498

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997.*

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES,

INC., ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL,
EMDEN ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO, JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C.
MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR., and
ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND
VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II, respondents.

Remedial Law; Writ of Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction is generally

based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The opinion and findings of fact of a
court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made
even before the trial on the merits is terminated.—We do not agree with petitioner. The
reliance of petitioner on the cited cases is out of place as they involve the issuance of a
preliminary injunction pending resolution of a case on the merits. In the instant case,
however, the subject of inquiry is not merely the issuance of a preliminary injunction but
the final injunctive writ which was issued after trial on the merits. A writ of preliminary
injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The opinion and
findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in
nature and made even before the trial on the merits is terminated. Consequently there
may be vital facts subsequently presented during the trial which were not obtaining
when the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive writ is
erroneous. And it does not necessarily mean that when a writ of preliminary injunction
issues a final injunction follows.

Civil Law; Easement; A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law
for public use or for private interest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.—A legal or compulsory easement
is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. By express
provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim
a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four (4)
requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and, (d) the right-of-way claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties.

Same; Same; When the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For,
even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial
easement. The court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
parties.—Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating
one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a
judicial easement. As in the instant case, the court merely declares the existence of an
easement created by the parties. Respondent court could not have said it any better—It
must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along
Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the manifest will
of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of contracts (Articles 1306 and 619,
New Civil Code; Tolen-tino, supra, page 308; Civil Code of the Philippines, by Paras,
Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549).

Same; Same; The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict
application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants
to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to
their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby
open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be
proven to be true.—Petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA residents at
a time when the case was already on appeal, and submits that intervention is no longer
permissible after trial has been concluded. It is quite clear and patent that the motions
for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial has
already been concluded, a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private
respondent and on appeal by the losing party x x x the same was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond
the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court (now Sec. 2,
Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other
Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object
of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means
to an end. The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of
the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act
seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their
successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby
open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be
proven to be true. After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay
the proceedings. On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the resolution of the case
as the incidents brought forth by the intervention, which could have been raised in
another case, were resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more
thorough disposal of this case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

     Benedicto G. Arcinas collaborating counsel for petitioner.

     Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Romulo Villa, et al.

     Bengzon, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengson & Jimenez for Ateneo de Manila
University.

     Tomas R. Leonidas for Solidhomes, Inc.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting Katipunan
Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of
the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now Miriam) College on the south.
Mangyan Road serves as the boundary between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO
and MARYKNOLL on the other. It bends towards the east and ends at the gate of
Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision. The road has been the subject of an endless dispute,
the disagreements always stemming from this unresolved issue: Is there an easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?

In resolving this controversy, the Court would wish to write finis to this seemingly
interminable debate which has dragged on for more than twenty years.

The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of
land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons
sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings amounting to
1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three
(3) of the deed provides that “x x x the boundary line between the property herein sold
and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide,
one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the
other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS.”

On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was then acting for and
in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO) in buying the properties from the
Tuasons, sold, assigned and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to
ATENEO which assumed the mortgage. The deed of assignment states—

The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage obligation on the
above-described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR and to perform any and all terms
and conditions as set forth in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated July 1, 1949,
hereinabove referred to, which said document is incorporated herein and made an
integral part of this contract by reference x x x x

On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to
Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known as La Vista
Subdivision. Thus, the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine
Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road.

On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion of the land adjacent
to Mangyan Road. MARYKNOLL then constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter
wide roadway making one-half of Mangyan Road part of its school campus.

The Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently, in an amicable settlement,
MARYKNOLL agreed to remove the wall and restore Mangyan Road to its original width
of 15 meters.

Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide
boundary. ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and erected instead an
adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter
wide roadway.
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the former’s intention to develop
some 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response,
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use
of Mangyan Road. Thus—

x x x The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from
your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of
a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an
easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 portion of the road in your favor
(paragraph 3 of the Deed of Sale between the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation and Ateneo de Manila dated 1 July 1949 x x x x

On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a letter to ATENEO

President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., offered to buy under specified conditions the property
ATENEO was intending to develop. One of the conditions stipulated by the LA VISTA
President was that “[i]t is the essence of the offer that the mutual right of way between
the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners’ Association will be
extinguished.” The offer of LA VISTA to buy was not accepted by ATENEO. Instead, on
10 May 1976 ATENEO offered to sell the property to the public subject to the condition
that the right to use the 15-meter roadway will be transferred to the vendee who will
negotiate with the legally involved parties regarding the use of such right as well as the
development costs for improving the access road.

LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid Homes, Inc., in the
bidding. Thus on 29 October 1976 ATENEO executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc., over parcels of land covering a total area of 124,424 square meters
subject, among others, to the condition that—

7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the VENDEE, its assigns and successors-in-
interest the privileges of such right of way which the VENDOR acquired, and still has, by
virtue of the Deeds mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph hereof;
provided, that the VENDOR shall nonetheless continue to enjoy said right of way
privileges with the VENDEE, which right of way in favor of the VENDOR shall be
annotated on the pertinent road lot titles. However it is hereby agreed that the
implementation of such right of way shall be for the VENDEE’s sole responsibility and
liability, and likewise any development of such right of way shall be for the full account
of the VENDEE. In the future, if needed, the VENDOR is therefore free to make use of
the aforesaid right of way, and/or Mangyan Road access, but in such a case the
VENDOR shall contribute a pro-rata share in the maintenance of the area.

Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now known as Loyola Grand
Villas and together they now claim to have an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan
Road through which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.

LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that LA
VISTA could not recognize the right-of-way over Mangyan Road because, first,
Philippine Building Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied with their
obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-meter portion of the
road and, second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid
Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was
established exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-of-way was originally
constituted. LA VISTA, after instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and
assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-
meter high cylindrical concrete posts chained together at the middle of and along the
entire length of Mangyan Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from passing
through.

Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete posts were not removed.
To gain access to LOYOLA through Mangyan Road an opening through the adobe wall
of ATENEO was made and some six (6) cylindrical concrete posts of LA VISTA were
destroyed. LA VISTA then stationed security guards in the area to prevent entry to
LOYOLA through Mangyan Road.

On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc., instituted the instant case,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450, before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
and prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and
passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road.

LA VISTA in turn filed a third-party complaint against ATENEO. On 14 September 1983

the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Solid Homes, Inc. (affirming an
earlier order of 22 November 1977), directing LA VISTA to desist from blocking and
preventing the use of Mangyan Road. The injunction order of 14 September 1983 was
however nullified and set aside on 31 May 1985 by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 02534. Thus in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 71150, Solid Homes, Inc., assailed the nullification and setting aside of the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

Meanwhile, on 20 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a
decision on the merits2 in Civil Case No. Q-22450 affirming and recognizing the
easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and
ordering LA VISTA to pay damages thus—

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that an easement of a right-of-

way exists in favor of the plaintiff over Mangyan Road, and, consequently, the injunction
prayed for by the plaintiff is granted, enjoining thereby the defendant, its successors-in-
interest, its/their agents and all persons acting for and on its/their behalf, from closing,
obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the plaintiff, its successors-in-interest,
its/their agents and all persons acting for and on its/their behalf, and to the public in
general, the unobstructed ingress and egress on Mangyan Road, which is the boundary
road between the La Vista Subdivision on one hand, and the Ateneo de Manila
University, Quezon City, and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, Marikina, Metro
Manila, on the other; and, in addition the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff
reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.00. The defendant-third-party
plaintiff is also ordered to pay the third-party defendant reasonable attorney’s fees for
another amount of P15,000.00. The counter-claim of the defendant against the plaintiff
is dismissed for lack of merit. With costs against the defendant.

Quite expectedly, LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV

No. 19929. On 20 April 1988 this Court, taking into consideration the 20 November
1987 Decision of the trial court, dismissed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 71150
wherein Solid Homes, Inc., sought reversal of the 31 May 1985 Decision in AC-G.R. SP
No. 02534 which nullified and set aside the 14 September 1983 injunction order of the
trial court. There we said—

Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at

any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is
established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his
complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs (Section 3[a], Rule 58) and it appearing that
the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner
in its decision rendered after trial on the merits (Sections 7 & 10, Rule 58, Rules of
Court), the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot
and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already made a clear
pronouncement as to the plaintiff’s right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been
decided on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is
proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet final (II Moran, pp.
81-82, 1980 ed.). Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction
cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merit
of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence
ceases to have any force and effect.3

On the other hand, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, several incidents were presented for
resolution: two (2) motions filed by Solid Homes, Inc., to cite certain officers of LA
VISTA for contempt for alleged violation of the injunction ordaining free access to and
egress from Mangyan Road, to which LA VISTA responded with its own motion to cite
Solid Homes, Inc., for contempt; a motion for leave to intervene and to re-open
Mangyan Road filed by residents of LOYOLA; and, a petition praying for the issuance of
a restraining order to enjoin the closing of Mangyan Road. On 21 September 1989 the
incidents were resolved by the Court of Appeals4 thus—

