillo y Marquez, being the principals therein,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kidnap and
detain one Lucio Uy Pua (Chinese name: Xinyi Pan)9 for
the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of Fifty (50)
million pesos, from him and from his relatives.

That during his[/her] detention, the said accused, in pursuance

of conspiracy, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and shot with a caliber 9mm pistol
the said Lucio Uy Pua10 which had directly caused his death
and, thereafter, chopped his body into several pieces and
placed them into big plastic containers and ice box, and burned
his head and placed the same into a plastic bag, and threw the
same on separate rivers located at Santiago City and at the
Province of Quirino.

That the accused Michael Miranda Genova alias Mike Miranda

being an accessory, took part in the subsequent commission of
the crime by providing the vehicle and a container drum used
to dispose the chopped body of said Lucio Uy Pua11 and threw
the same on the river, in order to conceal the body of the
crime, to prevent its discovery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 12-1-18-RTC, the criminal cases
were re-raffled to Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo of the RTC of
Quezon City, andre-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-12-175369, Q-12-
175370 to Q-12-175371.

In an Order13 dated September 28, 2012, the RTC of Quezon City denied

46
the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of merit. The RTC
ruled that a perusal of the application for search warrant reveals that it
was issued by the RTC of Hagan, Isabela, after conducting searching and
probing questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and
his witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae and more particularly Villador, and
finding probable cause based on their personal knowledge. In rejecting
the claim of unreasonableness of the implementation of the search
warrant, the RTC noted that the records show that the owner/custodian
of the property subject of the warrant by the name of Carlos Dimal, was
present, together with the Barangay Captain, two Barangay Kagawads,
and a reporter from Bombo Radyo.

Considering that no complaint was filed regarding the implementation of

the search warrant, and that a Certification of Orderly Search was issued
by the barangay officials, the RTC declared that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently
contradicted. Anent the claim that the search warrant was not issued in
connection with a single offense but with the crimes of Kidnapping and
Murder, the RTC said that the nature of the case and the circumstances
at the time the search warrant was applied for, justify the issuance of
such warrant as the two offenses are allied or closely related to each
other because it was reported to the applicant that the victims were
kidnapped for ransom and murdered. Finally, the RTC stressed that the
claim that no return on the search warrant was submitted must fail
because such a return was issued by the executing officer, and was
marked as Exhibit "4" for the prosecution during the preliminary
conference.

With the RTC's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA.

In a Decision14 dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and

ruled that the subject search warrant was validly issued, thus:
A perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through
searching and probing questions, personally examined the (sic)
P/lnsp. Malixi and the witnesses, Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador
and Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions
that Judge Ong propounded were sufficiently probing, not at all
superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses
while under oath, when they were asked by the examining
judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the
subject search warrant.

Furthermore, the subject search warrant specifically designated

47
 or described Felix Gumpal Compound, located at Ipil Junction,
Echague, Isabela as the place to be searched and enumerated
the articles to be seized.

Petitioners['] contention that the subject search warrant which

was issued in connection with two (2) separate offenses,
Kidnapping and Murder, as indicated therein, cannot stand.
However, as aptly pointed out by the People through the Office
of the Solicitor General, the crimes of kidnapping and murder
are interrelated and points to the commission of a single
complex crime known as kidnapping with murder. They cannot
be treated as separate crimes.15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2015. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

Issues

Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in failing to pass upon

petitioners' allegations (1) that the search warrant is void and its quashal
imperative; and (2) that the items seized on the basis of the void search
warrant are inadmissible in evidence. They contend that the search
warrant was null and void because it was issued in connection with two
unrelated offenses, without a finding of probable cause, and without
specifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly
issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are inadmissible in
evidence, as they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor
seized under the "plain view doctrine".

At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search

warrant was applied for in connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e.,
kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation to one
offense.

Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a

consequence of the detention, there is only one special complex crime for
which the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e.,
death.16 In People v. Larrañaga,17 the Court explained that this provision
gives rise to a special complex crime:
48
 This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the
concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder
or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and
those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought Consequently, the
rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659.

xxxx

x x x Where the law provides a single penalty for two or

more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a
special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide,
(2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5)
rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if
they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime."18
There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and
issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping with murder. Asked by
Judge Ong during the hearing as to what particular offense was
committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified that Dimal
"allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of
Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6,
2010."19 It is not amiss to add that a search warrant that covers several
counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule.20

49
Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to
ask searching questions, and to consider that the testimonies of the
applicant and his witnesses were based entirely on hearsay, as they have
no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to the supposed
disappearance or murder of the 3 victims.

The Court explained in Del Castillo v. People21 the concept of probable

cause for the issuance of a search warrant:
x x x Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it
was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more
than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is
to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to
him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a
flexible totality of the circumstances standard. The existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in
no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long
as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched.
Corollarily, the Court said in Oebanda v. People22 that in an application
for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full
and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. "The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the
judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must
be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary, general, peripheral
or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent and factual
and legal justifications for a search warrant. The questions should not
50
merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits/deposition
of the applicant and the witnesses."23

Having in mind the foregoing principles, the Court agrees with the RTC
and the CA in both ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a
search warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of
applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edison, Shaira Mae and
Villador. Their testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable
ground to believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's compound to
sell palay, but were probably killed by Dimal, and that they may have left
personal belongings within its premises.

During the hearing of his application for search warrant, Judge Ong was
ahto elicit from P/Insp. Malixi the specific crime allegedly committed by
Dimal, the particular place to be searched and items to be seized:
[COURT:]
Q: And in your application for Search Warrant, what
particular place are you going to search in this Search
Warrant if ever it will be granted?

[P/INSP. MALIXI:]
A: According to the Opponent we are applying to search the
Palay Buying Station of Jaylord Dimallocated at Felix
Gumpal Compound, Ipil, Echague, Isabela, and also to
search the back portion of a vacant lot within the Felix
Gumpal Compound, Your Honor.

Q: The particular place is Felix Gumpal Compound, in Echague,

Isabela, no more?
A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular offense have this Jaylord Dimal

committed, if any?
A: He allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and
multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one
Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010, Your Honor.

Q: And what particular items are you going to search in

that compound of Felix Gumpal?
A: Subject of the offense, the personal belongings of the
victims when they went to the Felix Gumpal Compound, where
they were reportedly murdered, Your Honor.

Q: What specific items are you going to search from that place?
51
 A: Personal belongings such as Driver's License of Lucio
Pua, Alien Certificate of Registration ID of Lucio Pua and
Rosemarie Pua, ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio
Pua's account, Deposit slips of BDO accounts of Lucio
Pua, receipts of the palay delivered, blood-stained
clothes of the victims, such as Rosemarie Pua's green
inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal
pants, Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt,
Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves
jacket, black stripe T-shirt and a shoulder bag of the
victim Gemma Eugenio color white, the 1,600 sacks of
palay inside the Warehouse of Felix Gumpal Compound,
long bolo [which] is approximately 16 inches long, and
the 9mm caliber black pistol, your Honor.

Q: Where did you get this information regarding the articles

found in the Felix Gumpal Compound?
A: This information was given to me by the Opponents, Your
Honor.

Q: And who are they?

A: They are Edison Uy Pua, Ernesto Villador y Yakapin and
Shaira Eugenio y Estrada, Your Honor.

Q: How sure are you that these people were able to see these
items in Felix Gumpal Compound?
A: Edison Uy Pua and Shaira Mae Eugenio are the relatives of
the victims who personally saw the victim's clothes they were
wearing right before they went to Jaylord's compound and the
victims were seen by Ernesto Villador sprawled lifeless on the
floor in the palay buying station of Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: You said that there is a gun 9mm pistol, how did they come
to know that there was a gun in that place?
A: It was reported to me by Ernesto Villador, Your Honor.24
Judge Ong was also able to draw corroborative testimonies from P/Insp.
Malixi's witnesses. Edison testified on the circumstances prior to the
disappearance of his uncle Lucio and his aunties Rosemarie and Gemma,
while Shaira Mae described the clothes and personal belongings of her
mother before the latter disappeared, thus:
[COURT]
Q: On September 6, 2010, where were you?

