De Castro vs De Castro G.R. No.

160172 THE FACTS

FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3 Leonila G.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5redarclaw
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding “without responsibility.”7redarclaw
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in
homes and did not live together as husband and wife. the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
ISSUE: second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid. argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

HELD: Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together THE RTC RULING
for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with easily duped by a person like Santos.8redarclaw
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license follows:10redarclaw
renders their marriage void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6)
from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of bigamy. No pronouncement as to costs.
 without a license is void.
SO ORDERED.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family as regards her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the knowledge of Santos’s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not subsisting marriage.
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she
argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11redarclaw before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as
it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
something this court can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings. validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
THE CA RULING marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos. Jr.16instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting
marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her The Ruling of the Court
marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy.12redarclaw The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s
THE ISSUES knowledge of Santos’s first marriage

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
because she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as
in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage
 or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during
marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case,
shown by the totality of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and petitioner has consistently27questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are
him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil void ab initio.28redarclaw
status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos. could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of
petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
CA. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20redarclaw
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated
of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
maximum. together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, no legal impediment to the marriage.
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime. marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years
before their marriage.31redarclaw
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence 199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without
imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited
duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous
two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a piglets.36redarclaw
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
The criminal liability of petitioner other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
resulting from her marriage to cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santos
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her
oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
The legal effects in a criminal case
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on
marriage the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case,
the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract. contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a
Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” 45 It must
nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46|||In keeping
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and bigamy.
commitment.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40redarclaw found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which SO ORDERED.
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been Republic vs. Nolasco
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in FACTS:
issue.43redarclaw
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that,
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in
a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already and void by a competent court
dead?
Unlike in the Family Code, the New Civil Code does not necessitate a judicial declaration of
HELD: absence of the absentee spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of
seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another Facts:
contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the In “In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse A”, Judge P in
authorities to find his wife. granting the petition cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code which provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous
CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse
present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of
FACTS: the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
• Marietta is the wife of the deceased, Teoderico Calisterio. spouse. Solicitor general sought to appeal the decision by filing a notice of appeal.
• 13 January 1946, petitioner was married to James William Bounds However, it was disapproved. Court of Appeals ruled the declaration of presumptive death
• 11 February 1947, James Bounds disappeared without a trace is a special proceeding.
• 08 May 1958, after 11 years, Teodorico and Marietta were married without Marietta
having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead Issue:
• 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate
• 09 October 1992, prespondent Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of deceased, Held:
claiming that she is the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and alleging that the
marriage between the latter and respondent being allegedly bigamous and thereby null
and void
• The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia, but the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
WON the marriage between deceased Teoderico C. And Marietta C. is valid.

