Sr. Vice-President, Indian Banks' Association, Mumbai: Basel III Orms - S S Murthy
Sr. Vice-President, Indian Banks' Association, Mumbai: Basel III Orms - S S Murthy
Sr. Vice-President, Indian Banks' Association, Mumbai: Basel III Orms - S S Murthy
- S S Murthy
Sr. Vice-President,
Indian Banks' Association, Mumbai
- Bhaskar Sharma
Chief Manager,
Risk Management Department,
Bank of Baroda, Mumbai
Basel III guidelines are bold, innovative and have been well drafted. The standards will be
implemented gradually and the impact will also be monitored by the guardians of
financial systems and economy.
After the Herstatt failure of 1974, the regulators world over have been working to design
regulatory framework to make the financial system safe. Bank for International
Settlement (BIS) published Basel I papers in July 1988, which was the first internationally
accepted framework of banking risk regulation. Basel I was drafted at a time when banks
were only carrying out the core function of accepting deposits for the purpose of lending.
However, when later on the banking functions went into a metamorphosis by retaining the
core functions, the Basel I principles suffered from many deficiencies and the risk
measurement framework was found to be inadequate with the changes in the banking
landscape. Basel II, published finally in June 2006, was a well deliberated and calibrated
framework to address the changed scenario. No sooner Basel II framework was published
and implemented the global financial system had to witness collapse and bankruptcy of
financial giants posing systemic threat to the financial system. The policy makers started
debating and brainstorming on how to redesign the global financial system so that another
destructive and devastating crisis does not occur again. Basel III guidelines are intended
to achieve this objective. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued
several revisions and enhancements after the June 2006 guidelines. BCBS set of rules
encompassing revisions and enhancements after this publication is commonly known as
Basel III Framework. Basel II was a self-contained complete guideline over Basel I. On
the contrary, Basel III guidelines on the one hand, supplements Basel II guidelines and on
the other also addresses certain macro prudential regulation by identifying systemic risk
as an important risk.
Basel III guidelines can be summarized as under:
• Basel III guidelines aim to improve the banking sectors' ability to absorb shocks
arising from financial and economic stress by strengthening of resilience of the
banking sector against future shocks, supplementing the current recovery process
and reducing the risk spillover to the real economy. New standards of Market
Risk, Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk have been stipulated.
• The definition of capital has been rationalized. Tier 1 capital will include only
Common Equity (share capital and retained earnings) and Perpetual Preferred
Stock (Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares—PNCPS). The attributes of
Tier II debt capital will be more akin to capital than as debt when compared to the
earlier regime.
• Some banks were observed to game around the rules of Capital Adequacy
computation. BCBS has introduced Leverage Ratio as another regulatory measure
of risk in the banks' balance sheet over and above Capital Adequacy Ratio.
Conclusion
Basel III guidelines are bold, innovative and have been well drafted after conducting
Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS) of each of the measures. Some circles have expressed
apprehensions that the norms are so stringent that it will have adverse impact on supply of
credit and will stifle the economy. However, the standards will be implemented gradually
and the impact will also be monitored by the guardians of financial systems and economy.
The transition has been carefully drafted to ensure that the banks meet new standards
maintaining sound credit and lending activities and does not hamper the fair risk taking
abilities of the banks. BCBS has also assured that the standards will suitably be modified
wherever it manifests unintended consequences.
The views expressed here are the authors' and do not in any way reflect those of the
organization they belong to.
Reference # 01M-2011-01-09-01.