[EDISON]
52
A: I was at home, Your Honor.

Q: Where?
A: At Antonino, Alicia, Isabela, Your Honor?

Q: Where is Lucio and Rosemarie Pua on that day?

A: They went to Jaylord to collect the payment of the palay,
Your Honor.

Q: And you were left in your house in Alicia when your Uncle
Lucio and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord to
collect payment of palay?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I was.

Q: And do you know what happened to your Uncle Lucio

and Auntie Rosemarie when they went to Jaylord's
place?
A: I know because when they went to collect payments
they did not come back anymore, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they did
not come back anymore?
A: They were already dead and their bodies were
chopped into pieces, your Honor.

Q: And what did you do when you learned that they were
already dead and chopped into pieces?
A: We went to look for the pieces of the bodies because
they said it was thrown to the river, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do after that?

A: We went to the house of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: And what did you do in the house of Jaylord?

A: We saw the T-shirt of my Uncle Lucio Pua and Ate
Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: Who is that Gemma?

A: My aunt, the one who canvass palay, your Honor.

Q: What did you see in the house of Jaylord?

A: Polo shirt and Jacket of Auntie Gemma, Your Honor.

Q: What else aside from the Polo shirt and jacket did you see?
53
 A: No more your Honor, we went back to Alicia.

Q: Who were with you when you went to the house of Jaylord?
A: My cousin, Your Honor.

Q: What is the name of your cousin?

A: Harison, Your Honor.

Q: When was that when you went to the house of Dimal?

A: October 5, 2010, Your Honor.25

xxxx

[COURT]
Q: On September 6, 2010, in the afternoon, at about 4:00
o'clock, do you know where was (sic) your mother then?

[SHAIRA MAE]
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?
A: She [Gemma] went to Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: Do you remember what was (sic) the clothes of your

mother and what did she brought (sic) with her when
she went to Jaylord Dimal?
A: Yes, Your Honor, the long sleeves is faded pink, the
inner shirt is black, and bag is pink, inside it are two (2)
cellphones, the picture of my sister and her Driver's
License.26
While it may be noted that applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses
Shaira Mae and Edison have no personal knowledge how the crimes of
kidnapping and multiple murder were committed, their testimonies
corroborated that of Villador, who petitioners admitted to have known
about the incidents surrounding the commission of such crimes. 27

Significantly, Judge Ong's inquiry underscored that Villador has a

reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed at the
Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010. In reply to the queries of
Judge Ong, Villador revealed that (1) when Dimal called him inside the
house to receive his payment as classifier of palay, he saw them [Lucio,
Rosemarie and Gemma] talking to each other; and (2) later in the day,
Dimal called him to ask for help, but he backed out upon seeing that

54
Dimal was holding a black 0.9mm pistol amidst people lying bloody on
the ground. Thus:
[COURT:]
Q: You said you are a classifier, what is the work of a
classifier?

[VILLADOR]
A: We classify the kinds ofpalay, Your Honor.

Q: Where are you working as a classifier?

A: Jaylord Dimal, Your Honor.

Q: And where is the place of the business of Jaylord Dimal?

A: Junction Ipil at the former compound of Felix Gumpal, Your
Honor.

Q: How long have you been a classifier of Jaylord Dimal?

A: It is already two (2) years that every cropping he calls for
me to classify, Your Honor.

Q: On September 6, 2010, are (sic) you still a classifier in the

business of Jaylord Dimal.
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where were you on that date?

A: In the compound of Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: In the afternoon of that date, do you know of any person

who went to the place of businessman Dimal?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who are they?

A: Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Do you know their purpose of going to the place of Jaylord

Dimal?
A: They were supposed to collect payment of the palay that
Jaylord asked me to gather, Your Honor?

Q: And where are those palay that Jaylord asked you to

gather?
A: I was the one discarding the sacks of palay in the bodega of
55
Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: Who owns these palay that you are discarding?

A: Owned by Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, Your Honor.

Q: And why were they taken to the place of Jaylord Dimal?

A: They asked me to classify those palay and by agreement of
Jaylord and the Pua's I discarded the palay in the bodega of
Jaylord, Your Honor.

Q: Do you know how many cavans?

xxxx

A: 1,600 sacks, Your Honor.

Q: And where are they now those sacks of palay?

A: They are in the bodega or warehouse, Your Honor.

Q: Are those sacks of palay still there up to now?

A: Yes, Your Honor, they are still there.

Q: What happened in the afternoon of September 6,

2010 when Lucio and Rosemarie and Gemma was (sic)
there in the house or place of Jaylord Dimal?
A: Jaylord Dimal went out from his house and he called
for the three and went inside the house, Your Honor.

Q: And do you know what happened when they were

inside the house?
A: Jaylord called for me inside the house when I
received my payment as classifier and I saw them
talking to each other, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Jaylord called me up but I was already in our house
and I was busy giving wages to my laborers, when he
summoned me to go to his house, "Kuya punta ka
sandali dito," meaning "Kuya, please come here for a
while."

Q: And did you go to the place of Jaylord?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I rode my motorcycle and went to
the place.
56
Q: And what happened next?
A: When I arrived at the gate he asked me to enter the
compound with my motorcycle, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: I asked him, "Bakit Boss?" meaning, "Why, Boss?"

Q: What happened next?

A: He answered, "Kuya yung mga tao patay na baka
pwedeng
patulong." Meaning Kuya the people are already dead
please help?

Q: What did you see from Jaylord [Dimal] when he told

you the people were already dead?
A: I saw him holding a black 9mm pistol and when I saw
the people lying bloody on the ground, I told him "Sir,
hindi ko kaya", meaning "I cannot do it.

Q: How may times have you seen that gun which he was
holding on that day September 6, 2010?
A: That night when he called for me, Your Honor.

Q: After the September 6, 2010 incident, have you went

(sic) back to the place of Dimal.
A: No more, Your Honor.

Q: What are the things did you see (sic) when Dimal
called for you and told you that these persons were
already dead?
A: I saw these people lying on the ground bloody and
they are already dead and I said, "hindi ko kaya",
meaning "I cannot do it" and he replied, "Sige sibat
kana," meaning "okay, just go."

Q: So, it is (sic) still possible that the gun held by Dimal is still
in his house?
A: I think so that is still in his house because he keep (sic) it in
one place, Your Honor.

Q: And you said he keep (sic) it in one place are you familiar
where he is keeping it?

57
 A: What I usually see, he placed it under the table where the
laptop is and there drawers in it, Your Honor.28 (Emphasis ours)
Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath
applicant P/lnsp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae and
Villador, whose collective testimonies would prompt a reasonably discreet
person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was
committed at the Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010, and
that specific personal properties sought in connection with the crime
could be found in the said place sought to be searched.