HELD: Valdez vs. Republic

Yes. The law in force at the time of their marriage was the Civil Code, not the Family Code FACTS:
which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Article 83 of the named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring
New Civil Code which provides: home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to
void from its performance, unless: separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other
1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner
2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, FACTS:
petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition
of presumptive death of Sofio. for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him
to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of
HELD: his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain
marriage is legal and valid. Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to
Almelor vs. RTC marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando
freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
Facts: Orlando’s affection and care towards her.
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3
children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that ISSUE:
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their (a) Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
children are often unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has under Article 45 of the Family Code; and
an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so
gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor ANSWER:
which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Therefore, the
homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his
concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught consent, should be dismissed.
Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear
when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not REASONING:
because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it
is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
perception against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume
court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made
was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
such. threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that
Villanueva vs. CA he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie.
His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
with Lilia. renders him “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
HOLDING:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in
Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary the performance of some marital obligations. It remains settled that the State has a high
damages is deleted for lack of basis. stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married
life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR institution. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. In the case at bar,
FACTS: petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner
Petitioner Veronica Alcazar alleged in her Complaint for the annulment of her marriage since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the
that she was married to respondent Rey Alcazar in 2000. When they went back to Manila country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or
after the wedding the respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode. In complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to work. The couple did
not communicate the whole time he was abroad despite numerous attempts by petitioner Sin vs. Sin
to call him. She even had to find out her husband was coming home to the Philippines
from a co-teacher about a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh. Petitioner FACTS:
further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
latter did not go home to petitioner in Manila; instead, respondent proceeded to his Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
parents’ house in Occidental Mindoro. She asserted that from the time respondent arrived marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and
in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and
physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no
Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having
petitioner and respondent. RTC of Malolos City dismissed the Complaint, a decision later appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
ISSUE: participation of the State in the proceedings.
Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
HELD: absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
No, the Court scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between
the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court
incapacitated. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear
established the facts in the complaint. These testimonies though do not give us much as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
insight into respondent’s psychological state. issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case
Dr. Tayag’s psychological report concluding that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated
Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood, did not in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
help petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine
respondent. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on Ancheta vs. Ancheta
information provided by petitioner, who was hardly impartial. The report is totally bereft
of the basis for the said conclusion and failed to explain how such a personality disorder FACTS:
made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5,
The Court emphasized that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent
and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court- The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”
Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of Petition is GRANTED.
psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was
already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was MA. LOURDES C. DE CASTRO v. CRISPINO DE CASTRO
residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless
substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it G.R. SP No. 81856, dated April 4, 2006, which found no grave abuse of discretion in the
was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void Orders dated August 20, 2003 and December 12, 2003, issued by Acting Judge Marvic
ab initio. Balisi-Umali of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 96-79135 for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her
marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her First, the facts:
person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his
petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be Petitioner Ma. Lourdes C. De Castro and private respondent Crispino De Castro, Jr. were
heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme married on January 1, 1971. In 1996, private respondent filed a petition[2] for the
Court for review on certiorari. declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid? In his petition, private respondent alleged that he was impulsive and reckless in his youth;
that while still in school, he impregnated petitioner, and they got married so as not to
HELD: expose both their families to further embarrassment; that their quarrels intensified during
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule the marriage; that due to immaturity and inability to cope with their problems, he
18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil abandoned his family many times and became involved in affairs with different women.
Procedure). He further alleged that they tried to save their marriage through counseling, but to no
avail. In 1992, he left the family home for good, and lived with another woman with
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger whom he had three illegitimate children.
of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on For failure of petitioner to file her Answer to the petition and upon motion of private
behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to respondent, the case was set for hearing and private respondent testified. Further, he
take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” presented psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Albaran, as an expert witness. He then rested his case,
with no opposition from the public prosecutor.
“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or
her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion On June 22, 1998, the RTC annulled the marriage between petitioner and private
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application respondent, viz.:
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his
opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.” After a thorough review of the evidence adduced and the testimonies of petitioner [herein
private respondent] and Dra. Cecilia Albaran, the Court finds and so holds that both parties
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and are psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage. The Court, therefore, is
rendered judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public convinced that from the evidence presented, there appears sufficient basis to declare that
prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.” herein parties are psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage, which, under the
provisions of the Family Code, is a valid ground for the annulment of marriage.
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered declaring the marriage On July 17, 2002, petitioner was to present her first witness. The trial court reset the
entered into by the parties herein on January 1, 1971 at Santuario de San Jose, Greenhills, hearing to August 21, 2002 as there was no return of the notice sent to private respondent
Mandaluyong City null and void and of no legal effect. and his counsel.[9]

The Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to cancel from the Registry On August 21, 2002, petitioner started her direct testimony. However, considering the
of Marriages the marriage contract entered into by the parties herein on January 1, 1971 length of her testimony, the continuance of her direct examination was set on October 2,
at Mandaluyong City. 2002.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City for On September 30, 2002, private respondent moved to reset the October 2, 2002 hearing
proper annotation and recording, as required by law; the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to November 13, 2002, due to his trip to Europe.[10]
and the National Census and Statistics Office for record purposes.
On November 8, 2002, private respondent again moved to reset the November 13, 2002
SO ORDERED.[3] hearing to December 11, 2002 or at the earliest possible date as the calendar of the trial
court would allow, for the reason that his counsel was "out of the country for important
On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave[4] to file an Omnibus Motion[5] personal reasons and cannot attend the hearing."[11]
seeking a new trial or reconsideration of the June 22, 1998 Decision. She alleged that she
was misled and prevented from participating in the annulment case by private respondent, During the hearing on December 11, 2002, petitioner's counsel moved for its cancellation
because of his promise of continuous adequate support for the children, and the transfer because of the absence of petitioner who was at that time attending a very urgent
of title to their three children of their family home, including its lot, located in Blue Ridge business meeting in connection with her volunteer work for Bantay Bata. The hearing was
Subdivision, Libis, Quezon City and another piece of real property in Tagaytay. reset to February 6, 2003.[12] However, the records reveal that no hearing was
conducted on said date.
The trial court granted the omnibus motion in an Order dated December 11, 1998. In the
Order, petitioner was required to submit a question-and-answer form affidavit which On the next hearing of February 20, 2003, petitioner's counsel again moved for the
would constitute her direct testimony. Further, the cross-examination of petitioner and resetting of the hearing to March 27, 2003.[13]
her witnesses was scheduled on February 4, 1999.
On March 27, 2003, the hearing was reset to April 10, 2003 because the Presiding Judge
On December 27, 1999, petitioner filed her Answer. She controverted the allegations of was on official leave.[14]
private respondent. She alleged that they were both psychologically and emotionally
prepared for marriage; that, except for a few slightly turbulent months in 1981, their life as On April 10, 2003, the hearing was again reset to May 8, 2003, by agreement of the
a married couple was smooth and blissful and remained so for twenty years, or until 1990; parties.[15]
that they were well adapted to each other, and their quarrels were few and far between;
that the communication lines between them were always open and they were able to On May 8, 2003, the hearing was likewise reset to July 25, 2003 because of the absence of
settle their differences through discussion; that private respondent was a devoted and counsel of both petitioner and private respondent.[16]
faithful husband, and did not abandon them repeatedly; and that petitioner knew of only
one extramarital affair of private respondent. During the hearing on July 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the hearing
because of the absence of petitioner who was then in the U.S. helping her daughter in
The trial court conducted hearings on petitioner's (1) application for support pendente lite taking care of her newborn baby. The trial court then ordered the resetting of the hearing
and (2) urgent motion for judicial deposit of petitioner's [herein private respondent's] to August 20, 2003 for the last time, viz.:
separation benefits,[6] in light of his retirement/separation from employment at Petron
Corporation, effective August 31, 2000; and private respondent's (3) motion for judicial As prayed for by respondent's counsel for the cancellation of today's hearing as according
approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the conjugal partnership to her the respondent is out of the country, over the vehement objection of petitioner's
of gains and partition of the conjugal properties.[7] The first has been resolved,[8] but counsel, the hearing today is cancelled and reset for the last time to August 20, 2003 at
the second and third remain pending. 9:30 o'clock (sic) in the morning.
In the event the respondent cannot present any evidence on the next scheduled hearing, the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
on proper motion the case shall be submitted for decision. and partition of the conjugal properties.[19]

It appears that the presentation of respondent's evidence had been reset twice at the This motion was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2003, which states:
instance of defendant's counsel, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a postponement
fee of Php100.00 and to show proof of compliance. This resolves respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on the August 20, 2003 Order
directing her to submit her formal offer of exhibits after the Court deemed her to have
Both counsels are notified in open Court. waived her right to present further evidence for her failure to appear on the hearing which
was previously set on said date by her counsel.
SO ORDERED.
The record of the case reveals that respondent commenced the presentation of her
Given in open Court this 25th day of July 2003 in the City of Manila, Philippines.[17] evidence on August 21, 2002. The subsequent settings were all cancelled on motion of
respondent's counsel for one reason or another.
In the hearing on August 20, 2003, counsel for petitioner again requested that it be
cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of witnesses. Petitioner was still in the U.S. On July 25, 2003, the hearing was again cancelled on motion of respondent's counsel and
taking care of her newborn grandchild, while Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who was reset for the last time to August 20, 2003 with the warning that if the respondent still
conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner, was likewise out of the country, fails to present evidence, the case shall be submitted for decision. On August 20, 2003,
attending a convention. The motion was denied by the trial court, viz.: respondent failed to adduce her evidence.

In its Order of July 25, 2003, respondent was given today her last chance to present her The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration deserves a DENIAL.
evidence, with the warning that if no evidence is presented today, then the case shall be
submitted for decision. It is more than apparent that the respondent was given all opportunity to adduce her
evidence but she failed to do so. The Court had stretched its leniency to the limit but it is
In today's hearing, respondent failed to present any evidence. As ordered and on motion apparent the respondent is merely trifling with the Court's precious time.
of petitioner's counsel, the Court deems the respondent to have waived her right to
present further evidence. In view thereof, she is hereby given fifteen (15) days from today Wherefore, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Respondent is
within which to make an offer of her exhibits, copy of which she shall furnish the given ten (10) days from notice to file her offer of exhibits.
petitioner's counsel, who is hereby given the same period of time from receipt thereof
within which to make his comments thereon. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the SO ORDERED.
Court's resolution on respondent's offer of exhibits, parties are directed to file their
respective Memorandum of Authorities. Manila, December 12, 2003.[20]

Thereafter, this case which is of 1996 vintage shall be submitted for the decision once Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
again. Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the Orders dated August 20, 2003 and December 12,
2003, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Upon motion of petitioner,
SO ORDERED. the trial court held in abeyance its Order to file the formal offer of exhibits, pending
resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari.
Given in open Court, this 20th day of August, 2003 in Manila.[18]
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled:
Petitioner moved to reconsider the August 20, 2003 Order. She claimed that her reasons
for her absence during the hearings were justifiable and she had no intention to delay the . . . A reading of the assailed Orders reveals that public respondent's denial of petitioner's
proceedings of this case. Further, she argued that there were pending incidents yet to be motion for cancellation and resetting of the hearing for continuance of her testimony was
resolved by the trial court, referring to her motion for judicial deposit of private for cause. We take notice of the several postponements of the hearings on the
respondent's separation benefits and private respondent's motion for judicial approval of continuation of petitioner's testimony, mostly on account of petitioner's own urgings.
Particularly, we find remarkably militating against petitioner's cause the Order dated 25
July 2003 where public respondent, maybe exasperated at petitioner's seemingly shallow October 2, 2002
interest to proceed with the case as manifested in the prior motions to cancel the hearing, November 13, 2002
dutifully warned that another postponement of the scheduled presentation of testimony December 11, 2002
would compel the court to consider the case submitted for decision. We see this as a February 6, 2003
reasonable exercise of discretion on the part of public respondent. Petitioner was February 20, 2003
properly apprised and warned of the consequence of another non-appearance in the March 27, 2003
hearing. Petitioner insists that her inability to be present on the scheduled hearing on April 10, 2003
August 20, 2003 was due to physical impossibility to appear as she was out of the country May 8, 2003
on that day. We find the excuse flimsy. Aware in advance that she could not make it on July 25, 2003
the 20 August 2003 hearing, the least that she could have done was to instruct her counsel August 20, 2003
to make a timely representation with the court by filing an early motion-manifestation for
the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient The hearing of March 27, 2003 was cancelled because the presiding judge was on official
time to file one. Had the counsel not waited for the August 20, 2003 hearing to make the leave, while the April 10, 2003 hearing was reset by agreement of the parties. Likewise,
motion, petitioner may have elicited a kinder action from public respondent. the hearing of May 8, 2003 was reset because the counsels of both parties were absent.
xxx
The Orders being assailed are interlocutory that will lead to a rendering of a judgment in On the other hand, the following postponements were made at the instance of private
the case by public respondent. Should such judgment be adverse to petitioner as she respondent: (1) October 2, 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on September 30,
assumes it would be, she is not completely rendered helpless and without remedy as there 2002, moved to reset the hearing because of his trip to Europe; and (2) November 13,
will always be the remedy of appeal where facts and issues raised in the instant petition 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on November 8, 2002, moved to reset the
such as errors of law and errors of facts will still be ventilated and passed upon. hearing because his counsel was out of the country for important personal reasons.

Certiorari is not available as a remedy against an interlocutory order except when such In contrast, the following postponements were made at the instance of petitioner: (1)
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford an December 11, 2002 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself, moved for the
adequate and expeditious relief. We do not find the assailed Orders patently erroneous cancellation of the hearing because of the absence of his client who was at that time
and in case of an eventual unfavorable judgment, the remedy of appeal is an adequate attending a very urgent business meeting in connection with her volunteer work for
relief always available to petitioner. Hence, certiorari, in the case at bar, will not lie. Bantay Bata; (2) February 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself,
moved for the resetting of the hearing; (3) July 25, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.[21] counsel, on the day itself, moved to reset the hearing because his client was in the U.S.
taking care of her newborn grandchild; and (4) August 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's
Hence, this petition where petitioner invokes the following grounds: counsel, again only on the day itself, moved to cancel the hearing because his client was
still in the U.S. Further, Dr. Ramos-Leynes, petitioner's witness who conducted a
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT JUDGE UMALI DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS DATED 20 AUGUST 2003 AND 12
DECEMBER 2003.[22] We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by petitioner were made on
the scheduled hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous
Petitioner argues that the lower courts erred in ruling that she waived her right to present warning that no further postponement would be allowed, petitioner still failed to appear.
further evidence when she failed to appear at the August 20, 2003 hearing. She contends We agree with the Court of Appeals when it pointed out that petitioner obviously knew in
that in effect, she was declared in default, which is violative of the state policy on marriage advance that she could not make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. As of the last
as a social institution and the due process clause of the Constitution. scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country. The least that
petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation
We disagree. with the trial court by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing.
Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously,
The instant case was set for hearing twelve times, or on the following dates: the warning by the court of the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing
July 17, 2002 fell on deaf ears. After having been granted numerous motions for postponement,
August 21, 2002
petitioner cannot now claim that she was denied due process. In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa petitioner to submit her formal offer of exhibits after the trial court considered her to have
German Airlines,[23] we ruled that: waived her right to present further evidence; and (2) dated December 12, 2003, which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. These orders are not violative of the state
Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his policy on marriage as a social institution, for the trial judge has the duty to resolve judicial
own inofficiousness, lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his disputes without unreasonable delay.
own interests or to the interests of those he represents, thereby resulting in his failure to
present his own evidence, the court would not extend to him its mantle of protection. If it Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as
was he who created the situation that brought about the resulting adverse consequences, she has not been cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently,
he cannot plead for his day in court nor claim that he was so denied of it. petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral testimony may be taken into account only when
it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party;
Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company,[24] we sustained the trial until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
court's denial of a motion for postponement on the ground that the defendant's considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence
witnesses, officers of the company, could not come because it was the beginning of the to be considered by the court in deciding the case. The rule will not apply to the instant
milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental and their presence in case.
the Central was necessary. We held that the reason adduced was "not unavoidable and
one that could not have been foreseen." We ratiocinated: Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and did
not register any objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out petitioner's
The reason adduced in support of the motion for postponement is not unavoidable and testimony from the records, is deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
one that could not have been foreseen. Defendant ought to have known long before the petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered worthless. The waiver will not
date of trial that the milling season would start when the trial of the case would be held. expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will still weigh the
The motion should have been presented long in advance of the hearing, so that the court evidence presented by petitioner vis-à-vis that of private respondent's. The situation is
could have taken steps to postpone the trial without inconvenience to the adverse party. not akin to default at all, where, for failure of defendant to file his responsive pleading and
As it is, however, the motion was presented on the day of the trial. Knowing as it should after evidence for the plaintiff has been received ex parte, the court renders a judgment
have known that postponements lie in the court's discretion and there being no apparent by default on the basis of such evidence.
reason why the defendant could not have presented the motion earlier, thus avoiding
inconvenience to the adverse party, the appellant can not claim that the trial court erred Lastly, the appellate court correctly pointed out that the assailed Orders are interlocutory
in denying postponement. Under all the circumstances we hold that the court was and there is yet no judgment in the case by the court a quo. If the trial court renders a
perfectly justified in denying the motion for postponement. judgment that is adverse to petitioner, she can always avail of the remedy of appeal to
protect her legal rights.
In the case at bar, petitioner's excuse that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her
newborn grandchild, while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country, attending a convention was SP No. 81856, dated April 4, 2006, is AFFIRMED.
unjustified. These reasons were "not unavoidable and one that could not have been
foreseen." The date of the trial was set one month prior, and as of July 25, 2003, SO ORDERED.
