G.R. No.

162894
February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, 
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the
trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for
an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service
contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and
Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment
ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. 5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution
dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-
BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST,
the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the
allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from
the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that
BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and
RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9 Petitioner also
referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent
and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.10 Petitioner
sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative
Defenses and for Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum
non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the
resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the
Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court
held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient
for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non
conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.15

Page 1 of 156
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion was opposed by
respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed
a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a
writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July
2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the
allegations in the complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving
petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of
Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the other on the
issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had indeed
merged together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue
should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the
trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the
inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law
Office, counsel on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio
Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and
that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent
efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a
comment.

The instant petition lacks merit.

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid
choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties
and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is
located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner
theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances 27 where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites
had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an

Page 2 of 156
action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent
(as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two
distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires
a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is
within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court’s desistance.35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion
that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same
manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are
binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action
against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one
company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On
this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents
produced in the hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a
ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that
Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant
Rust International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to
exist after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise
meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and
Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon
International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation of BMSI to
respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST
merged together requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the
merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Page 3 of 156
G.R. No. L-22595
November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the
part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law
of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not
being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.

Page 4 of 156
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and
to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16749            

January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. 
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, 
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things
the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx     xxx     xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency
per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx     xxx     xxx

Page 5 of 156
 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me
from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue
of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
(b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not
be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of
the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose
of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred
and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286,
49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel,
filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.;
his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.

Page 6 of 156
 Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he
again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p.
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of
his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
(pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State
of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to
the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided
in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was
a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was
a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in
his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place
to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for
the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,

Page 7 of 156
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in
the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision
and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and
in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which
is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see
why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers.
The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at
that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent
for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question,
and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws
rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile
of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's
last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the

Page 8 of 156
 deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things
the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial
process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by
the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer"
to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer
to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means
the whole of its law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman
who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance
with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference
back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are
to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile
in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time

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 of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the
process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom
and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-
443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of
the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will
then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the
state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147597 : August 6, 2008]
CLARISSA U. MATA, doing business under the firm name BESSANG PASS SECURITY
AGENCY, Petitioner, v. ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE, EDDIE E. SANTILLAN, PATRICIO A. ARMODIA,
ALEJANDRO A. ALMADEN and HERMENEGILDO G. SALDO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Page 10 of 156
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed petitioner's complaint for damages filed against the respondents.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondents Eddie E. Santillan, Patricio A. Armodia, Alejandro A. Almaden and Hermenegildo G. Saldo
were former security guards of the Bessang Pass Security Agency, owned by herein petitioner Clarissa
Mata.
On October 27, 1993, the respondents, assisted by their counsel, Atty. Alexander Agravante, filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cebu City for non-payment of
salaries/wages and other benefits.2 Subsequently, they filed an affidavit-complaint with the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in Cramp Crame, Quezon City requesting an investigation of the Bessang Pass
Security Agency and cancellation of its license to operate as security agency for violation of labor laws.
Copies of this affidavit-complaint were likewise sent to the following offices: (1) Office of the President, (2)
Office of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, (3) Office of the PNP Director General, (4) PNP
Chief Superintendent Warlito Capitan, (5) Office of the DILG Secretary, (6) Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez
and (7) Office of the Vice-President.
On January 6, 1994, petitioner instituted an action for damages against the respondents averring that
respondents filed unfounded, baseless complaints before the NLRC for alleged violation of the labor laws
and with the PNP for cancellation of its license to operate. She further alleged that by furnishing the
government offices copies of these complaints, especially the Department of Public Works and Highways
which was its biggest client, the agency's reputation was besmirched, resulting in the loss of
contracts/projects and income in the amount of at least P5,000,000.00. Petitioner then declared that
respondents' deliberate and concerted campaign of hate and vilification against the Bessang Pass
Security Agency violated the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, prayed that
the respondents be held jointly and severally liable to pay her the sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P200,000.00 and other reliefs.
On August 4, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages.3
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioner ex parte, the trial court found preponderant
evidence enough to justify petitioner's cause of action. It gave credence to the petitioner's contentions
that the respondents had no other motive in sending the letter to the seven (7) government offices
except to unduly prejudice her good name and reputation. The trial court, however, did not award the
sum of P5,000,000.00 as petitioner's estimated loss of income for being speculative.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision. It dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE
ERROR, AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 89 IN QUEZON CITY AND FURTHER CONCLUDED
THAT RESPONDENTS' ACT OF FURNISHING COPIES OF THEIR LETTER-COMPLAINT NOT ONLY TO SEVEN
(7) NATIONAL AGENCIES BUT ALSO TO PETITIONER'S BIGGEST CLIENT, WAS NOT TAINTED WITH BAD
FAITH AND WITH THE SOLE MOTIVE TO MALIGN THE GOOD NAME AND REPUTATION OF PETITIONER.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN THE
APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND APPLICATION OF LAWS, WHICH IF NOT RECTIFIED, WOULD CAUSE
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND DAMAGE TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE
ERROR, AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 89 IN QUEZON CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING
RESPONDENTS HAVING BEEN DECLARED IN DEFAULT.4

Petitioner contends that the respondents were so driven by unrestrained hatred and revenge that they
not only succeeded in disseminating the letter-complaint to the 7 government offices but to the DPWH,
her biggest client, with the intention to destroy her reputation and, more importantly, her business. She
posits that this would mean a loss of employment for numerous employees throughout the country who
solely depend on the security agency for their existence, and that respondents obviously failed to see this
fact. She claims that the respondents have abused their rights, to her prejudice, and that of the security
agency which has tried very hard to protect its name and hard-earned reputation. Petitioner then

Page 11 of 156
concludes that the respondents have violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code and should be held liable
for damages.5
We are not impressed. We are more in accord with the findings and conclusions of the respondent court
that petitioner is not entitled to any award of damages. We agree with the respondent court's
explanation, viz.:

In filing the letter-complaint (Exhibit "D") with the Philippine National Police and furnishing copies thereof
to seven (7) other executive offices of the national government, the defendants-appellants may not be
said to be motivated simply by the desire to "unduly prejudice the good name and reputation" of plaintiff-
appellee. Such act was consistent with and a rational consequence of seeking justice through legal means
for the alleged abuses defendants-appellants suffered in the course of their employment with plaintiff-
appellee, which started with the case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of backwages and benefits
earlier filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in Cebu City. In exhausting the legal avenues to air
their legitimate grievances, the paramount and overriding concern of the defendants-appellants - who
had already suffered from retaliatory acts of their employer when they manifested their desire to take
formal action on the violations of labor laws committed by employer - is to secure government
intervention or action to correct or punish their employer, plaintiff-appellee, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws or rules and regulations which may be applicable to their situation. And in this
process, the intervention of the Philippine National Police was sought in view of its mandated role of
administrative supervision over security agencies like plaintiff-appellee.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the "Private Security Agency Law," empowered
the Chief of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC) at any time "to suspend or cancel the licenses of
private watchman or security guard agency found violating any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Chief of Constabulary pursuant thereto." With the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6975 ("Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990"), the PC-INP was
abolished and in its place, a new police force was established, the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Among the administrative support units of the PNP under the new law is the Civil Security Unit which shall
provide administrative services and general supervision over the organization, business operation and
activities of all organized private detectives, watchmen, security guard agencies and company guard
houses. It was thus but logical for defendants-appellants, as advised by their counsel, to also
communicate their grievances against their employer security guard agency with the PNP. The act of
furnishing copies to seven (7) other executive offices, including that of the Office of the President, was
merely to inform said offices of the fact of filing of such complaint, as is usually done by individual
complainants seeking official government action to address their problems or grievances. Their pending
case with the NLRC would not preclude them from seeking assistance from the PNP as said agency is the
national body that exercises general supervision over all security guard agencies in the country, the
defendants-appellants were of the honest belief that the violation of labor laws committed by their
employer will elicit proper action from said body, providing them with a relief (cancellation of license)
distinct from those reliefs sought by them from the NLRC (payment of backwages and benefits).
Certainly, defendants-appellants had good reason to believe that bringing the matter to PNP is justified as
no private security agency found to be violating labor laws should remain in good standing with or [be]
tolerated by the PNP. Despite the pendency of the NLRC case, such request for investigation of plaintiff-
appellee could not in any way be tainted with malice and bad faith where the same was made by the very
individuals who suffered from the illegal labor practices of plaintiff-appellee. Moreover, no liability could
arise from defendants-appellants' act of filing of the labor case with the NLRC which plaintiff-appellee
claimed to have resulted in the agency's not being able to secure contracts because of such pending labor
case, defendants-appellants merely exercised a right granted to them by our labor laws.6
It has been held that Article 19,7 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of this article is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.8 Article
21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which
is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure. The
common element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be intentional,9 and
attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not this
principle has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21,10 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.11 In the case before us, as correctly pointed out by the
CA, the circumstances do not warrant an award of damages. Thus, the award of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages is quite preposterous. We agree with the appellate court that in the action of the respondents,