As to petitioners' claim that the judge did not ask anymore searching
questions after statements were made by Villador,29 the Court finds that
searching and probing questions were indeed propounded by Judge Ong,
and that there is no more necessity to ask Villador to describe the
position and state of the lifeless bodies, and the specific place in the
compound where the bodies were lying. Villador could not have been
expected to take a closer look into the bloody bodies on the ground
because Dimal was then holding a pistol, and told him to leave if he
cannot help. Petitioners would do well to bear in mind that, absent a
showing to the contrary, it is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed.30 The judge has the prerogative to give his own
judgment on the application of the search warrant by his own evaluation
of the evidence presented before him.31 The Court cannot substitute its
own judgment to that of the judge, unless the latter disregarded facts
before him/her or ignored the clear dictates of reason.32

Petitioners submit that the search warrant is also void for failing to
identify with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be
seized. They assert that Felix Gumpal Compound consists of a very large
area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms,
one garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse
utilized to store a palay drying machinery. They likewise claim that all the
items actually seized were either not among those listed in the warrant or
were seized in violation of the "plain view doctrine". Insisting that the
search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, petitioners posit that all the items seized in Dimal's
compound are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge

Ong identified with particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the
house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay warehouse in the premises of
the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela. This is
evident from the Search Warrant issued by the judge, which reads:
58
The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the
form of questions and answers in writing and under oath, the
applicant Police Senior Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the
witnesses, namely: Edison Pua, Shaira Mae Eugenio, and
Ernesto Villador, who all collaborated to the fact of death of
Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio in Echague,
Isabela. That witness Edison Pua went to the house of
Jaylord Dimal after the commission of the crime and was able
to see the blood-stained clothes of the victims:
1) Lucio Pua's clothes; and 2) [Rosemarie] Pua's
clothes
On the part of Shaira Mae Eugenio, she testified that before her
mother Gemma Eugenio left her house, she wore faded pink
long sleeves jacket and black T-shirt, and brought with her a
shoulder bag and two (2) cellphones which are probably in the
house of Jaylord Dimal. In the case of Ernesto Villador, he
testified that he saw Jaylord Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol
and testified that he usually keep said firearm under the
computer table or drawers. He likewise testify (sic) that there
were 1600 sacks of palay sold by the victims and brought to
the Felix Gumpal Compound.

With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang

Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that
there is probable cause to believe that in the house,
particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord
Dimallocated at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, said
items, to wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1600 sacks
of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal
Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

The said Application for Search Warrant was filed before this
Court due to compelling reasons for security and confidentiality
purposes, considering that possibility of leakages of information
once the application for search warrant is filed with the court
within the area having territorial jurisdiction over it.

In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any

time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gumpal
Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and
forthwith seize and take possession of the following
properties: blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua,
and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or
just photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to
59
 bring the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director
of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela
under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law.33
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place
intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. 34 A
designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. 35 To the Court's
view, the abovequoted search warrant sufficiently describes the place to
be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly to
the place described. At any rate, petitioners cannot be heard to decry
irregularity in the conduct of the search of the premises of the Felix
Gumpal Compound because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a Certification of
Orderly Search was issued by the barangay officials, and the presumption
of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently
contradicted by petitioners.

Moreover, the objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched

was belatedly raised in petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying their Omnibus Motion to quash. The Court has consistently
ruled that the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 1536 is
applicable to motion to quash search warrants.37 In Abuan v. People,38 it
was held that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused
may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing
of the motion to suppress." Accordingly, the trial court could only take
cognizance of an issue that was not raised in a motion to quash if (1)
said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to
quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction
over the subject matter.39 Because petitioners' objection as to the
particularity of the place to be searched was available when they filed
their omnibus motion to quash, and there being no jurisdictional issue
raised, their objection is deemed waived.

Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the

things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses
for which the warrant is being issued.40 The purpose for this requirement
is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in
60
the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no
unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed. 41

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court clarified that technical precision

of description is not required. "It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the
rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for." 43

Under American jurisprudence which has persuasive effect in this

jurisdiction, the degree of specificity required in a search warrant's
description of the items to be searched for and seized is flexible and will
vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought. 44 A
description is said to be valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and
the nature of the activity under investigation will permit. But if the
circumstances make an exact description of the property to be seized a
virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to
describe the generic class of the items sought. The practical guide to
determine whether a specific search warrant meets the particularity
requirement is for the court to inquire if the officer reading the
description in the warrant would reasonably know what items to be
seized.45

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described
and sought to be seized in connection with the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, namely: (1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma
Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a black tshirt,
and (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said
crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims
to Dimal and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a
search warrant because they do not fall under the personal properties
stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b)
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c)
those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of

the Omnibus Motion to quash because all the Constitutional 46 and
procedural47 requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still
61
present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be
detennined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 48

Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid,
petitioners are correct that most items listed in the Return on the Search
Warrant are inadmissible in evidence. Since only 2 items were
particularly described on the face of the search warrant, namely: (1) the
blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded pink long
sleeves jacket and black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9mm caliber pistol, the
Court declares that only two articles under the Return on the Search
Warrant are admissible in evidence as they could be the blood-stained
clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant:
c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-
26 with JAM markings)

d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood
stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)
It bears stressing that the application for search warrant particularly
described the victims' blood-stained clothes as follows: (1) Rosemarie
Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants;
(2) Lucio Pua's black shorts and pink polo shirt; and (3) Gemma
Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, and black striped
t-shirt. Considering that only Gemma's clothes were described in Search
Warrant No. 10-11 as specific as the circumstances will allow, the Court
is constrained to hold as inadequately described the blood-stained clothes
of Lucio and Rosemarie. Without the aid of the applicant's witnesses who
are familiar with the victims' personal belongings, any other warrant
officer, like P/Insp. Macadangdang who served the search warrant, will
surely be unable to identify the blood-stained clothes of Lucio and
Rosemarie by sheer reliance on the face of such warrant.

The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application for
search warrant and supporting affidavits were incorporated by reference
in Search Warrant No. 10-11, so as to enable the warrant officer to
identify the specific clothes sought to be searched. This is because under
American jurispru ence, an otherwise overbroad warrant will comply with
the particularity requirement when the affidavit filed in support of the
warrant is physically attached to it, and the warrant expressly refers to
the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference.
Conversely, a warrant which lacks any description of the items to be
62
seized is defective and is not cured by a description in the warrant
application which is not referenced in the warrant and not provided to the
subject of the search.49

The Court further declares that the following items are inadmissible as
they do not bear any direct relation to the 3 items particularly described
in Search Warrant No. 10-11:
a. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-24 with JAM
markings)

b. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Mark as E-25 with JAM

markings)

xxxx

e. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Mark as E-14 with JAM
markings)

f. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-16 with JAM
markings)

g. One (1) cell phone spare part (mark as E-17 with JAM
markings)

h. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (mark as E-28 with

JAM markings)

i. Suspected blood stain (mark as E-25-A with JAM markings)

With respect to the items under Return on the Search Warrant indicated
as "articles recovered/seized in plain view during the conduct of the
search," it is well settled that objects falling in plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence.50

For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following
requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.51 As explained in People v. Salanguit:52
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
63
 in the course of which he carne inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful arrest,
or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused-and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain
view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
The first requisite of the "plain view doctrine" is present in this case
because the seizing officer, P/Insp. Macadangdang, has a prior
justification for an intrusion into the premises of the Felix Gumpal
Compound, for he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid warrant.
However, the second and third requisites are absent, as there is nothing
in the records to prove that the other items not particularly described in
the search warrant were open to eye and hand, and that their discovery
was unintentional.

In fact, out of the 2 items particularly described in the search warrant,

only the 2 black t-shirts with suspected blood stain possibly belonging to
Gemma were retrieved, but the 9mm caliber pistol was not found. It is
also not clear in this case at what instance were the items supposedly
seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of
Gemma's bloodstained clothes - whether prior to, contemporaneous with
or subsequent to such seizure. Bearing in mind that once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view
doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found,53 the Court rules that the recovery of the items
seized in plain view, which could have been made after the seizure of
Gemma's clothes, are invalid.

