Perlas-Bernabe Digests (Soft) PDF

TABLE OF CONTENTS
POLITICAL LAW ........................................................................................................................................ 1

BAGUILAT v. ALVAREZ .................................................................................................................................................... 1
BELGICA v. OCHOA, JR. .................................................................................................................................................... 3
CARPIO MORALES v. CA AND BINAY ........................................................................................................................ 7
GONZALES III v OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ................................................................................................... 10
HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO v. LANDBANK (LBP) .......................................................................................... 14
KABATAAN v. COMELEC ............................................................................................................................................... 16
PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE
AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION (ODESLA-IAD) ............................................................................................... 17
PIMENTEL v. OCHOA ...................................................................................................................................................... 19
PURISIMA v. CARPIO-MORALES ................................................................................................................................. 21
LABOR LAW .............................................................................................................................................. 23
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, AND MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA
v. JOEL P. HIPE JR. ............................................................................................................................................................. 23
ARIEL P. HOBLADOR v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. (PTCPI), MARINE SHIP
MANAGEMENT LTD., AND CAPT. MARLON L. MALANAO ........................................................................... 25
THE NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC. AND/OR JENNIFER M. ENANO-BOTE v. FRANCISCO
N. DAKILA ............................................................................................................................................................................ 26
PNCC Skyway Corporation v. The Secretary of Labor and Employment and PNCC Skyway Employees Union
................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) v. SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA NG UST, FERNANDO
PONTESOR, RODRIGO CLACER, SANTIAGO BUISA JR., AND JIMMY NAZARETH ............................ 29
CIVIL LAW.................................................................................................................................................. 31
ACE FOODS v. MICRO PACIFIC TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. (MTCL) ......................................................... 31
BERNADETTE S. BILAG v. ESTELA AY-AY ............................................................................................................ 33
CRESENCIO BAÑO v. BACHELOR EXPRESS ......................................................................................................... 35
DELOS SANTOS v. ALBERTO ABEJON .................................................................................................................... 37
DOMINADOR M. APIQUE v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH ...................................................... 39
GOTESCO PROPERTIES INC (GPI) v. SPS. EUGENIO AND ANGELINA FAJARDO .............................. 41
JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI .............................................................................. 43
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI MORISONO ..................................................................... 45
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. ARTURO DY ................................................................................. 46
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO v. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO........................................................................................ 48
REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA v. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON ............................................................................. 50
RENEE B. TANCHULING v. SOTERO C. CANTELA ............................................................................................ 52
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. REGHIS M. ROMERO II .................................................................................... 54
REPUBLIC v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA .................................................................................................................. 58
SPOUSES VERGARA v. SPOUSES SONKIN .............................................................................................................. 60
SPS. BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL v. BOY SCOUT OF PHILIPPINES (BSP) .... 62
SPS. JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH v. JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN ............. 64
TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA v. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS ....................................................................... 66
UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES ....................................... 68
TAXATION LAW....................................................................................................................................... 70
ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS INC. (AIA) v. CIR .............................................................................. 70
BIR v. LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. (LCI) .................................................................................................................... 72
CIR v. NIPPON EXPRESS CORPORATION .............................................................................................................. 74
CARGILL PHILIPPINES v. CIR ...................................................................................................................................... 76
CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY v. CIR ..................................................................................... 78
CIR v. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY ..................................................................................... 80
CIR v. CTA AND PETRON............................................................................................................................................... 82
CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (CASURECO III) .......................... 84
METROPOLITAN BANK v. CIR .................................................................................................................................... 86
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION-MANILA BRANCH v. CIR ................................................................................... 88
COMMERCIAL LAW ................................................................................................................................ 90
ANICETO BANGIS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS v. HEIRS OF ADOLFO ................................................. 90
APEX BANCRIGHTS HOLDINGS v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS .................................................. 92
BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. CARLITO LEE.............................................................................................. 94
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. ST. MICHAEL MEDICAL CENTER ............................................................. 96
F & S VELASCO COMPANY INC (FSVCI) v. DR. ROMMEL L. MADRID ....................................................... 98
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT v. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG ................................................................ 100
GREAT WHITE SHARK ENTERPRISES v. DANILO M. CARALDE .............................................................. 101
NARRA NICKEL MINING v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP. ............................................. 102
SHANG PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION v. ST. FRANCIS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
................................................................................................................................................................................................. 104
W LAND HOLDINGS v. STARWOOD HOTELS.................................................................................................... 106
CRIMINAL LAW ...................................................................................................................................... 108
JESUS GARCIA v. HON. ALAN DRILON AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA ................................................ 108
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES v. JAY HINLO............................................................................................................... 111
PEOPLE v. BRAHIM LIDASAN.................................................................................................................................... 112
PEOPLE v. CRISANTO CIRBETO Y GIRAY ........................................................................................................... 114
PEOPLE v. EDGARDO DELA ROSA Y EMPAMANO ......................................................................................... 116
PEOPLE v. MAURICIO HALLARTE Y MENDOZA.............................................................................................. 118
PEOPLE v. RICO NIEBRES Y REGINALDO .......................................................................................................... 119
PEOPLE v. WILT SAM BANGALAN Y MAMBA .................................................................................................... 121
RIZALDO L. ORSOS v. PEOPLE.................................................................................................................................. 123
ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. PEOPLE .......................................................................................................................... 125
REMEDIAL LAW ..................................................................................................................................... 127
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY v. CYNTHIA B. BAÑA .......................................................................................................... 127
BOSTON FINANCE v. GONZALEZ .......................................................................................................................... 129
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN ..................................................................................... 131
ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN v. ANTONIO S. CAISIP ..................................................................................... 132
FENIX INTERNATIONAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY .................................................................................. 133
QUISAY v. PEOPLE.......................................................................................................................................................... 135
HARRY L. GO v. PEOPLE .............................................................................................................................................. 136
HEIRS OF VICTOR AMISTOSO v. ELMER T. VALLECER ................................................................................ 138
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ, RICHARD B.
LOPEZ v. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ ........................................................................................................................... 139
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O.
LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU ................................................... 140
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v. OMBUDSMAN ....................................................................................................... 142
JONATHAN Y. DEE v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED .................................................................. 144
JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI ............................................................................ 146
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO v. RTC .......................................................................................... 147
MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG v. PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION ................................................. 149
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES v. GJH LAND (formerly known as SJ Land Inc) ............................................ 151
NAPOLEON D. NERI v. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY ...................................................................................... 153
NENITA GONZALES v. MARIANO BUGAAY....................................................................................................... 155
NOEL NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR ............................................................... 156
NORTHERN ISLANDS v. SPS. DENNIS AND CHERYLIN* GARCIA ........................................................... 157
PEOPLE v. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS .............................................................................................................. 158
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY v. ALFONSO O. PINEDA ............................................................... 159
SPS. ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO v. RAFFY TULFO
................................................................................................................................................................................................. 160
TERESA R. IGNACIO v. OFFICE OF CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY .......................................... 161
WOODROW B. CAMASO v. TSM SHIPPING .......................................................................................................... 163
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ........................................................................................................... 164
PABLITO L. MIRANDA v. ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ .......................................................................................... 164
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN ...................................................... 166
U.P. LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
POLITICAL LAW
BAGUILAT v. ALVAREZ
Jul. 25, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Prior to the election of Speaker of the House Pantaleon Alvarez, then Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas
and Rep. Jose Atienza had an interchange wherein it was elicited that (a) all those who vote for the winning
Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c)the
Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.
• The result of the elections for speakership is as follows: 252 Alvarez, 8 Baguilat, 7 Suarez, 21 Abstain, 1 No
Vote.
• Petitioners hoped that as a long-standing tradition of the House, the candidate with the 2nd highest votes
will be the Minority Leader. However, Baguilat was never recognized as such.
• Later on, one of the abstentionists, Rep. Abayon, manifested that those who did not vote for Speaker
Alvarez convened and elected Rep. Suarez as Minority Leader.
• When the now majority leader Farinas moved for the recognition of Suarez as minority leader, Rep. Lagman
opposed on the ground that various irregularities attended the election of Suarez as minority leader:
o Rep. Suarez was actually a member of the majority as he voted for Alvarez
o The abstentionists are supposed to be considered as independent members of the House and thus,
irregularly deemed as part of the minority
• Lagman was overruled and Suarez was officially recognized as House Minority Leader.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the
House Minority - NO
a. The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and
the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear
legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
b. Petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought. When Rep. Farinas articulated that (a) all those
who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates
shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c)the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority, and the election
proceeded without any objection from any member of the Congress.
c. The election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at the first regular
session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their
respective leaders), considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the winning
Speaker and the Minority of those who did not.
d. Under Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to
how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control.
e. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to,
"determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity.
f. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of
government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
g. However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned
proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case
concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of
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grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil
this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
*CONST. Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Page 2 of 167
BELGICA v. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. NO. 208566 | November 19, 2013| PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Nature of Case: Mandamus
FACTS:
The 2011 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, in contrast with previous PDAF Articles, stated
lump-sum amounts for legislators and the Vice-President, with representatives given P70 Million each (P40 Million
for “hard projects,” P30 Million for “soft projects”), Senators and the Vice-President receiving P200 Million each
(P100 Million each for “hard” and “soft” projects). A provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once. It allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and
Highways to realign PDAF funds, with further conditions that (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit,
same project category as the original project for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work; and (c) the request of realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles, it is provided that the identification of projects shall conform to the priority
list, standard, or design prepared by each implementing agency. However, as practiced, the individual legislators still
chose and identified the project from the priority list. The 2013 PDAF Article also allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies. Legislators were allowed to identify programs and projects OUTSIDE of his legislative
district. Any realignment of PDAF funds, modification, and revision of project identification, as well as requests for
release of funds have to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president has funds from the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Funds,
created under Section 8 of PD 910 by Pres. Marcos, came from energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field. Section 12 of PD 1869 (again by Marcos) created the Presidential Social Fund, which is
sourced from the government’s share in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Controversies
There has been multiple controversies pertaining to the use of PDAF funds. It has been alleged that huge amounts
of money went to legislator’s pockets through kickbacks, and a number of petitioners have previously sought to
declare it unconstitutional, but the lack of evidence caused the dismissal of the case.
In July 2013, the NBI began to probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of P10 Billion by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and government agencies for ghost projects. This was
spawned by the sworn affidavits of 6 whistle-blowers who declared that the JLN Corporation (JLN = Janet Lim
Napoles) has swindled from public funds through ghost projects using no less than 20 dummy NGOs. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of the funds, the funds were diverted to Napoles’ private accounts.
The whistle-blowers also allege that at least P900 Million from royalties of the Malampaya gas project for agrarian
reform beneficiaries has gone to a dummy NGO. The Commission on Audit’s findings concurred with the
statements of the whistle-blowers (p. 82 of the case).
The petitioners thus question the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.”
Page 3 of 167
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
Procedural
1. WON there is an actual and justiciable controversy
YES. There is an actual and justiciable controversy in this case. The challenged funds and the provisions allowing
for their utilization (2013 GAA for PDAF, PD 910 for Malampaya Funds, PD 1869 as amended by PD 1993)
currently exist and are operational.
2. WON issues are matters of policy not subject to judicial review
NO. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon. Thus, it may be subject to judicial review.
3. WON petitioners have legal standing
YES. As taxpayers they have standing to question the validity of the Pork Barrel System under which the taxes
they pay have been and continue to be utilized. Furthermore, they have raised issues of transcendental
importance.
4. WON Court’s decision in “Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez” and “Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management” bar the litigation under the principles
of res judicata, stare decisis
NO. As to res judicata, judgment on the merits in a previous case would bind a subsequent case if there is an
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. However, this identity was not attendant in this case
since the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System, as opposed to
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article. Stare decisis would similarly not
apply.
Substantive
1. WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other similar Congressional Pork Barrel Laws are unconstitutional
considering that they violate constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegablity
of legislative powers; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy
a) Separation of Powers - Congress may still exercise its oversight function, but its role must be confined to
such. Post-enactment measures allowing legislator participation would be tantamount to impermissible
interference or assumption of executive functions.
b) Non-Delegability of Legislative Power – Articles which allow the legislator to identify the projects to which
PDAF money should be allocated is a violation on the rule of non-delegability of legislative power.
Appropriation involves 1) setting apart by law of a certain sum 2) for a specified purpose. Legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate under the 2013 PDAF Article, which is not allowed under the Constitution.
The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
c) Checks and Balances – The veto power of the President is undermined by the PDAF Article. The P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit. The actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill. The “budget within a budget” subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and impairs the President’s power of item veto. The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar operation are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
d) Accountability – Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. Insofar as its post-enactment features dilute
congressional oversight and violate Sec. 14, Art. VI of the Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
Page 4 of 167
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar operation are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
e) Political Dynasties – Sec. 26, Art. II of the Constitution prohibiting political dynasties is not self-executing
(“as may be defined by law”). The argument is largely speculative, since it is not proven how the Pork Barrel
System could propagate political dynasties.
f) Local Autonomy – The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development. The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
operation are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
2. WON the phrases “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” (Sec. 8,
PD 910) and “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869 as amended by PD 1993 are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power -NO.
It is contended that the Presidential Pork Barrel is unconstitutional because it violates Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI of the
Constitution, which states:
No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
According to the petitioners, the assailed sections are not to be considered to be appropriation laws because the
funds were merely incidental to the creation of the Energy Development Board and the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. The Court disagrees, stating that “if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the
legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent, and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
an “appropriation made by law” under contemplation of the Constitution.
However, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power; it allows the President to unilaterally appropriate funds beyond the
purpose of the law.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article;
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators — whether individually or
collectively organized into committees — to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment
stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision
of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight;
(c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of
similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both
failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court’s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase “and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision
is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent
injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund,
Page 5 of 167
while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners’ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide 163 the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related
to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners’ access to official documents already
available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected
to the custodian’s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without
prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a
separate petition. The Court also DENIES petitioners’ prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these
cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches
of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect. SO ORDERED.
Page 6 of 167
CARPIO MORALES v. CA AND BINAY

November 10, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office
of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al ), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
• The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit
an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st Special
Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al , charging them with six (6) administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
• Binay’s First Term: ○ Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III, IV and V of the Makati Parking
Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved
the release of funds therefor.
• Binay’s Second Term: ○ Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of contract with
Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project; and ○ Approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of the contract with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design
and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
• Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the
preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al. 's guilt
was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati
City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on
record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts
showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said
charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al .'s respective positions give
them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay
in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
• Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals: ○ Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively
liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since: ( a ) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and ( b ) Phases
III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases
against him moot and academic.In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that
he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of his prayer for injunctive relief,
Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide
vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
• At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer
for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day. ○ The OMB
manifested that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive
suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
• Proceedings before the SC: ○ In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6,
2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for
Page 7 of 167
purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during
the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed
acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 and C.A.- G.R. S.P. No. 139504, is the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy - YES
a. GENERAL RULE: MR must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari and prohibition. EXCEPTION: When there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government and
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
b. The case at bar falls under the exception.
2. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman – YES
a. OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office
to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea
that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from
judicial intervention, "particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"
claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."
b. The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman
from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion
that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against
a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.
c. The first paragraph of Section 14 RA 6770, in light of the powers of Congress and the Court under the
1987 Constitution, textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover
the Supreme Court.
d. Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the
policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory
provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the
Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare
as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
e. Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to
issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise
of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended,
and which it had already acquired over the main CA- G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
3. WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine – NO
a. The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation
doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office
during the administrative disciplinary proceedings. However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was
not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according
provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr. , which was the
Page 8 of 167
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that
although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the
condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension
order. With condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the
onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at
least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
b. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. To begin with, the concept of public office
is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability
arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative
offenses.
c. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court
devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
follow its interpretation. Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should
be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court
resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the
policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is
DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor;
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint
Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complaints,
docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062,
and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Page 9 of 167
GONZALES III v OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

January 28, 2014|Brion, J.
Nature of Case: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

● On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs
Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical
injury.
● Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his
allegations. Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without prejudice of
the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute.9
● On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the
entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. In his draft decision,
Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
● Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’ recommendation
on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2009, followed by
a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.
● On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records to the
Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14, 2009, the case
was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia for review and
recommendation.
● GIPO Garcia released a draft order to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for appropriate
action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’ office on April 27,
2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with the case records, on May 6, 2010
for the final approval by the Ombudsman.
● On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked
a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages.
While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically,
resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus.
● In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department
of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two
departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC).
● In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for
their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." The IIRC stated that
the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration,
"without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."
The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.
● Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of
Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.
Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

● In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others,
before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for
bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.
● On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered
into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia. Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea
of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect bribery; and
(ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser
Page 10 of 167
offense of facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership,
rights and other interests over the real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank
deposits alleged in the information.
● The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the parties’ submitted Joint Motion
for Approval.
● The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on Justice
of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found
that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust – grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.28The Committee recommended to
the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing of appropriate charges against her deputies
and assistants before the appropriate government office.
● Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. On March 24, 2011,
Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OP’s jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction
notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to
seek relief from the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S &RATIO:
1. WON The Office of the President has jurisdiction on Administrative disciplinary actions over a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor – Yes
a. The Ombudsman has no exclusive jurisdiction on Administrative disciplinary actions over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
b. Section 8 (2): A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for
any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
c. Sec. 21: Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
d. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
e. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to
the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
f. By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
g. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from
his power to appoint. Granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
diminish the  independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
2. WON petitioner Gonzales is guilty of betrayal of public trust. - NO

a. The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including
system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales
may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error
of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S
Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure
to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross
neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably
less time to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action
compared to the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted
to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman
Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case
was no longer in his hands.
Page 11 of 167
b. Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained
failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be
considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so
because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
3. WON OP is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-
Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for
under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act. - Yes
a. The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of
the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the
disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether
the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest
and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes
against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness
on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing
to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which
the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding
court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
b. Take Note: In the original case, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman
Act has failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of
the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal taken against
petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing
petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the
assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012.
There being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of
the Internal Rules of the Court.
c. Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
4. WON Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional – YES
a. The court ruled that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President,
whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key
officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly
did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances
that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
b. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence
the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
RULING: the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further
ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the
power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative
liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
Page 12 of 167
NOTES:
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series
of 1990, as amended)
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision
or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution.
Page 13 of 167
HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO v. LANDBANK (LBP)

Jan. 11, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Review on certiorari
FACTS:
• The petitioners’ agricultural land was put under the coverage of PD27 and certificates of land transfer were
distributed to 84 beneficiaries in 1973. The DAR valued the subject land at P1.3M inclusive of interests but
the Felicianos rejected the said valuation.
• In 2001, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of CamSur fixed the value of the subject land at
P4.6M. LBP then filed a petition to the RTC of Naga for the determination of just compensation.
Meanwhile, petitioners assigned their rights to Espiritu.
• The RTC (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject land at P7,725,904.05; and (b) directed the LBP (i)
to pay Espiritu the said amount, less amounts already paid to and received by the Feliciano heirs, and (ii) to
pay 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid balance of the just payment compensation, computed from January 1,
2010 until full payment.
• The RTC observed that the subject land fell under the coverage of several DAR AOs that provided for the
payment of 6% annual interest for any delay in the payment of just compensation. Since DAR AO 06-2008
was effective only until December 31, 2009, the RTC imposed 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid just
compensation from January 1, 2010 until full payment.
• The CA, on the other hand, CA fixed the just compensation for the subject land at P7,725,904.05, plus legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a., computed from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the
Decision, or the total amount of P8,316,876,97, and directed the LBP to pay the said amount to Espiritu.
• It ruled that the DAR AOs are no longer applicable to the instant case since the subject land was revalued
based on the July 1, 2009 values pursuant to DAR AO 1, Series of 2010. It further held that interest at 12%
p.a. was proper considering the delay in the payment of just compensation.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA's determination of just compensation is correct. - NO
a. Case law states that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete - such as in this case,
where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled - just compensation should be
determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."
b. For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
c. Since the claim folder covering the subject land was received by the LBP on December 2, 1997, or prior to
July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent DAR regulations applying
Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance.
While the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula
created by the DAR since the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially
a judicial function which is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and
justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the formula prescribed factors and the applicable.
d. Neither the RTC nor the CA considered the date when the claim folder was received nor explained their
reasons for deviating from the DAR formula. Therefore, as it stands, the RTC and the CA should have
utilized the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the
passage of RA 9700, in determining the just compensation for the subject land.
RULING:
The RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were issued in the names of the
farmer beneficiaries in 1989. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the RTC for the
valuation of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
Page 14 of 167
2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it should take into
account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land,
it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In any event,
should the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating
therefrom, and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the
acquired property.
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be
an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be pegged at
the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking in 1989 when Emancipation Patents were issued, until June 30,
2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners
shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
I.
Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider
the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their
determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial
discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of
the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported
by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the power to
make a final determination of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision dated October 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.122761
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2001-0359 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 23 for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines
set in this Decision. The trial court is DIRECTED to conduct the proceedings in the said case with reasonable
dispatch, and to submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60) days
from notice of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
Page 15 of 167
KABATAAN v. COMELEC
16 December 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
● President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which mandates the COMELEC to implement
a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
● COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which amended certain portions of Resolution No. 985329
dated February 19, 2014, by stating that Election Registration Boards shall deactivate the voters registration
records of those who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before October 31, 2015," and
that the "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015
Board hearing."
● Petitioner believes that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015
violates Section 8 of RA 8189.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, and 10013, all related thereto, are
unconstitutional. – NO
a. Petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period
beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. As already resolved in this Court's Resolution
dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but
may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.
b. COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfil its mandate. Perforce,
this power includes the determination of the periods to accomplish certain pre-election acts, such as voter
registration.
NOTE:
RA 8189: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A
SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election.
Page 16 of 167
PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR LEGAL

AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION (ODESLA-
IAD)
July 24, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS:
• During her presidency, President Gloria Arroyo created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for graft and corruption, among
others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the president.
• In 2010, President Benigno issued EO No. 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
ODESLA.
• In 2011, Finance Secretary Purisima filed before ODESLA-IAD a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct
against Prospero Pichay as head of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) in relation with the
purchase of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank.
• Exec. Sec. Ochoa required Pichay and his co-respondents to submit their written explanations under oath.
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Cautelam manifesting that a
similar case is already pending before the Ombudsman.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a public office
– NO
a. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
b. The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “ delegated legislative
authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
c. Generally, the authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office
or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way
around.
d. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa.
e. Since both of PAGC and ODESLA belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization
by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under
Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
f. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
g. The reorganization was pursued in good faith. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions
was for economy and efficiency.
2. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to appropriate funds –
NO
a. Placed upon the chief executive is the power to recommend the budget necessary for the operation of
the Government, which implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the
structure that each government agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most
economical and efficient manner.
Page 17 of 167
b. The President is also given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations
Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for his office
c. While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for
the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President’s own office budget without
committing any illegal appropriation
3. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of Congress to delegate quasi-judicial

powers to administrative agencies – NO
a. While the term “adjudicatory” appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve
cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission
of recommendations.
b. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power
to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
c. The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive
department.
4. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the powers of the Ombudsman-NO

a. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases.
b. Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-
ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman’s authority to
investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no
means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
5. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process and the equal protection
clause - NO
a. The equal protection clause is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations
bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
b. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right
to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
c. “Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
d. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until
the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
e. Also, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. As long as petitioner was given
the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.
f. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IADODESLA. Mere
allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present
substantial proof to show that the IAD-ODESLA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct
of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the fact-finding investigator’s duties.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. So ordered.
Page 18 of 167
PIMENTEL v. OCHOA
July 17, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS:
• On July 16, 2008, DSWD issued AO No. 16 series of 2008, setting the guidelines for the Pantawid Pamilyang
Pilipino Program. This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as CCTP, provides
cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human
development goals.
• Eligible households that are selected from priority target areas consisting of the poorest provinces classified
by the National Statistical Coordination Board are granted a health assistance of P500/mo., or P6,000/year,
and an educational assistance of P300/mo for 10 months or a total of P3,000/year for each child but up to
a max of 3 children per family.
• Under AO No. 16, DSWD institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among the DepEd, DOH,
DILG, the National Anti Poverty Commission (NAPC), and the LGUs, identifying each role and function
to ensure effective implementation of the CCTP. Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the
CCTP by providing it with funding under the General Appropriation (GA) of 2008 in the amount of
P298M, which was eventually increased to P10B in 2010. But the biggest allotment was in GA 2011 at
P21.19B.
• Former senator Aquilino Pimentel, and 2 incumbent barangay officers challenges the disbursement of
public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to encroach into the local autonomy
of the LGUs.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the P21B CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD GAA FY 2011 violates Art. II, Sec. 25 & Art. X,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC of 1991 by providing for the recentralization of
the national government in the delivery of basic services already devolved to the LGUs - NO
a. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. Petitioners have
failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The
allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national government itself
but implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal
development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local
governments.
b. The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure autonomy of local governments.
c. To fully secure the LGUs’ autonomy, Section 17* of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities. While the provision charges
the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from
the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
d. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unles an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
ben provided by the national government under the anual general apropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
e. To yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to preclude any and all
involvement by the national government in programs implemnted in the local level would be to shift the
tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would amount to a decentralization of power is
beyond our constitutional concept of local autonomy.
f. Complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

*LGC, Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.―(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Page 19 of 167
Local government units shall like wise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein. (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act,
other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as
the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.”
Page 20 of 167
PURISIMA v. CARPIO-MORALES
FACTS:
• In 2011, PNP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with WER Fast Documentary Agency without
any public bidding. PNP undertook to allow WER Fast to provide courier services to deliver firearm licenses
to gun owners. In turn, WER Fast agreed to donate equipment for an online application system for the
renewal of firearm licenses.
• Upon review of the MOA, PNP’s Legal Service opined that the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO)
must first formulate rules of accreditation.
• On Dec. 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed PNP Chief. Thereafter, former Civil Security Group Director
Meneses issued a memo stating that:
o The CSG has accredited WER Fast after it had complied with all the documentary requirements
stipulated in the FEO Policy on Accreditation.
o Mandatary delivery of firearm licenses to gun owners is recommended.
• Purisima approved this memo on Feb. 17, 2013, one month after the issuance of the Meneses Memo. This
accredited WER Fast as a courier services provides to all FEO clients.
• In 2014, 2 complaints were filed against Purisima, WER Fast, et. al. These alleged that:
o The MOA was not procured through competitive bidding
o It was executed before WER Fast obtained its certificate of registration
o WER Fast is not authorized by the DOTC
o Purisima has close personal ties with WER Fast’s incorporator and high-ranking officer
o Purisima made mandatory the use of courier service for the delivery of licenses and WER fast was
inefficient in delivering cards
o Purisima be charged with gross negligence/gross neglect of duty with a prayer for preventive
suspension.
• Purisima and another PNP Official filed their respective petitions for certiorari before the CA. While these
are pending, Purisima resigned as chief and the preventive suspension period lapsed.
• CA held that the petitions are moot. But ruled in favor of the Ombudsman on the merits of the case.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the petition has been rendered moot and academic - NO

a. A case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension is not mooted by the supervening lifting of
the same. It does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension
order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
b. Since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's preventive suspension would essentially determine his
entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse
of the period of his preventive suspension, there remains some practical value or use in resolving his
petition.
2. WON the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in
preventively suspending Purisima – YES
a. The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive suspension order under Section 24 of
RA 6770 when two (2) conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of guilt is strong based on the
Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of the three (3) circumstances are present - (1) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (2) the charges would warrant removal from service; or (3) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
b. With regard to the first condition, the Ombudsman found that the evidence of guilt against Purisima
was strong enough to place him under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to be tainted
with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on supporting documentary evidence, none of which
Page 21 of 167
were questioned to be inadmissible. The Court accords deference to the Ombudsman’s judgment
pursuant to its non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of her prosecutorial and investigatory
powers.
c. The second condition is also met, considering that the charges of gross neglect of duty, criminal and
administrative charges (violations of RA 6713, 3019, 7080, and 9184) would warrant removal from
office.
d. Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive suspension order against Purisima are present in
this case, the Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted within her powers when she issued the
assailed December 3, 2014 Order. In consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back salaries during the
period of his preventive suspension.
e. The Ombudsman also did not violate his right to due process, nor did she prejudge the case when she
issued the preventive suspension order. The suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts
of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Page 22 of 167
U.P. LAW BOC LABOR LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
LABOR LAW
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, AND
MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA v. JOEL P. HIPE JR.
November 12, 2014| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Joel Hipe was last employed by Bahia as a plumber for the vessel M/S Braemar under a 6-month contract.
Despite the lapse of his contract on June 6, 2008, Hipe continued to work aboard the vessel without any
new contract.
• On June 22, 2008, he sustained back injury while carrying heavy equipment for his job. After one month,
He was repatriated to Manila, upon his request.
• Upon arrival, he was examined by the company designated physician Dr. Lim, and eventually, on October
9, 2008, he was declared fit to work.
• Subsequently, Hipe sought second opinion from Dr. Garduce of UP-PGH who declared him unfit to work.
• Hipe then filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for the payment of permanent disability compensation,
sick wages, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees against Bahia, its president and its foreign principal.
• Petitioners aver that Hipe was sent back to Manila for termination of contract and not for medical reasons
and that when Hipe signed the certificate of fitness for work, he released the petitioners from any liability
concerning his medical condition.
• The LA found that Hipe was medically repatriated as a consequence of an accident which occurred in the
course of his employment, and that his injuries caused him to be unfit for sea work permanently. NLRC
reversed. CA reinstated the LA’s decision.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in granting Hipe’s petition for certiorari, thereby setting aside the NLRC Decision
dismissing the complaint and adjudging Hipe’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits. - YES
a. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that
the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.
b. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
• The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite
quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief.
• The NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability
benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through substantial evidence.
• Sec. 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC which enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee, tells
us that 2 elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the work
illness must be work-related; and (b) that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the
term of the seafarer’s employment contract.
c. Although CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of Bahia Shipping when the accident
happened and his repatriation can only be considered as a medical repatriation, Hipe was subsequently
declared fit to work by the company designated physician. This must fit-to-work certification must stand
because:
• The opinion of Hipe’s personal doctor that it would be impossible for him to work as seaman-plumber
was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute the fit to work
assessment, but merely relied on a review of Hipe’s medical history and physical examination.
• Hipe failed to comply with Sec. 20 (B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment
by the parties of whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer’s personal doctor
disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit to work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia v.
Page 23 of 167
Dumadag, the Court held that the seafarer’s noncompliance results in the affirmance of the company-
designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment.
d. Hipe filed his complaint before the NLRC but prematurely did so without any regard to the conflict-
resolution procedure under Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 2, 2012 and the Resolution dated
December 3, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 115888 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Joel P. Hipe, Jr.’s claim for disability benefits is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
*2. x x x.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness,
he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability
has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty
(120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-
designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so,
in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above
benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.
Page 24 of 167
ARIEL P. HOBLADOR v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC.

(PTCPI), MARINE SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD., AND CAPT. MARLON L.
MALANAO
Sept. 5, 2018| Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
• Hoblador was hired as Chief Cook on the vessel PRAIA for a period of 8 months. While on board the
vessel, he felt persistent and severe pain on his waist, abdomen, and down to his left scrotum. He was then
hospitalized and repatriated.
• Upon arrival in the Philippines, he reported to PTCPI and asked for further treatment, but he was ignored.
He sought treatment at the Molino Doctors Hospital where he was diagnosed with hernia. Thereafter, 2
other physicians concluded that the nature and extent of his illness permanently and totally prohibited him
from working as a seaman. Thus, he filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits.
• PTCPI averred that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits contending that
petitioner: (a) was not medically repatriated as his discharge from the vessel was due to contract completion;
(b) failed to comply with the mandatory post-deployment medical examination; and (c) failed to prove his
allegation that he had contracted and was diagnosed with hernia.
• The LA dismissed petitioner’s complaint. NLRC reversed and ruled that Hoblador’s disability is
compensable. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling, with modification, deleting the award of attorney’s fees.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly deleted the award of attorney's fees in petitioner's favor. - NO
a. There are 2 commonly accepted of attorney’s fees. There are two (2) commonly accepted concepts of
attorney's fees - the ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former renders; compensation is paid
for the cost and/or results of legal services per agreement or as may be assessed. In its extraordinary
concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party to the winning party. The instances when these may be awarded are enumerated in Article 2208* of
the Civil Code and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the client and his lawyer have agreed
that the award shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of compensation
b. In labor cases involving employees' wages and other benefits, the Court has consistently held that when the
concerned employee is entitled to the wages/benefits prayed for, he/she is also entitled to attorney's fees
amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award due him/her.
c. The CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees, considering that petitioner was found to be entitled
to permanent and total disability benefits and was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. Thus, the
reinstatement of such award is in order.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 3, 2017 and the Resolution
dated December 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136386 are MODIFIED in that the award of
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary awards due petitioner Ariel P. Horlador is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
*Civil Code Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
xxx
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest;
xxx
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability law
xxx
Page 25 of 167
THE NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC. AND/OR JENNIFER M.

