CERTIORARI

CASE FACTS ISSUE RULING PROVREM DOCTRINE MENTIONED

Clark Investors and Locators Association, Clark Investors and Locators Association Whether a Special Civil Action via Firstly, respondents did not act in any judicial
Inc. v. Secretary of Finance and (petitioners) assail the validity of RR 2-2012 Certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper or quasi-judicial capacity. A petition for
Commissioner of Internal Revenue via petition for certiorari (Rule 65) remedy; certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
G.R. No. 200670 promulgated by the Secretary of Finance upon Civil Procedure, as amended, is a special
July 6, 2015 the recommendation of the CIR. RR 2-2012 NO. civil action that may be invoked only against
imposes VAT, and excise tax on the a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
importation of petroleum and petroleum or quasi-judicial functions.
products from abroad into the Freeport or
Economic Zones (former Clark and Subic
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Military Conservations).
Procedure, as amended, provides:
By virtue of RA 7227, the said military
conservations were converted into Freeport or SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When
Economic zones. RA 7227 provided that the any tribunal, board or officer exercising
zone shall be operated and managed as a judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
separate customs territory, therefore exempt without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
from VAT, and in lieu of national and local or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
taxes, all businesses and enterprises to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
operating within the Subic Special Economic no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
Zone shall pay a preferential gross income tax adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
rate of 5%. law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging
The said provisions were extended to the the facts with certainty and praying that
Clark Economic Zone. It is also exempt from judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the payment of all taxes and duties on the the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
importation of raw materials, capital and officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
equipment. law and justice may require.
Thus, the petitioners assailed the validity of
RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT
For a special civil action for certiorari to
and excise tax on the importation of petroleum
prosper, the following requisites must concur:
and petroleum products from abroad and into
( 1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
the Freeport or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the
officer must have acted without or in excess
businesses and enterprises operating within
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Freeport Zone.
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
The Respondents however attacked the
ordinary course of law.1
remedy resorted to by the petitioners.
According to respondents, Certiorari (via Rule
65) was not the proper remedy because: (a) A respondent is said to be exercising
RR 2-2012 was issued by the respondents in
the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, not
quasi- judicial powers; (b) violated the doctrine Judicial function where he has the power to
of hierarchy of courts. determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes
On the merits, it argued that it did not to determine these questions and adjudicate
unilaterally revoke the law because Sec. 3 of
CERTIORARI

the RR provides for tax refund, upon sufficient

proof that the imported petroleum were used
upon the rights of the parties.2 
within the zones.

Quasi-judicial function,

on the other hand, is "a term which applies

to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."3 before a tribunal, board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
gives rise to some specific rights of persons
or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.4

RR 2-2012 was issued in the exercise of

Quasi- Legislative or Rule- Making
Powers

Respondents do not fall within the ambit of a

tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. They issued RR 2-
2012 in the exercise of their quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers, and not judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents
did not adjudicate or determine the rights of
the parties.

In order to determine whether a Revenue

Regulation is quasi legislative in nature, we
must examine the legal basis of the
Secretary of Finance in the issuance thereof.

In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of

Appeals.5 

we ruled that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was

CERTIORARI

quasi-legislative in nature because it was

issued by the Secretary of Finance in the
exercise of his rule-making powers under
Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC).

Conformably with our ruling in BPI Leasing

Corporation that the application of Section
244 of the NIRC is an exercise of quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers of the
Secretary of Finance, and since RR 2-2012
was issued by the Secretary of Finance
based on Section 244 of the NIRC, such
administrative issuance is therefore quasi-
legislative in nature which is outside the
scope of a petition for certiorari. issued by the
Secretary of Finance based on Section 244
of the NIRC, such administrative issuance is
therefore quasi-legislative in nature which is
outside the scope of a petition for certiorari.

The proper remedy is a Petition for

Declaratory Relief

While this case is styled as a petition for

certiorari, there is, however, no denying the
fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration
by this Court of the unconstitutionality and
illegality of the questioned rule, thus
partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which this Court has
only appellate, not original jurisdiction.

Accordingly, this petition must fail because

this Court does not have original jurisdiction
over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved. 8 The
special civil action of declaratory relief falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.9 The Rules of Court is
explicit that such action shall be brought
before the appropriate Regional Trial Court
CERTIORARI

G.R. No. 191215, February 03, 2014 This case stemmed from a complaint for death There is merit in the petition.
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, 1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA
(FORMERLY INTERMARE MARITIME refund of medical expenses, damages and COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges,
AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION attorney's fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
Inc.22 we had the occasion to settle the
LTD. AND NICANOR B. ALTARES, (private respondent) against petitioner LACK OR EXCESS OF
seeming conflict on various jurisprudence
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly JURISDICTION WHEN IT NOTED
touching upon the issue of whether the
AND AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (IN Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc./Oceanic THE PETITION FOR
period for filing a petition for certiorari may be
BEHALF OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
extended.
GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), its general manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares PRIVATE RESPONDENT
RESPONDENTS. (petitioner), filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA). INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT
OUTRIGHT FOR HAVING BEEN General Rule
Private respondent is the widow of seafarer FILED BEYOND THE
Guillermo M. Mendigorin (Guillermo) who was MANDATORY AND
In said case we stated that the general rule,
employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY
as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v.
oiler and eventually, as second engineer in the PERIOD REQUIRED BY
Court of Appeals,23 is that a petition for
latter's vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
and died of colon cancer during the term of the RULES OF COURT, AS
from notice of judgment or from the order
employment contract between him and AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-
denying a motion for reconsideration. This is
Thenamaris. SC.
in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC24 where
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA no provision for the filing of a motion for
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF extension to file a petition for certiorari exists,
Ultimately, the LA promulgated his
DISCRETION WHEN, IN NOTING unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule
Decision[5] dated January 29, 2008 in favor of
THE VERY LATE PETITION 6525 which allowed the filing of such a motion
private respondent.
FILED BY THE PRIVATE but only for compelling reason and in no case
RESPONDENT, IT GROSSLY exceeding 15 days.26
Ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) IGNORED THIS HONORABLE
COURT'S VERY RECENT Exception
On appeal, the NLRC reversed [7] the LA's RULING IN LAGUNA METTS
Decision. CORPORATION v. COURT OF
APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM Under exceptional cases, however, and as
Private respondent moved for reconsideration. AND GERALDINE ESGUERRA held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions
[8] In a Resolution[9] dated June 29, 2009, (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, of the Sandiganbayan,27 
however, her motion was denied for lack of 2009), WHICH DISALLOWED the 60-day period may be extended subject
merit. ANY MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION to the court’s sound discretion. In Domdom,
OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION we stated that the deletion of the provisions
Private respondent, through counsel, received FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did
the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC on 65.[21 not make the filing of such pleading
July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on absolutely prohibited. "If such were the
September 8, 2009, she filed a Motion for intention, the deleted portion could just have
Extension of Time to File Petition for simply been reworded to state that ‘no
Certiorari[10] before the CA. extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions
Private respondent alleged that she had until for extension are allowed, subject to the
September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, court’s sound discretion."2
the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday)
within which to file a petition for certiorari. Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down
some of the exceptions to the strict
However, as her counsel was then saddled application of the 60-day period rule, thus:
CERTIORARI

and occupied with equally important cases, it [T]here are recognized exceptions to their
would be impossible for him to file the petition strict observance, such as:
on time, especially since the case involves
voluminous documents necessary in the (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
preparation thereof. Accordingly, private
respondent asked for an extension of 15 days (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
from September 7, 2009, or until September commensurate with his failure to comply with
22, 2009, within which to file the petition. the prescribed procedure;

On September 22, 2009, private respondent (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
filed her Petition for Certiorari[11] before the immediately paying within a reasonable time
CA. from the time of the default;

Action of the Court of Appeals (4) the existence of special or compelling

circumstances;
In a Resolution[12] dated November 20, 2009,
the CA noted that private respondent's Petition (5) the merits of the case;
for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers
from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
interest of substantial justice, the CA fault or negligence of the party favored by the
entertained the petition and directed private suspension of the rules;
respondent to cure the technical flaws in her
petition. Thus: (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved
to NOTE the petition for certiorari filed on (8) the other party will not be unjustly
September 22, 2009, albeit the same was filed prejudiced thereby;
fifteen (15) days late.
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
A perusal of the instant petition reveals the negligence without appellant’s fault;
following procedural infirmities, namely:
(10) peculiar legal and equitable
1. Theattached Verification/Certificatio circumstances attendant to each case;
n of Non-Forum Shopping does not
conform with the requirements under (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules play;
of Notarial Practice, as a Community
Tax Certificate is no longer (12) importance of the issues involved; and
considered competent evidence of
an affiant's identity; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant
2. Except for the copy of the Motion for circumstances.1âwphi1 
Reconsideration filed with the
National Labor Relations Thus, there should be an effort on the part of
Commission, no other copies of the party invoking liberality to advance a
pertinent and relevant reasonable or meritorious explanation for
pleadings/documents are attached his/her failure to comply with the rules.
therewith, such as
petitioner's Complaint, Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there
respondent's Memorandum of should be an effort on the part of the litigant
CERTIORARI

Appeal, petitioner's Opposition to invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why

Respondent's Appeal, if any, all of he or she was unable to abide by the
which may aid this Court in rules.32 Here, the reason offered for availing
judiciously resolving the issues of the motion for extension is the heavy
raised in the petition. workload of private respondent’s counsel,
which is hardly a compelling or meritorious
Hence this petition. reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and
again, we have held that the excuse of
"heavy workload is relative and often self-
serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient
reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."33

In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of

discretion when it extended underserved and
unwarranted liberality to private respondent.
"There is grave abuse of discretion when
there is an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law
and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism xx x."38 

Such is present here as shown by the CA's

obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite
the late filing of the motion for extension and
the flimsy excuse for the extension sought,
the late filing of the petition and the
numerous infirmities attending the same, and
private respondent's continued defiance of its
directive. These circumstances serve to
highlight private respondent's propensity to
disregard the very rules that the courts, the
litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to
follow.
G.R. No. 175792               November 21, Private respondent Leonila sold her 3 parcels
2012 of land located in Pampanga to herein Whether or not Petition for certiorari under At the outset, it must be pointed out that
petitioners as evidenced by a deed of absolute rule 65 is the right remedy in this case? petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari
sale which was paid by the latter partially in under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and ARTEMIA
cash and the balance by postdated checks. YES. inappropriate.
MAGTOTO, Petitioners,
vs.
Upon its due and presentment, said checks Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse
COURT OF APPEALS, and LEONILA
were dishonored by the bank which prompted Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a
DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
Leonila to send demands to make good the Petition for Review on Certiorari. As such,
same. this petition should have been dismissed
DEL CASTILLO, J.: outright for being a wrong mode of appeal.
However, no action was taken on the part of
spouses Magtoto compelling private Even if the petition is to be treated as filed
respondent to file a complaint before the under Rule 45, the same must still be denied
Regional Trial Court. for late filing and there being no reversible
CERTIORARI

error on the part of the CA.