It is also not immediately apparent to the officer that, except for the
Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie, the BDO
Passbook in the name of Lucio, and the live ammo of caliber 22 (marked
as E-29 with JAM markings), the following items may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure:
a. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-1 with JAM markings)
b. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-2 with JAM markings)
c. One (1) pc torn cloth (Mark as E-3 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-4 with JAM
markings)
64
 e. One (1) bag pack color black (Mark as E-5 with JAM
markings)
f. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-6 with JAM
markings)
g. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-7 with JAM
markings)
h. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-8 with JAM
markings)
i. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-9 with JAM
markings)
j. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-10 with JAM
markings)
k. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-11 with JAM
markings)
l. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-12 with JAM
markings)
m. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as E-13 with JAM
markings)
xxxx
o. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Mark as 18 with JAM
markings)
p. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (mark as E-19 with JAM
markings)
q. Suspected human hair (mark as E-20 with JAM markings)
r. A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (mark as E-22 with JAM
markings)
s. Three (3) burned Tire wires (mark as E-23 with JAM
markings)
t. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (mark as
E-27 with JAM markings)
xxxx
v. One (1) color white t-shirt (mark as E-30 with JAM
markings)
It bears emphasis that the "immediately apparent" test does not require
an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of
the evidence, but only that the seizure be presumptively reasonable,
assuming that there is a probable cause to associate the property with a
criminal activity.54 In view thereof, the 10 pieces of spent shell of calibre
0.22 ammo cannot be admitted in evidence because they can hardly be
used in a 9mm caliber pistol specified in the search warrant, and
possession of such spent shells are not illegal per se. Likewise, the
following items supposedly seized under plain view cannot be admitted
because possession thereof is not inherently unlawful: (a) 3 torn cloths;
(b) black bag pack; (c) a piece of goldplated earing; (d) a suspected
65
human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered cloth; (f) 3 burned tire wires; (g)
empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above,

the Court sustains the validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11 and the
admissibility of the items seized which were particularly described in the
warrant. This is in line with the principles under American jurisprudence:
(1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not
render the whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those
things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that the officers,
after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made
a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not
invalidate the first search and seizure.55 To be sure, a search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime.56 Objects taken which were not specified in the search
warrant should be restored57 to the person from whom they were
unlawfully seized.

Although the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie and

the BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio are inadmissible in evidence, for
not having been seized in accordance with the "plain view doctrine,"
these personal belongings should be returned to the heirs of the
respective victims. Anent the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29
with JAM markings), which could not have been used in a 0.9mm caliber
pistol, the same shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of a
criminal case that may be later filed against petitioner Dimal. In Alih v.
Castro,58 it was held that even if the search of petitioners' premises was
violative of the Constitution and the firearms and ammunition taken
therefrom are inadmissible in evidence, pending determination of the
legality of said articles they can be ordered to remain in custodia
legis subject to appropriate disposition as the corresponding court may
direct in the criminal proceedings that have been or may thereafter be
filed against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128355 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION to declare that the following properties seized under
Search Warrant No. 10-11 are inadmissible in evidence for neither having
been particularly described in the search warrant nor seized under the
"plain view doctrine":
1. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-24 with JAM
markings)
66
2. Extracted suspected Blood stain (Marked as E-25 with JAM
markings)
3. One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM
markings)
4. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-16 with JAM
markings)
5. One (1) cell phone spare part (marked as E-17 with JAM
markings)
6. Palay husk with suspected blood stain (marked as E-28 with
JAM markings)
7. Suspected blood stain (marked as E-25-A with JAM
markings)
8. One (1) pc torn cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)
9. One (1) pc torn cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)
10. One (1) pc torn cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)
11. One (1) pc spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with
JAM markings)
12. One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM
markings)
13. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM
markings)
14. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM
markings)
15. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM
markings)
16. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM
markings)
17. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM
markings)
18. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM
markings)
19. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM
markings)
20. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM
markings)
21. Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and
Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of
Lucio Pua (mark as E-15 with JAM markings)
22. One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM
markings)
23. One (1) piece gold-plated earring (marked as E-19 with
JAM markings)
24. Suspected human hair (marked as E-20 with JAM
markings)
67
 25 A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (marked as E-22 with JAM
markings)
26. Three (3) burned Tire wires (marked as E-23 with JAM
markings)
27. One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid
(marked as E-27 with JAM markings)
28. One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (marked as E-29 with JAM
markings)
29. One (1) color white t-shirt (marked as E-30 with JAM
markings)
Moreover, the two (2) Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio Pua and
Rosemarie Pua, and One (1) BOO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua are
directed to be returned to the respective heirs of said victims, while the
live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with JAM markings) shall
remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal case that
may be filed against petitioner Jaylord Dimal.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,*Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes,

Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated
February 28, 2018.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, with Associate
Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez concurring; rollo,
pp. 44-50.

2
Id. at 52-53.

3
 Presided by Judge Aurora A. Hernandez-Calledo; id. at 94-
102.

4
Rollo, pp. 54-55.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 80-81.

7
Id. at 82-83, 136-138.

68
8
Id. at 84-93.

9
 The names of the 2 victims in the other Informations are
Rosemarie P. Pua (Chinese name: Juhua Pan) and Gemma
Eugenio y Estrada.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Rollo, pp. 126-129. (Emphasis ours)

13
Id. at 94-102.

14
Supra note 1.

15
Id. at 49-50.

16
 With the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,"
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, such
penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

17
 466 Phil. 324, 384-385 (2004), citing People v. Ramos, 357
Phil. 559 (1998), and People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37 (2000).

18
Id. at 385-387. (Italics in the original; emphasis added;
citations omitted)

19
Rollo, p. 59.

20
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875,
928 (1996).

21
 680 Phil. 447, 457-458 (2012).

22
 G.R. No. 208137, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA 623.

23
Id. at 631-632.

24
Rollo, pp. 58-61. (Emphasis added)

25
Id. at 63-66. (Emphasis added)
69
26
Id. at 69. (Emphasis added)

27
Id. at 125. Motion for Reconsideration dated October 16,
2012, p. 17.

28
Id. at 71-78. (Emphasis ours)

29
Rollo, p. 120. Motion for Reconsideration October 16, 2012, p.
18.

30
 Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

31
Oebanda v. People, supra note 22, at 642.

32
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 563
(2004).

33
Rollo, pp. 80-81. (Emphasis and underscoring added on the
particular place to be searched and things to seized,
respectively)

34
SPO4 Laud (Ret.) v. People, 747 Phil. 503, 522-523 (2014).

35
Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447, 458 (2012).

36
 Section 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of
section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.

37
Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Romars International Gases
Corporation, 153 Phil. 707, 716 (2015).

38
 536 Phil. 672, 692 (2006).

39
Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Romars International Gases
Corporation, supra note 37.

40
SPO4 Laud (Ret.) v. People, supra, at 525, citing Bache and
Co. (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 147 Phil. 794, 811 (1971).

41
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., supra note 32, at
70
568-569.

42
 471 Phil. 670 (2004).

43
Id. at 687.

44
 68 Am Jur 2d, §222 (2000)

45
Id.

46
 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

47
 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec.
4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must,

before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

48
Del Castillo v. People, supra note 35, at 456; People v.
Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016, 807 SCRA
77, 87-88.

49
 68 Am Jur 2d §223 Searches and Seizures (2000).

50
Miclat, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191, 206 (2011).

71
 51
Id.

52
 408 Phil. 817, 834 (2001), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 433, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).

53
People v. Salanguit, supra.

54
United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 363 (2005).

55
 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures §83.

56
People v. Nuñez, 609 Phil. 176, 187 (2009).

57
Id.

58
 235 Phil. 270, 278 (1987).

Constitution - are foreigners also protected by our

constitution when they are in the Philippines?