Page 12 of 156
there was no malicious intent to injure petitioner's good name and reputation. The respondents merely
wanted to call the attention of responsible government agencies in order to secure appropriate action
upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for their grievances. So, we reiterate the basic
postulate that in the absence of proof that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents,
no damages can be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154259            

February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, 
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim
assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals
dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at
the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr.
Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."8Mr. Reyes then went up with
the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant. 9 At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party
of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet
table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim,
who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11 In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told
him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried
to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of
the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming
damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or
exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the
past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim
generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes
was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller,
the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. 23 Mr. Miller replied
that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart,
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto
to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms.
Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned
around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. 28 Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms.
Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr. Reyes
lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself
to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim

Page 13 of 156
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng
pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around
trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the
story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who
volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the
elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr.
Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while, she thought that
Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung. 37 Then there was a
commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not
want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony
of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise
ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited
by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim
because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the
party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his
attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to
leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter
as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the
exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner
contrary to morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire
into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have
approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should
leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the
one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs.
Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.
Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages,
especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the
nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the
solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3)
attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply
discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in –

I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

Page 14 of 156
 II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and
being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 )
refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
"Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or
not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review
such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however,
obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower
court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him
politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within
hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s
invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s
former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor.
While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the
guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the
celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in
the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in
the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the
presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the
burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms.
Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

Page 15 of 156
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party
was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction
to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule
in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his
story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was
Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither
can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s
declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart
if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot
amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her
that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done
with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals held –

Page 16 of 156
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in life. This
has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not
sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code
Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case
and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr.
Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the
Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of
Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee
of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal,
Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the
records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim.
Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without
basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 128927

September 14, 1999
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON SUA, respondents.
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA appeals to us through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 which acquitted her of the crime of estafa but held her liable nonetheless for the value of the
checks she indorsed in favor of private respondent Ramon Sua.
On several occasions petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico
Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de
Guzman: (a) PCIB Check No. 157059 dated 26 February 1987 for P140,000.00; (b) PCIB Check No. 157073
dated 26 February 1987 for P28,000.00; (c) PCIB Check No. 157057 dated 27 February 1987 for P42,150.00;
and, d) Metrobank Check No. DAG-045104758 PA dated 2 March 1987 for P125,000.00. These checks were
signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for payment the checks were dishonored because the
drawer's account was already closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and
petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of
estafa were filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-8731. Arturo de Guzman was charged with two (2) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8733 and D-8734. These cases against petitioner and de
Guzman were consolidated and tried jointly.
On 27 December 1989 the court a quo 2 acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not rule
on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. The trial
court found Arturo de Guzman guilty of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two (2) counts and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day in each of the cases, and to pay private respondent
P167,150.00 as civil indemnity.
Private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial court with regard to the civil aspect but the court
refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute.
Private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR SP
No. 24626, praying that the court a quo be ordered to give due course to the appeal on the civil aspect of
the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that private respondent could appeal
with respect to the civil aspect the judgment of acquittal by the trial court.
On 22 January 1996, the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 36376 rendered the assailed Decision insofar as
it sustained the appeal of private respondent on the civil aspect and ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent P335,000.00 representing the aggregate face value of the four (4) checks indorsed by
petitioner plus legal interest from the notice of dishonor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. On 19 March 1997 the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution noting the admission of both parties that private respondent had already collected
the amount of P125,000.00 from Arturo de Guzman with regard to his civil liability in Crim. Cases Nos.

Page 17 of 156
8733 and 8734. The appellate court noted that private respondent was the same offended party in the
criminal cases against petitioner and against de Guzman. Criminal Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734 against De
Guzman, and Crim. Cases Nos. 8730 and 8729 against petitioner, involved the same checks, to wit: PCIB
Checks Nos. 157057 for P42,150.00 and Metrobank Check No. DAG-045104758 PA for P125,000.00.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent could not recover twice on the same checks.
Since he had collected P125,000.00 as civil indemnity in Crim. Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734, this amount
should be deducted from the sum total of the civil indemnity due him arising from the estafa cases
against petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous award, which was erroneously placed,
at P335,000,00, to P335,150,00 as the sum total of the amounts of the four (4) checks involved. Deducting
the amount of P125,000.00 already collected by private respondent, petitioner was adjudged to pay
P210,150.00 as civil liability to private respondent. Hence, this petition alleging that respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her acquittal by the trial
court from charges of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-8731 was absolute, the trial
court having declared in its decision that the fact from which the civil liability might have arisen did not
exist.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The issue is whether respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in requiring petitioner to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after the trial court had acquitted
of her of the criminal charges. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically
provides: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist."
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where
the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. 3 Thus,
under Art. 29 of the Civil Code —
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not acquittal is due to that ground.
An examination of the decision in the criminal cases reveals these findings of the trial court —
Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on various occasions, Remedios Nota Sapiera purchased
from Monrico Mart grocery items (mostly cigarettes) which purchases were paid with checks issued by
Arturo de Guzman: that those purchases and payments with checks were as follows:
(a) Sales Invoice No. 20104 dated February 26, 1987 in the amount of P28,000.00, that said items
purchased were paid with PCIBank Check No. 157073 dated February 26, 1987;
(b) Sales Invoice No. 20108 dated February 26, 1987 in the amount of P140,000.00; that said items
purchased were paid with PCIBank No. 157059 dated February 26, 1987;
(c) Sales Invoice No. 20120 dated February 27, 1987 in the amount of P42,150.00; that said items were
paid with PCIBank Check No. 157057 dated February 27, 1987;
(d Sales Invoice No. 20148 and 20149 both dated March 2, 1987 in the amount of P120,103.75; said
items were paid with Metrobank Check No. 045104758 dated March 2, 1987 in the amount of P125,000.00.
That all these checks were deposited with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, Dagupan Branch,
for collection from the drawee bank;
That when presented for payment by the collecting bank to the drawee bank, said checks were
dishonored due to account closed, as evidenced by check return slips; . . . . .
From the evidence, the Court finds that accused Remedios Nota Sapiera is the owner of a sari-sari store
inside the public market; that she sells can(ned) goods, candies and assorted grocery items; that she
knows accused Arturo De Guzman, a customer since February 1987; that de Guzman purchases from her
grocery items including cigarettes; that she knows Ramon Sua; that she has business dealings with him
for 5 years; that her purchase orders were in clean sheets of paper; that she never pays in check; that
Ramon Sua asked her to sign subject checks as identification of the signature of Arturo de Guzman; that
she pays in cash; sometimes delayed by several days; that she signed the four (4) checks on the reverse
side; that she did not know the subject invoices; that de Guzman made the purchases and he issued the
checks; that the goods were delivered to de Guzman; that she was not informed of dishonored checks;
and that counsel for Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and told him to pay . . . .
In the case of accused Remedios Nota Sapiera, the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.

Page 18 of 156
Based on the above findings of the trial court, the exoneration of petitioner of the charges of estafa was
based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her
and the other accused Arturo de Guzman in defrauding private respondent. However, by her own
testimony, petitioner admitted having signed the four (4) checks in question on the reverse side. The
evidence of the prosecution shows that petitioner purchased goods from the grocery store of private
respondent as shown by the sales invoices issued by private respondent; that these purchases were paid
with the four (4) subject checks issued by de Guzman; that petitioner signed the same checks on the
reverse side; and when presented for payment, the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank due to
the closure of the drawer's account; and, petitioner was informed of the dishonor.1âwphi1.nêt
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite the conflicting versions of the parties, it is
undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without
any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser
thereof. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides —

Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. — Where the language of the instrument is
ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: . . . . (f) Where a
signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the
same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. . . .
Sec. 63. When person deemed indorser. — A person placing his signature upon all instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate
words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
Sec. 66. Liability of general indorser. — Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all
subsequent holders in due course: (a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of
the next preceding section; and (b) That the instrument is, at the time of the indorsement, valid and
subsisting;
And, in addition, he engages that, on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, as the case
may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be
duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be
compelled to pay it.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was
due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the
civil action might arise did not exist. 4 An accused acquitted of estafa may be nevertheless be held civilly
liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for
the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant. 5
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is
sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one
of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction
of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by file aggrieved party . . . . It is just
and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to
be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful acts is also punishable by the criminal law
Finally, with regard to the computation of the civil liability of petitioner, the finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is civilly liable for the aggregate value of the unpaid four (4) checks subject of the
criminal cases in the sum of P335,150.00, less the amount of P125.000.00 already collected by private
respondent pending appeal, resulting in the amount of P210,150.00 still due private respondent, is a
factual matter which is binding and conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 January 1996 as
amended by its Resolution dated 19 March 1997 ordering petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera to pay the
private respondent Ramon Sua the remaining amount of P210,150.00 as civil liability, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

Page 19 of 156
G.R. No. 138509.
July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the
motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. 1 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no
longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter
action may proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7cräläwvirtualibräry
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution
of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license
is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Page 20 of 156
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware
of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:10cräläwvirtualibräry
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage,
they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we
are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state
that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment
of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."12 Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their
marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as
ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as
an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to
know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into
the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order
to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he
wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It
was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to
the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his
criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.

Page 21 of 156
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.19 The reason
is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. 20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.21cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SETASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.

THIRD DIVISION 
[G.R. No. 170290 : April 11, 2012] 
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. CITIBANK, N.A. AND BANK OF
AMERICA, S.T. & N.A., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N 
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
October 27, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61316, entitled “Citibank,
N.A. and Bank of America, S.T. & N.A. v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.”cralaw 
The Facts
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is a government instrumentality created
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3591, as amended by R.A. No. 9302.[2]
Respondent Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) is a banking corporation while respondent Bank of America, S.T.
& N.A. (BA) is a national banking association, both of which are duly organized and existing under the
laws of the United States of America and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, with offices
in Makati City.[3]
In 1977, PDIC conducted an examination of the books of account of Citibank. It discovered that
Citibank, in the course of its banking business, from September 30, 1974 to June 30, 1977, received
from its head office and other foreign branches a total of P11,923,163,908.00 in dollars, covered by
Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-bearing with corresponding maturity dates.[4] 
These funds, which were lodged in the books of Citibank under the account “Their Account-Head
Office/Branches-Foreign Currency,” were not reported to PDIC as deposit liabilities that were subject
to assessment for insurance.[5]  As such, in a letter dated March 16, 1978, PDIC assessed Citibank for
deficiency in the sum of P1,595,081.96.[6]
Similarly, sometime in 1979, PDIC examined the books of accounts of BA which revealed that from
September 30, 1976 to June 30, 1978, BA received from its head office and its other foreign branches
a total of P629,311,869.10 in dollars, covered by Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-
bearing with corresponding maturity dates and lodged in their books under the account “Due to
Head Office/Branches.”[7]  Because BA also excluded these from its deposit liabilities, PDIC wrote to
BA on October 9, 1979, seeking the remittance of P109,264.83 representing deficiency premium
assessments for dollar deposits.[8]
Believing that litigation would inevitably arise from this dispute, Citibank and BA each filed a petition
for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Rizal on July
19, 1979 and December 11, 1979, respectively.[9]  In their petitions, Citibank and BA sought a
declaratory judgment stating that the money placements they received from their head office and
other foreign branches were not deposits and did not give rise to insurable deposit liabilities under
Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 3591  (the PDIC Charter) and, as a consequence, the deficiency

Page 22 of 156
assessments made by PDIC were improper and erroneous.[10]  The cases were then consolidated.[11]
On June 29, 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City (RTC)  promulgated its Decision[12] in
favor of Citibank and BA, ruling that the subject money placements were not deposits and did not
give rise to insurable deposit liabilities, and that the deficiency assessments issued by PDIC were
improper and erroneous.  Therefore, Citibank and BA were not liable to pay the same.  The RTC
reasoned out that the money placements subject of the petitions were not assessable for insurance
purposes under the PDIC Charter because said placements were deposits made outside of the
Philippines and, under Section 3.05(b) of the PDIC Rules and Regulations,[13] such deposits are
excluded from the computation of deposit liabilities.  Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter likewise
excludes from the definition of the term “deposit” any obligation of a bank payable at the office of
the bank located outside the Philippines. The RTC further stated that there was no depositor-
depository relationship between the respondents and their head office or other branches.  As a
result, such deposits were not included as third-party deposits that must be insured.  Rather, they
were considered inter-branch deposits which were excluded from the assessment base, in
accordance with the practice of the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) after
which PDIC was patterned.
Aggrieved, PDIC appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC in its October 27, 2005
Decision. In so ruling, the CA found that the money placements were received as part of the bank’s
internal dealings by Citibank and BA as agents of their respective head offices.  This showed that the
head office and the Philippine branch were considered as the same entity.  Thus, no bank deposit
could have arisen from the transactions between the Philippine branch and the head office because
there did not exist two separate contracting parties to act as depositor and depositary.[14] Secondly,
the CA called attention to the purpose for the creation of PDIC which was to protect the deposits of
depositors in the Philippines and not the deposits of the same bank through its head office or foreign
branches.[15]  Thirdly, because there was no law or jurisprudence on the treatment of inter-branch
deposits between the Philippine branch of a foreign bank and its head office and other branches for
purposes of insurance, the CA was guided by the procedure observed by the FDIC which considered
inter-branch deposits as non-assessable.[16] Finally, the CA cited Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3591, which
specifically excludes obligations payable at the office of the bank located outside the Philippines
from the definition of a deposit or an insured deposit.  Since the subject money placements were
made in the respective head offices of Citibank and BA located outside the Philippines, then such
placements could not be subject to assessment under the PDIC Charter.[17]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
PDIC raises the issue of whether or not the subject dollar deposits are assessable for insurance
purposes under the PDIC Charter with the following assigned errors:
A.
The appellate court erred in ruling that the subject dollar deposits are money placements, thus,
they are not subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6426 otherwise known as the “Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines.”
B.
The appellate court erred in ruling that the subject dollar deposits are not covered by the PDIC
insurance.[18]
Respondents similarly identify only one issue in this case:
Whether or not the money placements subject matter of these petitions are assessable for
insurance purposes under the PDIC Act.[19]
The sole question to be resolved in this case is whether the funds placed in the Philippine branch by
the head office and foreign branches of Citibank and BA are insurable deposits under the PDIC
Charter and, as such, are subject to assessment for insurance premiums.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court rules in the negative.
A branch has no separate legal personality;
Purpose of the PDIC