After receiving summons, petitioners failed to
file their answer causing a court’s judgement Records show that petitioners received a
by default. copy of the CA Resolution denying their
Motion for Reconsideration on October 30,
2006.42 

They therefore had 15 days or until

November 14, 2006 within which to file their
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court. However, they filed their Petition for
Certiorari on December 29, 2006, 43 after the
period to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule

65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost
appeal which is not allowed.

The spouses Magtoto’s failure to file a timely

Answer was due to their own
fault; the RTC correctly declared them
in default.
THIRD DIVISION Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation The petition is meritorious.
(respondent PODC) was the registered owner Whether or not the Court of Appeals
of a parcel of land seriously erred when it sanctioned the PODC
[G.R. NO. 168088 : April 3, 2007] The CA erred in holding that the Order of the
resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of
PODC secured loans from San Fernando Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final possession was merely interlocutory.
SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, Rural Bank (petitioner SFRB). order and not an interlocutory order of the
INC., Petitioner, v. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS RTC.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and Interlocutory orders are those that
DOMINIC G. AQUINO, Respondents. daughter of Federico Mendoza), also secured determine incidental matters and which do
a loan from the petitioner. not touch on the merits of the case or put an
end to the proceedings. A petition
DECISION PODC failed to pay the loan. for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the proper remedy to question an
SFRB, filed a petition for extra-judicial improvident interlocutory order.60 
foreclosure. SFRB emerged as the winning
bidder.
On the other hand, a final order is one that
disposes of the whole matter or terminates
The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a Certificate of
the particular proceedings or action leaving
Sale and stated that "the period of redemption
nothing to be done but to enforce by
of the property shall expire one (1) year after
execution what has been determined. It is
registration in the Register of Deeds.
one that finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done with
On May 11, 2002, PODC executed a notarized
it in the lower court.61 The remedy to question
deed of assignment in favor of respondent
a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the
Dominic G. Aquino over its right to redeem the
Rules of Court.
property.
CERTIORARI

Respondent Aquino redeemed the property

but petitioner rejected the offer due to lack of
We agree with petitioner's contention that the
the redemption price
December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC
Ex-Officio Sheriff made another computation
granting the petition for a writ of possession
and allowed Aquino to redeem the property
is final. The remedy of respondents was to
consequently issuing Certificate of
appeal to the CA by filing their notice of
Redemption. However ex-officio sheriff failed
appeal within the period therefor. 62
to file the Certificate in the ROD.

On June 10, 2002, SFRB, executed an  Indeed, when the RTC denied on November
Affidavit of Consolidation over the property. 10, 2003 the motion of respondents to quash
the writ the court had earlier issued,
It was alleged therein that PODC or any other respondents appealed to the CA under Rule
person/entity with the right of redemption did 41 of the Rules of Court. The appeal was
not exercise their right to repurchase docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81607.
within one year from June 7, 2001. The Respondents did not file a supplemental
affidavit was filed with the Office of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 75787.
Register of Deeds on the same day.
The reliance of the CA in City of Manila v.
On June 14, 2002, Aquino sent a letter to ROD
Serrano63 is misplaced. In that case, the trial
informing them that he has redeem the subject
court issued the writ of possession in
property and requested not to register the
connection with a complaint for expropriation
Affidavit of Consolidation requested by SFRB.
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Such a
writ is interlocutory in nature. 64 
On June 18, 2002, ROD requested the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), by way of consulta, to issue On the other hand, an order granting a writ of
an opinion on whether a new title should be possession under Act No. 3135, as
issued to SFRB, or the Certificate of amended, is of a different species. The latter
Redemption in favor of respondent Aquino. order is final, hence, appealable. 65 Even if the
trial court erred in granting a petition for a writ
On October 15, 2002, SFRB filed a Petition for of possession, such an error is merely an
a Writ of Possession over the property to be error of judgment correctible by ordinary
issued in its favor upon the filing of the appeal and not by a petition for a writ
requisite bond in an amount equivalent to the of certiorari .66 Such writ cannot be legally
market value of the property or in an amount used for any other purpose.
as the court may direct.

By way of rejoinder, respondent PODC Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and
averred that the Certificate of Redemption inflexible in character.  lιbrαrÿ
executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff is presumed
valid and legal; the RTC, acting as a Land It is not a general utility tool in the legal
Registration Court, had no jurisdiction to workshop.67 
pass upon the validity of the Certificate of
Redemption
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
On December 12, 2002, the LRA resolved the jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
consulta of the Register of Deeds judgment.
……“Considering that the document first
presented and entered in the Primary Entry An error of judgment is one which the court
CERTIORARI

Book of the registry is the Affidavit of

Consolidation in favor of the creditors, the
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
mortgagee bank and not the Certificate of
and which error is reviewable only by an
Redemption in favor of the assignee of the
appeal.
debtor-mortgagor, although admittedly, the
latter instrument was executed on the last day
of the redemption period but not, in fact, Error of jurisdiction is one where the act
registered within the same period, under the complained of was issued by the court
premises, the consolidating mortgagee is without or in excess of jurisdiction and which
possessed with a superior right than the error is correctible only by the extraordinary
redemptioner. Under the law, the first in writ of certiorari . As long as the court acts
registration is the first in law.” within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will
On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC No. amount to nothing more than mere errors of
890 issued an Order granting the petition and judgment, correctible by an appeal if the
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. aggrieved party raised factual and legal
issues; or a Petition for Review under Rule
PODC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of
order, but the court denied the motion. law are involved.68

On March 6, 2003, PODC, filed a Petition for

Issuance of certification
Certiorari with the CA averting error that the
RTC should have dismissed the petition for a
writ of possession pending determination of A cert writ may be issued if the court or
the substantial issues by the LRA. quasi-judicial body issues an order with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
SFRB in its comment asserted that that the lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had implies such capricious and whimsical
jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
possession; thus, the remedy of of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
respondents should have to appeal the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
assailed order and not to file a petition for reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
certiorari in the CA. hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
On May 14, 2003 The RTC granted the motion to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
and issued a writ of possession and the Sheriff enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
implemented the writ and placed petitioner in law.69 Mere abuse of discretion is not
possession of the property. enough. Moreover, a party is entitled to a writ
of certiorari only if there is no appeal nor any
On September 4, 2003, SFRB filed a plain, speedy or adequate relief in the
Complaint against PODC and the Ex-Officio ordinary course of law.
Sheriff in the RTC of Pampanga, for the
nullification of the Deed of Assignment
executed by PODC in favor of Aquino and of The raison d etre for the rule is that when a
the Certificate of Redemption executed by the court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
Ex-Officio Sheriff and for damages. committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised
Meanwhile, the LRA Administrator issued a when the error was committed. If it did, every
Resolution recalling the Resolution dated error committed by a court would deprive it of
December 12, 2002 and declared that the its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. In such a
CERTIORARI

Certificate of Redemption executed by the

Ex-Officio Sheriff was superior to the
situation, the administration of justice would
Affidavit of Consolidation filed by
not survive. Hence, where the issue or
petitioner.
question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision - not the
On September 10, 2003, PODC filed a Joint
jurisdiction of the court to render said
Motion to quash the writ of possession issued
decision - the same is beyond the province of
by the trial court and for the issuance of a new
a special civil action for certiorari .
TCT. They averred that the LRA Administrator
finally resolved that the Certificate of
Redemption issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff Under Section 8, Act No. 3135, as amended,
was superior to the Affidavit of Consolidation the debtor-mortgagor may file a motion to set
of petitioner. aside a writ of execution:

On November 10, 2003, the court denied the

Section 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of
motion holding that respondent Aquino, as the
possession. - The debtor may, in the
registered owner of the subject property,
proceedings in which possession was
should initiate the appropriate action in the
requested, but not later than thirty days after
proper court in order to exclude petitioner or
the purchaser was given possession, petition
any other person from the physical possession
that the sale be set aside and the writ of
of his property. The court ruled that after
possession cancelled, specifying the
placing SFRB in possession of the
damages suffered by him, because the
property, the court had lost jurisdiction
mortgage was not violated or the sale was
over the case.
not made in accordance with the provisions
hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of
On November 27, 2003, PODC filed before the
this petition in accordance with the summary
CA their Joint Notice of Appeal from the
procedure provided for in section one
November 10, 2003 Order of the RTC.
hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four
hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the
On December 18, 2003, the CA rendered
complaint of the debtor justified, it shall
judgment in the joint appeal granting the
dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond
petition of PODC and setting aside the
furnished by the person who obtained
assailed orders of the trial court.
possession. Either of the parties may appeal
from the order of the judge in accordance
The appellate court ruled that the
with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four
December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC
hundred and ninety-six; but the order of
granting the petition for a writ of
possession shall continue in effect during the
possession was interlocutory and not final;
pendency of the appeal.
hence, it may be questioned only via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, not by appeal. The purchaser may appeal the order to the
CA if his petition is denied by the RTC.
SFRB moved for the reconsideration of the However, during the pendency of the appeal,
CAs decision however, the CA denied the the purchaser must be placed in possession
petition. of the property, such possession being
predicated on the right of ownership. 70
SFRB then filed a petition for review on
Certiorari for the reversal of the decision and
resolution of CA.
CERTIORARI

SFRB avers that the December 20, 2002

Order of the RTC granting the writ of
possession in its favor was final; hence, the
remedy of respondents herein, as oppositors
below, was to appeal to the CA and not to file
a special civil action for certiorari. In fact,
petitioner asserts, the writ of possession
issued by the RTC had already been
implemented when respondents filed their
petition in the CA on December 10, 2003.

SFRB further insisted that the RTC, acting as

a Land Registration Court, had limited
jurisdiction; it had no jurisdiction to resolve the
issues on the validity of the deed of
assignment and the legality of respondent
Aquino’s redemption of the property, as well as
its ownership. Only the RTC in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 12765
(where petitioner assailed the deed of
assignment and the Certificate of Redemption
executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff) was vested
with jurisdiction to resolve these issues. In
resolving these issues, the CA thereby
preempted the RTC in Civil Case No. 12765
and deprived it of due process. In any event,
according to petitioner, the pronouncement of
the CA on the validity of the Deed of
Assignment and Certificate of Redemption was
merely an obiter dictum.

G.R. No. 168612               December 10, Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a Whether or not a petition for certiorari under We note that PHILEC filed before the Court
2014 domestic corporation “engaged in the Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule
manufacture and repairs of high voltage Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision 65 of the Rules of Court against Voluntary
transformers.” Among its rank-and-file proper? Arbitrator Jimenez’s
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
employees were Lipio and Ignacio, Sr., former decision.69chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(PHILEC), Petitioner,
members of the PHILEC Workers’ Union No.
vs.
(PWU). While, PWU is a legitimate labor This was not the proper remedy.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL
organization and the exclusive bargaining
CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD
representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or
(NCMB), Department of Labor and
employees. modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a panel of
Employment, RAMON T. JIMENEZ, in his
Prior to the creation of the new collective Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC
bargaining agreement PHILEC selected Lipio appeal the award or decision before the
WORKERS' UNION (PWU), ELEODORO V.
for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade Court of Appeals. Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3
LIPIO, and EMERLITO C.
VIII to Foreman I under Pay Grade B and of the Rules of Court
IGNACIO, Respondents.
Ignacio, Sr., then DT-Assembler with Pay provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Grade VII, was likewise selected for training
for the position of Foreman I.
On September 17, 1997, PHILEC and
Section 1. Scope.
PWU entered into a new collective bargaining
CERTIORARI

agreement (CBA), effective retroactively on This Rule shall apply to appeals from
June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999. judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
collective bargaining agreement, a rank-and- orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
file employee promoted shall be entitled to the quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
following step increases in his or her basic quasi-judicial functions. Among these
salary. However, PWU members claimed that agencies are the Civil Service Commission,
the schedule of training allowance did not Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
conform with their CBA.Hence, PWU Securities and Exchange Commission, Office
submitted the grievance to the grievance of the President, Land Registration Authority,
machinery. Social Security Commission, Civil
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
settle their grievance. Thus, the parties filed a Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
submission agreement with the National National Electrification Administration,
Conciliation and Mediation Board. PHILEC Energy Regulatory Board, National
disputed PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice. Telecommunications Commission,
According to PHILEC, it did not violate its Department of Agrarian Reform under
collective bargaining agreement with PWU Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
when it implemented the “Modified SGV” Insurance System, Employees
scale. Even assuming that it violated the Compensation Commission, Agricultural
collective bargaining agreement, PHILEC Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
argued that its violation was not “gross” or a Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board
“flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply of Investments, Construction Industry
with the economic provisions of the collective Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
bargaining agreement.  PHILEC, therefore, arbitrators authorized by law.
was not guilty of unfair labor practice.
Voluntary Arbitrator held that PHILEC ....
violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering
them to pay the PWU members allowance Sec. 3. Where to appeal.
based on their CBA. PHILEC then filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging An appeal under this Rule may be taken to
that the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its the Court of Appeals within the period and in
discretion in rendering its decision. However, the manner herein provided, whether the
CA affirmed the decision of the Voluntary appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
Arbitrator. Hence the petition. mixed questions of fact and law. (Emphasis
supplied)

A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Should the parties
agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall also resolve the
parties’ other labor disputes, including unfair
labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code
provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CERTIORARI

ART. 261. JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATORS OR PANEL OF
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies referred to in the
immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, except those which are gross in
character, shall no longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article,
gross violations of Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and

the Regional Directors of the Department of
Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances, or matters under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and
refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or
Voluntary Arbitration provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ART. 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER

LABOR DISPUTES.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties,
shall also hear and decide all other labor
disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.

In Luzon Development Bank v. Association

of Luzon Development Bank
Employees,70 this court ruled that the proper
remedy against the award or decision of the
CERTIORARI

Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before the

Court of Appeals. This court first
characterized the office of a Voluntary
Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
as a quasi-judicial agency, citing Volkschel
Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC71 and Oceanic
Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero:72c

This court then stated that the office of a

Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is
not strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be
considered an instrumentality,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary

arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators
may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still
both he and the panel are comprehended
within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it
was to meet the very situation presented by
the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary
arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent
arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the
Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, that the broader term
"instrumentalities" was purposely included in
the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a

means or agency. Thus, the terms
governmental "agency" or "instrumentality"
are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government
acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word
"instrumentality," with respect to a state,
contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a
judicial instrumentality in the settling of an
estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent
appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an
instrumentality of the state.
CERTIORARI

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a

state function pursuant to a governmental
power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls,
therefore, within the contemplation of the
term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec.
9 of B.P. 129. 74 (Citations omitted)

FIRST DIVISION On 16 September 2011, the CA issued a I. We deny the petition.

Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioners for failing to THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT The general rule is that a timely appeal
G.R. No. 199384, September 09, perfect their petition for certiorari within the 60- EXERCISING ITS EQUITY JURISDICTION is the remedy to obtain reversal or
2015 day reglementary period provided under the AS ENUNCIATED BY JURISPRUDENCE modification of the judgment on the
Revised Rules of Court. The assailed CA ON THE merits.
LE SOLEIL INT'L. LOGISTICS CO., resolution reads in toto: MATTER;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
INC., AND/OR BETH UMALI, This is true even if one of the errors to
REYNANTE MALABANAN, AND Filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of be assigned on appeal is the lack of
EUGENIO S. YNION, Civil Procedure, the instant petition II. jurisdiction on the part of the court
JR., Petitioners, v. VICENTE for certiorari seeks the nullification and setting rendering the judgment over the
SANCHEZ, DAVID R. CONDE, AND aside of the April 25, 2011 Decision of the THE CA ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT subject matter, or the exercise of
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS National Labor Relations Commission in THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS power by said court is in excess of its
COMMISSION, Respondents. NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00038-11 which DISCRETION.6 jurisdiction, or the making of its
modified the September 6, 2010 Decision in findings of fact or of law set out in the
turn rendered by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-
RESOLUTION decision is attended by grave abuse of
NCR Case No. 04-04439-10, and the June 14,
discretion.
2011 Resolution denying the Motion for
PEREZ, J.: Reconsideration thereof.
In other words, the perfection of an
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition appeal within the reglementary period
outright on the following is mandatory because the failure to
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary perfect the appeal within the time
prescribed by the Rules of
First, the petition was filed three (3) days late Court unavoidably renders the
on September 5, 2011. Under Section 4, Rule judgment final as to preclude the
65 Revised Rules of the Civil Procedure, as appellate court from acquiring the
amended by AM No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions jurisdiction to review the judgment.7
for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of the judgment or order The pertinent rules on the perfection of
denying their motion for reconsideration. a petition for certiorari is set forth
Having received a copy of June 4, 2011 under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997
Resolution denying the motion for
Rules of Civil Procedure, amended by
reconsideration of the assailed April 25, 2011
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which reads:
Decision on July 24, 2011, petitioners had up
to September 2, 2011 only to file the petition
for certiorari. SEC. 4. When and where to file
petition. The petition shall be filed not
Second, the petition contains no statement of later than sixty (60) days from notice
the specific material dates showing when of the judgment or resolution. In case a
CERTIORARI