- YES , sakop sila as long as nasa Philippine Territory sila, hindi

72
lang prohibitive laws ng Philippines, pati na din mga rights and
privileges. Kahit nakapag commit sila ng alleged crime, entitled
sila na ma-enjoy ang Rights of the Accused, which is part ng Bill
of Rights Kung nandito sila as tourist or whatsoever, protected
sila under Philippine Law, pati na din constitution Same sa
Filipino Citizens.

ie. protected by our Bill of Right? - YES THEY ARE

Pag nahuli sila, iniinform pa din sila ng "Miranda Rights" kahit

foreigners sila Maeenjoy din nila ang speedy trial gaya ng mga
accused na Filipino Citizen (minsan mas mabilis pa pag foreigners
sir hahahahha) Simply put, kung applicable sa kanila lahat ng
prohibitive laws ng pilipinas, applicable din sa kanila ang rights
and privileges na binibigay sa mga pinoy.

They can move freely as filipinos except sa pagcommit ng

wrongdoings.

TWO CASES RELATED TO DRUGS ON WHICH THE

FOREIGNERS ARE INVOLVED?

73
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189272               January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE
SENGLAO, Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated January 9, 2009 and
Resolution2 dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R.
CR HC No. 00657 affirming the Decision 3 dated June 21, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in
Criminal Case No. Z-1058, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a),
Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3

Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the
Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a
suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said
island.4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the
specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by
side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speed boat.
They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on
board the speed boat who were transferring cargo fromthe former to the
latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped
away. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were prevented from
chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which
seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the
officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. ChanQue and Hui Lao
Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags
containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be
the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
74
as "shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification
papers but appellants failed to do so. 5 Thus, the police officers directed
appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed
appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc,
Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that
appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them "big, big amount of
money" which they ignored.6

Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together
with the bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station.
In the presence of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico,
they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty five
(45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. 7 Again, SPO3 Yuson
requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities
as well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine
territory.8 However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s
questions.9 Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to
their superiors, PNP Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna.
The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await
his arrival the following day.10

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel

Damian on a helicopter. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the
arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected
illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further
investigation.11 There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs
were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence
and Investigation Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to
communicate with the appellants using "broken" English. According to
Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase "call
China, big money," giving him a certain cellular phone number. 12 He
allowed appellants to call said number in which they spoke with someone
using their native language, which he could not understand. 13 Because of
this difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito
Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either Fookien or
Cantonese.

On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said

interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and explained to the appellants their
rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel, as well as the right tobe informed of the charges against
them, and the consequences thereof. 14 Inspector Culili also requested the
interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said
constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase
75
"big money, call China." Apart from their names, aliases and personal
circumstances, the appellants did notdivulge any other
15
information.  Inspector Culili, with the assistance of the arresting
officers, then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the
appellants, requested for their physical and medical examination, as well
as the laboratory examination of the white, crystalline substance inthe
bags seized from them.16 He also assisted the arresting officers in the
preparation of their affidavits.17 According to Inspector Culili,
moreover,he was able to confirm that the appellants are Chinese
nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report
that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen
along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province. 18

Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic

Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an
examination of the white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags
seized from the appellants.19 After performing three (3) tests thereon,
she positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is,
indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." 20

On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Occidental Mindoro filed an Information 21 with the RTC of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article
III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by
RA No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at

the coast of Brgy. Tambo, Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc
Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then the persons
not authorized by law conspiring and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through
the use of sea vessel into the above-mentioned place, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as Shabu contained in forty-five (45) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags having a total weight of 46,600 grams (46.60
kilograms) placed inside another forty-five(45) separate self-seling (sic)
transparent plastic bags which is prohibited by law, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter,

trial on the merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to
by the witnesses for the prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3
Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and Police Inspector Geronimo.

76
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga
and Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J.
Lozada, a former Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and
Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal Council,
essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely
recovered by the apprehending police officers from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat
the appellants were on.22

The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its
Decision dated June 21, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN QUE" AND
HIU LAO CHUNG @ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21
(a), Article IV as amended by R. A. 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, the Court hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos Philippine
Currency, with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.23

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision
dated January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the
appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent
reason to make any revision, amendment, or reversal of its assailed
Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF

IMPORTATION OF REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER
SECTION 14, ARTCILE III, IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A),
ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT 7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME

CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

III.

77
 WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE
GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT SACRED BY THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF

ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS IS VALID.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS

PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.24

Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the

instant case since the elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1)
the importation or bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or
prohibited drug; and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines
of said drugs was without authority of law, were not established herein.
Appellants assert that unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal
drugs came from a foreign country, the offense does not fall within the
ambit of illegal importation of said drugs. Thus, considering the
prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin of the boat on which
appellants were apprehended, appellants cannot be convicted of the
crime charged herein.

Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond

reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of
custody of the illegal drugs subject of this case was not sufficiently
established. In addition, they emphasize the irregularities attendant in
their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their
constitutionally protected rights. Appellants further call attention to the
invalidity of their arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel
of their choice.

This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument.

The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged

appellants with violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section
21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659, which provide:

ARTICLE III

Regulated Drugs
78
Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated
drug into the Philippines.

xxxx

ARTICLE IV

Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized

under Articles II and III

xxxx

Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this
Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any
attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases:

a) importation of dangerous drugs;

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of

regulated drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug
into the Philippines without being authorized by law. According to
appellants, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into
the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no importation. In support
of this, they cite our ruling in United States v. Jose, 25 wherein We said
that:

There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is alleged to

have been illegally imported comes from a foreign country, there is no
importation. If the ship came to Olongapo from Zamboanga, for example,
the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port of
Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be sustained no
matter how much opium she had on board or how much was discharged.
In order to establish the crime of importation as defined by the Opium
Law, it must be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or
on which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. Section
4 of Act No. 2381 provides that:

Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands, or assist in so doing, shall be punished . . . .

It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of opium

into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a prime

79
essential of the crime defined by that section. Without it, no crime under
that section can be established. 26

Moreover, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of

bringing goods and merchandise intoa country from a foreign
country."27 As used in our tariff and customs laws, imported articles,
those which are brought into the Philippines from any foreign country,
are subject to duty upon each importation. 28 Similarly, in a statute
controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear
wastes, importation was construed as the entry of products or substances
into the Philippines through the seaports or airports of
29
entry.  Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of
something into a certain territory coming from an external source.
Logically, if the article merely came from the same territory, there cannot
be any importation of the same.

The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that

appellants were, indeed, guilty of importing regulated drugs into the
country in violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were caught by police
authorities in flagrante delictoon board a speedboat carrying forty-five
(45) plastic bags of shabu. The drugsseized were properly presented and
identified in court. Appellants’ admission that they were Chinese nationals
and their penchant for making reference during custodial investigation to
China where they could obtain money to bribe the police officers lead this
Court to no other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of
origin of the confiscated drugs. All elements of the crime of illegal
importation of regulated drugs being present in this case, conviction
thereof is in order.30

We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as
well as their penchant for making reference to China where they could
obtain money to bribe the apprehending officers does not necessarily
mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. The
records only bear the fact that the speedboat on which the appellants
were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the
Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily come
from some other locality within the country, and not necessarily from
China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a
vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose how
appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental Mindoro from
China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on
board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of
Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently prove
80
the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs
in the country from an external source. This, notwithstanding, had the
prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court that
the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the
Philippines, the importation contention could have been sustained.
Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under
Section 14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from
all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident.

At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United

States v. Jose,31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of
importation and thus, they cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:

Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the
question whether, in case the charge of illegal importation fails, the
accused may still be convicted, under the information, of the crime of
illegal possession of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of
discussion of this proposition; but, believing that it is a question which
might fairly be raised in the event of an acquittal on the charge of illegal
importation, we have taken it up and decided it. Section 29 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure provides that:

The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any
frustrated or attempted offense, the commission of which is necessarily
included inthe charge in the complaint or information.