Page 23 of 156
PDIC argues that the head offices of Citibank and BA and their individual foreign branches are
separate and independent entities.  It insists that under American jurisprudence, a bank’s head office
and its branches have a principal-agent relationship only if they operate in the same jurisdiction.  In
the case of foreign branches, however, no such relationship exists because the head office and said
foreign branches are deemed to be two distinct entities.[20]  Under Philippine law, specifically, Section
3(b) of R.A. No. 3591, which defines the terms “bank” and “banking institutions,” PDIC contends that
the law treats a branch of a foreign bank as a separate and independent banking unit.[21]
The respondents, on the other hand, initially point out that the factual findings of the RTC and the
CA, with regard to the nature of the money placements, the capacity in which the same were
received by the respondents and the exclusion of inter-branch deposits from assessment, can no
longer be disturbed and should be accorded great weight by this Court.[22]  They also argue that the
money placements are not deposits.  They postulate that for a deposit to exist, there must be at
least two parties – a depositor and a depository – each with a legal personality distinct from the
other.  Because the respondents’ respective head offices and their branches form only a single legal
entity, there is no creditor-debtor relationship and the funds placed in the Philippine branch belong
to one and the same bank.  A bank cannot have a deposit with itself.[23]
This Court is of the opinion that the key to the resolution of this controversy is the relationship of the
Philippine branches of Citibank and BA to their respective head offices and their other foreign
branches.
The Court begins by examining the manner by which a foreign corporation can establish its presence
in the Philippines.  It may choose to incorporate its own subsidiary as a domestic corporation, in
which case such subsidiary would have its own separate and independent legal personality to
conduct business in the country.  In the alternative, it may create a branch in the Philippines, which
would not be a legally independent unit, and simply obtain a license to do business in the Philippines.
[24]

In the case of Citibank and BA, it is apparent that they both did not incorporate a separate domestic
corporation to represent its business interests in the Philippines.  Their Philippine branches are, as
the name implies, merely branches, without a separate legal personality from their parent company,
Citibank and BA.  Thus, being one and the same entity, the funds placed by the respondents in their
respective branches in the Philippines should not be treated as deposits made by third parties
subject to deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter.
For lack of judicial precedents on this issue, the Court seeks guidance from American jurisprudence.
In the leading case of Sokoloff v. The National City Bank of New York,[25] where the Supreme Court of
New York held:
Where a bank maintains branches, each branch becomes a separate business entity with separate
books of account.  A depositor in one branch cannot issue checks or drafts upon another branch or
demand payment from such other branch, and in many other respects the branches are considered
separate corporate entities and as distinct from one another as any other bank.  Nevertheless, when
considered with relation to the parent bank they are not independent agencies; they are, what
their name imports, merely branches, and are subject to the supervision and control of the parent
bank, and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank carries on its business, and are established
for its own particular purposes, and their business conduct and policies are controlled by the parent
bank and their property and assets belong to the parent bank, although nominally held in the names
of the particular branches.  Ultimate liability for a debt of a branch would rest upon the parent
bank. [Emphases supplied]
This ruling was later reiterated in the more recent case of United States v. BCCI Holdings
Luxembourg[26]where the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, emphasized
that “while individual bank branches may be treated as independent of one another, each branch,
unless separately incorporated, must be viewed as a part of the parent bank rather than as an
independent entity.”
In addition, Philippine banking laws also support the conclusion that the head office of a foreign bank
and its branches are considered as one legal entity.  Section 75 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking
Law of 2000) and Section 5 of R.A. No. 7221 (An Act Liberalizing the Entry of Foreign Banks) both

Page 24 of 156
require the head office of a foreign bank to guarantee the prompt payment of all the liabilities of its
Philippine branch, to wit:
Republic Act No. 8791:
Sec. 75. Head Office Guarantee. – In order to provide effective protection of the interests of the
depositors and other creditors of Philippine branches of a foreign bank, the head office of such
branches shall fully guarantee the prompt payment of all liabilities of its Philippine branch.
Residents and citizens of the Philippines who are creditors of a branch in the Philippines of foreign
bank shall have preferential rights to the assets of such branch in accordance with the existing laws.
Republic Act No. 7721:
Sec. 5. Head Office Guarantee. – The head office of foreign bank branches shall guarantee prompt
payment of all liabilities of its Philippine branches.
Moreover, PDIC must be reminded of the purpose for its creation, as espoused in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3591 (The PDIC Charter) which provides:
Section 1.  There is hereby created a Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation hereinafter referred to
as the “Corporation” which shall insure, as herein provided, the deposits of all banks which are
entitled to the benefits of insurance under this Act, and which shall have the powers hereinafter
granted.
The Corporation shall, as a basic policy, promote and safeguard the interests of the depositing public
by way of providing permanent and continuing insurance coverage on all insured deposits.
R.A. No. 9576, which amended the PDIC Charter, reaffirmed the rationale for the establishment of
the PDIC:
Section 1. Statement of State Policy and Objectives. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to strengthen the mandatory deposit insurance coverage system to generate, preserve,
maintain faith and confidence in the country's banking system, and protect it from illegal schemes
and machinations.
Towards this end, the government must extend all means and mechanisms necessary for the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation to effectively fulfill its vital task of promoting and
safeguarding the interests of the depositing public by way of providing permanent and continuing
insurance coverage on all insured deposits, and in helping develop a sound and stable banking
system at all times.
The purpose of the PDIC is to protect the depositing public in the event of a bank closure.  It has
already been sufficiently established by US jurisprudence and Philippine statutes that the head office
shall answer for the liabilities of its branch.  Now, suppose the Philippine branch of Citibank suddenly
closes for some reason.  Citibank N.A. would then be required to answer for the deposit liabilities of
Citibank Philippines.  If the Court were to adopt the posture of PDIC that the head office and the
branch are two separate entities and that the funds placed by the head office and its foreign
branches with the Philippine branch are considered deposits within the meaning of the PDIC Charter,
it would result to the incongruous situation where Citibank, as the head office, would be placed in
the ridiculous position of having to reimburse itself, as depositor, for the losses it may incur
occasioned by the closure of Citibank Philippines.  Surely our law makers could not have envisioned
such a preposterous circumstance when they created PDIC.
Finally, the Court agrees with the CA ruling that there is nothing in the definition of a “bank” and a
“banking institution” in Section 3(b) of the PDIC Charter[27] which explicitly states that the head office
of a foreign bank and its other branches are separate and distinct from their Philippine branches.
There is no need to complicate the matter when it can be solved by simple logic bolstered by law and
jurisprudence.  Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the head office of a bank and its branches are
considered as one under the eyes of the law.  While branches are treated as separate business units
for commercial and financial reporting purposes, in the end, the head office remains responsible and
answerable for the liabilities of its branches which are under its supervision and control.  As such, it is
unreasonable for PDIC to require the respondents, Citibank and BA, to insure the money placements
made by their home office and other branches.  Deposit insurance is superfluous and entirely
unnecessary when, as in this case, the institution holding the funds and the one which made the
placements are one and the same legal entity.
Funds not a deposit under the definition

Page 25 of 156
of the PDIC Charter;
Excluded from assessment
PDIC avers that the funds are dollar deposits and not money placements.  Citing R.A. No. 6848, it
defines money placement as a deposit which is received with authority to invest.  Because there is no
evidence to indicate that the respondents were authorized to invest the subject dollar deposits, it
argues that the same cannot be considered money placements.[28]  PDIC then goes on to assert that
the funds received by Citibank and BA are deposits, as contemplated by Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3591,
for the following reasons: (1) the dollar deposits were received by Citibank and BA in the course of
their banking operations from their respective head office and foreign branches and were recorded
in their books as “Account-Head Office/Branches-Time Deposits” pursuant to Central Bank Circular
No. 343 which implements R.A. No. 6426; (2) the dollar deposits were credited as dollar time
accounts and were covered by Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit which were interest-bearing and
payable upon maturity, and (3) the respondents maintain 100% foreign currency cover for their
deposit liability arising from the dollar time deposits as required by Section 4 of R.A. No. 6426.[29]
To refute PDIC’s allegations, the respondents explain the inter-branch transactions which necessitate
the creation of the accounts or placements subject of this case.  When the Philippine branch needs to
procure foreign currencies, it will coordinate with a branch in another country which handles foreign
currency purchases.  Both branches have existing accounts with their head office and when a money
placement is made in relation to the acquisition of foreign currency from the international market,
the amount is credited to the account of the Philippine branch with its head office while the same is
debited from the account of the branch which facilitated the purchase.  This is further documented
by the issuance of a certificate of time deposit with a stated interest rate and maturity date.  The
interest rate represents the cost of obtaining the funds while the maturity date represents the date
on which the placement must be returned.  On the maturity date, the amount previously credited to
the account of the Philippine branch is debited, together with the cost for obtaining the funds, and
credited to the account of the other branch. The respondents insist that the interest rate and
maturity date are simply the basis for the debit and credit entries made by the head office in the
accounts of its branches to reflect the inter-branch accommodation.[30]  As regards the maintenance
of currency cover over the subject money placements, the respondents point out that they maintain
foreign currency cover in excess of what is required by law as a matter of prudent banking practice.
[31]

PDIC attempts to define money placement in order to impugn the respondents’ claim that the funds
received from their head office and other branches are money placements and not deposits, as
defined under the PDIC Charter.  In the process, it loses sight of the important issue in this case,
which is the determination of whether the funds in question are subject to assessment for deposit
insurance as required by the PDIC Charter.  In its struggle to find an adequate definition of “money
placement,” PDIC desperately cites R.A. No. 6848, The Charter of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment
Bank of the Philippines.  Reliance on the said law is unfounded because nowhere in the law is the
term “money placement” defined.  Additionally, R.A. No. 6848 refers to the establishment of an
Islamic bank subject to the rulings of Islamic Shari’a to assist in the development of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),[32] making it utterly irrelevant to the case at bench.  Since
Citibank and BA are neither Islamic banks nor are they located anywhere near the ARMM, then it
should be painfully obvious that R.A. No. 6848 cannot aid us in deciding this case.
Furthermore, PDIC heavily relies on the fact that the respondents documented the money
placements with certificates of time deposit to simply conclude that the funds involved are deposits,
as contemplated by the PDIC Charter, and are consequently subject to assessment for deposit
insurance.  It is this kind of reasoning that creates non-existent obscurities in the law and obstructs
the prompt resolution of what is essentially a straightforward issue, thereby causing this case to drag
on for more than three decades.

Noticeably, PDIC does not dispute the veracity of the internal transactions of the respondents which
gave rise to the issuance of the certificates of time deposit for the funds the subject of the present
dispute.  Neither does it question the findings of the RTC and the CA that the money placements
were made, and were payable, outside of the Philippines, thus, making them fall under the

Page 26 of 156
exclusions to deposit liabilities.  PDIC also fails to impugn the truth of the testimony of John David
Shaffer, then a Fiscal Agent and Head of the Assessment Section of the FDIC, that inter-branch
deposits were excluded from the assessment base.  Therefore, the determination of facts of the
lower courts shall be accepted at face value by this Court, following the well-established principle
that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive on this Court, and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.
As explained by the respondents, the transfer of funds, which resulted from the inter-branch
transactions, took place in the books of account of the respective branches in their head office
located in the United States.  Hence, because it is payable outside of the Philippines, it is not
considered a deposit pursuant to Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter:
Sec. 3(f) The term “deposit” means the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received by a bank
in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obliged to give credit to a commercial,
checking, savings, time or thrift account or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, and trust
funds held by such bank whether retained or deposited in any department of said bank or deposit in
another bank, together with such other obligations of a bank as the Board of Directors shall find and
shall prescribe by regulations to be deposit liabilities of the Bank; Provided, that any obligation of a
bank which is payable at the office of the bank located outside of the Philippines shall not be a
deposit for any of the purposes of this Act or included as part of the total deposits or of the insured
deposits; Provided further, that any insured bank which is incorporated under the laws of the
Philippines may elect to include for insurance its deposit obligation payable only at such branch.
[Emphasis supplied]
The testimony of Mr. Shaffer as to the treatment of such inter-branch deposits by the FDIC, after
which PDIC was modelled, is also persuasive.  Inter-branch deposits refer to funds of one branch
deposited in another branch and both branches are part of the same parent company and it is the
practice of the FDIC to exclude such inter-branch deposits from a bank’s total deposit liabilities
subject to assessment.[34]
All things considered, the Court finds that the funds in question are not deposits within the definition
of the PDIC Charter and are, thus, excluded from assessment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The October 27, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61316 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 180863              

September 8, 2009
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing
petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio
Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave
birth to the spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly
because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left
their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972,
petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years
passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and
petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
effect.1 That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio,
his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2

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Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.3 Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was
subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The
RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio
Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is
burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This
belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in
light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s daughter testified that her
mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that
Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who
have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as
true petitioner’s testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that
he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this
case and not the Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971,
long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested
right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not
be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration
of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the
Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had
acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the
Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead.
The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this
requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a
vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio
under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio’s death, the OSG posits, could
not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family
Code.10 Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the
Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be
retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we
are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this
Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other
hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to
prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:

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Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11,
1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in
1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on
the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After
inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends
who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had
been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her
child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear
that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence
which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been
unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and
made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and

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submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding,
the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his
right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for
a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is
any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or
determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree,
then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack,
except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not
been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable
and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary,
superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel.
She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends,
and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he
had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that
she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract
a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic 17 are similar to
Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s husband left Manila where they were residing and went
to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in
anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed
to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of
Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration
that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized
by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law19and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, 20 Sofio is to be presumed dead
starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil
Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family

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Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code
in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded
belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it
was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the
Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 174689            

October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May
a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."

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An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled
to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:

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SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical  errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx       xxx       xxx

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(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.  – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days

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after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s
petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.

Page 35 of 156
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 :
January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760,
which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information
that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

Page 36 of 156
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002,
and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed
by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and
that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any
other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license
the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that
office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and
that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the

Page 37 of 156
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It
also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9,
1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even
if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are
hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. 
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III

Page 38 of 156
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART
OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39?r?l1
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. 
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage

Page 39 of 156
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued.
The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License
No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license
do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she

Page 40 of 156
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by
the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up

Page 41 of 156
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as
it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license,
a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

A.M. No. 99-1211           January 28, 2000

(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, 
vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse
of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan
J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar
alleging —
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; . . .
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage
was not registered; . . .
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the Local
Civil Registrar.
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar
due to the following and pressing circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in
Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr.
Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the
celebration of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave
that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to
go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of
finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former
Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already
with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be
out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another

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publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage,
complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as
to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which
respondent found all in order.
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved
more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so
doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the three
remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the said
marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three last
copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to
shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the
marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contract
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a
reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we
believe the claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason . . . but that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the
name of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties
probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public
interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable
way during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to
do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of
reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be
dealt with more severely pointing out that:
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City
is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to
wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate

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copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil register of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-
feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting
that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of
such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is
based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of
the OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage
in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its
foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others,
that —
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting
parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place
other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by
urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,
"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it
and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.4 Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.5
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on its
significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior
to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone that enacted in order to preserve so
sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage — and the stability of judicial doctrines laid

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down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant
in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his
court.6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that —
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.7
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog.8
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise
extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
—
Art. 23. — It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the
local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by
the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate . The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate , the original
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less
than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt
a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and
filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge
of his official functions.11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt
with more severely.
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape… people vs jumawan feb.2014

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by

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respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit
on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado,
Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by
respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that
after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal
dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)

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There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As
the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary  within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless
of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

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Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. L-27972            

October 31, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Fausto C. Cuizon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape and sentencing him
to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the
accessories prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the
amount of P500, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to
recognize and maintain, at P15 per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as consequence of
the rape, and requiring him further to pay the costs.
The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18, who was the injured
girl in this case. She is therefore appellant's niece by marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are
residents of the municipality of Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the
appellant asked Felicita, who was them about 18 years of age, to accompany him across the river on
some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river together into the municipality of San
Leonardo. After crossing the river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces
from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid them public view. In this spot the appellant
manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and
he finally notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton
Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about 11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In
the course of the afternoon Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the girl a few pesos and
sent her home. Her father happened to be away that night, but upon his return the next day, she
told him what had happened, a this prosecution for rape was started.

Page 48 of 156
The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above stated, and the
marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal
consequences of his act. We concur in this view of the case. The manner in which the appellant death
with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide  intention of
making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The
marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the
prosecution of the wrongdoer.
The Attorney-General suggest that, in fixing the penalty, it would be proper to take into account the
aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in an uninhabited place. But the evidence
fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that crime was committed en despoblado. The incident
occurred only a few paces from the Manila North Road, and it appears that there was an unoccupied
house nearby to which the girl was taken and where food was procured from Florentina Cuizon who
lived not far away. It is the constant doctrine of the court that an aggravating circumstance must be
as clearly proved as any other element of the crime (U. S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil., 23, 31; Albert, Law on
Crimes, pp. 88-89); and we cannot feel certain, upon the proof before us, that the place of the
commission of this offense was remote enough from habitation or possible aid to make appropriate
the estimation of the aggravating circumstance referred to. 1awph!l.net
The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. So ordered, with costs
against the appellant.

G.R. No. 186571              

August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous
of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,

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under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to
the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign

Page 50 of 156
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn
v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in
a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity
are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an

Page 51 of 156
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were
it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status,
i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;

Page 52 of 156
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status
of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign

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judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

G.R. No. 188289              

August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras,
who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in
courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00

located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. ₱400,000.00
located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00 3

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00
Maria Aurora, Aurora

USA

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly

City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

Page 54 of 156
 2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from
a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple
paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall
be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that
David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated
in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property,
leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. 6 The California court granted to
Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC
of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with
his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in
the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4)
David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property;
and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can
be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over
their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against
their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

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Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby
ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United
States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the
party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph
are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to
them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children
with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income from
these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras
shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive
legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and
other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the
respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his financial
capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the
share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe
taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be
made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook
of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the
same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot

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beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed
to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of
the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision
dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby
divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David
A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain
to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on
the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall
be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the
amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from
the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to
a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall
be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period,
withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount
of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner
EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia
to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal

Page 57 of 156
of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 16 we relaxed the requirement on certification
where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office
where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused
that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.

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In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within
the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the
saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of
the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that
she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20Third
and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis
supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each
of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in

Page 59 of 156
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority,
the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of
being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of
the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should
each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.

G. R. No. 183622              
February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, 
vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:

Page 60 of 156
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of
the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.
2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial
court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio
Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further
that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration
may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real
party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the
decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence
before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the
Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

Page 61 of 156
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special
proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or
respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering
its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar
pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the
same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the
former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must
perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the
Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any
person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any
other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted
has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The
deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity
of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not
even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no
basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the
estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial
court is in place.
x x x           x x x          x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA
was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand,
still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the
crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the
RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial
court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a

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valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio,9 to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law

Page 63 of 156
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus,
there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

Page 64 of 156
G.R. No. 193707              
December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all
the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the
crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal
case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

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WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes
him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged
to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic
v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to
wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered
in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not
a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or
not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

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It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in
the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support
his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in
relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same

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with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or

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other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or
her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that
the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the
case.

G.R. No. 196049              

June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, 
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
RESPONDENTS.
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and
its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
The Facts

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Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and
wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be

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the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others)
to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree
of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of
a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:

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[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule

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39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

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II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates
a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase,
or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue
to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife
of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is

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clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite  of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by

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extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice
to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
"[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions
on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582

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are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of
bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,” while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos
on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was “without responsibility.”7redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible
for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.8redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived

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together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her
case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five
years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:1
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.

THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.12redarclaw

THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of
a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any knowledge of Santos’s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,  People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage.  People v.
Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing

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prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s 
knowledge of Santos’s first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the
trial.20redarclaw
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to
six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed
in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months
of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner 
resulting from her marriage to 
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused wants to raise
the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.26 In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her

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union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,29 and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts  a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage
license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
marriage.31redarclaw

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 199632 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws,34and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the
solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage
was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case 
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the 
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.”
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of

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the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.”41If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall
be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.43redarclaw
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent
of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”45 It must be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M.
TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P.
RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18,
Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S.
ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC,
Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
Respondents.

Page 81 of 156
*PERLAS-BERNABE

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk ― live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the
public service."1

THE CASE

This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.3 Certain package fees were offered to
interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages.4

THE FACTS

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed
the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.5 A
female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They
went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for
a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel,
specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers
then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application
process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When
the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the
marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day
the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee
of three thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.6

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial
audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil
R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective
comments.7 The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them.8

On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-
three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team reported that
out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 3412 of
the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized
marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody.14 There is also an unusual
number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the
same day.16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and
entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10)
kilometers away from Cebu City.18

The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel,
also reported the following:

Page 82 of 156
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking
whether their documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and
Rosales afterwards;19

2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were
also "assistants" who would go over the couples’ documents before these couples would be
referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and
their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that
parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;20

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She
admitted that after the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (₱300), a different
amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter.21 She admitted that she
accepted four thousand pesos (₱4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan
Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy";22

4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the
marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the
registrars in those towns were not strict about couples’ attendance in the family planning seminar.
She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (₱500) if
the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said
amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500) for gasoline expenses if the
marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;23

5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis,
Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the
audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go
directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization;24

6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating
team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would
produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the
entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also
confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;25

7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples
looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City,
"para menos ang bayad."26 The excess of three hundred pesos (₱300) that couples paid to Judge
Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9;27

8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis.
Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-
forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10);28

9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to
Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to
the chambers of Judge Necessario.29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth
certificates.30 The respondent judge then inquired about their ages and asked them if they had been
previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage;31 and

10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize
marriage applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses
from her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.33 She also added

Page 83 of 156
that while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family planning seminar, they
may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage license.34

Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a
resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a
marriage date.35 Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the
number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was scheduled at 2
p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage license
was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500).
According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage
was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not
understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the
situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fiancé.

Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she
recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006.
While logging in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one
thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong" or a witness to
the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil wedding at that
time.

On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3,
4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental
Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to
furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed
below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this
administrative matter:

1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;

4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;

5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;

6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;

7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;

8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.

The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the
violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and
one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the Process
Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the
Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9,
Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member

Page 84 of 156
Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s court personnel received an amount in excess of the ₱300
solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to
the court’s "sinking fund".36

In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its
Supplemental Report,37 the respondent judges argued the following:

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents
presented to him by contracting parties.38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.39 He avers that he
ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry.40
He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of
the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution.41 The judge also denies knowledge of the
payment of solemnization fees in batches.42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who
was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and
reporting the total number of marriages monthly.43

Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to
inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual
resident.44 The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to
determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents.45
The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the
determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of
cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the
parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date
of arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their
witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if any.46

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the
judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment".47 She also claims that there is nothing
wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the
fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties
resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for
accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts.49 The affidavits also
enjoy the presumption of regularity.50 Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as
hearsay.51 The respondent said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with
the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that
they have been living together for five years.52 The judge also attributes the irregularity in the
number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.53

Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage.54 He maintains that it is the local
civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity
of the license issued.55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the
qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry.56 As to the affidavits of
cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. He
states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of
cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He
surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation, the missing document might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked
with the proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should
be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted
from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to
the Clerk of Court.57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.58

Page 85 of 156
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case.59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11
December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from
solemnizing marriages until further ordered.60

On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of
Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss.61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008,
the Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of
their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits from 9 July 2007.62

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent
judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA
summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner
who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his
embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.

xxx

JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that
the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were
minors during the cohabitation.

JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has
been paid and for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who
submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his
embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license.

JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has
been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who
submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the
embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.

xxx

HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift,
favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating an
irregular marriage.

RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage
license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.

Page 86 of 156
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the
required affidavit of cohabitation.

CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon
III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or
other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.64

The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.