ENANO-BOTE v. FRANCISCO N. DAKILA
FACTS:
• Dakila was employed by New Philippine Skylanders since 1987 and was terminated in 1997 when the
corporation was sold. In May 1997, he was rehired as consultant under a Contract for Consultancy Services
dated Apr. 30, 1997.
• In April 2007, Dakila informed petitioners of his compulsory retirement effective May 2, 2007 and sought
for the payment of his benefits pursuant to the CBA. His request was not acted upon and he was terminated
from service effective May 1, 2007.
• Consequently, Dakila filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal non-payment of retirement benefits,
under/non-payment of wages and other benefits of a regular employee, and damages against petitioners.
He claimed that the consultancy contract was a scheme to deprive him of the benefits of regularization.
• Petitioners, on the other hand, aver that Dakila was a consultant and not a regular employee and that there
is no employer-employee relationship between them.
• The LA found that Dakila was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement plus payment of backwages.
NLRC sustained the LA’s finding of illegal dismissal but noted that since Dakila was already beyond
retirement age, his reinstatement is no longer feasible and ordered payment of retirement pay computed
from 1997 until the date of the decision plus reinstatement wages from the time petitioner’s received a copy
of the LA’s decision up to the date of the NLRC’s decision with moral and exemplary damages. CA found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LA and dismissed petitioner’s petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Dakila was a regular employee who was illegally dismissed - Yes
a. Records reveal that both the LA and the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, have found substantial evidence to
show that respondent Dakila was a regular employee who was dismissed without cause.
b. Art. 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages computed from
the time he was illegally dismissed.
c. However, since Dakila was terminated one day prior to his compulsory retirement, his reinstatement is no
longer feasible. NLRC correctly held him entitled to the payment of his retirement benefits pursuant to the
CBA.
d. Accordingly, his backwages should only be computed for days prior to his compulsory retirement, which is
only a day.
e. The award for reinstatement wages must be deleted for lack of basis.
f. There is also no basis to hold Jennifer Enano-Bote, President and General Manager of New Philippine
Skylanders, jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of the monetary awards. The
mere lack of authorized or just cause to terminate one’s employment and the failure to observe due process
do not ipso facto mean that the corporate officer acted with malice or bad faith. There must be independent
proof of malice or bad faith which was not established in this case.
g. Moreover, for lack of factual and legal bases, the awards of moral and exemplary damages cannot also be
sustained.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed August 31,
2011 and November 23, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113015 are MODIFIED as
follows:
(1) petitioner Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote is ABSOLVED from liability for payment of respondent Francisco N. Dakila’s
monetary awards;
(2) the awards of reinstatement wages pending appeal as well as the moral and exemplary damages are ordered
DELETED; and
(3) the computation of backwages should be limited only for a day prior to his compulsory retirement.
The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Page 26 of 167
PNCC Skyway Corporation v. The Secretary of Labor and Employment and

PNCC Skyway Employees Union
Apr. 19, 2016| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• PNCC entered an Amended Supplemental Toll Operating Agreement (ASTOA) with Skyway O & M
Corporation (SOMCO), transferring the operation and maintenance of toll facilities from PNCC’s
subsidiary PSC to SOMCO. A transition period of 5 and ½ months was provided which lasted until Dec.
31, 2007, during which period, PSC continued to operate the Skyway.
• In line with this, PSC issued termination letters to its employees and filed a notice of closure with DOLE-
NCR, advising them that the services of the employees would be terminated effective January 31, 2008.
PSC offered its employees a separation package consisting of 250% of their salary for every year of service,
gratuity pay and other benefits.
• Meanwhile, PSC Employees Union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice resulting
in union busting and dismissal of workers. SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor incident.
• SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP and union busting but ordered PSC to pay its terminated employees
P30,000.00 each as indemnity after finding that the notices of their dismissal were invalid. The SOLE held
that while there is a valid basis for the closure, PSC failed to comply with the 30-day notice requirement in
terminating its employees, as provided by the Labor Code. It was observed that while PSC stated in the
notices of termination to the employees that the dismissal of the employees would take effect on January
31, 2008, it admitted that it actually ceased to operate and maintain the Skyway upon its turnover to SOMCO
on December 31, 2007. As such, PSC fixed the termination date at January 31, 2008 only to make it appear
that it was complying with the one-month notice requirement. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in affirming the DOLE Secretary’s ruling that PSC failed to comply with the 30-day
notice requirement under Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended – YES
(Stated differently, whether or not PSC properly complied with the thirty (30)-day prior notice rule, which
is the first prong of the termination procedure under Article 298 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code,
as amended. – YES)
a. Closure of business is an authorized cause for termination of employment under Art. 298 of the Labor
Code. Jurisdiction provides that the determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management
which the State does not usually interfere with.
b. Procedurally, Art. 298 provides 3 requirements to properly effectuate termination on the ground of closure
or cessation of business operations. These are: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the
DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination; (b) the cessation of business must
be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
c. Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through
invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.
d. There is no basis to award any indemnity in favor of PSC’s terminated employees. The PSC employees and
the DOLE were, therefore, notified 34 days ahead of the impending closure of PSC. Clearly, the mere fact
that PSC turned over the operation and management of the Skyway to SOMCO and ceased business
operations on December 31, 2007, should not be taken to mean that the FSC employees were ipso facto
terminated on the same date. The employees were notified that the effective date of their termination from
employment would be on January 31, 2008. This is lucidly evinced by the fact that they were still paid their
salaries and benefits for the whole month of January 2008. Case law teaches that an employer may opt not
to require the dismissed employees to report for work during the 30-day notice period. Their employment
with PSC did not cease by the sole reason that they were told not to render any service.
e. On top of that, it deserves mentioning that PSC undisputedly paid its dismissed employees separation pay
in amounts more than that required by law.
f. In addition, since the employees were not reporting for work although retained on payroll, they had, in fact,
more free time to look for job opportunities elsewhere after December 31, 2007 up until January 31, 2008.
This meets the purpose of the notice requirement.
Page 27 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2013 and the Resolution
dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 111201 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
So ordered.
Page 28 of 167
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) v. SAMAHAN NG

MANGGAGAWA NG UST, FERNANDO PONTESOR, RODRIGO CLACER,
SANTIAGO BUISA JR., AND JIMMY NAZARETH
FACTS:
• Respondents filed a complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal against UST before the NLRC.
Respondents alleged that UST repeatedly hired Pontesor to perform maintenance duties from 1990-1999.
• However, UST averred that although it repeatedly hired Pontesor, it did so on a per project basis, as
evidenced by the numerous contractual employee appointments signed by them.
• UST pointed out that each of the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the
project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in the event the project remained
unfinished upon the expiration of the specified term.
• The CEAs also expressed that the project employment will be automatically terminated (a) upon the
expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the project is completed ahead of such
expiration; or (c) in cases when their employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific
project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, the termination of
Pontesor, et al.’s employment with petitioner was validly made due to the completion of the specific projects
for which they were hired
• LA ruled in favor of Pontesor et. al. NLRC reversed and classified Pontesor et. al as mere fixed term casual
employees. CA reversed the NLRC ruling and reinstated that of the LA.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly ruled that Pontesor, et al. are regular employees and, consequently, were illegally
dismissed by petitioner - YES
a. The Court finds that the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, as its
finding that Pontesor, et al. are not regular employees of petitioner patently deviates from the evidence on
record as well as settled legal principles of labor law.
b. Art. 295[280]* distinguishes project employment from regular employment. Under the foregoing provision,
the law provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer (first
category); and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with
respect to the activity in which they are employed (second category).
c. A review of Pontesor, et al.’s respective CEAs reveal that petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various
positions in the nature of maintenance workers, such as laborer, mason, painter, tinsmith, electrician,
carpenter, and welder, for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999.
d. Pontesor, et al.’s nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner’s usual business as an
educational institution; hence, removing them from the ambit of the first category of regular. employees
under Article 295 of the Labor Code.
e. Nonetheless, it is clear that their respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs
each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second category of regular employees under
Article 295 of the Labor Code. Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with
respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such activities exist.
f. They are not project employees who were validly terminated upon the completion of their respective
projects/undertakings. Their specific undertakings or projects were not clearly delineated. This is evidenced
by the vagueness of the project descriptions set forth in their respective CEAs, which states that they were
tasked “to assist” in various carpentry, electrical, and masonry work.
g. Respondents should be considered regularized casual employees who enjoy, inter alia, security of tenure.
Accordingly, they cannot be terminated from employment without any just and/or authorized cause, which
unfortunately, petitioner was guilty of doing in this case.
h. Hence, Pontesor, et al. must be reinstated to their former or equivalent positions, with full backwages and
without loss of seniority rights. As pointed out by the LA, the NLRC Computation & Examination Unit
should be directed to compute the monetary awards that petitioner should be ordered to pay Pontesor, et
al. as a consequence of this ruling.
Page 29 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 12, 2008 and the Resolution dated
August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 85464 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
NOTE:
Art. 295 [280]. Regular and casual employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists.
Page 30 of 167
U.P. LAW BOC CIVIL LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
CIVIL LAW
ACE FOODS v. MICRO PACIFIC TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. (MTCL)
Sales| Dec. 11, 2013| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• ACE Foods is a domestic corporation engaged in the trading and distribution of consumer goods in
wholesale and retail bases, while MTCL is one engaged in the supply of computer hardware and equipment.
• MTCL sent a proposal for the delivery and sale of subject products to be installed at various offices of ACE
Foods. Said proposal provides:
o TERMS : Thirty (30) days upon delivery
o VALIDITY : Prices are based on current dollar rate and subject to changes without prior notice.
o DELIVERY : Immediate delivery for items on stock, otherwise thirty (30) to forty-five days upon receipt of [Purchase
Order]
o WARRANTY : One (1) year on parts and services. Accessories not included in warranty.
• Ace Foods accepted the proposal and issued PO 100023 for the subject products amounting to a purchase
price of P646,464. Thereafter, MTCL delivered the said products to ACE Food as reflected in the Invoice
Receipt in which MTCL reserved title to the items until full compliance of the terms and conditions and
payment of the purchase price.
• MTCL’s demands for payment went unheeded and instead, Ace Foods sent a letter stating that it has been
returning the products to MTCL’s representative but the latter failed to pull out the products.
• Ace Foods filed a Complaint against MTCL praying that the latter pull out from its premises the subject
products since MTCL breached its “after delivery services” obligations to it. MTCL in its Answer with
Counterclaim, maintained that it complied with its obligations, that there was actually no agreement as to
the purported “after delivery services” and that Ace Foods should be compelled to pay the purchase price.
• RTC directed MTCL to remove the subject products from ACE Foods’s premises and pay actual damages
and attorney fees. CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON ACE Foods should pay MTCL the purchase price for the subject products
a. The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or
promised. This may be gleaned from Article 1458* of the Civil Code. It is a consensual contract, which
means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon
perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the vendee may compel
transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold.
b. In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly
reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to
sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon.
c. In this case, the parties have agreed to a contract of sale and not to a contract to sell. A contract of sale had
been perfected at the precise moment ACE Foods, as evinced by its act of sending MTCL the Purchase
Order, accepted the latter’s proposal to sell the subject products in consideration of the purchase price.
From that point in time, the reciprocal obligations of the parties – i.e., on the one hand, of MTCL to deliver
the said products to ACE Foods, and, on the other hand, of ACE Foods to pay the purchase price therefor
within thirty (30) days from delivery – already arose and consequently may be demanded. Art. 1475** of
the Civil Code makes this clear.
d. MTCL’s reservation of ownership of the subject products as reflected in the Invoice Receipt hanged the
complexion of the transaction from a contract of sale into a contract to sell. However, records are bereft of
any showing that the said stipulation novated the contract of sale between the parties which, already existed
at the precise moment ACE Foods accepted MTCL’s proposal.
• Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.
Page 31 of 167
• Here, it has not been shown that the title reservation stipulation appearing in the Invoice Receipt had
been included or had subsequently modified or superseded the original agreement of the parties.
• The fact that the Invoice Receipt was signed by a representative of ACE Foods does not, by and of
itself, prove animus novandi since: (a) it was not shown that the signatory was authorized by ACE Foods
(the actual party to the transaction) to novate the original agreement; (b) the signature only proves that
the Invoice Receipt was received by a representative of ACE Foods to show the fact of delivery; and
(c) as matter of judicial notice, invoices are generally issued at the consummation stage of the contract
and not its perfection, and have been even treated as documents which are not actionable per se,
although they may prove sufficient delivery.
• ACE Foods failed to observe as regards its allegations of breach. Hence, the same cannot be sustained.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 21, 2011 and
Resolution dated February 8, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89426 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
* Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
** Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing
the form of contracts.
Page 32 of 167
BERNADETTE S. BILAG v. ESTELA AY-AY

Civil Law | Apr. 24, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Respondents Ay-ay et. al. filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with prayer for Preliminary Injunction
against petitioners.
• Respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold to them separately various
portions of a parcel of land in Baguio City and that they registered the corresponding Deeds of Sale.
According to respondents, Iloc Bilag not only acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his heirs,
successors-in-interest, and executors are to be bound by such sales, but he also caused the subject lands to
be removed from the Ancestral Land Claims.
• Respondents also alleged that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when
they were delivered to them and that they have already introduced various improvements thereon. Despite
the foregoing, petitioners refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject
lands. Worse, they continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to demolish their improvements
and dispossess them thereof.
• Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription/laches/estoppel,
and res judicata.
• The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the dismissal of the case. CA set aside the dismissal and
remanded the case to the court a quo for trial.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly set aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly, remanded the
case to the court a quo for trial. – NO
a. In setting aside the Order of dismissal due to the inapplicability of the grounds of res judicata and
prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its discussion the first ground relied upon by petitioners,
which is lack of jurisdiction.
b. A review of the records shows that the subject lands form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, a
portion of which was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record No. 211as evidenced by a Decision dated April 22, 1968.
c. In a catena of cases and more importantly PD1271, it was expressly declared that all orders and decisions
issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation are null and void and without force and effect.
d. While PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership over lands forming part of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, it requires, among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued on such lands on or before July
31, 1973.
e. In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled. Clearly, the award of lots 2
and 3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No.
544367, Psu 189147 – which includes the subject lands – to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD
1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law.
f. In view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified
as lands of the public domain as well.
g. Since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is
the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly
recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting of title.
h. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or
interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity.
Page 33 of 167
i. The court a quo's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority and necessarily
obviates the resolution of the merits of the case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution
dated September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61. SO ORDERED.
Page 34 of 167
CRESENCIO BAÑO v. BACHELOR EXPRESS

Torts | Mar. 12, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Salvaña was driving the bus owned by respondent Bachelor Express when he overtook a Lawin PUJ
jeepney, causing him to intrude into the opposite lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of
petitioner Cresencio Baño (Baño) running uphill from the opposite direction.
• The collision resulted in damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio
Asumbrado (Asumbrado), and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaña.
• Baño and heirs of Asumbrado (petitioners) filed a complaint for quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees
against respondents, accusing Salvaña of negligently driving the bus causing it to collide with the dump
truck.
• Respondents denied liability. They claimed that Asumbrado had the last clear chance to avoid the collision
had he not driven the dump truck at a very fast speed.
• RTC found that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the reckless negligence of the bus
driver, Salvaña. Having established the negligence of its employee, the presumption of fault or negligence
on the part of the employer, respondent Bachelor Express, arose, which it failed to rebut by evidence that
it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its bus driver Salvaña.
• CA affirmed the RTC’s findings but deleted the award of exemplary damages, value of lost income from
the dump truck, and moral damages. With respect to the heirs, CA reduced the RTC’s awards of actual
damages, loss of earning capacity, and moral damages. It also deleted the award of litigation expenses and
reduced the award of attorney’s fees.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON respondent Salvaña was grossly negligent in continuing to drive the bus even after he had
discovered the malfunction in its steering wheel. – YES
a. Records show that when bus driver Salvaña overtook the jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a
blind curve along a descending road. Considering the road condition, and that there was only one lane
on each side of the center line for the movement of traffic in opposite directions, it would have been
more prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus encroached on the opposite
lane in the process of overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming traffic
that resulted in the collision with the approaching dump truck driven by deceased Asumbrado, Salvaña
was grossly negligent in driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that the road was clear
and not to proceed if he could not do so in safety.
b. Court has defined gross negligence as "one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally
with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected."
2. WON CA erred in reducing the amounts of damages awarded by the RTC despite sufficient
evidence. - YES
a. The CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve as a warning
to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious actions. However, the award
should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another.
b. Thus, the Court reinstates the separate awards of exemplary damages to petitioners in the amount of
P50,000.00.
c. With respect to Baño, the award of moral damages for the loss of his dump truck was correctly deleted
since the damage to his vehicle was not shown to have been made willfully or deliberately.
d. However, the Court finds the grant of P100,000.00 as temperate damages for the damaged vehicle to
be insufficient considering its type as a 10-wheeler dump truck and its good running condition at the
time of the incident. Instead, the Court finds the amount of P400,000.00 as fair and reasonable under
the circumstances. With respect to the adjudged lost income from the dump truck, the Court sustains,
for being just and equitable, the award of temperate damages in the sum of P200,000.00
e. The Court upholds the grant to petitioner Heirs of P19,136.90 as actual damages corresponding to the
pecuniary loss that they have actually sustained, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, the reduced awards of
Page 35 of 167
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P415,640.16 as loss of earning capacity of the deceased Asumbrado,
which are all in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence
f. The attorney's fees of P50,000.00 as awarded by the CA is increased to P100,000.00 considering the
length of time that this case had been pending, or a period of about 18 years since the complaint a quo
was filed.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the assailed February 20, 2009 Decision and February 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Respondents are ordered to solidarity pay:
(1) petitioner Heirs of Amancio Asumbrado:
(a) P19,13 6.90 as actual damages representing hospital and funeral expenses;
(b) P415,640.16 as loss of earning capacity of the deceased Asumbrado;
(c) P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
(d) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(e) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(2) petitioner Cresencio Baño:
(a) P400,000.00 as temperate damages for his damaged dump truck;
(b) P200,000.00 as lost income of the said truck; and
(c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(3) attorney's fees of P100,000.00 to petitioners collectively.
SO ORDERED.
Page 36 of 167
DELOS SANTOS v. ALBERTO ABEJON

Civil Law | Mar. 20, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Respondents filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum of money before the RTC.
It alleged that petitioner Erlinda and her late husband Pedro borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from
the former's sister, Teresita Abejon.
• As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property in Makati City which mortgage was
annotated on the title.
• After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land
to Teresita for P150,000.00. They executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage and a TCT was issued
in the name of Teresita Abejon, married to Alberto Abejon. Thereafter, respondents constructed a 3-storey
building.
• Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that since Pedro died in
1989, his signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was definitely forged. As such, respondents
demanded from petitioners the amounts of P150,000.00 representing the consideration for the sale of the
subject land and P2,000,000.00 representing the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building, but to
no avail.
• In view of the stipulations during the pre-trial, the RTC limited the issue to who among the parties should
be held liable for damages and attorney's fees.
• The RTC declared the Deed of Sale null and void and ordered petitioners to pay the loan obligation plus
legal interest, Php2M representing the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building and attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.
• CA affirmed the RTC with modifications.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to respondents in the aggregate amount
of P2,200,000.00, consisting of the loan obligation of P100,000.00, the construction cost of the three (3)-
storey building in the amount of P2,000,000.00, and attorney's fees and costs of suit amounting to
P100,000.00. - NO
a. In view of the foregoing admissions and/or stipulations during pre-trial, there is now a need to properly
determine to whom the following liabilities should devolve: (a) the P100,000.00 loan obligation; (b) the
P50,000.00 extra consideration Teresita paid for the sale of the subject land, which was already declared
void - a matter which the RTC and the CA completely failed to resolve; and (c) the P2,000,000.00
construction cost of the three (3)-storey building that was built on the subject land.
• While petitioners admitted the existence of the P100K loan obligation as well as respondents' right to
collect on the same, it does not necessarily follow that respondents should collect the loan amount
from petitioners, as concluded by both the RTC and the CA. It must be pointed out that such loan was
contracted by Erlinda, who is only one (1) out of the four (4) herein petitioners, and her deceased
husband, Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still subsisting. Their property
relations were governed by the system of conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, pursuant to Article 121
of the Family Code, the loan obligation, including interest, if any, is chargeable to Erlinda and Pedro's
conjugal partnership as it was a debt contracted by the both of them during their marriage. While the
portion attributable to Pedro was not considered extinguished by his death, it is merely passed on to
his estate; and thus, his heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, could not be held directly answerable for the same.
Both the RTC and the CA erred in holding petitioners liable to respondents for the loan obligation in
the amount of P100,000.00. Respondents have the option to either file a personal action for collection
of sum of money or institute a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
• Since the Deed of Sale involving the subject land stands to be nullified in view of the parties' stipulation
to this effect, it is incumbent upon the parties to return what they have received from said sale.
Accordingly, Erlinda and the rest of petitioners (as Pedro's heirs) are entitled to the return of the subject
land. Register of Deeds of Makati City should cancel the TCT issued in the name of Teresita and
reinstate the TCT in the name of Pedro and Erlinda, restore the same to its previous state before its
cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated thereon. On the other hand,
Page 37 of 167
respondents, as Teresita's successors-in-interest, are entitled to the refund of the additional P50,000.00
consideration she paid for such sale. However, it should be clarified that the liability for the said amount
will not fall on all petitioners, but only on Erlinda, as she was the only one among the petitioners who
was involved in the said sale.
• The execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land was done in 1992. However, Teresita was
apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990 when she went on a vacation in the Philippines. As such, she
knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale which contained a signature purportedly belonging to
Pedro, who died in 1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would not have operated
to transfer any rights over the subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the defect in their
title to the subject land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a three (3)-storey building thereon.
Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad faith. On the other hand, petitioners knew of
the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale from the start, but nonetheless, still acquiesced to the
construction of the three (3)-storey building thereon. Hence, they should likewise be considered as
landowners in bad faith. Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the
builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith.
The landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448 of the Civil Code, he may appropriate the
improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and
useful expenses under Arts. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, or he may sell the land to the buyer, unless
its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay
reasonable rent. The instant case is remanded to the court a quo for the purpose of determining matters
necessary for the proper application of Articles 448 and 453, in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code, as applied in existing jurisprudence.
• Anent the issue on attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. In this case,
the Court finds no justification for the award of attorney's fees to either party. Accordingly, any award
for attorney's fees made by the courts a quo must be deleted.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19, 2014 and the
Resolution dated December 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96884 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) The Deed of Sale and the Release of Mortgage both dated July 8, 1992 are declared NULL and VOID;
(b) The Register of Deeds of Makati City is ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180286 in the
name of Teresita D. Abejon, married to Alberto S. Abejon, and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No.
131753 in the name of Pedro Delos Santos and Erlinda Dinglasan- Delos Santos, and restore the same to its previous
state before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated thereon; and
(c) The entire fourth paragraph[44] of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 19, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof:
I. The P100,000.00 loan obligation is DECLARED to be the liability of the conjugal partnership of petitioner Erlinda
Dinglasan Delos Santos and her deceased husband Pedro Delos Santos which may be recovered by herein
respondents in accordance with this Decision;
II. Petitioner Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos is ORDERED to return to respondents the amount of P50,000.00
representing the additional consideration Teresita D. Abejon paid for in the sale, with legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid;
III. For the purpose of determining the proper indemnity for the 3-storey building, the case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of
Articles 448, 453, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code, as applied in existing jurisprudence; and
IV. The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P100,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 38 of 167
DOMINADOR M. APIQUE v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH

Civil Law | Aug. 5, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Evangeline and Dominador are siblings. Evangeline left for work in Germany in 1979. In 1995, she executed
General and Special Powers of Attorney constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real
property for her, and to manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines.
• Evangeline opened a joint savings account on January 18, 1999 with Dominador at the Claveria Branch of
PCI Bank which became EPCIB and later on became BDO.
• On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account and,
thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank. It was only on February
23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB. She likewise discovered
that Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own account with the same bank and that he
had withdrawn various amounts from the said account.
• Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail. Hence,
she filed a complaint for sum of money against Dominador before the RTC, impleading EPCIB as a party
defendant.
• Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account, and that
Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same. On the other hand, she alleged that EPCIB violated its
banking rules when it allowed the withdrawal without the presentation of the passbook.
• In his Answer, Dominador asserted that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the subject account to
answer for the expenses of Evangeline's projects, considering (a) that it was a joint account, and (b) the
general and special powers of attorney executed by Evangeline in his favor.
• During trial, Dominador claimed that the money withdrawn belonged to him as it was his contribution to
the initial deposit.
• RTC ruled in favor of Dominador and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling
and, instead, ordered Dominador to return to Evangeline the amount of P980,000.00, plus interest.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Evangeline is entitled to the return of the amount of P980,000.00 Dominador withdrew from their
joint savings account with EPCIB, plus legal interest thereon. - YES
a. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical
persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and
their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485
of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests.
Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
b. The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each of the named
account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may deposit and/or withdraw,
partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other, during their lifetime. Nevertheless,
as between the account holders, their right against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon,
and the purpose for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.
c. There is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador was a joint "OR" account. It is
also admitted that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the transfer of needed
funds for Evangeline's business projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if" there is a
need to meet Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said projects.
d. Hence, while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus,
validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him
and Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by
the purpose for which the subject account was opened.
Page 39 of 167
e. Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject account was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of
funds for Evangeline's projects. Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the
subject account, there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline.
f. Nonetheless, the Court deems it proper to modify the amount to be returned to Evangeline, considering:
(a) the unrefuted claim that Dominador contributed the amount of P100,000.00 to the joint account at the
time it was opened; and (b) the absence of controverting proof showing that the same had been withdrawn
prior to February 11, 2002, when the contested withdrawal was made. Consequently, Dominador is entitled
to the said amount which should be, therefore, deducted from amount to be returned.
g. Finally, the Court finds a need to partially modify the interest accruing from the finality of the Decision,
which should be imposed at the lower rate of 6% p.a., and not 12% p.a. as imposed by the CA, in line with
the amendment introduced by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular No.
799 and Nacar Gallery Frames.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2012 and the Resolution dated January 17,
2013 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 00740-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION directing petitioner Dominador M. Apique to return to respondent Evangeline Apique
Fahnenstich the amount of P880,000.00, plus legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum, reckoned from the filing
of the complaint on May 7, 2002, until full payment. SO ORDERED.
Page 40 of 167
GOTESCO PROPERTIES INC (GPI) v. SPS. EUGENIO AND ANGELINA

FAJARDO
Feb. 27, 2013| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Sps. Fajardo entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Gotesco for the purcase of a 100-square meter
lot in a subdivision developed by GPI.
• Under the contract, Sps. Fajardo undertook to pay the purchase price of P126,000.00 within a 10-year
period, including interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum. GPI, on the other hand, agreed to
execute a final deed of sale (deed) in favor of Sps. Fajardo upon full payment of the stipulated consideration.
• However, despite full payment and subsequent demands, GPI failed to execute the deed and to deliver the
title and physical possession of the subject lot.
• Sps. Fajardo filed a complaint before the HLURB for specific performance or rescission of contract. They
averred that GPI violated Sec. 20 of PD 957.
• For their part, petitioners maintained that at the time of the execution of the contract, Sps. Fajardo were
actually aware that GPI's certificate of title had no technical description inscribed on it and that the failure
to deliver the title was beyond their control. As such, Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, the provision on which
Sps. Fajardo anchor their right of rescission – remained inapplicable since they were actually willing to
comply with their obligation but were only prevented from doing so due to circumstances beyond their
control. While GPI's petition for inscription of technical description was favorably granted RTC-Caloocan,
the same was reversed by the CA; this caused the delay in the subdivision of the property into individual
lots with individual titles.
• HLURB-ENCRFO decided in favor of petitioners. HLURB Board of Commissioners affirmed. OP
affirmed the HLURB rulings. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Sps. Fajardo have no right to rescind the contract considering that GPI's inability to comply
therewith was due to reasons beyond its control and thus, should not be held liable to refund the
payments they had received. - NO
a. In a contract to sell, the seller's obligation to deliver the corresponding certificates of title is
simultaneous and reciprocal to the buyer's full payment of the purchase price.
b. Section 25 of PD 957, which regulates the subject transaction, imposes on the subdivision owner or
developer the obligation to cause the transfer of the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon
full payment.
c. A perusal of the records shows that GPI acquired the subject property in 1992 from the former
registered owner of the property. GPI was issued TCT No. 244220 but the same did not bear any
technical description. However, no plausible explanation was advanced by the petitioners as to why the
petition for inscription was filed only after almost 8 years from the acquisition of the subject property.
d. Neither did petitioners sufficiently explain why GPI took no positive action to cause the immediate
filing of a new petition for inscription within a reasonable time from notice of the CA decision.
e. The long delay in the performance of GPI's obligation from date of demand was unreasonable and
unjustified. It cannot therefore be denied that GPI substantially breached its contract to sell with Sps.
Fajardo which thereby accords the latter the right to rescind the same pursuant to Article 1191* of the
Code.
f. Rescission does not merely terminate the contract and release the parties from further obligations to
each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and restores the parties to their original
positions as if no contract has been made. Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of
the benefits that each party may have received as a result of the contract, is thus required.
i. The effects of rescission as provided for in Article 1385** of the Code are equally applicable to cases
under Article 1191.
g. It cannot be denied that only GPI benefited from the contract while Sps. Fajardo remained prejudiced
by the persisting non-delivery of the subject lot despite full payment. As a necessary consequence,
respondents must be able to recover the price of the property pegged at its prevailing market value.
Page 41 of 167
2. WON petitioners should not be held liable to pay damages and attorney's fees since the individual
petitioners never participated in the acts complained of nor found to have acted in bad faith - NO
a. GPI’s unjustified failure to comply with its obligations caused Sps. Fajardo serious anxiety, mental
anguish and sleepless nights, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. In the same vein, the
payment of exemplary damages remains in order so as to prevent similarly minded subdivision
developers to commit the same transgression. And finally, considering that Sps. Fajardo were
constrained to engage the services of counsel to file this suit, the award of attorney’s fees must be
likewise sustained.
b. However, the Court finds no basis to hold individual petitioners solidarily liable with petitioner GPI
for the payment of damages in favor of Sps. Fajardo since it was not shown that they acted maliciously
or dealt with the latter in bad faith.
RULING:
*ART. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
**ART. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together
with their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands
rescission can return whatever he may be obligated to restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession
of third persons who did not act in bad faith.
In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person causing the loss.
Page 42 of 167
JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI

FACTS:
• In 1990, the RTC granted private respondent Atlantic Merchandising, Inc.’s action for revival of judgment
against Zamboanga Alta Consolidated, Inc. (ZACI). It ordered ZACI to pay private respondent
P673,536.54 representing its principal obligation, interest, attorney's fees and costs, plus interest.
• A writ of execution was issued but because it was returned unsatisfied, private respondent sought the
examination of ZACI's debtors, which included petitioners as its stockholders. Petitioners denied liability
for any unpaid subscriptions with ZACI and offered various documentary evidence to support their claim.
• RTC found petitioners indebted to ZACI as its incorporators in the aggregate amount of P750,000.00 by
way of unpaid stock subscriptions on the basis of the records of the SEC.
• CA dismissed their petition for review on the following grounds: (1) failure to attach certified true copies
of the assailed RTC Decision and Order; (2) only three out of four petitioners signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping; (3) the IBP Official Receipt Number of the counsel for petitioners
was outdated, violating Bar Matter No. 287; and (4) deficiency in the docket and other fees in the sum of
P1,530.00.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA's outright dismissal of their petition on procedural grounds, despite substantial compliance,
and the RTC Decision directing them to pay private respondent the amount of their alleged unpaid stock
subscriptions to ZACI, are tantamount to a denial of due process of law. - YES
a. Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment.
b. Procedural rules are not to be disregarded simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to
a party’s substantive rights. However, these same rules may be relaxed, for persuasive and weighty reasons,
to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with procedure.
c. After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court finds that compelling and substantial reasons exist in this
case as to justify the relaxation of procedural rules.
• Petitioners merely became involved in this case when, upon failure to execute the revived final
judgment, respondent sought to examine the debtors of ZACI which included petitioners on the
allegation that they had unpaid stock subscriptions to ZACI.
• During the proceedings, petitioners vehemently denied any such liability or indebtedness.
• RTC should have directed respondent to institute a separate action against petitioners for the purpose
of recovering their alleged indebtedness to ZACI, in accordance with Section 43, Rule 39 of the ROC*.
d. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent
third parties.
e. Petitioners were total strangers to the civil case between ZACI and respondent, and to order them to settle
an obligation which they persistently denied would be tantamount to deprivation of their property without due
process of law. The only power of the RTC, in this case, is to make an order authorizing respondent to sue
in the proper court to recover an indebtedness in favor of ZACI. It has no jurisdiction to summarily try the
question of whether petitioners were truly indebted to ZACI when such indebtedness is denied.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed May 27, 2005 and September 6,
2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The September 29, 2004 Decision and December 9,
2004 Order of the RTC are likewise NULLIFIED, without prejudice to the institution of a separate action against
petitioners in accordance with Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
* Section 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims the property. – If it appears that a person or
corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the
property adverse to him or denies the debt, the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment
obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a
Page 43 of 167
transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days from notice of the order,
and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated at any time by
the court which issued it, or the court in which the action is brought, upon such terms as may be just.
Page 44 of 167
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI MORISONO

Persons | Jul. 2, 2018| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Luzviminda married to Ryoji in Quezon City. They then lived in Japan for a year where they eventually
parted ways. Luzviminda and Ryoji then submitted a “Divorce Agreement” before the City Hall of Mizuho-
Ku, Nagoya City which was eventually approved and duly recorded with the head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City.
• Petitioner then filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree before the RTC which denied
Luzviminda's petition.
• It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines –
provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same does not find
application when it was the Filipino spouse who procured the same.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she
procured with Ryoji. - NO
a. The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do
not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles
15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even
by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
b. The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code which reads: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise.
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
c. This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
d. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof must still be determined by our courts.
e. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.
f. Pursuant to the ruling in the case of Republic v. Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless
of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the
recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
g. In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her
foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the ground that she admittedly
initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do.
h. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered
nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained,
in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in
this Decision. SO ORDERED.
Page 45 of 167
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. ARTURO DY

Sales | Nov. 14, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Cipriana, owner of a lot in Cebu, and her late husband, respondent Jose Delgado entered into an agreement
with Cecilia Tan (buyer) for the sale of the said property for P10/sqm. It was agreed that the buyer shall
make partial payments from time to time and pay the balance when Sps. Delgado are ready to execute the
deed of sale and transfer the title to her.
• At the time of sale, the buyer was already occupying a portion of the property while the rest was occupied
by tenants which Sps. Delgado undertook to clear prior to full payment. After paying the total sum of
P147,000.00 and being then ready to pay the balance, the buyer demanded the execution of the deed, which
was refused.
• Eventually, the buyer learned of the sale of the property to the Dys and its subsequent mortgage to petitioner
Philippine Banking Corporation (Philbank), prompting the filing of the Complaint for annulment of
certificate of title, specific performance and/or reconveyance with damages against Sps. Delgado, the Dys
and Philbank.
• Sps. Delgado claimed that there was no perfected sale because the latter was not willing to pay their asking
price of P17.00/sq.m. They also interposed a cross-claim against the Dys averring that the deeds of absolute
sale in their favor were fictitious and merely intended to enable the Dys to to use the said properties as
collateral for their loan application with Philbank and thereafter, pay the true consideration of P17.00/sq.m.
However, after receiving the loan proceeds, the Dys reneged on their agreement, prompting Sps. Delgado
to cause the annotation of an adverse claim on the Dys' titles and to inform Philbank of the simulation of
the sale.
• RTC dismissed the cross-claims of Sps. Delgado against the Dys and Philbank.
• The CA set aside the RTC's decision and ordered the cancellation of the Dys' certificates of title and the
reinstatement of Cipriana's title. It ruled that there were no perfected contracts of sale between Sps. Delgado
and the Dys in view of the latter's admission that the deeds of sale were purposely executed to facilitate the
latter's loan application with Philbank and that the prices indicated therein were not the true
consideration. Being merely simulated, the contracts of sale were, thus, null and void, rendering the
subsequent mortgage of the lots likewise void.
• The CA also declared Philbank not to be a mortgagee in good faith for its failure to ascertain how the Dys
acquired the properties and to exercise greater care when it conducted an ocular inspection thereof. It
thereby canceled the mortgage over the two lots.
• In the present petition, Philbank insists that it is a mortgagee in good faith. It further contends that Sps.
Delgado are estopped from denying the validity of the mortgage constituted over the two lots since they
participated in inducing Philbank to grant a loan to the Dys.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in declaring Philbank not a mortgagee in good faith - YES
a. Court takes note of the fact that the CA Decision nullifying the questioned contracts of sale between Sps.
Delgado and the Dys had become final and executory. Accordingly, the Petition-in-Intervention filed by
Arturo Dy, which seeks to maintain the subject contracts' validity, can no longer be entertained.
b. Philbank's mortgage rights over the subject properties shall be maintained. While it is settled that a
simulated deed of sale is null and void and therefore, does not convey any right that could ripen into a valid
title, it has been equally ruled that, for reasons of public policy, the subsequent nullification of title to a
property is not a ground to annul the contractual right which may have been derived by a purchaser,
mortgagee or other transferee who acted in good faith.
c. It bears noting that the doctrine of “mortgagee in good faith” is based on the rule that all persons dealing
with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the
face of the title.
d. In the case of banks and other financial institutions, however, greater care and due diligence are required
since they are imbued with public interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before
approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular
Page 46 of 167
inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the
real owner(s) thereof.
e. In this case, while Philbank failed to exercise greater care in conducting the ocular inspection of the
properties offered for mortgage, its omission did not prejudice any innocent third parties. In particular, the
buyer did not pursue her cause and abandoned her claim on the property. On the other hand, Sps. Delgado
were parties to the simulated sale in favor of the Dys which was intended to mislead Philbank into granting
the loan application. Thus, no amount of diligence in the conduct of the ocular inspection could have led
to the discovery of the complicity between the ostensible mortgagors (the Dys) and the true owners (Sps.
Delgado). In fine, Philbank can hardly be deemed negligent under the premises since the ultimate cause of
the mortgagors' (the Dys') defective title was the simulated sale to which Sps. Delgado were privies.
f. A finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the attendant circumstances of a
particular case. Thus, without diminishing the time-honored principle that nothing short of extraordinary
diligence is required of banks whose business is impressed with public interest, Philbank's inconsequential
oversight should not and cannot serve as a bastion for fraud and deceit.
g. The Dys' and Sps. Delgado's deliberate simulation of the sale intended to obtain loan proceeds from and to
prejudice Philbank clearly constitutes fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps. Delgado cannot now be allowed
to deny the validity of the mortgage executed by the Dys in favor of Philbank as to hold otherwise would
effectively sanction their blatant bad faith to Philbank's detriment.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the assailed January 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51672 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION upholding the mortgage rights of petitioner Philippine
Banking Corporation over the subject properties. SO ORDERED.
Page 47 of 167
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO v. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO

Persons | Feb. 15, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Rachel and Jose met in 1983 when they were 15 and 17 years old. In 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to
work as a domestic worker and supported Jose’s college education. In 1989, they decided to get married.
They were blessed with a son in 1993 and in 1995, they decided to renew their vows.
• In 1998, Rachel returned to Hongkong, and worked there ever since, returning home only once a year. She
was able to acquire a house and lot in Nueva Ecija.
• In Sept. 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC alleging that Jose
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
o Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as
husband and father.
o That Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before their church
wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he
hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's
parents' house where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle
of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which
he refused to perform.
o Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital
affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly.
o Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly
drifted apart.
o Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only
later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.
o Rachel also presented the testimonies of her son, her sisters. She also presented a psychology report of
Dr. Tayag which summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and
proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become
deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be
a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form
of intervention."
• Jose denied all the allegations.
• RTC declared the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Jose appealed to the CA which
reversed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity. - NO
a. Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code should
refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental - not
merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. In other words, it must be a
malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
b. In Santos v. CA, the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must
be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
c. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
d. Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted
in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity.
Page 48 of 167
e. The Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from sufficiently clear to
conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception.
Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and
how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital obligations.
f. The Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that
automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically
identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his
adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.
g. Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was
already existing at the inception of the marriage. Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's
side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid
and stringent standards.
h. Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 49 of 167
REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA v. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON

FACTS:
• Julian and Isabel Meliton, and respondents are registered owners of a 227,270-square meter parcel of land
in Naga covered by TCT No. 8027. During his lifetime, Julian sold portions of the subject land to various
persons, among others, to petitioner Remedios V. Geñorga's (petitioner) husband, who took possession
and introduced improvements on the portions respectively sold to them.
• However, Julian failed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 to enable the buyers,
including petitioner's husband, to register their respective deeds of sale, which eventually led to the filing of
a Petition for the surrender of the owner's duplicate of the TCT and the issuance of new titles pursuant to
PD1529.
• RTC of Naga ordered the administratrix of the estate of Julian or any person holding the owner's duplicate
of TCT No. 8027 to surrender possession thereof to the RD-Naga. It further held that should the holder
fail or refuse to comply with the court's directive: (a) TCT No. 8027 shall be declared null and void; and (b)
the RD-Naga shall issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof, enter the deeds of sale, and issue certificates
of title in favor of the buyers.
• Said decision became final and executory but remained unexecuted. Thus, RTC declared TCT No. 8027 as
null and void, resulting in the issuance of a new one, bearing annotations of the buyers' adverse claims. The
new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 (subject owner's duplicate title) was given to petitioner in
2009.
• In Apr. 2013, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner seeking the surrender of the subject owner's
duplicate title with damages.
• RTC granted respondents' petition, and ordered petitioner and/or the RD-Naga to deliver or surrender
possession of the subject owner's duplicate title to respondents.
• CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It noted the long length of time that had lapsed for the annotation of the
buyers' deeds of sale and the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title, and found no valid and
plausible reason to further withhold custody and possession of the subject owner's duplicate title from
respondents.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed the court a quo's Decision directing the surrender and delivery of
possession of the subject owner's duplicate title to respondents. - YES
a. A perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land were
eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon.
b. There is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers
to the segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their names
upon compliance with the requirements of law.
c. Section 58* of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides the procedure for the registration of deeds
or conveyances, and the issuance of new certificates of titles involving only certain portions of a registered
land. In this relation, Sec. 53 requires the presentation of the owner's duplicate title for the annotation of
deeds of sale.
d. Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the subject owner's duplicate title in 2009, a
considerable amount of time had passed until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13,
2013. But even up to the time she filed the instant petition before the Court on May 6, 2016, she failed to
show any sufficient justification for the continued failure of the concerned buyers to comply with the
requirements for the registration of their respective deeds of sale and the issuance of certificates of title in
their names to warrant a preferential right to the possession of the subject owner's duplicate title as against
respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion of the subject land.
e. Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds is only ministerial in nature. Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the
subject owner's duplicate title longer than what is reasonable to perform its duty. In the absence of a verified
and approved subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration on TCT No. 8027,
Page 50 of 167
it must return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better
right to the possession of the said owner's duplicate title as against respondents.
f. It must, however, be clarified that the above-pronounced delivery or surrender is without prejudice to the
rights of the concerned buyers who would be able to subsequently complete the necessary registration
requirements and thereupon, duly request the surrender of the subject owner's duplicate title anew to the
RD-Naga.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 7, 2015 and the Resolution dated
April 12, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103591 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Remedios V.
Geñorga or the Register of Deeds of Naga City is hereby DIRECTED to deliver or surrender the owner's duplicate
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8027 to respondents Heirs of Julian Meliton, through their attorney-in-fact,
Roberto Meliton, within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Register of Deeds of Naga City. SO ORDERED.
*Section 58. Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion of Land. - If a deed or conveyance is for a part only of the land
described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate to the grantee until a
plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the corresponding
technical descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. Meanwhile,
such deed may only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the grantor's certificate of title, original
and duplicate, said memorandum to serve as a notice to third persons of the fact that certain unsegregated
portion of the land described therein has been conveyed, and every certificate with such memorandum
shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee's title to the portion conveyed to him, pending the
actual issuance of the corresponding certificate in his name.
Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original of the plan, together with a certified copy of
the technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding certificate of
title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at
the same time cancel the grantor's certificate partially with respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the grantor
so desires, his certificate may be cancelled totally and a new one issued to him describing therein the remaining
portion: Provided, however, that pending approval of said plan, no further registration or annotation of any
subsequent deed or other voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion conveyed shall be
effected by the Register of Deeds, except where such unsegregated portion was purchased from the Government
or any of its instrumentalities. If the land has been subdivided into several lots, designated by numbers or letters, the
Register of Deeds may, if desired by the grantor, instead of cancelling the latter's certificate and issuing a new one to
the same for the remaining unconveyed lots, enter on said certificate and on its owner's duplicate a memorandum
of such deed of conveyance and of the issuance of the transfer certificate to the grantee for the lot or lots thus
conveyed, and that the grantor's certificate is canceled as to such lot or lots.
Page 51 of 167
RENEE B. TANCHULING v. SOTERO C. CANTELA

Obligations | Nov. 10, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner Sps. Tanchuling and Respondent Cantela executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering 2 parcels
of land in Legazpi City. On the face of the subject deed, P400K appears as the consideration for Cantela's
purported purchase of the properties.
• Sometime after the subject deed's execution, Vicente delivered the owner's copies of the aforementioned
TCTs to Cantela, although it is undisputed that none of the parties are in actual physical possession of the
properties.
• When Sps. Tanchuling tried to recover the TCTs from Cantela, the latter refused despite the former's
earnest demands, prompting them to file a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Delivery of
Owner’s Copy of the TCT with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction before the RTC, alleging
that the subject deed was absolutely simulated, hence, null and void given that (a) there was no actual
consideration paid by Cantela to them; (b) the subject deed was executed to merely show to their neighbors
that they are the true owners of the properties, considering that there are portions thereof being illegally
sold by a certain John Mercado to unsuspecting and ignorant buyers; and (c) Cantela simultaneously
executed an undated Deed of Absolute Sale (undated deed) reconveying the properties in their favor.
• RTC granted the complaint. CA reversed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the subject deed is simulated, hence, null and void. - YES
a. Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want the contract they have executed to produce the
legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation or vices of declaration may be either absolute or relative.
• CC, Art. 1345 -Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter when the parties conceal their true agreement.
• CC, Art. 1346 -An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does
not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their agreement.
b. The subject deed was absolutely simulated. The parties never intended to be bound by any sale agreement.
Instead, the subject deed was executed merely as a front to show the public that Sps. Tanchuling were the
owners of the properties in order to deter the group of John Mercado from illegally selling the same.
• Although the subject deed between Sps. Tanchuling and Cantela stipulated a consideration of
P400,000.00, there was actually no exchange of money between them, as revealed and corroborated by
the testimonies during the trial
• Cantela's persisting failure to secure a title in his name likewise indicates simulation. While Cantela
attributes the delay in the registration of titles of the properties under his name to the fact that Sps.
Tanchuling had posted the properties as a bond in another case, records do not sufficiently indicate the
subsequent steps taken by him to release the properties from this impediment, which altogether negates
the interest exhibited by a conscientious buyer of real estate.
• Cantela failed to take possession of the properties, which, according to the case of Cruz, is a clear
indication of simulation.
• the undated deed, which serves as a counter-agreement to, and which was simultaneously executed
with, the subject deed, unmistakably evinces absolute simulation. While Cantela posits that he was
tricked into signing the undated deed as it was supposedly surreptitiously inserted by Sps. Tanchuling
into the copies of the subject deed at the time of their signing, nothing, aside from his self-serving
assertions, support his account. It is well-settled that fraud is never presumed but must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence by the same party who alleges it.
c. The Court thus concludes that Sps. Tanchuling never intended to transfer the properties to Cantela; hence,
the subject deed was absolutely simulated and in consequence, null and void.
Page 52 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 95196 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 23, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5 in Civil Case No. 10659 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Page 53 of 167
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. REGHIS M. ROMERO II

Persons | Feb. 24, 2016 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Reghis and Olivia were married in 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed
with 2 children. The two met when he helped her family when they stranded in Kennon Road. From then
on, Reghis developed a closeness with Olivia’s family. Reghis was still a student at the time, but Olivia’s
parents kept trying to convince them to get married. Since Olivia’s parents were nothing but kind to him,
he agreed.
• They experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis
was resentful because he felt like he was dragged into the relationship. This became worse when he became
engrossed in his career. The couple eventually parted ways in 1986.
• In 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in RTC of Quezon City, citing his
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. He claims that he was not prepared
to comply with marriage at the onset, as his mind was geared towards finishing studies and finding
employment to support his family. He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with a certain Mr. Garcia.
• He presented a Psychological Evaluation Report from Dr. Basilio who testified that Reghis suffered from
OCPD. According to the report, his disorder gave him a strong obsession with the endeavors that he
chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities. Dr. Basilio surmised that this was the
root of the couple’s disagreements. Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind,
and such felt cheated into marriage.
• Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential requisites for marriage.
She added that petition is barred by res judicata, as Reghis had already filed a case for nullity, but on that
ground that it was Olivia who was incapacitated.
• RTC: Granted the petition, declared marriage void ab initio based on findings of Dr. Basilio. CA: Affirmed
findings of RTC. In line with Art. 36, as it is permanent in nature and incurable.
• Republic opposed as it believed that Reghis has not established that incapacity is grave, juridical
antecedence, and incurability and that the psychological report had no factual basis. According to the
evidence, Reghis was able to perform his marital obligations as he lived together with Olivia for years.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

W/N the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
YES
a. The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been
held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
b. To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. There must be a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage
c. The Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. Reghis' testimony shows that he was able
to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious
psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in
Paranaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated
that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of
Page 54 of 167
love, but out of reverence for the latter's parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated
in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
d. Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence.
Dr. Basilio's medical report did not establish that Reghis' incapacity existed long before he entered into
marriage. Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept of OCPD, its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure,
and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a
necessary inference that Reghis' condition had no definite treatment or is incurable.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution
dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, as amended, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Page 55 of 167
REPUBLIC v. HOMER AND MA. SUSANA DAGONDON

Property | Apr. 19, 2016| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Respondents, as attorneys-in-fact of Jover Dagondon, filed a petition before the RTC for the reconstitution
of the OCT of a 5,185sqm parcel of land in Camiguin.
• Respondents alleged that: (a) Jover is the registered owner of Lot 84, having purchased the same from a
certain Lourdes Borromeo Cordero, and consequently, registered it under his name for taxation purposes;
(b) they obtained two separate certifications from the LRA one stating that Decree No. 466085 was issued
in relation to Lot 84, and the other stating that it did not have a copy of Decree No. 466085 on file, and
that the same was presumed lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war; (c) they secured
another certification, this time from the Register of Deeds (RD) of Mambajao, Camiguin, declaring that the
subject property had no existing OCT and that it was probably destroyed or dilapidated during the eruption
of Hiboc-Hiboc Volcano or WWII; and (d) they were filing the petition for reconstitution on the basis of
Decree No. 466085.
• Petitioner Republic prayed for the dismissal of the petition for insufficiency in form and substance,
considering that respondents, among others, failed to establish the existence of the very Torrens Title which
they sought to reconstitute.
• In a decision dated Jul. 23, 2010, the RTC granted the petition for reconstitution. In ruling for respondents,
the RTC ratiocinated that neither the government nor any interested party would be prejudiced if it resolved
to grant the petition.
• Asserting that it was notified of the adverse ruling on August 6, 2010, petitioner moved for reconsideration
on August 23, 2010. The RTC denied the said motion for having been filed out of time.
• CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and held that the RTC Decision had already attained finality due to
petitioner's failure to move for its reconsideration within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period provided
by law.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the RTC Decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments – NO
a. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
b. The mandatory character of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not designed to be an
inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to
practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice.
c. Departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would circumvent and undermine
the stability of the Torrens System of land registration adopted in this jurisdiction. The Court deems it
apt to exercise its prerogative to suspend procedural rules and to resolve the present controversy
according to its merits.
2. WON the RTC correctly ordered the reconstitution of the OCT of Lot 84. - NO
a. RA 26 governs the process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be
done. It presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been
brought under the provisions of the Torrens System
b. In the case at bar, respondents miserably failed to adduce clear and convincing proof that an OCT
covering Lot 84 had previously been issued by virtue of Decree No. 466085. Accordingly, there is no
title pertaining to Lot 84 which could be "reconstituted," re-issued, or restored.
c. Even assuming that RA 26 applies, respondents could not predicate their petition for reconstitution on
the basis of Decree No. 466085 alone because as mentioned by petitioner, a copy of the same was not
even presented as evidence before the trial court; hence, its contents remain unknown. Neither could
the certification issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 466085 was issued to Lot 84 be given any
probative weight, considering that an ambiguous LRA certification without describing the nature of
Page 56 of 167
the decree and the claimant in such case, practically means nothing and could not be considered as a
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting a lost or destroyed certificate of title.
d. It must be stressed that this decision does not operate to completely divest respondents of their interest,
if any, in Lot 84. Rather, it simply underscored the wrong procedural remedy availed of.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 02428 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for
Reconstitution filed by respondents Homer and Ma. Susana Dagondon before the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28, and docketed as Misc. Case No. 80, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
Page 57 of 167
REPUBLIC v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA

Persons | Feb. 12, 2014| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Rodolfo and Natividad were married in 1969 and had 2 children. In 1998, Rodolfo filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations.
• Since the public prosecutor found no collusion, trial ensued. Rodolfo testified that he was forced to marry
Natividad merely 3 months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. At that time, he was
only 21 and she was only 18.
o When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their
house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez and bore him a child. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage in 1991 with another man and has since lived in Cagayan de Oro City.
o From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of their daughters and
he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
• Natividad failed to file her answer and to appear during trial. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she
submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Zalsos in response to Rodolfo’s claims.
• Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.
• In her psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from utter
emotional immaturity. As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of
being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a
husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only
manifested after.
• The OSG filed an opposition to the complaint contending that the acts committed by Natividad are mere
grounds for legal separation.
• RTC declared the marriage void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity. - YES
a. “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
b. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
c. In Santos v. CA, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved).
d. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
incapacity.
e. The RTC and CA heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however,
explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Page 58 of 167
f. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr.
Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at
the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation
to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report.
Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by
any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving.
g. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated
February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 59 of 167
SPOUSES VERGARA v. SPOUSES SONKIN

Defenses | June 15, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners Spouses Fernando Vergara & Herminia Vergara and Respondents Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin
& Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin are adjoining landowners in Bulacan.
• Property owned by Spouses Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by
Spouses Vergara (Vergara Property).
• When Spouses Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property in 1999, they raised the height of the partition wall and
caused the construction of their house thereon.
• In 2001, Spouses Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by filling it with gravel, earth,
and soil, thereby making the level of Vergara Property even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a
third of a meter.
• Spouses Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their
bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, and demanded that Spouses Vergara
build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon.
• Spouses Sonkin filed a complaint for damages, presenting the testimony of Engineer Victoria Mendoza who
declared that in view of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being lower in elevation than that of
the Vergara Property, Spouses Vergara were then duty bound to provide a retaining wall because they were
the ones who caused the landfill.
• Spouses Vergara’s Defense: Spouses Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall made the same susceptible to
breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to Spouses Vergara; and that when they levelled their own
property by filling it with gravel and soil, they left a distance of 1 meter from the partition wall such that the
edge of the landfill did not breach it, asserting further that there was no valid and legal reason why they
should be enjoined from exercising their proprietary rights.
• RTC found Spouses Vergara civilly liable to Spouses Sonkin.
• CA reversed, holding that although the cause of the water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act of
Spouses Vergara in elevating their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, Spouses Sonkin were
likewise guilty of contributory negligence in building their house directly abutting the perimeter wall. Thus,
the award of moral damages was deleted.
ISSUE & RATIO:

WON Spouses Sonkin are guilty of contributory negligence, thereby justifying the deletion of the award of
moral damages - YES
a. The Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 NCC. In this light, Spouses Sonkin should have been
aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize
the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and constructed
their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the National
Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof.
b. Spouses Sonkin are guilty of contributory negligence and must therefore equally bear their own loss: While the
proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Spouses Sonkin was the act of Spouses Vergara in
dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon,
as well as water seepage, Spouses Sonkin are nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing
to observe the two-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal
easement constituted over their property.
c. Contributory negligence, defined: It is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.
d. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must therefore be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
RULING: Decision of CA, affirmed.
Page 60 of 167
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
NCC
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
Art. 637 - Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
National Building Code

Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not more tan ninety percent of a corner lot
and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the property line.
Page 61 of 167
SPS. BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL v. BOY SCOUT

OF PHILIPPINES (BSP)
Jan. 14, 2013| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Sps. Mamaril are jeepney operators who park their 6 jeepneys in the BSP Compound for P300/month for
each unit. On May 26, 1995, all the jeeps were parked in the compound, but the next day, one of the vehicles
went missing.
• According to 2 security guards of AIB Security Agency (AIB), with whom BSP had a contract, a male person
who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound.
• Petitioners then filed a complaint against BSP, AIB and the security guards. Sps. Mamaril averred that the
loss of the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the security guards who allowed the vehicle to
be driven out by a stranger despite their agreement that only authorized drivers could do so. They prayed
that the guards, together with AIB and BSP, be held liable for the lost vehicle, plus damages.
• BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to
the manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself expressly stated
that the “Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left
therein.” It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from
not being parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP’s properties, its officers, and
employees.
• AIB alleged that it has observed due diligence in the selection, training and supervision of its security guards,
thus, they contended that Sps. Mamaril have no cause of action against them.
• RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, finding BSP, AIB and the security guards liable. CA affirmed the finding
of negligence on the part of security guards but it absolved BSP from any liability.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON BSP should be held liable for the loss of their vehicle based on the Guard Service Contract and the
parking ticket it issued – NO
a. It is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril’s vehicle was the negligent act of
security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
Moreover, the guards failed to refute Sps. Mamaril’s contention that they readily admitted being at fault
during the investigation that ensued.
• Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
b. The records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP.
c. Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case.
The guards were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract.No
employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards. The guards’ negligence
cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, their true employer.
d. Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards as to make
the former liable for the latter’s complained act. Records show that BSP merely hired the services of AIB,
which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere
can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an agent of BSP. What the
parties intended was a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB rendered its
security services to BSP.
e. In order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation
pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in
favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting
parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person – the favor is not merely incidental; (4)
The favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance
of the favor before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized,
by the third party. However, none of the elements obtains in this case.
Page 62 of 167
f. It is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject
agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Sps. Mamaril did not convey any
acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights
or favor under the said agreement.
g. The Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein was one of lease.
It has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car in any available space in the lot,
locks the car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car, necessary elements in
bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual relationship between the parties is
one of lease.
• On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that “the lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver
the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) to make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use
to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to maintain the lessee
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.” In relation
thereto, Article 1664 of the same Code states that “the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of
trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct
action against the intruder.” Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a
suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence,
it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
• The exculpatory clause in the parking ticket is not void for being a contract of adhesion. These are not
void per se, if the terms thereof are accepted without objection, as in this case, where plaintiffs-
appellants have been leasing BSP’s parking space for more or less 20 years, then the contract serves as
the law between them.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.The May 31, 2007 Decision
and August 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75978 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
Page 63 of 167
SPS. JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH v.

JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN
Aug. 17, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Respondent acquired a parcel of land through her aunt, Abid, through a Waiver of Rights. However,
unknown to respondent, Abid also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Alvarez, covering the same parcel
of land.
• After learning that the description of the property he bought under the Deed of Sale was erroneous, Alvarez
executed a handwritten letter stating that the subject lot belonged to respondent.
• In 2005, respondent learned that petitioners were occupying the subject lot she acquired from Abid and
built structures thereon without respondent's consent.
• Despite demands, petitioners refused to vacate the premises.
• After barangay proceedings failed, respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners before
the MCTC.
• Petitioners maintained that the land they were occupying is different from respondent's land, it is covered
by Tax Declaration 0052 while respodent’s is covered by Tax Declaration 0056.
• MCTC dismissed the complaint and upheld petitioner’s possession.
• RTC reversed and ordered petitioners to vacate subject lot. It observed that the identity of the property
petitioners were actually occupying was not clear and concluded that petitioners acted in bad faith.
• CA affirmed the RTCs findings insofar as it held that respondent was the prior possessor of the subject lot,
but remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the proper amount of monthly rentals payable
to respondent.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in holding that respondent was in prior possession of the subject lot. - NO
a. The present controversy involves two (2) properties which are separate and distinct from each other. The
first property is the 5.78-hectare lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056, while the second is the eight (8)-
hectare parcel of land under Tax Declaration No. 0052.
b. The subject lot was not the property sold to petitioners by Alvarez, but was the one which respondent
acquired from Abid in September 1995 by virtue of a Waiver of Rights.
c. With the true identity of the subject lot having been established, it must nonetheless be determined whether
or not respondent had prior de facto possession over the same, considering that this case stemmed from a
forcible entry complaint.
d. It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.
The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to
such issue. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises
until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.
e. Respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot. Records disclose that
respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in September 1995.
She even paid the lot's realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey authority thereon.
f. The law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be
said that he is in possession thereof.
g. Petitioners themselves claim that they began occupying the subject lot only in August 2005, after Alvarez
executed the corresponding Deed of Sale in their favor. Hence, in light of the foregoing, there is no doubt
that respondent had prior de facto possession.
h. Neither can petitioner’s possession be tacked onto that of Alvarez. Tacking of possession only applies to
possession de jure, or that possession which has for its purpose the claim of ownership. Possession de jure is
irrelevant because the only question in forcible entry - as it is here - is prior physical possession or possession
de facto.
i. Alvarez's possession is irrelevant, considering that petitioners' alleged possession over the subject lot cannot
be tacked onto that of Alvarez in suits for forcible entry.
Page 64 of 167
j. With regard to the rent due respondent, since petitioners disturbed respondent's possession of the subject
lot, rent is due respondent from the time petitioners intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears
of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. However, since the RTC
indeed failed to cite any document showing the assessment of the subject lot, any increase in the realty taxes,
and the prevailing rental rate in the area, the CA correctly remanded this aspect to the RTC for proper
determination.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2015 and the Resolution
dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133552 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 65 of 167
TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA v. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS

Civil Law | June 28, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner Zaragoza bought a parcel of land from his parents and had the same registered under his name.
He claims that unknown to him, his father leased a portion of the lot to respondent for 8 years and
renewable for another 8 years.
• Zaragoza allowed the lease to subsist and respondent had been diligent in paying its monthly rent amounting
to P10,000.00 per month.
• Zaragoza claims that when his father died, respondent stopped paying rent. On the other hand, respondent
maintained that it was willing to pay rent, but was uncertain as to whom payment should be made as it
received separate demands from Florentino's heirs, including petitioner. Thus, respondent filed an
interpleader case before the RTC where it eventually dismissed the petition and stated that Iloilo may avail
the remedy of consignation.
• This notwithstanding, petitioner sent a letter stating that granting without conceding the propriety of
consignation, the same did not extinguish the latter's obligation to pay rent because the amount consigned
was insufficient to cover the unpaid rentals plus interests from February 2007 to May 2011 in the amount
of P752,878.72. In this regard, petitioner demanded that respondent pay said amount and at the same time,
vacate the subject land within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter.
• As his demands went unheeded, petitioner filed a suit for unlawful detainer against respondent before the
MTC.
• Pending the unlawful detainer suit, respondent sent petitioner a letter expressing its intention to renew the
lease contract. Zaragoza rejected this.
• MTCC ruled in petitioner’s favor. RTC reversed. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly ruled that petitioner could not eject respondent from the subject land as the latter
fully complied with its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation. - NO
a. For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the defendant-
lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second, such possession
eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the provisions of the said lease contract or
the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in possession of the leased premises, thus,
effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay
or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within one (1) year from the last demand.
b. In this case, the first, third, and fourth requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering that at
the time the suit was instituted on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract between petitioner
and respondent; (b) respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and (c) the case was filed within
one (1) year from petitioner's letter dated May 24, 2011 demanding that respondent pay monthly rentals and
at the same time, vacate the subject land. Thus, the crux of the controversy is whether or not the second
requisite has been satisfied, that is, whether or not respondent violated the terms and conditions of the lease
contract, specifically with regard to the payment of monthly rentals.
c. A closer reading of the letter-reply and Manifestation and Notice reveals that the amount consigned with
RTC-Br. 24 represents monthly rentals only for the period of February 2007 to March 2011, which is two
(2) whole months short of what was being demanded by petitioner. In fact, petitioner pointed out such fact
in his letter dated June 9, 2011 to respondent, but the latter still refused to make any additional payments,
by either making further consignations with RTC-Br. 24 or directly paying petitioner.
d. Even assuming arguendo that respondent's consignation of its monthly rentals with RTC-Br. 24 was made in
accordance with law, it still failed to comply with its obligation under the lease contract to pay monthly
rentals. It is apparent that at the time petitioner filed the unlawful detainer suit on June 21, 2011, respondent
was not updated in its monthly rental payments, as there is no evidence of such payment for the months of
April, May, and even June 2011. Irrefragably, said omission constitutes a violation of the lease contract on
the part of respondent.
e. Considering that all the requisites of a suit for unlawful detainer have been complied with, petitioner is
justified in ejecting respondent from the subject land.
Page 66 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 22, 2015 and the Resolution dated
April 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 07839 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated December 29, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, Branch 10 in
Civil Case No. 32-11 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the rental arrearages due to petitioner
Teodorico A. Zaragoza shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on
May 24, 2011 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction. The other
amounts awarded in favor of petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza, such as the P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, P50,000.00
as litigation expenses, and the costs of suit shall also earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality
of the decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Page 67 of 167
UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF

PHILIPPINES
Jan. 20, 2014| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Foodmasters Inc. (FI) had outstanding loan obligations to both Union Bank’s predecessor-in-interest,
Bancom Development Corporation (Bancom), and to DBP.
• FI and DBP entered into a dacion en pago whereby the former ceded in favor of the latter certain properties,
including a processing plant, in consideration of the following: (a) the full satisfaction of FI’s loan
obligations to DBP; and (b) the direct assumption by DBP of FI’s obligations to Bancom in the amount of
P17,000,000.00.
• On the same day, DBP, as the new owner of the processing plant, leased back, for 20 years, the said property
to FI. In turn, FI is obliged to pay monthly rentals to be shared by DBP and Bancom.
• DBP also entered into a separate agreement with Bancom whereby the former: (a) confirmed its assumption
of FI’s obligations to Bancom; and (b) undertook to remit up to 30% of any and all rentals due from FI to Bancom
(subject rentals) which would serve as payment of the assumed obligations, to be paid in monthly installments.
• Meanwhile, FI assigned its leasehold rights under the Lease Agreement to Foodmasters Worldwide (FW),
while Bancom conveyed all its receivables, including, among others, DBP’s assumed obligations, to Union
Bank.
• Claiming that the subject rentals have not been duly remitted despite its repeated demands, Union Bank
filed a collection case against DBP. DBP countered, among others, that the obligations it assumed were
payable only out of the rental payments made by FI. Thus, since FI had yet to pay the same, DBP’s
obligation to Union Bank had not arisen.
• The RTC found the complaint meritorious and ordered DBP to pay Unionbank the subject rentals. The
CA set aside the RTC’s ruling and ordered FW to pay DBP the rentals, after which, DBP shall remit 30%
thereof to Unionbank. CA ruled that DBP did not default in its obligations to remit the subject rentals to
Union Bank precisely because it had yet to receive the rental payments of FW. This case then went up to
the Supreme Court where it upheld the CA ruling. On Aug. 2, 2000, the Court’s resolution became final
and executory.
• Unionbank filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC, praying that DBP be directed to pay the subject
rentals in the amount of P9.7M. DBP also filed its own Motion for Execution against FW.
• In a Consolidated Order dated Oct. 15, 2001, the RTC granted both motions for execution. As a result, a
Writ of Garnishment against DBP was issued. Records, however, do not show that the same writ was
implemented against FW. DBP filed an MR but was denied. CA dismissed DBP’s petition for review. But
in a Supreme Court decision dated Jan. 13, 2004, the Court granted DBP’s appeal and thereafter, DBP
moved for the execution of the said decision before the RTC. After numerous efforts on the part of Union
Bank proved futile, the RTC issued a writ of execution, dated Sept. 6, 2005, ordering Union Bank to return
to DBP all funds it received pursuant to the October 15, 2001 Writ of Execution.
• Union Bank then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Affirm Legal Compensation praying that the RTC
apply legal compensation between itself and DBP in order to offset the return of the funds it previously
received from DBP. RTC denied the Motion. CA dismissed Unionbank’s petition for review.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly upheld the denial of Union Bank’s motion to affirm legal compensation. - YES
a. Compensation is defined as a mode of extinguishing obligations whereby two persons in their capacity as
principals are mutual debtors and creditors of each other with respect to equally liquidated and demandable
obligations to which no retention or controversy has been timely commenced and communicated by third
parties.
b. The requisites therefor are provided under Article 1279* of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the rule on legal
compensation is stated in Article 1290 of the Civil Code which provides that “[w]hen all the requisites
mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes
both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the
compensation.”
Page 68 of 167
c. Union Bank filed a motion to seek affirmation that legal compensation had taken place in order to effectively
offset (a) its own obligation to return the funds it previously received from DBP as directed under the
September 6, 2005 Writ of Execution with (b) DBP’s assumed obligations under the Assumption
Agreement. However, legal compensation could not have taken place between these debts for the apparent
reason that requisites 3 and 4 under Article 1279 of the Civil Code are not present.
d. Since, in the Jan. 13, 2004 ruling, DBP’s assumed obligations to Union Bank for remittance of the lease
payments is contingent on the prior payment thereof by FW to DBP, it cannot be said that both debts are
due (requisite 3 of Article 1279).
e. Also, in the same ruling, the Court observed that any deficiency that DBP had to make up for the full
satisfaction of the assumed obligations “cannot be determined until after the satisfaction of Foodmasters’
obligation to DBP.” In this regard, it cannot be concluded that the same debt had already been liquidated,
and thereby became demandable.
f. The aforementioned Court decision had already attained finality on April 30, 2004 and, hence, pursuant to
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the facts and issues actually and directly resolved therein may
not be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different cause
of action.
g. In fine, since requisites 3 and 4 of Article 1279 of the Civil Code have not concurred in this case, no legal
compensation could have taken place between the above-stated debts pursuant to Article 1290 of the Civil
Code. Perforce, the petition must be denied, and the denial of Union Bank’s motion to affirm legal
compensation sustained.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 3, 2009 and Resolution dated
February 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93833 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
*Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: (1)That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of
money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has
been stated; (3) That the two debts be due;(4) That they be liquidated and demandable; (5) That over neither of them
there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
Page 69 of 167
U.P. LAW BOC TAXATION LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
TAXATION LAW
ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS INC. (AIA) v. CIR
Nature of Case: Petition for Review
FACTS:
• On August 25, 2004, AIA received from the CIR a Formal Letter of Demand, dated July 9, 2004, containing
an assessment for deficiency value added tax (VAT) and excise tax in the amounts of P102,535,520.00 and
P4,334,715.00, respectively, or a total amount of P106,870,235.00, inclusive of penalties and interest, for
auction sales conducted on February 5, 6, 7, and 8, 2004.
• AIA claimed that it filed a protest letter dated August 29, 2004 through registered mail on August 30, 2004
and submitted additional supporting documents on September 24, 2004 and November 22, 2004.
• CIR failed to act on the protest, prompting AIA to file a petition for review before the CTA on June 20,
2005, to which the CIR filed its Answer on July 26, 2005.
• On March 8, 2006, the CIR filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing the alleged
failure of AIA to timely file its protest which thereby rendered the assessment final and executory. The CIR
denied receipt of the protest letter dated August 29, 2004 claiming that it only received the protest letter
dated September 24, 2004 on September 27, 2004, three days after the lapse of the 30-day period prescribed
in the Tax Code. CTA First Division granted the CIR’s motion to dismiss. CTA en banc affirmed.
• On January 30, 2008, AIA filed a Manifestation and Motion with Leave of the Honorable Court to Defer
or Suspend Further Proceedings on the ground that it availed of the Tax Amnesty Program under Republic
Act 9480.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the case is moot and academic pursuant to AIA’s availment of the Tax Amnestry Program under RA
9480 - YES
a. A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the
government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start
with a clean slate.
b. In 2007, RA 9480 took effect granting a tax amnesty to qualified taxpayers for all national internal revenue
taxes for the taxable year 2005 and prior years, with or without assessments duly issued therefor, that have
remained unpaid as of December 31, 2005.
c. The Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480 may be availed of by any person except those who are
disqualified under Section 8 thereof, to wit: “Section 8. Exceptions. — The tax amnesty provided in Section
5 hereof shall not extend to the following persons or cases existing as of the effectivity of this Act:
(a)Withholding agents with respect to their withholding tax liabilities;
(b) Those with pending cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government;
(c) Those with pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth or under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
(d) Those with pending cases filed in court involving violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Law;
(e) Those with pending criminal cases for tax evasion and other criminal offenses under Chapter II of
Title X of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and the felonies of frauds, illegal
exactions and transactions, and malversation of public funds and property under Chapters III and IV of
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and
(f) Tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts”
d. The CIR contention that AIA is disqualified under Section 8(a) of RA 9480 from availing itself of the Tax
Amnesty Program because it is “deemed” a withholding agent for the deficiency taxes is untenable.
• The CIR did not assess AIA as a withholding agent that failed to withhold or remit the deficiency VAT
and excise tax to the BIR under relevant provisions of the Tax Code. Hence, the argument that AIA is
“deemed” a withholding agent for these deficiency taxes is fallacious.
Page 70 of 167
e. Indirect taxes, like VAT and excise tax, are different from withholding taxes. In indirect taxes, the incidence
of taxation falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such
as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. On the
other hand, in case of withholding taxes, the incidence and burden of taxation fall on the same entity, the
statutory taxpayer. The burden of taxation is not shifted to the withholding agent who merely collects, by
withholding, the tax due from income payments to entities arising from certain transactions and remits the
same to the government. Due to this difference, the deficiency VAT and excise tax cannot be “deemed”
as withholding taxes merely because they constitute indirect taxes. Moreover, records support the
conclusion that AIA was assessed not as a withholding agent but, as the one directly liable for the said
deficiency taxes.
f. The CIR also argues that AIA, being an accredited investor/taxpayer situated at the Subic Special Economic
Zone, should have availed of the tax amnesty granted under RA 9399 and not under RA 9480. This is also
untenable. RA 9399 was passed prior to the passage of RA 9480. RA 9399 does not preclude taxpayers
within its coverage from availing of other tax amnesty programs available or enacted in futuro like RA 9480.
Moreso, RA 9480 does not exclude from its coverage taxpayers operating within special economic zones.
As long as it is within the bounds of the law, a taxpayer has the liberty to choose which tax amnesty program
it wants to avail.
g. In the absence of sufficient evidence proving that the certification of qualification was issued in excess of
authority of the BIR Revenue District Officer, the presumption that it was issued in the regular performance
of the revenue district officer’s official duty stands.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC in view of Asia
International Auctioneers, Inc.’s (AIA) availment of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480. Accordingly, the
outstanding deficiency taxes of AIA are deemed fully settled. SO ORDERED.
Page 71 of 167
BIR v. LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. (LCI)

Apr. 24, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In 2011, Lepanto filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation before the RTC of Calamba City, alleging that
it had entered into a state of insolvency considering its inability to pay its obligations as they become due
and that its total liabilities amounting to P4.2B far exceed its total assets worth P1.1B. Notably, LCI admitted
in the annexes attached to the aforesaid Petition its tax liabilities to the national government in the amount
of at least P6,355,368.00.
• In 2013, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement Order which suspended all actions or
proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the enforcement of claims against LCI; prohibited LCI from making
any payment of its liabilities outstanding as of even date, except as may be provided under RA 10142
(Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act); and directed the BIR to file and serve on LCI its comment
or opposition to the petition, or its claims against LCI.
• Despite the foregoing, Assistant Commissioner Misajon sent a letter-notice of informal conference to LCI
informing it of its deficiency internal tax liabilities for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2010. In response,
the court-appointed receiver reminded BIR of the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings and the issuance
of the Commencement Order.
• Undaunted, BIR still sent LCI a formal letter of demand requiring LCI to pay deficiency taxes in the amount
of P567,519,348.39.
• This prompted LCI to file a petition for indirect contempt against petitioners before RTC Br. 35, the
rehabilitation court. It found Misajon et. al. guilty of indirect contempt.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the RTC Br. 35 correctly found Misajon, et al. to have defied the Commencement Order and,
accordingly, cited them for indirect contempt. - YES
a. Section 4 (gg) of RA 10142 states, “Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the debtor to a condition
of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible
and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the
debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.”
b. The inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of the distressed
corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the best possible framework for the corporation
to gradually regain or achieve a sustainable operating form.
c. In order to achieve its objectives, Sec.16 of RA 10142 provides that upon the issuance of a Commencement
Order which includes a Stay or Suspension Order - all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the
enforcement of "claims" against the distressed company shall be suspended.
d. Under the same law, claim "shall refer to all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against the
debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent,
matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, including, but not limited to; (1) all claims of the
government, whether national or local, including taxes, tariffs and customs duties; and (2) claims against
directors and officers of the debtor arising from acts done in the discharge of their functions falling within
the scope of their authority: Provided, That, this inclusion does not prohibit the creditors or third parties
from filing cases against the directors and officers acting in their personal capacities."
e. Creditors of the distressed corporation are not without remedy as they may still submit their claims to the
rehabilitation court for proper consideration so that they may participate in the proceedings. Any attempts
to seek legal or other resource against the distressed corporation shall be sufficient to support a finding of
indirect contempt of court.
f. It is undisputed that LCI filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. It is likewise undisputed that the BIR
- personally and by publication - was notified of the rehabilitation proceedings involving LCI and the
issuance of the Commencement Order related thereto.
g. The acts of sending a notice of informal conference and a Formal Letter of Demand are part and parcel of
the entire process for the assessment and collection of deficiency taxes from a delinquent taxpayer - an
action or proceeding for the enforcement of a claim which should have been suspended pursuant to the
Commencement Order. Unmistakably, Misajon, et al.'s foregoing acts are in clear defiance of the
Commencement Order.
Page 72 of 167
h. Misajon et.al could have easily tolled the running of such prescriptive period, and at the same time, perform
their functions as officers of the BIR, without defying the Commencement Order and without violating the
laudable purpose of RA 10142 by simply ventilating their claim before the Rehabilitation Court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 1, 2015 and the Order dated October 26, 2015
of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Province of Laguna, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 4813-2014-C are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 73 of 167
CIR v. NIPPON EXPRESS CORPORATION

FACTS:
• Nippon is a domestic corporation engaged in the freight forwarding business. It is a Value-Added Tax
(VAT) registered entity. As such, it filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2002 on April 25, 2002, July
25, 2002, October 25, 2002, and January 27, 2003, respectively.
• It maintained that during the said period it incurred input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales in the
amount of P28,405,167.60, from which only P3,760,660.74 was applied as tax credit, thus, reflecting
refundable excess input VAT in the amount of P24,644,506.86.
• In 2004, Nippon filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in the amount of
P24,644,506.86 for the year 2002 before the BIR. A day later, it filed a judicial claim for tax refund before
the CTA.
• On Aug. 10, 2011, CTA Division partially granted Nippon's claim for tax refund, and thereby ordered the
CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in the reduced amount of P2,614,296.84, representing its unutilized input
VAT which was attributable to its zero-rated sales. It found that Nippon failed to show that the recipients
of its services - which, in this case, were mostly Philippine Economic Zone Authority registered enterprises
- were non-residents "doing business outside the Philippines." Accordingly, it concluded that Nippon's
purported sales therefrom could not qualify as zero-rated sales, hence, the reduction in the amount of tax
credit certificate claimed
• Before its receipt of the August 10, 2011 Decision, or on August 12, 2011, Nippon filed a motion to
withdraw, considering that the BIR, acting on its administrative claim, already issued a tax credit certificate
in the amount of P21,675,128.91 on July 27, 2011.
• In a Resolution dated Jul. 31, 2012, CTA Division granted Nippon's motion to withdraw and, thus,
considered the case closed and terminated. CTA En Banc affirmed the July 31, 2012 Resolution of the CTA
Division granting Nippon's motion to withdraw.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CTA properly granted Nippon's motion to withdraw. - NO
a. The Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals reveals the lack of provisions governing the procedure for
the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA,
the Rules of Court shall suppletorily apply. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states that when the case is deemed
submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee's brief may still be
allowed in the discretion of the court.
b. The August 10, 2011 Decision was rendered by the CTA Division after a full-blown hearing in which the
parties had already ventilated their claims. Thus, the findings contained therein were the results of an
exhaustive study of the pleadings and a judicious evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties, as
well as the report of the commissioned certified public accountant.
c. The CTA Division, in its August 10, 2011 Decision, had already determined that Nippon was only entitled
to refund the reduced amount of P2,614,296.84. Markedly different from this is the BIR's determination
that Nippon should receive P21,675,128.91 as per the July 27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate, which is, in all,
P19,060,832.07 larger than the amount found due by the CTA Division.
d. The massive discrepancy alone between the administrative and judicial determinations of the amount to be
refunded to Nippon should have already raised a red flag to the CTA Division.
e. The CIR is not estopped from assailing the validity of the July 27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate which was
issued by her subordinates in the BIR. In matters of taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the
mistakes, errors or omissions of its agents for upon it depends the ability of the government to serve the
people for whose benefit taxes are collected
f. Finally, the Court has observed that based on the records, Nippon's administrative claim for the first taxable
quarter of 2002 which closed on March 31, 2002 was already time-barred for being filed on April 22, 2004,
or beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period pursuant to Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997. Although prescription was not raised as an issue, it is well-settled that if the pleadings or the
evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription, the Court may motu proprio order its
dismissal on said ground.
Page 74 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2013 and the Resolution
dated June 10, 2014 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 924 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated August 10, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals Third Division in CTA Case No. 6967 is
REINSTATED, without prejudice, however, to the right of either party to appeal the same in accordance with the
Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Page 75 of 167
CARGILL PHILIPPINES v. CIR

Mar. 11, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Cargill filed its quarterly VAT returns for the second quarter of calendar year 2001 up to the third quarter
of fiscal year 2003, covering the period April 1, 2001 to February 28, 2003, which showed an overpayment
of P44,920,350.92 and, later, its quarterly VAT returns for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003 to the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005, covering the period March 1, 2003 to August 31, 2004 which reflected an
overpayment of P31,915,642.26
• Cargill maintained that said overpayments were due to its export sales of coconut oil, the proceeds of which
were paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas and, thus, are zero-rated for VAT purposes
• On June 27, 2003, Cargill filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in the amount
of P26,122,965.81 for the period of April 1, 2001 to February 28, 2003 (first refund claim). Thereafter, or
on June 30, 2003, it filed a judicial claim for refund before the CTA.
• On May 31, 2005, Cargill filed a second administrative claim for refund in the amount of P22,194,446.67
for the period of March 1, 2003 to August 31, 2004 (second refund claim) before the BIR. On even date, it
filed a petition for review before the CTA.
• In its Aug. 24, 2010 Decision, CTA Division partially granted Cargill’s claims for refund of unutilized input
VAT and thereby ordered the CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in the reduced amount of P3,053,469.99,
representing Cargill’s unutilized input VAT attributable to its VAT zero-rated export sales for the period
covering April 1, 2001 to August 31, 2004. Both parties moved for reconsideration.
• In an Amended Decision, dated April 20, 2011, the CTA Division preliminarily denied the individual
motions of both parties. Separately, however, the CTA Division superseded and consequently reversed its
August 24, 2010 Decision citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CTA En Banc correctly affirmed the CTA Division’s outright dismissal of Cargill’s claims for
refund of unutilized input VAT on the ground of prematurity. - NO
a. In the landmark case of Aichi, it was held that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and
jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. As such, its non-
observance would warrant the dismissal of the judicial claim for lack of jurisdiction. It was, withal, delineated
in Aichi that the two (2)-year prescriptive period would only apply to administrative claims, and not to
judicial claims.Accordingly, once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period,
the taxpayer-claimant must wait for the lapse of the 120-day period and, thereafter, he has a 30-day period
within which to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed
the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.
b. Nevertheless, the Court, in the case of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque), recognized an
exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period. San Roque enunciated that BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003, which expressly declared that the “taxpayer-claimant
need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of
petition for review,” provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the NIRC.
c. In the more recent case of Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, the Court reconciled the pronouncements in
Aichi and San Roque, holding that from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 which refers to the
interregnum when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued until the date of promulgation of Aichi, taxpayer-
claimants need not observe the stringent 120-day period; but before and after said window period, the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period remained in force.
d. In this case, records disclose that anent Cargill’s first refund claim, it filed its administrative claim with the
BIR on June 27, 2003, and its judicial claim before the CTA on June 30, 2003, or before the period when
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in effect, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it was
incumbent upon Cargill to wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before seeking relief with the CTA, and
considering that its judicial claim was filed only after three (3) days later, the CTA En Banc, thus, correctly
dismissed Cargill’s petition in CTA Case No. 6714for being prematurely filed.
Page 76 of 167
e. In contrast, records show that with respect to Cargill’s second refund claim, its administrative and judicial
claims were both filed on May 31, 2005, or during the period of effectivity of BIR Ruling NO. DA-489-03,
and, thus, fell within the exemption window period contemplated in San Roque, i.e., when taxpayer-
claimants need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. Verily, the
CTA En Banc erred when it outrightly dismissed CTA Case No. 7262on the ground of prematurity.
• This notwithstanding, the Court finds that Cargill’s second refund claim should not be instantly granted
because the determination of Cargill’s entitlement to such claim, if any, would necessarily involve
factual issues and, thus, are evidentiary in nature which are beyond the pale of judicial review under a
Rule 45 petition.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 18, 2012
and the Resolution dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB Case No.
779 are hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it dismissed CTA Case No. 6714. On the other hand, CTA Case No.
7262 is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the CTA Special First Division for its resolution on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Page 77 of 167
CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY v. CIR

Aug. 26, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• CE Luzon is a VAT-registered entity which filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2005 on April 25,
2005, July 25, 2005, October 25, 2005, and January 25, 2006, which reflected an overpayment of
P20,546,004.87. CE Luzon maintained that its overpayment was due to its domestic purchases of non-
capital goods and services, services rendered by non-residents, and importation of non-capital goods.
• On November 30, 2006, CE Luzon filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in
the amount of P20,546,004.87 before the BIR. On January 3, 2007, it filed a judicial claim for refund before
the CTA.
• CTA Division partially granted CE Luzon's claim for tax refund (P14M). Both parties moved for partial
reconsideration which the CTA partially granted and directed the CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in the
reduced amount of P17M.
• CTA en banc set aside the CTA Division's findings, holding that CE Luzon's premature filing of its claim
divested the CTA of jurisdiction. It noted that CE Luzon's petition was hastily and prematurely filed on
January 3, 2007, or only after the lapse of 34 days from the time it filed its administrative claim with the
BIR on November 30, 2006.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CTA En Banc correctly ordered the outright dismissal of CE Luzon's claims for tax refund of
unutilized input VAT on the ground of prematurity. - NO
a. The rule governing a taxpayer's claim for refund of unutilized input VAT is found in Section 112 of the
NIRC*
b. The Court held in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR that from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010
which refers to the interregnum when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued until the date of promulgation
of the case CIR v. Aichi, taxpayer-claimants need not observe the stringent 120-day period; but before and
after said window period, the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period remained in force
c. Records show that CE Luzon's administrative and judicial claims were filed on November 30, 2006 and
January 3, 2007, respectively, or during the period of effectivity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 and, thus,
fell within the window period stated in San Roque, i.e., when taxpayer-claimants need not wait for the
expiration of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. Verily, the CTA En Banc erred when it
outrightly dismissed CE Luzon's petition on the ground of prematurity.
d. This notwithstanding, the Court is not wont to instantly grant CE Luzon's refund claim in the amount of
P20,546,004.87 which allegedly represented unutilized input VAT for the year 2005. This is because the
determination of CE Luzon's entitlement to such claim, if any, would necessarily involve factual issues
which are beyond the pale of judicial review under a Rule 45 petition.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 4, 2011
and the Resolution dated February 22, 2012 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB Case Nos. 591 and
628 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the CTA En Banc for its resolution on the merits as
stated in this Decision. SO ORDERED.
*SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. - any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x.
xxxx
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. - In proper cases, the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsection (A) hereof.
Page 78 of 167
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred
twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
Page 79 of 167
CIR v. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY

FACTS:
• CE Luzon is a corporation engaged in the business of power generation. Being one of the generating
companies recognized by the Department of Energy – and pursuant to the provisions of RA 9136 (Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), it treated the delivery and supply of electric energy to the PNOC as
VAT zero-rated.
• On October 25, 2001, CE Luzon timely filed its VAT return for the third quarter of 2001, in which it
declared unutilized input VAT in the amount of P2,921,085.31. On January 10, 2002, April 10, 2002, May
15, 2003, May 15, 2003, and April 1, 2003, respectively, it likewise filed its VAT returns for the fourth
quarter of 2001 and all quarters of 2002 whereby it declared unutilized input VAT in the amount of
P21,229,990.80.
• On September 26, 2003, CE Luzon filed an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT for the
third quarter of 2001 before the BIR. Alleging inaction on the part of the CIR, it filed a judicial claim for
refund before the CTA on September 30, 2003.
• Thereafter, on December 18, 2003, CE Luzon likewise filed an administrative claim for refund of unutilized
input VAT for the fourth quarter of 2001 and all quarters of 2002 before the BIR. It then filed a judicial
claim for such refund before the CTA on December 19, 2003.
• The CTA Division partially granted CE Luzon’s claims for refund, ordering the CIR to refund or issue a
tax credit certificate in favor of CE Luzon in the amount of P13,926,697.51, representing the unutilized
input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales for the third and fourth quarters of 2001 and all quarters of
2002. CTA En Banc denied the CIR’s appeal, and accordingly affirmed the CTA Division’s Ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CTA En Banc correctly ruled that CE Luzon did not prematurely file its judicial claims for
refund. - NO
a. The original VAT Law allowed the refund or credit of unutilized excess input VAT. Thereafter, the
provision on refund or credit was amended several times by RA 7716, RA 8424, and RA 9337, which took
effect on July 1, 2005.
b. Since CE Luzon’s claims for refund covered periods before the effectivity of RA 9337, Section 112* of the
NIRC, as amended by RA 8424, should apply.
c. In Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, the Court reconciled the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque
cases in the following manner: during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not
observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the
CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the
observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
d. While both claims for refund were filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, CE Luzon failed to
comply with the 120-day period as it filed its judicial claim in C.T.A. Case No. 6792 four (4) days after the
filing of the administrative claim, while in C.T.A. Case No. 6837, the judicial claim was filed a day after the
filing of the administrative claim. Proceeding from the aforementioned jurisprudence, only C.T.A. Case No.
6792 should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for being prematurely filed. In contrast, CE
Luzon filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund in C.T.A. Case No. 6837 during the period, i.e.,
from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place. As such, the
aforementioned rule on equitable estoppel operates in its favor, thereby shielding it from any supposed
jurisdictional defect which would have attended the filing of its judicial claim before the expiration of the
120-day period.
e. Due to the consolidation of C.T.A. Case Nos. 6792 and 6837, the CTA Division made a cumulative
determination of the total amount of unutilized input VAT to be refunded/credited in favor of CE Luzon
in the amount of P13,926,697.51. Considering, however, the foregoing disquisition, there is a need to
ascertain the specific amounts adjudged that pertain to C.T.A. Case No. 6792 and to C.T.A. Case No. 6837,
and consequently limit CE Luzon’s entitlement to refund/tax credit of unutilized input VAT only with
reference to C.T.A. Case No. 6837. For this purpose, the Court deems it proper to remand the instant case
to the CTA.
Page 80 of 167
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 1, 2009 and
the Resolution dated November 6, 2009, of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 474 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION DENYING CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company, Inc.’s (CE
Luzon) claim for refund in C.T.A. Case No. 6792 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for being prematurely filed.
On the other hand, the instant case is REMANDED to the CTA to determine the proper amount of input Value
Added Tax refunded/tax credited in favor of CE Luzon in relation to its claim for refund in C.T.A. Case No. 6837.
SO ORDERED.
* Section 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x xx.
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred
twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Page 81 of 167
CIR v. CTA AND PETRON

Feb. 14, 2018 | Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Resolution on MR
FACTS:
• On Jun. 29, 2012, CIR issued a letter interpreting Sec. 148(e) of the NIRC opining that "alkylate, which is a
product of distillation similar to naphtha, is subject to tax."
• Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued a memo implementing the same and assessed excise tax on
Petron’s importation of alkylate.
• Petron filed a petition for review before the CTA contesting the interpretation of Sec.148(e).
• CTA gave due course to Petron’s Petition for Review. Eventually, CIR elevated the matter to the Court
through a petition for certiorari.
• In the July 15, 2015 Decision, the Court ordered the dismissal of Petron’s petition and upheld the CIR's
position that the CTA could not take cognizance of the case because the latter's jurisdiction to resolve tax
disputes excluded the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of a law, rule or regulation and that,
in any case, it was premature to elevate a customs collector's assessment without a prior protest and an
appeal to the COC.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the Court's July 15, 2015 Decision, which ordered the dismissal of Petron's petition for review before
the CTA on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, should be reconsidered. - YES
a. Petron insists that the CTA has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the CIR's interpretative ruling on
alkylate, arguing that the CTA may rule on the validity of a revenue regulation, ruling, issuance or other
matters arising under the NIRC and other tax laws administered by the BIR. Petron cites for the first time
in its motion for reconsideration the Court's ruling in The Philippine American Life and General Insurance
Company v. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Philamlife)
b. The apparent conflicting jurisprudence on the matter involving the Court's 2008 En Banc ruling in British
American Tobacco and the Court's Third Division Ruling in Philamlife has been seemingly settled in the 2016
En Banc case of Banco De Oro v. Republic of the Philippines (Banco De Oro) wherein it was opined that:
“Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals from the
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs,
Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related
problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to have exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts and omissions of the
said quasi-judicial agencies should thus be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides an exception to the
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or validity of
tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity
of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or
rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or opinions in connection
with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are
official positions of the Bureau on inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the
determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7(l) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, subject to prior review by
the Secretary of Finance, as required under Republic Act No. 8424.”
Court had also dismissed Petron's petition for review before the CTA on the ground of prematurity. Unlike
in Philamlife where the petition for review was filed before the Secretary of Finance, Petron in this case
directly elevated for review to the CTA the customs collector's computation or assessment, which is not a
proper subject of appeal.
Page 82 of 167
Nevertheless, Petron has presently manifested that it had already complied with the protest procedure
prescribed under the N1RC, and later on, filed an administrative claim for refund and/or tax credit with
the BIR on November 21, 2013. Records are bereft of any showing that the CIR had already acted on its
claim and hence, Petron filed before the CTA a Supplemental Petition for Review to include a claim for
refund and/or tax credit of the excise tax that was levied on its alkylate importation. The CTA then gave
due course to the petition and, as per Petron's manifestation, the parties have already been undergoing trial.
Consequently, considering that the CTA had taken cognizance of Petron's claim for judicial refund of tax
which, under Section 7(a)(l) of RA 1125, is within its jurisdiction, the Court finds that these supervening
circumstances have already mooted the issue of prematurity.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Respondent Petron Corporation's
petition for review docketed as CTA Case No. 8544 is hereby DECLARED to be within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals, which is DIRECTED to resolve the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
Page 83 of 167
CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE

(CASURECO III)
FACTS:
• CASURECO III is an electric cooperative organized and existing by virtue of PD 269 and registered with
National Electrification Administration. CASURECO III distributes electricity in the City of Iriga and other
municipalities in the Rinconada Area in Camarines Sur.
• In 2003, City of Iriga required CASURECO III to submit a report of its gross receipts for the period 1997-
2002 to serve as the basis for the computation of franchise taxes, fees and other charges. The latter complied
and was assessed taxes.
• On Jan. 7, 2004, petitioner made a final demand on CASURECO III to pay the franchise taxes due for the
period 1998-2003 and real property taxes due for the period 1995-2003.[8] CASURECO III, however,
refused to pay said taxes on the ground that it is an electric cooperative provisionally registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA),9 and therefore exempt from the payment of local taxes.
• Petitioner then filed a complaint for collection of local taxes before the RTC. RTC ruled that the real
property taxes due for the years 1995-1999 had already prescribed in accordance with Section 194[14] of
the LGC. However, it found CASURECO III liable for franchise taxes for the years 2000-2003 based on
its gross receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area on the ground that the “situs of taxation is the
place where the privilege is exercised.
• CA found CASURECO III to be a nonprofit entity, not falling within the purview of “businesses enjoying
a franchise” pursuant to Section 137 of the LGC and relieved CASURECO III from liability to pay franchise
taxes.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA decision attained finality because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of
time – NO
a. RA 9282 expanded the jurisdiction of the CTA to include, among others, the power to review by appeal
decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
b. CASURECO III should have filed its appeal, not with the CA, but with the CTA Division in accordance
with the applicable law and the rules of the CTA. Resort to the CA was, therefore, improper, rendering
its decision null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. A void judgment has no legal
or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place.
2. WON an electric cooperative registered under PD 269 but not under RA 6938 is liable for the
payment of local franchise taxes - YES
a. PD 269 took effect on Aug. 6, 1973 and granted electric cooperatives several tax privileges, one of
which is exemption from the payment of “all national government, local government and municipal
taxes and fees, including franchise, filing, recordation, license or permit fees or taxes.
b. On Mar. 10, 1990, RA 6938 and 6939 were enacted. The latter law vested the power to register
cooperatives solely on the CDA, while the former provides that electric cooperatives registered with
the NEA under PD 269 which opt not to register with the CDA shall not be entitled to the benefits
and privileges under the said law.
c. On January 1, 1992, the LGC took effect, and Section 193 thereof withdrew tax exemptions or
incentives previously enjoyed by “all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions.”
d. CASURECO III can no longer invoke PD 269 to evade payment of local taxes. Moreover, its
provisional registration with the CDA which granted it exemption for the payment of local taxes was
extended only until May 4, 1992. Thereafter, it can no longer claim any exemption from the payment
of local taxes, including the subject franchise tax.
Page 84 of 167
e. The LGC was enacted granting the local government units, like petitioner, the power to impose and
collect franchise tax. To be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that
one has a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its
rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local government unit.
f. There is a confluence of these requirements in the case at bar. By virtue of PD 269, NEA granted
CASURECO III a franchise to operate an electric light and power service for a period of fifty (50) years
from June 6, 1979, and it is undisputed that CASURECO III operates within Iriga City and the
Rinconada area. It is, therefore, liable to pay franchise tax notwithstanding its non-profit nature.
3. WON the situs of taxation is the place where the franchise holder exercises its franchise regardless
of the place where its services or products are delivered – YES
a. What the petitioner seeks to collect from CASURECO III is a franchise tax, which as defined, is a tax
on the exercise of a privilege. As Section 137 of the LGC provides, franchise tax shall be based on
gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on business, rather than on persons or property. Since it
partakes of the nature of an excise tax the situs of taxation is the place where the privilege is exercised,
in this case in the City of Iriga, where CASURECO III has its principal office and from where it
operates, regardless of the place where its services or products are delivered. Hence, franchise tax covers
all gross receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 11, 2010 and
Resolution dated July 12, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Page 85 of 167
METROPOLITAN BANK v. CIR

April 17, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: review on certiorari
FACTS:
• Solidbank Corp. extended a loan to Luzon Hydro Corp. where LHC bound itself to shoulder all
corresponding internal revenue required by law to be deducted or withheld on the said loan, as well as the
filing of tax returns and remittance of the taxes withheld to the BIR. Metrobank subsequently acquired
Solidbank and assumed the latter’s rights and obligations in the loan agreement.
• In 2001, LHC paid Metrobank US$1.5M and US$1.3M and withheld and eventually paid BIR 10% final tax
on the interest portions of the said payments. LHC remitted US$106K or Php5.2M.
• According to Metrobank, it mistakenly remitted said amount to the BIR as well. Thus, on Dec. 27, 2002, it
filed a letter to the BIR requesting the refund thereof. Due to the CIR’s inaction, Metrobank filed a judicial
claim for refund via a petition for review before the CTA on Sept. 10, 2003.
• CTA Division denied Metrobank’s claims ruling that the latter’s claim was filed beyond the two (2)-year
prescriptive period. It pointed out that since Metrobank remitted such payment on April 25, 2001, the latter
only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial claim for refunds. In this regard, while
Metrobank filed its administrative claim well within the aforesaid period, or on December 27, 2002, the
judicial claim was filed only on September 10, 2003. Hence, the right to claim for such refund has prescribed.
CTA en banc affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CTA En Banc correctly held that Metrobank's claim for refund relative to its March 2001 final
tax had already prescribed. - YES
a. Sec. 204 of the NIRC* provides the CIR the authority to grant tax refunds while Section 229 of the same
Code provides for the proper procedure in order to claim for such refunds.
b. A claimant for refund must first file an administrative claim for refund before the CIR, prior to filing a
judicial claim before the CTA.Both the administrative and judicial claims for refund should be filed within
the two (2)-year prescriptive period indicated therein, and that the claimant is allowed to file the latter even
without waiting for the resolution of the former in order to prevent the forfeiture of its claim through
prescription.
c. Metrobank’s contention that the prescriptive period should be reckoned not from April 25, 2001 when it
remitted the tax to the BIR, but rather, from the time it filed its Final Adjustment Return or Annual Income
Tax Return for the taxable year of 2001, or in April 2002, as it was only at that time when its right to a
refund was ascertained, cannot be sustained.
• The cases cited by Metrobank involved corporate income taxes, in which the corporate taxpayer is
required to file and pay income tax on a quarterly basis, with such payments being subject to an
adjustment at the end of the taxable year.
• However, payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual
tax due.
• Since quarterly income tax payments are treated as mere "advance payments" of the annual corporate
income tax, there may arise certain situations where such "advance payments" would cover more than
said corporate taxpayer's entire income tax liability for a specific taxable year. Thus, it is only logical to
reckon the two (2)-year prescriptive period from the time the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return was filed, since it is only at that time that it would be possible to determine whether
the corporate taxpayer had paid an amount exceeding its annual income tax liability.
d. The tax involved in this case is a ten percent (10%) final withholding tax on Metrobank's interest income
on its foreign currency denominated loan extended to LHC. In this regard, it can be gleaned from Section
2.57 (A) of Revenue Regulations No. 02-98 that final withholding taxes are considered as full and final
payment of the income tax due, and thus, are not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the two (2)-year
prescriptive period commences to run from the time the refund is ascertained, i.e., the date such tax was
paid, and not upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes.
e. It is undisputed that Metrobank's final withholding tax liability in March 2001 was remitted to the BIR on
April 25, 2001. As such, it only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial claims for
refund. However, while Metrobank's administrative claim was filed on December 27, 2002, its
Page 86 of 167
corresponding judicial claim was only filed on September 10, 2003. Therefore, Metrobank's claim for refund
had clearly prescribed.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 21, 2008 of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 340 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
*Section 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The
Commissioner may –
x x xx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value
of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem
or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction.
No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner
a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a
return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
**Section 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum
has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Page 87 of 167
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION-MANILA BRANCH v. CIR

June 5, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In an Exchange of Notes Contract, the government of Japan agreed to extend a loan of Y40B to the
government of the Philippines for the implementation of the Calaca Coal Thermal Power Plant Project.
The latter undertook to assume all taxes imposed by the Philippines on Japanese contractors engaged in the
Project. Later on, another loan agreement was executed worth Y5.5B.
• In 1991, National Power Corp. (NPC), as the executing government agency, entered into a contract with
Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner's head office in Japan) for the engineering, construction, et. al for
the project. Under the contract, NPC undertook to pay any and all forms of taxes that are directly imposable
under the contract.
• Petitioner completed the project in 1995. In 1998, petitioner filed its Income Tax Return for the fiscal year
that ended in Mar. 1998. Petitioner included P44M income from the Project. Petitioner also filed its Monthly
Remittance Return of Income Taxes Withheld and remitted P8Ms BPRT for branch profits remitted to its
head office in Japan.
• In 2000, petitioner filed with the respondent CIR an administrative claim for refund of P52M representing
the P44M and P8M they erroneously paid in 1998.
• To suspend the running of the two-year period to file a judicial claim for refund, petitioner filed on July 13,
2000 a petition for review before the CTA.
• Petitioner anchored its claim for refund on BIR Ruling No. DA-407-98 interpreting the agreement of the
governments, “x x x this office is of the opinion and hereby holds that Mitsubishi has no liability for income tax and other
taxes and fiscal levies, including VAT, on the 75% of the NAIA II Project and on the 100% of the foreign currency portion
of the Calaca II Project since the said taxes were assumed by the Philippine Government.”
• CTA granted the petition but the CTA En Banc reversed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON petitioner is entitled to a refund – YES

a. Secs. 229* and 204 (C)** and of the NIRC grants CIR the authority to credit or refund taxes which are
erroneously collected by the government.
b. it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was erroneously collected
from petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same had already been assumed by the
Philippine Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese Government. Case law
explains that an exchange of notes is considered as an executive agreement, which is binding on the
State even without Senate concurrence.
c. The Exchange of Notes Contract provides for a tax assumption provision whereby “The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines will, itself or through its executing agencies or instrumentalities, assume all fiscal levies or
taxes imposed in the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and nationals operating as suppliers, contractors or
consultants on and/or in connection with any income that may accrue from the supply of products of Japan and services of
Japanese nationals to be provided under the Loan.”
d. To “assume” means to take on, become bound as another is bound, or put oneself in place of another
as to an obligation or liability. the concept of an assumption is therefore different from an exemption,
the latter being the "freedom from a duty, liability or other requirement" or "a privilege given to a
judgment debtor by law, allowing the debtor to retain [a] certain property without liability." Thus,
contrary to the CTA En Banc's opinion, the constitutional provisions on tax exemptions would not
apply.
e. This notwithstanding, petitioner included in its income tax due the amount of P44,288,712.00 and
further remitted P8,324,100.00. These taxes clearly fall within the ambit of the tax assumption provision
under the Exchange of Notes, which was further fleshed out in the Contract with NPC. Hence, it is
the Philippine Government, through the NPC, which should shoulder the payment of the same.
Therefore, considering that petitioner paid the subject taxes in the aggregate amount of P52,612,812.00,
which it was not required to pay, the BIR erroneously collected such amount. Accordingly, petitioner
is entitled to its refund.
Page 88 of 167
2. From which government entity should the refund be claimed? CIR

a. NIRC vests upon the CIR, being the head of the BIR, the authority to credit or refund taxes which are
erroneously collected by the government. This specific statutory mandate cannot be overridden by
averse interpretations made through mere administrative issuances, such as RMC No. 42-99.
b. A revenue memorandum circular is an administrative ruling issued by the CIR to interpret tax laws. It
is widely accepted that an interpretation by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce the law, is
entitled to great respect from the courts. However, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be
disregarded if judicially found to be incorrect.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 24, 2006 and the Resolution dated
December 4, 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 5 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6139 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED
*SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. — No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum
has been paid under protest or duress."
xxxx
**SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit Taxes. The Commissioner
may -
xxxx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value
of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem
or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction.
No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner
a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a
return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Page 89 of 167
U.P. LAW BOC COMMERCIAL LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
COMMERCIAL LAW
ANICETO BANGIS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS v. HEIRS OF ADOLFO
June 13, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• The Sps. Adolfo were the registered owners of a lot in Bukidnon covered by an OCT.. After being
foreclosed by DBP, Serafin Adolfo repurchased the land in 1971, a year after his wife died.
• In 1975, Serafin allegedly mortgaged the property to Bangis for P12,500. This transaction was not reduced
in writing. However, Bangis immediately took possession of the land.
• When Serafin died, his heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and the lot was eventually subdivided
and separate titles were issued to the heirs.
• In June 1998, the Heirs of Adolfo expressed their intention to redeem the mortgaged property from Bangis
but the latter refused, claiming that the transaction between him and Adolfo was one of sale. During the
conciliation meetings in the barangay, Bangis' son, Rudy Bangis, showed them a copy of a deed of sale and
a certificate of title to the disputed lot.
• The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Adolfo. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the transaction between the parties was one of sale and not a mortgage or antichresis – NO
a. Petitioner Heirs of Bangis maintain that the CA erred in not giving probative weight to the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale which supposedly bolsters their claim that their father, Aniceto
Bangis, bought the subject parcel of land from Adolfo. Hence, the corresponding title, TCT No. T-10567,
issued as a consequence should be respected.
b. On the other hand, Heirs of Adolfo averred that no reversible error was committed by the CA in upholding
that no sale transpired between the parties' predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, petitioners' TCT No. T-
10567 was not offered in evidence and worse, certified as of dubious origin per the Manifestation of the
Registrar of Deeds.
c. Court perused the records and found substantial evidence supporting the factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, that the nature of the transaction between the parties' predecessors-in-interest was a
mortgage and not a sale. Thus, the maxim that factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the CA
are final and conclusive on the Court obtains in this case.
d. There was neither an antichresis nor sale. For a contract of antichresis to be valid, the amount of the
principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis shall be void.
• In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce any document in support of their
claim that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis was an antichresis, hence, the CA properly held that
no such relationship existed between the parties.
• On the other hand, the heirs of Bangis presented only a photocopy of an extra judicial settlement with
absolute deed of sale without sufficient justification for the production of secondary evidence in
violation of the best evidence rule in Sec. 3 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Heirs
of Bangis failed to establish the existence and due execution of the subject deed on which their claim
of ownership was founded.
e. A perusal of a copy of TCT 10566, shows that it was a transfer from TCT No. T-10566, which title the
Heirs of Bangis unfortunately failed to account for, and bore no relation at all to either OCT No. P-489
(the original title of the Spouses Adolfo) or TCT No. T-6313 (issued to Adolfo when he repurchased the
same property from DBP).
f. However, the Court cannot sustain the CA’s ruling that TCT No. T-10567 cannot be invalidated because it
constitutes as a collateral attack which is contrary to the principle of indefeasibility of titles.
• Bangis interposed a counterclaim in his Answer seeking to be declared as the true and lawful owner of
the disputed property and that his TCT No. T-10567 be declared as superior over the titles of the Heirs
of Adolfo. Since a counterclaim is essentially a complaint then, a determination of the validity of TCT
Page 90 of 167
No. T-10567 vis-a-vis the titles of the Heirs of Adolfo can be considered as a direct, not collateral,
attack on the subject titles.
• Besides, the prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, which
are not accorded indefeasibility, as in this case.
g. The present action has not prescribed. While Bangis indeed took possession of the land upon its alleged
mortgage, the certificate of title (TCT No. 6313) remained with Adolfo and upon his demise, transferred to
his heirs, thereby negating any contemplated transfer of ownership. Settled is the rule that no title in
derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover,
even if acquisitive prescription can be appreciated in this case, the Heirs of Bangis' possession being in bad
faith is two years shy of the requisite 30-year uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137
of the Civil Code.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
assailed Decision dated March 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station (CA) and its Resolution dated
December 2, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00722-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: (1) cancelling TCT
No. T-10567; and (2) ordering respondent Heirs of Adolfo to pay petitioner Heirs of Bangis the sum of P12,500.00
with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from March 30, 2009 until the finality of this Decision and thereafter,
12% annual interest until its full satisfaction.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Page 91 of 167
APEX BANCRIGHTS HOLDINGS v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS

Oct. 2, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In July 2001, Export and Industry Bank (EIB) entered in a 3-way merger with Urban Bank Inc. (UBI) and
Urbancorp Investments Inc. (UII).
• Following the said merger, EIB encountered financial difficulties which prompted the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corp. (PDIC) to release financial assistance conditioned upon the infusion by EIB stockholders
of additional capital whenever EIB's adjusted Risk Based Capital Adequacy Ratio falls below 12.5%. Despite
this, EIB still failed to comply with BSP’s capital requirements, causing EIB’s stockholders to commence
the sale of the bank.
• BDO initially expressed interest in acquiring EIB. However, the acquisition did not proceed due to BDO’s
unwillingness to assume certain liabilities of EIB. As a result, EIB’s financial situation worsened.
• In 2012, EIB’s chairman and president voluntarily turned-over full control of EIB to BSP. BSP then
prohibited EIB from doing business and placed it under the receivership of PDIC, in accordance with the
New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
• PDIC submitted its initial receivership report to the Monetary Board contained its finding that EIB can be
rehabilitated or permitted to resume business provided that a bidding for its rehabilitation would be
conducted, and that the certain conditions would be met. Pursuant to rehabilitation efforts, 2 public
biddings were conducted but no bids were submitted. PDIC then informed BSP that EIB can hardly be
rehabilitated, subsequently, the Monetary Board, through its Resolution No. 571, directed PDIC to proceed
with the liquidation of EIB.
• Petitioners, who are stockholders representing majority stock of EIB, filed a petition for certiorari
challenging Resolution No. 571. The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA correctly ruled that the Monetary Board did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 571 which directed the PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of EIB - YES
a. The Monetary Board did not abuse its discretion in ordering the liquidation of EIB.
b. Sec. 30 of RA7453 provides:
“xxx the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from
doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver
of the banking institution.
xxx
If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in
accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of
directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution.
cxx
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
c. Said power and authority of the Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them is an exercise of the
police power of the state, subject only to judicial review if exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
d. After the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 686 which placed EIB under the receivership of PDIC,
the latter submitted its initial findings to the Monetary Board, stating that EIB can be rehabilitated or
permitted to resume business; provided, that a bidding for its rehabilitation would be conducted, and that
the following conditions would be met: (a) there are qualified interested banks that will comply with the
parameters for rehabilitation of a closed bank, capital strengthening, liquidity, sustainability and viability of
operations, and strengthening of bank governance; and (b) all parties (including creditors and stockholders)
agree to the rehabilitation and the revised payment terms and conditions of outstanding liabilities.
e. However, the foregoing conditions for EIB's rehabilitation "were not met because the bidding and re-
bidding for the bank's rehabilitation were aborted since none of the pre-qualified Strategic Third Party
Investors (STPI) submitted a letter of interest to participate in the bidding," thereby resulting in the PDIC's
Page 92 of 167
finding that EIB is already insolvent and must already be liquidated - a finding which eventually resulted in
the Monetary Board's issuance of Resolution No. 571.
f. Nothing in Section 30 of RA 7653 requires the BSP, through the Monetary Board, to make an independent
determination of whether a bank may still be rehabilitated or not. As expressly stated in the afore-cited
provision, once the receiver determines that rehabilitation is no longer feasible, the Monetary Board is
simply obligated to: (a) notify in writing the bank's board of directors of the same; and (b) direct the PDIC
to proceed with liquidation
g. If the law had indeed intended that the Monetary Board make a separate and distinct factual determination
before it can order the liquidation of a bank or quasi-bank, then there should have been a provision to that
effect. There being none, it can safely be concluded that the Monetary Board is not so required when the
PDIC has already made such determination.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and the
Resolution dated October 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129674 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 93 of 167
BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. CARLITO LEE

Aug. 1, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In Apr. 1988, Lee filed a complaint for sum of money and application for the issuance of a writ of
attachment against Trendline and Buelva (defendants) before the RTC.
• In 1988, RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment wherein Trendline’s accounts with Citytrust Banking
Corp. in the amount of P700K were garnished. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision finding
defendants liable for the full amount (P5M) of Lee’s investment plus legal interest, atty’s fees and costs of
suit.
• In 1994, Citytrust filed before the RTC an Urgent Motion and Manifestation seeking a ruling on defendants'
request to release the amount of P591,748.99 out of the garnished amount for the purpose of paying
Trendline’s tax obligations. CA affirmed the RTC’s denial of the motion.
• In 1996, BPI and Citytrust merged, with BPI as the surviving corporation. The Articles of Merger provide
that “all liabilities and obligations of Citytrust shall be transferred to and become the liabilities and
obligations of BPI in the same manner as if the BPI had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations.”
• In 1999, the 1994 RTC decision became final and executory. Lee filed a Motion for Execution which was
granted. However, when it was implemented, BPI Manager Mendoza denied having possession of any
deposits or property belonging to defendants.
• In 2002, Lee filed a Motion for Execution and/or Enforcement of Garnishment before the RTC to enforce
against BPI the garnishment of Trendline’s deposit of P700K and other deposits it may have had with
Citytrust. RTC denied the Motion. CA found grave abuse of discretion with the RTC’s denial and found
BPI liable.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 being an improper
remedy – NO
a. The order merely involved the implementation of a writ of execution, hence, interlocutory in nature.
An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the court's task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done. This is not subject to an appeal. The
remedy from such interlocutory order is petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. WON the CA erred in ruling that BPI became a party-in-interest in the case filed by Carlito Lee
upon approval by the SEC of its merger with Citytrust – NO
a. Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in court must be impleaded as private respondents. Upon the merger of Citytrust and BPI,
with the latter as the surviving corporation, and with all the liabilities and obligations of Citytrust
transferred to BPI as if it had incurred the same, BPI undoubtedly became a party interested in
sustaining the proceedings, as it stands to be prejudiced by the outcome of the case.
b. Citytrust, upon service of the notice of garnishment and its acknowledgment that it was in possession
of defendants' deposit accounts in its letter-reply dated June 28, 1988, became a “virtual party” to or a
“forced intervenor” in the civil case. As such, it became bound by the orders and processes issued by
the trial court despite not having been properly impleaded therein.
c. Although Citytrust was dissolved, no winding up of its affairs or liquidation of its assets, privileges,
powers and liabilities took place. As the surviving corporation, BPI simply continued the combined
businesses of the two banks and absorbed all the rights, privileges, assets, liabilities and obligations of
Citytrust, including the latter’s obligation over the garnished deposits of the defendants.
Page 94 of 167
3. WON the CA erred in not ruling upon the Motion for Execution and/or Enforcement of
Garnishment is not the appropriate remedy in the event there is a 3rd party involved during the
execution process of a final and executory judgment – NO
a. BPI claims that Lee should have instead availed himself of the remedy provided under Section 43, Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court because he is a third party to the case who denies possession of the
property. This argument is specious.
b. The institution of a separate action against a garnishee contemplates a situation where the garnishee
(third person) “claims an interest in the property adverse to him (judgment debtor) or denies the debt.”
Neither of these situations exists in this case. The garnishee does not claim any interest in the deposit
accounts of the defendants, nor does it deny the existence of the deposit accounts. In fact, Citytrust
admitted in its letter dated June 28, 1988 that it is in possession of the deposit accounts.
4. WON the CA erred in ruling that petitioner BPI should be held accountable for the amount of
P700K. – NO
a. By virtue of the writ of garnishment, the deposits of the defendants with Citytrust were placed in
custodia legis of the court. From that time onwards, their deposits were under the sole control of the
RTC and Citytrust holds them subject to its orders until such time that the attachment or garnishment
is discharged, or the judgment in favor of Lee is satisfied or the credit or deposit is delivered to the
proper officer of the court.Thus, Citytrust, and thereafter BPI, which automatically assumed the
former’s liabilities and obligations upon the approval of their Articles of Merger, is obliged to keep the
deposit intact and to deliver the same to the proper officer upon order of the court.
b. The RTC is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a preliminary attachment or garnishment except on
grounds specifically provided. in the Revised Rules of Court. The loss of bank records of a garnished
deposit is not a ground for the dissolution of garnishment, the obligation to satisfy the writ stands.
c. BPI cannot avoid the obligation attached to the writ of garnishment by claiming that the fund was not
transferred to it, in light of the Articles of Merger which provides that “[a]ll liabilities and obligations
of Citytrust shall be transferred to and become the liabilities and obligations of BPI in the same manner
as if the BPI had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations, and in order that the rights and interest
of creditors of Citytrust or liens upon the property of Citytrust shall not be impaired by merger.”
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed February 11, 2009 Decision and
October 29, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 95 of 167
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. ST. MICHAEL MEDICAL CENTER

Mar. 25, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Sps. Rodil are the owners of St. Michael Diagnostic and Skin Care Laboratory Services and Hospital (St.
Michael Hospital). They purchased 2 land adjoining their property and incorporated SMMCI with P2M
which later increased to P53M, 94.9% of the capital stock belonging to the spouses.
• In 2004, SMMCI applied for a loan with BPI Family Savings Bank for the construction of a new hospital
building. BPI-FSB gave a credit line of P35M secured by a real estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land
belonging to Sps. Rodil, on a portion of which stands the hospital building being constructed. SMMCI was
able to draw the aggregate amount of P23,700,000.00.
• After suffering financial losses due to their first contractor, Sps. Rodil temporarily deferred the original
construction plans for the 11-storey hospital and engaged the services of another for the completion of the
structural works up to the 5th floor. They spent an additional P25M or a total of P55M for the construction.
However, only 2 floors of the new building became functional.
• As of May 2006, SMMCI was still neither operational nor earning revenues. Hence, it was only able to pay
the interest on its BPI Family loan, or the amount of P3,000,000.00 over a two-year period, from the income
of St. Michael Hospital.
• In Sept. 2009, BPI Family demanded immediate payment of the entire loan obligation and soon after filed
for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real properties covered by the mortgage.
• In Aug. 2010, SMMCI filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation before the RTC, with prayer for the
issuance of a Stay Order as it foresaw the impossibility of meeting its obligation to BPI Family, its purported
sole creditor.
• It was averred that while St. Michael Hospital – whose operations were to be eventually absorbed by SMMCI
– was operating profitably, it was saddled with the burden of paying the loan obligation of SMMCI and Sps.
Rodil to BPI Family, which it cannot service together with its current obligations to other persons and/or
entities.
o In its proposed Rehabilitation Plan, SMMCI merely sought for BPI Family (a) to defer foreclosing on
the mortgage and (b) to agree to a moratorium of at least two (2) years during which SMMCI – either
through St. Michael Hospital or its successor – will retire all other obligations. After which, SMMCI
can then start servicing its loan obligation to the bank under a mutually acceptable restructuring
agreement.
• The RTC approved the Rehabilitation Plan with modifications recommended by the Rehabilitation
Receiver. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed SMMCI’s Rehabilitation Plan as approved by the RTC. - NO
a. The remedy of rehabilitation is improper. Rehabilitation assumes that the corporation has been operational
but for some reasons like economic crisis or mismanagement had become distressed or insolvent, i.e., that
it is generally unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the ordinary course of business or has liability that
are greater than its assets.
b. The basic issues in rehabilitation proceedings concern the viability and desirability of continuing the
business operations of the distressed corporation, all with a view of effectively restoring it to a state of
solvency or to its former healthy financial condition through the adoption of a rehabilitation plan.
c. In this case, it cannot be said that the petitioning corporation, SMMCI, had been in a position of successful
operation and solvency at the time the Rehabilitation Petition was filed in August 2010. While it had indeed
“commenced business” through the preparatory act of opening a credit line with BPI Family to finance the
construction of a new hospital building for its future operations, SMMCI itself admits that it has not
formally operated nor earned any income since its incorporation.
d. SMMCI could not have even complied with the form and substance of a proper rehabilitation petition, and
submit its accompanying documents, among others, the required financial statements of a going concern.
The applicable rule at the time, Sec. 2, Rule 4, of the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Rules) provides that the petition should be accompanied by 1) an audited financial statement of the debtor
at the end of its last fiscal year; 2) Interim financial statements as of the end of the month prior to the filing
Page 96 of 167
of the petition. While SMMCI claims that it would absorb St. Michael Hospital’s operations, there was
dearth of evidence to show that a merger was already agreed upon between them. Accordingly, St. Michael
Hospital’s financials cannot be utilized as basis to determine the feasibility of SMMCI’s rehabilitation. While
it appears that Sps. Rodil effectively owned and exercised control over the two entities, such fact does not,
by and of itself, warrant their singular treatment
e. SMMCI’s Rehabilitation Plan failed to comply with the fundamental requisites on the Rules - a material
financial commitment to support the rehabilitation and an accompanying liquidation analysis. The effect of
non compliance translates to the conclusion that the RTC’s stated considerations for approval are actually
unsubstantiated and hence, insufficient to decree rehabilitation.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 and the Resolution
dated January 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121004 upholding the Order dated August 4,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 approving the Rehabilitation Plan of respondent St.
Michael Medical Center, Inc. (SMMCI) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, SMMCI’s Petition
for Corporate Rehabilitation is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Page 97 of 167
F & S VELASCO COMPANY INC (FSVCI) v. DR. ROMMEL L. MADRID

Nov. 10, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• FSVCI was duly organized and registered as a corporation with Francisco O. Velasco (Francisco), Simona
J. Velasco (Simona), Angela V. Madrid (Angela), herein respondent Dr. Rommel L. Madrid (Madrid), and
petitioner Saturnino O. Velasco (Saturnino) as its incorporators. When Simona and Francisco died, their
daughter, Angela, inherited their shares, thereby giving her control of 70.82% of FSVCI's total shares of
stock. As of May 11, 2009, the distribution of FSVCI's 24,000 total shares of stock is as follows: (a) Angela
with 16,998 shares; (b) Madrid with 1,000 shares; (c) petitioner Rosina B. Velasco-Scribner (Scribner) with
6,000 shares; and (d) petitioners Irwin J. Seva (Seva) and Mercedez Sunico (Sunico) with one (1) share each.
• On Sept. 20, 2009, during her tenure as Chairman of the Board of FSVCI, Angela died intestate and without
issue. Madrid, as Angela’s spouse, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication covering the latter's estate
which includes her 70.82% ownership of FSVCI's shares of stock.
• Believing that he is already the controlling stockholder of FSVCI by virtue of such self-adjudication, Madrid
called for a Special Stockholders' and Re-Organizational Meeting. In preparation for such meeting, Madrid
executed separate deeds of assignment transferring shares of stock to respondents Danao, Labalan and
Arimado (Madrid Group).
• Meanwhile, corporate secretary Seva, sent a Notice of an Emergency Meeting to FSVCI's remaining
stockholders for the purpose of electing a new president and vice-president, as well as the opening of a
bank account. During this November 6, 2009 meeting, Saturnino was recognized as FSVCI President while
Scribner was elected Vice-President (Saturnino Group)
• Despite the election conducted by the Saturnino Group, the Madrid Group proceeded with the Special
Stockholders' and Re-Organizational Meeting on November 18, 2009, wherein: (a) the current members of
FSVCI Board of Directors (save for Madrid) were ousted and replaced by the members of the Madrid
Group; and (b) Madrid, Danao, Arimado, and Labalan were elected President, Vice-President, Corporate
Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of FSVCI.
• RTC held that both the Nov. 6 and Nov. 18 meetings are null and void.
• CA modified the RTC ruling declaring the Nov. 18 meeting valid and remanded the case for the
appointment of a management committee to take over the business affairs of FSVCI.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA correctly ruled that the November 18, 2009 Meeting organized by Madrid is legal and
valid - NO
a. Madrid's inheritance of Angela's shares of stock does not ipso facto afford him the rights accorded to
such majority ownership of FSVCI's shares of stock. Section 63 and 74 of the Corporation Code
provides that all transfers of shares of stock must be registered in the corporate books (Stock and
Transfer Book) in order to be binding on the corporation.
b. At the time Madrid called for the November 18, 2009 Meeting, as well as the actual conduct thereof,
he was already the owner of 74.98% shares of stock of FSVCI. However, records are bereft of any
showing that the transfer of Angela's shares of stock to Madrid had been registered in FSVCFs Stock
and Transfer Book when he made such call and when the November 18, 2009 Meeting was held. Thus,
the CA erred in holding that Madrid complied with the required registration of transfers of shares of
stock through mere reliance on FSVCI's GIS dated November 18, 2009.
c. The contents of the GIS should not be deemed conclusive as to the identities of the registered
stockholders of the corporation, as well as their respective ownership of shares of stock, as the
controlling document should be the corporate books, specifically the Stock and Transfer Book.
d. Madrid could not have made a valid call of the Nov. 18, 2009 meeting as his stock ownership as
registered in the Stock and Transfer Book is only 4.16%. As there was no showing that he was able to
remedy the situation by the time the meeting was held, the conduct of such meeting, as well as the
matters resolved therein, including the reorganization of the FSVCI Board of Directors and the election
of new corporate officers, should all be declared null and void.
Page 98 of 167
e. Thus, in view of the nullity of the November 6, 2009 Meeting conducted by the Saturnino Group which
ruling of the RTC had already attained finality, as well as the November 18, 2009 Meeting conducted
by the Madrid Group - both of which attempted to wrest control of FSVCI by reorganizing the Board
of Directors and electing a new set of corporate officers - the FSVCI Board of Directors at the time of
Angela's death should be reconstituted, and thereafter, fill the vacant seat left by Angela in accordance
with Section 29 of the Corporation Code. Such Board of Directors shall only act in a hold-over capacity
until their successors are elected and qualified, pursuant to Section 23 of the Corporation Code.
2. WON the CA correctly ruled that a Management Committee should be appointed or constituted
to take over the corporate and business affairs of FSVCI. – NO
a. Applicants for the appointment of a management committee need to establish the confluence of these
two (2) requisites:
• Dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other properties; and
• Paralyzation of its business operations which may be prejudicial to the interest of the minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.
b. In the case at bar, CA merely based its directive of creating a Management Committee based on its
findings without any actual evidence, legal or factual basis to support the appointment/constitution of
a Management Committee for FSVCI.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March 1, 2013 and the
Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113279 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Special Stockholders' and Re-Organizational Meeting of petitioner F & S Velasco Company,
Inc. called by respondent Rommel L. Madrid and held on November 18, 2009 is declared NULL and VOID and the
Management Committee constituted pursuant to the aforementioned CA Decision and Resolution is hereby
DISSOLVED.
Accordingly, the Board of Directors of petitioner F & S Velasco Company, Inc. prior to the death of Angela V.
Madrid - consisting of the remaining members petitioners Rosina B. Velasco-Scribner, Irwin J. Seva, and Mercedez
Sunico and respondent Dr. Rommel L. Madrid - is hereby ORDERED reconstituted. The Board of Directors is
ORDERED to fill the vacant seat left by Angela V. Madrid and, thereafter, act in a hold-over capacity until their
successors are elected and qualified, in accordance with prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
Page 99 of 167
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT v. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG

FACTS:
• Respondents alleged that in the evening of Mar. 22, 2003, Battung boarded petitioner’s bus bound for
Manila and seated at the first row, behind the driver.
• When the driver, Duplio, stopped the bus in Nueva Ecija to check the tires, a man who was seated in the
fourth row got up and shot Battung at his head and left with a companion. Duplio and the conductor took
Battung to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
• Respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the aggregate amount of P1.8M based on a breach of
contract of carriage against petitioner, the driver, and the conductor.
• RTC ruled in respondents’ favor. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner liable for damages to respondent
arising from culpa contractual. - NO
a. The Civil Code exacts from common carriers the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence)
in ensuring the safety of its passengers.
b. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be
overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
c. However, the law does not make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. It
is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the above-said provisions to show that
the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common carrier and/or its
employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.
d. In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due (1)
to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful
acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing - such as when the injury arises wholly
from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there
would be no issue regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care,
as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of
fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply.
e. In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in the method
of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioner's employees, namely, that of Duplio and
Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the case involves the death of
Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger.
f. Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil
Code, which states that "a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission." Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good
father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.
g. In contrast with Fortune Express v. CA, this case had no similar danger to impel petitioner or its employees
to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers. There was no showing
that Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned petitioner's employees of the
need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the passengers.
• Common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the passengers they take in will
not bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless there is
something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection should be made.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed by respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Page 100 of 167

GREAT WHITE SHARK ENTERPRISES v. DANILO M. CARALDE

FACTS:
• Caralde filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA), IPO a trademark application to register the mark
“SHARK & LOGO” for his manufactured goods under Class 25, such as slippers, shoes and sandals.
• Petitioner Great White Shark, a foreign corporation, opposed the application claiming to be the owner of
the mark consisting of a representation of a shark in color, known as “GREG NORMAN LOGO”. It
alleged that it owns the world famous mark which has been pending registration since Feb. 19, 2002, 5
months before Caralde’s application; and that the confusing similarity between the two (2) marks is likely
to deceive or confuse the purchasing public into believing that Caralde's goods are produced by or originated
from it, or are under its sponsorship, to its damage and prejudice.
• Pending the inter partes proceedings, Great White Shark’s trademark application was granted.
• The BLA rejected Caralde’s application. IPO Director General affirmed the BLA. However, CA reversed
as it found no confusing similarity between the subject marks notwithstanding that both contained the
shape of a shark as their dominant feature.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in reversing the previous resolutions of the IPO Director General and the BLA - NO
a. A trademark device is susceptible to registration if it is crafted fancifully or arbitrarily and is capable of
identifying and distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer or seller from those of another. Apart from
its commercial utility, the benchmark of trademark registrability is distinctiveness. Thus, a generic figure,
as that of a shark in this case, if employed and designed in a distinctive manner, can be a registrable
trademark device, subject to the provisions of the IP Code.
b. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, case law has developed the Dominancy Test and the
Holistic or Totality Test.
• The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the dominant features of the competing trademarks
that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the ordinary purchaser, and gives
more consideration to the aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods,
giving little weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments.
• The Holistic or Totality Test considers the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including
the labels and packaging, and focuses not only on the predominant words but also on the other features
appearing on both labels to determine whether one is confusingly similar to the other as to mislead the
ordinary purchaser. The “ordinary purchaser” refers to one “accustomed to buy, and therefore to some
extent familiar with, the goods in question.”
c. Irrespective of both tests, there is no confusing similarities between the marks. While both marks use the
shape of a shark, the Court noted distinct visual and aural differences between them.
• In Great White Shark's “GREG NORMAN LOGO,” there is an outline of a shark formed with the
use of green, yellow, blue and red lines/strokes
• In contrast, the shark in Caralde’s “SHARK & LOGO” mark is illustrated in letters outlined in the
form of a shark with the letter “S” forming the head, the letter “H” forming the fins, the letters “A”
and “R” forming the body, and the letter “K” forming the tail.
d. There being no confusing similarity between the subject marks, the matter of whether Great White Shark’s
mark has gained recognition and acquired goodwill becomes unnecessary.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the assailed December
14, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) for failure to show that the CA committed reversible error in setting
aside the Decision of the IPO Director General and allowing the registration of the mark “SHARK & LOGO” by
respondent Danilo M. Caralde, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Page 101 of 167

NARRA NICKEL MINING v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES

CORP.
Dec. 9, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• On Nov. 8, 2006, Redmont filed an Application for Exploration Permit (EP) over mining areas in in
Palawan. Upon inquiry, Redmont found out that the areas were already covered by existing Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) and an EP which were initially applied for by petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest.
• However, in March 2006, or prior to Redmont’s EP application, Narra Nickel had converted its MPSA into
a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) application. Upon recommendation of SENR
Atienza, petitioner’s applications were all approved in Apr. 2010.
• Prior to the grant of petitioners' applications for FTAA conversion, and the execution of the above-stated
FTAA, Redmont filed on January 2, 2007 three (3) separate petitions for the denial of petitioners' respective
MPSA and/or EP applications before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR-MGB.
• Redmont's primary argument was that petitioners were all controlled by their common majority stockholder,
MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI) - a 100% Canadian-owned corporation - and, thus, disqualified from being
grantees of MPSAs and/or EPs. In a separate case, SC declared petitioners as foreign corporations.
• Redmont then sought the cancellation of petitioner’s FTAA before the Office of the President.
• The OP denied Narra Nickel’s Motion to Dismiss and gave due course to Redmont’s application. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed on appeal the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA - NO
a. The question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised the
same. A court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment.
b. CA improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the reason
that the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one which could be classified as an
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA's jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdictional
parameter that the appeal be taken against a judgment, final order, resolution or award of a "quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions" is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the Rule 43.
c. The OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is obviously not an "adjudication”. The OP - at the
instance of Redmont at that - was exercising an administrative function pursuant to the President's authority
to invoke the Republic's right under paragraph a (iii), Section 17.2 of the FTAA*.
d. Since an FTAA is entered into by the President on the State's behalf, and it involves a matter of public
concern in that it covers the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources, it is
properly classified as a government or public contract, which is, according to jurisprudence, "generally
subject to the same laws and regulations which govern the validity and sufficiency of contracts between
private individuals." FTAA involves contract or property rights, which merit protection by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
e. The scenario at hand does not involve a complaint for cancellation/revocation commenced before the
ordinary courts of law. Hence, Redmont's recourse to the OP - that, on the assumption that it even had the
legal standing to oppose an already executed FTAA which it was not a party to - was, by and of itself, done
outside the correct course procedure. Observe that RA 7942 and its RIRR do not state that the OP has the
power to take cognizance of a quasi-judicial proceeding involving a petition for cancellation of an existing
FTAA. In fact, there is even no mention of a petition for cancellation or revocation to be taken by a third
party before the OP. While it may be said that the OP has administrative control or supervision over its
subordinate agencies, such as the POA, again the jurisdiction of that body pertains only to mining disputes,
and not those which involve judicial questions cognizable by the ordinary courts of law.
f. Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an FTAA's validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-
judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point,
the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a
contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action which should not be
considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's proper exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the
Page 102 of 167

CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is
unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
dated July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120409 are hereby declared NULL and VOID due
to lack of jurisdiction. This pronouncement is without prejudice to any other appropriate remedy the parties may
take against each other.
SO ORDERED.
*The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
Page 103 of 167

SHANG PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION v. ST. FRANCIS

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS:
• St. Francis, a domestic corporation engaged in real estate business, filed several complaints against
petitioners before the IPO-BLA for:
o Intellectual property violation case for unfair competition, false or fraudulent declaration, and damages
arising from petitioners’ use and filing of applications for the registration of the marks “THE ST.
FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE” (IPV Case)
o an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ application for registration of the mark “THE ST.
FRANCIS TOWERS” for use relative to the latter’s business, particularly the construction of
permanent buildings or structures for residential and office purposes (St. Francis Towers IP Case)
o an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ application for registration of the mark “THE ST.
FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE” (St. Francis Shangri-La IP Case)
• Respondent alleged that it has used the mark “St. Francis” to identify its numerous projects located at
Ortigas Center. And that as a result of its continuous use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” in its real estate
business, it has gained substantial goodwill with the public that consumers and traders closely identify the
said mark with its property development projects.
• Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from claiming ownership and exclusive use of the mark “ST.
FRANCIS” because the same is geographically descriptive of the goods or services for which it is intended
to be used (St. Francis St. in Ortigas Center)
• The BLA ruled in the IPV Case that petitioners committed acts of unfair competition against respondent
by its use of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” but not with its use of the mark “THE ST.
FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE”. BLA denied petitioner’s application in the St. Francis Towers IP Case
but allowed the registration in the St. Francis Shangri-La IP Case.
• Upon reaching the CA, it ruled that petitioner is guilty of unfair competition with respect to their use of the
marks “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE.” Meanwhile,
the decisions in both Inter Partes cases lapsed into finality.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON petitioners are guilty of unfair competition in using the marks “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and
“THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE.” - NO
a. The true test of unfair competition is “whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving or are
calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the particular
trade to which the controversy relates.” It is therefore essential to prove the existence of fraud, or the intent
to deceive, actual or probable, determined through a judicious scrutiny of the factual circumstances
attendant to a particular case.
b. Here, the Court finds the element of fraud to be wanting; hence, there can be no unfair competition.
• The CA appears to have disregarded the geographically-descriptive nature of the mark “ST. FRANCIS”
which thus bars its exclusive appropriability, unless a secondary meaning is acquired.
• In order to determine whether or not the geographic term in question is descriptively used, the
following question is relevant: Is the mark the name of the place or region from which the goods
actually come? If the answer is yes, then the geographic term is probably used in a descriptive sense,
and secondary meaning is required for protection
c. Under Section 123.2 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to be met in order to conclude that a
geographically-descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning, (a) the secondary meaning must have
arisen as a result of substantial commercial use of a mark in the Philippines; (b) such use must result in the
distinctiveness of the mark insofar as the goods or the products are concerned; and (c) proof of substantially
exclusive and continuous commercial use in the Philippines for five (5) years before the date on which the
claim of distinctiveness is made.
d. The records are bereft of any showing that petitioners gave their goods/services the general appearance
that it was respondent which was offering the same to the public. Neither did petitioners employ any means
to induce the public towards a false belief that it was offering respondent’s goods/services. Nor did
Page 104 of 167

petitioners make any false statement or commit acts tending to discredit the goods/services offered by
respondent. Accordingly, the element of fraud which is the core of unfair competition had not been
established.
e. Respondent also was not able to prove its compliance with the requirements stated in Section 123.2 of the
IP Code to be able to conclude that it acquired a secondary meaning – and, thereby, an exclusive right – to
the “ST. FRANCIS” mark, which is geographically-descriptive of the location in which its realty
developments have been built.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105425 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated
September 3, 2008 of the Intellectual Property Office-Director General is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Page 105 of 167

W LAND HOLDINGS v. STARWOOD HOTELS

Dec. 4, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In 2005, Starwood filed before the IPO an application for registration of the trademark "W" for Classes 43
and 44 of the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of
Marks (Nice Classification). This was granted and the mark “W” was registered in its name on Feb. 26,
2007.
• However, in Apr. 20, 2006, W Land applied for its own registration of the “W” mark for Class 36 which
thereby prompted Starwood to oppose the same. The BLA ruled in favor of Starwood.
• In May 2009, W Land filed a petition for cancellation of Starwood’s mark for non-use under Sec. 151.1 of
the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code). Starwood denied having abandoned the subject mark on the
ground of non-use, asserting that it filed with the Director of Trademarks a notarized Declaration of Actual
Use (DAU) with evidence of use on December 2, 2008, which was not rejected. Starwood also argued that
it operates interactive websites for its W Hotels in order to accommodate its potential clients worldwide.
These interactive websites allow Philippine residents to make reservations and bookings, which presuppose
clear and convincing use of the "W'' mark in the Philippines.
• BLA ruled in favor of W Land and ordered the cancellation of Starwood’s registration of “W” mark. On
appeal, IPO DG dismissed W Land’s Petition for Cancellation. CA affirmed the IPO DG ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed the IPO DG's dismissal of W Land's Petition for Cancellation of
Starwood's "W'' mark. - YES
a. The actual use of the mark representing the goods or services introduced and transacted in commerce over
a period of time creates goodwill which the law seeks to protect. The IP Code, under Section 124.2, requires
the registrant or owner of a registered mark to declare "actual use of the mark" (DAU) and present evidence
of such use within the prescribed period. Failing in which, the IPO DG may cause the motu propio removal
from the register of the mark's registration. Also, any person, believing that "he or she will be damaged by
the registration of a mark," which has not been used within the Philippines, may file a petition for
cancellation. Following the basic rule that he who alleges must prove his case, the burden lies on the
petitioner to show damage and non-use.
b. The IP Code have not specifically defined “use”. However, it is understood that the “use” must be bona
fide use which results or tends to result, in one way or another, into a commercial interaction or transaction
"in the ordinary course of trade.
c. Based on the amended Trademark Regulations, it is apparent that the IPO has now given due regard to the
advent of commerce on the internet. Specifically, it now recognizes, among others, "downloaded pages
from the website of the applicant or registrant clearly showing that the goods are being sold or the services
are being rendered in the Philippines," as well as "for online sale, receipts of sale of the goods or services
rendered or other similar evidence of use, showing that the goods are placed on the market or the services
are available in the Philippines or that the transaction took place in the Philippines," as acceptable proof of
actual use.
d. The Court therefore agrees with the IPO DG, as affirmed by the CA, that the use of a registered mark
representing the owner's goods or services by means of an interactive website may constitute proof of actual
use that is sufficient to maintain the registration of the same.
• The mark displayed over the website no less serves its functions of indicating the goods or services'
origin and symbolizing the owner's goodwill than a mark displayed in the physical market. Therefore,
there is no less premium to recognize actual use of marks through websites than their actual use through
traditional means. Indeed, as our world evolves, so too should our appreciation of the law.
e. However, it must be shown that the owner has actually transacted, or at the very least, intentionally targeted
customers of a particular jurisdiction in order to be considered as having used the trade mark in the ordinary
course of his trade in that country. A showing of an actual commercial link to the country is therefore
imperative.
• The use of mark on the internet must be shown to result into a within-State sale, or at the very least,
discernibly intended to target customers that reside in that country. This being so, the use of the mark
Page 106 of 167

on an interactive website, for instance, may be said to target local customers when they contain specific
details regarding or pertaining to the target State, sufficiently showing an intent towards realizing a
within-State commercial activity or interaction.
• In this case, Starwood has proven that it owns Philippine registered domain names for its websites. The
website is accessible to Philippine citizens and residents. It provides a phone number for Philippine
consumers and uses English language. The prices for hotel accomodations can also be converted to
Php.
f. Taken together, these facts and circumstances show that Starwood's use of its "W" mark through its
interactive website is intended to produce a discernable commercial effect or activity within the Philippines,
or at the very least, seeks to establish commercial interaction with local consumers. Accordingly, Starwood's
use of the "W" mark in its reservation services through its website constitutes use of the mark sufficient to
keep its registration in force.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 22, 2015 and the Resolution dated
January 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133825 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 107 of 167

U.P. LAW BOC CRIMINAL LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
CRIMINAL LAW
JESUS GARCIA v. HON. ALAN DRILON AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA
VAWC | June 25, 2013| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• March 8, 2004 – Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
• March 3, 2006 – Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition for the issuance of a TPO (Temporary Protection
Order) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia because of physical, psychological, and economic violence.
• Their marriage was marred by quarrels (due to petitioner’s infidelity), intense physical abuse, and economic
violence (threats of non-support).
• March 24, 2006 – RTC issued the TPO, followed by multiple amended and new TPOs because of
petitioner’s failure to comply.
II.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law – NO
a. In spite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as
a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.
b. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.
c. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction
to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
d. That the proceedings are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same
in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
not need to be supported by evidence. Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues.
e. Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11- SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to
expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running
afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
f. Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it
effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
g. The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits
of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat
the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Page 108 of 167

2. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9269 is discriminatory, unjust,
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause – NO
a. Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse,
which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough
basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.
b. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. But the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
c. RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions justifying the classification under the law.
• At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women
and children show that women are the “usual” and “most likely” victims of violence. While there
are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines,
the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
• The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.
• As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”
d. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to address violence committed against
women and children, as spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.
e. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only and apply equally to all members for as long
as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
f. There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner
in his defense.
g. There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution – NO
a. Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: “On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling
of what happened.”
b. A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
c. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a
writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which
the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,
in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands
of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could
be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
Page 109 of 167

process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
d. the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him
and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination.
e. Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to
the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.
• Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.
4. WON the CA seriously erred in not declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials
a. The BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay
is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
“enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”[
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
Page 110 of 167

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES v. JAY HINLO

Robbery with Homcide | Feb. 18, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Appeal
FACTS:
• On Oct. 14, 2003, Hinlo, Palma, Senido, Pedroso and Dumagat were drinking at the house of Senido when
the latter informed the others of the plan to rob the house of Sps. Clavel. The next day, they proceeded to
the house of Sps. Clavel where Senido used a knife to cut the cyclone wire fence. They destroyed the knob
of the kitchen door and gained entry where they took certain valuable items.
• Meanwhile, Freddie Clavel woke up to go to the bathroom which was located outside his bedroom and as
he opened the bathroom door, Senido, who was hiding inside, assaulted him and the two wrestled. Then,
Hinlo approached Freddie and with the use of a bladed weapon, stabbed the latter on his abdomen which
led to his untimely demise. Thereafter, Palma, Senido, Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat hurriedly escaped and
left behind part of the items they took on the railroad located behind the property. Shortly thereafter, the
police arrived and recovered 2 leather bags containing the items stolen.
• The City Health Officer who conducted the autopsy attested that Clavel sustained a stab wound at the right
upper quadrant of his abdomen causing massive hemorrhage which led to his death.
• Palma, Senido, Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat were charged with the Special Complex Crime of Robbery
with Homicide under Art. 294 RPC.
• RTC convicted accused-appellants as charged. CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction and ordered the
immediate arrest of Hinlo who remains at large.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellants for Robbery with Homicide. - YES
a. The elements for the crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, homicide was
committed. A conviction requires that the robbery is the main purpose and the killing is merely incidental
to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.
b. In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC's conclusions finding that accused-appellants were all
armed with knives when they broke into the house of the Sps. Clavel, took certain personal properties, and,
in the course thereof, stabbed Freddie, resulting to his death. This is supported by the testimony of the state
witness, Dumagat, who presented a detailed, consistent, and credible narrative of the incident and positively
identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
c. Positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their defense of alibi considering that in this
jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot outweigh the testimony of
eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants committed the crime.
d. Conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent
the killing.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01215 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accordingly, accused-appellants
Richard Palma y Varcas a.k.a. "Inday Atet," Ruvico Senido y Hamaybay a.k.a. "Ruby," and Edgar Pedroso y Palasol
a.k.a. "Libat" are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and are ordered to pay the heirs of Freddie Clavel the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of judgment until full payment. The rest of the CA Decision stands. SO ORDERED.
Page 111 of 167

PEOPLE v. BRAHIM LIDASAN

Kidnapping | Sept. 4, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• The Information filed with the RTC charged the accused-appellants (Lidasan, Mohamad, Mocalam, Usman,
Matoc, Wahab, Alunan, Rajid, Hassan, Camsa, Lawan, Bauting, Bansuan and Diang) with the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. The accusatory portions reads that they “…with the use of force and intimidation
kidnap MICHELLE RAGOS for the purpose of extorting P30 million ransom, and where she was brought
to two (2) safe-houses both situated at Las Piñas City, where she was detained and deprived of her liberty
until she was finally rescued by the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force on
November 7, 1998 after the payment of P4.83 million”
• Prosecution alleged that Ragos was in her family’s private office/residential compound in Valenzuela City
guarded by Bauting and Daliano when suddenly Bansuan and 2 others entered her bedroom and declared
“kidnapping ito.” Adil served as lookout while the other men tied Ragos’s hands, sealed her mouth and
ransacked their place. She was then brought to a house in Las Pinas where 6 persons took turns guarding
her and then transferred to another house where 10-20 persons guarded her some of whom were identified
to be Matoc, Kamir, Camsa, Rajid, Wahab, Hassan, Usman, Lawan, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan.
• RTC ruled as follows: (a) Alunan and accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged as principals, and were sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death; (b) Lidasan,
Mohamad, Mocalam, Usman, Matoc, Wahab, and Rajid were found guilty of the crime charged as
accomplices, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and (c) Camsa, Hassan, and
Lawan were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the convictions of accused-appellants for Kidnapping for Ransom should be upheld. - YES
a. The elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are as follows: (a) the offender is a
private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c)
the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; ii) it is
committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. Notably, the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if the
purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.
b. In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements
as it is undisputed that accused-appellants, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos against her will
for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family. Moreover, the collective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, such as victim Ragos and state witness Bauting, positively identified the perpetrators to the
kidnapping - including accused-appellants Adil, Daliano, and Kamir - as well as narrated in detail the events
that transpired from Ragos's abduction up to her rescue. These easily trump accused-appellants' denial and
alibi which are inherently weak defenses that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration by credible witnesses.
c. As to the proper penalties to be imposed on accused-appellants, Article 267 of the RPC originally prescribes
the death penalty for the commission of said crime made for the purpose of extorting ransom. However,
the passage of RA 9346 effectively lowered the imposable penalty to the principals, e.g., accused-appellants,
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Resultantly, the imposable penalty to the accomplices
must likewise be lowered to reclusion temporal, thereby entitling them to the benefit of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
d. It is worthy to note that none of the accomplices made any appeal to the Court. This notwithstanding, the
Court deems it proper to adjust their sentence as it is favorable and beneficial to them, in accordance with
Section 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, “An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.”
e. The Court deems it proper to impose civil liability ex delicto against accused-appellants in the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid. However, only
Page 112 of 167

accused-appellants Adil, Daliano, and Kamir, or those who pursued the present appeal, are held jointly and
solidarity liable for such amounts, since such imposition is clearly not favorable to their co-accused who no
longer appealed their conviction before the Court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decisions dated September 24, 2008 and March 5, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01937, which upheld the Decision dated August 15, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 in Crim. Case No. 98-1379, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
(a) Accused Jimmy Alunan and accused-appellants Omar Kamir, Alex Daliano, and Bayan Abbas Adil are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole;
(b) Accused Brahim Lidasan, Nhokie Mohamad, Rocky Mocalam, Teng Usman, Ali Matoc, Muslimen Wahab, and
Rowena Amal Rajid are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period often (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(c) Accused-appellants Omar Kamir, Alex Daliano, and Bayan Abbas Adil are ordered to solidarity pay the victim
Michelle Ragos civil liability ex delicto in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Page 113 of 167

PEOPLE v. CRISANTO CIRBETO Y GIRAY

Murder | Feb. 7, 2018 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Cirbeto was charged with the crime of murder. Prosecution eyewitness Dalimoos narrated that he saw his
friend, the victim, Casipit, and accused Cirbeto walking towards a nearby mall when accused suddenly pull
a knife from the right side of his back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife
using his right hand. Accused-appellant was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away.
However, accused-appellant ran after Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former held the latter's
shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death.
• Cirbeto tried to flee but was seized by Marikina police who also recovered the knife used to stab the victim.
• RTC convicted Cirbeto as charged. CA affirmed accused-appellant's conviction with modifications,
increasing the award of civil indemnity and damages.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly affirmed accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of Murder. - YES
a. To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC (e.g. 1. With treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; or 5. With evident premeditation) and (4) that the killing
is not parricide or infanticide.
b. In this case, and as correctly found by the courts a quo, the prosecution was able to establish a confluence
of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant
was positively identified as the one who killed him; (3) Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying
circumstance; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.
c. Accused-appellant's defense is focused on the possible uncertainty over his identification by Dalimoos, the
eyewitness, as the victim's assailant. He insists that Dalimoos was mistaken in identifying him and may even
have been coached to lie in his testimony.
• The Court is not convinced. It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive
and credible, as in the case of Dalimoos, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder.
• Dalimoos had consistently, straightforwardly, and positively identified accused-appellant as the person
who was walking with the victim Casipit and who later on stabbed the latter. Dalimoos's testimony did
not waver; neither did it suffer from any grave or material inconsistency as would strip away his
credibility as an eyewitness to the crime.
d. The findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and is in the best position to discern whether or not they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the
latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
e. As regards the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court likewise concurs with the
courts a quo in finding its presence in the commission of the crime.
• In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
• The evidence in this case clearly show that the attack against Casipit was sudden, deliberate, and
unexpected. He was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with accused-
appellant on the date and time in question. Moreover, deliberate intent to kill Casipit can be inferred
from the location and number of stab wounds he sustained, and even though he was able to run after
the first stab wound, accused-appellant was able to subdue and stab him further, rendering him
defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance in this case.
Page 114 of 167

f. However, the Court is of a different view with respect to the purported presence of evident premeditation.
• For evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying or an aggravating circumstance, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
• In this case, there is dearth of evidence to prove that accused-appellant had previously planned the
killing of Casipit. Nothing has been offered to establish when and how he planned and prepared for
the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his determination and
execution.
g. With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by accused-appellant, the Court - as with the
courts a quo - rejects the same. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes
face-to-face with the positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witness,
Dalimoos. Accused-appellant himself testified that on the date and time material to this case, he was outside
a fastfood restaurant standing beside a parked car within the vicinity of the stabbing incident.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 9, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06481 finding accused-appellant Crisanto Cirbeto y Giray guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the amount of exemplary damages, which is increased to P75,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. The rest of the assailed Decision stands. SO ORDERED.
Page 115 of 167

PEOPLE v. EDGARDO DELA ROSA Y EMPAMANO

Drugs| Oct. 1, 2018 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• A buy-bust team composed of members of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Special Operations Task
Group of Makati City was formed to respond to a tip regarding a male and a female peddling illegal drugs
along Makati Avenue, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.
• A search on the person of Edgardo Empamano yielded four plastic sachets containing suspected shabu.
Thus, after accused-appellants were apprised of their rights, the arresting officers brought them and the
seized items to the barangay hall where the items were marked, photographed, and inventoried in the
presence of Brgy. Captain Cruz. Thereafter, the confiscated items were brought to the crime laboratory for
examination and tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
• All three (3) accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, while Edgardo was further charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
• RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON accused-appellants' conviction for the crimes charged should be reversed. - YES
a. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders
the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence,
warrants an acquittal.
b. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court
as evidence of the crime.
c. The law requires that the apprehending team, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items. The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or
his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of
RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media." The law requires the presence of
these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.”
d. However, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render
the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
e. Anent the required witnesses rule, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit
they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case
basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable
under the given circumstances.
f. Records show that although the inventory of the seized items was conducted in the presence of Brgy.
Captain Cruz (an elected public official), no representatives from the DOJ and the media were present to
witness the same.
g. Neither do the records reflect that these witnesses were present during the photography of the seized items,
which process is usually conducted contemporaneously with the inventory thereof.
h. The prosecution is put to task to justify the absence of the required witnesses during the conduct of inventory and
photography or, at the very least, show that the arresting officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure
their presence. Unfortunately, no such justification or demonstration was even proffered in this case.
Page 116 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07579 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellants
Edgardo Dela Rosa y Empamano @ "Boy," Criselda Huerto y Docot @ "Cecil," and Ronaldo Huerto y Docot are
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause their immediate
release, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED
.
Page 117 of 167

PEOPLE v. MAURICIO HALLARTE Y MENDOZA

Robbery with Homicide | Apr. 2, 2014| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Hallarte was charged under two separate Informations:
o Criminal Case No. Q-00-93225 – alleging that on June 4, 2000, accused, by means of force and
intimidation, dragged AAA, a 7-year old minor, into his house and had carnal knowledge with her
against her will and without her consent.
o Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 – alleging that on June 17, 2000, accused, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design, committed an act of sexual assault against 8-year old BBB, by then
and there inserting his penis into her mouth against her will and without her consent.
• On June 4, 2000, appellant approached AAA, his niece, and began to remove his shorts. Thereafter, he laid
AAA, raised her skirt and pulled down her underwear. Then, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina,
causing AAA to feel pain and to shout for help. When appellant realized that his daughter Charissa might
be returning anytime, he let AAA go.
• On June 17, 2000, while appellant’s other niece, BBB, was with him in his house, he inserted his penis into
her mouth and threatened her not to tell anyone what he had done. BBB did not report the incident
immediately because she feared appellant.
• Private complainants were brought to the police station where they gave their respective sworn statements
against appellant. AAA was examined by a medico-legal officer of the PNP, whose findings led to the
conclusion of normal genital findings which do not exclude sexual abuse.
• RTC convicted appellant as charged, Simple Rape as to AAA and Rape by Sexual Assault as to BBB. CA
affirmed, modifying only the penalty in the Sexual Assault case.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in affirming appellant’s conviction for both crimes charged. - NO
a. The Court gives full weight to the RTC’s finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant indeed committed
the crimes charged and is therefore guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefor.
b. As observed by the RTC, which had the opportunity to personally scrutinize both AAA’s and BBB’s
conduct and demeanor during trial, they were credible witnesses whose testimonies must be accorded great
probative weight. The trial judge’s evaluation, which the CA sustained, now binds the Court, leaving to the
appellant the burden to bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight that were otherwise overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted but would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if duly
considered. Unfortunately for appellant, he failed to discharge this burden.
c. Moreover, testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has in fact been committed.
d. However, while the Court upholds the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon appellant in the Simple
Rape case, it modifies the penalty in the Rape by Sexual Assault
e. In view of the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily prove the age of BBB. While the information
alleged that BBB was “8 years of age, a minor,” and the parties stipulated on her minority during the pre-
trial conference, the same are insufficient evidence of her age which must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04061 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-00-93225 for Simple Rape, accused-appellant Mauricio Hallartey Mendoza is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 for Rape by Sexual Assault, accused-appellant Mauricio Hallartey Mendoza is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ordered to pay BBB the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The amounts of damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum, to be reckoned from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. ‘ SO ORDERED.
Page 118 of 167