petitioners received a copy of the assailed motion for reconsideration or new trial
April 25, 2011 Decision of the court a quo is timely filed, whether such motion is
when a motion for reconsideration was filed, required or not, the sixty (60) days
contrary to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 period shall be counted from the notice
Rules. of the denial of the motion.
Third, the petition does not state the date of If the petition relates to an act or an
issue of petitioners' counsel's Mandatory
omission of a municipal trial court or of
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate
a corporation, a board, an officer or a
of Compliance, as required under Bar Matter
No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008. person, it shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed with the Court of Appeals
or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or
not the same is in aid of the courts
appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or

omission of a municipal or a regional
trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Under the foregoing rules, petition
for certiorari should be instituted within
a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought
to be assailed.8 

The 60-day period is inextendible to

avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights
of parties to a speedy disposition of
their case.9

 Rules of procedure must be faithfully

complied with and should not be
discarded with the mere expediency of
claiming substantial merit.10 
CERTIORARI

As a corollary, rules prescribing the

time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are
considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless
delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their
very nature, these rules are regarded
as mandatory.11

Applying the foregoing statutory and

jurisprudential rules in the case at bar,
we agree with the disquisition of the CA
that petitioners failed to seasonably
perfect their appeal rendering the
Decision of the NLRC dated 25 April
2011 and its Resolution dated 14 June
2011, final and executory.

In this case, there is no debate that

petitioners incurred in delay in filing the
petition for certiorari before the
appellate court. While petitioners
concede that the filing of the appeal
was three days late, they however
invoke the indulgence of the Court to
liberally apply the rules to pave the
way for the resolution of the case on
the merits. A careful scrutiny of the
pleadings submitted by petitioners
reveals, however, that there is no
compelling reason to except this case
from the operation of the general rule
since none of the exceptions12
enunciated in the jurisprudence is
attendant herein. Certainly, liberality is
not a magic word that once invoked will
automatically be considered as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of the
party invoking it. There should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.13

Time and again, we have stressed that

procedural rules do not exist for the
CERTIORARI

convenience of the litigants; the rules

were established primarily to provide
order to, and enhance the efficiency of,
our judicial system. While procedural
rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied, indispensable as they
are to the prevention of needless
delays, and are necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.

The timeliness of filing a pleading is a

jurisdictional caveat that even this
Court cannot trifle with.14

Viewed in this light, procedural rules

are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance
may have prejudiced a party's
substantive rights; like all rules, they
are required to be
followed.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of This Court resolves to grant the instant
Demonteverde... served in the said discretion amounting to lack or excess of petition.
government agencies for a total of 32 years, jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated
from 1963 to 1995. February 17, 2016 reinstating A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule
Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, 65, is an independent action based on the
On June 30, 1995, Demonteverde joined the Prohibition and Mandamus; and Resolution specific grounds therein provided and will lie
Judiciary as Presiding Judge of the Municipal dated February 16, 2017 denying GSIS only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City BOT's Motion for Reconsideration of the speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
until her retirement on February 22, 2011. February 17, 2016 Resolution. course of law.[24] A petition for certiorari will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
Demonteverde requested from the alleged and proved to exist.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
a refund of the retirement premiums she paid "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65,
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146[4] refers to the arbitrary or despotic exercise of
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 660[5] in excess power due to passion, prejudice or personal
of the retirement premiums that she should hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
pay under R.A. No. 910, as amended, the law capricious exercise of power that amounts to
on retirement benefits for Judges and Justices an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
applicable to her when she joined the Judiciary duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
on June 30, 1995 contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse
However, instead of issuing a refund only of of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
the excess of the contributions paid, the GSIS, patent and gross.[25]
on August 23, 1995, refunded to
CERTIORARI

Demonteverde the amount of P16,836.60 Having said this, there is a preliminary need
representing her retirement premiums, or her to address the GSIS-BOT's argument that
total personal share with interest, under R.A. Demonteverde should have filed an appeal
No. 660. under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court instead
of filing the certiorari suit before the CA.
Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court
her retirement application under R.A. No. 910 A special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Demonteverde likewise filed an application Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to
with the GSIS for retirement benefits under timely file an appeal under Rule 43 of the
R.A. No. 8291[7] covering her government Rules of Court.[26] 
service outside of the Judiciary from July 1,
1963 until June 29, 1995. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot
be availed of as a substitute for the lost
, the manager of the GSIS Bacolod informed remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if
Demonteverde that the retirement laws such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's
covering her service in the government from own neglect or error in the choice of
July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995 were P.D. No. remedies.[27] 
1146,[8] R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The As this Court held in Butuan Development
GSIS thus returned the application of Corporation v. CA:[28]
Demonteverde so that she may choose from
the modes of retirement enumerated.
A party cannot substitute the special civil
Demonteverde... requesting a re-evaluation of
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
her application for retirement under R.A. No.
of Court for the remedy of appeal. The
8291.
existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availability of
on May 18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod informed her
the special civil action of certiorari.
of the COC's issuance of Resolution No. 021-
2012 denying her request to retire under R.A.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
No. 8291. Demonteverde then appealed the
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive,
COC's Resolution to the GSIS Board of
not alternative or successive.
Trustees (GSIS BOT).
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
GSIS BOT granted Demonteverde's petition
substitute for an appeal, especially if one's
Demonteverde filed a Motion for Execution[14]
own negligence or error in one's choice of
of the Decision of the GSIS BOT
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
Said Motion for Execution was granted by the
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
GSIS BOT on even date.
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
However, on January 6, 2014, Demonteverde
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Partial MR)
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will
and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution
not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion.
. She questioned the accrual date of her
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291,
General rule:
arguing that the date of her retirement should
be the date when she reached sixty (60) years
Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal
of age, even when she was still in active
and a certiorari are not interchangeable
government service at that time, and not on
admits of exceptions.
February 22, 2011, or the date of her actual
retirement from government service.
This Court has, before, treated a petition
CERTIORARI

for certiorari as a petition for review

Demonteverde likewise denied receiving a on certiorari, particularly:
copy of the GSIS BOT Decision, and denied
that the later Notice of Decision dated (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
November 19, 2013 contained a copy of the within the reglementary period within
GSIS BOT Decision. which to file a petition for review
on certiorari;
GSIS BOT denied Demonteverde's Partial MR
and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution, for (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
allegedly having been filed out of time.
Demonteverde filed before the CA a Petition (3) when there is sufficient reason to
for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition justify the relaxation of rules.[29]
under Rule 65

CA dismissed the said petition, ratiocinating Likewise, in Department of

that the course of action taken by Education v. Cuanan,[30] where this
Demonteverde was erroneous as the proper Court exercised liberality and
mode of appeal from a decision of a quasi- considered the petition
judicial agency such as the GSIS is by filing a for certiorari filed therein as an
verified petition for review with the CA under appeal, the Court identified
Rule 43 exceptions to the general rule.

Upon Demonteverde's motion for Thus:

reconsideration, the CA, in the assailed
February 17, 2016 Resolution, reversed itself
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a
and reinstated Demonteverde's Petition.
resolution issued by the CSC is to file a
petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of
It agreed with Demonteverde that the case
the Rules of Court within fifteen days from
may be classified as an exception to the
notice of the resolution. Recourse to a
general rule that certiorari is not a substitute
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders
for a lost appeal under any of the following
the petition dismissible for being the wrong
grounds: where appeal does not constitute a
remedy.
speedy and adequate remedy, and for certain
special considerations, such as public welfare
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this
or public policy
rule, to wit:

(a) when public welfare and the advancement

of public policy dictates;

(b) when the broader interest of justice so

requires;

(c) when the writs issued are null and void; or

(d) when the questioned order amounts to

an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June

19, 2014 Resolution, initially dismissed
Demonteverde's special civil action
CERTIORARI

for certiorari, reasoning that Demonteverde

had the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Citing the case
of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation,[31] the CA thus said:

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved

party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive.

Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a

substitute for an appeal, especially if one's
own negligence or error in one's choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if
the ground therefore is grave abuse of
discretion.

The CA even categorically ruled that the

present circumstances in Demonteverde's
case did not warrant the application of the
exceptions to the general rule provided by
Rule 43,[32] thereafter proceeding to identify
the aforementioned procedural defects in the
petition.

Yet, when the CA, upon Demonteverde's

motion for reconsideration, reversed itself
and reinstated the latter's Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition in
the assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution, it
failed to substantiate its decision to grant the
said motion and set aside its June 19, 2014
Resolution. Apart from Demonteverde's bare
allegations in her pleadings and her own
testimony that her case falls under the
exception to the general rule that if appeal is
available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is
nothing on record that would warrant the
grant of her motion for reconsideration and
the setting aside of the CA's June 19, 2014
Resolution.

A reading of the CA's assailed February 16,

CERTIORARI

2017 Resolution reveals that

Demonteverde's motion for resolution of the
CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution was
approved hastily. While the CA appears to
have ruled on the merits of Demonteverde's
motion, its ratiocination merely consists of
two paragraphs and it summarily made a
conclusion that Demonteverde's case may be
classified as an exception to the general rule
that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. In doing so, the CA did not clearly
and distinctly explain how it reached such
conclusion. To wit:

In the case of Andrew James Mcburnie vs.

Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E.
Ganzon, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
the Rules of Court was conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, court will be mere slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering real justice have always been, as
they in fact ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the
appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
should give way to the realities of the
situation.

Applying the above-cited jurisprudence

in Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalia
Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon,
Inc., and upon perusal of the arguments
contained in the instant Motion for
Reconsideration, there is basis to reconsider
the dismissal of the instant Petition.

The Court agrees with petitioner, that the

instant case may be classified as an
exception to the general rule that certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of
the following grounds: where appeal does not
constitute a speedy and adequate remedy
and for certain special considerations as
public welfare or public policy. In this case,
CERTIORARI

the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on

the assailed GSIS decision maybe [sic]
dispensed with on the same cited grounds of
public welfare and the advancement of public
policy and in addition, in the broader interests
of justice.[33]

"Public policy" has a specific definition in

jurisprudence. It has been defined as that
principle of the law which holds that no
subject or citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public of
against public good.[34] It is the principle
under which freedom of contract or private
dealing is restricted for the good of the
community.[35]

Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a

justification of her inability to comply with the
general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the
absence of legal and factual bases for its
invocation. The assumption of the appellate
court that Demonteverde could possibly face
"a grim prospect of a lengthy appeal as it is
very likely that the resolution will not happen
during her lifetime as she is already seventy-
three years old" is inconsistent with the
aforementioned definition of public policy.
Demonteverde failed to substantiate through
clear and well-established grounds exactly
how her case warrants a deviation from the
general rule that a writ of certiorari will not
issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to an aggrieved party.

Moreover, Demonteverde failed to overcome

in her petition the. presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions of
public officers. She failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to corroborate her
claim that the notice of decision as regards
the October 10, 2013 Decision of the GSIS
BOT failed to attach a copy of the written
decision.[36] As petitioner GSIS BOT pointed
out, Demonteverde could not have claimed in
her Motion for Execution - which she
ultimately attempted to withdraw - that the
GSIS BOT October 10, 2013 Decision had
attained finality if she indeed had not
received a copy of it and read its full text.
CERTIORARI

In her Motion for Reconsideration[37] of the

CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution,
Demonteverde claims that the GSIS BOT
Decision had not yet attained finality because
the GSIS BOT "did not rule on the merits of
the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration."[38] To wit:

Petitioner's mode of appeal via Rule 65 of the

Rules was guided by the pronouncements of
the court in the case of Page-Tenorio vs.
Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24,
2004. Her motion for partial reconsideration
and withdrawal of motion for execution dated
2 January 2014 was denied by
respondents on a dubious technical
ground of having been filed out of time,
without resolving on the merits the reckoning
period that were never taken up during the
proceedings, thus denying her due
process. Petitioner was never given a
[39]
chance to be heard on the matter.
While the CA gave credence to this claim and
granted Demonteverde's motion, this Court
cannot sustain the CA's resolution.

It should be emphasized that the resort to a

liberal application, or suspension of the
application of procedural rules, must remain
as the exception to the well-settled principle
that rules must be complied with for the
orderly administration of justice.[40] While
procedural rules may be relaxed in the
interest of justice, it is well settled that these
are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. The relaxation of
procedural rules in the interest of justice was
never intended to be a license for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
Liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules can be invoked only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While litigation is not a game
of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.[41]

Applying this to the instant case, there is

CERTIORARI

nothing dubious about the GSIS BOT's denial

of her Partial Motion for Reconsideration and
Withdrawal of Motion for Execution on the
ground that the said motion was filed out of
time. Demonteverde filed her Partial Motion
for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of
Motion for Execution only on January 6,
2014, fifty-six (56) days after November 11,
2013, which is the date of receipt of the GSIS
BOT Decision indicated in her Motion for
Execution, and forty-eight (48) days after
November 19, 2013, when she officially
received a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision.

Clearly, Demonteverde had, by then, lost her

right to question the Decision of the GSIS
BOT through a motion for reconsideration or
through any other form of appeal. Thus, the
CA should have dismissed her petition
outright on the ground of erroneous cause of
action as the remedies of appeal
and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
G.R. No. 176508               January 12, 2015 The petitioner claimed in its petition that the
original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and
lost in the fire that quitted the Quezon City The petition
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE
Registry of Deeds. Respondent Judge initially gave WON the petition for certiorari ad mandamus for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of
POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION,
due course to the petition, but after the is proper. procedural and substantive merit, is
INC., Petitioner,
preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for dismissed.
vs.
HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING reconstitution.
Firstly, certiorari, being an extraordinary
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
remedy, is granted only under the conditions
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL The petitioner moved for a motion for
defined by the Rules of Court. 
REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Hence,
CITY, Respondent. the petitioner came to the court alleging that The conditions are that:
respondent judge had “unfairly abused his
x-----------------------x discretion and unlawfully neglected the (1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer
performance of an act which is specifically exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Sec. 8 of the has acted without or in excess of its or his
UNIVERSITY OF THE Revised rules of Court;” that the judge acted jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
PHILIPPINES, Intervenor. without and in excess of his authority and with amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and
DECISION and prejudice of the herein petitioner, thus, the
present petition for certiorari and mandamus. (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
BERSAMIN, J.: of law.19Without jurisdiction means that the
court acted with absolute lack of authority;
there is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority;  grave abuse of discretion
CERTIORARI

implies such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of
law.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petition for certiorari and mandamus did

not show how respondent Judge could have
been guilty of lacking or exceeding his
jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Under Section 1221 of Republic Act No. 26,
the law on the judicial reconstitution of a
Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as the
successor of the Court of First Instance) had
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act
on the petition for judicial reconstitution of
title.

Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded

its authority in acting on and dismissing the
petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely
abuse his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that the
petition for reconstitution involved land
already registered in the name of the UP, as
confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would have
been contrary to law had respondent Judge
dealt with and granted the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title of the petitioner.

Secondly, the petitioner did not present the

duplicate or certified copy of OCT No. 1609.
Thereby, it disobeyed Section 2 and Section
3 of Republic Act No. 26,

Thirdly, with the questioned orders of the

RTC having finally disposed of the
application for judicial reconstitution, nothing
more was left for the RTC to do in the case.
As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for
the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of
Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days
CERTIORARI

from notice of the denial of its motion for

reconsideration. By allowing the period of
appeal to elapse without taking action, it
squandered its right to appeal. Its present
resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an
extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be
a substitute for a lost appeal. That the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an
alternative to an available remedy in the
ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1
of Rule 65, which requires that there must be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court
will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects
only jurisdictional
errors.22hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil

action directly in this Court is in disregard of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although
the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals in issuing the writ
of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extra-ordinary or
compelling reasons that justify the same. The
Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases
and thus afford time for it to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to
it.23 There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby
violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari.

Finally, the land covered by the petition for

judicial reconstitution related to the same
area that formed the UP campus. The UP’s
registered ownership of the land comprising
its campus has long been settled under the
law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition
for judicial reconstitution by respondent
Judge only safeguarded the UP’s registered
ownership. In so doing, respondent Judge
actually heeded the clear warnings to the
lower courts and the Law Profession in
general against mounting or abetting any
CERTIORARI

attack against such ownership. One such

warning was that in Cañero v. University of
the Philippines,24 as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary