Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA

Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

Richard A. Best Jr.

Specialist in National Defense

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

August 3, 2009

Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22017
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

Summary
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing
paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but
ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will
briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by
the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. For additional
information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

Contents
What Are Special Operations and Paramilitary Operations?...................................................1
Roles and Mission of CIA and SOF.......................................................................................1
Brief History of CIA and SOF Paramilitary Operations .........................................................2
CIA.................................................................................................................................2
SOF ................................................................................................................................2
9/11 Report Recommendations..............................................................................................3
Potential Impacts...................................................................................................................3
Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities........................................................................3
Additional Strain on SOF ................................................................................................4
A Reduction in Flexibility ...............................................................................................4
SOF Funding Authority...................................................................................................4
Issues for Congress ...............................................................................................................4
Oversight Issues..............................................................................................................4
Potential Legal Considerations ........................................................................................5
Congressional Activity ..........................................................................................................5
109th Congress ................................................................................................................5
110th Congress ................................................................................................................6
111th Congress.................................................................................................................6

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................6

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

T he U.S. strategy in pursuing the war on international terrorism involves a variety of

missions conducted by military and civilian intelligence personnel characterized as
“special operations” or paramilitary operations. The separate roles of the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not always clearly reflected in
media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap. Proposals such as
those made by the 9/11 Commission to change organizational relationships will, however, be
evaluated on the basis of separate roles and missions, operating practices, and relevant statutory
authorities.

What Are Special Operations and Paramilitary Operations?

DOD defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives
employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”1

DOD defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of
any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission.” In this report,
the term “paramilitary operations” will be used for operations conducted by the CIA whose
officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of the United States. (In practice, military
personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA and CIA personnel may temporarily serve
directly under a military commander.)

In general, special operations are distinguishable from regular military operations by degree of
physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of employment among other factors.
DOD special operations are frequently clandestine—designed in such a way as to ensure
concealment; they are not necessarily covert, that is, concealing the identity of the sponsor is not
a priority. The CIA, however, conducts covert and clandestine operations to avoid directly
implicating the U.S. Government.

Roles and Mission of CIA and SOF

USSOCOM was established by Congress in 1987 (P.L. 99-661, 10 U.S.C. §167). USSOCOM’s
stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the conduct of the War on
Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United
States.2

The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) to collect
intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence from all sources.
It was also to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct.” This opaque
phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include a range of covert activities such as those
that had been carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Although
some observers long maintained that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National

1
Definitions are from Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,”
Apr. 12, 2001, as amended through Oct. 7, 2004.
2
Taken from United States Special Operation Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004, U.S. Special Operations
Command, pp. 4-10.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

Security Act was amended (by P.L. 102-88) to establish specific procedures for approving covert
actions and for notifying key Members of Congress.

The statutory definition of covert action (“activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of
the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly....”) is broad and
can include a wide range of clandestine efforts—from subsidizing foreign journals and political
parties to participation in what are essentially military operations. In the case of paramilitary
operations, there is a clear potential for overlap with activities that can be carried out by DOD. In
general, the CIA would be designated to conduct operations that are to be wholly covert or
disavowable. In practice, responsibilities for paramilitary operations have been assigned by the
National Security Council on a case-by-case basis.

Brief History of CIA and SOF Paramilitary Operations

CIA
In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from the Korean War era to
Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD personnel in military operations. On
occasion it has also conducted clandestine military operations apart from the military. One
example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Especially important was a
substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese
resupply efforts. The CIA was directed to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus
of official U.S. military intervention in neutral Laos. The CIA’s paramilitary operations in
Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan
before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the
Taliban regime by the end of the year. According to media reports, the CIA has also been
extensively involved in operations in Iraq in support of military operations.3

SOF
SOF have reportedly been involved in clandestine and covert paramilitary operations on
numerous occasions since the Vietnam War. Operations such as the response to the TWA 847 and
Achille Lauro highjackings in 1985, Panama in 1989, Mogadishu in 1993, and the Balkans in the
late 1990s have become public knowledge over time but other operations reportedly remain
classified to this day. 4 Some speculate that covert paramilitary operations would probably become
the responsibility of a number of unacknowledged special operations units believed to exist
within USSOCOM.5

3
See Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, Oct. 22, 2004, p.
A1; Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), especially pp. 301-306, 373-376; Gary C.
Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York:
Ballantine Books, 2005).
4
Col. John T. Carney, Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer, No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America’s
Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan, 2002, pp. ix -x.
5
Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004, vol. 83, no. 2, p. 110.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

9/11 Report Recommendations6

Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: “Lead responsibility for directing and
executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense
Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and
execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command.” The
9/11 Commission’s basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-
based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability
to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on
improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory
outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build
“two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations,” and suggests that we
should “concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity.”

Some observers question whether procedures are in place to insure overall coordination of effort.
Press reports concerning an alleged lack of coordination during Afghan operations undoubtedly
contributed to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation regarding paramilitary operations. 7
Although such accounts have been discounted by some observers, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) included a provision (Section 1013) that requires DOD
and CIA to develop joint procedures “to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations
that involve elements” of the CIA and DOD. When separate missions are underway in the same
geographical area, the CIA and DOD are required to establish procedures to reach “mutual
agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of
operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.”