PEOPLE v. RICO NIEBRES Y REGINALDO

Qualified Rape | Dec. 4, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• The prosecution alleged that sometime in Oct. 2010, Niebres went to the house of his parents-in-law where,
after drinking, he went to the room where AAA (Niebres’ sister-in-law) and his family were sleeping and
lied beside her to sleep.
• The next morning, AAA suddenly woke up and noticed Niebres kissing her. Niebres then pulled down her
shorts, unzipped his pants, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. After repeatedly making a push
and pull motion on AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis and dismounted from her. According to AAA,
this was not the first time Niebres sexually abused her, claiming that Niebres also raped her several weeks
before the said incident in his house.
• When AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother, BBB, brought her to the hospital where the
doctors discovered that AAA is 5-6 months pregnant. When AAA finally admitted to BBB that Niebres
raped her, they reported the matter to the police and filed the instant Complaint.
• A psychiatrist revealed that AAA is suffering from a mild mental retardation, as such she has an IQ
equivalent to a 9-year old child.
• RTC found Niebres guilty of the crime of Simple Rape in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. However,
the RTC did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of relationship by affinity between Niebres and
AAA even if it was proven in court, given that the same was not alleged in the Information. CA upgraded
Niebres's conviction to that of Qualified Rape.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Niebres's conviction for the crime of Rape should be upheld. - YES
a. In criminal cases, the appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.
b. A plain reading of the Information reveals that Niebres was charged of the crime of Qualified Rape, as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1)*, in relation to Article 266-B**, of the RPC.
c. For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the
RPC, it is necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation,
when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
• Case law states that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below
12 years old, constitutes statutory rape.
d. In this instance, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape, as it was shown
that: (a) AAA was suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q. equivalent to a nine (9)-year
old child; (b) Niebres successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA sometime in October 2010; and (c) Niebres
was able to accomplish the said act because AAA, being a mental retardate, was deprived of reason at the
time of the incident
e. However, the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent evidence to
substantiate the same.
• Such qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to
be properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form.
• While the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was
specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. The
fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the
crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her disability at the
time of its commission.
• Mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently create moral certainty
that the former knew of the latter's disability.
Page 119 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06374 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Rico Niebres y
Reginaldo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary
awards from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
*ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed –

xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
**ART. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Page 120 of 167

PEOPLE v. WILT SAM BANGALAN Y MAMBA

Drugs | Sept. 3, 2018| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• An Information filed before the RTC accused Bangalan of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The
prosecution alleged that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of July 27, 2012, a team composed of members of
the Philippine National Police Tuguegarao City Police Station, with coordination from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, conducted a buy-bust operation against Bangalan, during which 8.12 grams of dried
marijuana leaves were recovered from him. The team, together with Bangalan, then proceeded to the
Tuguegarao City Police Station where the seized item was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the
presence of Barangay Kagawad Remigio Cabildo (Kgwd. Cabildo). Thereafter, it was brought to the crime
laboratory where, after examination, it was confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous drug.
• RTC found Bangalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. CA
affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, increasing the fine.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Bangalan’s conviction should be overturned - YES
a. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders
the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence,
warrants an acquittal.
b. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court
as evidence of the crime.
c. The law requires that the apprehending team, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items. The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or
his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of
RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media." The law requires the presence of
these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.”
d. However, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render
the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved.
e. It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
f. Non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine
and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While
the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for
the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances.
g. It is apparent from the testimony of P02 Caranguian that the inventory of the seized item was not conducted
in the presence of any representative of the DOJ and the media contrary to the afore-described procedure.
h. To add, records are bereft of any indication that photographs of the confiscated items were duly taken. This
lapse was completely unacknowledged and perforce, left unjustified by the prosecution altogether. Because
of these deviations, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from Bangalan were compromised, which consequently warrants his
acquittal.
Page 121 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 3, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07883 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Wilt Sam Bangalan y Mamba is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Page 122 of 167

RIZALDO L. ORSOS v. PEOPLE

Acts of Lasciviousness | Nov. 20, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In 2007, Minor victim AAA was a 14year-old third year high school student at Dumalag Central National
High School (DCNHS) where petitioner was then working as a teacher and Citizen's Army Training (CAT)
Commandant.
• Orsos asked AAA if she wanted to become a CAT officer and instructed her to go to his house. There,
Orsos pulled her to his lap and asked her to kiss him. Thinking it was part of the initiation rites, AAA kissed
his right cheek. Thereafter, petitioner asked her to sit on the sofa and proceeded to kiss her on the lips,
leading her to cry. Petitioner then instructed her to lie down on the sofa, lifted her shirt and underwear, and
sucked her right breast for about two minutes. Petitioner was about to unzip her pants when she pleaded
for him not to do so as she had her menstrual period then. Petitioner stood up and went back to the
bathroom. When he re-emerged, he told her to stop crying and not to report the incident if she truly wanted
to become a CAT officer. AAA decided to quit school, go to Manila for a year, and not tell her family what
happened.
• Sometime in July 2008, several female CAT officers in DCNHS revealed that petitioner had molested them
and filed cases against him in court. Prompted by her mother's inquiry if petitioner had also molested her,
AAA finally disclosed the details of the incident to her.
• A complaint charging Orsos with acts of lasciviousness as defined and penalized in Art. 336 of the RPC
was filed. The accusatory portion read “…with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kiss the lips and suck the breasts of one [AAA], a female and minor of 16 years old without her
consent and against her will…which acts of the former likewise constitute other child abuse”
• The RTC found him guilty of acts of lasciviousness, giving more credence to the testimony of AAA. The
CA affirmed with modifications as to the award of damages.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in affirming petitioner's conviction for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC, as amended. - NO
a. For there to be the crime of acts of lasciviousness, there must be a confluence of the following elements
before conviction can be had for such crime: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3)
that the offended party is another person of either sex.
b. On the other hand, RA 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are
children or those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves
or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition. The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as follows:
(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male
or female, is below 18 years of age.[47] "Lascivious conduct" is defined as “the intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person”
c. A meticulous perusal of the records reveals that all the elements of both acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently established in
this case. AAA's minority, as she was only 14 years old at the time of the incident, had been sufficiently
established with the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth, showing that she was born on July 6, 1992.
It was likewise established that petitioner, who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's school,
and therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed lascivious or
lewd conduct against her by kissing her lips and sucking her right breast.
Page 123 of 167

d. It has been established that petitioner, who was AAA's teacher and then the CAT Commandant in her
school, was able to carry out his lewd acts by asking her twice if she was determined to become a CAT
officer. Petitioner's inquiry strongly suggested that if AAA really wanted to become a CAT officer, she
should accede to his demands and allow him to commit lascivious conduct upon her person. Therefore,
petitioner exercised influence and coercion upon AAA in order to commit the crime against her, thereby
satisfying the element of force and intimidation in this case. Besides, although petitioner was not armed nor
did he threaten AAA, his moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or
intimidation.
e. Petitioner's conviction is upheld not for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, but for "lascivious conduct'' under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
considering that she was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.
f. Although it is true that Branch 20 of the RTC of Mambusao, Capiz is a regular court, it has jurisdiction over
the instant case considering that there is no family court constituted in the area where the crime was
committed. Thus, in accordance with Section 17 of RA No. 8369, which provides that in areas where there
are no family courts, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the said family courts shall be adjudicated by
the regular courts, the RTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over this case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Rizaldo L. Orsos is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and accordingly,
SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and further
ORDERED to pay private complainant the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Page 124 of 167

ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. PEOPLE

RA 3019 | Apr. 17, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Fe Valenzuela is the sole proprietor of Triple A ship Chandling and General Maritame Services which
operated in the port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993.
• In 2002, Roberto Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A’s Business Permit despite its
compliance with the proper procedure and the approval of other municipal officers.
• Triple A attempted to continue operations but the Bureau of Customs issued a Cease and Desist Order
against them after receiving an unnumbered Memorandum from Fuentes alleging that Valenzuela was
involved in smuggling and drug trading.
• Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be issued a Business Permit, but his security refused to receive
the same
• Valenzuela also obtained certifications and clearances from the Isabel Chief of Police, the Barangay Captain,
the Narcotics Group of Tacloban National Police Commission, the PNP Isabel Police Station, and the
Police Regional Office of the PNP all stating that she is of good moral character, a law¬-abiding citizen,
and has not been charged nor convicted of any crime as per verification from the records of the locality.
• Despite all her efforts, no Business Permit was issued to her, causing the spoilage of goods that were due
to be shipped and the suspension of Triple A’s operations from 2002 to 2006. A business permit was only
issued in 2007.
• Valenzuela filed a complaint against Fuentes for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
• In his defense, Fuentes alleged that he had withheld the approval of the business permit due to rumors that
Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities which he claimed were confirmed by written reports from the
Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police.
• Sandiganbayan: Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt; sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6)
months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and ordered to pay Valenzuela the
amount of P200,000.00 as nominal damages
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Fuentes was correctly convicted of a violation of Sec 3(e) – YES
a. The SC found that Fuentes was guilty of all the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) namely: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
b. Fuentes acted with partiality because he himself testified that in the rumours, there were 5 ship chandlers
involved in the smuggling operations but it was only Triple A that was refused a permit.
c. It is clear that Fuentes’ actions effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations,
thus causing undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. The suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations
prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002-2006.
d. The Court deemed it fit to modify the award of damages from nominal to temperate. Nominal damages are
re "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that
has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.”
e. In this case it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to the suspension of Triple
A’s operations but such amount was not proven with certainty. Thus, the award for temperate damages is
proper. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be provided with certainty.
f. There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial
credit or to the goodwill of a business firm.
Page 125 of 167

g. Computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages is usually left to the discretion of the courts, but
the amount must be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but
less than compensatory.
h. The Court holds that the award of temperate damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is proper, considering
that Valenzuela's net income from the previous year, 2001, was P750,000.00.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.
NOTES:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Page 126 of 167

U.P. LAW BOC REMEDIAL LAW PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
REMEDIAL LAW
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY v. CYNTHIA B. BAÑA
CivPro | March 7, 2018| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
• However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw. Respondent
invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining
for the court's independent adjudication.
• Petitioner filed his reply, averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the
same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Motion to Withdraw.
• RTC granted the Motion to Withdraw but declared respondent’s counterclaim as remaining for independent
adjudication. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for independent
adjudication before the same trial court. - YES
a. Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the ROC* provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in the event that a
complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs instance.
b. As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to
the complaint.
c. However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim
in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from notice o[the motion. Otherwise, his
counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action.
d. CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that
the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's third
sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior
to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should
the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.
e. By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated the foregoing principle
and in so doing, erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim "as
remaining for independent adjudication" despite the latter's failure to file the required manifestation within
the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period.
f. The RTC should have only granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the prosecution of respondent's
counterclaim in a separate action.
dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is ENTERED solely granting petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay's Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others,
without prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action. SO
ORDERED.
*Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
Page 127 of 167

motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court.
Page 128 of 167

BOSTON FINANCE v. GONZALEZ

Civ Pro | Oct. 9, 2018 | Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: Administrative
FACTS:
• Complainant alleged that plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY filed a Petition with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC. Respondent issued
an Order directing complainant to show cause why an injunctive writ should not be issued.
• In the same order, however, respondent also directed the Clerk of Court, as Ex-Officio Sheriff, and her
Deputy Sheriff "to cease and desist from conducting the scheduled public auction on November 19, 2010 pending the
resolution of the instant petition” without, however, specifying the duration of its effectivity.
• Complainant field its Compliance and eventually filed an Answer praying for the dismissal of the petition.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to resolve all pending incidents in connection with the case for a relatively
long time.
• Complainant again moved for the prompt resolution of all pending incidents in the case. Although it denied
that the parties were currently undergoing amicable settlement, complainant nonetheless expressed its
willingness to enter into a compromise agreement with plaintiffs. However, no compromise agreement was
reached for failure of the plaintiffs to cooperate with complainant.
• In an Order dated July 24, 2013, respondent suspended the proceedings in and archived Civil Case No. 10-
27-MY "pending resolution of the other related case in Bacolod City”
• Complainant maintained that respondent's failure to promptly resolve all pending incidents in the case, i.e.,
the motion to lift the cease and desist order and the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 10-27-MY, despite
repeated pleas for their immediate resolution, constituted gross dereliction of duty and violation of A.M.
No. 99-10-05-0
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON respondent should be held administratively liable. - YES
a. The Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue delay in rendering an order.
b. Respondent's "cease and desist" Order issued on November 19, 2010 was in the nature of a TRO. However,
the aforesaid order failed to justify the necessity for its issuance, as it merely issued the directive to the Clerk
of Court, acting as Ex-Officio Sheriff, and the Deputy Sheriff without stating the reasons therefor. Likewise,
it did not specify any period for its effectivity, in essence making the same indefinite.
c. These omissions on respondent's part are contrary to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
d. In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the rules and restrictions
regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of procedure, and hence, renders him
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Case law states that "when a law or a rule is basic,
judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law." It is of no moment that he was motivated by good
faith or acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of his
official functions.
e. Similarly, the Court finds respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering an order for his failure to
expeditiously resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY despite complainant's repeated
motions for early resolution.
f. His explanation for archiving the case on the ground that the parties were in the process of entering into
an amicable settlement does not justify the prolonged inaction thereon, in light of the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 or the "Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases," which provides that a
case may be archived only for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, after which, it shall be immediately
included in the trial calendar after the lapse thereof.
g. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious
charge punishable by either: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporation; or (b) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) months, but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. On the other hand, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less
serious charge punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
Page 129 of 167

less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
h. Considering that this is the first time that respondent has been found administratively liable for both
offenses, and in light of relevant jurisprudence where separate penalties had been imposed on a respondent
judge who is found guilty of two (2) or more offenses, the Court metes upon respondent in this case the
penalty of a fine in the amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, as well as a fine of P11,000.00
for undue delay in resolving pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY. Further, respondent is sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
i. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall exclusively govern administrative cases involving judges or justices
of the lower courts. If the respondent judge or justice of the lower court is found guilty of multiple offenses
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation
j. The administrative liability of court personnel (who are not judges or justices of the lower courts) shall be
governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which incorporates, among others, the civil service
laws and rules. If the respondent court personnel is found guilty of multiple administrative offenses, the
Court shall impose the penalty corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances.
RULING: WHEREFORE, respondent Candelario V. Gonzalez, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and accordingly,
meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of P30,000.00. Likewise, he is found GUILTY of Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order and accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of P11,000.00. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the aforestated guidelines shall be observed. These guidelines shall
APPLY to all pending and future administrative cases involving court employees, subject to revision by the Court
through the pertinent issuance therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Page 130 of 167

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

SpecPro | Oct. 8, 2014 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• In his petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner were former
common law partners. Lee confronted Ilagan regarding a purported sex video she discovered in Ilagan’s
camera involving Ilagan and another woman. During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s
head against a wall inside his office and walked away.
• Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely, (a)
a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, and (b) an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
• Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute it to the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman.
• RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s
digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a
verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
• Lee admitted that she kept the memory card but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence
in the cases she filed against Ilagan.
• RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the
implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further
reproducing the same.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. – NO
a. The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.
b. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
c. The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition
must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim
d. Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject
sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain
the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
e. Even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his
petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement.
f. Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends
– say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. SO ORDERED.
Page 131 of 167

ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN v. ANTONIO S. CAISIP

CivPro | August 06, 2018| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent Caisip. Respondent
defaulted in his obligation under a promissory note to pay €2,522 and refused to heed petitioner's demands
to comply.
• Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default and for
the MCTC to render judgment.
• MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the requirement
of barangay conciliation as mandated by the Local Government Code.
• When the case reached the review of the CA, it affirmed the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint. - YES
a. Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the ROC provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss.
“xxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.”
b. Thee grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order
the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
c. The motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's failure to refer the matter for
barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in
court. It is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon.
Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay, as in the parties herein, shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
d. The ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation
proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for
failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to
order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the
Court finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin,
for its resolution on the merits.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 23, 2014 and the Resolution
dated May 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129824 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2738-12 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac for resolution on the merits, with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Page 132 of 167

FENIX INTERNATIONAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
• President Gloria Arroyo issued EO 156 which provides for the ban on importation of all types of used
motor vehicles except those that may be allowed under its provisions. The constitutionality of this EO was
challenged in Hon. Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries where the Court held that the EO is valid
insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area
and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
• PGMA then issued EO 418 which provides a specific duty in the amount of P500,000.00 in addition to the
regular rates of import duty imposed on the list of articles in the EO. This prompted petitioner, a
corporation engaged in the conversion of imported used vehicles, to file a petition for declaratory relief.
The RTC ruled that Sec. 2 of EO 418 is unconstitutional. This became final and executory. The RTC issued
a writ of execution which resulted in the Bureau of Customs allowing importations by petitioner.
• In the meantime, another case questioning the validity of of EO 156 was filed before the RTC by
Forerunner. This reached the Supreme Court which ruled that EO 418 did not repeal EO 156, and that the
ruling in the Fenix Case did not have any effect, much less reverse the pronouncements in Southwing, which
upheld the ban on importations of used motor vehicles into the Philippines outside the fenced-in freeport
export zones.
• BOC then enforced EO 156, disallowing importations of used motor vehicles by petitioners. The latter
then filed a petition for indirect contempt against respondents.
• RTC granted respondents’ motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly upheld the RTC Br. 8's dismissal of the Contempt Case on the ground of res judicata
and forum shopping. - NO
a. Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment." It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points
and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted
to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate.
b. There are two (2) distinct concepts of res judicata, namely: (a) bar by former judgment; and (b) conclusiveness
of judgment.
c. The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements to be present for it to operate: (a) a former final
judgment that was rendered on the merits; (b) the court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (c) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the
first and second actions. In contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are identity of: (a) parties;
and (b) subject matter in the first and second cases.
d. There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court.
e. In this case, res judicata, whether through bar by prior judgment or through conclusiveness of judgment,
does not apply. While the private parties in Southwing, Forerunner, and the Fenix Case are all importers of used
motor vehicles, the cases filed before the Court dealt with different issues and causes of action. In particular,
the Southwing and Forerunner cases dealt with the constitutionality of the ban on importation of used motor
vehicles as provided under EO 156, while the Fenix Case dealt with the constitutionality of EO 418. On the
other hand, the issue in the Contempt Case is limited to whether or not respondents committed indirect
contempt by going against the wordings of the Writ of Execution in the Fenix Case. Clearly, Southwing,
Forerunner, and the Fenix Case do not bar the Contempt Case from proceeding. In view of the inapplicability
of res judicata in this case, it then necessarily follows that there was no forum shopping.
f. The courts a quo erred in ruling that the Contempt Case is barred by res judicata and/or forum shopping. Thus,
it is only proper to remand the case for further proceedings.
Page 133 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 and the
Resolution dated September 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36899 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, S.C.A. No. II-5557 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
Page 134 of 167

QUISAY v. PEOPLE
Preliminary Investigation - Review | January 13, 2016 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
● Dec. 28, 2012: OCP-Makati issued a Pasiya/Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner Girlie M.
Quisay for violation of RA 7610. (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse Exploitation and
Discrimination Act). Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal/Information was filed before RTC on Jan. 11, 2013
charging petitioner of such crime.
● Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground of lack of authority of the person who
filed the same before the RTC.
○ Resolution: penned by Assistant City Prosecutor De La Cruz, approved by Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor Hirang.
○ Information: penned by De La Cruz but w/o approval from any higher authority. There was only a
certification claiming that De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor
in filing the said information.
● OCP-Makati countered that Hirang was authorized to approve the Resolution pursuant to OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32 and the prior approval from the CP with regards to the information in the Certification.
● RTC denied motion to quash for lack of merit. It found that the Certification attached in the Information
sufficiently complies with Sec. 4, Rule 112.
● CA affirmed and held that OCP-Makati complied with aforementioned Order and RA 10071 (Prosecution
Service Act of 2010). Certification should enjoy the presumption of regularity in absence of a contrary
proof.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's
motion to quash. - NO
a. As a general rule (Sec. 4, Rule 112), complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior
written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders it defective and, therefore, subject
to quashal pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 117.
b. People v. Garfin: The filing of an information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by
express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
c. The Resolution, finding probable cause, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated
review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
d. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing
that it was approved by either CP of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati’s division chiefs or review
prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from De La Cruz.
e. Despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same
in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority
from any of those authorized officers in Sec. 4, Rule 112.
f. Hence, Information must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CA Decision and Resolution REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Information against petitioner is QUASHED. Criminal case DISMISSED.
NOTE:
Rule 112, Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. —
xxx
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Rule 117, Section 3 (d). Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
Page 135 of 167

HARRY L. GO v. PEOPLE
Crim Pro | July 18, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information
against them alleges that they defrauded Highdone Company, represented by Li Luen Ping, when they
misrepresented that they have chattels installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Mills Factory
which resulted in the execution of a Deed of Mortgage for P20M, when in fact, these property were already
encumbered and foreclosed by China Bank.
• The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September
9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
• On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection in Cambodia.
• MetC granted the motion the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li
Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and
void. CA held that MetC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA erred in not finding that the MetC infringed in the Constitutional right of the petitioners to
a public trial in allowing the taking of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia. - YES
a. The procedure for testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness is covered under Sec. 15
Rule 119.
b. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
c. The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, but
for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure*.
d. Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court
where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the
deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.
e. To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly
assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused.
f. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
g. The conditional examination of a prosecution witness cannot defeat the rights of the accused to public trial
and confrontation of witnesses.
h. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the
presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the
courtroom in the absence of a trial judge.
i. The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination,
and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19, 2008
and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Page 136 of 167

Accordingly, the Decision ofthe Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
* SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
Page 137 of 167

HEIRS OF VICTOR AMISTOSO v. ELMER T. VALLECER

Civ Pro | Dec. 6, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Elmer Vallecer, through his brother, Benjy, filed a complaint review on certiorari for recovery of possession
and damages against petitioners claiming that he purchased a parcel of land after confirming with the DAR
that it was not tenanted. However, when he started the construction of a building on the property,
petitioners, with the aid of their workers stopped or barred him by force, threats, and intimidation.
• RTC declared respondent as the absolute owner of the subject property. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC. This became final and executory.
• Thereafter, respondent filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title ownership, possession, and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. L-298.
• Petitioners, in their Answer with Counter-claim and Affirmative Defenses, invoked res judicata, laches and
prescription.
• RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses for lack of merit, declaring that
the principle of res judicata would not apply in view of the lack of identity of causes of action. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO: WON Civil Case No. L-298 is barred by res judicata - NO
a. Petitioners argument that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil Case No. L-298,
considering that what is sought to be cancelled is their CLT; hence, an agrarian dispute falling within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, is specious.
b. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein and
regardless of the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss by the defendant.
c. A reading of the material allegations of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. L-298 and even petitioners'
admissions readily reveals that there is neither a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent,
nor had petitioners been the tenant of respondent's predecessors in-interest. In fact, respondent did not
even question the validity of petitioners' CLT nor sought for its cancellation. Rather, what respondent
sought was for a declaration that the property covered by his Torrens title is different from the property
covered by petitioners' CLT in order to quiet his title and remove all adverse claims against it. Clearly, this
is not an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.
d. For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
e. In this case, the Court finds that Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-298 on the
ground of res judicata as the causes of action in the two cases are not the same.
f. As plaintiff in Civil Case No. S-606, respondent never asked that he be declared the owner of the land in
question, but only prayed that he be allowed to recover possession thereof from petitioners. It is an accion
publiciana or a plenary action to recover the right of possession of land.
g. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. L-298, respondent asserted his ownership over the property by virtue
of his Torrens title, and alleged that petitioners' tenancy relationship actually pertains to the portion of the
adjacent land that belongs to Maria Kho Young with whom petitioners admittedly have the tenancy
relationship. Thus, the October 17, 2003 CA Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606 and petitioners'
unlawful possession and claim of ownership constitute a cloud on his title over the property. Accordingly,
respondent prayed for the court to declare him as the absolute owner of the property, and restrain and
prohibit petitioners from performing and/or continuing to perform act/s that affect his possession and
enjoyment thereof as owner.
h. It is clear that the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. S-606 and L-298 are different from each other. And
thus, the ruling in the former would not operate as res judicata on the latter.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 24, 2016 and the Resolution
dated August 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06720 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
Page 138 of 167

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF

ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ, RICHARD B. LOPEZ v. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ
Nov. 12, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Enrique Lopez died leaving his wife Wendy, and four legitimate children petitioner Richard, and
respondents Diana, Marybeth, and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a last
will and testament.
• Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC with prayer
for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the
purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law.
• RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which
requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. CA
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. - YES
a. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code
provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.
b. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages
and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
c. Richard failed to follow substantial compliance in the form of the attestation clause. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT that it “consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot
be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 139 of 167

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN

FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU
Spec. Pro | Nov. 13, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners’ names are included in an Order of Battle list containing names of organizations and personalities
connected to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People’s Army
(NPA).
• Petitioner Atty. Ladaga, secretary-general of Union of People’s Lawyer Movement (UPLM), came to know
of the list through Rep. Ocampo. the reflected her alleged part on the movement to oust PGMA. In her
affidavit, Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life, liberty and security by narrating that
suspicious looking people have been visiting her law office during her absence.
• Davao City Councilor and Bayan Muna member, Atty. Librado-Trinidad, demanded the removal of her
name in the OB List. She recounted that two suspicious men on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went
about her day going to different places.
• Atty. Carlos of FLAG and UPLM, was also informed that his name was on the list.
• In fine, petitioners asserted that the OB List is a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there
have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB
List.
• Petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Application
for a Production Order. The RTC issued separate Writs of Amparo and directed respondents to file a
verified written return within 72 hours.
• During the scheduled hearing, Rep. Satur Ocampo’s oral testimony on the circumstances surrounding his
obtention of the alleged military document was dispensed with and, instead, the Affidavit he executed on
June 30, 2009 was presented in the hearing held on to form part of the documentary exhibits of petitioners.
• The RTC found no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners' life, liberty and
security was attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents, thus disposing of each of the
three cases.
o It rejected the sworn statement of Representative Ocampo for being hearsay, holding that with no
direct or personal knowledge of the authenticity of the subject OB List, even an oral testimony from
him on the circumstances surrounding its obtention through a “conscientious soldier” would still be of
no probative weight.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule.
a. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to
life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on
amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.
b. Every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the
following matters: xxx (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; xxx
c. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide that the parties should establish their claims
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or
violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged
d. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable
amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or indirect involvement
in the purported violations and found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces
of evidence adduced in their totality” and “to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under
our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.” Put
simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it
Page 140 of 167

satisfies “the most basic test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
e. In cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this case) a threatened violation of his/her rights since the
facts, circumstances and the link between these that create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably
within the ability of the amparo petitioner to prove.
f. A mere inclusion of one’s name in the OB List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the burden to
establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence.
g. The statement of Rep. Ocampo that the respondents are the real source of the OB List is unquestionably
hearsay evidence because, except for the fact that he himself received the OB List from an unnamed source
merely described as “a conscientious soldier,” he had no personal knowledge concerning its
preparation. But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate measure of flexibility in the instant cases
by admitting the hearsay testimony of Rep. Ocampo a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality
of those adduced leads to the conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be adequately proven.
h. Even if the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners' names therein, can be properly
inferred from the totality of the evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to relate
the subject OB List either to the threatening visits received by petitioners from unknown men or to the
violent deaths of the three (3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which could strongly
suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of military involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an Order
of Battle would eventually result to enforced disappearance and murder of those persons tagged therein as
militants
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders dated
August 14, 2009 and September 22, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 141 of 167

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v. OMBUDSMAN

Crim Pro | Mar. 15, 2016 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners, Jessica Reyes, Janet Napoles and the Napoles Siblings are all charged as co-conspirators for
their respective participations in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam.
• The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318 (NBI Complaint);
and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation
Office of the Ombudsman (FIO).
• The Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 finding probable
cause against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and against Reyes,
Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them.
- NO
a. The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless,
this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
b. Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable
basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible
for it.[148] Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
c. Thus, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable
cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute
certainty.
d. Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all elements of the crime charged need
not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is
because probable cause - the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation implies mere probability of
guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction
would suffice.
e. The validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
f. Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence
should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the determination of probable
cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibilitv or
veracity of testimonies presented.
g. The Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes, Janet
Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De
Asis of fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
• Records reveal that there is substantial basis to believe that Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile,
dealt with the parties involved; signed documents necessary for the immediate and timely
implementation of the Senator's PDAF-funded projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost
projects"; and repeatedly received "rebates," "commissions," or "kickbacks" for herself and for Senator
Enrile representing portions of the latter's PDAF.
• The evidence is already sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were
committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof as it remains apparent that: (a) Reyes, a public officer,
connived with Senator Enrile and several other persons (including the other petitioners in these
Page 142 of 167

consolidated cases as will be explained later) in the perpetuation of the afore-described PDAF scam,
among others, in entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b)
Senator Enrile and Reyes acted with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly
endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF without the benefit of public bidding
and/or negotiated procurement in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government
procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue
injury to the government, and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to
the beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes, was able to accumulate and acquire
ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00.
• Anent Janet Napoles's complicity in the abovementioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in all
reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. once
Janet Napoles was informed of the availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead
employee" of the JLN Corporation, would prepare a listing of the available projects specifically
indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet
Napoles would give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO and/or NCA is released.
Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects,
which were "ghost projects" that allowed Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.
• There is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is
ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief of staff, Reyes,
who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into transactions involving illegal
disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest partiality and
evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-
funded projects - even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated procurement, in direct
violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; and (c) the "ghost"
PDAF-funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.
• There is no merit in Janet Napoles's assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form and in
substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the
commission of the crimes charged.
• The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is,
therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypotheticallv admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense.
• In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated that: (a) Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles,
among others, are the ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused
of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; (c) they used a certain modus operandi to perpetuate
said scam, details of which were stated therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine
government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount of P345,000,000.00; and (e) the
PDAF scam happened sometime between the years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig
City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. The aforesaid allegations were essentially reproduced in the sixteen
(16) Informations - one (1) for Plunder and fifteen (15) for violation of RA 3019 - filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
• As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must be first
highlighted that they are placed in the same situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged
with crime/s principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or multiple
violations of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as private individuals on account of their
alleged conspiracy with public officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that
"[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." Thus, the reasonable likelihood that
conspiracy exists between them denotes the probable existence of the elements of the crimes above-
discussed equally as to them.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions
and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Page 143 of 167

JONATHAN Y. DEE v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED

Civ Pro | Mar. 15, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Harvest All, Bondeast Private, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy Yap Chua are minority stockholders of
Alliance Foods. (Harvest All, et al)
• As per Alliance’s by-laws, the Annual Stockholders’ Meeting is held every June 15. However, in a Special
Board of Directors Meeting held on May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's
objections, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending complete
subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of Pl Billion which was
earlier approved in a Board Resolution.
• According to Alliance’s Disclosure, such postponement was made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance]
better representation in the annual meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO]
of [Alliance]."
• This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint involving an intra-corporate controversy.
• The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to P8,860.00 which
they paid accordingly. Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint: (a) deleting its prayer to
declare null and void the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b)
instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to
and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.
• Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.' s failure to pay the
correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based
on the SRO which was valued at P1 Billion.
• RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to petitioners’ failure to pay the correct filing fees.
• CA reversed the RTC's order of dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to
the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same should have been
based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO - NO
a. Depending on the nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an intra-corporate
controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.
b. A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its main
purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation's by laws, or at
the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with the
corporation would somehow be preserved.
c. Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM
as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's impending SRO valued at P1 Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to
one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or
much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely narrative or
descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority shareholders
would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed.
d. Having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds
that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable
fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141, of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M.
No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the RTC in order:
(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially
assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04- SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.'s payment of any
discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the
regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of P8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings
of the case with dispatch.
Page 144 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871
is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for
further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Page 145 of 167

JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI

Civ Pro | Sept. 10, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Private respondent Atlantic Merchandising, Inc. filed an action for revival of judgment against Zamboanga
Alta Consolidated, Inc. (ZACI) before the Regional Trial Court.
• In its Jan. 31, 1991 decision, the RTC revived the judgment in Civil Case No. 3049 and ordered ZACI to
pay private respondent the amount of P673,536.54.
• The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied so private respondent sought the examination of ZACI's
debtors, which included petitioners as its stockholders.
• The RTC found that petitioners are indebted to ZACI as its incorporators in the aggregate amount of
P750,000.00 by way of unpaid stock subscriptions and ordered petitioners to settle their obligations to the
capital stock of ZACI.
• CA dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari on the following grounds: (1) failure to attach certified true
copies of the assailed RTC Decision and Order; (2) only three out of four petitioners signed the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping; (3) the IBP Official Receipt Number of the counsel for petitioners
was outdated, violating Bar Matter No. 287; and (4) deficiency in the docket and other fees in the sum of
P1,530.00.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA's outright dismissal of their petition on procedural grounds, despite substantial compliance, and
the RTC Decision directing them to pay private respondent the amount of their alleged unpaid stock
subscriptions to ZACI, are tantamount to a denial of due process of law. - YES
a. Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment. However, these rules may be relaxed,
for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to
comply with procedure.
b. After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court finds that compelling and substantial reasons exist in this
case as to justify the relaxation of procedural rules.
c. Records show that petitioners merely became involved in this case when, upon failure to execute the revived
final judgment in its favor in Civil Case No. 3776, respondent sought to examine the debtors of ZACI, the
judgment obligor, which included petitioners on the allegation that they had unpaid stock subscriptions to
ZACI, as its incorporators and stockholders. During the proceedings, petitioners vehemently denied any such
liability or indebtedness.
d. RTC should have directed respondent to institute a separate action against petitioners for the purpose of
recovering their alleged indebtedness to ZACI, in accordance with Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
e. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent
third parties.
f. Petitioners were total strangers to the civil case between ZACI and respondent, and to order them to settle
an obligation which they persistently denied would be tantamount to deprivation of their property without due
process of law. The only power of the RTC, in this case, is to make an order authorizing respondent to sue
in the proper court to recover an indebtedness in favor of ZACI. It has no jurisdiction to summarily try the
question of whether petitioners were truly indebted to ZACI when such indebtedness is denied.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed May 27, 2005 and September 6,
2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The September 29, 2004 Decision and December 9,
2004 Order of the RTC are likewise NULLIFIED, without prejudice to the institution of a separate action against
petitioners in accordance with Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Page 146 of 167

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO v. RTC

Crim Pro | Jan. 7, 2013| Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of Case: petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS:
• Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC for his use of personal
violence on the complainant.
• After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant
of arrest against petitioner. Petitioner then posted a bond and filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that at the
time the incident happened, he was no longer in a dating relationship with the complainant.
• The RTC denied the Motion.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused - NO
a. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262* specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered
as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a
woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had
sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to
result in physical harm or suffering.
b. Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying
the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts,
then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
c. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed.
d. Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm
under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification
for prescribing a higher penalty for the former.
2. WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense - YES

a. The Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the
petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law.
b. SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of
such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
c. The Court finds the Order of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the
Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended
party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
d. Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea, such as
in this case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 20 I 0 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional 'I'rial Court (KfC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210. SO ORDERED.
Page 147 of 167

* SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
Page 148 of 167

MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG v. PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION

Civ Pro | Jan. 24, 2018 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Galang filed a complaint for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings against
Peakhold before the RTC. (Annulment Case)
• While the Annulment Case was pending, Peakhold filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject lot. The RTC ordered the issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of Peakhold.
Initially, Galang filed a petition for extension of time to file a petition for review. Galang then filed a
Petition for Relief of Judgment contending that the Ex-Parte Petition is not summary in nature and should
have been threshed out in an adversarial proceeding, as it essentially deals with the validity of the subject
deed.
• After filing the Petition for Relief Case, Galang manifested that he is withdrawing the filing of the intended
petition for review before the CA.
• Peakhold filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Relief Case on the ground of forum shopping. The
RTC granted the said motion.
• During the pendency of the Certiorari Case, the Annulment Case was re-raffled. Considering the
implementation of the writ of possession, Galang was prompted to file a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, incorporating her additional prayer for
reconveyance of the subject lot. In response, Peakhold moved to dismiss the Annulment Case on the ground
of forum shopping since the Amended Complaint failed to disclose that Galang has a pending certiorari
case and a criminal complaint before the OCP of Caloocan.
• RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and found that the causes of actions and reliefs prayed for in the
Annulment and Certiorari Cases are different from those in the Criminal Complaint.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA erred in finding that Galang committed forum shopping when she failed to declare the pending
Certiorari Case and Criminal Complaint in her Amended Complaint in the Annulment Case. - YES
a. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential to ask whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another or whether the following elements of litis pendentia
are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
b. A judicious perusal of the records reveals that there is no identity of causes of actions and reliefs prayed for
among the said cases. The Annulment Case seeks to nullify the mortgage document executed in Peakhold's
favor, as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, given that the alleged real estate mortgage covering
the subject lot was void for having been executed without Galang's knowledge and consent. In the Petition
for Relief Case, Galang sought to set aside the ex parte writ of possession, contending that the same should
have been threshed out in an adversarial proceeding, since it involves a fictitious deed of real estate
mortgage, where the mortgagor therein is supposedly an impostor of Galang; while the Certiorari Case
sought to revive the Petition for Relief Case which was dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Finally, the Criminal Complaint involves the determination of whether or not there is probable cause to
indict the President of Peakhold and Donasco for Qualified Theft.
c. The issues raised and determined in these cases likewise differ. In the Annulment Case, the issue is whether
or not the deed of real estate mortgage is void, thereby entitling Galang to the recovery of the subject lot.
In the Petition for Relief Case, the issue is whether or not extrinsic fraud was actually employed by
Peakhold during the Ex-Parte Petition proceedings. In the Certiorari Case, the issue is whether or not the
RTC-Br. 122 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the dismissal of Galang's Petition for
Relief. Lastly, in the Criminal Complaint, the issue is whether or not there is probable cause to believe
that the President of Peakhold and Donasco committed the crime of Qualified Theft and should stand trial
therefor.
d. Given the above, the Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in the
Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same causes of
Page 149 of 167

actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said Amended Complaint,
or anytime thereafter. In this light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases essentially involve different causes
of actions, reliefs, and issues. Thus, any judgment rendered in one will not necessarily amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration. This holds true even if the complaint in the Annulment Case was
subsequently amended by Galang. Moreover, the cases also differ in their form and nature, for while a ruling
in the Annulment Case may result in the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject lot, a
favorable ruling in the other cases will not have the same effect, considering that: (a) the granting of the
Certiorari Case will lead to the granting of the Petition for Relief Case; (b) a favorable result in the
Petition for Relief Case would end up in the conduct of adversarial proceedings before a writ of possession
concerning the subject lot may be issued; and (c) the resolution of the Criminal Complaint is only
determinative of whether or not the President of Peakhold and/or Donasco should be indicted of the crime
of Qualified Theft and stand trial therefor.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 21, 2017 and the Resolution
dated August 29, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107678 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. C-22988 is hereby REVIVED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 126 for its resolution on the merits. SO ORDERED.
Page 150 of 167

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES v. GJH LAND (formerly known as SJ Land

Inc)
Civ Pro | Nov. 20, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction against respondents before the RTC seeking to enjoin the sale
of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. Essentially, petitioners
alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land,
Inc. but were nonetheless offered for sale to the corporation’s stockholders.
• The case was raffled to Branch 276 which is not a Special Commercial Court. Said branch granted the
application for writ of preliminary injunction against respondents.
• Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, pointing out that the case
involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court.
• The RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. - YES
a. Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly rooted in
the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights
and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation, hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as
provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC.
b. The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case - such as
the instant intra-corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction,
unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to
time by the Court. It was recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and
has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
d. RA 8799 transferred the cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of PD 902-A from the SEC to the RTC, being courts
of general jurisdiction.
e. When the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first implemented, they were transmitted to the Executive
Judges of the RTCs for raffle between or among its different branches, unless a specific branch has been
designated as a Special Commercial Court, in which instance, the cases were transmitted to said branch.
f. In A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, the RTC branch so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as
well as those involving violations of intellectual property rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed
in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Courts.
g. Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court. It is,
therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the nature of the action. Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a
regular branch instead of being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which is Branch 256.
h. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction
with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages," which, however, contradicts and more importantly,
cannot prevail over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute.
i. According to jurisprudence, it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may be legally
characterized.
j. Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial
Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a
Page 151 of 167

scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter,
the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the
station, i.e., Branch 256.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 17, 2012 and July 9, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11-077 is REFERRED to the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City for re-docketing as a commercial case. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall ASSIGNsaid case to
Branch 256, the sole designated Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is ORDERED to
resolve the case with reasonable dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC shall DETERMINE the
appropriate amount of docket fees and, in so doing, ORDER the payment of any difference or, on the other hand,
refund any excess.
Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of
action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to
the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the
RTC to which the case was referred to should re- docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC
has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if
the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special
branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case.
Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special branches which, by
statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under existing
rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On
the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both
in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio,
be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in
application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.
SO ORDERED.
Page 152 of 167

NAPOLEON D. NERI v. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY

FACTS:
• Anunciacion Neri had 7 children, 2 from her first marriage with Gonzalo, Eutropia and Victoria, and 5
from her second marriage with Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
• Throughout the marriage of Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a
total area of 296,555 square meters.
• In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said
homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy.
• The children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against
spouses Uy.
• RTC annulled the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while
the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his
minor children, Rosa and Douglas. CA reversed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON CA erred when it upheld the validity of the “extra-judicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale” as far as the shares of Eutropia and Victoria, and Rosa and Douglas, were
concerned, thereby depriving them of their inheritance –
a. All petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion and are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares,
pursuant to Arts. 979 and 980 of the Civil Code.
b. As such, upon the death of Anunciacion, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances: Enrique – 9/16, Eutropia – 1/16, Victoria - 1/16, Napoleon - 1/16, Alicia – 1/16,
Visminda – 1/16, Rosa – 1/16, Douglas – 1/16.
c. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them
and consequently, a total nullity.
d. Sec. 1 od Rule 74 provides that no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
e. However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.
f. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the
basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and
bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
However, since it appears from the records of the case that they ratified the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale, all the defects existing at the time of its execution are purged.
g. Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in
the homestead properties have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy. “A person can only
sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the seller can legally transfer.”
h. Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They
were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied
constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which
states:“if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.”
Page 153 of 167

As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to P5,000.00
each or a total of ?15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
2. WON the CA erred when it found that laches or prescription had already set in
a. The present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule
74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful
participation in the subject estate. Besides, an “action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence
of a contract does not prescribe” in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
b. However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause
of action accrues, which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed. In this case,
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale
after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint
filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards
the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of
the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-
2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D.
Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum
thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Page 154 of 167

NENITA GONZALES v. MARIANO BUGAAY

CivPro | Feb. 22, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• The deceased Sps. Ayad had 5 children, Enrico, Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximo, and Mariano. Mariano,
single, predeceased his parents. The only living children of Sps. Ayad at the time of the complaint were
Enrico and Consolacion. Enrico remained single.
• Encarnacion died in 1966 and is survived by her children (all surnamed Gonzales) Nenita, Generosa, Felipe,
Lolita, Dolores, Conchita, and Beatriz, herein petitioners.
• Consolacion married the late Imigdio Bugaay. Their children (all surnamed Bugaay) are Mariano, Alicia,
Letecia, Lydia, Luzviminda, and Belen, respondents herein.
• In their Amended Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents with Damages against Enrico,
Consolacion, and respondents, petitioners alleged that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents
covering all the properties owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents, completely
disregarding their rights.
• RTC declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico and respondents, as
well as all other documents and muniments of title in their names, as null and void.
• Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial from the said Decision. The RTC issued
an Order which reads: “in the event that within a period of one (1) month from today, they have not yet
settled the case, it is understood that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for
resolution without any further hearing.”
• Without resolving the above motion, the RTC gave the parties a period of 15 days to submit nominees for
commissioner who will partition their estate.
• Subsequently, the RTC discovered the pendency of the MR and set the same for hearing. RTC granted the
MR for the specific purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents.
• However, instead of presenting the documents, respondents demurred to petitioner’s evidence which the
RTC denied.
• Respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which granted it.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA's dismissal of the Amended Complaint was in accordance with law, rules of procedure and
jurisprudence. - NO
a. The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically involved the propriety of filing a demurrer to evidence
after a Decision had been rendered in the case.
b. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to
dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment.
c. Respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While respondents'
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and
offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied with the
directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned.
Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET
ASIDE and the Orders of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer are REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC
dated November 24, 1995 STANDS. SO ORDERED.
Page 155 of 167

NOEL NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR

CrimPro | Sept. 11, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• A preliminary investigation was initiated by DKT Philippines, charging its then Regional Sales Manager for
Visayas, Ana Navaja, wife of petitioner, of the crime of falsification of a Private Document.
• Noel Navaja went to a Ms. Magsigay’s, material witness for DKT, office and told the latter that as per his
wife’s counsel, Atty. Bonghanoy, her presence is no longer needed in the hearing before the prosecutor.
She then signed an affidavit which supported Ana Navaja’s counter-affidavit. Atty. Bonghanoy present this
affidavit in the hearing which resulted in the dismissal of the case.
• Meanwhile, DKT’s counsel, Atty. Borje, found out about the incident from Ms. Magsigay herself. The latter
manifested that she would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing were it not for the
misrepresentation of petitioner that her presence therein was no longer required.
• This prompted Atty. Borje to file the ff. criminal complaints, 1. charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice
under Sec.1 (a) of PD1829 and 2. charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as
well, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law.
• Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash before the MCTC which denied it. RTC affirmed the MCTC. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations
of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly committed during the
pendency of a single proceeding. - NO
a. Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates
or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of
any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation,
force or threats;
xxxx
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and
with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
b. The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD
1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or
delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.
c. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds
that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the
alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation proceeding which was in fact, eventually dismissed.
d. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution
dated November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 2878 pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-
Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 156 of 167

NORTHERN ISLANDS v. SPS. DENNIS AND CHERYLIN* GARCIA

Civ Pro | Mar. 18, 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a Complaint with application for a writ of preliminary attachment alleging that petitioner
delivered goods amounting to P8M to respondents but the latter failed to pay despite repeated demands.
• Instead of filing an answer, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper
Pleading and Motion for Discovery asking the RTC to allow them to photocopy and personally examine
the original invoices, delivery cargo receipts, and bills of lading attached to the Amended Complaint.
• Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment alleging that the attachment
previously ordered by the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that their properties attached are valued
at P17M while the attachment bond is only P8M
• RTC denied the Motion and directed respondents to file an Answer, which they complied with by filing
their Answer Ad Cautelam Ex Abudante. Despite this, respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
file for Motion for Discovery.
• RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment but granted the Motion for Discovery. However,
no production or inspection was conducted on July 10, 2006 as the RTC directed since respondents received
the copy of the above order only on July 11, 2006.
• CA partly granted the certiorari petition of respondents ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as
provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment
if so found therein, and, on the other hand, denying respondents’ Motion for Discovery.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner
appealed the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the
CA – YES
a. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
b. petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision resolving the
Main Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011.
c. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25, 2012, had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered
the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Meanwhile, records do not show that respondents
filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of its own period to appeal therefrom. Thus, based on Section
9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the Main
Case.
2. WON the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent discharge
of any excess attachment found by said commissioner. - YES
a. With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction
over all matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners
in order to determine the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere
ancillary matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in the CA.
b. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action
because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 19, 2012 and the Resolution
dated August 24, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97448 are hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED
Page 157 of 167

PEOPLE v. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS

CrimPro | Nov. 29, 2017| Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Respondent undertook the construction of CTTL in Baguio City, which is adjacent to Baguio Pines Tourist
Inn (BPTI), which is an establishment owned and operated by University of Manila (UM). Respondent’s
father, Virgilio, President and Chairman of UM at the time, allowed respondent to tap into BPTI’s electricity
and water supply.
• When Virgilio died, he was succeeded by Emily de Leon. She filed a complaint against respondent for the
crime of qualified theft of the electricity and water supply of BPTI, with a total value of P3M.
• The investigating prosecutor dismissed the complaint in view of the absence of the element of "lack of
consent or knowledge of the owner," considering that Virgilio, while being the President and Chairman of
the BOT of UM, explicitly allowed respondent to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI.
• However, this was reversed upon UM’s MR, pointing out that respondent's defense of being expressly
allowed by his father is barred under the Dead Man's Statute.
• An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC. RTC denied respondent’s Motion upon
finding probable cause for the indictment of respondent. CA dismissed the complaint and quashed the
warrant of arrest against respondent.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in holding that probable cause exists
against respondent for qualified theft. - NO
a. A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
Information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of
judicial scrutiny.
b. A judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
(Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure), but this must be done only in clear-
cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged.
c. The Court agrees with the CA that there was no probable cause against herein respondent for the crime of
qualified theft, considering the glaring absence of certain key elements thereof
d. The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309, of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs
to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it
be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and
(f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse
of confidence.
• The elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case.
e. UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by respondent's family. His
father, Virgilio, owned 70.79% of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and respondent himself claims
9.85% share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM at the time material to
this case, and respondent himself was a board member and stockholder. Records disclose that respondent
was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply. As such, respondent had no
criminal intent – as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his father's authority, on behalf of UM – to appropriate
said personal property.
f. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence
with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in
prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges."
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Amended Decision dated November 21, 2014 and the
Resolution dated August 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128625 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 158 of 167

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY v. ALFONSO O. PINEDA

Civ Pro | Date | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner alleged that it extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the amount
of P557K. This was secured by a Chattel Mortgage constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents.
• Notably, the Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note
shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place
where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option."
• Respondent defaulted and since petitioner’s demand went unheeded, petitioner filed the instant suit for sum
of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it has
a branch in San Mateo, Rizal.
• RTC issued a Writ of Replevin but later recalled it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. – NO
a. Jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the
court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot
be waived and may be brought at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a
court which has no jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.
b. On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must
be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection
shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio
dismiss the case.
c. In this case, the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, a sum of money involving the
amount of P510,132.00. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of its purported
lack of jurisdiction.
d. Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which, as already discussed, are not
synonymous with each other. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC correctly pertained to venue, it still
committed grave error in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
e. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law. But it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence
of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
f. In this case, the venue stipulation, which reads "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this
Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any
place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option" is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the
courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In
light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has
been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on.
g. even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu proprio
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order dated July 21, 2016 and the Order
dated September 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM is REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Page 159 of 167

SPS. ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET

SANTIAGO v. RAFFY TULFO
SpecPro | Oct. 21, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioners were complaining about their lost luggage at the NAIA 3 when they noticed that Mon Tulfo was
taking photos of Claudine with his cellphone. When Raymart, and eventually Claudine, approached Mon,
the latter allegedly punched and kicked Raymart forcing the latter to fight back.
• Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV
program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate. Terrified by
the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against
respondents.
• RTC granted the TPO and directed respondents to file their return/answer. However, in a resolution, the
RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the RTC's dismissal of petitioners' amparo petition was correct. - YES
a. The writ of amparo is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof.
b. Extrajudicial killings, are generally characterized as "killings committed without due process of law” while
"enforced disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time."
c. The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element
of government participation.
d. The delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which reads: “The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.”
e. While the first paragraph does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security
of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of
such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which
are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security.
f. Applicable is the statutory construction rule that "clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.
g. It is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial
killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition
is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to life and
security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC and, perforce, must fail.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for writ of amparo filed by petitioners-spouses
Rozelle Raymond Martin and Claudine Margaret Santiago before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed
as SP No. Q-12-71275, is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Page 160 of 167

TERESA R. IGNACIO v. OFFICE OF CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON

CITY
Sept. | Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Warrant of Levy, Public Auction Sale, Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale, Recovery of Ownership and Possession, and Damages against respondents. Teresa alleged that she is
the registered co-owner of a real property which public respondents, with malice and bad faith, sold at a
public auction in 2009 to Sps. Dimalanta without notice of the levy and auction sale proceedings, thereby
depriving her of said property without due process of law. She added that public respondents were in bad
faith as they did not return to her the difference between the bid price paid by Sps. Dimalanta and her
alleged tax liability.
• Sps. Dimalanta moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that Teresa's cause of action is barred by the final
judgment in a prior Cancellation Case which upheld and confirmed the validity of the auction sale.
• Meanwhile Teresa filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition for Relief from Judgment and the corresponding
Motion for Relief from Judgment before the LRC in the Cancellation Case. LRC granted the motion for
the parties to file additional pleadings or memoranda.
• RTC dismissed with prejudice the Annulment Complaint on the ground of res judicata. CA upheld the
dismissal. In the interim, the LRC denied the petition for relief.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA has jurisdiction over Teresa's appeal from the RTC Decision - YES
a. Based on Sec. 7 of RA 9282, CTA's appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
RTCs becomes operative only when the RTC has ruled on a local tax case. Thus, before the case can
be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the RTC must be in the nature of a tax case, or one
which primarily involves a tax issue.
b. In this case, a reading of the Annulment Complaint shows that Teresa's action before the RTC is
essentially one for recovery of ownership and possession of the property, with damages, which is not
anchored on a tax issue, but on due process considerations. The Annulment Complaint's allegations do
not contest the tax assessment on the property, as Teresa only bewails the alleged lack of due process
which deprived her of the opportunity to participate in the delinquency sale proceedings.
2. WON the Annulment Case was barred by res judicata – NO

a. For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action
b. In this case, the Court disagrees with the conclusion reached by the RTC and the CA that the Decision
in the Cancellation Case barred the filing of the complaint in the Annulment Case as there is no identity
of causes of action between these two (2) cases.
c. It is clear that the causes of action in the two (2) cases are different: in the Cancellation Case, the cause
is the expiration of the one-year redemption period without the landowners having redeemed the
property; whereas in the Annulment Case, the cause is the alleged nullity of the auction sale for denial
of the property owners' right to due process. Moreover, the issues raised and determined in these cases
differ: in the former, the issue is whether Sps. Dimalanta is entitled to the cancellation of Teresa's TCT
and the issuance of a new one in their favor; while in the latter, the issue is whether she is entitled to
recover the property, and to damages. The LRC, in the Cancellation Case, granted Sps. Dimalanta's
petition based simply on a finding that there was indeed a failure to redeem the property within the
one-year period therefor, without ruling on whether the property's owners were duly notified of the
auction sale. In other words, the validity of the auction sale raised as an issue in the Annulment Case
was never an issue, nor was it determined with finality, in the Cancellation Case. Since the validity of
the auction sale was not raised or resolved in the December 22, 2011 Decision in the Cancellation Case,
the subsequent filing of the complaint in the Annulment Case was not barred by res judicata.
Page 161 of 167

3. WON the filing of the Petition for Relief did not amount to forum shopping. – YES
a. Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Its requisites are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.
b. In this case, the Court finds that no litis pendentia exists between the Annulment Case and the Petition
for Relief, as the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, even though based on similar set of facts,
essentially differ. Moreover, any judgment rendered in one will not necessarily amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration: on one hand, a ruling in the Annulment Case may result in the recovery
of the property's ownership and possession; on the other hand, a favorable ruling in the Petition for
Relief will result only in the setting aside of the LRC Decision in the Cancellation Case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 26, 2015 and November 24,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 102111 are hereby SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-12-70759 is
hereby REINSTATED and consequently, REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Page 162 of 167

WOODROW B. CAMASO v. TSM SHIPPING

FACTS:
• Camaso signed a contract of employment with respondents to work as a second mate on a vessel for 6
months. Prior to said contract, petitioner claimed that he had been working with respondents for almost 5
years.
• In 2013, petitioner complained of a noticeable obstruction in his throat. He was diagnosed with tonsillar
cancer and was repatriated. He underwent chemotherapy.
• However, respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to pay for
his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their
obligation, Camaso filed the instant complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement
of medical and hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before the NLRC.
• LA ruled in Camaso’s favor. NLRC reversed and dismissed Camaso’s complaint.
• CA dismissed Camaso’s case for non-payment of the required docketing fees. Camaso filed an MR arguing
that a check representing the amount of docket fees was attached to his petition. CA denied his MR.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment of docket fees. -
NO
a. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such as a
petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the failure to comply
with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
b. The Court nevertheless explained that while non-payment of docket fees may indeed render an original
action dismissible, the rule on payment of docket fees may be relaxed whenever the attending circumstances
of the case so warrant.
c. The failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has
long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically
cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
d. Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a Metrobank
check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as
payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII
of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay
the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the
government.
e. In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there was no check
attached to Camaso's certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined at the Office
of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 12, 2015 and March 4, 2016
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 141278-UDK are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant
case is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings as discussed in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Page 163 of 167

U.P. LAW BOC LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS PERLAS-BERNABE DIGESTS
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

PABLITO L. MIRANDA v. ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ
FACTS:
• Complainant Miranda filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP averring that respondent notarized certain
documents during the year 2010 despite his notarial commission being already expired way back in
December 31, 2005 and has yet to be renewed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna
(RTC-San Pedro) where he resides and conducts his notarial businesses.
• Furthermore, complainant claimed that respondent failed to comply with his duties under the Notarial
Rules, particularly: (a) to register one (1) notarial office only; (b) to keep only one (1) active notarial register
at any given time; (c) to file monthly notarial books, reports, and copies of the documents notarized in any
given month; and (d) to surrender his notarial register and seal upon expiration of his commission.
• Complainant also alleged that Alvarez committed grave violations of the Notarial Rules when he authorized
unlicensed persons to do notarial acts for him using his signatures, stamps, offices, and notarial register.
• The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Alvarez liable for violating the Notarial Rules, the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he barred as a notary public and
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed the decision with
modification, deleting the penalty of suspension. Complainant filed an MR.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON the IBP correctly found respondent administratively liable. - YES
a. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
b. The Court finds that respondent committed the following violations of the Notarial Rules:
c. First, respondent performed notarial acts without the proper notarial commission. It should be emphasized
that under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission.
• Respondent notarized an Affidavit in 1993, and an application for business permit and SPA in 2010, in
San Pedro, Laguna. However, respondent was commissioned as a notary public for and within San
Pedro, Laguna only from 1998 to 2005, and that the said commission has not been renewed in 2010
and therefore, already expired.
• Although respondent has been issued a notarial commission by the RTC-Biñan valid from 2010-2011,
he notarized documents not only in his Biñan law office but also in his law offices in San Pedro, Laguna,
and thus, performed notarial acts beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said commissioning court;
and he also notarized an Affidavit for Death Benefit Claim in Biñan, Laguna on April 10, 2012, during
which time the said commission had already expired.
d. Second, respondent notarized a document that is bereft of any details regarding the identity of the signatory.
• This is contrary to the Notarial Rules which says that "a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the signatory to the document is in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent
evidence of identity.”
• The jurat of the 2010 Application for Business Permit which respondent notarized did not bear the
details of the competent evidence of identity of its principal-signatory.
e. Third, respondent failed to forward to the Clerk of Court (COC) of the commissioning court a certified
copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before him.
• Under the Notarial Rules, a notary public must forward to the Clerk of Court, within the first ten (10)
days of the month following, a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of
any instrument acknowledged before the notary public.
Page 164 of 167

f. In view of respondent's numerous violations of the Notarial Rules, the Court upholds the IBP's
recommendation to revoke his incumbent notarial commission, if any, as well as to perpetually disqualify
him from being commissioned as a notary public.
g. As a member of the Bar, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the
CPR. The Court suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. (respondent) GUILTY of
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
effective immediately, the Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and, perpetually DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned
as a notary public. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to
determine when his suspension from the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and his
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect.
Further, respondent is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held
in contempt of court and/or further disciplined for allegedly practicing law despite the suspension therefor as
discussed in this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and, (3)
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Page 165 of 167

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN

FACTS:
• The Senate investigated the alleged anomalous huge disbursements of monies in the Philcomsat Group of
Companies. At the time, Atty. Lokin managed the financial records and documents of the company.
• The Senate discovered an entry in complainant's checkbook stub which reads "Cash for Sandiganbayan,
tro, potc-philcomsat case - P2,000,000". It was found that the check was issued in connection with
complainant's injunction case against Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation before the
Sandiganbayan. which was filed by Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s group, as its representatives, with Atty. Labastilla as its
external counsel.
• Sandiganbayan found Lokin and Labastilla guilty of indirect contempt. After which, complainant instituted
the instant complaint.
• IBP Investigating Commissioner found Lokin administratively liable and absolved Atty. Labastilla. IBP
Board of Governors affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON respondents should be held administratively liable. - YES
a. Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the filing of an
administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan's ruling in the aforesaid case is premature
on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. It is well-settled that a disbarment proceeding
is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set
of facts.
b. Court agrees that the subject checkbook entry contained a contumacious imputation against the
Sandiganbayan, that the P2M check was issued in order to secure a favorable TRO in the POTC case. Since
the records show that Atty. Lokin was the one who caused the making of the subject entry, the IBP was
correct in finding him administratively liable.
c. However, as to Atty. Labastilla, the Court is more inclined to concur with the Sandiganbayan’s findings that
Labastilla also had a hand in the creation of the subject checkbook entry, considering that:
• He was complainant’s external counsel, he admitted receipt of the proceeds of the check the TRO was
only effected/served upon payment of the corresponding fees per the testimonies of the witnesses
from Sandiganbayan, the TRO and the aforesaid check were both dated September 23, 2005, thereby
establishing an unmistakeable connection between the TRO and the check.
d. Furthermore, while Atty. Labastilla claims that he received the amount of P2,000,000.00 as payment for his
legal fees, he failed to properly account the aforesaid amount. In addition, complainant's summary of legal
fees paid to Atty. Labastilla did not reflect the P2,000,000.00 check which he purportedly received as legal
fees.
e. As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or
denigrate the integrity of the courts. This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "a
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others."
f. Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession" for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. In this
case, respondents compromised the integrity of the judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt motives
against the Sandiganbayan through the subject checkbook entry.
g. In similar cases where lawyers perform acts which tend to erode the public confidence in the courts, put
the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice system into disrepute, the Court imposed upon them the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
• Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court imposes upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for his complicity in the making of the subject
checkbook entry. On the other hand, since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one directly responsible for the
making of the subject checkbook entry, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon him the graver
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the
IBP.
Page 166 of 167

RULING: WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla are found GUILTY
of violating Canons 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal record as members of the Bar. Likewise, let copies
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Page 167 of 167

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL LAW ........................................................................................................................................ 1

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

BELGICA v. OCHOA, JR.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

CARPIO MORALES v. CA AND BINAY

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

GONZALES III v OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

2. WON petitioner Gonzales is guilty of betrayal of public trust. - NO

HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO v. LANDBANK (LBP)

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR LEGAL

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

3. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of Congress to delegate quasi-judicial

4. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the powers of the Ombudsman-NO

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. So ordered.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the petition has been rendered moot and academic - NO

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

ARIEL P. HOBLADOR v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

THE NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC. AND/OR JENNIFER M.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

PNCC Skyway Corporation v. The Secretary of Labor and Employment and

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) v. SAMAHAN NG

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.

BERNADETTE S. BILAG v. ESTELA AY-AY

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

CRESENCIO BAÑO v. BACHELOR EXPRESS

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

DELOS SANTOS v. ALBERTO ABEJON

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

DOMINADOR M. APIQUE v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

GOTESCO PROPERTIES INC (GPI) v. SPS. EUGENIO AND ANGELINA

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

JOSE VICENTE ATILANO II v. JUDGE TIBING A. ASAALI

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI MORISONO

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. ARTURO DY

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO v. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA v. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

RENEE B. TANCHULING v. SOTERO C. CANTELA

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. REGHIS M. ROMERO II

ISSUE/S & RATIO: