Toivino Kais Junior Massamba

HIS601- History of International conflicts in the 20th Century & Beyond

Professor Munoz

November 09, 2020

as Hitler had made it very clear both in his speeches and in “Mein Kampf” that he would break

the “unjust” terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

Essentially, the French and British did nothing. Britain was still recovering from the Depression

which had devastated her economy. She could not afford a conflict. The French preferred a

defensive policy against a potential German threat and she spent time and money building the

vast Maginot Line – a series of vast forts on the French and German border. The most Britain,

France and Italy did (at this time, Italy did not view German as a potential ally as the above was

pre-Abyssinia) was to form the Stresa Front which issued a protest against Hitler’s rearmament

policy but did nothing else.

It seemed that Britain was even supporting Germany’s breaking of the Treaty of Versailles. This

treaty had clearly stated what Germany’s navy should be – no submarines and only six warships

over 10,000 tons. In June 1935 the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed. This allowed

Germany to have one third of the tonnage of the British navy’s surface fleet (probably the largest

in the world at this time) and an equal tonnage of submarines.

This event saw the start of what was to be called appeasement. It was believed that Nazi

Germany would develop her navy regardless and that an official agreement between Nazi

Germany and Britain would do much to foster relations between both countries.

12. What was the significance of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance of May 1935?

What was the significance of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935?
 The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was a bilateral treaty between the two

countries with the aim of encircling Nazi Germany in 1935 in order to force it into a more

negotiable stance. It was pursued by Louis Barthou, the French foreign minister, but he was

assassinated before negotiations were finished. His successor, Pierre Laval, was skeptical of both

the desirability and the value of an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, after German

armament began in March 1935 the French government forced the reluctant foreign minister to

complete the arrangements with Moscow that Barthou had begun. The pact was concluded in

Paris on 2 May 1935 and ratified by the French government in February 1936. Ratifications were

exchanged in Moscow on 27 March 1936, and the pact went into effect on the same day.

On 2 May 1935, France and the USSR concluded the pact of mutual assistance. Laval had taken

the precaution of ensuring that the bilateral treaty agreement was strictly compatible with the

multilateral provisions of the Locarno Treaties. What this meant in practice was that military

assistance could be rendered by one signatory to the other only after prior approval of the other

signatories of the Locarno pact (the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium) had been attained. The

effectiveness of this pact was undermined even further by the French government's insistent

refusal to accept a military convention stipulating the way in which the two armies would

coordinate actions in the event of war with Germany.

The pact was no longer what Louis Barthou had originally planned, but it remained to serve the

purpose of acting as a hollow diplomatic threat of war on two fronts for Germany, should

Germany pursue an aggressive foreign policy. Most of the Locarno powers felt that it would only

act as a means of dragging them into a suicidal war with Germany for Russia's benefit. It marked

a large scale shift in Soviet policy in the Seventh Congress of the Comintern from a pro-

revisionist stance to a more western-oriented foreign policy as championed by Maxim Litvinov.

Hitler to form an alliance with Austria. It gave Hitler a reason to use this as an excuse saying that

he felt threatened by this pact hence military alliance with Austria was justified. Former British

Prime Minister David Lloyd-George stated in the House of Commons of the United

Kingdom that Hitler's actions in the wake of this pact were fully justified, and he would have

been a traitor to Germany if he had not protected his country.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on June 18, 1935 by Germany and Great

Britain. It was a bilateral understanding between Great Britain and Germany which governed the

size of Germany’s Kriegsmarine, or navy. The agreement limited the Kriegsmarine to 35% of the

size of Great Britain’s Royal Navy based on tonnage. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was

registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on July 12, 1935 and persisted until April 28 of

1939, when Adolf Hitler renounced it.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was an attempt to improve the relationship between

Germany and Great Britain. The Germans regarded the agreement to be the start of an alliance

against Soviet Union and France. For Great Britain, however, it was meant to be the beginning of

arms restriction arrangements which were designed to restrict Germany’s expansion. This

agreement was considered very controversial by many other nations as the tonnage ratio granted

Germany the authority to produce a navy far larger than the Treaty of Versailles had permitted. It

was also made without prior consultations with Italy or France.