petitioner was in the U.S. Certainly, petitioner would know in advance if she could make it
to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a scheduled event, Macadangdang vs. CA
also something known in advance. It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for
postponement before the day of the hearing, so that the court could order its resetting FACTS:
and timely inform the adverse party of the new date. This was not the case at bar for the Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had
subject motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any justification. We intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and
thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for her husband separated in 1967.
postponement. October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) – she gave birth to a
baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December
Consequently, we cannot strike down the trial court's following orders: (1) dated August 24, 1967.
20, 2003, which denied petitioner's motion for postponement, and, instead, directed April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.
February 27, 1973 – lower court dismissed the complaint. highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case
to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no
but it was denied. concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of
access between Elizabeth and Crispin.
ISSUE: Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the
WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses possibility of access to one another.
Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven months from
the separation of the spouses.
HELD: Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the the spouses. (note the baby was not premature). This presumption becomes conclusive in
value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses
may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
of the sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of the states or The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L- marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that
[1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.
Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of Sexual intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved.
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the
of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be husband at the time of the conception was not impossible and there is the presumption
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. that a child so born is the child of the husband and legitimate even though the wife was
The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception.
that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife
which is self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence. Carlos vs. Sandoval
Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court Facts:
When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
and is contradicted by evidence on record. parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995,
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint,
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his
twenty days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He
This physical impossibility may be caused: argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received
(1) By the impotence of the husband; by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access
was not possible; HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
(3) By the serious illness of the husband. judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary
child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial
set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place
in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
 Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the marriage?
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular FACTS:
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time,
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. xxxx
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not
in its application. even impleaded as a party to said case.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. ISSUE:
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of
depends upon when the marriage took place. nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old
Civil Code
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. HELD: YES
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent marriage may be material, either direct or collateral.” xxx
amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
ceremony. marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
2003. marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for imprescriptible.
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes......the court may pass upon the validity
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02- of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on essential to the determination of the case.
August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it
is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest”
and can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of sisters or their children to the other half.
their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack
of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise: spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC
thereon involves questions of fact. declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We take
note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the
action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the
involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are
have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
likewise implead Leila.
ISSUE:
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants. HELD:
No, it does not.
BOLOS V. BOLOS
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
DOCTRINE: Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered “Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After
trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal. extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and “marriages.”
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in
conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
 A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC March 4, 2003 contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-making,
child care, education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS
the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the
supporting spouse to give support, taking into account that spouse's earning capacity,
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the
Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on
court may deem just and equitable.
Provisional Orders, the Court Resolved to APPROVED the same.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper
the spouse.
of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003
Section 3. Child Support. - The common children of the spouses shall be supported from
March 4, 2003
the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Davide Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.
give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall
Ynares-Santiago, on leave,
be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
Corona, officially on leave.
recipient.
RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider
the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent
Section 1. When Issued, - Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute
and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her
nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and
special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to;
at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon application under oath
(4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-
of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may issue provisional orders and
being of the child.
protection orders with or without a hearing. These orders may be enforced immediately,
with or without a bond, and for such period and under such terms" and conditions as the
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary
court may deem necessary.
of the parent.
Section 2. Spousal Support. - In determining support for the spouses, the court may be
Section 4. Child Custody. - In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of
guided by the following rules:
the child of the parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child and shall give paramount consideration to the material and
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
moral welfare of the child.
the spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
The court may likewise consider the following factors: (a) the agreement of the
parties; (b) the desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of
between the child and the other parent; (c) the child's health, safety, and welfare; (d) any
time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during
history of child or spousal abase by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial
the marriage.
relationship with the child, including anyone courting the parent; (e) the nature and
frequency of contact with both parents; (f) habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances;
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking
(g) marital misconduct; (h) the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological
support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that
and educational environment; and (i) the preference of the child, if over seven years of age
spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient
and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
education and training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate
employment, and that spouse's future earning capacity; (3) the-duration of the marriage;
The court may award provisional custody in the following order of preference: (1) to
(4) the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning
both parents jointly; (2) to either parent taking into account all relevant considerations
abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the
under the foregoing paragraph, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a hold-departure order
unless the parent chosen is unfit; (3} to the surviving grandparent, or if there are several of has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also be
them, to the grandparent chosen by the child over seven years of age and of sufficient included.
discernment, unless the grandparent is unfit or disqualified; (4) to the eldest brother or
sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified; (5) to the The court may recall the order. motu proprio or upon verified motion of any of the
child's actual custodian over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or (6) to parties after summary hearing, subject to such terms and conditions as may be necessary
any other person deemed by the court suitable to provide proper care and guidance for for the best interests of the child.
the child.
Section 7. Order of Protection. - The court may issue an Order of Protection requiring any
The custodian temporarily designated by the" court shall give the court and the person:
parents five days notice of any plan to change the residence of the child or take him out of
his residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights (a) to stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the child,
of the parents. other parent or any other party, and to stay away from any other specific place designated
by the court;
Section 5. Visitation Rights. - Appropriate visitation rights shall be provided to the parent
who is not awarded provisional custody unless found unfit or disqualified by the court. . (b) to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such child or the other parent or
any person to whom custody of the child is awarded;
Section 6. Hold Departure Order. - Pending resolution of the petition, no child of the
parties shall be brought out of the country without prior order from the court. (c) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety, or welfare of the child;
The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may issue ex-parte a hold
departure order, addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, directing it not (d) to permit a parent, or a person entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation
to allow the departure of the child from the Philippines without the permission of the agreement, to visit the child at stated periods;
court.
(e) to permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in
The Family Court issuing the hold departure order shall furnish the Department of order to take persona! belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family
Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation of the Department of Court;
Justice a copy of the hold departure order issued within twenty-four hours from the time
of its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal. (f) to comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the child.

The hold-departure order shall contain the following information: Section 8. Administration of Common Property. - If a spouse without just cause abandons
the other or-fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the court may, upon
(a) the complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, and the application of the aggrieved party under oath, issue a provisional order appointing the
place of last residence of the person against whom a hold-departure order has been issued applicant or a third person as receiver or sole administrator of the common property
or whose departure from the country has been enjoined; subject to such precautionary conditions it may impose.

(b) the complete title and docket number of the case in which the hold departure was The receiver or administrator may not dispose of or encumber any common property
issued; or specific separate property of either spouse without prior authority of the court.

(c) the specific nature of the case; and The provisional order issued by the court shall be registered in the proper Register of
Deeds and annotated in all titles of properties subject of the receivership or
(d) the date of the hold-departure order. administration.

Section 9. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.