1.Defendant-appellant La Vista Association, Inc., its Board of Directors and other

officials and all persons acting under their orders and in their behalf are ordered to allow
all residents of Phase I and II of Loyola Grand Villas unobstructed right-of-way or
passage through the Mangyan Road which is the boundary between the La Vista
Subdivision and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision;
2.The motion to intervene as plaintiffs filed by the residents of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision is GRANTED; and
3.The motions for contempt filed by both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant are
DENIED.
This resolution is immediately executory.5

On 15 December 1989 both motions for reconsideration of Solid Homes, Inc., and LA
VISTA were denied. In separate petitions, both elevated the 21 September 1989 and 15
December 1989 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals to this Court. The petition of Solid
Homes, Inc., docketed as G.R. No. 91433, prayed for an order directing the appellate
court to take cognizance of and hear the motions for contempt, while that of LA VISTA
in G.R. No. 91502 sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction to order Solid Homes,
Inc., ATENEO and LOYOLA residents to desist from intruding into Mangyan Road.

On 22 May 1990, pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 91433 and 91502, the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals6 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929 affirmed in toto the Decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-22450. On 6 September 1990 the motions for
reconsideration and/or re-raffle and to set the case for oral argument were denied. In
view of the affirmance of the Decision by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19929 this Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 91502 for being moot as its main
concern was merely the validity of a provisional or preliminary injunction earlier issued.
We also denied the petition in G.R. No. 91433 in the absence of a discernible grave
abuse of discretion in the ruling of the appellate court that it could not entertain the
motions to cite the parties for contempt “because a charge of contempt committed
against a superior court may be filed only before the court against whom the contempt
has been committed” (Sec. 4, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Consequently we are left with the instant case where petitioner LA VISTA assails the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court
which rendered a judgment on the merits and recognized an easement of right-of-way
along Mangyan Road, permanently enjoining LA VISTA from closing to Solid Homes,
Inc., and its successors-in-interest the ingress and egress on Mangyan Road.

In its first assigned error, petitioner LA VISTA argues that respondent appellate court
erred in disregarding the decisions in (a) La Vista Association, Inc. v. Hon. Ortiz,
affirmed by this Court in Tecson v. Court of Appeals;9 (b) La Vista Association, Inc. v.
Hon. Leviste, affirmed by this Court in Rivera v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court; and,
(c) La Vista v. Hon. Mendoza, and in holding that an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road exists.

We do not agree with petitioner.

The reliance of petitioner on the cited cases is out of place as they involve the issuance
of a preliminary injunction pending resolution of a case on the merits. In the instant
case, however, the subject of inquiry is not merely the issuance of a preliminary
injunction but the final injunctive writ which was issued after trial on the merits. A writ of
preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are
interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is terminated.
Consequently there may be vital facts subsequently presented during the trial which
were not obtaining when the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Hence, to equate
the basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final
injunctive writ is erroneous. And it does not necessarily mean that when a writ of
preliminary injunction issues a final injunction follows. Accordingly, respondent Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision rightly held that—

We are unswayed by appellant’s theory that the cases cited by them in their Brief
(pages 17 and 32) and in their motion for early resolution (page 11, Rollo) to buttress
the first assigned error, are final judgments on the merits of, and therefore res judicata
to the instant query. It is quite strange that appellant was extremely cautious in not
mentioning this doctrine but the vague disquisition nevertheless points to this same
tenet, which upon closer examination negates the very proposition. Generally, it is
axiomatic that res judicata will attach in favor of La Vista if and when the case under
review was disposed of on the merits and with finality (Manila Electric Co. vs. Artiaga,
50 Phil. 144; 147; S. Diego vs. Carmona, 70 Phil. 281; 283; cited in Comments on the
Rules of Court, by Moran, Volume II, 1970 edition, page 365; Roman Catholic
Archbishop vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339; 350-351, cited in Remedial Law
Compendium, by Regalado, Volume I, 1986 Fourth revised Edition, page 40).
Appellants suffer from the mistaken notion that the “merits” of the certiorari petitions
impugning the preliminary injunction in the cases cited by it are tantamount to the merits
of the main case, subject of the instant appeal. Quite the contrary, the so-called “final
judgments” adverted to dealt only with the propriety of the issuance or non-issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, unlike the present recourse which is directed against a
final injunctive writ under Section 10, Rule 58. Thus the invocation of the disputed
matter herein is misplaced.14

We thus repeat what we said in Solid Homes, Inc. v. La Vista which respondent Court of
Appeals quoted in its assailed Decision—
Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merits of the main
case for injunction. The merits of the main case having been already determined in
favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have
any force and effect.