13. Why did Britain and France pursue an equivocal policy vis-à-vis Mussolini after he

decided to invade Ethiopia in October 1935? In what ways did the fiasco of the Hoare-

Laval Pact's disclosure clarify matters?

to keep Italy as an ally against Germany.

At the League, Britain talked about ‘collective security’ and said the League should defend

Abyssinia. In September, the League appointed a five-power committee to arbitrate in

Abyssinia. It suggested that Italy should have some land and power in Abyssinia. Both Haile

Selassie and Mussolini refused to accept the League’s plan. In October 1935, Italy’s 100,000

strong army invaded Abyssinia.

The British delegate to the League, Mr Hoare, said that the world would face ‘danger and gloom’

if the League failed to act. But the French refused to do anything, because of their treaty with

Italy. And Britain refused to do anything without France. In December 1935, news leaked out

of the Hoare-Laval Pact, a secret plan made by Britain and France to give two-thirds of

Abyssinia to Italy, without telling the League.

15. What was the significance of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39)?

The Spanish Civil War, often regarded as the prologue to the Second World War, pitted the

Spanish Republican government of the Frente Popular elected in 1936 against a military and

nationalist insurrection led by Francisco Franco, with the - decisive - support of Adolf Hitler and

Benito Mussolini, from July 1936 to April 1939. Despite the support of the USSR, Great Britain,

France and above all the International Brigades (35,000 volunteers from 50 nations), the defeat

of the Republicans allowed the establishment of Francisco Franco's dictatorship, which lasted

until his death in November 1975. The conflict claimed more than a million victims.
What began as a failed coup spiraled into a proxy war between Europe’s fascist and communist

countries, with the future Allies backing the Republicans and the Axis powers supporting

Franco’s Nationalists.

16. Why did Neville Chamberlain believe he could achieve long-term stability by

“appeasing” Nazi Germany after he became British Prime Minister in May 1937? How

important were economic factors and the belief that Britain could develop a “strategic

deterrent” by building a bomber force in explaining Chamberlain's policy? {Here see the

essay by Jeffrey L. Hughes (pp. 281-302.}

This was the policy of giving Hitler what he wanted to stop him from going to war. It was

based on the idea that what Hitler wanted was reasonable and, when his reasonable demands

had been satisfied, he would stop.

Chamberlain wanted a strong Germany to serve as a barrier against expansion by communist

Russia.

The British people wanted peace - they would not have supported a war in 1938.

17. What was the significance of the “Hossbach Conference” of November 5, 1937?

Hitler, as we have been told a thousand times, wanted to conquer the world, or at least Europe.

During the great Nuremberg Trial after the war, the victorious Allies tried to prove that Hitler

and his "acolytes" were engaged in a sinister "conspiracy to wage a war of aggression". The most

important evidence produced in support of this accusation was and is a document known as the

"Hossbach Protocol" or "Hossbach Memorandum".

1937 partly to reconcile the heads of the various military branches, and partly to relaunch the

German rearmament programme. Foreign policy was only a subsidiary issue. Hitler sought to

justify the need to rebuild German military strength by presenting several hypothetical and

exaggerated cases of international crises that would require military action, none of which ever

occurred. Hitler announced no new direction for German foreign policy, let alone a plan for a

war of aggression.

The important role of the fraudulent Hossbach protocol at the Nuremberg Tribunal is another

overwhelming confirmation of the illegitimate, theatrical character of the most extravagant

judicial enterprise in history. On the basis of the protocol, which became Nuremberg Document

386-PS, the Tribunal's prosecution stated: "An influential group of Nazi conspirators met with

Hitler on 5 November 1937 to discuss the situation. Once again, it was stressed that Germany

needed to acquire living space in Central Europe. They recognised that such a conquest would

probably meet resistance that would have to be broken by force, and that their decision would

probably lead to a general war". US prosecutor Sidney Alderman told the Tribunal that the

memorandum ("one of the most striking and revealing documents seized") removed all

remaining doubts about the guilt of the German leadership for their crimes against peace. It was

also the basis for the conclusion of the Nuremberg judges that the "German conspiracy to wage a

war of aggression" began at the conference of 5 November 1937. The document was crucial for

the condemnation of Göring, Neurath and Raeder for their roles in the "criminal conspiracy".