As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included in

the charge in the information it is not sufficient that the crime maybe
included, but it must necessarily be included. While, the case before us,
the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond
question and they might have been convicted of that offense if they have
been charged therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an
essential element of the crime of illegal importation and was not
necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say the
least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not
necessary that the opium be discharged or that it be taken from the ship.
It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the
Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which
subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to
discharge its cargo. That being the case it is clear that possession, either
actual or constructive, is not a necessary element of the crime of illegal
importation nor is it necessarily included therein. Therefore, in acquitting
the appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot legally
convict them of the crime of illegal possession.32

81
However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish, 33 this Court held
that possession is inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who
was suspected of being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of
blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked inside
Philippine territory, was charged with illegal importation of the articles
under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal
possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two
(2) separate informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of
the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court
affirmed the dismissal of the information on illegal importation, in the
following wise:

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case

against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.

With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it

seems plain beyond argument that the latter is inherent in the former so
as to make them juridically identical. There can hardly be importation
without possession. When one brings something or causes something to
be brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of it. The
possession ensuing from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or
constructive, but whatever its character, the importer, in our opinion, is a
possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal prosecution.If
he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches
Philippine territory, he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the
legal meaning of the term, and he is not subject to prosecution for either
offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the
time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He who puts
merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it is in
transit does not incur criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a
prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high seas outside the
jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573). 34

82
As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double
jeopardy therein since the offense charged in the information on
possession is necessarily included in the information on importation in
view of the fact that the former is inherent in the latter. Thus, this Court
sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which charged the
accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for
possession is necessarily included in the charge of importation.

Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants
cannot be held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the
information, their criminal liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond
reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. As previously
mentioned, the crime of importation of regulateddrugs is committed by
importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without
being authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes
something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has possession
of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation can never beproven
without first establishing possession, affirming the fact that possession is
a condition sine qua nonfor it would rather be unjust to convict one of
illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in
possession thereof.

At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal
possession when the information filed against them charges the crime of
importation does not violate their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is
that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence,
and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged.35 An offense charged necessarily includes thatwhich is proved,
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this
is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. 36

Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused,

charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal
possession thereof. In those cases, this Court upheld the prevailing
doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal
possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal
possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not
included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs
was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the
accused.37 Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element
of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the

83
accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of the
accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.

In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an

element of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous
drugs, convicting appellants of the former, if duly established beyond
reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. Indeed,
where an accused is charged witha specific crime, he is duly informed not
only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included
therein.38

Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is

necessarily included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this
Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under Section 16, 39 Article III
of RA No. 6425.

The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a)

the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a regulated drug; (b) such possession isnot authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated drug. 40

The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in

possession of the bags containing the regulated drugs without the
requisite authority. As mentioned previously, on the date of appellants’
arrest, the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the
coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro,
upon being informed by the Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a
suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long after, they
spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the persons on which were
transferring cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they moved
closer to the area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching
the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with several
transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which
were plainly exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were
found to be in possession of the subject regulated drugs.

Moreover, this Court is not legallyprepared to accept the version of the

appellants that they had nothing todo with the incident and that they
were being framed up as the drugs seized from them were merely
planted by the apprehending officers. At the outset, this Court observes
that appellants did not provide any explanation as tohow the
apprehending officers were actually able to plant forty-five (45) bags of
regulated drugs weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of
appellants in the middle of the ocean without their knowledge. Also, as
84
the trial court noted, they did not even give any explanation as to the
purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental Mindoro.
More importantly, aside from saying that the confiscated bags of
regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not
provide the court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In
the words of the lower court:

Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva,

and Godofredo Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the
police authority from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza
taxes only one’s credulity. Their testimonies appear to be merely a
product of an [afterthought]. They have not executed any prior affidavit
on the matters concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution
witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2 Paglicawan who executed their joint
affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. It is so apparent from the
testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses that they
[did not] know anything about the case. What is even worse is that Atty.
Evasco, the former counsel of the accused, procured the testimonies of
Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Reyes. Clear enough their
intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the monetary
consideration in exchange of their testimony.41

This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard

defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law. This defense has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can
easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-
up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. 42 Without proof
of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to
appellants the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect,
deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of frame
up by appellants.43

Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated

by certain irregularities in the proceedings of this case. First and
foremost, appellants allegea violation of their constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of probable
cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on
their persons and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated
bags of regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them.

Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides:

85
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things
to be seized.

A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest

made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a
previously issued warrant, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

This Court has ruled that for anarrest to fall under the above exception,
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 44

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were

caught by the apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. As previously
stated, the records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the
apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay
Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another.
However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to
the appellants, naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. Soon
after, the police officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed
to the view of the officers. When they requested appellants to show
proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for
being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less
respond to any of their questions. In fact, when the officers were
transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant
Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers "big, big
amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding
the arrest of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they
were actually committing a crime within the view of the arresting officers,
who had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.

86
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search
and seizure conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that
the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the
arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the
requirement of obtaining a search warrant.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 45 It applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.46

In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty
of ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the
time and place reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad daylight,
appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of illegal drugs from
one boat to another and thereafter caught in possession of the same,
which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of
view of the arresting officers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the
seizure of illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls within the purview
of the "plain view" doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are
admissible as evidence against appellants.

As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to

substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delictiof the crime
charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently
established, the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records of
the case provides otherwise. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the
seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and photographed.
Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants
and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the confiscated
drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters. 47 There, the
evidence was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an
examination which yielded positive results. The laboratory report,
photographs, and receipts were all made part of the records of this case.
In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented
87
before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which
was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the officer who confiscated the same.
Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs was
established by the prosecution.

Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally
charged in an Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after
their arrest on December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period
in Article 12548 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the law subjects
such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal period to
criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding taken
against the detained persons for the act they committed remains
unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate. 49 This Court is
nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police
officersin this case, such as the language barrier, the unresponsiveness of
the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a Sunday, as well as
the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even
assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the
Information, appellants should havetaken steps to report or file charges
against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot now rely on
administrative short comings ofpolice officers to get a judgment of
acquittal for these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found
in appellants’ possession.50

Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further

violated for during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of
their choice nor were they provided with one, this deserves scant
consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes
the basis of his conviction.51 In this case, neither one of the appellants
executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show,
appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call
China, big money." The trial court convicted them not on the basis of
anything they said during custodial investigation but on other convincing
evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Verily,
there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel during
custodial investigation.

In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings

in saying that during their arraignment, they were not represented by a
counsel of their choice but were merely represented by a court-appointed
government lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial court likewise
appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little Chinese
language. As such, considering the absence of any assurance that the
interpreter was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in
88
the language they understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter
their plea.

The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the
contention of the appellants.1âwphi1 This Court does not find a violation
of appellants’ right to counsel for evenin their own narration of facts,
appellants stated that when they appeared without counsel when the
case was called for arraignment on January19, 1999, the trial court gave
appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was
only when appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23,
1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public Attorney’s
Office.52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample opportunity to
secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot now
assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court for the fact
remains that they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the
law.

In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the
services of a Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their
standards. As pointed out by the CA, the trial court gave appellants the
authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s
assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. 53 Appellants
were even given time, through several postponements,to properly secure
the services of one. If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of
the court-appointed interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities
given by the trial court. In this relation, the trial court’s observations are
worth mentioning, to wit:

Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify
on their own behalf, the defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese
interpreter. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8,
1998 or six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for
such period oftime that this case has been pending in court, accused
could not still secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne
out by the records, they were able to secure the services of several
lawyers one after the other. The accused on two (2) occasions have even
submitted written requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O")which
were granted by the Court allowing them to call their relatives but still
they failed to secure the services of an interpreter. To the mind of the
Court, accused can also understand English as proven by their letters. x x
x54

Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings
of the lower court as to appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against
them, especially when such findings are adequately supported by
89
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of this
Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact
of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in
a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the
opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’
deportment during the trial.55

Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of

the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this
Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of
the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the above
findings.56 It is clear, therefore, that based on the findings of the courts
below, appellants were, in fact, in possession of regulated drugs without
the requisite authority.