Petitioner LA VISTA in its lengthy Memorandum also quotes our ruling in Ramos, Sr. v.
Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,17 no less than five (5) times—

To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a
road right-of-way provided by the petitioner’s subdivision for its buyers simply because
Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming
from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right-of-way, that ‘mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for
it’ (See Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 371)

Again this is misplaced. Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., concerns a legal or
compulsory easement of right-of-way—

Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a
right-of-way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement
between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private
respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not petitioner is entitled
to a legal or compulsory easement of a right-of-way— which should be distinguished
from a voluntary easement.

A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for
private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has
established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by
other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment
of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and,
(d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.20 A voluntary easement on the other hand is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.

From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is
quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949
stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the “boundary line between
the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road
fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold
to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors”;
(b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land
to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the
obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of
the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against
MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of contract and the enforcement of the
reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its
wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL
constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President
Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr.
Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that “Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which
is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the
easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and
likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in
your favor”; (e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property
in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested
that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista
Homeowners’ Association would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO
property and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates;
and, (f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
received by this Court on March 1997, acknowledged that “one-half of the whole length
of (Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam
(Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal portions”;

These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted
a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract,
the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate. Thus respondent Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error when it ruled that—

Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an easement, we are
of the belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-of-way was properly appreciated along
the entire route of Mangyan Road. Incidentally, the pretense that the court a quo erred
in holding that Mangyan Road is the boundary road between La Vista and Ateneo (page
31, Appellant’s Brief) does not raise any critical eyebrow since the same is wholly
irrelevant to the existence of a servitude thereon from their express admission to the
contrary (paragraph 1, Answer).

One’s attention should rather be focused on the contractual stipulations in the deed of
sale between the Tuason Family and the Philippine Building Corporation (paragraph 3,
thereof) which were incorporated in the deed of assignment with assumption of
mortgage by the Philippine Building Corporation in favor of Ateneo (first paragraph,
page 4 of the deed) as well as in the deed of sale dated October 24, 1976 when the
property was ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any other
contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary rescission
of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant
lots (Chuanico vs. Ibañez, 7 CA Reports, 2nd Series, 1965 edition, pages 582; 589,
cited in Civil Law Annotated, by Padilla, Volume II, 1972 Edition, pages 602-603), more
so when the easement was implicitly recognized by the letters of the La Vista President
to Ateneo dated February 11 and April 28, 1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case
Law 745).

The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement
between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and
625, New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct
the same so much so that when the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or
constructs works impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant
tenement may ask for the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to
their condition before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for damages
suffered (3 Sanchez Roman 609). An injunction may also be obtained in order to
restrain the owner of the servient tenement from obstructing or impairing in any manner
the lawful use of the servitude (Resolme v. Lazo, 27 Phil. 416; 417; 418).”
(Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino,
Volume 2, 1963 edition, page 320)21

Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For,
even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial
easement. As in the instant case, the court merely declares the existence of an
easement created by the parties. Respondent court could not have said it any better—

It must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along

Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the manifest will
of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of contracts (Articles 1306 and 619,
New Civil Code; Tolentino, supra, page 308; Civil Code of the Philippines, by Paras,
Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549).22

The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA from
Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet
to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also
qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.23

_________________

21 CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, 22 May 1990, pp. 11-12.

22 Id., p. 13.

23 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, No. L-22733, 25 September 1968, 25 SCRA 145.

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515

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court
could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of
the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid
Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When
the Philippine Building Corporation transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO the
Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves
developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the other hand,
ATENEO sold the hillside portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the
right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when the easement in this case was
established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by
all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.

The contractual easement of right-of-way having been confirmed, we find no reason to

delve on the issue concerning P.D. No. 957 which supposedly grants free access to any
subdivision street to government or public offices within the subdivision. In the instant
case, the rights under the law have already been superseded by the voluntary
easement of right-of-way.

Finally, petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA residents at a time when
the case was already on appeal, and submits that intervention is no longer permissible
after trial has been concluded. Suffice it to say that in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,24 we said—

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial has already been concluded, a judgment thereon
had been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by the losing party
x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and manifestly

___________________

24 No. L-45168, 25 September 1979, 93 SCRA 238, 245-246.

516

516

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court
(now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a
rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.

The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule
due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will
lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-
interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to
fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be proven to be true.

After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay the proceedings.
On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the resolution of the case as the incidents
brought forth by the intervention, which could have been raised in another case, were
resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more thorough disposal of this
case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 22 May 1990 and its
Resolution dated 6 September 1990, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 89,
Quezon City, dated 20 November 1987, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

     Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Notes.—View that the purpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction

is to preserve the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable,
noncontested status. (Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995])

517

VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997

517

People vs. Talisic

To be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both, or he must be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of the property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Acenas II vs.
Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 773 [1995])

——o0o—— La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498, G.R. No.
95252 September 5, 1997