The falsified Hossbach Protocol is far too typical of the kind of evidence used by the victorious

Allies at Nuremberg to legitimise the imprisonment and execution of the leaders of defeated

Germany.
18. What was the significance of the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938? How can

you explain the longevity of the “Munich analogy”? {Hughes, pp. 317-321.}

These agreements were intended to settle the Sudeten crisis but indirectly sealed the death of

Czechoslovakia as an independent state. They allowed Hitler to annex Czechoslovakia's

predominantly German-populated regions.

With the Munich agreements, Nazi Germany expanded its territory without a single shot being

fired. Humanity speaks of a "Diplomatic Sedan".

The Munich analogy has not only been used consistently in American presidential and

governmental rhetoric but has also affected foreign policy decisions at crucial moments in U.S.

history. Presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush, from the 1940s to the

1980s, have used the example of Munich as a warning to the public about the inherent dangers of

appeasing aggressors.

19. Why did Britain and France decide to stand up to Hitler over Poland after he destroyed

Czechoslovakia in March 1939? {Hughes, pp. 312-313.}

The friendship they showed with Poland was just a way for them to contain Germany. That is

why the stance of the governments was that only Germany is not allowed to attack any country

or they will declare war on it.

Hitler had made it clear that he wanted to coexist with Britain and France with all their colonies

and Germany would conquer eastern Europe and have an ultimate war with the Soviets. Both of

them had signed a non-aggression pact which in reality was only an excuse to buy some time and

have a military build-up for the upcoming war.

To put it simply, Britain and France had only given security guarantees against Germany.
Their aim was to contain Germany which was bigger threat to them.

20. How can we account for the fact that Britain and France were not able to conclude and

anti- German alliance with the Soviet Union by the summer of 1939? {Hughes, pp. 302-306;

314-315}

The Western Allies had hoped to be able to negotiate with Stalin. But the Soviet dictator,

although ideologically very distant from the German dictator, preferred, in 1939, to guarantee his

exports of raw materials to a Germany where the arms industry is active at full speed than to

block the road to the Nazis.

On August 24, 1939, we learned with amazement that the USSR, engaged for months in

negotiations for a military alliance with France and Great Britain, had just concluded a non-

aggression pact with Nazi Germany. A few days later it was the invasion of Poland. The Second

World War was beginning.

the leaders of the Kremlin were convinced of the existence, between Berlin, Paris and London, of

a collusion whose beginnings go back to 1925 and the Treaty of Locarno. The Franco-Soviet

pact of 1935 was not enough to dispel their mistrust since it had not had any military extension,

and Munich had been interpreted not as the surrender of weak countries wanting to avoid war at

all costs, but as the beginning of a concrete collaboration between the Axis, France and England.

21. Why did Hitler and Stalin come together in August 1939? Why did the Nazi-Soviet Pact

fail to deter Britain from standing by its commitment to Poland? {Hughes, pp. 306-307}

Hitler believed that Britain would never take him on alone, so he decided to swallow his fear

and loathing of communism and cozy up to the Soviet dictator, thereby pulling the rug out from
the British initiative. Both sides were extremely suspicious of the other, trying to discern ulterior

motives.

The pact was terminated on 22 June 1941, when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and

invaded the Soviet Union, in pursuit of the ideological goal of Lebensraum. After the war,

Ribbentrop was convicted of war crimes and executed. Molotov died at 96 in 1986, five years

before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

23. Why does Scott Sagan believe that it is “misleading to regard Japan's attack on Pearl

Harbor as irrational”? What “lessons” does he draw for the nuclear age? {See his essay in

the Reader, vol., pp. 323-352.}

Japan's decision to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941 can only be explained as an

act of irrationality, given the difference in relative power of the two nations.

Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened

economic destruction of Japan by the United States