63. Valdez vs.

Court of Appeals had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 369 forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in
G.R. No. 132424. May 4, 2006.* the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Same;  Same; Same;  Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
and FRANCISCA FABELLA, respondents. present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
Actions; Possession;  Ejectment;  Jurisdictions; Three Kinds of Actions recovered—such tolerance must be present right from the start of
Available to Recover Possession of Real Property; Accion interdictal possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as one of
comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) unlawful detainer, not forcible entry.—To justify an action for unlawful
and unlawful detainer (desahuico), the jurisdiction of these two actions, detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
metropolitan trial court.—Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are to be recovered.
three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: 371
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 371
reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
forcible entry, unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v.
_______________ Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257 (1968): But even where possession preceding the
*
 FIRST DIVISION. suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at
370 the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the
one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of date of the demand to vacate. x x x x A close assessment of the law and the
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that
one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the not of forcible entry.
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has Same;  Same; Same;  Same; It is the nature of defendant’s entry into
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or unlawful detainer.—It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two actions, determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession
the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.The issue in said cases is Same;  Same; Same;  Same; To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the
the right to physical possession. ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Accion publiciana is the plenary action to such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.— in nature.—To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the

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complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or unlawfully occupied;
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion 3. 5.That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the
372 former to surrender the lot peacefully;
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 4. 6.That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to
of Appeals. File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court,
     Aventino B. Claveria for petitioners. xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex
     Juan Moreno for respondents. “C”;
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5. 7.That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender
petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were
nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision 1 and 30 January 1998 constrained to engage the professional services of counsel
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND
the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and
Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand
in Civil Case No. 2547. was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by as Annex “D”;
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel 6. 8.That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the
and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in
complaint alleges these material facts: question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless
1. “2.That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x” 2
residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk. 19 located at In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to
Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that
which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents
[i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open,
of which is hereto attached marked as Annex “A” and the continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment
marked as Annex “B”; and Natural Resources.
_______________ _______________
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices 2
 Rollo, pp. 88-90.
Artemon D. Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring. 374
373 374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 373 Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court
1. 3.That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the
thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay
thereof; rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
2. 4.That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial
defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in
toto the decision of the MTC. Undeterred, the private respondents filed a

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petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question,
the decision of the RTC. which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case available to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance
for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by
private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a _______________
3
requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in  Id., p. 91.
4
petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which  Id., pp. 152-155.
5
requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals  Id., p. 146.
ratiocinated thus: 376
“An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations 376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that will support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
particular, an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible The petition is not meritorious.
entry, x x x and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions
neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal;
respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
x     x     x forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer,
over the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order. one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
375 right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. 8 The two are
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 375 distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby termination of the right to possess.9
rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.”3 the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. 10 Both actions must
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case
dated 30 January 1998.4 of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
Hence, the instant petition. detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration: 5 Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
1. A.WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession
COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR has lasted for more than one
UNLAWFUL DETAINER. _______________
6
2. B.WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S)  Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA
OF THE COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT 565, 572-573.
7
OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL  Id.
8
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED  Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184; 362 SCRA 755, 766
BEFORE IT. (2001).
9
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed  Id.
10
together.  Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
11
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make  Id., p. 572.
out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents 377

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 VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 377 may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make
year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
possession of realty independently of title. 13 In other words, if at the time of prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an nature of the action.”18 (Italics supplied)
action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause
an ordinary civil proceeding.14 of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal,
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. 15 Otherwise, if the case is unlawful detainer.
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
be an improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:17 occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement
“But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
still, distinction should be made. statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the without resort to parol testimony.20
premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within _______________
18
one year from the date of the demand to vacate.  Id., pp. 372-373; pp. 1264-1265.
19
x      x      x      x  Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156; 250 SCRA 108, 116
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” (1995).
20
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present  Id.
right from the start of possession sought to be recov- 379
_______________ VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 379
12
 Id., p. 573. Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
13
 Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
543. complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
14
 Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573. as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
15
 Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10 dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
September 2003, 410 SCRA 485, 490. an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. 21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
16
 Id. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
17
 131 Phil. 365; 22 SCRA 1257 (1968). respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
378 intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled: 23
ered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of “Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her
challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
speedy redress—in the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property.
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy xxx
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of

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tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of recovered.”25
action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the _______________
24
conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by  Supra note 5.
25
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x  Id., pp. 490-491.
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the 381
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 381
that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
their mother. x x x Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted
clandestinely, without or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
_______________ contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any color of title
21
 Id. whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
22
 Supra note 8. land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been
23
 Id., pp. 184-186; pp. 766-767. said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession
380 started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals unlawful detainer is fatal. 26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the
the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal
by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. 27 It is in this light that this Court
in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of
x x.” Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare No pronouncement as to costs.
allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property SO ORDERED.
after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her      Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson),  Ynares-Santiago,  Austria-
allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
unlawful detainer, held: Notes.—Where the facts averred in the complaint reveals that the action
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
have been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x involves a boundary dispute, the
x     x     x     x _______________
26
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any  Unida v. Heirs of Ambrosio Urban, G.R. No. 155432, 9 June 2005, 460
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it SCRA 68, 75.
27
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.  Id.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately 382
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. vs. Yuipco
mere tolerance. same must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. (Sarmiento vs. Court of
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 [1995])
its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance In ejectment cases, the question is limited to which party among the
the view that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its litigants is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful is to say, who should have possession de facto; In an ejectment case, the
detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must assertion by a defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not

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serve to divest an inferior court of its jurisdiction. (Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia,
Inc. vs. Dimatulac, 401 SCRA 742 [2003])
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