THE ISSUE

The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu
City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.

THE COURT’S RULING

The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the
evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.

This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.65 In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:

Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must
be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.66

The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the
parties and the proper administration of justice.

The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo
C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages
without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the
Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization process
which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of the
respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.

Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario

The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-
three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage
certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of the 184 marriages, only
seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five (105) were
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven
(47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to
42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of
years.69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete

Page 87 of 156
documents such missing as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation.70

Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such
as marriage licenses.71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties
appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage
license.72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries
of residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit
was submitted by the parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also
apparent in the documents.75

The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code.
These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show
minority of one or both of them during cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004
the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of
Lapu-Lapu City.77

There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee
but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found.78 The presence of the receipts implies
that these marriages were solemnized.

Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta

Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007.79 However, the
logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly
reports of cases showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same
period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under

Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under
Article 34 in a four-year period.81

There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as
solemnizing officers found in his custody.82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation.83 To
illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old,
and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.84

There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were
residents of Cebu City.85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party’s
required certificate of legal capacity to marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the
solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.87

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based
on the marriage certificates actually examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that
she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007.89 The OCA
report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track
of marriages.90

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents
such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation.91 In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity to marry.92

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Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of
the required documents particularly the marriage license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous
erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.94

In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio
on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.95

The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
wherein the marriage requirements’ authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the
cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the parties.96 These irregularities were evident
in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007.
The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu
City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate
showing that Secuya’s address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."97

Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales

Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007
based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team.98 However, only three (3)
marriages were reported for the same period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-
two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code.100 Thirty-eight

(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu.102 Nine (9)
or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars.103

There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for
marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to
the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no corresponding marriage
certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to two
different persons within nine (9) months.105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106

The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents
such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.107 He
solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable circumstances such as the submission of an
affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry, the
discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage documents,
and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued.108

Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee
of ₱300 was paid.109 On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization
fees were paid late.110

To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents
showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the
parties’ place of residence.111 These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size,
and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license.112 These

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actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,113the Court held
that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization
fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s
attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public
welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing115 or payment by batches was made for marriages
performed on different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee
starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the
process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party
is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy.
What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity
in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code117 displayed
the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents
required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under
Article 34 of the Family Code119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal
impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120 The audit team
cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to
twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of
cohabitation.121 These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.122

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some
couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill
up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized.123

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the
validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially
when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the
OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the
marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.

In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:

…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance
of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.

However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the
irregularity of the issuance.

It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate
from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the
judges should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As

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noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the presence of mere
affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.

The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article
34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made
under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license.126 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general
rule should be strictly but reasonably construed.127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not be
issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter.
The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.128 The parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.129

To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code
provides the requisites for a valid marriage:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)

The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio.130 The actions of the
judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized
since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications.
In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131 the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even
an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently.132

It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered
Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and
offer services.133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to
get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she found out about the judicial
audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages not as

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a duty but as a business.135 The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No.
MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a
copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount of five thousand pesos (₱5,000) in A.M. Nos.
04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC.136 She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M.
No. MTJ-001337.137 Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March
2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives
and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact
competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that
"Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary,
ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity."140 In connection with this, the
administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to
be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly
of justice.141

The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.

Liability of Other Court Personnel

The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:

Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty
of grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can
facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.142

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of ₱3,000.
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from
soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.

Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as
the usual practice143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya
deliberately gave false information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself,
constitutes grave misconduct."144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.

In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties
seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or
position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court
personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects
the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.145

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Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her
actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.

Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City,
is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and
demanded and accepted ₱4,000 from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez
induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her
residence as Barili, Cebu.147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was
allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA,
when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not
Borces.148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had been misplaced, it was
Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.149

This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty.150 Such penalty can be dismissal from service.

Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be
married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the
other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which according to
Alesna costs ₱10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is minimal,
the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are
making money out of judicial transactions.152

The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo153 that acts of court personnel outside their official functions
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is
prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free
court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.

Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of
Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City,
admitted to the audit team that they received food from couples they assisted.154 This is in violation
of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel
from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in
transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA,
they are admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In
Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first
time is an extenuating circumstance.155

The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that
Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received ₱5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary
Grace Gabiana to secure necessary documents.156 The information was volunteered by Corazon
Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies this fact later on
in her Comment.157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and lacking support
from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the
doubt.

The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez
was only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who
attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" ₱1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family
through the assistance of Cabañez.158 Cabañez denies that she was the one who assisted the couple
and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabañez herself but from Baguio-

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Manera’s younger sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did
not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabañez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA
that there is lack of positive identification of Cabañez and finds merit in her denial.160

The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server
Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an
excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge
of such fund.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;

2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or -controlled corporation;

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would
have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service
in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);

4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;

5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that
she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporation;

6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that
she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporation;

7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a
period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

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8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely;

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu
City; and Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and
Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.

The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the
Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with
respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones,
Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to take the
necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805,
July 03, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,
Respondents.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.

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Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the
second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing
of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72
in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: “Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G.
Tismo,” a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of
the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears
that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been
nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared “the voidness,
non-existent or incipient invalidity” of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that
there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution7 dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7,
2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST
PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS
AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE
SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE

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TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT
IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH
IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY
TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME “CAPILI” IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING
NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER
1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE
OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage
is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the

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bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar
the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply
file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13
It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted
the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089
October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

Page 98 of 156
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order1 dated
September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent
Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San
Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch

256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003.6

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against
respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an
Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by
Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still
married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO
VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper
judicial authorities.11

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two
valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in
1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears
to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void
by the court.

In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that
with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling
in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For

Page 99 of 156
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16

As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second
marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be
the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that
the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy
was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this
will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void
prior marriage.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January
24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that
jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of
respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled
state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of
the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the
accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first
marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent.
In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the
judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or
confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a
second marriage cannot be considered criminal.

Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:

I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense
for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?

II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19

Page 100 of 156

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for
bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20

Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed
the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a
petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:

In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the
trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x

Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of
the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required
the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment,
we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22

Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying
that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.

As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing
the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her
first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in
the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was
declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.

Page 101 of 156

3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had
already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was
only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first
and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31

And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction
for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and
subsisting.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting
as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was
properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.

Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration
was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that

Page 102 of 156

the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity
of a completely void marriage.

We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first
on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision
on bigamy.38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is
ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Page 103 of 156

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March
11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City
are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it
was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that

Page 104 of 156

the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT
OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY
FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las

Page 105 of 156

Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time
of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.
It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from
an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken
place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after
the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking
the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26
has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in

Page 106 of 156

Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish
the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage
was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer
be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of
the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

Page 107 of 156

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 175367

June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,
vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23,
1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological
incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent
prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondent’s petition are the following allegations,
to wit:

x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of
performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was
existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack
of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his
working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods
alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the
family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his family’s needs. He exhibited

Page 108 of 156

arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and
embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences.
Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand
frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she
cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each
other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of
marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological
aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private
respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both
husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private
respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas
petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him
immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.5

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued
that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the
Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying petitioner’s motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by
the RTC in an Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioner’s motion, the RTC ruled that
respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the
Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs
presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals
(268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of
the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12
and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6
of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in
paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition.
Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a
cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both
parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing
on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain
a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence
that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant
nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.9

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari10
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.

