Discrimination, Women, and Work: Processes and Variations by Race and Class

The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253
DISCRIMINATION, WOMEN, AND WORK:

Processes and Variations by Race and Class
Susan Y. Ortiz*
The Ohio State University
Vincent J. Roscigno
The Ohio State University
Research on gender and workplace stratification has made clear that persistent employment, wage,
and mobility gaps exist, and that discrimination at organizational and interactional levels is
playing a role. Few studies, however, have been able to directly capture processes involved. In this
article, we draw on unique qualitative and quantitative data pertaining to verified cases of work-
place sex and race discrimination (1988 to 2003), and analyze the discriminatory experiences of
African-American and white women across various occupational statuses. Notable are high levels
of discriminatory firing for both groups, but higher instances of race-based promotional discrimi-
nation for black women—a pattern partially linked to their disparate concentration in
sex-segregated workplaces and in positions of lower occupational prestige. Our qualitative immer-
sion into case materials reveals influential mechanisms and employer justifications, unique mani-
festations of differential treatment on the job, and the use of “soft skill” criteria in gatekeeper
decision making. We conclude by discussing important dimensions of workplace discrimination
for women, variations by social class and race status, and how complexities of status matter for
what women experience and gatekeeper behavior.
Women’s struggle for employment equality began long before the feminist movement of
the 1970s, especially for those of minority and working-class backgrounds. Sociological
research has made this point clearly, denoting incongruence between what is stated by
the law and the actual treatment of women on the job. Although some progress has been
made, inequalities persist in the sexual division of paid and unpaid work (Bianchi et al.
2000), sex segregation across industry and occupations (Killingsworth 1987; England
1992), sexual harassment (Welsh 1999), sex labeling of jobs, and sex differences in
earnings and mobility (Marini 1989; England 1992; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Padavic and
Reskin 2002).
The inequalities noted above are compounded by race and class disadvantages.
From the 1940s up until the 1980s, black women were making dramatic gains in the
labor market—moving closer to white women in economic status—but that progress
has since slowed (Cunningham and Zalokar 1992). Black women continue to find
themselves in lower-status, lower-paying jobs compared with white women (Burbridge
1994)—disadvantages perhaps triggered by their race status, but also possibly by
simultaneous class-related inequalities that they uniquely face. For both women and
*Direct all correspondence to Susan Y. Ortiz, Department of Sociology, 300 Bricker Hall, 190 N. Oval Mall,
The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210; e-mail: ortiz.60@sociology.osu.edu
336 The Sociological Quarterly 50 (2009) 336–359 © 2009 Midwest Sociological Society
Susan Y. Ortiz and Vincent J. Roscigno Discrimination, Women, and Work
minorities, there indeed remain “unseen, yet unbreachable barriers that keeps [them]
from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifica-
tions or achievements” (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 1995:4; see also Cotter
et al. 2001).
Our aim in this article is to investigate contemporary manifestations of employment
discrimination for women. Workplace inequality literature, while often inferring dis-
crimination and speculating about differences by status, offers limited analytic attention
to discrimination itself, potential variations by status, and how and where it may matter.
Analyses of “social closure” and differential treatment by gatekeeping actors and
coworkers are thus clearly warranted. We draw data from a large body of verified
discrimination cases—cases verified by third-party actors (i.e., civil rights investigators)
whose job it is to evaluate discrimination claims, collect evidence, and draw conclusions
regarding whether in fact discrimination in the legal sense occurred. This allows for
analyses of several types of discrimination for both white and black women, and across
a wide range of occupational statuses. Although there are certainly biases that exist
within such data, our analyses, which rely on both quantitative and qualitative tech-
niques, move us beyond conventional human capital approaches, which can only infer
discrimination from residuals. Instead, we address the very “processes” that inequality
scholars have speculated about for some time.
INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION AT WORK

Unlike much work by economists—work that centers on skill and other human capital
attributes (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]
2001)—sociological research has come to recognize that a simple human capital con-
ceptions leave too much inequality unexplained (Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and
Johnson 2005). While variations in education, skills, training, and so on certainly con-
tribute to employment disavantages, discrimination appears to have a far greater
explanatory potential (Cunningham and Zalokar 1992). Consistent with this point,
numerous studies now tie wage inequality (Killingsworth 1987; England et al. 1994;
Kilbourne et al. 1994; Peterson and Saporta 2004) and occupational gender segregation
(Becker 1971; Reskin 1984; DiPrete and Soule 1988; Carrington and Troske 1995) to
active processes of gatekeeping and social closure in the workplace itself.
Experimental work has been especially effective at linking the gender inequalities to
gatekeeper decision making. Correll et al. (2007), for instance, find that black and white
women who are also mothers tend to be judged more harshly than their male counter-
parts. Women, particularly those who are mothers, tend to be seen as less dependable,
less promotable, and deserving of lower starting salaries. This parallels the conclusions
of Budig and England (2001), who find that mothers exclusively experience a wage
penalty as a likely function of employer discrimination.
Along with motherhood or potential motherhood, women are also often viewed as
sex objects and, consequently, are either pushed into front line “women’s work” or are
outright harassed by supervisors and coworkers. According to Welsh (1999:170)
The Sociological Quarterly 50 (2009) 336–359 © 2009 Midwest Sociological Society 337
Discrimination, Women, and Work Susan Y. Ortiz and Vincent J. Roscigno
“depending on the sample used, 16% to 90% of working women experience sexual
harassment in their lifetime.” But do women face such discriminatory pressures uni-
formly? Or might it be the case that status variations alter the extent and forms of
discrimination that women experience? Although research has had difficulty addressing
these questions directly, at least with respect to discrimination, there is a growing and
informative body of work—work to which we now turn—on both race and social class
variations in women’s disadvantage and labor market experiences.
Status Variations and Inequality at Work

Prior work dealing with gender and race stratification has examined multiple forms of
disadvantage, as well as the possibility of distinct labor market processes. For instance,
since the 1970s, the percentage of both black and white women who participate in the
labor force out of preference rather than necessity has increased. However, black women
are still more likely than white women to participate out of necessity (Herring and
Wilson-Sadberry 1993).
By the close of the 1970s, black women moved into almost every occupational realm,
yet continued to experience both race and sex discrimination (Spaights and Whitaker
1995). At the end of the 1980s, occupational differentiation had changed very little from
the previous decade, with black women earning degrees concentrated in teaching and
nursing. Even without a degree, many black women continue to work in the public
sector (King 1992; Xu and Leffler 1992). In the 1990s—where most of our data are
situated—black women are disproportionately found in service positions (27 percent)
and sales/clerical positions (26 percent) (King 1995). Although white women continued
to be concentrated in clerical occupations (28 percent) as well, discrepancies between
professional/technical occupations for white women (19 percent) and professional/
technical occupations for black women (14 percent) remain.
As a consequence of occupational concentration and race status, women may expe-
rience unique discriminatory practices at various points throughout their careers.
Hiring is often where researchers focus (Anderson 1982; Blau and Ferber 1987; Jenks
1992; Bloch 1994; Olson 1997; Peterson, Saporta, and Siedel 2000), yet hiring discrimi-
nation is often difficult to substantiate unless systematic audit tests of discrimination are
employed. Indeed, “the hiring process is perhaps the single most important but least
understood part of the employment relationship” (Peterson et al. 2000:763).
Once hired, other forms of discrimination may be enacted. As previously noted,
women experience discrimination in terms of segregated work places, wage inequality,
or other types of inequality related to their lower status positions. They also may
experience differential treatment on the job, such as harassment, lack of promotion, and
so on. This might explain why we tend to find women in jobs with lower wages, less
independence, and limited promotional opportunities (Wright et al. 1982; Reskin 1984).
Indeed, as the percent female and percent black increases in industry as well as occupa-
tion, there is a notable decrease in the supervisory authority, managerial responsibility,
and complex task assignments for women occupying those positions (Tomaskovic-
Devey 1993; Wilson 1997).
How women leave a job or the workforce can also be shaped by discrimination. In
this regard, Reid (2002) notes that Black women tend to leave full-time work sooner
than their White counterparts as a result of firing or other forced exits (see also Elvira
and Zatzick 2002), and she speculates that discrimination may be central. Wilson (1997)
and Wilson and McBrier (2005) concur, noting both race and gender “vulnerability” to
employer discretion—vulnerability and discretion that we return to momentarily.
Much of the research on discrimination, or potential discrimination, to which we are
referring, more often than not centers on lower-status workers, who may be most
vulnerable to gatekeeper biases given both lower status and poor workplace organiza-
tion. Moss and Tilly (1995, 2001), for instance, describe how in entry-level unskilled
positions, employers often use “soft skills” to evaluate workers—with negative assess-
ment of the soft skills possessed by African Americans. They also suggest that such
employer perceptions might be as important in the hiring process as the actual skills of
the applicants.
None of this is to suggest that middle-class workers do not feel unique pressures.
Many middle-class black women and white women continue to face a glass ceiling and
often do not move above middle management. Black women may be especially vulner-
able. Wilson and McBrier (2005:303) find support for the minority vulnerability thesis,
which posits “African Americans in upper-tier occupations are expendable, relative to
whites, because they are placed in jobs that generate relatively low levels of revenue and
are considered marginal to long-term trajectories for the economic viability of firms.” In
addition, “being a Black female professional in a White world places an inordinate
amount of stress on Black women” (Spaights and Whitaker 1995:291).
Employer Stereotypes and Women’s Status Identities

Employers often carry stereotypic beliefs about race and gender into the labor market,
and have an economic incentive to let such views function as a proxy for the current or
future behavior of an individual. Individual level screenings would necessitate large
amounts of time and money (England 1992; Browne and Kennelly 1999), thus stereo-
types often provide a convenient filtering tool. Indeed, gendered and racialized views,
which are the product of both history and culture, permeate the walls of many employ-
ment settings. Employers often harbor gendered beliefs about women as workers and
about women as mothers (Browne and Kennelly 1999). Most women in the labor market
are, in fact, viewed and treated as mothers even if they do not have children (Sokoloff
1980). Such stereotypes imply that women are not as committed to paid work as their
male counterparts. Even as recent at 2005, Smith continues to find such employer views
of women—especially white women.
Black women are likewise vulnerable to stereotypical assumptions, yet it is not
simply their image as mothers that shapes employers’ (mis)conceptions. Kennelly
(1999:168) notes that an “over-whelming majority of those who make decisions about
whom to hire are White,” and many of those employers also harbor racist beliefs. Like
white women, black women are viewed as mothers, but in addition, they are often
regarded as single mothers. Thus, not only do black women have to contend with
negative stereotypes of blacks (lazy, insubordinate, late, belligerent, etc.), they must also
confront the racist and gendered stereotypes of “single” motherhood.
It is not only employer attitudes that matter for the types, forms, or processes of
discrimination that women may experience. The salience of women’s identities, along
with their structural location, may likewise be significant. Processes of inequality for
women, while certainly shaped by the salience of gender, race, and social class for
employers, will also be interpreted through victims’ identities. Lewis (1977:346),
echoing this point, notes that “the variance in deference and access to power and
authority between black and white women have proven to be critical factors underlying
black woman’s perception of common group interests with black men and distrust of
white women.” More recently, Jaret and Reitzes (1999) find that blacks are much more
likely than whites to feel as if their racial-ethnic identity is important at work and in
other social settings. Specifically, black females tend to place more importance on the
racial-ethnic identity than either white females or multiracial females. They conclude
that the status of black females is such that their racial-ethnic identity is “more impor-
tant to their sense of self than do other race-sex categories” (Jaret and Reitzes 1999:733).
What this means, relative to our own analysis of discrimination, is that black women
will likely attribute discrimination to their racial status above and beyond their sex
status. White women, in contrast, are often resistant to recognize themselves as racial
(Anderson 2003). Thus it would be hardly surprising to find that white women who
file discrimination charges are more likely see the discriminatory action as sex based.
The importance of gender and racial-ethnic identity is likely a function, at least in
part, of segregation from men. Particularly important in this regard is the fact that black
women are more likely to be sex segregated, and, thus, opportunity for and the visibility
of sex discrimination may be less prevalent. Indeed, black women are more likely to be
working with other women—something that may contribute to the stability of race-
based experiences and identities within their work lives. White women, especially those
moving into the ranks of management or other traditionally “male work,” in contrast,
have a higher likelihood of contact with male coworkers, are often traversing into
historically male employment territory, and thus may experience clearer-cut gender
differentiation and treatment on the job.
Expectations Regarding Discrimination and Status Variations