As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No.

7659, amending RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, provide:

Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous DrugsAct of 1972, is amended to read as
follows:

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of

reclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

xxxx

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read
as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -The penalties for offenses under
Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:

xxxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

90
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have
possessed forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is more than the two hundred (200) grams
stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." As regards the fine,
We find that the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) for each
appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the quantity seized
from them. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April
24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00657 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are found GUILTY
of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above

91
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 enned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Romeo F. Barza,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-18.
2
 CA rollo, p. 281.
3
 Penned by Presiding Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, id. at 8-19.
4
 Rollo, p. 4.
5
 CA rollo, p. 9.
6
 Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 2-12; and TSN, May 19,
1999, pp. 12-24.
7
 CA rollo, p. 10.
8
 TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 13.
9
 Id.
10
 Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 12-14; and TSN, May 19,
1999, pp. 24-26, 28.
11
 Id., citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 14-15; 26-29.
12
 Id.,citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 5-14.
13
 CA rollo, p. 11.
14
 Id.
15
 Rollo p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 14-17.
16
 Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-25.
17
 CA rollo, p. 12.

92
18
 Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, p. 36.
19
 Id. at 6, citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 7-28.
20
 Id., citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 38-73.
21
 CA rollo, p. 6.
22
 Id. at 16.
23
 Id. at 19.
24
 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
25
 G.R. No. L-11737, August 25, 1916.
26
 United States v. Jose, supra. (Emphasis ours)
27
 http://thelawdictionary.org/importation/ (last accessed November 11,
2014).
28
 Section 101, Title 1 of Book 1, Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known
as "An Act to Revise and Codify the Tariff and Customs Laws of the
Philippines."
29
 Section 5(d)Republic Act No. 6969, otherwise known as "An Act to
Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes," October 26,
1990.
30
 Rollo, pp. 13-14. (Emphasis ours)
31
 United States v. Jose, supra note 23.
32
 Id. (Emphasis ours)
33
 People v. Elkanish, G.R. No. L-2666, September 26, 1951.
34
 Id. (Emphasis ours)
35
 Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 4.
36
 Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 5.
37
 People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 and People v.
Hong Yeng E, G. R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013, citing People v.
Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 561.

93
38
 People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010, citing People v.
Villamar, 358 Phil. 886, 894 (1998).
39
 Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a
fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription.
40
 People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997).
41
 CArollo, p. 18.
42
 People v. Amansec, G. R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA
574, citing People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604
SCRA 250, 269.
43
 People v. Cruz,G.R. No. 187047, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 286, citing
People v. Chua, 416 Phil. 33, 56 (2001).
44
 Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539,
550, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
45
 Fajardo v. People, G. R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 194,
209, citing People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v.
Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610 and Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927)
46
 Id., at 209-210, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).
47
 CA rollo, p. 11.
48
 Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article
shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
49
 People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 528 (2004), citing People v. Mabong,
100 Phil. 1069, 1071 (1957).
50
 Id., citing People v. Tejada, 252 Phil. 515, 525-526 (1989).
94
51
 Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA
624, and People v. Vinecario, G. R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004, citing
People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364, 372 (2000).
52
 Rollo, p. 59.
53
 Id. at 15.
54
 CA rollo, p. 18. (Emphasis ours)
55
 Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011, citing People v. Dilao,
555 Phil. 394, 407 (2007).
56
 Id. at 439.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182178               August 15, 2011

STEPHEN SY y TIBAGONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 dated October 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00402, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case
No. 17614 convicting petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, as well as the Resolution 2 dated March 7, 2008, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

95
Under an Information dated June 12, 2005, petitioner Stephen T. Sy was
indicted for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 11th day of June 2005, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
[petitioner], not being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess and keep one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline
substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.3

Upon his arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded

not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, on the one hand, the prosecution presented Police
Senior Inspector Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas, Police Officer (PO) 3
Liberato Faelogo, PO3 Dario Paquera, Barangay Kagawad Rogelio
Talavera, PO2 Glenn M. Corsame, and Reysan Elloren.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole
witness.

Evidence for the Prosecution

PO3 Faelogo, a member of the PNP and assigned as Intelligence

Operative of the Dumaguete City Police Station, testified that at about 2
o’clock in the afternoon of June 11, 2005, while he was on duty, their
office received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that an illegal
drug trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City.
With him at that time was PO3 Paquera. PO3 Faelogo averred that the
two (2) of them immediately responded and went to the place as
reported. While walking at the pathway going to the interior portion of
Zone 3, Barangay Looc, at a distance of about two (2) meters away, they
saw a man, later identified as the [petitioner] in this case, examining a
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same.
They approached the [petitioner], introduced themselves as policemen
and announced his arrest for illegal possession of dangerous drug. PO3
Faelogo then apprised the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights but
while doing so, the [petitioner] hurriedly boarded on his motorcycle for a
possible escape. PO3 Faelogo was not able to finish his recital of the
constitutional rights of the [petitioner]. PO3 Faelogo had to wrestle with
the [petitioner] who dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground. While
96
PO3 Faelogo and the [petitioner] were wrestling, PO3 Paquera picked up
the said sachet of shabu. After a few minutes of struggle, they were able
to subdue the [petitioner] and handcuff him. PO3 Faelogo continued to
inform the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights in the Cebuano dialect.
The [petitioner] was searched and found in his possession was a
disposable lighter. PO3 Paquera gave the plastic sachet of shabu to PO3
Faelogo who made markings on it with the initials "SS 06-11-05" with SS
to mean the name of the [petitioner] Stephen Sy and the numbers, the
date of the incident. They then brought the [petitioner] with the seized
items to the police station. They were not able to conduct an inventory in
the crime scene, as there was a commotion where some people tried to
rescue the [petitioner]. For their safety, they left the area.

At the police station, PO3 Paquera took a photograph of the [petitioner]

and the seized items. PO3 Faelogo then conducted an inventory of the
recovered sachet of shabu including the disposable lighter in the presence
of DOJ Representative Pros. Angelita Alcoran, Brgy. Kagawad Rogelio
Talavera of Barangay Looc, the elected official representative, Reysan
Elloren, the media representative and PO2 Glenn Corsame of the PDEA,
who all signed the receipt of property seized. The [petitioner] was given a
copy of the receipt. PO2 Corsame had the incident recorded in the PDEA
blotter.

PO3 Faelogo also averred that he was the one who submitted the seized
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline pow[d]er/granules to the PNP Crime Laboratory, together with
a letter request dated June 11, 2005 of the Chief of Police of Dumaguete
City Police Station. The [petitioner] was not subjected to drug
examination, as no drug testing kit was available at that time.

It was Police Senior Inspector Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas, forensic

chemical officer of the Negros Oriental Provincial Crime Laboratory who
received the seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
marking "SS-06-11-05" and conducted a laboratory examination on the
contents thereof. She re-marked the sachet as Specimen A which had a
weight of 0.02 gram. Her qualitative examination conducted on the
specimen gave positive result to the tests for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her
conclusion was that Specimen A contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her examination results
were embodied in a Chemistry Report No. D-103-05 and a certification,
which she signed and submitted.