Page 109 of 156

SO ORDERED.11

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code
and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF
HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN
DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after March 15,
2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.
02-11-1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it
may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that
the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

Page 110 of 156

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor
General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family
Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.16

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition
are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina
guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be
stated in the petition.17

First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent
that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as
the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist
clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to
bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist
reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features.
Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be
grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were
alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the
Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have
presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court
after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision
rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court
to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.18 It would thus be
more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to
scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the
ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Page 111 of 156

Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.19 Even assuming arguendo that
this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition are
insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the same is merely an
error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.20

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to
dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to
reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of
marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The
existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the
CA.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October
26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 172060 :

September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, v. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1cralaw assailing the Decision2cralaw of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals' decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
City).nad

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Page 112 of 156

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053cralaw holding that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are
the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of
petitioner's marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of
the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5cralaw the RTC Quezon
City denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced
the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would
be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6cralaw provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Page 113 of 156

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information7cralaw for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to
RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8cralaw Respondent's
petition9cralaw in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10cralaw A prejudicial question is defined
as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11cralaw

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12cralaw which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13cralaw The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder14cralaw or homicide.15cralaw However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner's will.16cralaw At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner's reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17cralaw that "the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x
x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or

Page 114 of 156

subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences."18cralaw In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned."19cralaw

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

G.R. No. 170022

January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered
its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA
set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil
Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while
still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in
1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar
and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in
her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left
their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the
family home.10 He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores
of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any
form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of
her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts
some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis
to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

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The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita
merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA
significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of
the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA
set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended
decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity
that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations
to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely
grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her
grave and incurable psychological incapacity.

The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity
of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity

contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

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In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified
on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their
home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of
the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer
from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with
co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at
the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar.
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness
and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as
measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar
abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the
CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its
dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions
made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

G.R. No. 166357

January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised

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on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in
the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This
was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove
that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be
dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that
they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was
around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites
the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2

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In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported
by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not
both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the
term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in
Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

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(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together

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in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable
"some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12
In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and
evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own
judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16
The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on
the petitioner’s version of the events.

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After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that
basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties."18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is
the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such
other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any
ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered
not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own
witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive
and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

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In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult
for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To
others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions
contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less
conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely,
placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26
conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency,
narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will
be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to
the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as
with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So,
more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that
the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to
look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal
grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was
unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her
siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena
Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as
a mother because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself.
So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a
particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or
the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your
own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with
what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of

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fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal
care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still
insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife
and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29
Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-
à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars
of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30
It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article
36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On
the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the bread
winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own
ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her
few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

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Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would
be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the
top priority in her life.
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with
you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic]
upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation

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for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and
therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and
putting it in top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject
as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his
opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would
advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of
the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more
than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship
to the other spouse.

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Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to
compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
"each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,

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but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that
the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s

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mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done.
Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency
and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted
on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son
confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity
or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get
there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you
went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture
of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state
of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

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 (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and
thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the
time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological
deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she
had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her.
And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I
think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you
that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18.
He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given
these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into
marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

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A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of
husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in
the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice
should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1
It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I
submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not
hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."

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These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of
what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State
to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976
as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 178044

January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March
2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-
01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful,
and would at times become violent and hurt him.

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Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which
was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in
her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-
lasting and by nature, incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly
made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and
that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of
the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained
a divorce abroad and married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the
City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

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In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October
2006 Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply
to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the

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other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does
not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound

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securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since
the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.

G.R. No. 176492

October 20, 2014
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

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For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido questioning
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated
January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofBacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the
partition of the subject property.
The facts as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of respondent
Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated
in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the Family
Code. It ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal property
of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361
located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant
Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.

Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant

₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience brought about
by this suit; and an additional ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter others from following suit;
and attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱575.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC reversed the
ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:
(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them in
payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato pursuant to
Article 51 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the
property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the following
errors in the CA Decision:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO
TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
II.

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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-
140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH
RAYMUND NONATO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE
HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6
The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does
not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the

procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the
effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party.1âwphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage

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or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man
and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the provision
pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any impediment to marry has not
been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.15

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said
party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.17
In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing
Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property that they owned in common, the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code should
aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence
of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the
ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former
spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that
without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately,
Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of
Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235,
are hereby AFFIRMED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

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To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her
marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua
New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were
still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business
management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately
led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her
eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they
moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s best friend
to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he
finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the family’s needs, first
as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a
pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s
expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college
before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically,
he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered
all the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his irregular income could not be
depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee
at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep
in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked
her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage. She soon
found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his
personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on
her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00
belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of
jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even
threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time
and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him
to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in
another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume
Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and
presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute
nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she
issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and
responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and
forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave

Page 140 of 156

all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the
one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate,
immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and emotional
deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a
husband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent
conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of
a married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and
incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing
Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect
and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage
respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he
studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and
landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual
infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s propensity to borrow money, his
deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not
had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondent’s personality disorder
and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent’s
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are
mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondent’s
childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity
is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment although
its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted
marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary
means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper
outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of
nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only
proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s personality traits
either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while
persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’ separation
had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.11
Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert witness,
holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondent’s condition, assuming it is
serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioner’s
expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’
marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact that the witness’
findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself,
who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her resolve to have her
marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson.12

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The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s psychological
affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on
the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15
the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for
his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a
case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel
remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an
immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological
incapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or
violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner.
Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent is convicted by final
judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she
had presented in the trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag,
Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted
by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have
applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the
effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.

Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well
taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt
the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not
himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not
participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by
her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of
him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order
to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill-
feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed
about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you
interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital
problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself
regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned,
would you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the
petitioner, Sir.

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Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the
petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr.
Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert
for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the
establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of
her husband."18 But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify,
much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine
Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and
opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the
inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert’s
testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden
of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other
words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage
was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his
psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as
follows:

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The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non
in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of
Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a
finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of
medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we
should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to
determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings.23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love,
respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of
marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter
incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and
obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his
actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack
of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members,
albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that
was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological
incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the
OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25

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The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by
the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to
actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to
the court proof of such service within the same period.26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from
the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be
submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies
of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.1âwphi1
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by
any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the
capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to
appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child
was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez
Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the
hospital’s Treasurer.11

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The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on
August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles
Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin
used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner
continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of
the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and
force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task
to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s
drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family
and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy
expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to
his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three
times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no
money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an
act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.23
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family
car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no
longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied
being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support
within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week.28
During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent
behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from

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1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work
as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic
notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical
abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors
and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38
reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced
to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact,39
contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina
ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare
decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed
a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted
the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the
CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in
its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized; and

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III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was
later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the
18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles
necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that
would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal
conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error
correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal
stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis,
has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of
the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to
consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible.
As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should
be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both
respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

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In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect
stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing
itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from
the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed
by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc.
v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held,
on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on
the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again
in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law
by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts

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must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must
always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o
poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and
the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to
prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband,
and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s
rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.621avvphi1.zw+
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing
the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa

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who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s
brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November
17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993,
which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the
Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Three children were born
to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition
seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of
the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to
the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with
another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women,
and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with
a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an
order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the parties.7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5,
1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case
be set for trial.8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of
teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private
respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees,
while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from

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petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented
her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice
and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would
help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband
was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private
respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came
back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was
employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered
by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for
the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire
amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships
with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was
an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master
Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth
Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).10
When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a
result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on
July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite
from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he
was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty Corporation
whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I
in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full
payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of
absolute sale (Exh. K)14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter16 to private respondent
expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her
letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney17 and to
divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of
her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she

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was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed
private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November
1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she
thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long
thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night.
Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried
on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent.
After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter
accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to
his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision19 dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of
her claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds
cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not
as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the
same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as
a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated
circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as
grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article
46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea
transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph
(3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code,
and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground
(fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage
with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally
accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court of
Appeals held:22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.
More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands
character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not
constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good
looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened

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to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her
respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there
is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to
constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY
WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION
OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN
ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that
private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after
the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,24 we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

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In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which
in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that
private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage,
private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he
received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did
not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and
later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis,
supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.26 Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can
these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions
on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the
declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

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