Current theorizing, particularly in feminist literature, has been especially explicit in
calling for a consideration of connections across and between various statuses. Indeed,
while much of the research discussed above includes some dimension of social stratifi-
cation, little work has been able to systematically explore potentially relevant interrela-
tions. To the extent that discrimination is shaping inequality in the arena of work, there
is good reason to suspect that there may be unique processes—processes resulting from
the simultaneous effects of race, gender, and even social class inequality. Indeed, gender,
race, and class stand in relation to each other, and, as such, they “intersect to create
unique constellations of disadvantage and privilege throughout a society” (Browne and
Misra 2005:165).
Drawing from unique data pertaining to incidents of sex and race-based discrimi-
nation against women across an array of occupational statuses, we analyze below a
variety of discrimination processes in the arena of work with two specific expectations.
First, since, Black and White women have differential access to jobs, it is plausible that
they will encounter distinct forms of discrimination and at varying levels. This may be
because of variations in the organization of work—specifically, variations in formal
procedure in low- and high-status jobs, which may in turn shape workplace experiences
and gatekeeper discretion. Variations in discrimination prevalence and type, however,
might also be a function of more fundamental differences in treatment based on race
status, race stereotyping, and race-based discrimination. Whichever is the case, there is
good reason to suspect that black women will be more likely to face discriminatory
discharge (i.e., illegal firing), while white women will more often face discrimination
surrounding promotion and advancement opportunities. Such a finding would reflect
“minority vulnerability,” and perhaps limited workplace protections for lower-status
workers (see also Anderson 1982; Reid and Padavic 2005; Wilson and McBrier 2005). It
would also capture the glass ceiling of gender mobility, something more likely to impact
higher status and arguably white female workers.
Second, much work on the topic of labor-market race and gender inequalities and
potential discrimination tends to focus on high-status or low-status individuals, making
it correspondingly difficult to delineate whether processes of inequality, vulnerability,
and, arguably discrimination, vary by social class status. We suspect there will be impor-
tant social class variations. Specifically, women, both black and white, in lower-status
jobs will be more likely to experience discrimination in the form of arbitrary firing given
vulnerability, low levels of power, and significant managerial discretion, especially in
low-wage service sector jobs. Those in higher-status positions, in contrast, are arguably
more likely to experience discriminatory barriers to mobility and promotion (since such
opportunities exist in the first place, and competition dynamics will more clearly mani-
fest across lines of status). While such variations will be in part a product of status
vulnerability, there is also good reason to believe that the organization of work itself—
which entails both degrees of formalized procedure and levels managerial discretion—
will have consequences for what low- and high-status workers experience in terms of
abuse and targeted discrimination (Hodson, Roscigno, and Lopez 2006).
DATA
Our data are drawn from archived discrimination case files made available to the authors
by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC). The OCRC holds case materials per-
taining to discrimination suits filed in state, including but not limited to the major
metropolitan areas of Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Akron, and Toledo.
This state agency was set up to enforce civil rights laws in the state of Ohio, following
both state law and federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guide-
lines. Since 1978, the OCRC has had work share arrangements with the EEOC so that
employment charges are dual filed (OCRC 2004). The EEOC often relies on the opinion
of the OCRC unless the case falls into an already existent EEOC investigation, litigation,
or national initiative. These cases are, in effect, both state and federal discrimination
cases. The OCRC creates and maintains a database of cases—a database that includes the
case identification number, the name, sex, and race of the charging party, the respondent
(i.e., employer), the basis of the charge, the harm that was suffered, the job position held
by the charging party, the position of the person committing the alleged harm, the final
determination by the OCRC, whether either party has legal or extra organizational
representation, and whether there are comparative cases in the workplace. We draw from
some of these quantitative data within our analyses while also immersing ourselves in a
random subsample of case materials themselves in order to highlight the processes
involved.
Certain biases undoubtedly exist within such data. It would, for instance, be errone-
ous to assume that a discrimination claim necessarily implies that discrimination
occurred. OCRC’s case determination (and a probable cause finding in particular) helps
distinguish cases with little supporting evidence from those with significant and support-
ing evidence in favor of the charging party’s claim. Along with probable cause findings,
settlement of a case in the charging party’s favor (prior to litigation) is often deemed as
supporting evidence from the point of view of legal scholars who both study and testify in
discrimination suits. Thus, our analyses are limited to verified cases, wherein probable
cause determinations were reached or favorable settlements for the charging party were
brokered by a neutral third party (OCRC or District Attorney’s office)—a neutral third
party whose job it is to collect evidence, eyewitness accounts, and case histories, and to
weigh the preponderance of all evidence following EEOC guidelines.
Selecting verified cases will have the effect of underestimating discrimination by
excluding cases where there simply was not enough evidence. Moreover, discrimination
will be underestimated by virtue of the fact that a case must be reported. Specifically,
someone discriminated against must (1) understand their rights under the law; (2)
interpret their treatment as discrimination; (3) actively seek out a civil rights commis-
sion office; and (4) enter the office and go through an entire investigative process. There
is undoubtedly a subjective element to the process, and to the verified cases analyzed—
one wherein a charging party’s subjective interpretation of the discrimination experi-
ence and their corresponding filing of a charge aligns with the law and meets
investigative criteria. Despite these caveats pertaining to underestimation, however, the
use of verified case materials bolsters our confidence and ability to speak directly to
issues of discriminatory process, rather than simply alleged or perceived discrimination.
There is a good reason to believe that lower status women and others who feel
vulnerable are less likely to file a charge of discrimination (see, for instance, Bumiller
1988). Additionally, there is evidence that women and younger individuals may be least
likely to either interpret or lodge complaints (e.g., Uggen and Blackstone 2004). In these
regards, our own supplemental analyses reveal that there are indeed statistical differ-
ences in attorney representation, with middle-class white women at an advantage rela-
tive to both African-American women, generally, and working-class white women. A
truly accurate evaluation of data bias, however, would necessitate knowing how much
discrimination (reported and unreported, realized and not realized) is occurring in the
real world. In addition, there may be temporal, local, or regional variation in reporting
as a function of the high visibility of cases or changing local politics—variation that
research on stratification and law has had difficulty addressing in any systematic fashion.
In this regard, we examined in supplementary analyses distributions of race and sex
based cases over the 15-year period, but found relative consistency across time.
Since our principal analytic intent is to compare the discrimination experienced by
black and white women across a wide range of statuses (rather than predicting levels of all
discrimination occurring in the real world), we do not view potential data biases, such as
those noted above, as particularly problematic for our analyses. And, more importantly,
we seek to delineate relevant processes from the qualitative case materials. Our data provide
significant variation across status, occupation, and labor market sector, and also rich
qualitative detail pertaining to what actually unfolded. Indeed, relative to prior work that
attempts to capture discrimination by relying on retrospective interviews or experimental
techniques (e.g., audit testing), the verified cases we focus on reflect concrete acts of
discrimination within the arena of work, confirmed by a neutral, third-party investiga-
tion following state and federal civil rights guidelines. Second, the combined quantitative
and qualitative materials provide rare insight into the processes involved—our principal
aim—and something that existing quantitative work has seldom been able to show.
Finally, there is significant heterogeneity in race and occupational status in our sample of
cases. Variation along these dimensions allows for key comparisons.
Drawing from the larger database, we selected all sex and race discrimination cases
filed by women (N = 33,202) over a 15-year period, from 1988 to 2003. Of these, 8,122
(or 24 percent) reflect verified cases. Figure 1 reports, side by side, all cases filed by
women and then only those that were verified, disaggregated by race.1 Note that the
distribution of verified cases follows the same pattern of all cases. Since cases by women
of Hispanic, Asian, or other races and/or ethnicities are relatively rare in these data, given
the composition of the state from which the data derive, we focus our analysis specifi-
cally on black and white women.
Focusing on verified cases in Figure 2, we find an interesting distribution on the basis
of discriminatory charge. White females are much more likely to report gender-based
discrimination, while virtually none file charges of race discrimination. For black
women, race status and race-based discrimination appear to be much more prevalent
than identity dynamics or experiences of discrimination rooted in sex. Race may be a
more salient identity for African-American women, as they experience a high degree of
separation from whites at work, at home, and in their neighborhoods (Roscigno 1994).
Wharton (2000:177) concurs, noting that while the sex category is often prominent in
personal identity, it is “not always an important factor is workplace social relations.”
Indeed, the patterns in Figure 2 may very well be capturing identity dynamics and the
greater salience of race in the work environment for black women.
For qualitative purposes, we took a random subsample of all of the verified cases
(N = 378). Each was content coded using a standardized coding device. Weekly meetings
were then held to check for inter-coder reliability. These cases were content coded in
All Race and Gender Discrimination Case Filings by Women

(N=33,202)
60
56.1%
50
39.8%
40
Percent
30
20
10
3.7%
0.2% 0.1%
0
African White Hispanic Asian Other
American
Charging Party’s Race/Ethnicity
Verfied Race and Gender Discrimination Cases for Women

(N=8,928)
60
52.0%
50
43.6%
40
Percent
30
20
10
4.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0
African White Hispanic Asian Other
American
Charging Party’s Race/Ethnicity
FIGURE 1. Percent of All Discrimination Cases and Verified Cases Filed by Women, Disaggre-
gated by Race/Ethnicity.
White Female
(Race Discrimination)
2.5%
African-American Female
(Sex Discrimination)
15.8%
White Female
(Sex Discrimination)
43.1%
African-American Female
(Race Discrimination)
38.5%
FIGURE 2. Distribution of All Verified Discrimination Cases for Women, by Race of Charging
Party and Basis of Charge.
order to obtain rich qualitative information, as well as information about occupational

status and prestige, the claims made by the charging party, counterclaims made by the
respondents, EEOC data, case log sheets, and information on whether outside actors
(i.e., lawyers) were involved on either side of the case. All names have been changed in
the qualitative material that follows.
Analyses thus draw from both the larger data set of verified cases for black and white
women (N = 8,122), as well as information from the smaller content-coded sample. The
larger data are used to examine the discriminatory experiences of women, the types of
discrimination that occur, and potential variations by race. For discussions of social class
and more qualitative analyses of the process of discrimination, we rely on the smaller
content-coded sample of cases.
We created two distinct proxies for social class status. The first is the standard
nine-category EEOC occupational ranking (e.g., craft, technical, sales, etc.). Since,
however, materials in the case files included specific occupation and place of
employment, we recognized that a more refined and easily interpretable indicator of
social class position in the form of occupational prestige (low, medium, and high) could
be constructed. We did so by coding each specific occupation by its occupational prestige
score, and then cross-referenced this with the Equal Employment Opportunity Job
Classification Guide. Based on this combined information, low-status positions in our
data include, for instance, laundry attendant, custodian, cashier, waitress, and so on.
Medium-status positions include, but are not limited to, administrative assistant, tech-
nician, and corrections officer. High-status positions in our data, in contrast, include
positions such as professor, staff attorney, and systems analyst.
As noted by Dickson and Lind (2001:38), “occupation is also frequently cited as the
‘single best proxy indicator of social class.’ ” Although there are complexities pertaining
to women’s class status, given associations with marital status, it remains important that
researchers attempt to capture it empirically if associations and intersections of gender,
race, and class are to be adequately examined (Browne and Misra 2005). Using these two
indicators (EEOC occupational rank and occupational prestige) as proxies for class
provides some insight into how class position may be playing a role in the variation of
discrimination examined.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND RESULTS

Our twofold strategy of drawing from the larger quantitative data and immersion in the
qualitative data meets the mutually beneficial aims of both (1) assessment of variations
in general patterns across groups and by status; and (2) grounded insight into the
relevant dynamics in concrete workplace settings. Our principal question is whether
women of distinct racial and social class statuses experience varying patterns of dis-
criminatory treatment. First, drawing from the entire body of verified cases (N = 8,122),
we examine racial variations in the types of discrimination that black and white women
experience. We rely here on descriptive statistics and comparative tests of statistical
difference. We supplement this with qualitative material—material that allows us to
explore the process of discrimination itself and possible variations.
We then do the same for social class, drawing from the smaller content-coded sample
(N = 378). It certainly may be the case that differences we find are related to the unique
status of women as black or white. On the other hand, and given the historical legacy for
black women in particular, discrimination vulnerability may be at least partly attribut-
able to disadvantages in social class status, and, correspondingly, the types of jobs in
which they are disproportionately located. We draw on rich qualitative data, including
statements given by women who have experienced discrimination—statements pertain-
ing to what happened and how. Such data provide important insight into the mecha-
nisms implicated in the disparities highlighted in the more quantitative data.
Workplace Discrimination toward Women and Variations by Race

The majority of discrimination cases in our data are filed by black women (54.4 percent)
versus white women (45.6 percent). As Figure 1 revealed, this holds even when only the
verified cases2 are selected. Figure 2 further suggested that the foundations of the
70
61.5% White Black
60
53.4%
50
Within-Group Percent
40
29.6%
30
19.2%
20
10 7.1% 7.3%
4.6% 4.5%
4.0% 3.4% 3.2%
2.0%
0
Hiring* Firing Promotion* Demotion General Sexual
Harassment* Harassment*
Discrimination Type
FIGURE 3. Distribution of Discrimination Types for African-American and White Women.

*Denotes statistically significant racial difference within discriminatory type below p < 0.01 level.
discrimination (i.e., race discrimination or sex discrimination) may be distinct for black
and white women, with white women more likely to report sex discrimination, and black
women more likely to report race discrimination.
Discrimination is undoubtedly a multidimensional phenomenon with distinct inju-
ries, such as hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, general harassment,3 and sexual
harassment, each of which can be ascertained from the larger data set. Figure 3, reported
above, examines the detailed and more specific injuries that occurred within and across
race.
Analyses show that for both black and white women, the majority of claims occur for
discriminatory firing (57.2 percent), and second for general harassment (22.9 percent).
This is quite notable, given that much research on gender and race stratification takes as
its central analytic foci issues of wage disparity and mobility within workplaces. It
appears from our data, however, that discriminatory firing and general harassment may be
more relevant to understanding women’s experiences of social closure in employment (see
also Feagin and McKinney 2003; Reid and Padavic 2005). This result more closely
parallels research done in legal studies. For example, Donohue and Siegelman (1991)
find that discharge has replaced hiring as the majority of all employment litigation
suites. Of course, such results must be tempered with the understanding that there may
be some systematic biases in data such as ours. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that
once fired, an employee will not suffer any repercussions for filing a discrimination
charge and hence may be more likely to file once terminated. However, it is also impor-
tant to note the extent of general harassment and other forms of discrimination repre-
sented in these data—forms that occur with women’s current employment settings and
where the possibility of retaliation is very real.
We ran nonparametric chi-square tests to compare the significance of the differences

reported above. Turning back to Figure 3, which also reports the statistical results, the
reader will note the significant associations between race and discrimination for hiring,
promotion, general harassment, and sexual harassment (p < 0.01). Black women are
significantly more likely to file a discrimination case for hiring, promotion, and general
harassment, whereas white women are significantly more likely to file for sexual harass-
ment. Although hiring discrimination is often where theorizing has tended to focus
(Blau and Ferber 1987; Jencks 1992; Bloch 1994; Olson 1997), discrimination in hiring
is difficult to substantiate without systematic designs, such as audits. In one of the few
audit projects pertaining to sex and employment, Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort (1996),
focusing on restaurant hiring specifically, find a statistically significant difference in the
number of job offers and interviews given to women, particularly at high-priced estab-
lishments. More audit studies are undoubtedly needed to gauge the prevalence of sex
discriminatory hiring practices. Selection bias in the number of overall hiring cases
reported is undeniable. It is nevertheless noteworthy here that despite such potential
biases, black women remain significantly more likely to have verified hiring discrimi-
nation claims. Additional studies, such as those conducted recently by Pager (2003)
pertaining to race, as well as studies that examine the conjoined effects of race and
gender, are both needed to better gauge how hiring disparities play out for women not
only by race but also across occupations and industries.
Both black and white women have high rates of discriminatory firing. The high rate
for white women is a surprise relative to our earlier expectation. Our immersion into the
qualitative materials on discharge suggests, however, key differences in process as opposed to
actual rates. It is more common for white women, for instance, to report and experience
gender-related discrimination in relation to being fired. Indeed, they are over three-and-
a-half times more likely to file a pregnancy discrimination case where the discrimination
entailed outright discharge. Take for instance the following examples reported by a credit
manager and an administrative assistant. According to the credit manager:
I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my sex (pregnancy) for
the following reasons. I had a doctor’s appointment on April 1, 1992 at which time
it was confirmed that I was pregnant. On April 2, 1992, I went to work and told
everyone in the office that I was pregnant. The Owner’s wife, Sue McGrady, was
visiting the office when I was telling everyone of my news. Ms. McGrady asked me if
it was a planned pregnancy. She told me I should deal with Sam about it. On April
3, 1992, my supervisor, Sam Jacobson and Sue McGrady . . . were in a meeting for
the majority of the morning. At approximately 5:15 p.m. that same day, Sam told me
that I was let go because I was no longer dependable. I feel the Respondent’s actions
are discriminatory because I am pregnant. My doctor did not place any restrictions
on me and I am able to perform my job as Credit Manager. I am aware that the
Respondent employs approximately two hundred (200) employees and only
approximately ten (10) of them are females. I am also aware that a pregnant
employee, Kate Flounder, was discharged while out on leave after giving birth. The
Respondent does not have a maternity leave or disability leave policy.
An administrative assistant, who is also white and female, relates similar treatment
upon her employer finding out she is pregnant.
During the time that I worked (while pregnant) the atmosphere at the job was
hostile. The Owner . . . male, made derogatory comments about my pregnancy.
Certain employees told another employee that if I returned to work after my preg-
nancy that they would leave the company. While I was out on maternity leave one girl
in the office said that if I was not pregnant that she would beat me up.
African-American women reporting discriminatory firing as the principal injury,
in contrast, seem to experience a more generalized form of differential treatment
and unequal terms and conditions—differential treatment more often rooted in their
race status than their sex status, that escalates over time, and that ultimately leads to
their firing. Indeed, our examination of the entirety of case material for the content-
coded subsample suggests a centrality of race for African-American women and
their experiences at work. Take the following case, for instance, where an African-
American woman is singled out for unique supervisory scrutiny and then eventually
discharged.
I had been working for the Clinic since October 26, 1986 most recently as Admin-
istrative Secretary in the General Anesthesiology Department. Mary Kent Caucasian
Administrator terminated me because she said that things were not working out. I
believe that I have been unlawfully discriminated against because of my race, Black,
for the following reasons: On April 10, 1989, I transferred into the department and
was placed on a standard 90 days probation. On July 26, 1989, Ms. Kent placed me
on an additional 30 days probation because she said that my evaluations were not
high enough. I deny that my work was below standard. All my previous evaluations
given by other supervisors had been excellent. Prior to my termination, three phy-
sicians to whom I had to report gave me excellent evaluations, but Ms. Kent refuses
to accept them.
After an investigation by the OCRC, a probable cause finding was issued. They had
determined that indeed, “(the) Respondent discharged her for reasons not applied
equally to all persons without regard to their race.” The OCRC typically seeks a “make
whole” remedy policy. The intent with such a policy is to get the victim their job back or
obtain compensation for the pay the employee did not receive while they were looking
for another job. The cases we are reporting do not include class-action lawsuits, and
most often do not result in large financial settlements to the charging party. Although
not all discrimination victims hire an attorney, the victim reported above did have legal
representation, who contends that in this particular case, a “make whole” remedy of
rehiring the fired employee would not be appropriate:
(The Charging Party) is no longer interested in being reinstated to her prior position
with the Clinic. We believe that because of the nature and extent of her discrimina-
tion as well as the extreme humiliation which she suffered at the Clinic as a result of
employer actions, reinstatement is not an alternative for which we can consider. For
example, a notice was posted on her office door broadcasting (the Charging Party’s)
termination. Also, there have been instances of extreme racial discrimination such as
an instance, which occurred on May 8, 1989, where she was referred to as a monkey.
Under these circumstances, I would not recommend reinstatement to my client.
White women and black women both seem to be vulnerable to discriminatory firing,
although the foundations of that differential treatment appear to vary. Indeed, the roots
of black women’s discriminatory experiences, whether as a result of perception and
identity dynamics or actual treatment, are often race rather than gender based. White
women, in contrast, experience similar levels of discriminatory firing relative to their
black counterparts, although the discrimination they experience and face when being
fired is more directly tied to their status as women.
The same pattern holds true for harassment, the second most prevalent form of
discrimination women face, according to our qualitative immersion. Again, for black
women, the harassment entails disparate racial policing and differential treatment.
I am a Black person and was employed by Respondent from April 27, 1992 until
January 18, 1993 as a secretary/receptionist. . . . Lucy Marks did not give me the
necessary training for the position. On many occasions I asked another secretary for
the procedures that were used, such as, giving clients particular information or giving
providers information concerning clients benefits status. I was not allowed computer
training in June 1992 with other secretaries (White). Lucy Marks told me I would not
be paid for attending staff meetings. Other employees attending the meetings were
paid. After attending several meetings, I was excluded from two and then invited back.
Other secretaries work was not scrutinized in the same manner mine was.
This woman was not given the same terms and conditions as other white female
secretaries. The following quote is from a White women working in a similar position
(secretary). She also was also harassed, although the treatment was clearly sex based. As
noted earlier in Figure 3, white women are significantly more likely to have verified
sexual harassment charges.
Mark asked me to come over and he rolled his desk chair over towards me, grabbed
me by the hips and pushed me towards him. He put his legs around me and put his
head on my breasts. He then said “I can make your job easy for you here.” I became
very upset and left the room. . . . Mark became abusive towards me. He would call
me “Goddamn mother fucker” and yell at me. He constantly used foul language
when talking to me.
Earlier, we reported that there are very few instances of white women charging racial
discrimination and white women’s harassment nearly always centers on either their
status as women, mothers, or sexual objects. Although the dominant pattern of harass-
ment for African-American women is largely racially antagonistic in nature, there are
certainly some instances of African-American women who report either sex discrimi-
nation or a combination of race and sex discrimination. These are, however, by no
means the typical cases. Few black women charge solely gender discrimination, and,
where they do, case materials suggested some conjoined impact of race and sex. One
black woman, for instance, noted that that “white male dispatchers” were disciplined less
severely than she, while another interpreted a company’s refusal to hire her as attribut-
able to her “race and sex.” A third experienced “sexual harassment and derogatory
remarks based on her race and sex.” The following quote is a valuable example in these
regards, highlighting how race and sex intersections impact experiences and confound
interpretations of what occurred.
Defense Attorney: Do you know why he was treating you differently than other
employees?
Dolores Williams: He treated me differently, I think, because I am a Black female and
that John Dixon has a problem with females. . . . He also has a problem with Blacks.
He just had a problem with me being on the job.
Variations by Social Class

As previously discussed, black women typically earn less and are in lower-prestige jobs
(Cunningham and Zalokar 1992). It may be possible that black and white women work
in different occupations, where the structural makeup of the workplace makes discrimi-
nation more or less easily practiced or visible (Burris and Wharton 1982). High levels of
bureaucracy, for instance, are thought to limit the extent to which formal and informal
discrimination can occur (Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999). Might such status varia-
tions and their implications for the types of workplace organization experienced shape
forms and processes of discrimination?
Figure 4 shows the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) distribution of our
verified cases by occupational category. The majority of both black and white women
30
White Black
25
20
15
10
0
s*
s*
al
d)
d)
e
ca
d)
al
ic
ric
er
le
lle
lle
on
ni
lle
rv
Sa
ag
le
ki
ki
ch
Se
ki
si
i-S
ns
an
(S
es
Te
&
(U
em
M
of
ft
ce
ra
rs
Pr
&
(S
ffi
re
s
es
al
bo
ci
tiv
La
ffi
ra
O
pe
O
EEOC Occupation
FIGURE 4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Occupational Breakdown of

Verified Discrimination Cases for African-American and White Women.
* Denotes statistically significant racial difference within occupational category below p < 0.01
level.
70
63.3% White Black
60
50
46.1% 45.4%
40
30.1%
30
20
8.6%
10 6.6%
0
Low Medium High
Occupational Prestige
FIGURE 5. Verified Discrimination Cases for African-American and White Women by Occupa-
tional Prestige.
who file charges are located in office/clerical positions (24 percent) and service occupa-
tions (22 percent). Patterns of occupational concentration mirror, to a great extent, the
more general sex segregation of occupations noted in prior work. Notably, however,
there is a significantly greater percentage of white women filing charges in official/
manager positions, as well as in sales and craft (skilled) positions. As black women are
underrepresented in craft (skilled) and managerial positions, it is not surprising that
their percentage is lower compared with white women.
Using occupational prestige scores cross-referenced with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Job Classification Guide as a proxy for class, Figure 5 reports the break-
down of verified and content-coded discrimination cases for women in positions of low,
medium, and high occupational prestige. The majority of cases lie among those in the
middle ranks. Working-class black women and middle-class black women have almost
exactly the same number of verified charges, 46.1 and 45.4 percent, respectively. The
difference between working-class and middle-class white women, in contrast, is obvious.
Upper-status women, generally, file the fewest number of cases regardless of their race.
This result is not surprising, given that the number of women, and especially women of
color, in high-status positions is much lower than the number in middle- and lower-
status jobs.
Firing, as noted earlier, is the most frequently recorded injury for both black and
white women. Interestingly, there is a significant difference between middle-class black
women and middle-class white women for firing, demotion, general harassment, and
sexual harassment (see Table 1). Differences on other types of discrimination appear
substantively distinct, yet are not statistically different owing largely to smaller sample
sizes and less overall representation in certain discriminatory categories (e.g., hiring,
TABLE 1. Percentage (Raw Number) of Verified Discrimination Cases by Type of Injury, Race,
and Class Status: Content-Coded Subsamplea
Status
b
Injury Low Medium High
Hiring
Black 28.6 (2) 71.4 (5) 0.0 (0)
White 11.1 (1) 77.8 (7) 11.1 (1)
Firing
Black 50.6 (43) 41.2 (35) 8.2 (7)
White 35.2 (43) 55.7 (68) 9.0 (11)
Promotion
Black 39.1 (9) 56.5 (13) 4.3 (1)
White 21.7 (5) 73.9 (17) 4.3 (1)
Demotion
Black 25.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 25.0 (1)
White 23.1 (3) 76.9 (10) 0.0 (0)
General harassment
Black 41.4 (12) 44.8 (13) 13.8 (4)
White 18.2 (8) 77.3 (34) 4.5 (2)
Sexual harassment
Black 75.0 (3) 25.0 (1) 0.0 (0)
White 53.3 (8) 46.7 (7) 0.0 (0)
a
Percentages reported represent within-racial group breakdown by status for each injury classifi-
cation. Counts in parentheses.
b
Boldfaced type indicates statistically significant racial difference (under p < 0.05) within each
occupational status and injury designation.
etc.). The high number of verified discrimination cases, most notably for middle-class
white women, may be a function of sociodemographic attributes. Women with
advanced education may know more about how and where to file charges, and where to
find information about filing. Supplemental analyses reveal that white women are sig-
nificantly more likely than black women to hire an attorney. And, middle-class white
women are significantly more likely than their lower-status white counterparts to hire an
attorney. According to Donohue and Siegelman (1991:993), “clearly the ability to detect
violations of one’s rights—and, once detected, to categorize such violations as legally
actionable—depends not only on the grossness of the violation, but also one’s educa-
tion, legal sophistication, and general perceptions of one’s rights.” Additionally, middle-
class women in our sample may also be cushioned against potential job loss by a
well-earning spouse and/or savings. Finally, middle-class white women are more likely
to be surrounded by others on the job who are not like them (men), unlike their
lower-status counterparts. As such, differential treatment may be all the more obvious.
When analyzing the qualitative data for both black and white women in various class
positions, it becomes clear that black women, regardless of occupational status, experience
discrimination mostly as a function of differential (racial) treatment from their cowork-

ers, many of whom also tend to be white and female. As in the case below, this may be
because of the sex-segregated surroundings, often with white female supervisors, within
which they work.
I was employed by the above named Respondent most recently as a Medical Biller.
. . . On December 15, 1998, Adrianne Moss, White, Manager, gave me a letter that
stated that Respondent would no longer be needing my services due to excessive
absences and my inability to take direction and work the hours I was hired to
work. . . . I believe that I was discharged due to considerations of my race, Black,
because Martha Gregory, White, Medical Biller, had excessive absences and was not
discharged. I only missed two days while employed by Respondent and I successfully
completed my probationary period. Between September 21, 1998 and December
1998, Moss called me an asshole, referred to me as a child and called me out of my
name, but Moss never treated White employees this way. Two days after my dis-
charge, Respondent replaced me with a White person. Prior to my discharge, I was
never given an oral or written warning or a suspension.
Class variations among white women are more clear. Those in lower-status positions
become vulnerable to harassment and discharge, especially when working in tradition-
ally male work environments where, as in the following case, they are often more harshly
scrutinized than their male coworkers.
Mark Aaron [foreman] terminated me for the stated reason that I was caught by
assistant superintendent, Rusty Goward, momentarily looking out of the window of
the junction house and not working, and that I had a bad attitude. Joe Eddington
was also caught looking out of the window but was only given a warning. Joe
Eddington was also caught not working that afternoon and was not disciplined. Joe
Eddington has been late on many occasions and has never been disciplined. I have no
attendance problems whatsoever.
In the above situation, Sarah Zircher (steel mill worker) was not given the same
terms and conditions as her fellow employees. Status vulnerability and low levels of
power open a woman up to supervisory abuse, disparate policing, and penalties.
White women generally experience discrimination associated with unequal treat-
ment, blocked mobility, and sexual harassment, all of which fall under sex discrimina-
tion according to state and federal law. Those, especially within the middle ranks who
enter male-dominated professions, seem particularly vulnerable. Take, for instance, the
case of Kay Sorenson, who was harassed by both supervisors and male coworkers.
Kay was the only female electrician in her department and was subjected to numer-
ous forms and instances of sexual harassment. She was shown pictures of nude
women, asked, “seductively about a light bulb and [saw] a male co-worker have it
between his legs,” and had her face “pushed toward a male co-workers crotch.” Her
co-workers also made comments about women working. “One told me that in other
countries the women know their place and that I was taking a good paying job away
from a man and that I should be at home taking care of my kids. . . . He said maybe
I should move to another ‘cunt’ry.’”
For black women, however, the experience of discrimination is, in general, more
firmly rooted in race, regardless of class status. White women on the lower end of the
occupational status hierarchy, similar to all black women, face discretionary and differ-
ential treatment as women in general. For middle- to upper-class white women, issues of
maternity/pregnancy and sexual harassment seem much more paramount and more
often culminate in their termination.
CONCLUSIONS
This article highlights race and class as salient issues when it comes to understanding
gender inequalities in the labor market and discrimination in the arena of work. Our
analyses draw from both quantitative data on distributions of discrimination type for
black and white women, as well as rich qualitative materials pertaining to relevant
processes and experiences as they play out in concrete work settings. The type, quality,
and richness of such data are a rarity, and their uniqueness in allowing for suitable
qualitative and quantitative analysis is something needed in the social science and
sociology literatures. The benefit lies in the ability to analyze discrimination processes
specifically, thus filling gaps in our understanding of stratification and its micro-
interactional dimensions.
Both black and white women continue to experience discriminatory firing as the
most salient discriminatory issue. Black women, by all indications, are more likely to
experience higher levels of discrimination in hiring, promotion and general harassment,
and it is most often race based. Whether this is the objective reality, or whether African-
American women are simply more sensitive to race as a salient identity and issue in their
lives, however, remains an open question. Women may be experiencing discrimination
through a combination of stratification systems, but are only reporting what seems to be
the most obvious form. Even if black women are experiencing discrimination based on
their sex, for instance, it may be perceived as a function of differential racial treatment.
Most white women, in contrast, clearly interpret discrimination as being based on their
sex, despite the objective importance of social class in shaping discrimination prevalence
and form.
There is good reason to believe and make explicit that discrimination faced by
women in the contemporary workplace is both racialized and classed. Individuals can
experience simultaneous advantage and disadvantage, but may attribute their experi-
ences of inequality to a singular dimension. Our results revealed that there are differ-
ential discrimination experiences for middle- and working-class white women. As for
black women, there appears to be little in the way of social class differences in their
discriminatory experiences. Indeed, both working-class and middle-class black women
file an almost equal number of cases, with little variation in discriminatory form. White
women, particularly middle-class white women, are significantly more likely than black
women to experience and report sexual harassment.
It is certainly conceivable that many employees do not report discrimination out of
fear of retaliation. Or if they are experiencing discrimination, they may simply quit or
transfer from their current job instead of filing charges and seeking compensation. This
would arguably hold more true for working-class women—women who, lacking safety
nets, need these jobs to survive. It is also difficult to acquire proof that discrimination
has occurred, and many working-class women may not be in a position to collect
enough evidence, know what their rights are, or how to most effectively follow through
on grievances. Additionally, although most women do not have an attorney, middle-
class white women are significantly more likely that their minority and lower-
occupational status counterparts to hire an attorney. We thus again temper our
interpretations with the reality that discrimination is much more prevalent and complex
than can be captured in any single data set or article for that matter.
Our analyses only examine discrimination experienced by African-American and
white women. Discrimination certainly may occur, and perhaps even differentially, for
women of other races and ethnicities—a fact that we hope future research will consider.
Although the population of Ohio is not representative of the population of the United
States in many respects, it should be noted that according to the U.S. Census Bureau
(1990), the Ohio labor force participation of white and black women is very similar to
that of the United States. The same federal discrimination laws apply to all the states, and
many states share similar occupations and industries with the state of Ohio. Conse-
quently, although greater racial heterogeneity in our data may be wanting, our analyses
and results nevertheless do tackle explicitly, like few studies have, how discrimination
unfolds for women in actual workplaces. There is little reason to believe that the patterns
revealed in this article—particularly the high rates of discriminatory firing and harass-
ment relative to other discriminatory forms, the race- or gender-based nature of the
discrimination experience, and the social class variations we uncovered—should not be
of relevance to most analyses of discrimination and inequality, regardless of region,
state, or maybe even nation.
NOTES
1
In 1990, 56 percent of women over the age of 16 were in the U.S. labor market. Of those women,
white women comprised 81.07 percent of the labor force, while black women comprised 12.18
percent of the labor force. In 1990, in the state of Ohio, almost 55 percent of women over the age
of 16 were in the labor market. Of those women, white women comprised 88.21 percent of the
labor force, while black women comprised 10.38 percent of the labor force.
2
Recall that verified cases are those wherein evidence supported the charging party’s claim, or
there was a higher-level finding in the charging party’s favor.
3
General harassment includes exclusion, antagonism, and intimidation. General harassment cases
include those where the employer or fellow employees are doing something to make the work
environment intolerable for the Charging Party. It can take on many forms, including, differential
treatment because of pregnancy, antagonism, exclusion from opportunities given to other
employees, and so on. The basic premise of general harassment is to make the Charging Party feel
unwelcome and uncomfortable, with the likely result of the Charging Party leaving the place of
employment.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Karen Tucker. 1982. “Last Hired, First Fired: Black Women Workers during World War
II.” Journal of American History 69:82–97.
Anderson, Margaret. 2003. “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness.” Pp. 21–34
in Whiteout: The Continuing Significance of Racism, edited by A. Doane and E. Bonilla-Silva.
New York: Routledge.
Becker, Gary. 1971. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bianchi, Suzanne M., Melissa A. Milkie, Liana C. Sayer, and John P. Robinson. 2000. “Is Anyone
Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor.” Social Forces
79:191–228.
Blau, F. and M. Ferber. 1987. “Occupations and Earnings of Women Workers.” Pp. 37–68 in
Working Women: Past, Present, Future, edited by K. S. Koziara, M. H. Moskow, and L. D.
Tanner. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs.
Bloch, F. 1994. Antidiscrimination Law and Minority Employment. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Browne, Irene and Ivy Kennelly. 1999. “Stereotypes and Realities: Images of Black Women in the
Labor Market.” Pp. 302–26 in Latinas and African American Women at Work: Race, Gender, and
Economic Inequality, edited by I. Browne. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Browne, Irene and Joya Misra. 2005. “Labor Market Inequality: Intersections of Gender, Race and
Class.” Pp. 165–89 in Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities, edited by M. Romero and E.
Margolis. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Budig, Michelle J. and Paula England. 2001. “The Wage Penalty for Motherhood.” American
Sociological Review 66:204–25.
Bumiller, Kristin. 1988. The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Burbridge, Lynn C. 1994. “Black Women in the History of African American Economic Thought:
A Critical Essay.” Pp. 101–22 in A Different Vision: African American Economic Thought, edited
by Thomas D. Boston. London, England: Routledge.
Burris, Val and Amy Wharton. 1982. “Sex Segregation in the U.S. Labor Force.” Review of Radical
Political Economics 14:43–56.
Carrington, William J. and Kenneth R. Troske. 1995. “Gender Segregation in Small Firms.” The
Journal of Human Resources 30:503–33.
Correll, Shelley J., Stephen Benard, and In Paik. 2007. “Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?” American Journal of Sociology 112:1297–338.
Cotter, David A., Joan M. Hermsen, Seth Ovadia, and Reeve Vanneman. 2001. “The Glass Ceiling
Effect.” Social Forces 80:655–81.
Cunningham, James S. and Nadja Zalokar. 1992. “The Economic Progress of Black Women,
1940–1980: Occupational Distribution and Relative Wages.” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 45:540–55.
Dickson, John P. and R. Bruce Lind. 2001. “The Stability of Occupational Prestige as a Key Variable
in Determining Social Class Structure: A Longitudinal Study, 1976–2000.” Pp. 38–44 in AMA
Winter Educators’ Conference, edited by Ram Krishman and Madhu Viswanathan. Chicago, IL:
American Marketing Association.
DiPrete, Thomas A. and Whitman T. Soule. 1988. “Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job
Ladder Systems.” American Sociological Review 53:26–40.
Donohue, John J., III and Peter Siegelman. 1991. “The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation.” Stanford Law Review 43:983–1033.
Elvira, Marta M. and Christopher D. Zatzick. 2002. “Who’s Displaced First? The Role of Race in
Layoff Decisions.” Industrial Relations 41:329–61.
England, Paula. 1992. Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de
Gruyter.
England, Paula, Melissa A. Herbert, Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Lori L. Reid, and Lori McCreary
Megdal. 1994. “The Gendered Valuation of Occupations and Skills: Earnings in 1980 Census
Occupations.” Social Forces 73:65–99.
Feagin, Joe R. and Karyn D. McKinney. 2003. The Many Costs of Racism. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield.
Federal Glass Ceiling Commission. 1995. A Solid Investment: Making Full Use of the Nation’s
Human Capital. Washington, DC: Federal Glass Ceiling Commission.
Herring, Cedric and Karen Rose Wilson-Sadberry. 1993. “Preference or Necessity? Changing Work
Roles of Black and White Women 1973–1990.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 55:314–25.
Hodson, Randy, Vincent J. Roscigno, and Steven H. Lopez. 2006. “Chaos and the Abuse of Power:
Workplace Bullying in Organizational & Interactional Context.” Work & Occupations 33:382–
416.
Jaret, Charles and Donald C. Reitzes. 1999. “The Importance of Racial-Ethnic Identity and Social
Settings for Blacks, Whites, and Multiracials.” Sociological Perspectives 42:711–37.
Jencks, Christopher. 1992. Rethinking Social Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kennelly, Ivy. 1999. “ ‘That Single-Mother Element’: How White Employers Typify Black Women.”
Gender and Society 13:168–92.
Kilbourne, Barbara, George Farkas, Kurt Beron, Dorothea Weir, and Paul England. 1994. “Returns
to Skill, Compensating Differentials, and Gender Bias: Effects of Occupational Characteristics
on the Wages of White Women and Men.” The American Journal of Sociology 100:689–719.
Killingsworth, Mark R. 1987. “Heterogeneous Preferences, Compensating Wage Differentials, and
Comparable Worth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:727–42.
King, Mary C. 1992. “Occupational Segregation by Race and Sex, 1940–88.” Monthly Labor Review
115:30–8.
——. 1995. “Black Women’s Labor Market Status: Occupational Segregation in the United States
and Great Britain.” Review of Black Political Economy 24:23–44.
Lewis, Diane K. 1977. “A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism, and Sexism.” Signs
3:339–61.
Marini, Margaret Mooney. 1989. “Sex Differences in Earnings in the United States.” Annual Review
of Sociology 15:343–80.
Moss, Philip and Chris Tilly. 1995. “Skills and Race in Hiring: Quantitative Findings from
Face-to-face Interviews.” Eastern Economic Journal 21 (Summer):357–74.
——. 2001. Stories Employers Tell: Race, Skill, and Hiring in America. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Neumark, David, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort. 1996. “Sex Discrimination in Restaurant
Hiring: An Audit Study.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 11:915–41.
Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 2004. “Ohio Civil Rights Commission: History.” Retrieved
February 20, 2004 (http://www.crc.ohio.gov/history.htm).
Olson, Walter K. 1997. The Excuse Theory: How Employment Law Is Paralyzing the American
Workplace. New York: Free Press.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2001. The Well-Being of
Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital. Paris, France: OECD.
Padavic, Irene and Barbara Reskin. 2002. Women and Men at Work. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine
Forge Press.
Pager, Devah. 2003. “The Mark of a Criminal Record.” American Journal of Sociology 108:937–75.
Peterson, Trond and Ishak Saporta. 2004. “The Opportunity Structure for Discrimination.” The
American Journal of Sociology 109:852–901.
Peterson, Trond, Ishak Saporta, and Marc-David L. Siedel. 2000. “Offering a Job: Meritocracy and
Social Networks.” American Journal of Sociology 106:763–816.
Reid, Lori L. 2002. “Occupational Segregation, Human Capital, and Motherhood: Black Women’s
Higher Exit Rates from Full-Time Employment.” Gender & Society 16:728–47.
Reid, Lori L. and Irene Padavic. 2005. “Employment Exits and the Race Gap in Young Women’s
Employment.” Social Science Quarterly 86:1242–60.
Reskin, Barbara. 1984. Sex Segregation in the Workplace: Trends, Explanations, Remedies.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Reskin, Barbara F., Debra B. McBrier, and Julie A. Kmec. 1999. “The Determinants and Conse-
quences of Workplace Sex and Race Composition.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:335–61.
Roscigno, Vincent. 1994. “Social Movement Struggle and Race, Gender, Class Inequality.” Race,
Sex, and Class 2:109–26.
Smith, Ryan A. 2005. “Do the Determinants of Promotion Differ for White Men versus Women
and Minorities?” American Behavioral Scientist 48:1157–81.
Sokoloff, Natalie J. 1980. Between Money and Love: The Dialectics of Women’s Home and Market
Work. New York: Praeger.
Spaights, Ernest and Ann Whitaker. 1995. “Black Women in the Workforce: A New Look at an Old
Problem.” Journal of Black Studies 25:283–96.
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald. 1993. “The Gender and Race Composition of Jobs and the Male/
Female, White/Black Pay Gaps.” Social Forces 72:45–76.
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, Melvin Thomas, and Kecia Johnson. 2005. “Race and the Accumu-
lation of Human Capital across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Applica-
tion.” American Journal of Sociology 111:58–89.
Uggen, Christopher and Amy Blackstone. 2004. “Sexual Harassment as a Gendered Expression of
Power.” American Sociological Review 69:64–92.
U.S. Census Bureau. 1990. “American Fact Finder.” Retrieved March 17, 2005 (http://
factfinder.census.gov).
Welsh, Sandy. 1999. “Gender and Sexual Harassment.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:169–90.
Wharton, Amy. 2000. “Feminism at Work.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences 561:158–76.
Wilson, George. 1997. “Pathways to Power: Racial Differences in the Determinants of Job
Authority.” Social Problems 44:38–54.
Wilson, George and Debra Branch McBrier. 2005. “Race and Loss of Privilege: African American/
White Differences in the Determinants of Job Layoffs from Upper-Tier Occupations.” Socio-
logical Forum 20:301–21.
Wright, Erik Olin, David Hachen, Cynthia Costello, and Joey Sprague. 1982. “The American Class
Structure.” American Sociological Review 47:709–26.
Xu, Zu and Ann Leffler. 1992. “Gender and Race Effects on Occupational Prestige, Segregation,
and Earnings.” Gender and Society 6:376–92.

Discrimination, Women, and Work: Processes and Variations by Race and Class

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Discrimination, Women, and Work: Processes and Variations by Race and Class

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Discrimination, Women, and Work: Processes and Variations by Race and Class

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253

DISCRIMINATION, WOMEN, AND WORK:

INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION AT WORK

Status Variations and Inequality at Work

Employer Stereotypes and Women’s Status Identities

Expectations Regarding Discrimination and Status Variations

All Race and Gender Discrimination Case Filings by Women

Charging Party’s Race/Ethnicity

Verfied Race and Gender Discrimination Cases for Women

Charging Party’s Race/Ethnicity

order to obtain rich qualitative information, as well as information about occupational

ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND RESULTS

Workplace Discrimination toward Women and Variations by Race

FIGURE 3. Distribution of Discrimination Types for African-American and White Women.

We ran nonparametric chi-square tests to compare the significance of the differences

Variations by Social Class

FIGURE 4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Occupational Breakdown of

discrimination mostly as a function of differential (racial) treatment from their cowork-

You might also like