In support of the case filed, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera executed a
joint affidavit of arrest, which they identified in Court.4
97
Evidence for the Defense

The [petitioner] claimed that on June 11, 2005 at around 2 o’clock in the
afternoon, he was in Barangay Looc to book a masseur to massage him
in the evening. As he was not able to find the person to massage him,
the [petitioner] started to go home. While he was about to board his
motorcycle, one of two (2) men, whom he had seen earlier from a
distance, immediately handcuffed him in his left wrist. The [petitioner]
was not given a warning and he was surprised why he was handcuffed
especially since he had not committed any crime. Fearing for his life, the
[petitioner] resisted and told the person who handcuffed him, "What am I
charged of?" The [petitioner] was told to just keep quiet. The [petitioner]
told the person to search him first before he should handcuff him. The
[petitioner] continued to resist the person and they wrestled with each
other. Noticing that this person had a gun tucked in his waist, the
[petitioner] did not resist anymore. The [petitioner] was frisked in his
pockets, in his cap and other parts of his body, including his brief wherein
the person inserted his hand inside. The pants of the [petitioner] were
also removed. The search was conducted in full view of many onlookers,
but still nothing was found on the [petitioner]. One of the persons then
picked up something, which the [petitioner] could not see and was told
that it was shabu and a lighter. The [petitioner] was then brought to the
Dumaguete City Police Station. The [petitioner] later learned at the police
station the identity of the persons who arrested him, namely, Liberato
Faelogo and Dario Paquera. At the police station, a photograph was taken
of the [petitioner]. The [petitioner] then requested that he be subjected
to drug examination, but was not tested. The [petitioner] kept on
requesting for drug examination for a week but still he was not tested.
The [petitioner] also claimed that while he was at the police station and
being investigated, he was kicked and punched by no less than the Chief
of Police, one named Hidalgo. The [petitioner] tried to protest but was
not able to do anything, as nobody was around to help him. 5

On May 12, 2006, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has
established all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a
Decision6 convicting petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused

Stephen Sy y Tibagong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of illegal possession of 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and (1)
day, as minimum, term to fourteen (14) years, as maximum term, and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
98
The seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02
gram of white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu is hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government
and to be disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the Decision before the CA, which was
later docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00402.

On October 24, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the

decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED

and the assailed decision of the lower court finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the

Resolution dated March 7, 2008.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the police

officers enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty.

ii

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that

petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.

iii

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the right

of the petitioner against unlawful searches and seizures was
not violated.

iv

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding the conviction

of the petitioner based on the transparent plastic sachet

99
 considering that the same was the "fruit of a poisonous tree"
and could not be used for any purpose in any proceeding.

The honorable court of appeals erred in holding that because

petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the lower court, that
he also waived his right to object to the admission of the
plastic sachet in evidence.9

Simply stated, petitioner contends that since he was not doing anything
illegal at the time of his arrest that would arouse the suspicion of the
arresting officers, his subsequent arrest and the ensuing search upon his
person was illegal and, therefore, any alleged illegal drugs recovered
from him cannot be used in trial against him, without the risk of violating
his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizure.

Petitioner posits that the arresting officers lacked probable cause when
they arrested him. He argues that the act of flicking a clear plastic sachet
in broad daylight cannot be perceived as an illegal act. Thus, he was not
caught in flagrante delicto and the resulting warrantless arrest made by
the police officers was invalid. Moreover, the confiscated sachet is not
admissible in evidence against him being the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The petition is without merit.

It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing

any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for
the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.10

In the case at bar, petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his

arrest before his arraignment. Moreover, he actively participated in the
proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any
perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will
not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 11

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for

us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.12
100
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Corolarilly, the 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent

seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. 13 Said proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.14

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or

seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.15

In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the

search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
101
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset
of the search. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.16

In the case at bar, the established facts reveal that on June 11, 2005,
PO3 Faelogo, an Intelligence Operative of the Dumaguete City Police
Station, received information from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug
trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. Together
with PO3 Paquera, PO3 Faelogo immediately acted on the information
and went to the place. While traversing the pathway going to the interior
portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, they saw petitioner, at a distance of
two (2) meters, examining and flicking a transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu powder. The two then approached petitioner, introduced
themselves as police officers, and announced the he is being arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. While being informed of his
constitutional rights during the arrest, petitioner tried to escape by
boarding his motorcycle. While wrestling with PO3 Faelogo, petitioner
dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground, which was picked up by PO3
Paquera. The police officers eventually were able to subdue and handcuff
petitioner. Upon searching his person, they also found in his possession a
disposable lighter. The seized sachet was marked on location. They then
brought petitioner, together with the items seized, to the police station
and conducted a proper inventory thereof. The heat-sealed transparent
sachet containing white crystalline substance was submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug under RA No. 9165.

From the foregoing, sufficient evidence supports that the warrantless

arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto. The police officers witnessed petitioner
flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the
arresting officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced
themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic
sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a regulated drug.

Under these circumstances, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante

delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers. At the time of his arrest,
102
the police officers were actively performing their duties, since they were
following up a tip that there was an illegal drug trade being conducted in
the area. This fact, coupled with the overt acts of petitioner, formed
sufficient basis on the part of the police officers to believe that a crime
was actually being committed. Thus, petitioner’s case falls within the
exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
Consequently, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were
admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner.17

In addition, buttressing the presumption of regularity in the performance

of their duties, the arresting officers substantially complied with the rules
on the custody and disposition of evidence recovered from petitioner.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21.  Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
[Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency] shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

103
x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.

x x x x.18

In the case at bar, the requirements of the law were substantially

complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized from petitioner were
preserved and safeguarded. From the time of petitioner’s arrest, the
seized item was properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory
was also made in the presence of the representatives from the media,
the Department of Justice, the PDEA, and an elected public official, who
all signed the receipt of the property seized. The evidence was sent to
the Negros Oriental Provincial Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination, which later tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a weight of 0.02 gram. An unbroken chain of custody
of the seized drug had been evidently established by the prosecution.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the

following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the
drug.19 Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above
elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a
regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted
to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.20

104
The Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the
lower court as to petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged against him,
particularly where such findings are adequately supported by
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. The same respect holds too
as regards the lower court’s evaluation of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on
reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in
criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to
assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an
honest determination of the witnesses’ deportment during the trial. 21

Furthermore, the well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the

trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this
Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of
the case.22 In the present case, after a careful evaluation of the records,
we find that no oversight was committed by the RTC and the CA to
disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime
charged against him.1avvphi1

In contrast to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner

merely raised the defense of alibi. The defense of denial and frame-up
has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense
of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence.23

To stress, in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,

credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of
motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail
over petitioner’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial. 24 1avvphil

As to the propriety of the penalty imposed upon petitioner, We find that

the RTC imposed the appropriate penalty.

Section 11, Article II, of RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:

105
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree
of purity thereof:

x x x x.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,

the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.25

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized
with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). The
evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.02 gram of shabu, or less
than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the

imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the
law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed
under the law. Taking the foregoing into consideration, the penalty meted
out by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was within the range provided by
RA No. 9165. The appropriate penalty was, therefore, imposed by the
lower court.

106
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated October 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated March 7, 2008, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00402 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO***

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1059 dated August 1, 2011.

107
**
 Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose
Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1056 dated July 27, 2011.
***
 Designated as an additional member, per Special Order No. 1028
dated June 21, 2011.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices
Francisco P. Acosta and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-
49.
2
 Id. at 51-52.
3
 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
4
 Id. at 53-54
5
 Id. at 55.
6
 Id. at 53-59.
7
 Id. at 58-59.
8
 Id. at 48-49.
9
 Id. at 11-12.
10
 Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010,
623 SCRA 343, 348.
11
 People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578,
601.
12
 Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA
611, 622.
13
 1987 Constitution, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (2).
14
 People v. Rancho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633,
641.
15
 People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463,
476.
16
 People v. Rancho, supra note 14, at 642.
17
 People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA
556, 564.
108
18
 Emphasis supplied.
19
 People v. Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon, G.R. No. 184599,
November 24, 2010.
20
 People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010, 628 SCRA
328, 343.
21
 People v. Dilao, G.R. NO. 170359, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 427, 439.
22
 Id. at 439.
23
 People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625,
642-643.
24
 People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 185166, January 26, 2011.
25
 Emphasis supplied.

109