Potential Impacts

Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities

Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly
related to the Agency’s responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some
individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or
supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however,
certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven
important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear.8

6
Taken from The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington: GPO, 2004) pp. 415 - 416.
7
See, for instance, Jonathan Weisman, “CIA, Pentagon Feuding Complicates War Effort,” USA Today, June 17, 2002,
p. 11. Another account cites CIA claims that the DOD command process is “bureaucratic and slow-rolling because of
an execution-by-committee process;” as well as complaints by DOD officials that in past conflicts little information
acquired by CIA “could be used by the military for strike activities because it disappeared into the black hole of the
intelligence universe.” See David A. Fulghum, “CIA Trigger Men Trouble Military,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, Nov. 26, 2001, p. 39.
8
See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century, Staff Study, 104th Cong., 2d sess., April 9, 1996, pp. 201-202.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

Additional Strain on SOF

Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who
are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite
training to conduct covert operations.9 They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations
training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions.

A Reduction in Flexibility
The 9/11 Report notes the CIA’s “reputation for agility in operations,” as well as the military’s
reputation for being “methodical and cumbersome.”10 Some experts question if DOD and SOF
are capable of operating in a more agile and flexible manner. They contend that the CIA was able
to beat SOF into Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which
permitted them to “do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military.”11 Some
are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert operations that they
will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic interference from defense
officials.

SOF Funding Authority

Section 1208 of P.L. 108-375 permits SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups
supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Although not a recommendation in the 9/11
Commission’s report, many feel that this authority will not only help SOF in the conduct of
unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or
clandestine operations. In Afghanistan, SOF did not have the authority to pay and equip local
forces and instead relied on the CIA to “write checks” for needed arms, ammunition, and
supplies.

Issues for Congress

Oversight Issues
Congress may choose to review past or current paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA
and might also choose to assess the extent of coordination between the CIA and DOD. P.L. 108-
458 required that a report be submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005
describing procedures established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD
operations. That report provided an opportunity to indicate how initiatives by the executive
branch have addressed relevant issues.

CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force “on the shelf.” When directed, it has built
paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with paramilitary
experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in an entity known as the
Special Activities Division. The permanent staff would be responsible for planning and for

9
Kibbe, p. 113.
10
The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 416.
11
Kibbe, p. 112.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military personnel and individuals (including those
with special language qualifications) who could be employed should the need arise. Few
observers doubt that there is a continuing need for coordination between the CIA and DOD
regarding paramilitary capabilities and plans for future operations. Furthermore, many observers
believe that the CIA should concentrate on “filling the gaps,” focusing on those types of
operations that DOD is likely to avoid. Nevertheless, they view this comparatively limited set of
potential operations to be a vitally important one that should not be neglected or assigned to
DOD. There may be occasions when having to acknowledge an official U.S. role would preclude
operations that were otherwise considered vital to the national security; the CIA can provide the
deniability that would be difficult, if not impossible, for military personnel. 12

Potential Legal Considerations

Some experts believe that there may be legal difficulties if SOF are required to conduct covert
operations. One issue is the legality of ordering SOF personnel to conduct covert activities that
would require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status to retain deniability. To operate with
deniability, SOF could be required to operate without the protection of a military uniform and
identification card which affords them combatant status under the Geneva Convention if
captured. Also, covert operations can often be contrary to international laws or the laws of war
and U.S. military personnel are generally expected to follow these laws.13

Traditionally, the public text of intelligence legislation has included few provisions regarding
paramilitary operations; levels of funding and other details are included in classified annexes
which are understood to have the force of law. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees do
have considerable influence in supporting or discouraging particular covert actions. In a few cases
Congress has formally voted to deny funding to ongoing covert operations. Special Forces,
however, fall under the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and it is unclear how
Congress would handle oversight if covert operations are shifted to SOF as well as how disputes
between the intelligence and armed services committees would be dealt with.

Congressional Activity

109th Congress
The 109th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President
Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to
review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23,
2005. In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005,
the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation.14 In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that “neither the CIA nor

12
See U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991, 102nd
Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 102-85, pp. 42-48.
13
Cole Kathryn Stone, All Necessary Means—Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special
Operations Forces, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, July 4, 2003, p. 13.
14
Transcripts, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subject: National Security Threats to the United States,
Federal New Service, Feb. 16, 2005, p. 29.

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 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

DOD endorses the commission’s recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or

operations.”15 The Administration reportedly rejected the 9-11 Commission’s recommendation to
shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DOD.16

110th Congress
The 110th Congress saw the enactment of P.L. 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 which did not address either paramilitary operations by CIA or
special operations by DOD. Opposition by the Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and the
Bush Administration undoubtedly affected the congressional response to the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation to vest responsibilities for paramilitary operations in DOD. CIA’s reputation
may have also been assisted by the generally favorable assessments given to the Agency’s post-
9/11 performance, especially in the initial phases of the Afghan campaign that led to the collapse
of the Taliban regime in December 2001.

111th Congress
Although most observers believe that there remains little inclination among Members to transfer
responsibilities for all paramilitary operations out of CIA, some Members have expressed
concerns about apparent blurring of lines between DOD clandestine operations and CIA
intelligence-gathering operations.17

Author Contact Information

Richard A. Best Jr. Andrew Feickert

Specialist in National Defense Specialist in Military Ground Forces
rbest@crs.loc.gov, 7-7607 afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673

15
John J. Lumpkin, “Rumsfeld, Goss Oppose DOD Assumption of CIA Paramilitary Covert Operations,” Army Times,
June 29, 2005.
16
Douglas Jehl, “White House is Said to Reject Panel’s Call for a Greater Pentagon Role in Covert Operations,” New
York Times, June 28, 2005.
17
See CRS Report RL33715, Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions, by Alfred
Cumming; also, U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, to accompany H.R. 2701, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 26, 2009, H.Rept. 111-186 (Washington:
GPO, 2009), pp. 48-49.

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